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

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THE TRANSFER OF POWER
1942-7

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Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru at the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee, Bombay, August 1942.

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CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN BRITAIN AND INDIA

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

1942–7

Volume II 'Quit India'
30 April–21 September 1942

Editor-in-Chief
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Master of St John's College, Cambridge

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LONDON
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
1971

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Frontispiece
Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru at the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee, Bombay, August 1942. (*Photo Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India*)

MAP
At end of volume
India 1942

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Foreword

On 9 March 1966 the Prime Minister, Mr Harold Wilson, announced in the House of Commons that the closed period for official records was to be reduced from fifty to thirty years. He stated that the Government also proposed that the range of Official Histories, which had hitherto been confined to the two great wars, should be extended to include selected periods or episodes of peacetime history and considered that there was scope for extending to other Oversea Departments the Foreign Office practice of publishing selected documents relating to external relations. The Prime Minister hoped that both of these subsidiary proposals, supplementing the reduction in the closed period to thirty years, would be acceptable in principle to the Opposition parties, who would be associated with their implementation.[1]

On 10 August 1966 the Prime Minister announced that a standing inter-party group of Privy Counsellors was to be appointed to consider all such proposals[2] and on 8 June 1967 that its members were, for the Government and to act as Chairman, the Right Hon. Patrick Gordon Walker, Minister without Portfolio; for the Official Opposition, the Right Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home; and for the Liberal Party, Lord Ogmore.[3]

A project to publish documents from the India Office Records had been under discussion for some years and on 30 June 1967 the Prime Minister, in replying to a written question in the House of Commons, announced that the first of the new series of selected documents to be published was to relate to the Transfer of Power in India. His statement was as follows:

> As I informed the House on the 9th of March, 1966, the Government have decided to extend to other Oversea Departments the Foreign Office practice of publishing selected documents concerned with our external relations, subject to inter-party agreement through the Group of Privy Counsellors whose composition I announced on the 8th of June. I am happy to inform the House that the Group have agreed that in view of the great interest now being shown in historical circles in the last days of British rule in India the first selection of documents to be published under the new arrangements should be documents from the India Office records on the Transfer of Power and the events leading up to it.
>
> The scheme will follow closely the lines of the Foreign Office series of *Documents on British Foreign Policy* from 1919 to 1939, and, as in that series, the editors will be independent historians who will be given unrestricted access to the records and freedom to select and edit documents for publication. Professor P. N. S. Mansergh, Smuts Professor of the History of the

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 725, Written Answers to Questions, cols. 561–3.
[2] *Ibid.*, vol. 733, cols. 1706–7. [3] *Ibid.*, vol. 747, col. 1291.

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British Commonwealth at Cambridge, has expressed willingness to accept appointment as Editor-in-Chief, and the scheme will be in full operation by the end of the year.

Mr E. W. R. Lumby was appointed Assistant Editor and took up his duties on 1 January 1968. The Editors were assisted by Mr R. W. Mason, C.M.G., Director of Research, Librarian and Keeper of the Papers at the Foreign Office 1960–5, who by that date had already made a preliminary survey of the India Office papers relating to the theme, and by Mr C. G. Costley-White, C.M.G. and Mr D. M. Blake, both of whom joined the Historical Section at the India Office Records in March 1968.

The Series will cover the period 1 January 1942 to 15 August 1947. The first volume, carrying the sub-title, *The Cripps Mission*, was published in 1970 and dealt with developments during the months January–April 1942. Succeeding volumes will continue the documentary story down to the day of the Transfer of Power to India and Pakistan.

The principles of selection, the arrangement of documents—which is in strict chronological order throughout in so far as that has been ascertainable—together with other details of presentation were explained in the Foreword to the First Volume (pp. vi–x) and need not, therefore, be recapitulated here. It may, however, be worth while restating the purpose of the Series. It is to make available to scholars in convenient printed form the British historical records relating to the Transfer of Power in India.

N. MANSERGH

Historical Section
India Office Records
February 1970

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Introduction to Volume II

The first volume covering 1 January–30 April 1942, in the series of British Documents on the Transfer of Power, carried the sub-title *The Cripps Mission*. The second volume, beginning on 30 April and ending on 21 September 1942, records the supersession of the qualified hopes of greater Anglo-Indian accord implicit in that Mission by the growing estrangement of Congress India from Britain and the Government of India. The principal theme of this second volume, therefore, is not constitutional negotiation but the politico-psychological alienation which culminated in the passing of the 'Quit India' Resolution by the All-India Congress Committee on 8 August [No. 470], and the arrest of the principal Congress leaders, including Gandhi and Nehru, by the Government of India on 9 August 1942. From that date the record provides a commentary from British sources on the subsequent disturbances up to 21 September.

There is a variety of important topics documented in this volume in part or whole distinct, or distinguishable, from its main theme. Included are, notably, the Viceroy's discussions with the Secretary of State about the reconstitution of his Executive Council, the relevant documents being grouped in Chapter 5 of the Summary of Documents; the Viceroy's consultations with the Governors of the Provinces of British India about the possible use of non-official Advisers, and his discussions with his Council on this matter and on possible readjustments at the Centre; the anxiety of the Princes to obtain further assurances for their future [see Chapter 6]; the problem of India's accumulating sterling balances which were evidently a considerable preoccupation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer [see Chapter 8]; continued indications of United States and Chinese concern with developments in India and the Viceroy's sharply critical reaction to suggested visitors from the United States whom he deemed to be unhelpful or uninformed about the Indian situation (see Chapter 4 generally and on the last point especially Linlithgow's telegram of 31 August to Churchill [No. 662] stressing the dangers inherent in such visits and asking Churchill to move Halifax to check the flow of American visitors); the Viceroy's sensitivity to Press and B.B.C. criticism [e.g. Nos. 32, 41, para. 5, 190, 495, 512]; the concern of the Viceroy, the Secretary of State for India and the British Ambassador in Washington (a former Viceroy) with publicity at home and abroad about British policy in India and the nature, as they conceived it, of the Indian problem at this time [e.g. Nos. 105, 123, 175, 201, 749]; the social and economic context of British policy in India [e.g. Nos. 664, 678, 731, 775]; and, ever present and dominating much of British and Indian thinking on all these matters, the imminent (as it seemed) threat of Japanese invasion of the sub-continent and the reality of Japanese control of South-East Asia. Yet, except for the last which was different in kind, these issues, while possessing their own significance, were

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essentially subsidiary in these months to the deterioration in British relations with Congress India.

Sir Stafford Cripps' detailed account of his discussions during his visit to India was circulated as a War Cabinet Paper on 6 July [No. 227]. The failure of the Mission, however, would seem to have been accepted at a much earlier date on the British side as tantamount to the closure of an episode in Anglo-Indian relations, the Secretary of State for India, L. S. Amery, reporting to the Viceroy on 6 May [No. 28] that there had been no retrospective discussion of the Mission in the Cabinet or its India Committee. Yet it was recognised on every side that the situation was not, and could not be, as though the Mission had never gone to India; and it was accepted that there was accordingly need for reassessment. Both Viceroy and Secretary of State tended at first to discount the more extreme views of the consequences of failure. Writing to the Secretary of State on 18 May [No. 69] the Viceroy felt that 'the longer the gap that elapses between Cripps' departure and the time of writing, the more I feel that you and I were entirely justified in refusing to subscribe to the very gloomy view of the possible consequences of failure' (which Cripps had sketched out in a telegram to Churchill [Vol. I, No. 519]). '... it seems to me', Amery responded on 10 June [No. 138], 'that everything in India is now subordinate to getting ahead with the war', adding that the Cripps Mission had receded far into the back of Churchill's mind. 'For him, the main thing about it has been the good effect in America; for the rest, he isn't interested, really disliking the whole problem as much as ever before.'

But the problem none the less remained, and the Viceroy is shown to have been preoccupied throughout with ways and means of mitigating it. This is seen particularly in his concern with the status and membership of his Executive Council. He remained aggrieved at the insufficient regard he deemed Cripps to have paid to Members of it [No. 69] and he gave very close attention in consultation with the Secretary of State and the War Cabinet [Nos. 27, 49, 75, and 88 for India Committee and Cabinet Papers] to the reconstitution of its membership (to which allusion has already been made) with a view to securing a balanced and experienced Council and to demonstrating in so far as was possible that there was an alternative to the concept of a 'National Government' which had been introduced, in his view without authority, into the last phase of the discussions on the Cripps proposals. 'The more the Government of India ... can publicise itself and put itself across', wrote the Secretary of State to the Viceroy on 29 May, 'the better. It is ridiculous the way the Press has got itself into the habit of making much of the least utterance or even movement of these Congress politicians and tends to ignore the doings and sayings of those who have the real responsibility and much greater ability as well' [No. 95].

Both Viceroy and Secretary of State furthermore were concerned to underline that there were, and to ensure that there remained, bases of support for

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British rule in India and for the war effort outside the Congress. The sensitivity of the Princes to Cripps' allegedly restrictive interpretation of the obligations of the Paramount Power to the States, when a dominion constitution was agreed for British India, accordingly was viewed with understanding [e.g. Nos. 69, 181, 209, 226, 232] even when Princely contentions failed to win acceptance [see Chapter 6 of the Summary of Documents]. More important was felt to be the opposition of the Muslims and other minority groups or communities in India to what the Viceroy described on 21 July as 'the establishment of Congress Hindu raj' [No. 297]. 'The Congress Party', wrote the Prime Minister to President Roosevelt in a forceful exposition of this view, 'in no way represents India and is strongly opposed by over 90 million Mohammedans, 40 million Untouchables, and the Indian States comprising some 90 millions, to whom we are bound by Treaty' [No. 392]. The mobilization of anti-Congress opinion in British India was urged upon Governors [e.g. Nos. 273, 274, 276, 284] and indications of divided counsels within the Congress, as manifested especially in Rajagopalachari's growing detachment from the Congress policies, received close attention in Delhi, though the Viceroy was careful not to overestimate the weight of the backing for Rajagopalachari's views [e.g. Nos. 22, 41, 80]. But when all available bases of support had been assessed and countervailing divisions within the Congress taken into the reckoning, the question remained—what was to be the nature of British relations with the Indian National Congress in the post-Cripps period?

On 5 May the Viceroy, commenting on the suggestion that the Congress 'must now definitely be regarded as irreconcilable and that we must cease to consider whether any action we take will further alienate them', concluded that while 'there was probably very little hope, if any, of doing business with these people in the present circumstances and that the failure of the Cripps negotiations had brought that out forcibly for the edification of the world at large, and in particular of the United States and of certain circles at home . . . we must keep our minds open and be prepared, if circumstances changed, to take advantage of the change in them' [No. 21]. But as the Viceroy also remarked in the same letter '. . . we are again of course faced with a political problem the solution of which and the control of which do not rest entirely in our own hands'. This would seem in the light of the sequel to have been an understatement.

Although the draft resolution which Gandhi proposed to the Congress Working Committee on 27 April [enclosure to No. 43] and his other expressions of opinion had given the authorities ample indication of his state of mind, the first warning recorded in these documents that he might instigate a hostile move came from the Governor of Bombay on 13 May [No. 56] and from that time onwards indications multiplied both in the public speeches and reported private views of the Congress leaders of a new departure [e.g. Nos. 89, 90, 92, 1 2, 105, 108, 133, 136, 142–3 for references to Gandhi's statements up to 15

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June only; for a report of Nehru's views see No. 157]. Increasingly, analysis of the likely nature of this departure and assessment of the measure of support it was likely to enlist, occupied the attention of the Governors, Sir Maurice Hallett in the United Provinces notable among them, of the Viceroy, of the Secretary of State and finally of the War Cabinet to the members of which a Memorandum by the Secretary of State was circulated on 16 June [No. 150] summarising the position 'in order that the background of possible developments may be readily available' since it was 'not unlikely that early next month a decision of great importance may have to be taken—and at short notice'. This was followed by the circulation to the War Cabinet on 27 June [No. 196] of an appreciation by the Viceroy and a summary of the discussion that had taken place on 1 May in the Congress Working Committee. Since it was felt that the campaign of mass protest on which the Congress seemed likely to embark might not remain non-violent, counter-measures were prepared by the Government of India in consultation with the Secretary of State [e.g. Nos. 319, 321]. The plan of action against Congress, of which advance information was given to Governors on 24 July [No. 322], was communicated to Provincial Governments on 2 August for action when need arose, and to the Secretary of State the following day [No. 393]. It was approved by the War Cabinet on 6 August [No. 435]. Two matters remained in debate. Firstly, there was the question whether Gandhi should be deported to Aden and the principal Congress leaders to Nyasaland in accordance with arrangements, including the commissioning of a warship to convey the latter to Kilindini, that had already been provisionally made [Nos. 312, 351, 361–2, 383–4, 444–6, 449, 460] or whether they should be interned in India. Deferring to the opinion of the majority of the Governors and of the members of his Executive Council, the Viceroy recommended the latter course and in view of the advice tendered by the Viceroy the Cabinet ultimately agreed not to insist on deportation, which they had previously 'strongly favoured' [Nos. 387, 435, 440–1, 451, 452 and also 462, 469]. Secondly, there was the question of Gandhi's treatment should he fast. The Government of India's plan had originally contemplated Gandhi's release 'as soon as his life is in danger to avoid possibility of his death as a prisoner' [No. 393]. But the War Cabinet felt 'that Gandhi must continue in detention whatever the consequences' [No. 451]. The majority of the Governors and of the Executive Council favoured Gandhi's release should he fast and the Viceroy was at first inclined to adhere to this course [e.g. Nos. 479–80, 488, 490, 500, 564], but eventually he altered the Government of India's plans to take account of the War Cabinet's views [Nos. 574–5, 582, 588, 652, 663, 687, 706, 714]. On 8 August, the All-India Congress Committee having ratified the 'Quit India' Resolution, the counter-measures already approved [No. 393] were put into effect [No. 466]. Gandhi was interned in the Aga Khan's palace at Poona and his principal colleagues, including Jawaharlal Nehru, at Ahmednagar Fort.

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The remainder of the volume chiefly consists of documents on the course of the struggle between the Congress-inspired supporters of the 'Quit India' movement, their leaders being detained in isolation from the outside world, and the forces at the disposal of the Government of India. Its contents, set out in Chapter 3 of the Summary of Documents, have a unity imposed upon them by the nature of the events they record. It may, however, be helpful to mention here that the Viceroy, in response to a request from the Secretary of State [Nos. 523, 524] sent appreciations of the situation daily from 13 August to 7 September and thereafter at intervals of three or four days [No. 704]. These appreciations, which show the main outline of events, were repeated to the Ambassadors at Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev. They were for the most part based upon reports received from Provincial Governments and represented in large measure a summary of them. This has made it appear reasonable not to reprint the bulk of the Governors' written or telegraphic situation reports, which together would fill a volume, but to include only one or two from the Provinces most affected on grounds of intrinsic interest or historic significance.

The Viceroy's telegraphed appreciations are supplemented by a great deal of evidence in other and less compressed form, including that contained in the Viceroy's correspondence with the Secretary of State and notably in a personal message from the Viceroy to the Prime Minister [No. 662] in which the emphasis is rather different from that in the daily appreciations. 'I am engaged here', wrote the Viceroy on 31 August, 'in meeting by far the most serious rebellion since that of 1857, the gravity and extent of which we have so far concealed from the world for reasons of military security.' Three weeks later, however, on 21 September, the Viceroy commented to the Secretary of State in what is the concluding document in the volume [No. 780]: 'I think we can be pretty well content with the general situation in the country . . . taken as a whole things are pretty comfortable.'

By far the greater part of the hitherto unpublished documents included in this volume, as in its predecessor, are drawn either from the official archives of the India Office in the custody of the India Office Records or from the Linlithgow Collection in the India Office Library.

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The Linlithgow Collection consists of the papers of the second Marquess of Linlithgow as Viceroy and Governor-General of India which the present Marquess deposited on permanent loan in the India Office Library in 1964. The documents from this Collection which are published here are almost all drawn from the series of volumes of the Viceroy's correspondence. Each of these volumes is divided into two sections, the first containing correspondence (letters and telegrams), addressed to the Viceroy, the second, correspondence from him. Within each section, correspondence is, with some exceptions, in chronological sequence. Documents from the Linlithgow Collection are referred to in the present volume by the catalogue number of the Collection (*MSS. EUR. F. 125*), followed by the number of the relevant volume.

The Editors wish to thank the present Marquess of Linlithgow for permission to use the Linlithgow papers.

Some documents which are not in either of these archives have been obtained from elsewhere, notably the Cabinet Office.[1]

The most important categories of telegraphic communications between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy were classified in the following ways. One category of Private and Personal telegrams from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State carried the letter 'S', or 'S.C.' if the Viceroy was at Simla or in Camp, i.e. on tour. Another category consisted of 'U' telegrams, which were reserved for the most secret and personal matters, the letter 'U' indicating the nature of the telegram, irrespective of whether it did, or did not, carry a 'Secret' or 'Private and Personal' prefix. 'U' telegrams could be enciphered or deciphered only in the Private Offices of the Secretary of State or the Viceroy. Telegrams in the Superintendent series indicated to Superintendents of Telegraph branches that especial care should be taken to safeguard their security.

It was the practice of the Viceroy to comment in the margin of incoming letters from the Secretary of State or reports from the Governors of the Provinces of British India for the guidance of the Private Secretary to the Viceroy (P.S.V.) or occasionally, it would seem, for his personal satisfaction. These marginal comments are reproduced in italics so as to distinguish them from the main text.

[1] A file (R/30/1/2) containing copies of these documents can be consulted in the India Office Records.

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In conclusion the Editors desire to acknowledge once again the friendly assistance and advice they have received from the officials at the India Office Library and Records, among whom they would like to mention the Librarian and Keeper of the Records, Mr S. C. Sutton, C.B.E., F.S.A., and the Deputy Librarian and Deputy Keeper, Miss Joan C. Lancaster, F.S.A.; from the Editors of the *Documents on British Foreign Policy*; and from the Historical Adviser to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Rohan Butler, C.M.G.

N. MANSERGH
E. W. R. LUMBY

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Abbreviations

A.D.C.	Aide-de-Camp
A.F.I.	Auxiliary Force (India)
A.F.V.	Armoured Fighting Vehicle
A.H.Q.	Air Headquarters
A.-I.C.C.	All-India Congress Committee
A.-I.R.	All-India Radio
A.-I.S.F.	All-India Students Federation
A.O.C.	Air Officer Commanding
A.R.P.	Air Raid Precautions
B.B.C.	British Broadcasting Corporation
B.I.	British Infantry
B.N.-W.R.	Bengal and North-Western Railway
B.O.R.	British Other Ranks
B.S.T.	British Summer Time
C.B.E.	Commander of the Order of the British Empire
C.D.	Civil Disobedience
C.G.S.	Chief of the General Staff
C.I.D.	Criminal Investigation Department *or* Committee of Imperial Defence
C.I.G.S.	Chief of the Imperial General Staff
C.-in-C.	Commander-in-Chief
C.I.O.	Central Intelligence Officer
C.O.S.	Chiefs of Staff
C.P.	Central Provinces
C.P.I.	Communist Party of India
C.S.P.	Congress Socialist Party
D.I.B.	Director of the Intelligence Bureau (Home Department)
D.I.G.	Deputy Inspector General (of Police)
E.I.R.	East Indian Railway
F.B.I.	Federal Bureau of Investigation
G.C.I.E.	Knight Grand Commander of the Indian Empire
G.C.S.I.	Knight Grand Commander of the Star of India
G.H.Q.	General Headquarters
G.O.C.	General Officer Commanding
G. of I.	Government of India
G.S.O.	General Staff Officer
H.E.	His Excellency
H.E.H.	His Exalted Highness
H.M.	His Majesty *or* Honourable Member
H.M.G.	His Majesty's Government

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H.R.H.	His Royal Highness
I.A.O.C.	Indian Army Ordnance Corps
I.C.O.	Indian Commissioned Officer
I.C.S.	Indian Civil Service
I.G.P.	Inspector General of Prisons *or* Inspector General of Police
I.M.S.	Indian Medical Service
I.N.A.	Indian News Agency
I.P.	Indian Police
I.S.F.	Indian States Forces
I.S.T.	Indian Standard Time
K.C.I.O.	King's Commissioned Indian Officer
K.C.S.I.	Knight Commander of the Star of India
L.P.S.	Lord Privy Seal
M.E.S.	Military Engineer Stores
M.G.O.	Master General of the Ordnance
M.L.A.	Member of Legislative Assembly
M.O.I.	Ministry of Information
M.P.	Member of Parliament
M.T.	Motor *or* Mechanical Transport
N.E.I.	Netherlands East Indies
N.H.Q.	Naval Headquarters
N.-W.F.P.	North-West Frontier Province
O.A.G.	Officer Administering Government
O.W.I.	Office of War Information (Washington)
P.M.	Prime Minister
P.Q.	Parliamentary Question
P.S.V.	Private Secretary to the Viceroy
R.I.	Rex Imperator
R.I.N.	Royal Indian Navy
R.T.C.	Round Table Conference
S.A.A.	Small Arms Ammunition
S.B.	Special Branch
S. of S. *or* S/S	Secretary of State
T.U.C.	Trades Union Congress
U.K.	United Kingdom
U.P.	United Provinces
W.T.	Wireless Telegraph

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List of Principal Holders of Office

UNITED KINGDOM

WAR CABINET

Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, Minister of Defence	Mr Winston S. Churchill
Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs	Mr Clement Attlee
Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons	Sir Stafford Cripps
Lord President of the Council	Sir John Anderson
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	Mr Anthony Eden
Minister of Production	Mr Oliver Lyttelton
Minister of Labour and National Service	Mr Ernest Bevin

OTHER MINISTERS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME

Secretary of State for Air	Sir Archibald Sinclair
Secretary of State for the Colonies	Viscount Cranborne
Chancellor of the Exchequer	Sir Kingsley Wood
Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security	Mr Herbert Morrison
Secretary of State for India and for Burma	Mr L. S. Amery
Minister of Information	Mr Brendan Bracken
Lord Chancellor	Viscount Simon
Secretary of State for War	Sir James Grigg
Attorney-General	Sir Donald Somervell

INDIA OFFICE

Secretary of State	Mr L. S. Amery
Permanent Under-Secretary	Sir David Monteath
Parliamentary Under-Secretary	Duke of Devonshire
Deputy Under-Secretary	Mr W. D. Croft
Assistant Under-Secretaries	Sir Leonard Wakely
	Mr P. J. Patrick

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Private Secretary to Secretary of State	Mr F. F. Turnbull (Resumed duty on 11 June; until then Mr M. J. Clauson had been acting for him)

INDIA

Viceroy, Governor-General and Crown Representative	The Marquess of Linlithgow
Private Secretary to the Viceroy	Sir Gilbert Laithwaite
Reforms Commissioner	Mr H. V. Hodson

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (UNTIL 2 JULY 1942)

Commander-in-Chief	General Sir Archibald Wavell
Home	Sir Reginald Maxwell I.C.S.
Finance	Sir Jeremy Raisman I.C.S.
Communications	Vacant on appointment of Sir A. Clow to Governorship of Assam on 4 May
Education, Health, and Lands	Mr Nalini Sarker
Commerce	Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar
Labour	Sir Firoz Khan Noon
Law	Sir Sultan Ahmed
Indians Overseas	Dr Madhao Shrihari Aney
Information and Broadcasting	Vacant since death of Sir Akbar Hydari on 8 January
Supply	Sir Homi Mody
Civil Defence	Mr E. Raghavendra Rao (Died 15 June)

FROM 2 JULY THE COUNCIL WAS RECONSTITUTED AS FOLLOWS

Commander-in-Chief	General Sir Archibald Wavell
Home	Sir Reginald Maxwell I.C.S.
Finance	Sir Jeremy Raisman I.C.S.
War Transport	Sir Edward Benthall (assumed charge of office 14 July)
Posts and Air	Sir Mahomed Usman (assumed charge of office 16 July)

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Education, Health, and Lands	Sir Jogendra Singh (assumed charge of office 29 July)
Commerce	Mr Nalini Sarker
Labour	Dr Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (assumed charge of office 20 July)
Law	Sir Sultan Ahmed
Indians Overseas	Dr Madhao Shrihari Aney
Information and Broadcasting	Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar (assumed charge of office 3 August; resigned 20 August)
Supply	Sir Homi Mody
Civil Defence	Sir J. P. Srivastava (assumed charge of office 27 July)
Defence	Sir Firoz Khan Noon

The appointment of Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar (who continued to be a Member of the Council) and of the Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar as India's representatives at the War Cabinet and on the Pacific War Council was also announced on 2 July. They arrived in London on 8 September and attended their first Cabinet meeting on 14 September.

GOVERNORS OF PROVINCES

Madras	Capt. The Hon. Sir Arthur Hope
Bombay	Sir Roger Lumley
Bengal	Lt-Col Sir John Herbert
United Provinces	Sir Maurice Hallett I.C.S.
Punjab	Sir Bertrand Glancy I.C.S.
Central Provinces and Berar	Sir Henry Twynam I.C.S.
Assam	Sir Andrew Clow I.C.S. (from 4 May; until then, Sir Robert Reid I.C.S.)
Bihar	Sir Thomas Stewart I.C.S.
North-West Frontier Province	Sir George Cunningham I.C.S.
Orissa	Sir William Hawthorne Lewis I.C.S.
Sind	Sir Hugh Dow I.C.S.

PRIME MINISTERS OF PROVINCES

Bengal	Mr A. K. Fazlul Huq
Punjab	Sir Sikander Hyat Khan

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Orissa	Maharaja of Parlakimedi
Sind	Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh
Assam	Sir Muhammad Saadulla (from 25 August)

The remaining Provinces were administered by their Governors under Section 93 of the Government of India Act 1935.

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Chronological Table of Principal Events

1942

April	
27	Congress Working Committee meets at Allahabad
28	Congress Working Committee resolutions on (1) collapse of civil administration in Burma, (2) military evacuation schemes, molestation of women, (3) evacuees from Malaya and Burma
	Publication of first resolution and second part of second banned by Government of India
29	All-India Congress Committee meets at Allahabad
May	
1	All-India Congress Committee resolution on war situation
2	All-India Congress Committee rejects Rajagopalachari's resolution recommending negotiations with Muslim League
7–8	Air raid on Chittagong; battle of Coral Sea
8	Germans attack in Crimea
20	Allied withdrawal from Burma completed
26	Rommel attacks at Gazala
June	
4–7	Battle of Midway
17	Churchill leaves for Washington
21	Fall of Tobruk
27	Churchill returns to London
July	
1	Germans capture Sevastopol
1–2	Debate in both Houses of Parliament on conduct of the war
1–3	Rommel held at Alamein
2	Announcement of expansion of Viceroy's Executive Council
6	Congress Working Committee meets at Wardha
10	Congress Working Committee resolution on grievances
14	Congress Working Committee resolution demanding British withdrawal from India
23	Government of India announces raising of ban on Communist Party. Germans capture Rostov
30	Amery's Commons statement on Congress Working Committee's resolution
31	Stalemate at Alamein
August	
3	Churchill leaves for Cairo
4	Government of India releases to Press Congress documents seized at Allahabad

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August

7–8 Changes in Middle East Command; U.S. landings in Solomon Islands

7 All-India Congress Committee meets at Bombay

8 All-India Congress Committee adopts 'Quit India' resolution

Governor-General in Council publishes resolution on political situation

9 Gandhi and Congress leaders arrested early in morning

12 Churchill arrives in Moscow via Tehran

13 Linlithgow begins series of daily situation reports

16 Churchill leaves Moscow for Cairo

20 Resolution of Muslim League Working Committee restates League's policy

24 Churchill returns to England

31 Resolution of Mahasabha Working Committee proposing formation of 'National Government'

September

7 Linlithgow proposes that situation reports should now be sent at more extended intervals

8 Indian representatives at War Cabinet arrive in London

10 Churchill's Commons statement on Indian situation

11 Commons debate on Indian situation

21 Linlithgow describes Indian situation as 'pretty comfortable'

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Summary of Documents

To assist readers who desire to follow the documentary record through on a particular subject, this Summary is divided into Chapters, each with a title indicating its principal contents. The first three Chapters deal chronologically with the main themes of the volume, the remainder with other topics which can be conveniently classified separately.

CHAPTER I

Reactions to the failure of the Cripps Mission; anticipations of a 'Quit India' movement and speculation on Gandhi's intentions

	Name and number	*Date (April–May)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
1	Linlithgow to Hope, Lumley, Stewart, Twynam, Reid, Cunningham Tel. 1176–S	30	Question of appointing non-official Advisers in Section 93 Provinces	1
2	Lumley to Linlithgow Tel. 517	1	Refers to No. 1 and favours addition of non-official to present official Advisers	2
3	Twynam to Linlithgow Tel. 352–M.S.	1	Refers to No. 1 and opposes appointment of non-official Advisers	3
4	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 3443	1	Text of first two Congress Working Committee resolutions of 28 April and summary of third	3
5	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 3444	1	Refers to No. 4 and explains decision to prohibit publication of whole of first resolution and part of second	6
7	Glancy to Linlithgow Letter 393 (extract)	1	Sikh discontents	7
8	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–4, 10, 14	1	Cripps' attitude to enlargement of powers of Viceroy's Council; ways of keeping at bay demands by certain Councillors for wider powers; Rajagopalachari; comments arising from Cripps Mission; Moore	8
9	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 3480	2	Suggesting line of reply to P.Qs on banning of Working Committee resolutions	13
10	Minutes by Patrick and Monteath	2	Suggesting lines of reply to P.Qs on banning of Working Committee resolutions	14
13	Stewart to Linlithgow Tel. 19	3	Refers to No. 1 and opposes appointment of non-official Advisers	19
14	Cunningham to Linlithgow Tel. (unnumbered)	4	Refers to No. 1 and states willingness to add a non-official to present official Adviser	20
16	Hallett to Linlithgow Letter U.P.–136	4	Refers to No. 1 and qualifies his views expressed in No. 620 para. 5 in Vol. I on appointment of non-official Advisers	23
17	Tara Singh to Cripps Letter	4	Thanks for references to Sikhs by Cripps and Amery in Commons debate	26
20	Dow to Linlithgow Letter 161/M.70	5	Encloses a record of Cripps' Press Conference of 12 April at Karachi	28

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	Name and number	*Date (May)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
21	Linlithgow to Hallett Letter	5	Refers to No. 620 in Vol. I and suggests that an open mind must be kept on the question of conciliating Congress; question of appointing non-official Advisers	32
22	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 3–5	5	Non-official Advisers; Rajagopalachari	34
23	Hope to Linlithgow Tel. 58–M	6	Refers to No. 1 and favours appointment of non-official Advisers	36
24	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1243–G	6	Summary of statements by Gandhi in *Harijan* of 3 May	37
26	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 569	6	Refers to current B.B.C. discussions on India, and consults him on Cripps' suggestion for talks by Indian representative speakers on All-India Radio	38
28	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 3–6, 8	6	No retrospective discussion of Cripps Mission in Cabinet or India Committee; problem of filling Provincial Governorships	42
29	Stewart to Linlithgow Letter 323–G.B., paras. 2–5	6	Public morale; lack of enthusiasm for War Front; activities and attitudes of local political parties; visit of All-India Defence Committee of Muslim League	44
30	Dow to Linlithgow Letter 164/F.R., paras. 2, 5, 6	6	Greater support for A.R.P.; relations between Allah Bakhsh and Congress, with enclosed letter from Azad	46
31	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1264–S	7	Announces arrangements for tour to Madras and Calcutta	49
32	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1270–S	7	Refers to No. 26, deplores B.B.C. talks and strongly opposes any political discussion either repeated from London or organised by All-India Radio	50
34	Linlithgow to Hallett Letter, paras. 1–3	7	Refers to No. 695 in Vol. I; danger of clash with Press over articles on U.S. attitude to India	51
37	Amery to Cripps Letter	8	Transmits Linlithgow's views on B.B.C. talks on India; and recommends posture of unconcern with Indian politics	54
39	Clow to Linlithgow Letter 3	9	Refers to No. 1; question of appointing non-official Advisers in Section 93 Provinces	55
40	Cunningham to Linlithgow Report 9, paras. 1–3	9	A local explanation of breakdown of Cripps Mission; 'Martyrs Day'	58
41	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 3, 5, 6 and P.S.	9–11	His forthcoming tour; agreement on desirability of keeping Indian politics off wireless; Rajagopalachari	60
42	Cripps to Amery Letter	9	Refers to No. 37 and disagrees with attitude to Indian politics suggested therein	62
43	Hallett to Linlithgow Letter U.P.–137	10	A.-I.C.C. meeting at Allahabad, with enclosure showing two drafts of 'war' resolution and final version	63

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	Name and number	*Date* (*May*)	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
44	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1311–G	11	Partial summary of article by Gandhi in *Harijan*	71
45	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1314–G	11	Summary of Azad's Press statement on Amery's Commons remarks on banned Congress resolutions	72
46	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 588	11	Refers to No. 32, is hopeful as to effect of B.B.C. talks but still opposes their repetition to India or any political discussion on All-India Radio	72
48	Linlithgow to Hallett Letter	11	Thanks for No. 43	74
53	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 2, 5, 6	12	India Committee's discussion of non-official Advisers; B.B.C. discussions on India	78
54	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 595, para. 7	13	Conveys conclusions of India Committee on non-official Advisers	80
56	Lumley to Linlithgow Report 105, paras. 2, 3	13	Prospect of hostile move by Gandhi; views of Munshi; National War Front	83
58	Savarkar to Linlithgow Letter	14	Forwards copy of resolution passed at anti-Pakistan meetings on 10 May	85
60	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 2–4	15	Possibility of more representative Executive Council; action by Catto to control Moore	87
64	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1400–S	17	Refers to No. 31 and gives general impressions of his tour to Madras and Calcutta	93
65	Hope to Linlithgow Tel. 72–M	17	Requests his opinion on question of prohibiting entry of Azad and Nehru to Madras Presidency	94
66	Singh Roy to Laithwaite Letter	17	Appeals to Linlithgow to make fresh move for Indian unity	95
67	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1407–G	18	Summary of part of Gandhi's Press interview at Bombay, 16 May	96
68	Linlithgow to Hope Tel. 1420–S	18	Refers to No. 65 and agrees that no prohibition should be placed on Azad and Nehru initially	97
69	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 4–7, 9–11, 13	18	Refers to Nos. 683, 706, and 709 in Vol. I; relations between Cripps and Executive Council; Commons debate on Cripps Mission; Rajagopalachari; tour to Madras and Calcutta; policy towards the Press	97
√71	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1434–G	19	Summary of Gandhi's leading article, and other pronouncements, in *Harijan* of 17 May	104
✱ √76	Herbert to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 9, 10	21	Linlithgow's visit to Calcutta; relations between servicemen and civilians	111
78	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1471–G	22	Summary of Press account of speech by Nehru on 21 May	113
80	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1499–G	25	Summary of speech by Rajagopalachari on 22 May	114
81	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1502–G	25	Extracts from *Harijan* of 24 May	115

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	Name and number	*Date (May–June)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
83	Twynam to Linlithgow Letter R-101-G, paras. 2–4 and P.S.	25	Expectations of new moves by Gandhi	117
84	Stewart to Linlithgow Letter 380-G.B., paras. 2, 5, 6	25	Formation of village defence parties; local political feeling; expectation of new move by Gandhi	119
85	Lewis to Linlithgow Letter 1918-G.O., para. 3	25	Visit of Mira Ben	121
86	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13	25	Apprehensions of Sikhs; interview with Rajkumari Amrit Kaur; comment on letter from Singh Roy (No. 66)	121
89	Glancy to Linlithgow Letter 396 (extract)	26	Nehru's speeches; expectation of new move by Gandhi	127
90	Note by Pilditch	26	Encloses (1) note summarising reports that Gandhi is about to launch a popular movement (2) account of interview with Gandhi on 15 May	127
92	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1517-S	27	Interview with Rajkumari Amrit Kaur; expectation of new move by Gandhi	134
93	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1519-S	27	Press report of forthcoming visit of Nehru to Washington	136
95	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 2, 7–12, 14, 18–21	27–9	Future of Cabinet India Committee; B.B.C. discussions on India; forecast of post-war planning for India; Congress situation; necessity for supporting loyal elements and publicising India's war effort; Labour Conference resolution	138
102	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 2, 8–10, 13	29	Refers to No. 53; Hallett's visit; non-official Advisers; expected move by Gandhi; Indian students in Britain	146
103	Minute by Monteath	29	Submits drafts of Nos. 104 and 105	149
104	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 660	30	Suggests that members of Executive Council should tour, making speeches on war effort	150
105	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 9739	30	Refers to No. 92 and consults him on guidance to British Press, etc. in anticipation of new move by Gandhi	151
108	Note by Pilditch	30	Refers to No. 90 and encloses note summarising further information on Gandhi's intentions	153
113	Hallett to Linlithgow Letter U.P. 140	31	Refers to No. 43 and encloses record of discussion in Congress Working Committee on 'war resolution'	156
121	Linlithgow to Hallett Letter	4	Thanks for No. 113	179
122	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1652-S	5	Gives his conclusions on question of non-official Advisers	179
123	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1679-S	6	Refers to Nos. 105 and 104; propaganda in case action against Congress becomes necessary; speech-making by Members of Executive Council	180

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128	Linlithgow to Wavell Letter	6	Suggests that Wavell should assert publicly that Japanese will be defeated	184
129	Linlithgow to Twynam Letter, paras. 1–3	6	Refers to No. 83 and discusses Gandhi's intentions	184
130	Lumley to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 2	6	Improvement in public confidence; Gandhi's intentions	185
131	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 4484	7	General appreciation of situation of Gandhi and Congress, with summary of points to be made in counter-propaganda	187
133	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 2–4, 11, 15	8	Refers to No. 60; Gandhi's apprehended move and his women agents	190
134	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1725–G	9	Summary of articles in *Harijan* of 7 June	193
135	Cunningham to Linlithgow Report 11, para. 1	9	Probable local reactions to Gandhi's threatened campaign	194
136	Twynam to Linlithgow Letter R.106–G.C.P., para. 1	9	Refers to No. 129 and urges that if Gandhi launches new movement Government should declare that it will never do business with him or a Congress led by him	195
137	Lewis to Linlithgow Report 11, para. 6	10	Mira Ben	196
138	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–7, 12	10	Situation demands that everything in India should be subordinated to war effort; Churchill's attitude to Indian problem; prospects of return to ministerial Government in some Provinces; correspondence between Menon and Nehru	197
139	Linlithgow to Lumley Letter	10–12	Conveys the conclusions of Amery and himself on non-official Advisers	200

CHAPTER 2

The Government of India's and the War Cabinet's reaction to the threat of a Congress movement; resolutions of the Congress Working Committee (14 July) and the All-India Congress Committee (8 August) demanding British withdrawal from India; preparation of measures, including the time and place of detention of Gandhi and other leaders, to counter the movement.

	Name and number	Date (June)	Main subject or subjects	Page
142	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1757–S	11	Refers to Enclosure to No. 113 and suggests that it should be shown to Cabinet in view of possible need for action against Gandhi	203

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	Name and number	*Date (June)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
143	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1807-S	15	Refers to No. 142 and promises his considered views on policy to be adopted towards Gandhi, including suggestion that Government should refuse all further dealings with Congress	204
144	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1809-G	15	Summary of articles in *Harijan* of 14 June	205
146	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 74th Conclusions, Minute 3	15	Amery announces that he will circulate an appreciation of Gandhi's intentions	208
147	Lumley to Linlithgow Letter 283-H.E.	15	Refers to No. 139 and agrees with decision not to proceed with appointment of non-official Advisers	209
148	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 7-10, 16	15	Gandhi's intentions; policy to be adopted towards Congress; possible economic motive for Japanese invasion of India	210
149	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 738	16	Refers to No. 143, announces circulation to War Cabinet of No. 150, and discusses future policy towards Gandhi and Congress	216
150	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 255	16	Memorandum by Amery on policy to be adopted towards Gandhi	217
151	Hallett to Linlithgow Letter U.P.-142, paras. 2 (in part), 3-6	16	Present and possible future action against Congress and Gandhi; current Indian views of Congress	220
154	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 2, 8	17	Possible action against Gandhi and Congress; Coupland's *The Cripps Mission* and Amery's *India and Freedom*	224
156	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1845-G	18	Summary of Press report of speech by Rajagopalachari on 15 June	228
157	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1846-G	18	Summarised passages from Press interview of Nehru	229
161	Linlithgow to Twynam Letter, paras. 1-3	18	Refers to No. 136, discusses Gandhi's intentions, but deprecates suggestion that if he launches new movement Government should declare that it will never do business with him or a Congress led by him	232
162	Linlithgow to Lumley Letter	18	Refers to No. 147 and is relieved to have judgement on non-official Advisers expressed therein	234
165	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1861-G	19	Summary of Press report of speech by Nehru on 18 June	238
167	Lumley to Linlithgow Report 107, para. 1 and PS.	19	Nehru's private talks in Bombay and the indications they give of Gandhi's intentions	240
168	Herbert to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 2, 3	19	Movement by Gandhi unlikely to be successful in Bengal, but may be dangerous in certain areas	241
169	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1873-G	20	Summary of Press statement by Setalvad on 19 June	242

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172	Stewart to Linlithgow Letter 435–G.B., para. 7	21	Measures to forestall expected move by Gandhi	246
173	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1886–G	22	Summary of Gandhi's answers to questions in *Harijan* of 21 June	247
177	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 1	22	Refers to No. 102; Gandhi's intentions	249
178	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1890–G	23	Summary of Jinnah's statement to Press of 22 June	251
180	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 769	23	Refers to No. 149, discusses method of keeping Cabinet informed of situation, and enquires whether Linlithgow is yet able to propose line of action to counteract future move by Gandhi	253
181	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 3, 8–10, 13, 15–17, 21, 22 and PS.	23	Refers to No. 95; Cabinet India Committee; war situation; recent statements by Gandhi and Jinnah; official publicity in connection with Gandhi; controversy over Cripps' statements; Krishna Menon; post-war planning for India	254
182	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1903–S	24	Supplies material for reply to probable Parliamentary enquiries arising from allegations in cable from Nehru to Menon	263
184	Twynam to Linlithgow Letter R–110–G.C.P., paras. 1, 2	24	Refers to No. 161; Gandhi's intentions and possible counter-measures; analysis of probable attitudes in Province to any subversive movement by Gandhi; conversation with Nazimuddin	264
185	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1915–S	25	Refers to No. 180 and promises early despatch of appreciation on policy to be adopted towards Gandhi	266
188	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1928–S	26	Appreciation of position *vis-à-vis* Gandhi and Congress	270
190	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1929–S	27	Suggests that if it is impracticable to debar B.B.C. from giving any publicity to utterances of Congress leaders these should be given close scrutiny and minimum publicity	276
196	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 271	27	Memorandum by Amery on policy to be adopted towards Gandhi	282
200	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1951–G	29	Summary of article by Gandhi in *Harijan* of 28 June	287
208	Glancy to Linlithgow Letter 400–F.L. (extract)	30	Effect of Gandhi's writings on public morale	294
209	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 5, 7, 13–16, 22	30	Refers to No. 138; his appreciation (No. 188); how to preserve Indian unity; criticism of lack of war-mindedness in India; little prospect of restoration of ministerial government in the Provinces; objections to Viceregal Press Conferences	294

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	Name and number	*Date (July)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
215	Gandhi to Linlithgow Letter	2	Requests him to use his influence with army to prevent slaughter of milch cows and plough cattle for beef for troops	303
216	Hallett to Linlithgow Letter U.P.–144, paras. 1, 2 (in part)	2	Gandhi's attitude; small effect of his activities in U.P. at present and probably in future	303
218	Lumley to Linlithgow Report 108, paras. 1, 2	3	Impact on morale of reverse in Western Desert and of outspoken criticisms in U.K.; intentions of Patel and Desai; Rajagopalachari's talks with Jinnah	305
219	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1995–G	4	Summary of Press report of speech by Nehru on 3 July	307
220	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2003–S, para. 2	5	Gandhi's letter (No. 215)	308
221	Linlithgow to Gandhi Letter	5	Acknowledges No. 215	308
222	Savarkar to Linlithgow Letter	5	Encloses his statement urging a declaration granting India complete political freedom and equal co-partnership in Indo-British Commonwealth	309
224	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2013–G	6	Summary of Council of National Liberal Federation resolutions of 5 July	312
225	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2014–G	6	Summary of leading article in *Harijan*	313
226	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 2, 8, 14	6	Refers to No. 154; military situation in North Africa; Gandhi's attitude; failure of British newspapers to maintain correspondents in India	314
228	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 86th Conclusions, Minute 5	6	Note taken of Nos. 150 and 196	344
229	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 828	7	Refers to No. 188 and reports War Cabinet Conclusions (No. 228)	344
231	Campbell to Eden Tel. 3597	7	Transmits text of Gandhi's letter to Chiang Kai-shek	346
233	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 2	7	Policy should Rajagopalachari and Jinnah reach an agreement; policy towards Congress	349
234	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 12162	8	Refers to No. 190 and reports results of personal discussions with B.B.C. and M.O.I., and of representations to Reuters	350
235	Seymour to Eden Tel. 946	8	Conveys gist of Chiang Kai-shek's reply to No. 231	351
237	Cunningham to Linlithgow Report 13, paras. 1, 2, 4	8	Probable degree of local support for Gandhi should he start a 'Quit India' campaign; effect of reverses in Libya on public opinion	353
241	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 5, 6	9	Gandhi's high blood pressure; Amery's volume of speeches and Sapru's vehemence against him	357

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244	Cripps to Tara Singh Letter	10	Acknowledges No. 17	362
245	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2056-G	11	Summary of Congress Working Committee resolution of 10 July passed at Wardha, as published in *Hindustan Times*	362
246	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2057-G	11	Summary of Press statement by Rajagopalachari on 10 July	364
247	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 5419	11	Discusses action to be taken if Congress Working Committee's resolution passes in the form anticipated, and reports action already being taken	365
248	Linlithgow to Glancy Letter, paras. 1, 2	11	Refers to No. 208; pros and cons of continuing to allow *Harijan* to publish; Gandhi's intentions	367
249	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 7	11–15	Refers to No. 177; Gandhi's intentions; unsuitability of suggestion to use Narain to train guerrillas	368
252	Twynam to Linlithgow Letter R.111-G.C.P., paras. 1–3, 5	12–14	Congress intentions; Gandhi's allegations of atrocities by troops; Gandhi and United States opinion; observances in event of Gandhi's death; food shortages; first reactions to Congress Working Committee resolution of 14 July	371
253	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 850	13	Refers to No. 245, favours immediate action and tells Linlithgow not to await Cabinet authorisation should drastic measures be required	374
254	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 852	13	Comments on No. 245, and asks for assurance that prompt compensation for requisitions was being given, and for information on salt situation	375
255	Monteath to Laithwaite Tel. 853	13	Refers to Nos. 253 and 254 and asks whether Bajpai and Chungking would be informed by Government of India direct of any action against Congress	376
256	Amery to Churchill Minute P.42/42	13	Encloses No. 245 and hopes Cabinet will authorise immediate arrest of Gandhi and Congress Working Committee	376
257	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 91st Conclusions, Minute 8	13	Agreement on despatch of interim assurance to Linlithgow of H.M.G.'s fullest support for strong measures should they become necessary	377
58	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 857	13	Refers to No. 253, reports War Cabinet's interim assurance of support and adds that Linlithgow could rely on it, if immediate action became vital	379

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260	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2084-S	14	Refers to Nos. 253, 254, 255, and 258, prefers to await main resolution before settling policy and replies to points raised in No. 254	381
261	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Tel. 2085-S	14	Refers to No. 247, explains reasons against immediate action, and asks for fullest details on points raised in No. 254	382
263	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 858	14	Refers to No. 258 and explains wording of its para. 1	384
264	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 862	14	Asks for early information on points raised in No. 254 and on certain other points concerning requisitions and payment of compensation	384
265	Resolution of Congress Working Committee	14	Demand for British withdrawal from India	385
266	Herbert to Linlithgow Tel. 3-T	15	Acknowledges No. 261	388
267	Glancy to Linlithgow Tel. 33-G	15	Refers to No. 261 and suggests pre-censorship of Congress pronouncements and *Harijan*, and intensive counter-propaganda	388
268	Stewart to Linlithgow Letter 501-G.B., paras. 2, 3	15	Effect of events in Libya and Russia, and of Japanese inactivity, on morale; probable local reaction to threatened civil disobedience movement, and plans for dealing with it	389
269	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1-4, 7	15	Policy towards Congress; comments on Working Committee resolution of 14 July; idea of 'administrative self-government' for India	390
270	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 12635	16	Refers to Nos. 245 and 247 and discusses policy to be adopted towards Congress in light of Working Committee's resolutions of 10 and 14 July	393
272	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 5529	16	Comments on Working Committee resolution of 14 July and concludes that Congress challenge should not be taken up until after its ratification by A.-I.C.C.	394
273	Linlithgow to Lumley Tel. 2107-S	16	Points out importance of mobilising anti-Congress opinion to condemn Gandhi's view publicly and trusts that Ambedkar will do so	395
274	Linlithgow to Herbert Tel. 2109-S	16	Repeats points made in No. 273 and suggests encouraging Fazlul Huq to speak out; but emphasises there could be no *quid pro quo* for doing so	396
275	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2100-S	16	Refers to No. 272, transmits part of Gandhi's statement on resolution, and reports his Council's views on action required	397

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276	Linlithgow to Glancy Letter	16	Refers to No. 267; mobilisation of anti-Congress opinion, in particular the Sikhs and Sikander; question of censoring *Harijan*	398
277	Mira Ben to Linlithgow Letter	16	Requests interview	400
278	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2111-S	17	Refers to No. 270, paras. 2 and 4, reports Wavell anticipates no adverse military effects, and notifies action taken to mobilise anti-Congress opinion	400
280	Linlithgow to Glancy Letter	17	Refers to No. 243, discusses propriety of Sikander making statement assuming that terms of draft declaration remain British policy, and indicates nature of advice Glancy might give him	402
281	Glancy to Linlithgow Letter 402	17	Conveys and criticises further suggestions and views of Sikander	403
282	Laithwaite to Mira Ben Letter	17	Acknowledges No. 277, explains why Linlithgow could not see a direct representative of Gandhi and requests her to convey any message through himself	404
283	Lumley to Linlithgow Report 109, para. 2	17	Local reactions to Congress Working Committee resolution of 14 July and discussion of policy to be adopted	405
284	Linlithgow to Hallett, Stewart, Twynam, Clow, Cunningham, Lewis, and Dow Tel. 2117-S	18	Mobilisation of anti-Congress opinion	406
285	Linlithgow to Hope, Lumley, Herbert, and Glancy Tel. 2120-S	18	Asks to be kept in closest touch with reactions to Congress agitation	407
286	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2128-S	18	Reports main points of Mira Ben's interview with Laithwaite	407
287	Glancy to Linlithgow Letter 403	18	Refers to No. 276 and discusses mobilisation of anti-Congress opinion	408
288	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2130-S	19	Discusses arrangements for detaining or deporting Gandhi and Congress Working Committee	409
289	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2131-S	19	Points out dangers of using certain propaganda slogans	410
290	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 5640	19	Reports on salt situation in light of Congress Working Committee resolution of 10 July	411
291	Tabular statement by Gibson	20	Summarises Provincial Governments' reports on local situation regarding grievances detailed in Congress Working Committee resolution of 10 July	413
299	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2136-S	20	Refers to Nos. 278 and 270, paras. 1 and 3, and discusses action for dealing with Congress	419

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294	Linlithgow to Glancy Letter	20	Comments on No. 281	421
295	Churchill to Amery Minute	21	Asks to see draft of reply to No. 288, and points out that Amery should now derive assistance from Cabinet decision in No. 257, Minute 8	421
296	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2143-S	21	Repeats Stewart's reply to No. 284 reporting on mobilisation of anti-Congress opinion in Bihar	422
298	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2146-S	21	Refers to No. 288 and discusses arrangements should the solution of deportation to Uganda be adopted	424
299	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2150-S	21	Repeats Cunningham's reply to No. 284 reporting on reactions in N.-W.F.P. to Congress Working Committee resolution of 14 July	424
300	Hallett to Linlithgow Tel. G-229	21	Refers to No. 284 and suggests using D.I.B. pamphlet *Congress and War* for anti-Congress propaganda	425
301	Hallett to Linlithgow Letter U.P.-148, paras. 8-10 (extract)	21	Mobilisation of anti-Congress opinion; difficulties caused by sympathy of Liberals and of Hindu government officers with Congress; necessity of striking at Congress, especially Gandhi	425
303	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Tel. 2157-S	22	Requests appreciation of state and morale of police forces	428
304	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2160-S	22	Repeats Twynam's reply to No. 284 reporting on reactions in Central Provinces and Berar to Congress Working Committee resolution of 14 July	428
307	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1-5, 7, 13	22	Unfavourable Press received by Congress; Gandhi's intentions; Laithwaite's interviews with Mira Ben and Birla; Executive Council's desire for a re-affirmation of H.M.G.'s Indian policy by Prime Minister; anti-Congress statements by members of Council	432
308	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2163-S	22	Repeats Lumley's reply to No. 285 reporting on reactions in Bombay to Congress Working Committee resolution of 14 July and conveying a suggestion that H.M.G. should reaffirm its Indian policy	434
309	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2164-S	22	Repeats Herbert's reply to No. 285, reporting Press reactions in Bengal to Congress Working Committee resolution of 14 July and the not entirely satisfactory attitude of Huq	435

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311	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13060	23	Refers to No. 289, agrees with Linlithgow in deprecating implication that independence and dominion status were substantially different, and points out danger of propaganda slogans which might be held to commit Government	437
312	Amery to Cranborne Letter	23	Asks him to ascertain if East African authorities could undertake custody of 12 to 15 Congress leaders and if Aden authorities could deal similarly with Gandhi	438
313	Herbert to Linlithgow Report, para. 4	23	Attitudes of Huq, Mahasabha, and Communist Party to Congress Working Committee resolution of 14 July; Banerjee's efforts to still Congress grievances on compensation question	439
314	Hope to Linlithgow Report 6, paras. 3-14	23	Spontaneity of anti-Congress opinion in Madras; probable lack of effect of disobedience movement in Madras; necessity for prompt action and imprisonment of Congress leaders outside their own Provinces and under strict conditions should a disobedience movement be launched; non-official Advisers	441
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316	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2174-S	24	Reports Executive Council's desire for a statement by Prime Minister to indicate that the Cripps proposals, or something equally liberal, remained the basis of H.M.G.'s policy	445
317	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2175-S	24	Transmits Mody's draft for a restatement of H.M.G.'s Indian policy	446
318	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2176-S	24	Transmits draft for a Parliamentary Question and Answer restating H.M.G.'s Indian policy	447
319	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 5766	24	Continues No. 272, discusses legal basis for action against Congress on strength of Working Committee resolutions, and outlines plan of action	447
320	Hallett to Linlithgow Tel. G-231	24	Summarises evidence that mass movement is in preparation and urges that action against Congress should be taken immediately after forthcoming meeting of A.-I.C.C.	450
321	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13166	24	Refers to Nos. 278 and 292 and discusses (*a*) whether Gandhi should be detained under Defence Rules or Regulation III,	

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322	Laithwaite to Secretaries to Governors of Madras, Bombay, United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces and Berar, Assam and North-West Frontier Province Letter	24	Encloses draft plan of action against Congress to be made official by subsequent telegram and explains that secrecy necessitates adoption of this procedure	454
323	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–3	24	Bad press received by Gandhi in Britain; advantages of deporting Congress leaders; Nehru's character; reasons for Congress bitterness against Amery	454
324	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13220	25	Refers to Nos. 316, 317, 318, and (in para. 3) 319, discusses text and timing of proposed statement reaffirming H.M.G.'s Indian policy and transmits draft	456
325	Linlithgow to Gandhi Letter	25	Refers to Nos. 221 and 215 and states that he has taken steps to prevent as far as possible slaughter of milch cattle and working bullocks	458
326	Cunningham to Linlithgow Letter G.H.–315	25	Refers to No. 303 and gives appreciation of state and morale of N.-W.F.P. police	458
327	Clow to Linlithgow Letter 39	25	Refers to No. 303 and gives appreciation of state and morale of Assam police	459
328	Dow to Linlithgow Letter 282–62	25	Refers to No. 303 and gives appreciation of state and morale of Sind police	460
329	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2192–S	26	Refers to No. 321 and discusses (*a*) reasons for detaining Gandhi under Defence Rules, (*b*) proposal to declare Congress an unlawful association, (*c*) proposals to deport Congress leaders to Uganda and Gandhi to Aden	461
330	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2199–S	26	Agrees to proposal in No. 324 subject to one drafting alteration	462
331	Glancy to Linlithgow Letter 404	26	Refers to No. 285 and reports reactions in Punjab to Congress Working Committee resolution of 14 July	463
332	Linlithgow to Hallett Tel. 2203–S	27	Refers to No. 320, para. 5 and asks him to postpone arrest of Tandon	
333	Linlithgow to Hope, Lumley, Twynam, Glancy, Stewart, and Hallett Tel. 2208–S	27	Discusses question of deporting Congress leaders and requests Governors' views	466
334	Lumley to Linlithgow Tel. 193–C	27	Refers to No. 303 and gives appreciation of state and morale of Bombay police	466
335	Lacey to Laithwaite Tel. 37	27	Refers to No. 322 and raises two points arising from plan of action against Congress	467
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337	Gandhi to Linlithgow Letter	27	Thanks him for No. 325	469
340	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 96th Conclusions, Minute 8	27	Invitation to Amery to circulate proposed statement on Indian policy to War Cabinet Ministers for their comments	473
341	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 319	27	Memorandum by Amery circulating proposed statement on Indian policy	474
343	Lumley to Linlithgow Tel. 195-C	28	Refers to No. 333 and opposes deportation	475
344	Hallett to Linlithgow Tel. G-234	28	Refers to No. 333, on balance opposes deportation, and emphasises importance of arresting all organisers as well as Working Committee members	476
345	Twynam to Linlithgow Tel. 361-M.S.	28	Refers to No. 303 and gives appreciation of state and morale of Central Provinces police; and, referring to No. 322, requests confirmation that 'Provincial Congress Committees' is intended to include local committees	477
346	Stewart to Linlithgow Tel. 38	28	Refers to No. 333 and opposes deportation	478
347	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13311	28	Accepts amendment suggested in No. 330; refers to No. 329 and suggests that reasons for detaining Gandhi under Regulation III rather than Defence Rules apply equally to those Congress leaders who cannot be deported	478
348	S. of S. to G. of I., Home Dept Tel. 13312	28	Refers to No. 319 and suggests text of proposed denunciation of Congress Working Committee resolution of 14 July	479
351	Cranborne to Officer Administering Govt of Nyasaland Tel. (unnumbered)	28	Asks whether there is any insuperable objection to detention of Congress leaders in Nyasaland	481
352	Amery to Churchill Minute P.43/42	28	Explains gist of proposed statement on Indian policy	482
353	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 321	28	Memorandum by Amery accepting some and resisting other amendments suggested by Churchill, Cripps, and Anderson to proposed statement on Indian policy	483
354	Amery to Churchill Letter	28	Opposes one of Churchill's amendments to proposed statement on Indian Policy which might be interpreted by Indians as whittling down Cripps' offer	484
355	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1-6, 10, 14, 16, 17	28-9	Refers to No. 233; Executive Council and action against Congress; Gandhi's prospects of success and possibility of Congress retreat; Gandhi's hopes of	

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356	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2225-S	29	Refers to No. 347 and reports opposition of Lumley (No. 343), Stewart (No. 346), Tottenham, and Pilditch to deportation	490
357	Twynam to Linlithgow Tel. 362-M.S.	29	Refers to No. 333 and favours deportation	491
358	Glancy to Linlithgow Tel. 36-G	29	Ditto	492
359	Glancy to Linlithgow Tel. 37-G	29	Refers to No. 303 and gives appreciation of state and morale of Punjab police	492
360	Stewart to Linlithgow Tel. 39	29	Refers to No. 303 and gives appreciation of state and morale of Bihar police	493
361	C. in C., Eastern Fleet to First Sea Lord Tel. 703	29	Notifies intention to use H.M.S. *Manxman* to convey political prisoners to Africa	494
362	Cranborne to Amery Letter	29	Refers to No. 312, encloses No. 351, and opposes Aden as place of detention for Gandhi	494
363	War Cabinet Paper Addenda to W.P. (42) 321	29	Further amendments suggested by Churchill and Simon to proposed Commons statement on Indian policy	495
364	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 99th Conclusions (extract)	29	Decision on final text of Commons statement on Indian policy	496
365	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13420	29	Refers to No. 330 and explains contents of No. 366	497
366	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13421	29	Text of statement on Indian policy made by Amery in Commons on 30 July	497
368	Lewis to Linlithgow Report 14, para. 3	29	Congress intentions in Orissa	499
370	Hope to Linlithgow Tel. 117-M	30	Refers to No. 333, reports Madras officials divided on question of deportation and comments on action proposed against Congress	501
371	Lewis to Linlithgow Tel. 358-S.G.C.	30	Refers to No. 303 and gives appreciation of state and morale of Orissa police	502
376	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2244-S	31	Refers to No. 347 and announces decision to arrest Gandhi if need arises, under Defence Rules rather than Regulation III	508
377	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2252-S	31	Refers to No. 348, announces decision not to issue any interim denunciation of Congress Working Committee resolution of 14 July, but gives rough outline of communiqué to be issued after its ratification by A.-I.C.C.	508

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381	Herbert to Linlithgow Tel. 8-T	31	Refers to No. 303 and gives appreciation of state and morale of Bengal police	512
382	Hope to Linlithgow Tel. 118-M	31	Refers to No. 303 and gives appreciation of state and morale of Madras police	513
383	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13551	31	Refers to No. 348, para. 3 and comments on points arising in reply from O.A.G., Nyasaland (No. 384) to request to accommodate Congress leaders; refers to No. 319, para. 6 and asks for terms of draft deportation ordinance	513
384	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13552	31	Repeats reply to No. 351 from O.A.G., Nyasaland reporting conditions under which detainees could be accommodated there	514
386	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2263-S	1	Council decision to release to Press Congress documents seized on 28 May (enclosure to No. 113)	516
387	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2264-S	1	Refers to No. 356, reports views of Governors, and concludes that it would be unwise to deport Congress leaders	517
390	Twynam to Linlithgow Letter R-114-G.C.P., paras. 1–3	1	Prospects of local support for Gandhi's movement; necessity of prompt counter-measures; interview with Aney	526
391	Linlithgow to Hope Tel. 2271-S	2	Refers to No. 370; preparations to counter Congress movement	528
393	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 6092	3	Summary of letter to Provincial Governments explaining plan of campaign against Congress	534
394	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2273-S	3	Ahmednagar best place of detention for Working Committee	537
395	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Tel. 2274-S	3	Importance of explaining anti-Congress measures to public	537
397	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 938	3	Refers to No. 386, requests summary of Congress documents, and puts case for postponement of publication	539
399	Cripps to Amery Letter	3	Suggests that he should broadcast to India	540
400	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 940	3	Summarises Cripps' proposed broadcast, and requests views	541
401	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–9, 14, 18, 19, 22, 24, 29–31	3–5	Preparation of anti-Congress measures; Council discussion on publication of Congress documents; Rajagopalachari's appeal not to publish documents;	

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402	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 2, 4–6	3	Publication of Congress documents; policy if Gandhi fasts; comments by the Bishop of Calcutta and the Reverend W. Paton	550
403	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2276–S	4	Refers to No. 397 and explains that Congress documents have already been released to Press and why this was done	554
404	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2279–S	4	Refers to No. 400 and advises against Cripps' proposed broadcast	555
405	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2282–S	4	Refers to No. 403 and transmits text of messages exchanged with Rajagopalachari regarding his protest against publication of Congress documents	555
406	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2284–S	4	Repeats telegram from Hope regarding circular from Andhra Provincial Congress Party to district Committees	557
407	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2285–S	4	Summarises circular referred to in No. 406	557
408	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2286–S	4	Enquires as to conditions on which Alexander came to India with Friends Ambulance Unit	558
409	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13667	4	Refers to No. 377 and comments on proposed communiqué on Congress Working Committee resolution of 14 July	559
412	Zafrullah Khan to Linlithgow Letter	4	Suggests that when opportunity offers another Muslim should be appointed to Executive Council; and encloses memorandum containing proposals for minimising effect of withdrawal of British element from Services when independence comes	562
413	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2289–S	5	Repeats telegram from Lumley reporting on Congress plans in Ahmedabad and Gujarat and discussing counter-measures	569
414	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2291–S	5	Refers to No. 387; places of detention for Working Committee and Gandhi	570
415	Hope to Linlithgow Tel. 123–M	5	Refers to No. 395 and agrees to frame instructions for anti-Congress measures when position becomes clearer	570
416	Hallett to Linlithgow Tel. G–237	5	Refers to No. 395 and reports on plans for explaining anti-Congress measures to public	570

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418	Clow to Linlithgow Tel. 1061–G.S.	5	Ditto	572
419	Cunningham to Linlithgow Tel. 65–T	5	Ditto	572
420	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 947	5	Refers to No. 404; Cripps has agreed not to broadcast but will make a statement to *The Times*	572
422	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 340	5	Memorandum by Amery on action to be taken, if necessary, against Indian National Congress	574
425	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2296–S	6	Refers to No. 60, para. 4, complains of Moore's behaviour, and suggests further pressure on him through Catto	577
426	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2300–S	6	Refers to No. 425, and deplores potential effect of *Statesman* leader	578
427	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2301–S	6	Protest by Executive Council against B.B.C. statement	579
428	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2302–S	6	Refers to No. 409, and announces despatch of text of draft communiqué on anticipated resolution of All-India Congress Committee	579
429	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2303–S	6	Text of draft communiqué	580
431	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2307–S	6	Refers to Nos. 383 and 384 and replies to points raised in latter	583
432	Stewart to Linlithgow Tel. 41	6	Refers to No. 395 and reports on plans for explaining anti-Congress measures to public	584
433	Cranborne to Officer Administering Govt of Nyasaland Tel. (unnumbered)	6	Informs him that his comments had been repeated as in No. 384, but that proposal to deport Congress leaders had been suspended	584
435	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 105th Conclusions, Minute 1	6	Anti-Congress measures	586
436	Ramaswami Aiyar to Linlithgow Letter	6	Comments on Congress Working Committee resolution of 5 August and suggests declaration by H.M.G. of their intention to Indianise Government of India	592
438	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2308–S (incorporating 28–U)	7	Intends to resist current pressure from Council members for Indianisation of Executive Council	594
439	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2313–S	7	Refers to No. 428 and reports that new draft is being prepared	595
440	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13855	7	Transmits in part War Cabinet Conclusions as in No. 435	595

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442	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13856	7	Refers to No. 440 and transmits remaining Cabinet conclusions as in No. 435	597
443	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2315–S	7	Refers to No. 442 and to possibility that Council may insist on delay in taking action against Congress	598
444	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13859	7	Refers to No. 440 and asks him to telegraph direct to Governor of Nyasaland his views on points raised in No. 383	598
445	Cranborne to Officer Administering Govt of Nyasaland Tel. (unnumbered)	7	Refers to No. 433, informs him that plans to deport Congress leaders had been revived, and asks him to arrange for their reception and accommodation	599
446	Cranborne to Governor of Aden Tel. unnumbered	7	Asks him to make plans for Gandhi's reception and accommodation in Aden	599
447	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2319–S	7	Revised text of communiqué on anticipated resolution of All-India Congress Committee	600
448	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2321–S	7	Reports that Council had approved No. 447	603
449	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13870	7	Refers to No. 444 and notifies him that Nyasaland and Aden have been informed of Cabinet decision communicated in No. 440	604
450	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 956	7	Suggests he might point out to his advisers that deporting Gandhi would relieve them of responsibility for him	604
451	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 107th Conclusions, Minute 5	7	Rejection of suggestion that Government of India should make statement welcoming Sapru's attempt to bring about meeting of Indian leaders; agreement on reply to No. 441 and on policy in event of fast by Gandhi; rejection of suggestion of Indianisation of Executive Council	604
452	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13931	7	Refers to No. 441 and conveys War Cabinet's agreement not to press for deportation of Gandhi, and their insistence on necessity for strong line against him	607
453	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13932	7	Refers to No. 452 and conveys War Cabinet's view of undesirability of daily announcements of Gandhi's condition during a fast	608
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460	Governor of Aden to Cranborne Tel. (unnumbered)	8	Refers to No. 446 and enquires as to number and racial composition of party accompanying Gandhi	616
461	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2323-S	8	Outlines situation on eve of probable action against Congress	616
462	Amery to Churchill Tel. Tulip 65 via Air Ministry and C.-in-C., Middle East	8	Explains current situation regarding Congress and War Cabinet's decisions in No. 435, Minute 1, and No. 451	617
463	Cranborne to Governor of Aden Tel. (unnumbered)	8	Refers to Nos. 446 and 460; proposal to deport Gandhi again in abeyance	618
464	Cranborne to Officer Administering Govt of Nyasaland Tel. (unnumbered)	8	Refers to No. 445; proposal to deport Congress leaders again in abeyance	619
465	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2327-S	8	Refers to No. 442, opposes publication in India of Congress instructions for a mass movement but agrees to it in U.K. and U.S.A.	619
466	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. (unnumbered)	8	Announces that action is being taken as in No. 393, paras. 3 and 4	620
467	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2331-S	8	Announces unanimous support of Executive Council for immediate action	620
468	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2332-S	8	Suggests that reference to racial composition of Council which took decision announced in No. 467 should be avoided	620
469	Churchill to Amery Tel. Reflex 46 via C.-in-C., Middle East and Air Ministry	8	Cordially endorses War Cabinet policy set forth in No. 462	621
470	Resolution of All-India Congress Committee	8	The 'Quit India' Resolution	621
471	Cunningham to Linlithgow Report 15, paras. 1-3	8	Abdul Ghaffar Khan awaiting a lead from Gandhi; local attitudes to Congress; visit of party of Red Shirts to Malakand Agency	625
472	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 968	8	Suggests that his appreciation of their firm action be conveyed to Executive Council	626

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CHAPTER 3

The arrest and internment of Gandhi and the Congress leaders; discussion of treatment of Gandhi should he fast; the 'Quit India' movement; discussion of possible reforms in the Central Executive, in the Provinces, and in the social and economic spheres

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474	Amery to Linlithgow Letter	8–10	War Cabinet discussions of 6 and 7 August (Nos. 435 and 451); Executive Council's position and question of its Indianisation; policy should Gandhi fast; basic cause and possible long-term results of present situation; period and conditions of leaders' confinement	628
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479	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2334-S	9	Refers to No. 452, announces he has consulted Governors on policy should Gandhi fast and transmits Hartley's views thereon	635
480	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2335-S	9	Refers to No. 479 and repeats his telegram to Governors on policy should Gandhi fast and replies from Glancy, Stewart, Lumley and Twynam	636
481	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2335-S	9	Repeats telegram from Dow on policy should Gandhi fast	638
482	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 14012	9	Refers to No. 465; question of publishing Congress instructions for mass movement	638
483	Note by Mudaliar	9	Circulates memorandum urging (i) transfer of Home and Finance portfolios of Viceroy's Executive Council to non-official Indians, (ii) constitution of executive councils in Section 93 Provinces, (iii) submission to Executive Council of all important questions of policy from all Departments	639
485	Churchill to Amery Tel. Reflex 66 via C.-in-C., Middle East and Air Ministry	10	Amery's broadcast reference to Government's pledge to give India independence after war surely went beyond draft Declaration	643
486	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2340-S	10	Repeats telegram from Herbert on policy should Gandhi fast	643
487	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2342-S	10	Repeats telegram from Hallett on policy should Gandhi fast	644

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488	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 109th Conclusions, Minute 7	10	Suggestion for advice to Press representatives in India; consideration of policy should Gandhi fast	644
489	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2343-S	10	Repeats telegram from Clow on policy should Gandhi fast	646
490	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2344-S	10	Refers to No. 479, reports discussion in Executive Council on policy should Gandhi fast and trusts that Cabinet would agree to free Gandhi as soon as his life was in danger	646
491	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2345-S	10	Executive Council favours a self-denying ordinance on speeches in India and in U.K.; immediate reactions to anti-Congress action satisfactory	647
492	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2346-S	10	Refers to No. 467, reports Executive Council's attitude to any revision of H.M.G.'s policy without reference to them and asks for soothing reply to their representation conveyed in No. 493	647
493	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2347-S	10	Emphasises effect on personal position of Executive Council members of decision reported in No. 467 and conveys their claim to be consulted on any proposal by H.M.G. to revise its policy	648
494	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2350-S	10	Refers to No. 482; question of publishing Congress instructions for mass movement	649
495	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2352-S	10	Refers to No. 426 and suggests Catto might instruct Moore to avoid all editorial reference to civil disobedience and Congress situation	649
496	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2353-S	10	Text of Moore's *Statesman* leader complained of in No. 495	650
497	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2355-S	10	Thanks for No. 472	651
498	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 970	10	Refers to No. 408, explains understanding on which Alexander went to India and suggests line to take with him	651
500	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 14074	11	Refers to Nos. 479–81, 486–7 and 489, discusses policy should Gandhi fast, and enquires how effectively prisoners' communication with outside world could be controlled at Poona or Sevagram and Ahmednagar Fort	653
501	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2358-S	11	Repeats telegram from Lewis on policy should Gandhi fast	654
502	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2359-S	11	Repeats telegram from Cunningham on policy should Gandhi fast	654
503	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2362-S	11	Thanks for No. 458	655

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504	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2373–S	11	Repeats telegram from Hope on policy should Gandhi fast	655
505	Amery to Churchill Tel. Tulip 91 via Air Ministry and 30 Military Mission, Moscow	11	Refers to No. 485 and transmits passages in his broadcasts referring to post-war pledge to India	656
506	Campbell to Eden Tel. 4068	11	Recommends mobilisation of British labour opinion to counteract that of American labour on Indian situation	657
507	Amery to Attlee Letter	11	Encloses Nos. 490 and 492 and recommends giving Executive Council reassurance	658
508	Stewart to Linlithgow Letter 540–G.B., paras. 1–3	11	Congress plans for civil disobedience campaign; non-Congress attitudes; situation at commencement of campaign	658
509	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–12, 16, 23	11	Refers to No. 323; Executive Council's decision to act against Congress; law and order situation; Council's intensely bitter attitude to Cripps and their suspicion of possible moves by H.M.G.; constitutional proposals (No. 483) of some Council members; Alexander's activities	661
510	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2385–S	12	Reports Ramaswami Aiyar's proposal to visit Gandhi; Mudaliar's, Srivastava's and Viceroy's firm opposition to any climb-down or compromise	668
511	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2386–S	12	Situation report; control of Press messages from India	669
512	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2387–S	12	Question of controlling tone of *Statesman*	670
513	Linlithgow to Herbert Tel. 2387–A.S.	12	Ditto	670
515	Irwin to Laithwaite Tel. (unnumbered)	12	Reports Lumley had received letter from Gandhi asking: (*a*) not to receive special privileges, (*b*) for Patel, Patel's daughter, and other co-prisoners to be accommodated at Aga Khan's Palace, (*c*) to receive newspapers	672
516	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 14159	12	Requests daily situation reports	673
520	Amery to Attlee Letter	12	Refers to No. 506 and asks Attlee to act in the matter if he sees fit	680
521	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 111th Conclusions, Minute 4	12	Invitation to Amery to ascertain extent of resort to whipping as a punishment; and again to impress on G. of I. need for control of Press messages and to hold a meeting with U.K. editors	680
523	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2398–S	13	Agrees to send daily situation reports as requested in No. 516	682
524	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2399–S	13	Situation report, midday 13 August	682

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525	Linlithgow to Lumley Tel. 2405-S	13	Refers to Nos. 515 and 543, directs how Gandhi's requests are to be dealt with, and refuses to agree to delivery of telegram from Rajagopalachari to Gandhi	683
526	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2411-S	13	Repeats gist of letter from Rajagopalachari to Hope asking permission to see Gandhi to dissuade him should he attempt a fast	684
527	Linlithgow to Hope Tel. 2406-S	13	Refers to telegram repeated by No. 526 and refuses permission for Rajagopalachari to communicate with Gandhi	684
528	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 983	13	Reports Labour Party and Cabinet concern on question of whipping and enquires as to application of this punishment; Cabinet concern at inadequate Press control	685
529	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 988	13	Refers to Nos. 492 and 493 and consults him on draft of assurance to Executive Council which he proposes to submit to Cabinet	685
530	Attlee to Churchill Tel. Tulip 118 via Air Ministry and 30 Military Mission, Moscow	13	Reports salient points of Labour Party and Trade Union Congress statement on Indian situation	686
531	Churchill to Amery Tel. Reflex 80 via 30 Military Mission, Moscow and Air Ministry	13	Comments on No. 505	687
533	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 112th Conclusions, Minute 5	13	Agreement that meeting with U.K. editors about Indian news no longer necessary; invitation to Amery to see representatives of Reuters to direct them as to form of their messages from India	688
534	Amery to Attlee Letter	13	Encloses draft of assurance to Executive Council (see No. 529) for approval or submission to Cabinet	689
535	Attlee to Amery Letter	13	Refers to Nos. 506 and 520 and notes that a satisfactory statement on behalf of Labour Party has been made	689
536	Note by Amery	13	Conversation with Villiers	690
538	Amery to Linlithgow Letter	13	Conversation with Cripps; possibility of Rajagopalachari's forming a Government in Madras; importance of supporting Executive Council's position and of restoration of Ministerial Government in Provinces	692
539	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2420-S	14	Refers to No. 540 and suggests instructions be sent to Seymour on line to take regarding Chinese interference in Indian politics	693
540	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2422-S	14	Repeats text of message from Chiang Kai-shek to Gandhi, Nehru, and Azad and request for Chinese Commissioner to interview Nehru	694

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541	Linlithgow to Seymour Tel. 2421-S	14	Stresses objections to any Chinese interference in Indian politics as proposed in No. 540 and transmits personal message to Chiang	695
542	Seymour to Laithwaite Tel. 505	14	Suggests that best way of replying to proposal in No. 540 would be by personal message from Linlithgow	696
543	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2423-S	14	Repeats text of letter from Rajagopalachari to Lumley asking for telegram to Gandhi to be delivered, with Lumley's comments thereon	696
544	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2424-S	14	Situation report, midday 14 August	697
545	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2426-S	14	Refers to No. 512, reports that Moore was to go on leave preparatory to retirement, and emphasises importance of *Statesman* editorship	698
546	Linlithgow to Herbert Tel. 2425-S	14	Expresses satisfaction at decision reported in No. 545	698
547	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2427-S	14	Approves No. 529	699
548	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2430-S	14	Transmits message from Lumley reporting Jinnah's attitude	699
549	Lumley to Linlithgow Tel. 550	14	Describes and defends application of Bombay Whipping Act	700
550	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 994	14	Refers to No. 510 and agrees with Linlithgow's attitude to Ramaswami Aiyar's proposal to visit Gandhi	701
553	Gandhi to Linlithgow Letter	14	Criticises Government of India's action against Congress, attacks its resolution (No. 447), and pleads for reconsideration of its whole policy	702
554	Notes by Linlithgow	undated	Opening of discussion on constitutional matters in Council	706
555	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2433-S	15	Refers to No. 544 and reports major interference with railway lines around Patna and his authorisation of machine-gunning from air of saboteurs	707
556	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2436-S	15	Situation report, midday 15 August	708
557	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2440-S	15	Refers to No. 528; action to reassure Labour Party on whipping in Bombay	709
558	Linlithgow to Radhakrishnan Letter	15	Acknowledges No. 473	709
559	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 14416, para. 2	15	Notes with approval measures authorised against saboteurs	710
560	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 362	15	Memorandum by Amery on proposed assurance to Viceroy's Executive Council	710
564	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2443-S	16	Answers questions raised by No. 500 on policy should Gandhi fast and control of his and Congress leaders' communication with outside world	719

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566	Note by Linlithgow	16	Interview with Ramaswami Aiyar with two letters from latter setting out his position (Appendix 1) and draft Press announcement of his resignation (Appendix 2)	720
567	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2453–S	16	Situation report, midday 16 August	730
568	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2455–S	16	States prospects of restoration of ministerial Government in Assam	731
569	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2457–S	16	Emphasises damage done by suggestions in U.K. Press of anxiety to negotiate with Congress and formally states his conviction of impossibility of negotiations with them save on basis of complete surrender by H.M.G.	732
571	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 14442	16	States that Jinnah's statement in No. 548 was published by *Daily Telegraph* and sent to U.S.A.	733
572	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2477–S	17	Situation report, midday 17 August	733
573	Russell to Turnbull Letter	17	Transmits alternative draft by Cripps of assurance to Executive Council	734
574	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 363	17	Memorandum by Amery on treatment of Gandhi in event of a fast	753
575	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 113th Conclusions, Minutes 6–9	17	(6) General situation; Press control in India and U.K. (7) Agreement on assurance to Executive Council (No. 576) (8) Conditions of Gandhi's detention (9) Whipping in Bombay	736
576	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 14510	17	Transmits assurance to Executive Council in sense suggested by No. 493	739
577	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–13, 19	17	Comments on disturbances; use of air power against saboteurs; need to consolidate position before Gandhi fasts; prominent part played by students; advantage gained by Government's precipitating crisis before India was immediately threatened by war situation; Press control; Ramaswami Aiyar; discussion in Executive Council on possible constitutional adjustments	739
578	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2484–S	18	Explains purposes he has in mind when compiling daily situation reports	745
579	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2493–S	18	Situation report, midday 18 August	745
580	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1003	18	Transmits personal message from Churchill congratulating Linlithgow on his handling of situation	746

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582	Monteath to Anderson Letter	18	Encloses draft telegram to Linlithgow on conditions of Gandhi's detention for him to consider whether it correctly interpreted War Cabinet's intention in No. 575, Minute 8	747
583	Ramaswami Aiyar to Linlithgow Letter	19	Explains his desire to see Gandhi and criticises Government's handling of the Press	749
584	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2504-S (incorporating 31-U)	19	Refers to No. 565; Ramaswami Aiyar; Executive Council discussions of (*a*) relaxations in conditions of detention of Gandhi and other détenus, (*b*) expansion of its role, (*c*) Section 93 Provinces; possibility of Sultan Ahmed becoming non-official adviser to Stewart	751
585	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2505-S	19	Has communicated Gandhi's letter (No. 553) and lines of his proposed reply (No. 611) to Executive Council	753
586	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2509-S	19	Situation report, midday 19 August	754
587	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. 2512-S via India Office	19	Thanks him for No. 580 and looks forward to offering India as a sound platform for future operations	755
588	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 14649	19	Refers to No. 564 and communicates War Cabinet's suggestions (as in No. 575, Minute 8) on conditions of Gandhi's detention	755
589	S. of S. to G. of I., External Affairs Dept Tel. 14641	19	Repeats telegram from Eden to Seymour supporting Linlithgow's reaction (No. 541) to Chiang's messages to Indian leaders and indicating line to take on Chinese intervention in Indian politics	757
590	Ramaswami Aiyar to Linlithgow Letter	20	Persists in his decision to resign from Executive Council	758
591	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2522-S	20	Refers to No. 584; Ramaswami Aiyar's proposed resignation	761
592	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2526-S	20	Situation report, midday 20 August	762
593	Linlithgow to Ramaswami Aiyar Letter	20	Refers to No. 590, accepts his resignation, suggests line to be taken in public statements and encloses draft communiqué	763
594	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2532-S	20	Refers to No. 591, and explains decision to accept Ramaswami Aiyar's resignation	765
597	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1-3, 9 and PS. 1	20	Non-official advisers in Section 93 Provinces; Indianisation of Executive Council; conditions of Gandhi's detention; question of an independent 'Sikhdom'	769

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599	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2535–S	21	Refers to No. 594; Ramaswami Aiyar's resignation	775
600	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2544–S	21	Situation report, midday 21 August	775
601	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2548–S	21	News of strike at Tata's mentioned in No. 600 is being kept secret	777
602	G. of I., Supply Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 10058–C.S.	21	Report on strike at Tata's	777
603	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1026	21	Comments on No. 584	778
604	Ramaswami Aiyar to Linlithgow Letter	21	Refers to No. 593; arrangements for announcing resignation; change needed in constitutional position of Executive Council	779
605	Linlithgow to Ramaswami Aiyar Letter	21	Refers to No. 604; agrees to arrangements for announcing resignation and to Ramaswami Aiyar's proposed statement (enclosed)	780
607	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2556–S	22	Situation report, midday 22 August	782
608	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2558–S	22	Refers to No. 603, clarifies situation regarding non-official advisers, and notes advantage of discussing such matters with Executive Council	783
609	Monteath to Laithwaite Tel. 1031	22	Refers to No. 584 and speculates on possible implications of certain phrases therein	784
611	Linlithgow to Gandhi Letter	22	Acknowledges No. 553, but is unable to accept criticisms or request made therein	786
612	Stewart to Linlithgow Letter 575–G.B.	22	Disturbances in Bihar and efforts of authorities to control them; evidence of planning behind disturbances; attitude of Press and intelligentsia; performance of the services	787
613	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2567–S	23	Situation report, midday 23 August	791
614	Radhakrishnan to Linlithgow Letter	23	Hopes that letter posted to Gandhi (copy enclosed) will reach him	792
616	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2578–S	24	Situation report, midday 24 August	794
617	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2579–S	24	Has recommended Governors to resist demands for enquiries into police conduct; is considering case for judicial enquiry to establish responsibility for disturbances	795
621	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 117th Conclusions, Minute 1	24	Invitation to Amery to report (i) G. of I.'s view on extent to which disturbances had been provoked by	

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621 (*cont.*)			agencies of Japan, (ii) on pay and conditions of Lascar seamen and possibility of assisting G. of I. in formulating social and industrial policy; notice taken of Linlithgow's failure to explain division in Executive Council on policy should Gandhi fast	800
622	Linlithgow to Chiang Kai-shek Letter	24	Refers to Nos. 540 and 541, para. 2, and describes considerations which made it impossible for him to agree to his requests	802
624	Lumley to Linlithgow Report 110, paras. 1, 2	24–7	Local opposition to civil disobedience campaign; success of Patel and others in arousing support; morale of Government officers on eve of A.-I.C.C. meeting; success of plans for arresting leaders; incident involving Nehru and Shankarrao Deo at Poona station	804
625	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–8, 10–12, 17, 20–2	24	Refers to No. 402; disturbances; consequences of a fast by Gandhi; Congress–Muslim League relations; Ramaswami Aiyar's resignation; Executive Council's constitutional discussions	807
626	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–4, 6	24	Refers to Nos. 401 and 509; development of Executive Council's Committee system; need to maintain provincial rights as basis of future constitutional solution; Cripps and Executive Council	818
627	Linlithgow to Hope, Lumley, Hallett, Stewart, Twynam, and Cunningham Tel. 2582–S	25	Discusses possible arrangements for associating non-officials with control in Section 93 Provinces, himself favours addition of non-official to existing official advisers, and invites views	820
628	Laithwaite to Monteath Tel. 2583–S	25	Refers to No. 609, and comments on constitutional discussions in Executive Council	821
630	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2594–S	25	Situation report, midday 25 August	825
631	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1043	26	Refers to No. 608; Cabinet has deferred consideration	826
632	S. of S. to G. of I., Home Dept Tel. 15057	26	Asks to what extent disturbances might be attributable to Japanese agencies	826
633	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2608–S	26	Situation report, midday 26 August	827
634	Laithwaite to Monteath Tel. 2609–S	27	Refers to No. 628, reports Noon's views and thinks agreement by Council on proposal of type recently under discussion now unlikely	828
636	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2616–S (incorporating 2619–S)	27	Situation report, midday 27 August	829

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638	Gandhi to Secretary to Bombay Govt, Home Dept Letter	27	Wishes to write to persons other than his family and to correspond on certain non-political matters	832
639	Linlithgow to Zafrullah Khan Letter	27	Acknowledges No. 412	833
640	Glancy to Linlithgow Letter	27	Refers to No. 294 and reports that Chhotu Ram and Baldev Singh had asked him to urge against H.M.G. making any declaration on Pakistan	834
641	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–4	27	Disturbances; Cabinet and use of whipping as punishment; no question of resuming negotiations with Congress or with minor parties	835
643	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1052	28	Presumes he will have conveyed to Governors Cabinet's views contained in No. 581	838
644	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1051	28	Suggests tribute might be paid in Commons by Churchill or himself to staunchness of police	838
647	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 383	28	Memorandum by Amery circulating No. 509, paras. 2 and 8, on Linlithgow's relations with Executive Council	840
648	Linlithgow to Aney Letter	28	Rejects idea of a talk with Rajagopalachari	840
649	Linlithgow to Glancy Letter	28	Is sending a copy of No. 640 to Amery and agrees on wisdom of avoiding commitment on Pakistan	841
650	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2635-S (incorporating 2636-S)	28	Situation report, midday 28 August	841
652	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2648-S	29	Refers to No. 588, comments on Cabinet's proposals, and proposes revised scheme for conditions of Gandhi's detention should he fast	843
653	G. of I., Home Dept, to Govt of Bombay Tel. 6885	29	Announces decision against regular bulletins on health of Gandhi and Congress leaders but requests issue of communiqué	845
654	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2649-S	29	Situation report, midday 29 August	846
655	Cunningham to Linlithgow Tel. G.H.-361	29	Does not consider it possible to form a Ministry at present	847
656	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Tel. 2651-S	30	Advises them of Cabinet sensitivity on question of whipping, suggests avoidance of publicity thereon, and asks how many whippings had occurred in their provinces	847
657	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2654-S	30	Situation report, midday 30 August	848
659	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 15278	30	Refers to No. 617, approves his advice to Governors to resist demands for local enquiries, and opposes general judicial enquiry	850

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661	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2661–S	31	Situation report, midday 31 August	853
662	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. 2662–S (incorporating 32–U) via India Office	31	Describes gravity of rebellion and consequent dangers of visits by prominent Americans	853
663	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 15339	31	Refers to No. 652, para. 4(*d*) and asks whether statements to Press by Gandhi's visitors or household were to be restricted	855
664	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 119th Conclusions, Minute 9	31	Social and industrial policy; conditions of Gandhi's detention	855
665	Allah Bakhsh to Linlithgow Letter	31	Criticises British policy and advocates declaration by H.M.G. that after war India would be free to frame own constitution and that communal differences would be referred to independent international arbitration	856
666	Note by Linlithgow	undated	Sketch note—conclusion of discussion on constitutional matters in Council on 31 August	859
667	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2682–S	1	Situation report, midday 1 September	864
668	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1069	1	Asks whether there is any objection to his using in Commons quotation from intercepted letter from Miss Pandit	865
669	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 15392	1	Discusses Press control in India and U.K., and asks for full appreciation of Congress situation	865
670	Amery to Churchill Minute P.46/42, second and third paras.	1	Refers to No. 662 and discusses ways of contradicting suggestions that Cripps had gone back on a promise of National Government	867
671	Bridges to Turnbull Letter	1	Asks whether Amery sees any objection to amendment to No. 664 proposed by Cripps	868
672	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 3–9, 11, 12, 15	1	Refers to No. 474; general situation; strike at Tata's; tribute to be paid in Commons to police; question of guarantee against victimization; Executive Council and Gandhi; Council's constitutional discussions; question of formation of minority ministries while Congress M.L.A.'s in jail; wisdom of avoiding commitment on Pakistan question; first political incident in army; Horace Alexander	868
673	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 2–5, 7, 8, 12	1–2	Cabinet monologue by Churchill on India; economic and social reform in Section 93 Provinces; pay and conditions of Lascars; Smuts' message	

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673 (*cont.*)			(enclosed) suggesting a constitutional conference; line to take in Commons debate on policy towards Congress leaders	874
674	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2684-S	2	Comments on No. 659; advises unqualified tribute to police in Commons debate (see No. 644) and that it should extend to all Government servants; notes certain features of public's attitude to disturbances	878
675	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2689-S	2	Situation report, midday 2 September	880
677	Turnbull to Bridges Letter	2	Refers to No. 671 and suggests alternative amendment to No. 664	881
678	Note by Cripps	2	Suggests rallying Indian support for the war effort by economic and social reforms designed to appeal to certain classes—peasants and workers—rather than communities	882
679	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 394	3	Memorandum by Amery circulating Nos. 588 and 652 and recommending careful consideration of Linlithgow's revised scheme for treatment of Gandhi should he fast	885
680	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2699-S	3	Situation report, midday 3 September	885
683	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1079	3	Refers to No. 669 and indicates nature of summary of disturbances required for P.M.'s Commons statement	889
687	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 329-S.C.	4	Refers to No. 663 and explains how he hopes to restrict statements by Gandhi's visitors	892
689	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 332-S.C.	4	Situation report, midday 4 September	892
693	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 339-S.C.	5	Reports Governors' replies to No. 656 on use of whipping	900
694	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 7078	5	Transmits text of cable from Quezon to Gandhi and suggests how refusal to allow its delivery should be explained	901
695	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 341-S.C.	5	Situation report, midday 5 September	902
696	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 347-S.C.	5	Refers to No. 669 and indicates points to bear in mind when deciding line of Churchill's Commons statement	903
697	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 348-S.C.	5	Refers to No. 669 and transmits appreciation	904
698	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 349-S.C.	5	Refers to No. 697 and transmits further information supplied by Railway, Home, and War Departments	906
699	Stewart to Linlithgow Tel. 95	5	Asks whether collective fines should be imposed on Muslims	908

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701	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–4, 7, 8, 10, 12	5–7	Requests for interviews from Bengal Ministers; general situation and U.K. opinion; non-official advisers; problem of coincidental retirements of himself, Maxwell, Craik, and Lumley; danger of encouraging Sikhistan project	910
702	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 7100	6	Refers to Nos. 697 and 698 and transmits information supplied by Posts and Telegraphs Department	914
703	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2712–S	6	Situation report, 6 September	915
704	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2719–S	7	Situation report, midday 7 September; proposes to send further reports at intervals of 3 or 4 days	915
705	Linlithgow to Stewart Tel. 2720–S	7	Suggests he should slow down or desist from realising collective fines from Muslims for the moment	916
706	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 121st Conclusions, Minute 3	7	Approval of Linlithgow's proposed arrangements (see Nos. 652 and 687) should Gandhi fast with request to Amery to impress on Linlithgow need for effective control of Gandhi's visitors	916
708	Laithwaite to Maxwell Letter 11694–G.G.	7	Linlithgow has asked extent of circulation of enclosed *Harijan Bulletin 3* by Amrit Kaur	918
711	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2727–S	8	Suggests further point which might be made in Commons Debate	922
714	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 15753	8	Communicates War Cabinet Conclusion (as in No. 706) on arrangements should Gandhi fast	924
715	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 15789	8	Refers to No. 674, agrees to tribute to police and all Government servants in Commons debate, and proposes to avoid commitment to any enquiry	925
716	Linlithgow to Allah Bakhsh Letter	8	Acknowledges No. 665, but is unable to accept much of its substance	925
717	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2733–S	9	Suggests Amery's statement of 30 July (see No. 366) might be referred to in Commons debate	926
719	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2742–S	9	Refers to No. 715 and urges him to give a more definite refusal to demands for enquiry	928
722	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2743–S	10	Reports interview with Mookerjee	930
723	Linlithgow to Amery Tels. 2745–S–2747–S	10	Transmits exchange of telegrams with Lumley on health of Mrs Gandhi and Mrs Naidu and possibility of releasing them	932
725	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2754–S	10	Situation report, midday 10 September; Wavell's preliminary forecast of effect of Congress campaign to date	934

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	Name and number	Date (September)	Main subject or subjects	Page
728	Mookerjee to Laithwaite Letter	10	Encloses public statement by certain leading public figures urging immediate transfer of power to a National Government	936
729	Saksena to Linlithgow Letter	10	Attacks Government's action against Congress, challenges it to give Legislative Assembly information of use of military, of damage done to war effort, and of treatment of détenus and warns of mounting popular bitterness	938
730	Eden to Halifax No. 371 Saving	11	Asks him to explain to Quezon why his message to Gandhi could not be delivered as suggested in No. 694	942
731	Note by Croft	11	Refers to No. 678 and discusses question of economic and social reform	943
734	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2768–S	12	Describes reactions to Churchill's statement and suggests reference to Indian character of Government which had imprisoned Gandhi should be avoided	952
735	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 7266	12	Notes mistakes in numbers of casualties and troops employed during disturbances in Churchill's statement and asks if there was any objection to Maxwell giving correct figures	952
740	Reports of Press Conference	13	Jinnah defends Muslim League position	956
741	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2778–S	14	Describes Mookerjee's progress in securing support for Mahasabha programme but will not allow him to see Gandhi	960
742	S. of S. to G. of I., Home Dept Tel. 16121	14	Refers to No. 735 and asks that correct figures should not be issued so soon after Churchill's statement	961
743	Churchill to Amery Minute M.373/2	14	Asks for note on Gandhi's intrigues with Japan	961
744	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–5, 8	14	Refers to No. 626; Executive Council's constitutional discussions, communal problem and prospects of constitutional advance; problem posed by Section 93 Provinces; Hindu constitutional views and difficulties of Pakistan; attitude of Executive Council and all parties to Cripps; his wish to drop idea of enquiring into Pakistan schemes	962
745	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2789–S	15	Situation report, midday 15 September, covering period 10–15 September	967
746	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2797–S	16	Reports on health and attitude of détenus at Ahmednagar	967
747	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 7330	16	Refers to No. 742 and states that correct figures have been given in debate in the Legislature	968

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	Name and number	*Date* (*September*)	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
753	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 5, 6, 9	16	Control of outgoing Press messages from India; Bombay Whipping Act; future of Reforms Office	974
755	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 16323	17	Refers to No. 741 and agrees with refusal to allow Mookerjee to see Gandhi	978
756	Amery to Churchill Minute P.49/42	17	Refers to No. 743 and encloses note on Gandhi and Japan	978
758	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2808–S	18	Refers to No. 693 and transmits further report on use of whipping	982
765	Minute by Croft	18	Reports discussion with Chatterjee on economic and social reform	989
771	Halifax to Quezon Letter	19	Refers to No. 730 and explains why his message to Gandhi could not be delivered as suggested in No. 694	994
775	Churchill to Cripps and Amery Minute M.396/2	20	Refers to No. 678 and urges move on economic and social reform	999
776	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2830–S	21	Situation report, midday 20 September, covering period 15–20 September	1000
777	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2831–S	21	Intends to appoint Menon as Hodson's successor as Reforms Commissioner	1000
779	Gandhi to Secretary, G. of I., Home Dept Letter	21	States his reaction to disturbances	1002
780	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 2, 6, 9–11	21	Refers to Nos. 641 and 673; general situation 'pretty comfortable'; anticipated pressure for 'constructive policy'; significant quiescence of Gandhi and Congress leaders; Smuts' message suggesting constitutional conference	1003

CHAPTER 4

Concern of the United States and China with the Indian situation; measures to explain British policy towards India in these and other countries

	Name and number	*Date* (*May*)	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
6	Linlithgow to Roosevelt Letter	1	Refers to No. 350 in Vol. I and expresses pleasure at Johnson's appointment	7
8	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 16	1	'China Day'	8
36	Linlithgow to Chiang Kai-shek Letter	8	Conveys good wishes and congratulations on performance of Chinese troops in Burma	53
41	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 4	9	Chinese visitors to New Delhi	60
61	Note by Spry	15	Account of interview with Roosevelt	89

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	Name and number	Date (May–June)	Main subject or subjects	Page
69	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 18, 19	18	Johnson and U.S. attitude to Indian war effort	97
82	Lumley to Linlithgow Letter 282–H.E., paras. 1, 3	25	American Technical Mission; Grady's impressions	116
91	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 26–U	27	Suggests means of counteracting possible adverse effects of Johnson's reports on U.S. attitude to Indian affairs	133
93	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1519–S	27	Press report of forthcoming visit of Nehru to Washington	136
95	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 11, 12	28	Johnson and Grady	138
97	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1544–S	28	Refers to Nos. 91 and 93 and reports and comments on conversation with Sarker regarding Johnson and Nehru	144
98	Amery to Eden Letter	28	Forwards copy of No. 91 and requests that Halifax may be apprised of Johnson's activities	144
99	Churchill to Hopkins Tel. (unnumbered)	28	Report of Johnson's views on Indian affairs	145
100	Bajpai to Linlithgow Tel. 9624 via Foreign Office and India Office	29	Account of interview with Roosevelt	145
101	Amery to Churchill Minute P.38/42	29	Suggests Johnson should be prevented from returning to India	146
105	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 9739	30	Consults him on guidance to U.S. Press in anticipation of new move by Gandhi	151
106	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1564–S	30	Suggests Gandhi's *Harijan* articles be given full publicity in U.S.	152
109	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1586–S (extract)	31	Requests information from Halifax as to results of Johnson's return to Washington on high-level U.S. opinion regarding India	155
111	Churchill to Linlithgow Tel. 22–U via India Office	31	Refers to No. 91 and announces his request that Johnson should not return to India	156
112	Churchill to Hopkins Tel. (unnumbered)	31	Nehru should not be invited to U.S. nor should Johnson return to India	156
114	Hopkins to Churchill Tel. (unnumbered) (extract)	1	Nehru not going to U.S. nor Johnson to India	164
117	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. 1635 via India Office	4	Thanks for Nos. 111 and 114 (see note 2)	175
120	Halifax to Amery Tel. 3088 via Foreign Office	4	Reports conversation with Hull on situation in India and discusses suggestion of unofficial enquiry into Indian problem under U.S. auspices	177
123	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1679–S	6	Refers to No. 105; propaganda in U.S. in case action against Congress becomes necessary	180
133	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 9, 10	8	American Technical Mission; Johnson	190

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	Name and number	*Date (June–July)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
148	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 9	15	Probable U.S. reaction to clash with Gandhi	210
152	Amery to Halifax Tel. 3849 via Foreign Office	17	Action to be taken in view of possible measures against Gandhi and Congress	223
153	Amery to Seymour and Clark Kerr Tels. 836 and 57 via Foreign Office	17	Ditto	224
154	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 3	17	Grady Report	224
159	S. of S. to G. of I., Home Dept Tel. 10853	18	Describes action taken to inform H.M. representatives abroad and Press of position as regards Gandhi and Congress	230
160	Halifax to Amery Tel. 3329 via Foreign Office	18	Refers to No. 152, reports interview with Hull, and asks to be kept informed	232
163	S. of S. to G. of I., Home Dept Tel. 10854	19	Refers to No. 159 and transmits text of circular telegram on Gandhi and Congress sent to H.M. representatives abroad	234
170	G. of I., External Affairs Dept, to Bajpai Tel. 4817	20	Suggests line Gandhi will probably take to woo U.S. opinion, and urges importance of counter propaganda	243
171	G. of I., External Affairs Dept, to Bajpai Tel. 4818	20	Refers to No. 170 and transmits illustrative extracts from *Harijan*	244
175	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 11130	22	Suggests that extracts from *Harijan* should be telegraphed to Bajpai and Zafrullah Khan	248
176	Halifax to Linlithgow Tel. 17 (extract)	22	Replies to enquiry in No. 109	249
194	Seymour to Eden Tel. 901	27	Refers to No. 153 and announces despatch of No. 195	280
195	Seymour to Eden Tel. 902	27	Refers to No. 194 and transmits summary of his interview with Chiang Kai-shek on 25 June	281
201	Halifax to Eden Tel. 298 Saving	29	Refers to No. 152 and discusses action to be taken in U.S. to counter moves by Gandhi	288
212	Halifax to Eden Tel. 3523	2	Reports conversation with Soong on Gandhi's attitude and military situation in Far East	301
217	Eden to Halifax Tel. 4122	3	Requests full text of No. 231	304
226	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 4, 14	6	Grady report; failure of British newspapers to maintain correspondents in Chungking	314
231	Campbell to Eden Tel. 3597	7	Refers to No. 217 and transmits text of Gandhi's letter to Chiang Kai-shek	346
235	Seymour to Eden Tel. 946	8	Refers to Nos. 194 and 195 and conveys gist of Chiang's reply to No. 231	351
251	Eden to Seymour Tel. 952	12	Refers to No. 235 and contradicts assumption that Gandhi would not start any movement	370

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	Name and number	*Date (July–August)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
255	Monteath to Laithwaite Tel. 853	13	Asks whether Bajpai and Chungking would be informed by Government of India direct of any action against Congress	376
260	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2084–S, para. 6	14	Replies to No. 255	381
279	Bajpai to G. of I., External Affairs Dept Tel. 172	17	Reports two U.S. views on Indian situation	401
297	Linlithgow to Bajpai Tel. 2144–S	21	Refers to No. 279, emphasises damage a climb-down to Congress would do to Indian Army and states that impression given by Bajpai's reports of U.S. attitude is belied by evidence from other sources	423
305	Note by Amery	22	Conversation with Maisky	429
306	Note by Amery	22	Conversation with Wellington Koo	431
323	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 1	24	Bad Press received by Gandhi in U.S.A.	454
339	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 318	27	Note by Cripps circulating report by Spry on India as a factor in Anglo-American relations	471
342	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2220–S	28	Requests confirmation that rumour (to which he was issuing immediate démenti) that Wendell Willkie was to visit India was unfounded	475
355	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 3	28	Gandhi's hopes of assistance from opinion outside India	485
367	Note by Amery	29	Conversation with Winant	498
369	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2243–S	30	Refers to No. 342 and suggests that Willkie be tactfully advised that a visit to India would not be welcome at present	500
372	Campbell to Eden Tel. 3912	30	Reports that Soong had had discussions with Roosevelt on Indian situation and Soong's statement of Chiang Kai-shek's desire for a compromise between H.M.G. and Congress	502
388	Cranborne to various Colonies Tel. (unnumbered)	1	Appreciation of political situation in India	518
392	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 334	2	Note by Bridges, covering telegrams exchanged between Roosevelt and Churchill	529
398	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 939	3	Refers to Nos. 342 and 369; possible visit to India of Wendell Willkie	540
402	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 3	3	Comment on correspondence in No. 392	550
411	Campbell to Eden Tel. 3984	4	Suggests implications of seized Congress documents should be explained to Roosevelt and Hull	561

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	Name and number	*Date (August)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
421	Campbell to Eden Tel. 3986	5	Refers to No. 411 and reports conversation with Roosevelt on draft reply to Chiang Kai-shek	573
423	Wellington Koo to Halifax Letter	5	Transmits gist of telegram from Soong regarding Chiang's message to Roosevelt (Annex 1 to No. 392)	575
424	Campbell to Cadogan Letter	5	Reports conversation with Roosevelt on Cripps offer and post-war situation	576
434	Amery to Eden Letter	6	Refers to No. 411 and encloses drafts designed to meet Campbell's suggestions	585
437	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2306-S	7	Refers to No. 398 and is prepared to leave situation regarding Willkie as it stands	593
454	Eden to Campbell Tel. 4728	7	Refers to No. 411 and transmits message from Attlee to Roosevelt explaining Government of India's anti-Congress measures	608
455	Eden to Campbell Tel. 4729	7	Refers to No. 411 and provides material for conversation with Hull	610
456	Eden to Seymour Tel. 1056	7	Gives explanation of Government of India's plan of action against Congress, to be disclosed to Chiang Kai-shek only after detention of Gandhi and other Congress leaders	612
477	Churchill to his Private Office Tel. Reflex 51 via C.-in-C. Middle East and Air Ministry	9	Transmits message to be conveyed to Roosevelt about proposed message on anniversary of Atlantic Charter	634
478	Roosevelt to Churchill Tel. 176 via Joint Staffs Mission, Washington and C.-in-C., Middle East	9	Refers to Annex 2 to No. 392 and summarises his reply to Chiang's suggestions on Indian situation	635
484	Churchill to Roosevelt Tel. Reflex 62 via C.-in-C., Middle East and J.S.M. Washington	10	Thanks for No. 478	643
499	Amery to Eden Letter	10	Possible visit to India of Wendell Willkie	652
506	Campbell to Eden Tel. 4068	11	Recommends mobilisation of British labour opinion to counteract that of American labour on Indian situation	657
514	Martin to Rowan Tel. Tulip 101 (Nocop) via Air Ministry and 30 Military Mission, Moscow	12	Transmits telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill asking his opinion on a message from Chiang Kai-shek	672
517	Amery to Churchill Tel. Tulip 105 via Air Ministry and 30 Military Mission, Moscow	12	Refers to No. 514 and urges him to dissuade Roosevelt from paying any attention to Chiang's intervention	674
518	Campbell to Eden Tel. 4101	12	Reports conversation between Hopkins and Soong and remarks by Roosevelt at Pacific War Council	674
519	Note by Hollington Tong	undated	Record of conversation between Chiang and Seymour	675

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	Name and number	*Date* (*August*)	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
520	Amery to Attlee Letter	12	Refers to No. 506 and asks Attlee to act in the matter if he sees fit	680
522	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2397-S	13	Lauchlin Currie	681
532	Churchill to his Private Office Tel. Reflex 83 via 30 Military Mission, Moscow and Air Ministry	13	Transmits telegram for transmission to Roosevelt commenting on Chiang's message in No. 514	687
535	Attlee to Amery Letter	13	Refers to Nos. 506 and 520 and notes that a satisfactory statement on behalf of Labour Party has been made	689
537	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 358	13	Memorandum by Amery on India as a factor in Anglo-American relations	690
539	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2420-S	14	Refers to No. 540 and suggests instructions be sent to Seymour on line to take regarding Chinese interference in Indian politics	693
540	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2422-S	14	Repeats text of message from Chiang Kai-shek to Gandhi, Nehru, and Azad and request for Chinese Commissioner to interview Nehru	694
541	Linlithgow to Seymour Tel. 2421-S	14	Stresses objection to any Chinese interference in Indian politics as proposed in No. 540 and transmits personal message to Chiang	695
542	Seymour to Laithwaite Tel. 505	14	Suggests that best way of replying to proposal in No. 540 would be personal message from Linlithgow	696
551	Eden to Amery Letter	14	Refers to No. 499, doubts rumours that Willkie was to visit India as Roosevelt's personal representative and explains instructions he proposes to give Campbell	701
552	Amery to Eden Letter	14	Asks him to bear No. 522 in mind and acknowledges No. 551	702
559	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 14416, para. 1	15	States that he is repeating paras. 1 and 2 of No. 555 to Butler and Bajpai	710
562	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 14433	16	Comments on No. 563 and outlines instructions thereon which he proposes should be given to Campbell	715
563	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 14434	16	Repeats Campbell's account of conversation with Hull and former's suggestion that propaganda in India and China should follow line taken by Hull's speech of 23 July	717
570	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 996	16	Wholeheartedly approves his firm handling of Chiang	732
589	S. of S. to G. of I., External Affairs Dept Tel. 14641	19	Repeats telegram from Eden to Seymour supporting Linlithgow's reaction (No. 541) to Chiang's messages to Indian leaders and indicating line to take on Chinese intervention in Indian politics	757

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	Name and number	*Date (August–September)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
596	Note by Amery	20	Interview with Wellington Koo	768
610	Eden to Amery Letter	22	Refers to No. 552, comments on No. 522, and suggests that hint might be given to Linlithgow to take Americans more into his confidence, and that President might be asked to appoint eminent American to New Delhi	785
618	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 14874	24	Repeats telegram from Eden to Seymour containing reply to Chiang Kai-shek's views on Indian situation	796
619	Halifax to Eden Tel. 4259	24	Bajpai reports publicity line intended by All-India League of America, Grady's fear of disturbances prejudicing implementation of his report and latter's regret over absence of U.S. representative at Delhi	798
620	Amery to Churchill Minute P.45/42	24	Thanks him for his telegram to Chiang (see No. 637) and encloses No. 596	799
622	Linlithgow to Chiang Kai-shek Letter	24	Refers to Nos. 540 and 541, para. 2, and describes considerations which made it impossible for him to agree to his request	802
625	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 18, 19	24	Chiang Kai-shek; Wendell Willkie	807
637	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1047	27	Repeats message from Churchill to Chiang Kai-shek commenting on his conversation with Seymour (see No. 519)	830
646	Halifax to Eden Tel. 456 Saving	28	Merrell has reported that Princes (Hindu and Muslim), Muslim landlords, and English business community give Muslim League financial support to postpone settlement of constitutional problems	839
651	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2646-S	29	Is grateful for No. 637 and suggests it be shown to Zafrullah Khan and Bajpai	842
658	Halifax to Amery Tel. 4367 via Foreign Office	30	Reports conversation with Fischer, and that Eddy was thinking of visiting India	849
662	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. 2662-S (incorporating 32-U) via India Office	31	Stresses danger in conditions of rebellion of visits like those proposed by Willkie and Eddy, and asks him to move Halifax to arrest flow of U.S. visitors	853
670	Amery to Churchill Minute P.46/42, first para.	1	Refers to No. 662 and asks whether Churchill can have warning conveyed to people like Willkie and Eddy	867
672	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 10	1	Chiang Kai-shek	868

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	Name and number	Date (September)	Main subject or subjects	Page
673	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 6 and 13	1–2	American visitors	874
676	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 120th Conclusions, Minute 2	2	Visits of influential Americans to India	880
682	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1075	3	Informs him of Churchill's concurrence in his suggestion in No. 651	889
684	Halifax to Eden Tel. 4450	3	Willkie's tour	890
688	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 330–S.C.	4	Thanks for No. 682	892
694	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 7078	5	Transmits text of cable from Quezon to Gandhi and suggests how refusal to allow its delivery should be explained	901
700	Churchill to Linlithgow Tel. 1087 (incorporating 26–U) via India Office	5	Refers to No. 662, asks him to consider trying to captivate and, if necessary, convert Willkie and Eddy, but states they should not have access to internees	909
701	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 9	7	Amery's interview with Wellington Koo (No. 596)	910
724	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. 2748–S (incorporating 33–U) via India Office	10	Describes past difficulties with American visitors, is anxious not to encourage Gandhi's supporters to expect U.S. intervention and therefore cannot welcome Eddy's visit	933
730	Eden to Halifax No. 371 Saving	11	Asks him to explain to Quezon why his message to Gandhi could not be delivered as suggested in No. 694	942
732	Sherwood Eddy to Linlithgow Letter	11	Introduces himself and encloses draft plan for solution of Indian problem	947
736	Churchill to Eden and Amery Minute	12	In view of No. 724 thinks Eddy's visit should be deprecated	953
739	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1117	13	Asks for his views on Eden's suggestion (see No. 610) that Roosevelt be asked to appoint eminent American to Delhi and points out its attractions	955
748	Eden to Halifax Tel. 5622	16	Refers to No. 658, explains Linlithgow's reasons for opposing Eddy's visit (see No. 724), and asks Halifax to discourage it	968
749	Halifax to Eden Tel. 4650	16	Is disturbed by trend of American opinion on India	969
760	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2814–S	18	Refers to No. 739, agrees with need to have a man of substance to represent U.S. in Delhi, but strongly prefers Foreign Service Officer to political figure	983
761	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2816–S	18	Refers to Nos. 749 and 762 and emphasises that preference expressed in No. 760 was in no way altered by them, given delicate situation and danger of encouraging Congress	984

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	Name and number	Date (September)	Main subject or subjects	Page
762	Halifax to Eden Tel. 505 Saving	18	Repeats telegram from Bajpai to Linlithgow reporting trend of American opinion on India	985
764	Halifax to Eden Tel. 4699	18	Refers to No. 748 and reports conversation with Hull	988
771	Halifax to Quezon Letter	19	Refers to No. 730 and explains why his message to Gandhi could not be delivered as suggested in No. 694	994
774	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1146	20	Refers to No. 761, will support views expressed in No. 760, and discusses line to take against possible U.S. pressure for formation of provisional Government	998
780	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 5	21	Type of U.S. representative needed in Delhi	1003

CHAPTER 5

Reconstitution of the Viceroy's Executive Council; representation of India at the War Cabinet and in Commonwealth countries; resignation of Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar

	Name and number	Date (May)	Main subject or subjects	Page
8	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 2, 3	1	Plans for reconstituting the Executive Council	8
11	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 552	2	Suggests Mirza Ismail for publicity portfolio	15
12	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1215-S	3	Provisional conclusions on reconstitution of Council	16
18	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 8063	5	Suggests Chetty for Commerce portfolio	27
22	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 6, 7	5	Present Councillors' desire to be consulted on reconstitution of Council; poor health of Rao and Sarker	34
25	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1254-S	6	Refers to No. 18 and states he is keeping Chetty in view as a reserve	38
27	War Cabinet Committee on India Paper I (42) 18	6	Memorandum by Amery commending Linlithgow's proposals for reconstituting Executive Council, with explanatory Annexes	39
28	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 7	6	India Committee to consider reconstitution of Council	42
33	Linlithgow to Aney Letter	7	Possible exchange of High Commissionerships with Canada	51
41	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 7	9	Mudaliar declines to serve at War Cabinet	60
47	Aney to Linlithgow Letter	11	Refers to No. 33, and agrees that question of exchange of High Commissionerships with Canada might be reopened	73

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	Name and number	Date (May)	Main subject or subjects	Page
49	War Cabinet Committee on India I (42) 15th Meeting	11	Consideration of Linlithgow's proposals for reconstituting Executive Council	74
50	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1323-S	12	Refers to No. 12; representation at War Cabinet and reconstitution of Council	76
52	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 599	12	Refers to No. 54 and suggests further names for Council	78
53	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 4	12	India Committee's discussion of proposals for Council; Azizul Huque	78
54	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 595	13	Conveys conclusions of India Committee on Linlithgow's proposals for Council	80
55	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 601	13	Refers to No. 50 and suggests Indian representative at War Cabinet and Pacific Council might temporarily be either High Commissioner in London or a Prince	82
57	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 604	14	Refers to No. 626, para. 19 in Vol. I and enquires position regarding High Commissionership in Canada	85
63	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1388-S	17	Refers to No. 57 and asks that question should be reopened	93
69	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 8	18	Possible candidates for Council membership	97
70	Amery to Massey Letter	18	Asks him to ascertain whether Canadian Government is prepared for exchange of High Commissioners with India	104
72	Massey to Amery Letter	19	Refers to No. 70 and has made the enquiry requested	106
73	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1442-S	20	Urges that he must have freedom in choosing members of Executive Council; Begum Shah Nawaz	106
74	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1443-S	20	Refers to No. 54 and comments on India Committee's conclusions	107
75	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 217	21	Memorandum by Amery on proposed reconstitution of Executive Council	110
79	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 9308	23	Refers to No. 74 and makes various suggestions	114
86	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 7	25	Executive Council	121
87	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1513-S	26	Refers to No. 50 and reports Mudaliar's agreement to serve at War Cabinet	125
88	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 68th Conclusions, Minute 5	26	Approval of Linlithgow's proposals for reconstituting his Council	126
95	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 6	27	War Cabinet's decision on reconstitution of Council; projected exchange of High Commissioners with India and Australia	138
96	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 9494	28	Refers to No. 74 and conveys War Cabinet's approval of proposals for reconstitution of Council	143

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102	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 3, 4	29	Reconstitution of Council; Azizul Huque	146
104	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 660, para. 3	30	Suggests Ramaswami Aiyar for Information portfolio	150
107	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1565–S	30	Enquires when Mudaliar will be needed at War Cabinet; and whether Jam Saheb should now be invited to serve there	153
118	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1647–S	4	Reports formal selection by Executive Council of Mudaliar as representative at War Cabinet and Pacific Council, and deals with other matters relating to reconstitution of Council	175
119	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 682	4	Refers to No. 107 and promises early reply after consultation with Churchill	177
124	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 10123	6	Refers to No. 118, expresses general agreement, and discusses consequential arrangements	181
126	Minute by Monteath	6	Contests Churchill's objection to both Indian representatives attending War Cabinet at the same time	182
127	Amery to Churchill Minute P.40/42	6	Ditto	183
132	Churchill to Amery Minute	7	Refers to No. 127 and opines that War Cabinet meetings will have to be held in the Albert Hall	190
140	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1753–S	11	Invites comment on proposed content of new Defence Department	201
141	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1754–S	11	Subjects proposed for inclusion in new Defence Department	202
145	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 731	15	Comments on No. 140	207
148	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 4–6, 13, 14	15	Reconstitution of Executive Council; Raghavendra Rao; proposed Defence portfolio	210
154	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 4, 5	17	Raghavendra Rao; Mirza Ismail; Ramaswami Aiyar	224
155	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1841–S	18	Possible nominees for membership of Council	227
158	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1848–S	18	Refers to No. 155 and reports Ramaswami Aiyar's acceptance of seat on Council	230
164	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1858–S	19	Refers to No. 155 and proposes to give Information portfolio to Ramaswami Aiyar, Civil Defence to Srivastava	238
166	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 749	19	Refers to No. 155, agrees to Srivastava being offered seat on Council but suggests he be given Civil Defence portfolio and Ramaswami Aiyar Information	239

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179	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1893–S	23	Refers to No. 145 and replies to comments on proposed content of new Defence Department	252
181	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 2, 4, 6	23	Reconstitution of Council	254
183	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1905–S	24	Enquires whether Mudaliar can serve temporarily as Member of both Council and War Cabinet	264
186	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1920–S	25	Refers to No. 183; date of Mudaliar's departure for London and his status at War Cabinet	267
191	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 11468	27	Refers to Nos. 183 and 186 and explains Mudaliar's position in relation to Council and War Cabinet	277
192	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 786	27	Refers to No. 179 and accepts position described therein	279
193	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 787	27	Refers to No. 191 and further explains position of Indian representative at War Cabinet	279
197	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1942–S	28	Enquires whether royal approval can now be obtained for new appointments to Council	285
199	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1948–S	29	Arrangements for announcing new appointments to Council and at War Cabinet	286
202	Amery to Hardinge Letter	29	Requests royal approval for new appointments	289
203	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1955–S	30	Comments on points raised in No. 193, para. 2	290
204	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1956–S	30	Refers to No. 191; position of Mudaliar in relation to Council and of Indian representative in relation to War Cabinet	291
205	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 798	30	Refers to No. 199; arrangements for announcing reconstitution of Council	291
206	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 799	30	Draft announcement referred to in No. 205	292
207	Hardinge to Amery Letter	30	Refers to No. 202 and conveys royal approval as requested	293
209	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 8, 9	30	Reconstitution of Council now complete; position of Indian representative at War Cabinet	294
210	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1967–S	1	Refers to No. 205; arrangements for announcing reconstitution of Council	300
211	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1968–S	1	Refers to No. 206 and transmits text of proposed communiqué announcing reconstitution of Council	300
213	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 805	2	Agrees to proposals contained in Nos. 210 and 211 subject to one amendment	302

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220	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2003–S, para. 1	5	Public reaction to expansion of Council	308
222	Savarkar to Linlithgow Letter	5	Encloses statement on expansion of Council	309
223	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2012–G	6	Summary of Press statement by Sapru on 5 July on expansion of Council	311
226	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 3	6	Press reaction to expansion of Council	314
238	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 12282	9	Refers to No. 140 and asks for comments on proposed reply to parliamentary question on new Defence portfolio	354
239	Nawanagar to Linlithgow Letter	9	Conveys Princes' thanks for his appointment	355
241	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 4	9	Reaction to reconstitution of Council	357
250	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2075–S	12	Refers to No. 238, agrees to proposed reply to first two parts of question, and comments on last part	370
268	Stewart to Linlithgow Letter 501–G.B., para. 3	15	Reactions in Bihar to expansion of Council	389
314	Hope to Linlithgow Report 6, paras. 1, 2	23	Reactions in Madras to expansion of Council	441
355	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 1	28	Nearly all new members have joined Council	485
410	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13670	4	Consults him on ways of occupying spare time of Mudaliar and Jam Saheb while in U.K.	560
412	Zafrullah Khan to Linlithgow Letter	4	Muslim representation on reconstituted Council	562
430	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2305–S	6	Refers to No. 410 and states intention of consulting Mudaliar and Jam Saheb on suggestions made therein	582
510	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2385–S	12	Reports Ramaswami Aiyar's proposal to visit Gandhi	668
550	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 994	14	Refers to No. 510 and agrees with Linlithgow's attitude to Ramaswami Aiyar's proposal	701
565	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2448–S	16	Thanks for No. 550 and comments on Ramaswami Aiyar's attitude	720
566	Note by Linlithgow	16	Interview with Ramaswami Aiyar, with two letters from latter setting out his position (Appendix 1) and draft Press announcement of his resignation (Appendix 2)	720
577	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 11	17	Ramaswami Aiyar	739
583	Ramaswami Aiyar to Linlithgow Letter	19	Explains his desire to see Gandhi and criticises Government's handling of the Press	749

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590	Ramaswami Aiyar to Linlithgow Letter	20	Persists in his decision to resign from Council	758
591	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2522-S	20	Refers to No. 584; Ramaswami Aiyar's proposed resignation	761
593	Linlithgow to Ramaswami Aiyar Letter	20	Refers to No. 590, accepts his resignation, suggests line to be taken in public statements and encloses draft communiqué	763
594	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2532-S	20	Refers to No. 591 and explains decision to accept Ramaswami Aiyar's resignation	765
595	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1022	20	Occasions on which Indian representatives might attend War Cabinet	766
597	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 2	20	Possible changes in membership of Council	769
599	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2535-S	21	Refers to No. 594; Ramaswami Aiyar's resignation	775
603	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1026, para. 4	21	Interim reply to No. 584 on changes in Council membership	778
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605	Linlithgow to Ramaswami Aiyar Letter	21	Refers to No. 604; agrees to arrangements for announcing resignation and to proposed statement (enclosed)	780
606	Ramaswami Aiyar to Linlithgow Letter	21	Thanks and good wishes	782
615	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2574-S	24	Reports Jam Saheb's and Mudaliar's agreement with suggestions in No. 410	794
623	Linlithgow to Nawanagar Letter	24	Explains his position as Indian representative at War Cabinet	803
625	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 8, 9, 27	24	Ramaswami Aiyar's resignation and problem of the resultant vacancy; Jam Saheb's and Mudaliar's activities while at War Cabinet	807
626	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 5	24	Ramaswami Aiyar's resignation	818
635	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2610-S	27	Suggests putting Srivastava in charge of Information as well as Civil Defence	828
639	Linlithgow to Zafrullah Khan Letter	27	Acknowledges No. 412 and discusses recent expansion of Council	833
645	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 15207	28	Agrees to proposal in No. 635 and mentions alternative of joining Information to Defence under Noon	839
660	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1061	30	Discusses papers which Indian representatives at War Cabinet might see and occasions when they might attend	851
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690	Hardinge to Turnbull Letter	4	Refers to No. 686 and will explain position to the King	893
709	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 395	7	Note by Churchill on the Indian representatives at the War Cabinet, with enclosed summary of papers to be supplied to them	920
712	Turnbull to Laithwaite Tel. 1094	8	Refers to No. 681 and describes categories of telegrams proposed to be shown to Jam Saheb and Mudaliar	923
713	Turnbull to Laithwaite Tel. 1097	8	Refers to No. 712 and asks for detailed account of telegrams seen by Council	923
718	Laithwaite to Turnbull Tel. 2736-S	9	Refers to Nos. 712 and 713 and describes circulation of telegrams to Council	926
738	Monteath to Laithwaite Tel. 1116	13	Refers to No. 718 and describes his instructions to India Office concerning circulation of telegrams to Jam Saheb and Mudaliar	954
744	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 6	14	Candidates for vacancy on Council and intention to ask Jinnah to release Muslim Leaguer	962
753	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 2	16	First Cabinet meeting attended by Jam Saheb and Mudaliar and latter's contribution on question of rice for Ceylon; efforts to make them feel at home	974
780	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 7	21	Difficulty of filling Council vacancies	1003

CHAPTER 6

The Indian States

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86	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 11	25	Apprehensions of Princes	121
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115	Nawanagar to Craik Letter	1	Urges that Princes should be given assurances to allay disquiet resulting from Cripps Mission	164
116	Linlithgow to Indore Verbal communication	3	Admonishes him for writing open letter inviting Roosevelt to arbitrate in India	174
133	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 12	8	States' reactions to Cripps' negotiations	190
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154	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 11	17	Possible appointment of Monckton as Political Adviser	224
177	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 5	22	Ditto	249
181	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 5, 12, 14	23	Objections to association of Princes with Viceroy's Council; controversy over Cripps' Commons statement on Princes; importance of retaining their support	254
187	Fitze to Patrick Letter D.494-P(C)/42	25	Forwards copy of No. 115 and urges that it calls for definite answer whose nature can only be determined by H.M.G.	268
198	Indore to Linlithgow Letter	28	Refers to No. 116 and explains his action in writing open letter to Roosevelt	285
209	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 6	30	Effect of Cripps Mission on Princes	294
226	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 11 and PS.	6	Monckton; effect of Cripps Mission on Princes	314
232	Linlithgow to Amery Letter H.E./10	7	Refers to correspondence on disquiet of Princes following Cripps Mission, suggests Amery should discuss position with Jam Saheb and demands clarification of policy on points arising from Jam Saheb's letter (No. 115)	348
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239	Nawanagar to Linlithgow Letter	9	Princes' thanks for Jam Saheb's appointment as representative at War Cabinet and Pacific War Council	355
242	Nawanagar to Craik Letter	10	Consults him on proposals of Standing Committee of Princes on contacts between Princes and British Indian party leaders	358
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401	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 21	3	Question of associating Princes with Viceroy's Council	542
509	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 15	11	Question of contact between Princes and political parties	661
561	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 14395	16	Refers to No. 187, outlines proposed reply to Jam Saheb's memorandum (No. 115), and asks for Linlithgow's early comments	711
625	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 13–15 and Annex	24	Contribution of States to war effort	807
629	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2591-P	25	Comments on No. 561 and outlines reply which, subject to Amery's approval, would now be made to No. 115, adding some further observations	822
685	Amery to Cripps Letter	3	Sends an advance copy of No. 691 and hopes he will agree that a Cabinet discussion on it is unnecessary	891
691	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 391	4	Memorandum by Amery on request by Chamber of Princes (see No. 115) for statement of policy by H.M.G.	894
692	Gidney to Fitze Letter 2419-C	4	Encloses letter from Government of Hyderabad requesting statement by H.M.G. to remove any misunderstanding arising from Cripps' Commons speech of 28 April	898

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19	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 562	5	Enquires position on question of release of students in prison	28
62	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1386-S	17	Refers to No. 19 and reports position regarding detained students	92
151	Hallett to Linlithgow Letter U.P.-142, para. 2	16	Decision to raise ban on Communist Party of India	220

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240	Amery to Morrison Letter	9	Encloses No. 230 and asks whether raising ban on Indian Communist Party would embarrass him	355
241	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 1	9	Has referred question of raising ban to Morrison	357
257	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 91st Conclusions, Minute 9	13	Agreement on raising ban on Communist Party	377
262	S. of S. to G. of I., Home Dept Tel. 12502	14	Refers to No. 230, welcomes proposal to raise ban and suggests amendments to announcement	383
271	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 5526	16	Refers to No. 262 and accepts amendments	394
313	Herbert to Linlithgow Report, para. 4	23	Dangers of too liberal policy towards Communist Party and Students' Federation	439
401	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 12	3	Raising of ban on Communist Party	542

CHAPTER 8

Discussions arising from the War Financial Settlement of 1940

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373	Raisman to Linlithgow Tel. 924 via India Office	30	Describes discussions with Treasury on Indian Sterling Balances and suggests Linlithgow might press for him to be present when Cabinet considers question	503
374	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 925	30	Refers to No. 373 and requests Linlithgow to telegraph him expressing hope that Raisman would be given opportunity of being heard by Cabinet	504
375	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 325	30	Memorandum by Kingsley Wood on Indian Sterling Balances	504
378	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2254-S	31	Announces despatch of telegram on lines suggested in No. 374	510
379	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2255-S	31	Hopes that Raisman would be given opportunity of being heard by Cabinet, and warns of grave consequences of an adverse decision	510
385	Amery to Churchill Letter	31	Refers to No. 375 and requests permission for Raisman to attend Cabinet	515
389	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 328	1	Memorandum by Amery on Indian Sterling Balances	519

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402	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 7	3	Churchill's agreement to Raisman's attendance at Cabinet	550
435	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 105th Conclusions, Minute 2	6	War Financial Settlement of 1940 and Indian Sterling Balances	586
457	Amery to Kingsley Wood Letter	7	Argues against upsetting existing arrangements for apportioning war expenditure between United Kingdom and India	613
476	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 966	9	Refers to No. 379 and reports War Cabinet discussion on Sterling Balances (No. 435)	633
595	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1022	20	Refers to No. 379, asks that Raisman should make clear the limited capacity in which he attended War Cabinet	766
625	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 23	24	Raisman's attendance at War Cabinet	807
710	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2725–S	8	Informs him that several questions on War Financial Settlement were tabled for answer in Assembly on 14 September and asks whether any decision thereon had yet been reached	922
720	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1099	9	Refers to No. 710 and informs him that Cabinet had not yet reached decision	929
721	Amery to Kingsley Wood Letter	9	Refers to No. 435, Minute 2, and No. 710, and suggests they should explain position to Churchill prior to obtaining Cabinet decision next week	929
726	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1109	10	Refers to No. 710 and informs him that decision will not be made till 18 or possibly 22 September	935
733	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2762–S	12	Refers to No. 720 and begs him to get question of War Financial Settlement settled by 18 September	951
737	Amery to Kingsley Wood Letter	12	Encloses No. 733 and urges him to see Churchill as soon as possible to enable Cabinet to reach early decision on War Financial Settlement	953
750	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 125th Conclusions	16	War Financial Settlement of 1940 and Indian Sterling Balances	970
751	Amery to Kingsley Wood Letter	16	Discusses draft telegram to Linlithgow communicating War Cabinet Conclusion (as in No. 750) on Financial Settlement	972
752	Amery to Simon Letter	16	Suggests passage for draft telegram to Linlithgow communicating War Cabinet Conclusion (as in No. 750)	973
753	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 3, 4	16	His own and Churchill's views on Financial Settlement	974

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757	Draft by Treasury	17	Draft telegram to Linlithgow on War Financial Settlement	981
759	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2809–S	18	Thanks for No. 754 and asks for Cabinet's reservation as soon as possible	983
763	Amery to Kingsley Wood Letter	18	Proposes shorter alternative to No. 757, explains reasons for disliking latter, and insists that in any event its final sentence must be amended	987
766	Simon to Amery Letter	18	Has inserted two passages from No. 752 in No. 757 and returned the latter to Kingsley Wood	991
767	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1139	18	Has reluctantly agreed to revised draft telegram on War Financial Settlement, awaits Churchill's concurrence, and suggests line Raisman might take in Assembly	991
768	Amery to Churchill Minute P.51/42	18	Asks him to authorise despatch of telegram to Linlithgow on War Financial Settlement without further reference to Cabinet	992
769	Draft by Churchill	19	Amendments to draft telegram to Linlithgow	992
770	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1143	19	Transmits final para. of No. 769 and asks for his urgent comments	994
772	Amery to Churchill Minute P.52/42	19	Feels unable to agree with No. 769 and asks for matter to be taken at forthcoming Cabinet meeting	995
773	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2828–S	20	Refers to No. 770, describes Council's discussions on Financial Settlement, and suggests Cabinet's only course is not to notify its reservation to G. of I. but to bury it in Treasury Records	996
778	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 421	21	Note by Kingsley Wood circulating draft telegram to Linlithgow	1001
780	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 4	21	Council's attitude to War Financial Settlement	1003

CHAPTER 9

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8	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 7, 8	1	Cripps and fire-fighting apparatus; pay of officers attached to Indian Army	8

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38	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 586	9	Endorses Auchinleck's suggestion of visit to India by Duke of Gloucester	54
51	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1324-S	12	Refers to No. 38, welcomes Duke of Gloucester's visit but warns of inconveniences he would have to face	77
59	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 607	14	Refers to No. 51 and conveys King's approval of Duke of Gloucester's visit	87
60	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 1	15	Duke of Gloucester's visit	87
69	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 12	18	Ditto	97
77	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1468-S	22	Refers to No. 489 in Vol. I; recruitment to Indian Civil Service and Indian Police	112
86	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 20	25	Decision not to release civil servants for military duty	121
110	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 664	31	Refers to No. 77; recruitment to Indian Civil Service and Indian Police	155
133	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 1	8	Duke of Gloucester's visit	190
148	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–3	15	Ditto	210
181	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 11	23	Ditto	254
227	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 283	6	Cripps' Report on Mission to India	318
302	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2154-S	22	Suggests he might be able to see manuscript of Coupland's forthcoming book	426
349	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 13361	28	Requests information for Cabinet regarding numbers of King's Commissioned Indian Officers with, and I.C.Os without, powers of punishment and asks how many I.C.Os might need such powers	480
350	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 24-U	28	Refers to No. 349 and reports information is required because of Churchill's supremely unreasonable opposition to demand for powers of punishment for I.C.Os	480
355	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 18	29	Discontent among King's Commissioned Indian Officers	485
577	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 15	17	Ditto	739
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I

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir A. Hope (Madras), Sir R. Lumley (Bombay), Sir T. Stewart (Bihar), Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar), Sir R. Reid (Assam), and Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125 /110

IMPORTANT *30 April 1942*

No. 1176–S. While provincial position attracted relatively little attention during Cripps' discussions and Parliament has now approved[1] further extension of proclamations up to November next, I think it well that we should again consider to what extent, on assumption that general political deadlock remains unresolved, we can more closely associate non-official opinion in Section 93 provinces with the government of those provinces.

2. Earlier personal correspondence which will be on record with you contains full analysis of arguments for and against non-official Advisers in circumstances with which we have to deal. Those arguments have lost none of their force, and it is indeed arguable in addition that from the point of view solely of efficiency war effort may stand to gain nothing, and possibly to lose something from change-over from present official Advisers. But I should like to do what I can to ease feeling of frustration which is already evident and which is likely to become still more marked as result of failure of Cripps' discussions, and would welcome your views—

(*a*) on general question of associating non-official opinion with work of provincial governments with any suggestions you may have;

(*b*) on specific suggestion put to me by one Governor[2] that we should keep existing official Advisers but add to them non-official Advisers who could deal with departments (Supply, Production, &c.) directly related to war effort. Effect of this would be to leave responsibility for more controversial departments and for enforcement of law and order, &c., with officials, and so avoid possible reluctance of non-officials to burn their fingers over prosecutions, &c., while giving non-officials direct opportunity to function in connection with provincial war effort. Position and responsibilities of Governor would of course remain unchanged.

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 379, 28 April 1942, cols. 917–18; H. of L., vol. 122, 29 April 1942, cols. 749–815.

[2] Vol. I, No. 620, para. 5.

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2

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

1 May 1942

No. 517. Your telegram No. 1176-S,[1] dated April 30th. In my view there is now more need for associating non-official opinion with the work of Provincial Governments. For the first two years of Section 93, there was no great public interest in work of Provincial Governments, but since the threat to India has become definite, all sections of the population realise that the war may touch them, and there has been much greater interest in civil defence and other matters. This increased interest has created a wider demand for non-official Advisers and led occasionally to complaint that Provincial Government as at present constituted is not in close enough touch with the public. This complaint is sometimes exaggerated or malicious but it would be unwise to disregard it. In addition I agree with you that there is need to do something to meet the feeling of frustration which has been aggravated by results of Cripps' discussions. For these reasons I consider introduction of a non-official element is desirable and I would anticipate that a move in this direction would be generally welcomed and would not now create resentment in Congress circles which was the principal objection earlier.

2. I would not favour the abolition of official advisers on the ground that it would lead to much dislocation and loss of efficiency. I would definitely prefer the addition of non-official advisers to the existing official ones. I would however not make too strong a point of using non-official advisers only in departments directly related to the war effort. Here for instance I would probably want to keep an official adviser on work connected with civil supplies, prices and transport, as much experience has been gained by the existing adviser which it would be a pity to waste. I might also find it preferable to give some departments not directly related to the war effort, to non-officials. An additional reason for adding non-official advisers is that it would bring some relief to official advisers, though not I fear to Governor. The burden of work on existing advisers has so increased that I have lately begun to consider asking for a fourth adviser.

3. I therefore favour an attempt to bring in non-official advisers in addition to existing ones, but the success of the move would largely depend on personnel which could be obtained. There would be little advantage in getting a second-rate team which had no prestige with public, and it is difficult to say, until soundings are taken, who would be prepared to come. May I make some informal and preliminary soundings?

[1] No. 1.

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3

Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMPORTANT *1 May 1942*

No. 352–M.S. Your Excellency's telegram No. 1176–S,[1] dated April 30th. On general question I think it is most desirable to let dust of controversy arising from Cripps' visit subside before we embark on any new developments which are likely to occasion political controversy. I suggest we should concentrate on getting on with war and should do nothing which would arouse fresh controversy. As regards specific suggestion of appointing non-official Advisers I am much opposed to this proposal at the present juncture. It could only result in marked loss of efficiency with no corresponding political gain. Present official Advisers have at their fingers' ends problems of great importance connected with supply and production such as timber supplies, price-control, petrol-rationing, requisitioning of vehicles and furnishing help generally in connection with Burma and China roads, new aerodromes, new factories, civil defence, transport problems. Handing over of these matters now to non-official Advisers would inevitably mean loss of efficiency especially as regards rapid disposal of work which is so important now.

I would willingly reconsider this after a few months but I am strongly of opinion that nothing matters in the immediate future except concentrating of all effort on winning the war and especially on resisting the imminent Japanese threat.

[1] No. 1.

4

Government of India, Home Department, to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/791: ff 78–9

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *1 May 1942, 5.55 am*

Received: 1 May, 11 am

3443. Following is text of first two resolutions and summary of third resolution adopted by Congress Working Committee on April 28th:—

1. "The Committee has noted recent extraordinary happenings in Burma and notably in the city of Rangoon, when though actual military operations were still some distance away, the whole civil administration suddenly collapsed and those in charge of it sought their own safety and abandoned their

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posts just when their presence was most needed. Private motor cars were commandeered for the evacuation of high officials and Europeans, leaving their owners stranded and unprovided for. The police force was discharged or withdrawn to other places, habitual and other criminals were released from prisons, and lunatics allowed to go out of their asylum. The city of Rangoon was thus left not only without any civil administration but at the mercy of lunatics, hardened criminals, and other anti-social elements. Even previously at time of air raids it had been evident that A.R.P. organisation did not function and no thought had been given to problem of organised evacuation, food supply or shelter. A situation was thus created which involved the citizens of Rangoon in utmost misery and desolation, and which was discreditable in extreme to the Government and its high officials.

As war approaches India, the lessons of Rangoon and Lower Burma are full of meaning for this country, for the same type of official wields authority here, and recent astonishing exhibition of panic and incompetence in Madras[1] demonstrates dangers arising from inefficient and irresponsible officials, who have, in addition, no contacts with people of the country. Recent orders passed and circulars issued on behalf of various Provincial Governments indicate that they are obsessed with making provision for safety of higher civil officials and their removal from places of immediate danger. Little thought appears to have been given to drawing up of well prepared schemes for possible evacuation of a particular area and arrangement of transport, housing and food supply in a time of emergency. It is misfortune of India at this crisis in her history not only to have a foreign Government, but a Government which is incompetent and incapable of organising her defence properly or of providing for safety and essential needs of her people. As no reliance can be placed on Central or Provincial Governments functioning in India to act effectively and intelligently in times of emergency, it becomes especial duty of people to rely upon and organise themselves for this purpose. The Congress programme of self-sufficiency and self-protection is essential foundation for self-reliance and avoidance, as far as possible, of many of the evils that follow in train of war. On this programme, therefore, the people must concentrate themselves. In larger cities where special problems arise schemes should be worked out with the help of experts in regard to food supply and other measures that may be necessary in time of emergency. In particular all panic should be avoided even though those in authority give way to it."

2. "The attention of All-India Congress Committee has been drawn to variety of orders passed by Government or military authorities for evacuation of certain areas in the country. Such evacuation is often necessary in times of war for reasons of military necessity or safety of population in a particular area. But it is the recognised practice that no such orders should be passed, except in

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cases of sudden and extreme urgency, without making suitable arrangements and without even giving reason and sufficient time to people concerned to do so and, in any event, without every facility of transport and adequate compensation. It appears that no such facilities have been provided and in many cases no compensation or totally inadequate compensation has been given. Some orders have demanded evacuation from an area within 24 hours, thus making it impossible for families to do anything but to walk out, camp under the trees, become destitute and starve. No Government worth the name should allow this to happen, and even from military point of view such happenings are highly undesirable as they lead to widespread resentment among the people.

The Committee has also noted with dismay that frequent and well authenticated reports have been received of molestation of women by soldiers in railway trains and evacuated and other places. These have already led to disastrous consequences including the shooting of people who resisted in some places and there is a growing and widespread feeling of deep resentment, especially at the inability of any authority to take effective measures to prevent these happening or to punish the culprits. The civil authority appears to be powerless and the Military authority disinclined to intervene. The Committee trusts that immediate steps will be taken to check and put an end to this molestation which must be resisted by the people at all costs."

3. All-India Congress Committee has noted with indignation arrangements made for and treatment accorded to evacuees from Malaya and Burma. Officials whose business it was to protect lives of people in their areas utterly failed to discharge responsibility and, running away from post of duty, sought safety for themselves leaving vast majority of people wholly unprovided for. Such arrangements for evacuees as were made were principally for the European population and at every step racial discrimination was in evidence. Because of this and of the utter incompetence, callousness and selfishness of those in authority, vast numbers of Indians in Malaya and Burma have lost all they possessed and have undergone unimaginable sufferings, many dying on the way. Racial discrimination was shown at the base camps in Burma, and there was particular scandal of safer and more convenient route being practically reserved for non-Indians while Indians were forced to travel by longer, more difficult and more dangerous route.

Committee is aware that recently some alterations had been made in these arrangements and Indians are now being brought by air from Myitkyina and can also avail themselves of safer land route in limited numbers. Treatment of evacuees on Indian side of the border though somewhat better now is still far from satisfactory. From all reports conditions at the base camps in Burma are highly unsatisfactory and the worst sufferers are the Indians. Committee calls

[1] See Vol. I, No. 651.

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on the Government of India to make all necessary arrangements for speedy evacuation from unoccupied zone in Burma of all Indians who wish to be evacuated. Suitable Indians should be appointed to supervise their interests. Problem of evacuees is not solved by merely bringing them to India. Every effort should be made to find suitable work for them. Committee expresses appreciation of fine service rendered by various non-official relief organisations and calls upon Indian public to extend all possible help to evacuees. Committee extends warm welcome for all Indians who have returned to home land in these distressing circumstances and assures them of deep sympathy.

5

Government of India, Home Department, to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/791: f 83

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *1 May 1942, 5.40 am*
Received: 1 May, 10.30 am

3444. Continuation of my telegram No. 3443.[1]

Text of resolutions was submitted by Associated Press for press advice and after due consideration of possible consequences we decided every possible step should be taken to prevent publication of whole of first resolution and that portion of second which deals with alleged molestation of women by soldiers. Remainder of second resolution and whole of third, although objectionable, were passed for publication. It seems to us that deliberate object of resolutions was to bring Government into hatred and contempt, to undermine public confidence in Government's ability to defend India, to excite hostility against (?Near East) forces British and (?Indian) on whom safety of country depends and to encourage establishment of parallel administration. Mere advice against publication would have been ineffective and immediate action was necessary. We therefore issued general prohibitory orders under Defence Rule 41 (1)(*b*)[2] and warned all Provincial Governments to take action against defiance of orders. Prohibitory orders seem to have been generally effective although in some places they were not in time to prevent summaries of resolutions from appearing.

We realise that our action may provoke conflict with large section of press and possibly with Congress itself. We cannot however hold our hands indefinitely and we are convinced that time has come to stem the flood of seditious and defeatist utterances with which Congress are endeavouring to cover their failure over Cripps Mission. Impression may have been caused outside India that Congress have adopted policy of non-embarrassment if not of

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active support for war effort but in spite of some professions to this effect which have been given exaggerated publicity position is far otherwise. (?True) temper of Congress is revealed by these resolutions, general effect of which should, we consider, be given full publicity in England and America.

[1] No. 4.

[2] Empowering the Government of India or Provincial Governments, 'for the purpose of securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of war', to make orders prohibiting the printing or publishing of any document or class of documents.

6

The Marquess of Linlithgow to President Roosevelt

MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *1 May 1942*

Dear Mr President,

I have received your letter of March 19th, 1942,[1] which has been presented to me by Colonel Louis Johnson and write to assure you how glad we are to have with us in India one of his personality and distinguished attainments, a man moreover who enjoys the President's personal confidence.

2. It has been a pleasure to me to meet Colonel Johnson and I am confident that his experience and personality, particularly in problems relating to military supply, will be of the greatest assistance to India and America in the prosecution of the joint war effort. His presence among us is an earnest of high endeavour in the common cause.

May I send you an expression of esteem and cordial good wishes on behalf of the Princes and peoples of India and from myself.

Yours very sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

[1] Vol. I, No. 350.

7

Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL GOVT. HOUSE, LAHORE, *1 May 1942*

The Sikhs, although, as I have recently told you, they are undoubtedly relieved by the rejection of the offer brought by Sir Stafford Cripps, are still feeling distinctly restive. Master Tara Singh and his Lieutenants have found it an easy

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matter to stir up communal feeling at the alleged danger of the Sikhs being subjected to Muhammadan rule in the Punjab, and they are loath to cease from exploiting this opportunity. They will no doubt derive some degree of comfort from the sympathetic references made to Sikhs in the debates which have just taken place in Parliament, but it is to be hoped that these expressions of sympathy will not go to their heads and lead them to believe that "Khalistan" is regarded in responsible quarters as a practicable proposition. As you are well aware, the practical objections to "Khalistan" are even greater than those which lie in the path of Pakistan. Apart from the upheaval that would be caused by tearing out a large section of territory from the vitals of the provincial body politic, it is worth remembering that there is not one single district in which the Sikhs command a majority. Another illustration of the complexity of the problem is to be found in the Punjab States Agency. Little reliance can be placed on the results of the last Census[1] owing to the determination of all communities to inflate their own figures, but it is true that a few years ago, though there are half a dozen Sikh States in the Agency, there was only one State, the Muslim State of Malerkotla, where the majority of the population were Sikhs.

The obvious course for the Sikhs to pursue is to seek a satisfactory basis for combining with the major community in the Province. The Sikhs are still clamouring for what they profess to regard as their due representation on the Governor-General's Executive Council and in the Punjab Cabinet. The names most commonly mentioned as suitable candidates for elevation to the Executive Council are those of Sir Jogendra Singh, now Prime Minister in Patiala, and Sardar Baldev Singh, and occasionally Sardar Buta Singh, C.B.E., of Amritsar.

[1] Of 1941.

8

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *1 May 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for the most interesting series of letters which I received from you by the last bag (31st March, 3rd and 11th April).[1] They were of all the greater interest because the delay in their receipt was so small and they, therefore, arrived so closely on the heels of the events which they dealt with. It was pretty clear to me when I read them that you were in some doubt as to the precise extent to which I had, in fact, been effectively consulted (or informed) by Cripps on certain of the developments in his discussions and negotiations, and I

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thought it well therefore, particularly in view of the debate, to send you my telegram No. 25-U[2] of 25th April, which showed what the true position was. That telegram covers much of the ground taken in your letters and I need not add to it here. But I am bound to say that scraps of information that come to me from one source and another are leading me a little to wonder whether the Congress had not after all some reason to think that His Majesty's Government and Cabinet were prepared to go practically the whole way as regards the Viceroy's Council, leaving the Viceroy in the position of a constitutional monarch, and whether they may not quite genuinely have thought that Cripps was prepared to make such a concession and to go to those lengths, and, with that assumption in view, concentrated on the one outstanding point of defence. And Cripps has never contradicted the specific suggestion made in Kalam Azad's reply of 11th April.[3] However the main importance, at this stage, of any such suggestion or possibility is that it might tend to throw a good deal of discredit on to Cripps out here, and to leave the impression that His Majesty's Government had tried to be clever and tried, by despatching a negotiator well-known to be sympathetic to Congress, to lead them up the garden path and get them to accept propositions on the assumption that they were going to receive concessions which in practice they would not have received, and I can see signs of some little acidity of comment as regards Cripps himself.

2. But the debate has made the position clear. The only point to which one could take exception in Cripps' statement of the position was his reference to the suggestion that the reconstituted Council should contain the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief only as official members.[4] But I do not suppose any decisive harm has been done by it, and I propose, any way, to carry on with my intention of recommending Benthall for a seat and shall be telegraphing to you about that in the next day or two. Warmest congratulations to you on your own handling of the position, and my best thanks, too, for all the help and support that you have given me throughout a most difficult time, and in circumstances the difficulty of which only you and I are likely fully to appreciate.

3. Our line must now of course be, as you and I agree, to try what we can do here to keep the atmosphere sweet. I am turning over a variety of minor propositions in my mind, though they are none of them too easy, and I suspect that what it may come down to will be that (if soundings here show that it is likely to have any value that matters) I should recommend to you a Defence Co-ordination portfolio, and that I should aim at getting the minor minorities adequately represented when we come to fill the other vacancies. I have let you know privately[5] that certain of my Councillors had been brooding over a series

[1] Vol. I, Nos. 476, 517, and 610. [2] Vol. I, No. 690. [3] Vol. I, No. 604.
[4] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 379, 28 April 1942, col. 840. [5] Vol. I, No. 670.

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of specific propositions which, if accepted, would take us a good deal further, and would have handed over (by convention, since they are under the impression that Cabinet authorised Cripps to agree to a convention of that nature) the Governor-General's discretion to the Governor-General in Council, &c. But there are considerable internal differences of view, largely communal in character, inside my Council, and in the result I think that with skilful handling I am likely to be able to avoid being confronted with a united series of demands of this nature; while I do not think that those of my friends, who want to put them forward, will risk the possibility of a counter-memorandum, the arguments in which were of an essentially communal character, from others of their colleagues. But the mere fact that there are these internal developments makes me the more anxious to do what I can to make gestures or minor concessions which may strengthen the position of the Council outside and confirm its members in the view that one is genuinely sympathetic to the idea of constitutional progress.

4. As I write, the All-India Congress Committee is still in Session. There are conflicting views as to what Rajagopalachariar is likely to do; but there is a certain amount of suggestion that he may be prepared to fight. I should be perfectly well pleased if he were to go back to Madras, if he did quarrel with the main body, and if he could get a government together there with a majority. (A majority must of course depend on the extent to which Congress members in the Madras Legislature follow the Working Committee rather than Rajagopalachariar, and if he were able to do so there would of course be a howl from the non-Brahmins, but it is after all up to non-Brahmins to organise themselves and get into a position to defeat the Congress electorally, and that they have signally failed to do though they have had every opportunity in these last three years.) But the example might very well spread and it might be of real significance and importance from the point of view of general constitutional development at the present stage. However, I do not propose to worry you with an examination of possible hypotheses—they will be as present to you as they are to me. I am pretty clear, however, on one important point, that, supposing that Rajagopalachariar now definitely quarrels with Congress and comes out in opposition, there would be very little point in my taking him into my Council straightaway, for he, as a lone individual, loses most of his value the moment he is in open opposition; but were he to go into opposition, form a Ministry in Madras, and serve as Prime Minister there, for even quite a short period, the position would be quite different, and I could, I have little doubt, with advantage see him as a colleague at the Centre, leaving Satyamurti or someone else of that type to run a Ministry in Madras.

[Para. 5, on employment for Mr Fazlul Huq, omitted.]

6. I do not think there is very much else that I need say in the political

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field save that, as I mentioned in one of my telegrams, the only true solvent of our problems here is likely, in my judgment, to be a substantial victory or series of victories in the field or upon the oceans. There is a natural tendency in the Indian mind to reinsure, and to avoid finding himself on the wrong side of the fence, and I shall be very surprised if that characteristic is not a pretty marked feature of the present situation.

7. Now for a word on some miscellaneous points arising out of your letters. The first time I saw Cripps' telegram[6] to Winston about fire fighting apparatus, &c., which you mention in paragraph 5 of your letter of the 31st March, was when your protest regarding it was received. It was of course sent through my office, but merely as a post office for Cripps. Turnbull will be able to give you the background of it. I gather that the drafting was done in Cripps' Secretariat. I need not say how grateful I am to you for your interest and for all that has in fact since then been done; and I think the telegram, objectionable as it may have been in certain ways, has in fact, thanks to your co-operation at the other end, produced quick results in the shape of pumps, &c.

8. I am so glad, too, that this business of rates of pay for officers attached to the Indian Army has been settled up.[7]

* * *

10. I have dealt with the general political position earlier in this letter, but there are one or two comments that suggest themselves on specific points raised in your letters with which I am now dealing. On paragraph 5 of your letter of the 3rd April, I am now quite sure that self-government along with the removal of British influence is incompatible with unity, and I have little doubt that Indians themselves will gradually come to realise that that is the case. I agree also with what you say in paragraph 6 of the same letter as to the general effect of the Cripps negotiations—our position is worse here on the short view, but better on the long. As for paragraph 7 of your letter, I did not at all agree with Cripps' estimate of the position, which it seems to me was designed to make the Cabinet's hair stand on end. But no necessity arose for me to send you the detailed counter statement which I had ready, and the period which has elapsed since the negotiations broke down entirely confirms me in my feeling that his picture was sadly over-coloured.

* * *

13. In paragraph 4 of your letter of 24th March[8] you will remember that you quoted Lytton as having mentioned one Narayan in connection with the Sundarbans. We have found some difficulty in ascertaining whom Lytton has

[6] Vol. I, No. 451. [7] See Vol. I, No. 476, para. 4. [8] Vol. I, No. 375.

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in mind. The D.I.B. suggests that it is possible that he is thinking of Dr. Narayan Roy (Jugantar), who was sentenced to 20 years' transportation on 27th November 1930 in connection with the recovery of bombs from a house in Calcutta—a sentence reduced on appeal to 15 years' transportation. Perhaps you could let me know?

14. I commented in paragraph 8 of my letter of the 19th April[9] on Moore and his activities. He has been rather quieter for the last few days. But I think that you should see the extract I am sending you by this bag from a personal letter[10] I have had from Wavell commenting on Moore's unfounded attack on the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, on the grounds that he had prepared a panic evacuation scheme. [Rest of para. relates to move of a department from Calcutta.]

15. As promised in paragraph 18 of my letter of the 26th January,[11] I can now let you know the result of Craik's examination in consultation with Hodson of the constitutional aspect of the question of the absorption of smaller States into British Indian Provinces. Section 290 of the Government of India Act, 1935, leaves no doubt that neither the Provinces nor the Federation should be coerced into accepting an alteration of Provincial boundaries which is objectionable to them, though contumacious and unreasonable objection could be overridden. On the question of financial adjustments it seems that the Provinces would have a strong point in claiming that Section 145 intended any pensions to former Rulers or their descendants to be paid by the Crown Representative out of monies provided by the Federation. The constitutional position would not, in Hodson's opinion, have been affected even if the draft Declaration brought out by Cripps had been finally issued. Nevertheless, the mere publication of the draft has, as he points out, altered the political background, because any major variation from the policy for future constitutional procedure embodied therein will have to be justified in the face of a critical and awakened public opinion. The main effect of this episode so far as the States are concerned is, it seems, to render still more urgent the need for pursuing plans for fitting the smaller States to take some place in a future Indian Union.

16. "China Day", which I mentioned in my letter of the 18th February,[12] proved a success, and the reports which I have seen of the celebration show that it was marked by genuine enthusiasm all over India. Collections raised about Rs. 14 lakhs—a tidy sum considering the many competing demands on public generosity in this country. I telegraphed the result to Madame Chiang and received a very warm expression of thanks from her. I may be able to send part of the gift in the form of medical supplies purchased in India.

[9] Vol. I, No. 626; the date should be 14 April. [10] Not printed. [11] Vol. I, No. 30.
[12] Vol. I, No. 135, para. 5; the date should be 16–17 February.

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9

Government of India, Home Department, to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/791: f 80

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *2 May 1942, 10.10 pm*
Received: 3 May, 2.45 am

3480. Your 7712[1] dated April 30th. Parliamentary Question, Congress resolutions. Please see our telegram 3444[2] dated April 30th. Suggest answer should contain full quotations from resolutions which should not however be telegraphed to India. There is no truth in allegation in first resolution that circulars of Provincial Governments indicated obsession with providing for safety of higher civil officials. This would in fact be in direct contravention of instructions[3] referred to in our telegram 3231[4] dated April 23rd. Nor (?of course) is it true that little thought has been given to preparation of evacuation scheme. Banned portion of second resolution obviously referred mainly to events at place called Feni[5] in Bengal regarding which Defence Dept. are sending you separate communication.

2. Your telegram 7789[6] dated May 1st on same subject. We must leave you

[1] Requesting material for reply to a Parliamentary Question for 7 May which asked why publication of the Congress Working Committee resolution of 28 April had been banned. L/P&J/8/791: f 90.

[2] No. 5; the date should be 1 May.

[3] Government of India's Home Department letter No. 67/42-Pol.(1) of 9 April 1942 states that the policy requiring civil officers to remain at their posts in the event of enemy occupation had been modified 'to the extent that no civil official should be expected to go out of his way to surrender himself deliberately to the enemy'. But the following principles (among others) were still to be adhered to: there must be no 'hasty or unregulated departure of officials at the first sign of danger'; local and municipal officials should be encouraged to remain even after enemy occupation; no official whose duty was connected with the 'denial policy' should leave until his task was completed; subordinate staff should not be directed to remain, while superior officers were directed to withdraw, although the personal safety of unimportant officials might be safeguarded by allowing them to merge into the ordinary population; officials responsible for law and order as distinct from officials of specialised departments should remain till the last possible moment 'putting their duty in all cases before their personal safety'. L/P&J/8/557: ff 37–8.

[4] Stating that invasion policy had 'been modified to the effect that civil officials are not deliberately to surrender to the enemy' and adding that district officers, in consultation with the military authorities, were to ensure 'against hasty unregulated departure of officials'. L/P&J/8/557: f 42.

[5] The events at Feni were reported to Mr Amery in Sir J. Herbert's telegrams Nos. 97, 103, and 105 of 20, 28, and 30 April and the Government of India's Defence Department telegram 2051 of 4 May. They may be summarised as follows: a party of Sikh soldiers cutting trees were attacked by villagers upon whom they opened fire killing two of them. The villagers made allegations (which the District Magistrate considered to be false) that the attack was due to molestation of women and looting by the troops. Since such charges had been preferred, an enquiry, in which the G.O.C. had concurred, was proceeding under section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. L/P&J/8/791: ff 84–6, 88.

[6] Requesting material for reply to a Parliamentary Question for 7 May which asked whether Mr Amery would, with a view to improving understanding between the peoples of India and the

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to judge whether resolutions themselves contain any evidence of desire for better understanding between India and Britain. Fact that we allowed publication of first part of second resolution whole of third and also whole of All-India Congress Committee's resolutions of May 1st[7] regarding attitude to war should (?afford) ample proof that our so-called censorship is neither rigid nor arbitrary.

U.K., remove 'the present rigid censorship now applied to the deliberations and decisions of representative bodies of Indian people'. L/P&J/8/791: f 89.

[7] See enclosure to No. 43.

10

Minutes by Mr Patrick and Sir D. Monteath

L/P&J/8/791: ff 81–2

2 May 1942

The banning of Resol[utio]n 1 and of the second part of Resol[utio]n 2 seems to be a mild application of the policy advocated in S/S's telegram of 31 Jan[uar]y[1] and on military and morale grounds entirely justifiable. We are presumably in no position to check up on the account of what happened at Rangoon and on the alleged raping, enquiries are not complete. This may be a sufficient reason for a check on internal publicity.

A more difficult problem arises when we are accused in Parliament and no doubt in U.S.A. of deliberately suppressing the views of a responsible body which has lately been in conflict with Government on a matter of high policy.

It may be necessary for S/S, besides defending the G[overnment of] I[ndia] and G[overnment of] B[urma] on the allegations allowed to appear, to assure the House that what was suppressed had no relation to the Cripps Mission and that it was suppressed because based on unverifiable rumours of a defeatist and provocative character, not—as the G[overnment of] I[ndia] in tel[egra]m 3444[2] suggest—as a measure of reprisal against Congress. It may be awkward to sustain the position, but the *mot d'ordre* from the debate in Parliament is "no recriminations".

I have asked War Staff separately to collate if they have it any information on the subject in para. 1 of Resol[utio]n 2. If they have none either they or Pol[itical] Dep[artmen]t will enquire from India what answer could be given in the event of another P.Q.

P. J. P.

It seems a pity that the G[overnment] of I[ndia] did not ban the whole lot, while they were about it. What they have let go is quite intolerable in its

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suggestio falsi and calculation to create not merely despondency but ill will. The only point gained by the release of what has been released is that it enables one to say "Judge by it the tenour of what had to be suppressed." I hope a firm line will be taken in relation to any P.Q.'s, and will not be departed from owing to undue respect for the "no recriminations" attitude—to which Maulana Azad's speech in Pol: 3474[3] shows that Congress have no intention of adhering.

D. T. M.

[1] Vol. I, No. 53. [2] No. 5.
[3] The India Office register number of Lord Linlithgow's telegram 1171-G (Vol. I, No. 714).

II

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/544: ff 120–1

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *2 May 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

552. I hope it will not embarrass you while formulating ideas promised in para. 2 of your private and personal telegram 25th April, 285S–C[1] as to expansion of Council, if I make suggestion about Publicity portfolio, vacant, I believe, since Hydari's death. This portfolio has now clearly become of first importance in present emergency, both internally as organ for steadying morale of Indian public and externally for putting across India's view of affairs, particularly in the United States and China. It seems very desirable that person selected as Member should have personal experience in technique of publicity as well as of course wide range of contact with political parties and also other elements in Indian life. At previous stage you had it in mind to transfer Noon from present portfolio to succeed Hydari. He has shown himself quite good instrument for publicity but I doubt whether he has much knowledge of technique of organisation. You are probably turning over other names in your mind and I know you previously felt some hesitation about bringing Mirza Ismail into your Council, but publicity is a matter of organisation of which he has, I should judge, had considerable experience, and his name of course is known outside India.

2. If foregoing suggestion appeals to you it may have bearing on your intentions for Firoz Khan Noon. I suppose he would be possible candidate for Defence Co-ordination or, with Mudaliar (since both know public life and

[1] In para. 2 Lord Linlithgow announced that his preliminary ideas for the expansion of his Executive Council would be telegraphed early in the following week. L/PO/10/17: f 70.

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governmental organisation in England)[2] candidate for representative with War Cabinet and Pacific Council. But it occurs to me that in this position Firoz having so recently left India House might be little embarrassing to new High Commissioner. In any case if you are still entertaining idea of rotation in this War Cabinet appointment it would be better with Muslim High Commissioner to start off with non-Muslim.

[2] Sir Firoz Khan Noon served as High Commissioner for India in Britain from 1930 to 1941. Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar had served successively as a member of the Council of India and as an Adviser to the Secretary of State from 1936 to 1939.

12

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *3 May 1942, 11.25 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 3 May, 11 pm*

No. 1215-S. Following are my provisional conclusions as regards the reconstitution of my Council.

1. Following vacancies have to be considered:—
   (*a*) Information.
   (*b*) Communications, consequent on promotion of Clow.
   (*c*) New portfolio of War Transport to be taken out of present Communications Department.
   (*d*) War Cabinet and Pacific Council.
   (*e*) Defence Co-ordination, if such a portfolio is to be established.

2. Appointment of British Indian representative to War Cabinet and Pacific Council (I assume same individual will fill both *plus* a Prince) falls to be made by the Governor-General in Council under Prime Minister's statement.[1] Remainder will be made in the ordinary course on my recommendation.

3. As new blood I have the following in view:—
   (*a*) Mohammad Usman.
   (*b*) Benthall.
   (*c*) Ambedkar.
   (*d*) A Sikh—Jogendra Singh.
   (*e*) I am very anxious to get someone in who will at once be of good quality and have had some recent active connection with the States. I should be averse to Mirza Ismail who incidentally would give us two

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Shias out of three Muhammadans, and my strong disposition is to go for C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar and try to find a really competent Dewan for Travancore in his place, e.g., Gyan Nath from Jaipur.

4. As regards allocation of portfolios that must depend very largely on the decision as regards War Cabinet and Pacific Council. I am greatly attracted by possibility of sending Mudaliar. He is of first class quality and would be a very great loss to my Council in terms of ability, but I think he might himself feel that he was more in the centre of things if he were holding this post.

5. The next question for consideration is whether or not we should have a Defence Co-ordination portfolio. Such a portfolio with the content envisaged in the Cripps discussions has been a good deal blown on here. For all that, I think there is a great deal to be said for establishing it. I will look again at the content proposed in the Cripps discussions for the Defence Department in case I have any suggestion to make; and will discuss with the Chief. Subject to that my considered recommendation to you would be in favour of a Defence Co-ordination Department to be held by a non-official Indian probably with very much the same content as proposed in the Cripps discussions, though we should have to safeguard any weak points in the formulas then proposed, the Commander-in-Chief to remain Defence Member of Council.

6. On the assumption that you agree to the recommendation in the preceding paragraph the communal aspect of the division of the more important new posts has to be considered. If we decide to send Mudaliar to Washington and London, (especially if the Princely representative were the Jam Saheb and so a Hindu) I shall be under very strong pressure[2] to find an active war appointment for a Muslim. I cannot take Supply from Mody, and while Raghavendra Rao's health continues to cause me serious concern, matters have not yet reached a point at which he can properly be relieved of Civil Defence. I have always been anxious to put Firoz into Information, which I think he would do admirably, and which has a general political flavour which might appeal to him. But if we were to send Mudaliar home then I think that I should do better to put *Firoz* into the new *Defence portfolio*. That would incidentally be some recognition of the part played by the Punjab, while the relatively limited content of the Defence portfolio might be some consolation to Sikander for not being brought in to fill it.

7. Proceeding from those assumptions, we should have available (*a*) Commerce, (*b*) Information, (*c*) War Transport, (*d*) Communications, and (*e*) Labour. For Labour, Ambedkar, with his labour connections is a strong candidate.

[1] Lord Linlithgow presumably meant Mr Amery's statement of 12 February, which had been approved by Mr Churchill; see Vol. I, Nos. 107 and 117.

[2] Deciphered as '(?omission)'.

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8. For Commerce, I think Sarker (here again his health is not yet quite firmly re-established) is probably our best choice in succession to Mudaliar. He is actively interested in the commercial and financial sides and has repeatedly made it clear to me that, while he will do his best in Education, Health and Lands, that is not really his country. He would be taking a physical risk in assuming so heavy a department as Commerce, and I should have to warn him before giving it to him that he must be prepared to do a twelve-hour day. But if he is prepared to take a chance of the risks involved then I would let him have Commerce, for which he is admirably qualified.

9. For Education, Health and Lands *vice* Sarker if appointed to Commerce, Jogendra Singh would, I think, be quite a good selection.

10. The balance of the present Communications portfolio after War Transport has been taken out could go to Sir Mohammad Usman.

11. That would leave us with Information for C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar. Given the great political importance of Information, I think we could reasonably expect him to be satisfied with it. I am much inclined to rename the portfolio "Public Relations".

12. War Transport would go to Benthall (we should be under some criticism on the ground that we have emasculated the Communications portfolio and given the better half of it to a European, but I think we can probably face that).

13. We shall have provided for the Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes by the arrangements suggested above.

14. Firoz Khan Noon was appointed a Minister of the Punjab on the 3rd January 1927 and appears to have[3] served continuously in that capacity until 1st July 1936. He has been in my Council since 21st October 1941, and thus satisfies the service criterion.[4] We need not therefore make a temporary appointment to succeed Clow and can wait until the permanent man is available. I would propose that Roy should carry on as Secretary in the meantime. It is essential, however that Benthall should be out here as soon as possible, particularly as his seniority in Council will depend on his date of arrival. Risk of any real hitch here over his appointment I would judge to be small, and I suggest that, on the assumption that he will get War Transport and be willing to take it, he should be flown out at earliest possible moment so as to be on the spot when the vacancy is announced.

15. I should be grateful for earliest possible indication of your reaction, as it is important now to get ahead, and I can take no soundings of any one until I know that you agree.

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16. Above was drafted before receipt of your private and personal telegram No. 522.[5] I am glad we agree about Firoz and Mudaliar. I fear I am not attracted by the idea of Mirza and would much prefer C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar if I can get him.

[3] 'appears to have' was received corrupt.
[4] Government of India Act 1935, Ninth Schedule, Sec. 36 (3). [5] No. 11.

13

Sir T. Stewart (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMPORTANT *3 May 1942*

No. 19. Your telegram No. 1176-S.[1] I fully agree that there exists in public mind a feeling of frustration and exasperation by reason of prolongation of purely official Section 93 régime. Apart however from administrative objections [to?] appointment of non-official Advisers, to which I shall later refer, I fear such appointments would do little or nothing to remove public dissatisfaction. Moderate opinion has hardened very much in the past year or 18 months and I have no hope that a public which was so strongly at one with Congress over the issue of Defence portfolio in Your Excellency's Council would be to any appreciable degree placated by the appointment of non-official Advisers even if men of standing and public reputation were available and could be persuaded to serve. Even so pronounced a careerist as Yunus has made it clear that office as Adviser is unacceptable.

2. I now turn to the political difficulties. In the course of the 1937 exchanges on the subject of Advisers Hallett analysed personnel situation and came to the conclusion that Sultan Ahmad and Darbhanga were the only possibilities. Former is not available and latter would be a dead weight only in these days of quick decisions. Outside the main political groups there is no one else who in my opinion carries the weight or possesses the necessary ability and the appointment of mediocrities would be harshly criticised if not actively resented.

3. Your Excellency refers to the arguments, for and against, which have been advanced since 1937. In addition I would urge in present circumstances of this Province where we are in hour to hour liaison with an A.H.Q. and continually at its service and where we are under no very distant threat of hostile action, it would be serious clog on administration to change over at the present time. Russell is almost entirely taken up by questions relating to war

[1] No. 1.

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and civil defence and leaving aside any question of diligence in duty, I do not think inexperienced non-official could overtake his work.

4. The alternative suggestion has been made that non-official Advisers should be brought in in addition to existing officials. It is a corollary that they would have to be put in charge of war subjects and that the officials would be relegated to routine administration such as Revenue, Law and Order (group corrupt and?) no other arrangement would satisfy either the individual or popular demand. In such a case arguments advanced in previous paragraph apply with equal force.

5. I would not have it thought in advancing objections I am not sensible of the advantages of public support. On the contrary I am only too well aware that sustained barrage of criticism some of it justified but much of it malevolent, is affecting the morale of some of my officers and I would welcome any device which would ease the strain. If I thought appointment of non-official Advisers would achieve that end I would be ready to meet difficulties as best I could but, as I see it, the advantage is not worth the price.

14

Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

4 May 1942

Your Excellency's telegram No. 1176-S[1] of April 30th.

2. In this Province interest in politics is probably confined to fewer persons than elsewhere in India and I think appointment of Advisers would do little to hearten or stimulate public feeling generally. I also feel that our educated minority who in general regret failure of Cripps' efforts towards settlement of big issues would think Advisers a rather colourless concession.

3. Beneficial effect from political point of view would therefore be confined to the one or two persons chosen; local Muslim leaders would be only mildly gratified if one of their number were chosen.

4. But such appointments would in no way embarrass me and if I could find a man capable of handling the whole supply organisation of the Province, there would be positive practical value.

5. I would certainly desire to keep official Adviser as well. He takes certain departmental work off my shoulders in a way non-official could hardly do.

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6. My great difficulty would be to find a man of proper quality, especially if he is to be taken from ranks of prominent politicians. Factional jealousies increase the difficulties. I would probably select a good Muslim lawyer who is not in politics. But this again might detract from the value of whole movement.

[1] No. 1.

15

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *4 May 1942*

D.-o. No. 278-H.E.

My dear Linlithgow,

I enclose a letter[1] which has come in from N. M. Joshi, together with a memorandum which he sent with his letter. The memorandum appears to be of some importance, as it advances the Communist offer of co-operation somewhat further than, so far as I am aware, has been the case hitherto. In fact, it offers full support to the war, and specifies the terms which it demands of Government in return for its support. These are clearly matters of all-India importance, and so I send the memorandum to you.

2. I felt, when the left-wing began to change its attitude towards the war that, sooner or later, we should find ourselves somewhat embarrassed; and it was therefore, with some relief that I saw, a few months ago, that this change of attitude had not been endorsed. It is not clear from whom this document now comes, but, as it is not signed, I expect it comes from the underground leaders of the Communist party, such as Dr. Adhikari and P. C. Joshi. Its significance seems, to me, to lie in the fact that it offers whole-hearted support to the war. This is undoubtedly attractive. At a time when Congress is being as unhelpful as ever, and the threat to India is daily becoming closer, there is much to be said for rallying all who will support the war, whatever their past activities or their future intentions,—and that is particularly the case with regard to any section which has an influence over Labour, which we are so anxious to keep straight on the war issue. There are, however, some very awkward issues involved in the acceptance of full support from the Communist party, and I would like to make some observations about them.

3. In the first place, their offer to give their help in recruitment to the Army and the Police seems quite unacceptable. It is only a few weeks ago that, in

[1] Not printed.

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one of their documents, they made it clear that they would try and establish themselves in the Army and the Police so as to use them for their own purposes at a suitable moment. I notice that this document appears to realise that this part of their offer will not meet with much favour.

4. A general release of Communists may eventually be unavoidable, but if these left-wing people became the definite allies of Government, and in a far stronger position in India, than they have ever been before, there would be something like consternation amongst the employers and the capitalist classes. In this document, the Communists say that it would be their policy to avoid strikes and to settle all disputes by negotiations. They are probably quite genuine about that, but I have little doubt that they would at once press for very large increases in wages, and would urge their claims with the argument that these were essential for the war effort. It is more than likely that, as has often happened in the past, if they worked up an agitation about wages, they may not be able to control the workers, and strikes would result. Even if that were not the case, employers who have given dearness allowance and bonus—under pressure from my Government, so far as this Province is concerned—would, I have no doubt, view the release of Communists with much misgiving, and would consider that Government, for the sake of peace in industry, was now going to press them still further on the subject of wages.

5. Apart from employers, the wealthy and middle-classes would be very much alarmed. They are terrified of Communism and of proletarian rule, and they would see, in Government recognition of and co-operation with the Communist party, the beginning of the rise of Labour. In fact, I believe that acceptance of the demands in this document would create a class issue, the end of which, in India, would be difficult to see. It can be argued that this is bound to come, sooner or later, and that if we can obtain some important support for the war by introducing it now, it is worth doing. I feel, however, that the introduction of a class issue now may be too risky. The likely repercussions are not clear, but they may be formidable.

6. The repercussions on Congress have also to be considered. So much support for Congress comes from the *Banias* that there may be consternation in the Congress party at the prospect of the rise of the Communist party. This bogey might even induce the Congress to reconsider its position with regard to co-operation with Government, or it might lead them to try and rally all the well-to-do classes—merchants, land-owners, Princes—against a Government-cum-Labour alliance.

7. In short, acceptance of full Communist support may raise very large and imponderable issues. I still have an open mind on them, but I am inclined to the view that the support we would get from the Communists is probably

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not great enough to justify the social uneasiness which might result, and that we should, therefore, go slow about it. Gradual and experimental release of Communist prisoners and detenus, without any commitment as to the recognition of the Communist party, may be the best solution.

Yours sincerely,

ROGER LUMLEY

P.S.V.—

I would value H. M. Home's views on this important matter. I doubt if we should find any very positive policy helpful in resolving the problem. One must constantly check the position by asking oneself what exactly these gentry can do to help us. It is the case that most of existing friends would be evidently repelled by any open alliance between Communists & Government. It is well also to recognize that "Communists" is in India a word that covers a lot of very mixed views & policies.

L.,—6. 5

16

Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

SECRET *4 May 1942*

No. U.P.–136.

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

This is with reference to your telegram No. 1176[1] of April 30th, 1942 to other Governors of which Laithwaite has sent me a copy. I am grateful to you for putting my tentative suggestions[2] regarding Section 93 régime to other Governors, but there are certain points which I feel it necessary to emphasise, for I have to some extent modified my views—

(*a*) The political situation seems to me to have further deteriorated since I wrote immediately after the end of Cripps' mission:

(i) Even at that time I drew attention to the objectionable comments in the *National Herald*; now these comments are far more widespread and now all Congress speakers and papers accuse His Majesty's Government of hypocrisy, lack of sincerity and the adoption of Machiavellian tactics. They emphasise even more strongly than in the past their hostility to British Rule.

(ii) Though Government were able to stop publication of the two objectionable resolutions[3] of the Working Committee, yet there is no doubt that Congress propaganda will follow those lines.

[1] No. 1. [2] Vol. I, No. 620, para. 5. [3] See Nos. 4 and 5.

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(iii) More serious still is attack on British and now American armies. There are first of all the false allegations of molestation of women to which one banned resolution referred. But more significant still is Gandhi's article in *Harijan* of April 26th entitled "Foreign soldiers in India", which appeared on the same date in Congress vernacular papers. It is also important to note that the Berlin radio gave a summary of the article in Hindustani only two days later, on April 28th, which goes to show either that our censorship is inefficient or that Congress have some means of communication with Axis powers. I have no doubt you will get the D.I.B. to make investigations. But the article itself appears to be a deliberate attempt to stir up feeling against the British and American armies which, apart from being prejudicial to war effort, is most dangerous. It goes even further than the war resolution of the A.-I.C.C.,[4] though that was very objectionable especially the paragraph which said that the Indian Army has been maintained till now to hold India in subjection. I have recently heard of two clashes between British troops and Indians, one in Allahabad, another in Agra which though not very serious may be an indirect result of Congress' attitude.

(iv) Rejection of Rajagopalachari's proposal and acceptance of counter-resolution about Pakistan[5] may very possibly accentuate communal feeling.

(v) I enclose a copy of the latest appreciation received from my C.I.D. which though written strongly can hardly be regarded as an overstatement of the case.

(vi) I was in any case going to put my views on the situation before Your Excellency and it is relevant to the question of non-official Advisers for this reason. If as appears inevitable, we must have another fight with Congress and take drastic action against their fifth-column activities, we must keep official Advisers for the law and order departments. At a recent meeting of my Civil Defence Public Relations Committee, when discussing the National War Front, members recognised the necessity for action against objectionable Congress propaganda and indeed held that the Front would not be successful unless this was done, but they conveyed the impression that they would prefer that we should do that work. This again goes to show that non-official Advisers would not deal satisfactorily with law and order matters.

(*b*) As regards my suggestion of having some non-official Advisers for war departments, I must emphasise the point indicated in my previous letter that to appease our well-wishers more of them must be taken in at the Centre. Since I wrote, I have seen Chaudhri Khaliq-uz-Zaman of the Muslim League and I gathered that he thought that the solution of the problem of the Centre was far

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more important than the problem of the Section 93 Provinces. J. P. Srivastava, I think, also regards the Centre as more important. This view is not unnatural, for clearly any person who gets office at the Centre now will be better placed in regard to the post-war settlement of the Constitution than a non-official Adviser in a Province, apart from the fact that he will have more important war work now and greater prestige. The Muslims in particular always have an eye on the ultimate constitution. Chaudhri Sahib said to me if you could get a National Government at the Centre of representatives of non-Congress parties—and he thought that Jinnah might agree—the Provinces could then follow suit. In view of all this I am convinced that if a change is needed, you must start at the Centre. I feel that at present without the League I could not get any really useful or influential non-official Advisers.

(*c*) The mere appointment of non-official Advisers will do little to ease the feeling of frustration to which Your Excellency refers; that feeling will only be eased by a more drastic change in the composition of Your Excellency's Council.

I apologise for writing such an unduly long letter but the present position is getting very difficult.

Yours sincerely,

M. G. HALLETT

Enclosure to No. 16

BRIEF NOTE ON SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY FOR THE FORTNIGHT ENDING APRIL 28TH, 1942

While the news of the bombing of Japan and of the arrival in India of American troops has had a heartening effect, alarm, despondency and defeatism over the war situation have if anything increased. District reports attribute this in part to enemy broadcasts, which are increasingly popular, but there is no doubt that, in much larger measure, the deterioration in public morale is due to Congress propaganda of the most virulent fifth column type and to our failure to take any steps to put an end to it. It is particularly unfortunate that Nehru and others have, for the uninformed public in Britain and America, confused what would have been a clear-cut issue when the Cripps talks broke down, by indulging in semi-hysterical and wholly unreal heroics about resisting Japanese aggression, while at the same time taking no part in the war effort.

[4] See Enclosure to No. 43.

[5] On 2 May 1942 the All-India Congress Committee rejected Mr Rajagopalachari's resolution recommending that Congress should acknowledge the Muslim League's claim for separation and on this basis invite the League to consultations aimed at securing the installation of a National Government to meet the emergency. It passed a counter-resolution opposing any proposal to disintegrate India.

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The resist-the-Japanese slogan has simply served to create confusion in the minds of the great mass of people who definitely want a clear lead, and its falsity and absurdity have already been exposed by many speakers, including in this Province Balkrishna Sharma. It is in fact difficult to resist the suspicion that the whole campaign has been deliberately conceived in order to tie the hands of Government. It has certainly been effective in hoodwinking people at home and in America, and even American representatives in this country. In fact the whole cry of resistance to the enemy would still be pure and arrant nonsense and have absolutely no effect whatever even if it were not accompanied and preceded in every case by rabid vilification of the British, of British arms and of British capacity, by anti-war and anti-recruitment propaganda, and by defeatism and the spread of despondency and alarm, both regarding external aggression and internal disorder.

It is difficult to imagine what possible benefit can be hoped for by any further delay in taking action against fifth columnists in general and against Congress in particular. Congress has nothing to offer so far as assistance in fighting the war is concerned. Neither in the maintenance of morale, nor in the maintenance of law and order can Congress implement any of its wordy boasts, while talk of organising guerilla warfare is farcical and has met with absolutely no response except, in many quarters, condemnation.

There are many elements which would rally to a bold lead by Government accompanied by stern action against all forms of fifth column, but every week's delay in taking such action and giving such a lead makes recovery more difficult.

17

Master Tara Singh to Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/8/510: f 276

AMRITSAR, *4 May 1942*

Dear Sir Stafford Cripps,

I am very much thankful to you for the kind words[1] which you used for the Sikhs in the debate in the Parliament on 28.4.1942. Your words and those of Mr. Amery[2] have gone a long way to remove the misgivings which were created by your proposals at Delhi in the minds of the Sikhs.

In the discussions during the 2nd meeting[3] with you, the Sikhs deputationist[s] were sure that they were able to convince you with the justice of their demand. But as you did not commit and the talk could not be made public, the Sikhs were much dejected. But Mr. Amery's reassuring words and your sympathetic language in the Parliament have encouraged the Sikhs a good deal.

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The only party which will object to the division of the Punjab as proposed by the Sikh representatives will be the Muslim League. If the British Government be prepared to accept this proposal of the Sikhs, there is a likelihood of the final solution of the communal problem. In that case, I may be able to persuade the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha to agree to the communal solution outlined in your proposals, as amended by the Sikh proposal. If there be some idea of arriving at some solution in this direction, I might see some responsible Indian politicians.

I again thank you and request you to convey my thanks on behalf of the Sikh community to Mr. Amery also. I hope you will stand by the Sikhs when the time comes, to save the major portion of the Sikhs from the domination of any single community.

I am,
Yours truly,
TARA SINGH (Master)

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 379, cols. 828, 835–6, 838, and 841.
[2] *Ibid.*, col. 912. [3] Vol. I, No. 466.

18

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/537: f 308

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *5 May 1942, 3.30 pm*
Received: 6 May

8063. I was on point of circulating your telegram No. 1215-S[1] to the India Committee commending your proposals, but it occurs to me that you may like to consider question whether it would be a good thing to work Chetty in somewhere. For instance you may possibly think him better choice for Commerce portfolio in light of your remarks about Sarker's health. Please telegraph your reactions.

[1] No. 12.

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19

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/7/4414: f 36

PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *5 May 1942, 5.45 pm*
Received: 6 May

562. Cripps tells me that he discussed with you and Maxwell, question of releasing students at present in prison including Doctor Subbarayan's son.[1] He says that you were both favourably disposed to this idea and action may have been taken by this time. Would you kindly let me know what the position is and who exactly are the students concerned?

[1] Mr S. M. Kumaramangalam, son of Dr Subbarayan, was accused No. 1 in the 'Madras Conspiracy Case'. On 19 November 1941 he was convicted in the Court of the Second Presidency Magistrate, Madras, to 3½ years rigorous imprisonment, and a further six months in default of a fine of Rs 500, for possessing and circulating documents containing incitements to revolutionary violence, to sabotage of war industries and essential services, to mutiny by Indian troops, and to general armed insurrection. L/P&J/7/4414. On 17 June 1942 Lord Linlithgow agreed to his unconditional release. MSS. EUR. F. 125/70.

20

Sir H. Dow (Sind) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/98

GOVT. HOUSE, KARACHI, *5 May 1942*

D.-o. No. 161/M.-70.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I see from the Press that Sir Stafford Cripps has thought it necessary to issue a denial[1] of statement that he is alleged to have made to a Press Conference at Karachi just before he left for England. This Conference was an informal gathering of local editors and journalists that he held in my house on the evening of Sunday, the 12th April. The two leading newspapers, the *Sind Observer* and the *Daily Gazette* gave rather different versions next morning of what Sir Stafford Cripps had said, and therefore, on the off-chance that this might turn out to be a matter of some importance, I instructed my Secretary, Phelps, and the Press Advisory Officer, Raza, both of whom were present at the interview, to place on record at once their version, to the best of their recollection, of what was actually said by Sir Stafford Cripps at the Conference. They did so: both were agreed that the account given by the *Sind Observer* was the more accurate, they therefore made this the basis of their report, and have made additions and alterations where they considered it was inaccurate.

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2. I am, therefore, enclosing their version of what took place at the interview, in case this controversy should continue and the record may turn out to be of value. I should make it clear that this record was made before any controversy had started, merely because I thought that it might possibly be of value, if recriminations should be made; and I did this, not because I had any thought that there would be dishonest intention on anybody's part, but because our local journalists are for the most part extremely incompetent and ill-equipped. They don't know shorthand sufficiently well to take things down, and don't understand English sufficiently well to take notes in longhand which they can afterwards expand.

Yours sincerely,

H. DOW[2]

Enclosure to No. 20

I have failed in my mission. For that, I do not blame any one but myself. The British Government went as far as they could in the existing conditions of emergency. But the Congress desired to have all and full responsibility or nothing at all, and now they have got nothing. I have not lost hope that the people of India will some day come to an agreement. There are always chances. It depends on the Indian[s] themselves, on the Indian parties and the Indian leaders. I do not consider that my mission would have had a more favourable turn had the British plan not dealt with the post-war aspect of the matter but been confined to the immediate interim arrangements. The Congress could not accept commencing any negotiations without their demand for self-determination and a Constituent Assembly being definitely included within the scope of the discussions. The issue on which there was a breakdown was in regard to the relationship between the Viceroy and the Members of the National Government. The Congress desired that the Government in order to be fully representative, ought to have their voice felt in all matters pertaining to the powers allocated to them, but in view of the fact that the war was on and the minorities had the fear of being dominated by the majority party or group, the responsibility of the Viceroy to the administration (?British Government) ought to continue, but the Congress was not agreeable to this arrangement.

Sir Stafford further explained that the new Government ought to be held to account by and to someone, and it was not possible to devolve this responsibility from the Viceroy to the people's representatives without effecting vital changes in the constitution, and such violent departure from the present

[1] See Vol. I, Nos. 637, note 1 and 665, p. 816.

[2] Lord Linlithgow acknowledged this letter on 9 May, adding that he was letting Mr Amery have a copy of it privately. MSS. EUR. F. 125/98.

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constitutional conditions would certainly not be warranted owing to the emergency of war.

Questioned further with regard to the statement[3] in his broadcast, that the Indian National Government, as envisaged by the Congress would be a sort of Cabinet dictatorship, not responsible to anybody or the people, Sir Stafford agreed that the leaders would not of course lose their representative character when they joined the Government. But as the Congress required it, the National Government would not be responsible to the Viceroy and in the present state of war emergency, it was essential that there should be some control over such a Cabinet. In all forms of government, there must be some form of control over the Cabinet, and at the present emergency, the Viceroy could not divest himself of his powers.

When asked whether it was not possible to establish certain conventions regarding Viceregal veto, without making any immediate alterations in the constitution itself, Sir Stafford said that he was prepared to leave it entirely to the discretion of the Viceroy to settle the relations with the Cabinet but the Congress was not satisfied with this position.

When a Pressman suggested whether the present breakdown did not amount to a permanent veto on progress by small minorities in the country, Sir Stafford Cripps said "I cannot consider 70 millions a small minority nor would I consider Sikhs and the Depressed Classes and the Christians (8 millions) small minorities. The minorities certainly cannot stop anything happening, but it does not mean that the views of these minorities can be disregarded."

As far as Muslims were concerned, Sir Stafford observed that they were "afraid" of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha getting into a permanent majority.

Asked how his present proposal to form a fuller Executive Council with representatives of the Congress, the League, and the other parties was an improvement on the old one, if the ultimate responsibility was the Viceroy's as now, Sir Stafford said that all this while the Government had been accused of having no real representatives of the people on the Council and here was an opportunity given to representatives of the people to come together under the present constitution. "I personally attach very great importance to it. If there was such representation it would be able to exert the influence of its own weight."

Sir Stafford maintained that the opportunity which the British offer provided for representative Indians getting together and helping the Viceroy as far as the present constitution permitted in the successful prosecution of the war would within a short time have meant a historic change for the ultimate good of India but the opportunity had been lost.

Asked how it was that just a day only before the negotiations did actually fail the reports were favourable to an amicable settlement being arrived at Sir Stafford implied that the source of optimism was the Congress headquarters.

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Sir Stafford said that the point about Cabinet responsibility did not arise till the last day in Delhi. It was not correct to say that it was sprung on him as a surprise by the Congress; but when all the other problems had been discussed and disposed of, this point emerged.

Asked what insuperable difficulty there could be in having fresh elections in the country with a view to forming a really National Government as was done in war time in Egypt and Canada, Sir Stafford said: "Egypt is different. We have no control over Egypt." Sir Stafford emphatically declared that it was not possible to change the constitution without months and years of Conferences and discussions.

When someone asked him "What about England?" Sir Stafford smiled and replied "We have no written constitution in England."

Sir Stafford characterised the rôle which Col. Louis Johnson played in the parleys as that of a helpful friend who, taking advantage of his presence at the scene of the talks, attempted to interest himself to the advantage of all concerned.

Question.—Who took the initiative?

Answer.—The Congress.

Asked whether he was satisfied that the Congress and the League and the other parties would be prepared to pull their weight and co-operate in all non-political activities for the defence of the country, Sir Stafford said: "I really cannot say. My own view is that the majority of the people will do all they can to help the war. I hope they will do so. It makes it more effective if they join the existing Government and co-operate with it. Now it makes it more difficult without joining the Government."

Asked whether there would be more repression in the country in the wake of the breakdown of the talks, Sir Stafford said: "It all depends on the parties themselves. If they interfere with war activities, there would be trouble. There may be some people who are not going to co-operate, for instance, Mr. Bose's party, and they will have to be dealt with. After all, somebody has to carry on the War."

Sir Stafford observed that the British Government did not circumscribe their arrangements for the war period owing to any sort of fear of the political parties in the country entering into any pact with the enemies in the event of responsibility for defence being transferred into their hands. He had been perfectly convinced of the anti-Japanese and anti-Axis attitude of the country's leaders.

All the leaders had been quite positive on that point; they never wanted any kind of peace with the aggressive nations.

When a Pressman sought to draw a contrast between the view of Sir Stafford as an independent British Socialist and a Member of the British War Cabinet, the Lord Privy Seal denied that he had a dual personality, and observed that

[3] Vol. I, No. 609, p. 755.

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some difference might have been discerned, but this was because he was convinced that winning the war against the Axis Powers was the primary object for all.

Sir Stafford, however, added that he had not resiled from his old views that complete self-determination was the only solution for the Indian problems, "but the present situation", he said "is quite different".

Asked whether there was no possibility of the Government reopening the question again if they could arrive at an agreed solution, Sir Stafford said that, the British Government was at all times prepared to consider any agreed solution if that was put to them but he made clear that the initiative itself should come from Indians.

Sir Stafford in conclusion said that he did not blame anybody for the failure of his mission, "I do not blame the Congress. I don't blame any one. I accept the blame on myself entirely."

Sir Stafford before concluding the interview, took in good humour, the good wishes of the Pressmen and their solicitude that he would soon come back to this country as the next Viceroy of India or as a "friendly visitor to Free India".

21

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

SECRET THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *5 May 1942*

My dear Hallett,

I am much behind hand in my correspondence with you, and I owe you two or three letters. Let me deal in this with your secret letter of 13th April, No. U.P.–132.[1] I read it with very great interest, and the analysis which it contains of the general position in the light of the failure of the Cripps Mission was of very real value. I have of course sent a copy of it to Amery. It is clear from the information one receives from many quarters that the feeling which you report as being that of J. P. Srivastava that Congress was given the predominant position (with the Muslim League as runners-up) and that insufficient attention was paid to the other interests among the minor minorities is one which is fairly widespread.

2. On the question of conciliating Congress, we are always up against the same problem, and the arguments for or against do not vary very much even though the circumstances of a particular situation may vary a good deal. I am not myself greatly disturbed by the possible effect on war effort of our failure to secure the full support of Congress or even of the Muslim League:

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and I have been greatly relieved in the three weeks that have passed since the end of Cripps' discussions here to note from day to day and over the period as a whole the absence of any really profound reaction in this country to the failure of those negotiations. There was always the risk, I suppose, that their failure would so embitter people that the disappointment (particularly since that failure followed so closely on a few days during which the prospect of success seemed so great) would have a really bad effect and might even, indirectly at any rate, have shown itself in diminished effort over the prosecution of the war. But I see none of that, and though there is a good deal of talk and criticism in the Press, I would judge that we are just as well off today in terms of support for war effort and for the prosecution of the war as we were when the Cripps Mission began. I should expect that condition of things to remain—indeed I should hope that the closer approach of the actual military threat to the shores of India might even lead to some small intensification of production, &c. But I have never believed myself, and I was throughout at pains to make that clear to the Cabinet, that even if we got a satisfactory solution of the constitutional problem any marked improvement in war effort, in recruits or the like would result. The most I felt might happen would be that one would in such circumstances have a greater certainty, or a greater reason to hope that the leaders of the Congress would give us active support in advising their followers to resist the Japanese or any other invader by every means in their power. In actual fact we have (a little unexpectedly) got a good deal of support of that nature from Jawaharlal, Rajagopalachari, &c. (I say nothing about the enigmatic utterances of the Mahatma which call for special tests!)

3. And I agree with you also that even if we had a constitutional settlement, the situation would have had in it the possibilities of trouble which could not wisely be ignored. At the same time, on the proposition stated in paragraph 3 of your letter that Congress must now definitely be regarded as irreconcilable and that we must cease to consider whether any action we take will further alienate them, while I feel some sympathy with your point of view, we are again of course faced with a political problem the solution of which and the control of which does not rest entirely in our own hands. I should have said myself that the true answer was that there was probably very little hope, if any, of doing business with these people in the present circumstances, and that the failure of the Cripps negotiations had brought that out forcibly for the edification of the world at large, and in particular of the United States and of certain circles at home. But equally as in the past, despondent as we may frequently feel as to the prospects of our efforts bearing any fruit, we must keep our minds open and be prepared, if circumstances changed, to take advantage of the change in them.

[1] Vol. I, No. 620.

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4. My general feeling will have been made clear to you by the circular telegram[2] which I sent to the Governors of the Section 93 Provinces about the possibility of non-official Advisers. (As you will see, the proposition which I put to them was very much the proposition that you have yourself suggested in your letter, and I look forward with great interest to their reactions.) For your own information, the replies I have so far received are on the whole divided. Lumley is disposed to see advantage in possibly combining a certain number of non-officials with the existing official Advisers:[3] Twynam and Stewart, for reasons which they argue with some care, are definitely against:[4] George Cunningham a little uncertain[5]—not too zealous but open-minded. I have still to hear from Madras. But there of course, if (which I do not think too likely) anything were to come of Rajagopalachari's expressed intention of endeavouring to form a Ministry, a somewhat different situation might arise. Let me only add while we are on this subject that I entirely agree with you as to the objections, at any rate at this stage, to a reversion to Government by a Governor in Council, though there are times when in my gloomier moments of meditation on the Indian political situation I am much tempted to ask myself whether the parliamentary experiment does not show signs of a complete breakdown in this country (the outcome of the Cripps discussions being the latest stage) and whether we (or rather His Majesty's Government) will not find it necessary to consider a radically different form of treatment for the problems of India.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[2] No. 1. [3] See No. 2. [4] See Nos. 3 and 13. [5] See No. 14.

22

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *5 May 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

3. I have been sounding Governors about non-official Advisers on the lines which Hallett suggested. I will telegraph a digest of their replies in due course, but send you the full text of those which I have so far received[1] by today's bag. As you will see, Lumley is disposed to favour the Hallett solution, but Stewart and Twynam are against, while George Cunningham is, as usual, prepared to work anything, but not unduly zealous.

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4. I send you also (though you will probably have had it through Reuters) the text,[2] as reproduced in the Press, of Rajagopalachariar's discussions with Press representatives yesterday. It is too early to see how much will come out of this, but, as you know, I personally should not have the slightest objection to his forming a government if he could do so and his government is prepared to support the war effort. But we have yet to see, I suspect, how opinion will be divided in the Madras Legislature, and the Gandhian party may prove to be sufficiently strong to make any question of a government backed by a majority academic. Whether that is the case or not, the episode has been an interesting one, and Rajagopalachariar has said a good deal which will be of assistance to us. He has displayed far greater realism than the more non-violent section of the Congress.

5. I send you by this bag copy of the latest letter from Twynam, dated the 30th April.[3] I may cable you a boil down of its political paragraphs. They are very well put together.

6. I have telegraphed[4] to you in some detail about the reconstitution of my Council, and look forward with great interest to your reaction. I recognise that C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer is also not without his controversial side; but I personally do not greatly trust Mirza, and some information I received a little while ago rather suggested, too, that his health might not be what it was. We shall no doubt have a groan from interested quarters on the appointment of Benthall, but I think it is worth while facing if we do. Meanwhile I have so far had no formal representation from the Indian Members of my Council, though I have been given to understand that they are engaged in trying to put together agreed suggestions to me. But Mudaliar did indicate that they would like the forthcoming vacancies, &c., to be filled after consultation with them. I explained that that was quite out of the question and tried to bring home to him the practical difficulties likely to arise, owing to communal and other conflicts of interest inside Council, were we to try to dispose of this business round a table. I reminded him, too, of practice at home and of the extent to which these matters lie in the hands of the Prime Minister. Other considerations apart, it would of course be perfectly impossible to discuss round a table with a dozen colleagues representing different points of view, the merits or demerits of individuals, and I did not conceal from Ramaswami my feeling that any such practice, if adopted, would merely result in the production in due course of a team of entirely safe and colourless nonentities. He was I think a little shaken, but I dare say we shall hear more of this later.

7. I have, as you know, not been too fortunate over the health of my team since Council was expanded. Rao has been ill off and on; Sarker has been out of

[1] See Nos. 2, 3, 13, and 14. [2] Not printed. [3] Vol. I, No. 710. [4] No. 12.

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action for a couple of months; and Hydari's premature death followed on a period during which he had not been able to carry too heavy a burden. Sarker, as I write, seems to be well patched up, but he has told me that he is not entirely free from the uneasy symptoms associated with his condition, and I have a feeling myself that he has been a shade unwise in continuing to face up to these responsibilities, and that he would do better not to risk another really serious stroke and to move out. But he must decide that for himself, and I certainly should not be justified on his performance at the present time in suggesting that he is not pulling his weight. Rao is more of a problem. He has been ill, and I hear that the Doctors examining him have recommended him a month's complete rest. I have had also a hint from other sources that he may follow this up a little later by asking for his 4 months' leave, though I sincerely hope that that may not be the case! But the relative inability of the middle aged or elderly Indian to take any real weight is a nuisance; all the more so when it is accompanied, as it always is, by an extreme reluctance to demit office!

23

Sir A. Hope (Madras) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMPORTANT *6 May 1942*

No. 58–M. Reference your telegram No. 1176–S[1] of April 30th. As you know I have always advocated having non-official Advisers as well as official. The feeling of frustration which you mention is most certainly there and it is a constant irritant to loyalists.

2. I agree that it will not make for any greater efficiency rather the reverse, but despite this I think it should be done.

3. I do not think that allotment of portfolios will present any difficulties as popularity or otherwise of any Government order will react on Government as a whole and not on individual Adviser.

[1] No. 1.

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24

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *6 May 1942, 6.45 pm*
Received: 7 May, 3.30 am

No. 1243–G. Following is summary of article by Gandhi in *Harijan* of May 3rd, entitled "Scorched earth policy again":—

Begins. A correspondent has written about destruction that is going on of crops, houses, boats, &c., in name of preparation for war and asking how, if I suffer this destruction, I can oppose scorched earth policy. Destruction that enemy may work or which the receding portion of population affected may have to do is problematical and in any case will be nothing compared to crores already drained from country for warding off threatened danger. Money taken through taxation has not been felt so keenly as is direct deprivation of thousands of homesteads as in Feni (East Bengal). No promise of compensation can be any comfort for dispossession of houses which to poor people is like taking away their bodies. To deprive people in East Bengal of boats is like cutting off vital limb. As out and out war resister, is it my duty to ask affected people to resist, non-violently of course, the deprivation of holdings including boats? My very non-violence has deterred me from offering opposition to point of embarrassment. I only hope that authorities will find way to avoid distress such as has been caused in Feni. *Ends.*

2. Following is summary of answer given by Gandhi in same issue of *Harijan* to question whether by asking British rulers to withdraw he is not inviting Japanese to attack India:—

Begins. I feel convinced that British presence is incentive for Japanese attack. If British wisely decided to withdraw and leave India to manage her own affairs, Japanese would be bound to reconsider their plans. The very novelty of British stroke will confound Japanese, dissolve subdued hatred against British, and set up atmosphere for ending unnatural state of things that have dominated and choked Indian life. Japanese seem to have made plans independently of Indian opinion and are not to be affected by my writing. But they will be confounded by action I have advised British to take. *Ends.*

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25

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *6 May 1942, 10.10 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 6 May, 11.30 pm*

No. 1254–S. Your personal telegram of 5th May.[1] I am very glad that you are in general agreement with my proposals. I had had and still have Chetty in view as a reserve. Sarker's health is not in my judgment yet completely restored, but he is able to carry on sufficiently well to make it impossible for me to suggest relieving him, and he would of course be most reluctant to be relieved. He must therefore I fear take his chance. On the other hand Raghavendra Rao's condition is far from encouraging and he has just asked for a month's complete rest, and I await medical certificate. It is, as you will see, possible that I may at short notice be faced with vacancy in either portfolio, and in that event I should be very ready to consider Chetty: but for the moment I had better go on the assumption that Sarker will be available and that he would go to Commerce if Mudaliar goes to London. I should add that I have considered whether if I have both Chetty and Ramaswami Aiyar, I should unduly overweight Council with personnel with States experience. On the whole I think not. Chetty's service in Cochin was only four years, and he has since then been employed directly on very important war supply work in the United States.

[1] No. 18.

26

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/I/1/948: ff 41–2

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *6 May 1942, 7.45 pm*
Received: 7 May

569. B.B.C. are running short series of discussions on India giving several Indian and British points of view, since it seemed desirable to take advantage of current interest in India here to try to educate ordinary listener and provide balanced view. I am trying to ensure that British case gets a good show, and I think that general impression produced on public will be that nobody in India can agree on anything.

Cripps is taking an active interest (he is anxious in particular that we should not try to suppress expression of Congress view) and he has suggested that

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series should be repeated to India. Whole basis on which I have—with some hesitation—agreed to series is that it should be for *Home* consumption. The less India thinks we are still worrying about her politics the better. Cripps I think now accepts my conclusion on this. He has however also suggested that it would be a good plan for Indian representative speakers such as Nehru, Jinnah, &c., to be given each five minutes on All-India Radio with a neutral summing up at the end. He feels that this might have good propaganda results. I said of course I would pass this suggestion on to you but I shall not be surprised if you think that the time is not ripe for departure from the view previously held that broadcasting should not be used in relation to India for the purpose of political propaganda nor am I sure that you could find anyone to sum up who would be accepted as impartial or that Indian politicians would be prepared to meet each other in set debate in this fashion with only a few minutes apiece. I also feel the objection expressed above that the less interested we now appear in Indian politics the better.

27

War Cabinet

Committee on India. Paper I (42) 18[1]

L/P&J/8/537: ff 298–305

PROPOSED RECONSTITUTION OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

INDIA OFFICE, *5 May 1942*

I circulate, for the information of the Committee, a telegram[2] containing the Viceroy's proposals for the reconstitution of his Executive Council. The strength of the Council was raised to twelve (including the Commander-in-Chief) last year. Two vacancies now exist through the death of Sir Akbar Hydari and the appointment of Sir Andrew Clow to the governorship of Assam. In view of the outcome of the recent negotiations the Viceroy now proposes to fill these two vacancies, to add three further seats to his Council ((1) War Transport, (2) Defence Co-ordination on lines proposed by Sir Stafford Cripps in the recent discussions, but subject to the Commander-in-Chief's views, and (3) a member without portfolio to be the British Indian representative with the War Cabinet and on the Pacific War Council in London), and

[1] The paper is dated 6 May. [2] No. 12.

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to select for the five appointments representative non-officials not associated with the leading political parties.

I attach a statement showing the present and the proposed appointments, with brief notes on the proposed new members. These include a representative non-official European whom the Viceroy is very anxious to include in his Council. Only two officials remain, apart from the Commander-in-Chief, but the statutory requirements of the Government of India Act, Ninth Schedule, S.36(3), are met by Sir Firoz Khan Noon having been at least ten years in the service of the Crown in India.

I commend the Viceroy's proposals and, subject to any further recommendation he may make as regards the Defence Co-ordination portfolio, would wish to be in a position to endorse them as early as possible.

L. S. A.

Annex 1 to No. 27

[*There follows the text of No. 12.*]

Annex 2 to No. 27

Executive Council of the Governor-General

Portfolio	*Present*	*Proposed*
1. Commander-in-Chief	Sir A. Wavell	Sir A. Wavell
2. Home	Sir R. Maxwell	Sir R. Maxwell European (I.C.S.)
3. Finance	Sir J. Raisman	Sir J. Raisman European (I.C.S.)
4. Communications	(Sir A. Clow)	Sir M. Usman Moslem (Sunni)
5. Commerce	Sir R. Mudaliar	N. R. Sarker Caste Hindu
6. Law	Sir Sultan Ahmed	Sir Sultan Ahmed Moslem (Shiah)
7. Education, Health and Lands	N. R. Sarker	Sir Jogendra Singh Sikh
8. Supply	Sir H. Mody	Sir H. Mody Parsee
9. Information	(Sir A. Hydari)	Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar Caste Hindu
10. Civil Defence	Raghavendra Rao	Raghavendra Rao Caste Hindu
11. Labour	Sir Firoz Khan Noon	B. R. Ambedkar Depressed Classes

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Portfolio	*Present*	*Proposed*
12. Indians Overseas	M. S. Aney	M. S. Aney Caste Hindu
13. War Transport	—	Sir E. Benthall European non-official
14. (?) Defence Co-ordination	—	Sir Firoz Khan Noon Moslem (Sunni)
15. Without portfolio	—	Sir R. Mudaliar Hindu (non-Brahmin)

Apart from the Commander-in-Chief, the proposed list contains 2 Europeans (official), 1 European (non-official), 5 Hindus, 3 Moslems, 1 Sikh, 1 Parsee and 1 member of the Depressed Classes.

Annex 3 to No. 27

Proposed new members

Sir E. Benthall.

A man of wide Indian experience both in business (as senior partner of Bird & Co.) and in public life as a prominent representative of the European non-official community: he has the confidence of the European community in India and is recognised by Indians as a man of independent and sympathetic views. At present serving on the staff of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, from which Dr. Dalton is prepared to release him.

Sir Mahomed Usman.

Knighted 1928, K.C.I.E. 1933. Member of Madras Executive Council, 1925–1934. Officiated as Governor, May–August, 1933.

Sirdar Sir Jogendra Singh.

A Punjab *Taluqdar*: was Minister of Agriculture in the Punjab Government from 1926 to 1937. Served on Indian Sugar Committee, Indian Taxation Enquiry, Indian Sandhurst Committee.

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar.

The well-known Depressed Classes leader. He was a member of the Round Table Conference 1930–32 and the Joint Parliamentary Committee. Is a member of the Bombay Legislative Assembly but has not hitherto held office.

Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar.

Dewan of Travancore since 1936. Joined the Madras Bar in 1903 and was long prominent in public life in Madras and India. Advocate General, Madras, 1920: Law Member of Madras Government 1923–28. One of the Indian

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representatives at the League of Nations, 1926 and 1927. A member of the Round Table Conference 1930–32 and the Joint Parliamentary Committee. He has also acted in 1931 as Law Member of the Government of India during Lord Willingdon's Viceroyalty.

28

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *6 May 1942*

3. I hope the final resolution[1] of Congress at Allahabad, telling us to clear out bag and baggage, will have opened the eyes of most people here and in America. Even the *Manchester Guardian* today in its leader washes its hands of them. I wonder what hope there is of Rajagopalachari getting together enough Congressmen and others to form a coalition government in Madras. It would be a great beginning of a break-up in Congress if he could do so. To my mind certainly the only hope of progress in India lies in a revolt against Congress and I expect, Rajagopalachari apart, it must come mainly from younger men.

4. Your letter from Dehra Dun of April 14th[2] came in while I was dictating. I must leave most of the points in it for subsequent answer, but may as well comment straight away on certain matters.

5. You say that you are looking forward with the greatest interest to Cabinet reactions to Cripps' report. The answer in brief, comic though it sounds, is that there was no report and no reaction. Cripps prepared no sort of report for the Cabinet, apart from his speech in the House which he drafted on his journey home. More extraordinarily still, Winston decided that there was no particular point in his telling the Cabinet anything about his experiences and conclusions, and in fact Cabinet has not discussed the matter at all since his return! Even the India Committee has not been summoned. Naturally I have had more than one talk with Cripps and it may be—though it also may not be—that he discussed the subject with Winston when down at Chequers for his first week-end. However, by now you will not be surprised by anything that happens or does not happen in the conduct of affairs. As a matter of fact, there was perhaps not much for Cripps to say, and there is, I think, a unanimous feeling in the Cabinet and a very general feeling in Parliament and outside that Cripps did the best he could, that Congress was supremely unreasonable, but that on the whole the

Shabash!

L.

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after-effects of the mission may be good in India and the immediate effect excellent in America. Winston may, of course, have been influenced, in deciding to avoid Cabinet discussion, by a reluctance to bring up the question of how far Cripps went beyond his instructions. He may have preferred to let bygones be bygones and get ahead with urgent war business.

6. I do hope I said enough in my speech to smooth the very naturally hurt feelings of your Executive. On the other hand, it was clearly impossible for Cripps to go out and try and negotiate a policy with party leaders on behalf of the Cabinet, except by doing so personally. From that point of view, the Cabinet here and you and I were very much in the same boat as your Executive. Anyhow, whatever might have happened, we all of us find ourselves still where we were and, I hope, unperturbedly carrying on our work—myself not yet absorbed in the Dominions Office, yourself not yet superseded by Maurice Gwyer,[3] and your Executive carrying on and only waiting for a filling up of vacancies and some further expansion.

7. I hope to bring this matter of the expansion of the Executive before the India Committee in the next day or two, for I find that much the most convenient way now of getting things past Winston and the Cabinet. It is possible that Cripps may still have hankerings after a politically re-constituted Executive, though I should have thought that even his optimism was now finally quenched. Where I expect the possibility of more objection is to Benthall, on the ground that this may be regarded as directly contrary to the course to which we are pledged; possibly also on the grounds of his business contacts.

Please let me *do this!*

L.

8. . . .[4] we cannot at a time like this afford to be considerate. If you feel that any Governor should go, do not hesitate to telegraph and, so far as an appointment from here is concerned, I will do the best I can. Would it be wholly impossible, in view of the difficulty of finding good Indian Civil Service men during war-time to send a member of Parliament or junior Minister to a place like Assam? I do not see how in the long run the Indian Civil Service Governorships can be maintained. I find it equally hard to see how 11 Governorships can easily be filled from this country. There is, of course, the possibility that if it once became established that all the Governorships were filled from here, a rising young man might look to a career in India of three or four Governorships in succession, and that would mean therefore a comparatively small demand for new men. But I must stop for the mail.

Good God!

L.

[1] See Enclosure to No. 43. [2] Vol. I, No. 626. [3] See Vol. I, No. 626, para. 8.
[4] Personal comments omitted.

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P.S.—

1. I am rather taken by Hallett's idea of non-official advisers (excluding law and order) in Section 93 Provinces.

2. The Pacific Council is really (at present at any rate) rather small beer, and is easily covered by the War Cabinet representative (or representatives including a Prince).

29

Sir T. Stewart (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/49

SECRET *6 May 1942*

No. 323–G.B.

2. The report that Tokyo had been bombed acted as a mild, but very temporary, stimulus to general morale but I fear that subsequent news from Burma has caused a further wave of pessimism. Many are asking themselves whether the Japs can be stopped and giving an answer in the negative. Not in all cases is this merely blind defeatism but rather it is an honest attempt to assess the meaning of facts and events as they are known to the man in the street. It is impossible, for obvious reasons, to reassure the doubters by telling them that, in this way or that, a limit will be put to further advance or by explaining to them the differences between the strategic situations in Burma and India. One can only hope that some of the optimism and confidence of the stauncher souls is transmitted to their contacts. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that my Commissioners in their latest letters report no widespread enthusiasm for the War Front. Nevertheless the Provincial Leader has been working hard and has got his selection of District Leaders nearly complete. There is some difficulty in securing Muslims of adequate calibre so long as the Muslim League is formally standing out; and of course Congress will not associate in a mass contact movement which is not their own creation and monopoly. Chandreshwar has contacted Swami Sahajanand and other leaders of the Kisan Sabha but while they are sympathetic they are reluctant to come out into the open as protagonists of the Front. The consequence is that the organisation is largely a landlord one and though Chandreshwar realises the importance of using labour and the Royists he is a little shy of such new bedfellows. Recruitment for the combatant ranks has been sluggish while the demands for labour for local military works and for the Assam Road has made it difficult to fill our quota for the Munda Labour Company. It was reported to me from the

Stick to it. If the tide turns, the doubters will soon "rush to the aid of the victors"! *L.*

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United Provinces that labour for the Assam Road recruited in Bihar or passing through the Province had been tampered with. I had enquiries made from all important suppliers of labour and could not discover that any incident had occurred in Bihar.

3. Congress has been engaged in setting its house in order. Rajendra was given *carte blanche* to re-form the Provincial Working Committee and though he has taken back the three Hindu ex-Ministers he has clipped the wings of the ex-Prime Minister by reducing the weightage of that person's community on the Committee. The Party has been concentrating on constructive work, which means (1) the organisation of Defence Parties to maintain public morale and to check crime, and (2) a grow-more-food campaign. In theory both are most admirable objects but I cannot but think that there are dangers in a multiplication of sectional Defence Committees. In this "constructive work" Anugrah, the late Finance Minister, has been the most prominent figure and it would not surprise me to find the Provincial leadership—under Rajendra of course—transferred from Sri Krishna to Anugrah. In the All-India political theatre the return of Cripps and Rajagopalachariar's revolt have been the high lights. The pack was in full cry before Cripps left India and we have now come to the stage when the emissary who was greeted so warmly on arrival is denounced as the cynical Machiavellian instrument of a super-Machiavellian British Government! It may be that nerves are going to pieces but I am afraid that some who should know better are taking the popular view that His Majesty's Government was never in earnest. The Madras resolutions[1] never had any chance of support in Bihar where even amongst Muslims the urge towards Pakistan is not very great. Both Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha were early in the field to show their disapproval. Congress did so more in sorrow than anger while the Sabha treated the episode as a Congress plot to sell the pass. Rajagopalachariar was roughly handled and there is now in progress a local dogfight between the *Searchlight* and the *Nation* which recalls the Eatanswill election.[2] I have never met Rajagopalachariar but I knew his lieutenant Santanam fairly well when I was in the Assembly. He was a very sensible practical fellow and I am not surprised to find him in agreement with the view that whatever the theoretical merits and the appeal of Pakistan at the present time, general common sense will reject it as a practical proposition.

4. The Provincial Muslim League has been overshadowed by the visit to Bihar of the All-India Defence Committee consisting of Nawab Muhammad Ismail, Sir Nazimuddin, Chaudhuri Khaliquzzaman and Kazi Muhammad Isa. The members interviewed me on May 1st here in Ranchi and were most friendly and affable. They had come to assure me that the organisation which they were seeking to set up was for protection only and was in no way aggressive.

[1] Vol. I, No. 682. [2] Charles Dickens, *The Pickwick Papers*, Chap. XIII.

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It was not hostile to Government but on the contrary they wished to co-operate and in the event of an outbreak of dacoity, looting, &c., the Defence Parties would place themselves at the disposal of the authorities. I pointed out that their aim appeared identical with our own in setting up Civic Guards, Village Defence Parties, A.R.P., and the War Front and I asked why they did not associate themselves with these activities. They were prepared to take advantage of A.R.P. training—given an adequate share of Wardenships to the Muslim community—but though individuals might join in War Front activities the League as a body was constrained to stand aside so long as Congress and the Mahasabha remained aloof. They mentioned to me, as they did to Hallett, their apprehensions about Nepal. There is good reason to believe that Savarkar had been making advances to the Darbar but from what Betham told me a month or two ago, the approach was regarded with some suspicion. The Committee left me with the impression that they wished to be friendly. They certainly did not enter upon any of the so-called grievances of the Muslim League in Bihar and I gathered that they regarded the protest resignation of Leaguers from our War Committees as mere petulance. At the same time, whatever their aims there are elements of danger in the existence side by side of Defence Parties sponsored by the various parties and communities.

Is E[xternal] A[ffairs] aware?
L.

5. There has been a fair amount of activity amongst the parties of the Left. The Socialists and the Forward Bloc are of course hostile but we, or at any rate Russia and China, are getting support from the Kisans and the Communists. I have my suspicions that the Communists are playing a double game. On the surface they are anti-Fascist and pro-war; below the surface they are anti-Imperial and their demand for arms may have as much relation to one as to the other of these lines of thought. Labour conditions one must regard as satisfactory though there is a certain amount of grumbling. There are no signs of panic in the vital areas but the test will come with the first air raid.

30

Sir H. Dow (Sind) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/98

GOVT. HOUSE, KARACHI, *6 May 1942*

D.-o. No. 164/F.R.

2. I agree[1] that there is no marked change in the general attitude towards the war, but there are a few hopeful signs. Recruits are still coming in steadily for

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A.R.P. work in Karachi, and as more visible marks of their work appear, Press comment is more favourable. It is known that Government is not stinting funds for this work and have made considerable payments to the Karachi Municipality whose agency is being used. It is therefore not likely that attempts to raise volunteers outside the official organisation will be very successful so long as the money to keep them going has also to be raised privately.

* * *

5. The Premier is making a tour of the district by way of inaugurating the War Front, and according to the Press is holding successful meetings and making impassioned appeals for help in the war effort. But I am afraid he is still rather handicapped by his dependence on Congress support. He told me before he went that he had written to the Maulana asking for his sanction to Congressmen supporting the war effort, and particularly the A.R.P. and Civic Guards organisations, in Sind, and he has since announced that the Maulana has agreed "so long as these movements are placed under non-official guidance and control". That is not going to be particularly helpful, and Allah Bakhsh may be coquetting with the idea of putting a non-official committee, largely of Congress leaders, over the official organisation. Actually I have seen (intercepted by the C.I.D.) the Maulana's reply to Allah Bakhsh, of which the Maulana sent copies to Dr. Chothram Gidwani and Mr. R. K. Sidhwa, who are our two most irreconcilable Congress leaders. In this letter the Maulana's intention to sap the loyalty to Government of these two organisations is very clear. He says to Allah Bakhsh "You may form a non-official Central Board of seven, or at the most nine, members. This Board should have full powers to control the general policy and line of action of the A.R.P. organisation. The Minister in charge of Civil Defence can be the Chairman of this Board. So far as the technical side of the work is concerned the training of workers should be under the guidance of men appointed by the Government."

6. You will perhaps agree that this suggestion of using the Ministry to bring these organisations under what will practically be Congress control is as dangerous as the setting up of parallel organisations. I do not know how far Allah Bakhsh has fallen for the Maulana's plan, but I shall make it my business to have a serious talk with him as soon as he returns to Karachi. It seems to me that if Allah Bakhsh could be induced to come "all out" now as a War Minister, and take a strong line with Congress, he would be in an unassailable position: he would be supported by the vast bulk of the population and could afford to defy both the Congress and the Muslim League, neither of whom are in a position to form an alternative Ministry. There is no reason why he should call a meeting of the Assembly for the next six or eight months, and those months are likely to be so critical that he need not look beyond that period. If he

[1] With the view expressed in the official report on the Province for the latter half of April.

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weathers them his position will be a very strong one. I am appending a copy of the Maulana's letter to this letter.

Enclosure to No. 30

CONGRESS PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, 19-A, BALLYGUNGE CIRCULAR ROAD, CALCUTTA, *24 April 1942*

My dear Allah Bakhsh,

Excuse me I could not reply your letter earlier. I am very busy.

I write below the scheme of A.R.P. which I had under consideration. You may discuss the details with Dr. Gidwani and Mr. R. K. Sidhwa.

The work is of such a nature that we cannot rely merely on paid workers. Only those can work under abnormal and dangerous circumstances who have learnt to risk their lives in a spirit of self-sacrifice. Such persons do not work for monetary gain, but for the high ideals of national service. Only the Congress can claim to have such persons under its banner. Despite many shortcomings the Congress is the only organisation which has a long tradition of service and sacrifice to its credit; and has successfully passed through many ordeals. Unfortunately, owing to the attitude of the British Government it cannot defend India, but nevertheless it is ready to serve the country in danger resulting from the war. If you want to make the A.R.P. organisation an active and effective body, it can only become so by full co-operation with the Congress.

The arrangement made by the Bengal Government proved quite useless in face of real danger, and the Government was forced to seek the co-operation of the Congress.

2. The Congress does not wish to do this work on party lines. She is prepared to work with other parties, provided they are prepared to work in a spirit of co-operation.

3. You may form a non-official Central Board of seven, or at the most nine, members. This Board should have full powers to control the general policy and line of action of the A.R.P. organisation. The Minister in charge of Civil Defence can be the Chairman of this Board.

4. So far as the technical side of the work is concerned the training of workers should be under the guidance of men appointed by the Government.

5. How the work will be carried on in the districts and cities under this Board? Two methods can be adopted—

(*a*) The work can be undertaken by the Municipalities and the above-named Provincial Board may supervise the work, or

(*b*) Non-official branches of this Board may be formed in the same manner as this Board is formed.

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The former has been adopted in the North-West Frontier Province and I personally prefer it. From many points of view the work can be properly carried on only when the local Municipal Board undertakes to do it.

You have also mentioned the Civic Guards and other necessary measures. I cannot form an opinion about them just at present unless some fundamental questions are clarified at first. In other Provinces the Civic Guards are considered to be a subordinate body of the local Police. If this very method is adopted in Sind, then it is unnecessary to say to you that the Congress workers cannot work under the present Police Officers. And the fact is that the work will not go smoothly in this way. The Police Officers are so much away from the national spirit, that no national workers can work under them.

I am prepared to concede to Sind what I am not prepared to do in other Provinces, provided some practical plan of work is possible. I would have no objection if full co-operation is established between the Civic Guards and the Police under a joint Board of Control. But the organisation of Civic Guards should be formed on purely national lines, so that every Civic Guard may feel that he is a part of a national organisation and is working under the national command. Unless such a spirit is nourished, no effective organisation for Civil Defence is possible under the existing circumstances. Paid constables can work under the present Police Officers for the sake of money, a national servant will not do so for the service of the nation.

Yours sincerely,

A. K. AZAD

31

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE *7 May 1942*

PERSONAL

No. 1264–S. I think it would be a good thing to pay a personal visit to Madras and Calcutta, and propose, with full agreement of Hope and Herbert, to leave here on morning of 12th by air, accompanied only by my Private Secretary and Military Secretary, arriving Madras same afternoon, spending next day in Madras looking at A.R.P. &c., leaving Madras 7 a.m. morning of 14th, breaking journey at Vizagapatam to see damage recently done by Japanese &c., reaching Calcutta that afternoon, remaining in Calcutta till morning of Saturday 16th, arriving Delhi that afternoon. I have no doubt as to the propaganda value of such a visit, and it would give me a chance of saying a word to hearten in all

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these places those concerned with A.R.P. and Civil Defence, and of showing one's own interest in what is being done. I do not, however for security reasons, propose that there should be any publicity until I have left Calcutta and return to Delhi, and I am arranging accordingly with the Governors concerned.

32

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT *7 May 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1270–S. Your private and personal telegram of May 6th, No. 569.[1] I do wish it had been possible to avoid these B.B.C. talks. Had I been consulted I should have been entirely opposed to them. But in any event I should be strongly opposed to any repetition of them to India. I have the most difficult hand to play here as a result of Cripps Mission and my one anxiety is to try to keep communal feeling quiet and let the dust settle. Effect of repeating series of this type would be most unfortunate from that point of view.

2. Equally I am wholly opposed, and would not be prepared to agree, to talks on All-India Radio such as Cripps suggests. I fear I cannot accept his view that propaganda results would be good, and I repeat that I would much have preferred that these B.B.C. talks had never been initiated. Criticisms in your telegram are of course entirely to the point, and I am sure I can look for your full support on all aspects of this matter. Is it too late if not to stop the B.B.C. series at any rate to cut it down? You are absolutely right in thinking that the less interested we now appear to be in Indian politics the better. I agree also that as you yourself suggest only effect of talks such as those suggested by Cripps would be statement of sectional views with inevitable unhappy reaction on communal and general political situation but with no umpire to sum up who would be accepted as impartial.

[1] No. 26.

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33

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Aney

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *7 May 1942*

My dear Mr. Aney,

I had some correspondence at an earlier stage with the Secretary of State, copies of which Bajpai saw at the time, about a possible exchange of High Commissionerships with Canada; and I now enclose copies of it,[1] so that you should be aware of the position. I had reason to believe in the course of this spring,[2] that Mackenzie King might be willing, despite his earlier hesitations, to consider an exchange of High Commissionerships, and I should like, if you agree now, to sound the Secretary of State privately as to whether, in his judgment, the Canadian Government would be prepared to proceed with it. My own feeling is that the more we can have of representation of India of this type and on this level in the international field and in the imperial field the better, but I should welcome your view.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[1] The enclosures are printed in MSS. EUR. F. 125/124.
[2] See Vol. I, Nos. 345, 349, paras. 7–8, and 626, paras. 5 and 19.

34

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

SECRET THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *7 May 1942*

Many thanks for your secret letter of the 25th April, No. U.P.–135.[1] I can well appreciate your feelings in compiling your most useful memorandum on the Section 93 régime!

2. Thank you so much for your general comment on the official report for the first half of April, for which I am very grateful. Thank you also for your very valuable comment on the situation generally. I was particularly interested in Chaudhri Khaliq-uz-Zaman's remarks to you. They bring out very well indeed the sort of problem that continually faces us—a problem the complexity of which is so frequently overlooked by our critics in Parliament, &c.

[1] Vol. I, No. 695.

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3. As for Colonel Louis Johnson and the articles referred to in paragraphs 7 and 8 of your letter, I am not too much fussed over the *National Herald*: not because I do not agree with you that some of these articles are in the worst of taste and objectionable from other points of view also, but because I suspect that what they are really out to do is to get us to choose one of them as an issue on which to fight, in the hope that the publicity which our choice may result in in America would produce an embarrassing situation for us there. With the most profound gratitude to the United States for the quite invaluable assistance which it has consistently given us and is still giving us, I suspect that the average American, unless he has pretty close cultural and family connections with Great Britain, has far more frequently at the back of his mind the vague recollection of grievances against us dating from the eighteenth century than one might imagine; and articles in the *National Herald* or other papers which favourably contrast the manner in which it is suggested that America would have handled particular problems with the manner in which we have in fact dealt with them, would be a very bad text for prosecution. I do not, in other words, wish Nehru and his friends to dictate the circumstances in which they shall be held to be martyrs. I think you will probably agree with me that we may have to be ready to put up with a good deal of tiresome and possibly sometimes dangerous stuff, but that that is the wise course.

35

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: f 80

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *8 May 1942*
Received: 9 May

581. Your telegram No. 254-SC,[1] dated 23rd April. Recent developments will no doubt have worsened prospects of securing European recruits at present and I am not sure about desirability of inviting young men from this country to embark on civil career in India which they would be likely to regard as permanent but which might in fact be of short duration. I am therefore now disposed if you agree to abandon intention to endeavour to obtain some European recruits for both Services this year. At the same time I feel (having regard not only to the undesirability of going back on explicit announcements but also to the wider considerations suggested in the next paragraph) that arrangements already announced for this year's Police examination and next year's I.C.S. examination for Indians should stand.

As regards more distant future, suspension of European recruitment is no doubt likely to continue for duration of war but in view of extreme uncertainties

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it would perhaps be premature to assume even this, and in any case I cannot help feeling some doubt as to propriety without reference to Parliament (having regard, e.g., to Sec. 244 of the Act)[2] of deliberate total shutting-down of recruitment both for Europeans and Indians as you suggest.

For these reasons I am doubtful as to any announcement of a decision in regard to future at present, and I am indeed not at all clear as to political advantage to be expected from an announcement of suspension of all recruitment including Indians for period of war, though I recognise that announcement of suspension of European recruitment might have advantage for what it is worth as counter to suggestions that we do not really contemplate any political advance. Even so more might be read into it than we should wish at present and I should be strongly inclined to leave it alone.

As regards recruitment of Indians beyond arrangements already announced, we could perhaps keep our minds open until time gets nearer for next announcement of a competitive examination.

I shall be glad of your further views in the light of the above. I quite recognise difficulty of whole question.

[1] Vol. I, No. 668. [2] Government of India Act 1935.

36

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

MSS. EUR. F. 125/155

PERSONAL NEW DELHI, *8 May 1942*

My dear Generalissimo,

I am asking General Yu Pe Lun to take to you this expression of my high regard for Madame Chiang and yourself, and my best wishes for the days to come.

I would like you to know that I hear from all my officers the very highest praise for the manner in which Your Excellency's troops have fought in the Burma campaign. As a true admirer and well-wisher of China, this has given me the utmost pleasure.

My wife and I very often think of Madame and of Your Excellency, and of the days which you spent with us here in New Delhi.

The times are heavy, and I fully understand the heavy strain imposed upon you by recent happenings. Nevertheless, I can truthfully say that today, my confidence in the ultimate success of our common cause is greater than at any time since the opening phases of Japan's attack upon the U.S.A. and Great Britain.

I trust that Madame Chiang and you are in perfect health.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

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P.S. We have been delighted to welcome both General Yu Pe Lun and General George Yeh, and to give them all the assistance in our power. I feel sure that the visits of these distinguished officers will prove of much value.

L.

37

Mr Amery to Sir S. Cripps

L/I/1/948: f 32

INDIA OFFICE, *8 May 1942*

My dear Cripps,

I consulted[1] the Viceroy about the B.B.C. talks and he is very strongly opposed[2] to any repetition to India of the talks now going on. In fact he doesn't like them at all and would wish to have them cut down if it is not too late to stop them. He is equally wholly opposed to a talk from India such as you suggested, even if it were possible to get the principal parties concerned to join in, which I confess seems to me unlikely.

I confess I do not altogether share his objection to the talks here because I think it does no harm to our public to learn something of the complexity of the Indian situation, on the other hand the more I think of it, the more I feel that the less interested we appear to be in Indian politics now, the better. You went out to bring about a particular solution and, while you could not achieve that, you have I hope achieved what is hardly less important, namely made Indian political leaders realise that it is they who have got to solve their own problem by compromise and not by getting at us here. The more we can create an impression here that for the time being we are not concerned with Indian politics, the better and the more it will help Rajagopalachari and those who are trying to work for a reasonable solution.

L. S. A.

[1] No. 26. [2] No. 32.

38

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: f 81

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *9 May 1942*

Received: 10 May

586. Auchinleck has suggested that the Duke of Gloucester who is quite willing to do so should visit India on conclusion of his tour in Mideast. He feels that

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coming straight from contact with Indian troops in Mideast his visit would have excellent effect on troops in India and on the classes from which troops are enlisted. It would also probably, in my opinion, do much to counteract the impression left among Princes and in loyal quarters by Cripps' visit that we are only concerned to run after those who attack and vilify us. The season of course involves no little discomfort but the fact that His Royal Highness is willing to face that might have good effect especially upon European community. I fully realise the additional strain this might throw upon you and Government generally at this critical time. I should be very glad to have immediately your reaction to the idea and could then if you favour it approach Prime Minister and Palace.

39

Sir A. Clow (Assam) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

GOVT. HOUSE, SHILLONG, *9 May 1942*

No. 3.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Reid passed to me Your Excellency's telegram No. 1176-S[1] on the appointment of non-official advisers. I reply by letter as I have more to say than I feel justified in telegraphing, especially in the present state of telegraph traffic in this area.

2. Reid's own views on the two specific points put were—

(*a*) It would be decidedly advantageous to associate non-official opinion with the work of Provincial Governments. The difficulty here is to find the men. It is not exaggerating to say there are no suitable non-officials outside politics.

(*b*) Given suitable men, he would agree.

3. Dealing first with the question put at (*a*) of the telegram and without reference to the special conditions here, I suggest that the appointment of non-official advisers would be, in general, a sound step. The case for such a change has become stronger. The Section 93 régime has lasted for a long time, longer than was expected by large sections of public opinion, and perhaps by Parliament also. If it is likely to last much longer—a point to which I recur later—the case is correspondingly strengthened. While it is true that Governors and their Advisers are not out of touch with non-official opinion, and although in some Provinces, the Indian advisers probably impose a less bureaucratic outlook, my impression is that, working as they all are at high pressure, the administration in Section 93 Provinces are not able to maintain any intimate contact with

[1] No. 1.

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popular thought. This is perhaps especially true where the Governors are drawn from the Indian Civil Service and are predisposed by their training to give undue stress to administration as opposed to political considerations. The Section 93 régime takes us back not merely behind the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms; by depriving the Provinces of Legislatures it goes behind the Morley-Minto Reforms. And I think it will be agreed that the great advantage of the Morley-Minto Legislative bodies was that they brought the officials directing and advising the Government into close contact with Indian public men and helped them to realise, in a manner impossible before, where the shoe pinched and how their policy and acts reacted on public opinion. I have found myself, and I know others have felt the same, that my constant contact with the Legislature was invaluable as providing a mirror—often a distorting mirror, but a mirror all the same—in which I could see the work which I and others were doing and gauge its political reactions. All that is missing in a Section 93 Province and there is a need to provide something, however inadequate, in its place. The appointment of non-official advisers would go a little way to supply this need. Moreover, from the other side, it would do something to let the well-disposed sections of the public feel that they had an influence on the Provincial Governments concerned.

4. It is not, in my view, the only possibility. A small Advisory Council for legislation which would meet the Governor at intervals would have several advantages— *Interesting.* *L.*

(*a*) It would give a larger number of public men regularised access to the Governor and a feeling that they had a share in the Government, and thus go further to reduce the feeling of frustration.

(*b*) It would bring the Governor into close contact with more sections of public opinion than would daily contact with a small number of executive advisers.

Such a body would, of course, meet *in camera* and the Governor would, if he so desired, be able to discuss much more than legislative proposals (including proposals to make rules) with them. I have not had time to think this idea out fully and Your Excellency may be aware of objections which have not occurred to me, but it seems to me to deserve consideration. *A possible objection would be that it would involve making a selection from Members of the Legislatures (though the Council need not be restricted to these); but I do not

Let Reforms have a cut at this. *L.*

**Not understood.* *L.*

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think this a grave objection. The selection would be made from all parties; and if, as is almost certain, Congress Members declined invitations, that would not do any great harm. Most of these invited would, I believe, value the privilege not so much because of any opportunity of contributing to Acts or Rules, but because the confidential contact with the Governor would give them more than the valued prestige and influence which a seat in the Legislature confers.

5. The decision must, I think, take account of the possibilities of a return to Parliamentary Government. Here the possibility is present; I gathered from Twynam when I was in Pachmarhi, that Khare was moving and that a Ministry was not an impossible contingency; and it seems possible that Rajagopalacharia's movements though directed to another end might conceivably lead to a change in Madras. It is possible, here and elsewhere, that any association of public men with the Government in an advisory capacity might postpone indefinitely a return to Ministries and this is a contingency which has to be faced. Personally, so long as the association was real and effective one, I think it would have some advantages over Ministerial Government, at any rate at a time so critical as the present; I recognise also the advantages that would be lost!

There's the cut!

L.

6. The question must also depend on the view taken as regards probable personnel. I do not propose to enlarge on this, as Your Excellency will have adequate advice from those familiar with each Province. I would merely say that so far as India generally is concerned, I do not think there should be serious difficulty. The Provincial Executive Councillors under the Montagu-Chelmsford régime belonged to a good type which is far from extinct, and there are a number of men who have found recent politics distasteful but who combine administrative gifts with a genuinely national outlook.

7. In Assam, I feel that if there was to be a non-official adviser, there would have to be another. The deep cleavages between the two main communities and the two Valleys would have to be recognised. For one of the posts Sir Muhammad Saadulla would be the obvious choice. Whether, after getting such a position Saadulla would go on with efforts to form a Ministry is very doubtful; my impression is that he would be content to rest there, at least for a considerable time. The second Adviser would then be a Surma Valley Hindu. There are several possibles, I gather; I have not had time to look round properly and would like to explore the ground a little further before being definite. One possibility is Rai Bahadur P. C. Dutta, the Advocate-General, formerly in turn a Minister, a Member of the Council of State and an Executive Councillor. I do not know if he and Saadulla would be a harmonious team; but advisers

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would not, of course, have the collective responsibility of Executive Councillors. I would add that the absence of official advisers here affords a ground, not present elsewhere, for the appointment of non-official advisers, if a Ministry is not coming soon.

8. I come finally to the suggestion at (*b*) in Your Excellency's telegram. I am, on the whole, against this proposal. In the first place men who are likely to serve as non-official advisers will not normally be of a type suited to new war departments. These require a lot of driving force, with the power of quick decision and unflagging vigilance. The non-official adviser would be more suited to "guid-ganging" departments, with more settled ways and a less improvised staff; and I think men could be found in many Provinces who would be suitable for the more controversial departments. In the second place the effect of giving the new men the new departments would be to create an impression that all the really responsible work remained in bureaucratic hands while the files were given to non-officials. This could not be so in fact, but in the public mind the established departments have a prestige value and the entrustment of some of these to non-officials would be regarded as a more real leavening of the Government than the assignment of new portfolios. I would, moreover, be disposed to reduce the number of official advisers when there is more than one, so as to make the non-official advisers not a mere addition to the existing machine.

Yours sincerely,
A. G. CLOW

Some interesting ideas.—L.

40

Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/77

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE GOVERNOR'S REPORT NO. 9, DATED THE 9TH MAY 1942

Apart from an occasional reference in the Press—mostly the Congress inclined papers—Sir Stafford Cripps' Mission is now seldom spoken of. Unless pressed to do so few of my visitors mention it. Malik Khuda Bakhsh, who was evidently in touch with a good many of his political friends during the last National

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Defence Council meeting, tells me that his opinion is that the real reasons why Congress broke off negotiations were firstly, the Pakistan element in Cripps' proposals and, secondly, that Congress were shy of taking responsibility. He says they are conscious of their weakness on constructive work, and that at a lecture given in Delhi by Jawaharlal Nehru he was struck mostly by the fact that Nehru did not seem able to make up his own mind. Khuda Bakhsh confirmed my supposition that the chief reason why Khan Sahib refused to see Cripps was that he was nervous of being asked difficult questions!

2. I have not seen many of the Muslim League leaders lately, but I notice that an intercepted letter from a leading Muslim League Barrister in Peshawar to Jinnah says that the general feeling is one of relief at the failure of Cripps' Mission, as people here would not have welcomed a return to Ministerial Government. Malik Khuda Bakhsh told me that he thought Jinnah realised at a fairly early stage of the negotiations that the Pakistan scheme was not in fact going to give him what he wanted. Khuda Bakhsh thinks that neither Bengal nor the Punjab would follow Jinnah, and that both would want to stay with the Central Government; his estimate is that in Sind and the North-West Frontier Province it would be very doubtful whether the necessary majority could be secured for secession.

3. The proceedings on "Martyrs Day"[1] on 23rd April are always a fairly good index of local Congress feeling. It is probably easier for speakers to play on the public feeling on this day than on any other occasion. This year the crowd seems to have numbered between two thousand and two thousand five hundred, but a large number of these were children who gathered to see the fun. About 1,000 red shirts were in uniform. Congress leaders had been making strenuous efforts for some weeks to make the meeting a success. But there was evidently very little enthusiasm. Neither the Ahrars nor Muslim Leaguers took any part. Congress speakers spent a good deal of their time talking of Sir Stafford Cripps' Mission. Their main anxiety seemed to be to justify the rejection of the proposals by Congress, and the only way they could do it was by condemning the British Government. I think the efforts being made by Dr. Khan Sahib and others to create a split between the people and Government are due mainly to the realisation that their own popularity is on the wane, and that the only hope of re-establishing Congress influence is to condemn Government for everything.

[1] Commemorating those who were killed in conflict with troops and police in Peshawar City on 23 April 1930.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *9 May 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

3. I hope I shall not have too bumpy a journey to Madras and Calcutta, but I have not any doubt as to the desirability of my trip; and while I do not propose to allow any publicity until it is over, I think that it will be well worth while as showing one's active interest in the position and in the A.R.P. and Civil Defence arrangements in the immediately threatened areas. I am glad, too, to think that I shall have an opportunity at Vizagapatam of seeing and commending the local people who did so well on the occasion of the recent Japanese attack,[1] and it will of course be most useful to be able to get first-hand personal impressions from Hope and Herbert, their officials, and the non-official communities of morale and of the problems that are in people's minds in the two Presidencies.

4. I have been having a variety of Chinese visitors, the two latest being General Yu Pe Lun and Professor George Yeh. It seems to me of great importance that we should go out of our way to be as civil as possible to the Chinese, and I have spared no pains over them. I thought it well to take the opportunity of General Yu Pe Lun's visit to send through him an autographed letter[2] to Chiang Kai-shek conveying good wishes, &c.—more with a view to keeping the wheels of personal contact well oiled than for any other reason. All these Chinese I find most friendly and helpful. The new Chinese Commissioner, Mr. Shen Shih-Hua, is also a very definite addition.

5. Thank you so much for telegraphing[3] to me about these B.B.C. talks on India. I hope what I have sent you may strengthen your hand. I doubt if Cripps really understands what the position is out here. But I am perfectly clear myself as to the grave disadvantages (our general policy of keeping politics off the wireless so far as possible apart) of encouraging political leaders to make statements on the wireless. They would certainly not submit to censorship, the exacerbation of feeling would be likely to be extreme, and there is no hope of finding any one here who would be accepted as even reasonably impartial to sum up objectively at the end of the debate. You are absolutely right in thinking that the wise course now is to lie back and let things settle, and that the less we talk and fuss about India the better from all points of view; and as I said in my telegram I should, with that consideration foremost in my mind, have much preferred to have avoided this series of B.B.C. talks, and would

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much prefer even now to see it cut down if practicable. As to the objections against their being relayed to India, I am perfectly clear.

6. In the general political sphere Rajagopalachari continues to talk manfully and to hint, I gather, that he may break away, that he would be willing to let Jinnah form a government in Madras and would, at a pinch, serve under him in any capacity, &c. Those suggestions have a familiar ring, but I must confess that I do not feel any more optimistic as time goes on as to the prospect of anything very great coming out of C. R.'s latest move though he has shown far more realism and courage than most men in public life in this country.

7. I await your final views on my suggestions for the reconstitution of my Council. But in the meantime I threw a fly over Mudaliar as to the possibility of his being selected to go to London. To my great disappointment he informed me that for domestic reasons and because of his wife's feelings, &c., he could not possibly accept: and in conversation subsequently with my Private Secretary he went so far as to suggest that perhaps after all the great thing had been achieved by securing recognition of our right to be represented in the War Cabinet and that that fence having been taken, the necessity for actually sending someone there was at this juncture perhaps not decisive! and that it might not be too easy to get people to go home from India at a moment such as this. I do not intend to let him get away quite so lightly, and I am writing today to press him in the most formal manner to reconsider his decision. But I must say that experience over these last few months of the readiness of Indian public men to serve their country overseas in time of war, even in appointments of first-class importance, has been somewhat depressing. You are familiar yourself with the difficulties we experienced in filling Indian vacancies among your Advisers. I had one refusal, on family grounds, for the South African post. Next Chetty's post in Washington had previously been refused by Mody and I think someone else, while Chetty took it without undue zeal and has now come back to India to relinquish it. Azizul Haque has shown much patriotism in accepting the High Commissionership, but has never concealed from me his desire to be back to India as soon as he can. And Mudaliar's reaction on this most important opening is the latest in the series. It is all very well, and I can quite understand that with those concerned domestic considerations must carry great weight. But that is only half the story. After all everyone of us at home who is offered duty abroad has to consider domestic considerations very often of a most difficult type, but were we to allow them to dominate our decision, the effect on the representation of the country overseas would be lamentable. The plain fact is that when the test is applied, the Indian is found to have a far

[1] See Vol. I, No. 651. [2] No. 36. [3] No. 26.

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sharper bent for private interest than for public duty. However I do not yet despair of Mudaliar changing his mind.

* * *

All luck.

P.S.—I sat up till 1.30 a.m. this morning (11th May) to hear Winston's broadcast, and thought it first-class value.

2. I felt that the time had come for me to broadcast in support of the War Front, and I did so a few days ago.[4] I send you a copy of my broadcast by this bag. So far as I can gather it seems to have had quite a good reception, and I hope that it may do good, though the Governors' fortnightly letters will show you the conflicting type of consideration that seems to arise in different Provinces in connection with the organisation of the War Front. I cannot occasionally refrain from asking myself what must be the reaction of the British soldier in India, and what must be the ultimate electoral reactions at home to the indifference, or apparent indifference, of such important elements in the political lives of India and Burma to what is going on around them. I find it difficult in the circumstances to envisage the British tax-payer paying, or the British soldier fighting, to reconquer Burma from the Japanese merely to enable her to acquire and enjoy Dominion Status! That may be a heresy—I dare say it is—but I shall be very surprised if this consideration does not begin to bulk a good deal larger than it has as time goes on.

[4] 7 May.

42

Sir S. Cripps to Mr Amery

L/I/1/948: f 31

GWYDYR HOUSE, WHITEHALL, S.W. 1, *9 May 1942*

My dear Amery,

Thanks for your letter[1] about the broadcast talks. I listened to one last night which I thought was quite good. I am afraid I do not share your view that we should appear to be as little interested as possible in Indian politics for the present since I think it would be disastrous if it was thought that we no longer wished to arrive at an accommodation with the Indians.

I agree that we have no further proposals to put forward, but this does not mean that we are not interested.

Yours ever,

R. STAFFORD CRIPPS

[1] No. 37.

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43

Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

SECRET CAMP, *10 May 1942*

No. U.P.–137

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

We are getting a certain amount of interesting information about the A.-I.C.C. meeting at Allahabad, and though no doubt this will reach Your Excellency through the D.I.B., I think it desirable to bring it personally to your notice.

We have recently intercepted the original draft of the "war" resolution with certain manuscript corrections and I enclose a photograph of this document and also a broad sheet showing in parallel columns the original draft, the corrected draft and the final draft which was passed by the A.-I.C.C. and published.

2. The draft was enclosed in a letter from Sadiq Ali, a Secretary of the A.-I.C.C., to Rajendra Prasad who, as the letter shows, had asked for it. It is very curious that this letter should have gone through the post, for Congress know well our power of interception and usually send important documents by special messenger. It is suggested to me that Sadiq Ali is a friend of Sajjad Zaheer and Dr. Ashraf, two communist leaders in Congress, who, as the D.I.B.'s report of the 2nd May[1] shows, opposed the resolution; that it was sent by ordinary post so that it might be intercepted and so that Government might realise the pro-Japanese policy of Congress or of some members thereof, a policy strongly resented by the communist members. This may sound a little far-fetched but it is by no means impossible.

3. It is not of course possible to say with any certainty who was responsible for this draft. We know that Gandhi had written a letter of instructions as to the way he wished things to go (vide D.I.B. report of May 2nd) and I believe that Gandhi also sent a draft resolution from Wardha by a special messenger. If this draft is really the Mahatma's draft, then clearly he is a fifth columnist or a Quisling and we must be very watchful of his activities. I have no doubt Your Excellency will get the D.I.B. to go very carefully into this question of authorship.[2] Possibly they may be able to identify the typewriter. The corrections may have been made by Acharya Narendra Deo.

[1] Not printed.

[2] In a note dated 13 May Mr Pilditch commented as follows on paras. 3–4 of Sir M. Hallett's letter: 'As regards the authorship of the original draft, there is not the least doubt that Gandhi was responsible. The original was toned down by Rajendra Prasad (not by Acharya Narendra Deo) for consideration by the Working Committee, and the final resolution as passed by the All-India Congress Committee was the handiwork of Jawaharlal Nehru.' L/P&J/8/596: f 210.

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4. There is no doubt that Nehru who as Pilditch has rightly pointed out "suffered from a confusion of impulses in which now the anti-British, now the anti-Japanese prevailed" opposed the resolution as originally drafted; he was at that time presumably under the influence of the anti-Japanese impulse and also as we know he is not really a disciple of non-violence and wanted guerilla warfare. Our information is that after long discussion Acharya Narendra Deo was asked to amend it to show non-violent non-co-operation with the invaders, and lip sympathy to the oppressed nations of Russia and China and it was to this draft, which was ultimately published, that Nehru agreed. We also have information to show that at a secret meeting reviewing the position of Congress, Acharya Kripalani stated that 75 per cent. of Congress workers were pro-Japanese and 100 per cent. anti-British. Rajendra Prasad expressed the view that it would be easier to oust the Japanese from India after ridding themselves of the British, whose imperialism was too deep-rooted.

5. All this information I had at the time when we first got hold of the draft, but I have just seen another intercepted letter from Rajendra Prasad from Wardha to Kripalani, dated 5th May, in which he says: "We saw Bapu yesterday and explained the whole position to him. He feels that though he does not like the resolution, it does not bar his way and we can proceed further. *He thinks there can be no other way than to go*; that the British should leave India alone. It is only *there* that we shall be able to live true life and make our own arrangements. The period of transition may be a difficult period and we must be prepared for it, but it need not necessarily be so." The sentence italicized is not clear and the word "there" is presumably a mistake for "then".

6. Knowing as we do that Rajendra Prasad wanted the original draft (but has not got it!), it seems to me that this latest letter justifies the inference that Gandhi was responsible for the original draft, though earlier in this letter I have held that it was doubtful. Much of the language is I think Gandhian, in particular the bit about non-violent non-co-operation which appeared in the final draft, and the bits about "scorched earth" policy and foreign soldiers. But apart from this it is clear as far as I can see that Gandhi and Rajendra hold the view that Britain must first go and that then they will be able to get rid of Japan. This comes out most clearly from Rajendra's latest letter, also from the report of his views at the secret meeting to which I have referred. It is also clear from a study of the draft itself and in particular the deleted portions. Thus the following sentences have been deleted:—

(1) "Japan's quarrel is not with India. She is warring against the British Empire."

(2) "If India were free, her first step would probably be to negotiate with Japan. The Congress is of opinion that if the British withdrew from India, India would be able to defend herself in the event of Japanese or

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any aggressor attacking India." (The amendment to this read as follows: "If India were free, she would wish to keep out of the war, her sympathies with victims of aggression notwithstanding. India would also know how to defend herself in the event of Japanese or any aggressor attacking India.")

(3) "The A.-I.C.C. is therefore of opinion that the British should withdraw from India."

(4) "The Committee desire to assure the Japanese Government and people that India bears no enmity either towards Japan or towards any other nation." (The amendment runs—"India bears no enmity towards any foreign nation.")

(5) (This is not amended by the manuscript corrections.) "For all these reasons the Committee appeals to Britain, for the sake of her own safety, for the sake of Indian safety and for the cause of world peace to let go her hold on India, even if she does not give up all her Asiatic and African possessions." In the published draft it is much milder: "Not only the interests of India but also Britain's safety and world peace and freedom demand that Britain must abandon her hold on India."

7. I have in a recent letter regarding non-official advisers (No. U.P.–136[3] of May 4th) given my reasons for holding that the political situation was deteriorating; perhaps it would be more correct to say that evidence was forthcoming to show that the Congress attitude was becoming more dangerous. If Gandhi and his followers who have the majority in Congress really hold that they should first by some measures not indicated get rid of us, it is certainly dangerous. One of the measures is obviously the campaign of vilification of the British armies and the British Government, of which the two banned resolutions were the most striking examples. We hear a good deal of fifth column activities in Burma (recently wounded officers and soldiers passing through Lucknow whom I have met have told me a good deal) and it looks to me as though we must be prepared for similar behaviour by the Hindu population in this country.

Yours sincerely,

M. G. HALLETT

P.S.V.—

When we have D.I.B.'s and Maxwell's comments, S./S. should be completely informed about this very important document.

L.,—11.5.42

[3] No. 16.

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Enclosure to No. 43

A.-I.C.C. WAR RESOLUTION, 1942

REMARKS

The italicized portions in column 1 indicate the words omitted in the corrected version in column 2. The italicized portions in column 2 indicate the words inserted from ink corrections made on the original draft, shown in column 1.

Draft No. 1, dated Allahabad, April 27th, 1942. Working Committee.

1

Whereas the British War Cabinet's proposals sponsored by Sir Stafford Cripps have shown up British imperialism in its nakedness as never before, the A.-I.C.C. has come to the following conclusions:—

The A.-I.C.C. is of opinion that Britain is incapable of defending India. It is natural that whatever she does is for her own defence. There is an eternal conflict between Indian and British interests. It follows that their notions of defence would also differ. The British Government has no trust in India's political parties. The Indian Army has been maintained up till now mainly to hold India in subjugation. It has been completely segregated from the general population who can in no sense regard it as their own. This policy of mistrust still continues and is the reason why national defence is not entrusted to India's elected representatives.

Japan's quarrel is not with India. She is warring

Draft No. 1, dated Allahabad, April 27th, 1942. Working Committee, as finally corrected on the recovered copy.

2

Whereas the British War Cabinet's proposals sponsored by Sir Stafford Cripps have shown up British imperialism in its nakedness as never before, the A.-I.C.C. has come to the following conclusions:—

It is natural that whatever she does is for her own defence. There is an eternal conflict between Indian and British interests. It follows that their notions of defence would also differ. The British Government has no trust in India's political parties. The Indian Army has been maintained up till now mainly to hold India in subjugation. It has been completely segregated from the general population who can in no sense regard it as their own. This policy of distrust still continues and is the reason why national defence is not entrusted to India's elected representatives, *and India rendered incapable of defending herself.*

India's participation in the war has not been

All-India Congress Committee Resolution, May 1st, 1942.[4]

3

In view of the imminent peril of invasion that confronts India, and the attitude of the British Government, as shown again in the recent proposals sponsored by Sir Stafford Cripps, the All-India Congress Committee has to declare afresh India's policy and to advise the people in regard to the action to be undertaken in the emergencies that may arise in the immediate future.

The proposals of the British Government and their subsequent elucidation by Sir Stafford Cripps have led to greater bitterness and distrust of that Government and the spirit of non-co-operation with Britain has grown. They have demonstrated that even in this hour of danger, not only to India but to the cause of the United Nations, the British Government functions as an imperialist government and refused to recognise the independence of India or to part with any real power. India's partici-

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against the British Empire. India's participation in the war has not been with the consent of the representatives of the Indian people. It was purely a British act. If India were freed *her first step* would *probably be to negotiate with Japan. The Congress is of opinion that if the British withdrew from India*, India would *be able* to defend herself in the event of Japanese or any aggressor attacking India.

The A.-I.C.C. is therefore of opinion that the British should withdraw from India. The plea that they should remain in India for protecting the Indian Princes is wholly untenable. It is additional proof of their determination to maintain their hold over India. The Princes need have no fear from unarmed India.

The question of majority and minority is a creation of the British Government and would *disappear* on their withdrawal.

For all these reasons the Committee appeals to Britain, for the sake of her own safety, for the sake of India's safety and for the cause of world peace to let go her hold on India even if she does not give up all Asiatic and African possessions.

This Committee desires to assure the Japanese Government and people that India bears no enmity either towards Japan or towards any other nation. India only desires freedom from all alien domination. But in this fight for freedom the Committee is of opinion that India while welcoming universal sympathy does not stand in need of foreign military aid. India will attain with the consent of the representatives of the Indian people. It was purely a British act. If India were free she would wish to keep out of the war, her sympathies with victims of aggression notwithstanding. India would know also how to defend herself in the event of Japanese or any aggressor attacking India.

The plea that the *British* should remain in India for protecting the Indian Princes is wholly untenable. It is additional proof of their determination to maintain their hold over India. The Princes need have no fear from unarmed India.

The question of majority and minority is a creation of the British Government and would *solve itself* on their withdrawal.

For all these reasons the Committee appeals to Britain, for the sake of her own safety, for the sake of India's safety and for the cause of world peace to let go her hold on India even if she does not give up all Asiatic and African possessions.

India bears no enmity towards any foreign nation. India only desires freedom from all alien domination. In her fight for freedom the Committee is of opinion that India while welcoming universal sympathy does not stand in need of foreign military aid. Her past experience teaches her that it is harmful to India's interests and dangerous to the cause of India's freedom to introduce foreign soldiers in India. She therefore hopes that the British Government as also other foreign nations will remove their legions and henceforth stop their further pation in the war was a purely British act imposed upon the Indian people without the consent of their representatives. While India has no quarrel with the people of any country, she has repeatedly declared her antipathy to Nazism and Fascism as to imperialism. If India were free she would have determined her own policy and might have kept out of the war, though her sympathies would, in any event, have been with the victims of aggression. If, however, circumstances had led her to join the war, she would have done so as a free country fighting for freedom, and her defence would have been organised on a popular basis with a national army under national control and

4 Lord Linlithgow had already transmitted almost the full text of this resolution to Mr Amery in telegram 1189–G of 2 May, which stated that about 180 members of the Committee had been present, and that the resolution, which was moved by Pandit Pant and seconded by Rajendra Prasad, had been passed by a large majority, only four members voting against it.

The penultimate sentence of the text given in the telegram ran as follows: 'They desire our help only as slaves—position we can never accept.' The telegram noted that this sentence had been added to the original draft in the course of discussion; and that other amendments, including the deletion of mention of non-violence in order to permit armed resistance, were withdrawn or rejected. L/P&J/8/510: f 488.

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her freedom through her non-violent strength and will retain it likewise. Therefore the Committee hopes that Japan will not have any designs on India. But if Japan attacks India and Britain makes no response to its appeal the Committee would expect all those who look to Congress for guidance to offer complete non-violent non-co-operation to the Japanese forces and not render any assistance to them. *It is no part of the duty of those who are attacked to render any assistance to the attacker. It is their duty to offer complete non-co-operation.*

It is not difficult to understand the simple principle of non-violent non-co-operation:—

1. We may not bend the knee to the aggressor or obey any of his orders.

2. We may not look to him for any favours nor fall to his bribes. But we may not bear him any malice nor wish him ill.

3. If he wishes to take possession of our fields we will refuse to give them up even if we have to die in the effort to resist him.

4. If he is attacked by disease or is dying of thirst and seeks our aid we may not refuse it.

5. In *such* places where the British and Japanese forces are fighting our non-co-operation will be fruitless and unnecessary. *At*

introduction. They know fully well that there is inexhaustible manpower in India which remains untapped on account of the policy of distrust of the Indian people by the British Government. India will attain her freedom through her own strength and will retain it likewise. India having no quarrel with Japan or any other nation, the Committee hopes that Japan will not have any designs on India. But if in spite of this Japan attacks India and Britain makes no response to her appeal the Committee would expect all those who look to Congress for guidance to offer complete non-violent non-co-operation to the Japanese forces and not render any assistance to them.

We may not bend the knee to the aggressor nor obey any of his orders.

We may not look to him for any favours nor fall to his bribes. But we may not bear him any malice nor wish him ill.

If he wishes to take possession of our *homes and our* fields we will refuse to give them up even if we have to die in the effort to resist him.

If he is attacked by disease or is dying of thirst and seeks our aid we may not refuse it.

In places where the British and Japanese forces are fighting our non-co-operation will be fruitless and unnecessary. Not to put any obstacles in the way of the British forces will

leadership, and with intimate contacts with the people. A free India would know how to defend herself in the event of any aggressor attacking her. The present Indian army is in fact an offshoot of the British army and has been maintained till now mainly to hold India in subjection. It has been completely segregated from the general population, who can in no sense regard it as their own.

The essential difference between the imperialist and the popular conceptions of defence is demonstrated by the fact that while foreign armies are invited to India for that defence, the vast man-power of India herself is not utilised for the purpose. India's past experience teaches her that it is harmful to her interest and dangerous to the cause of her freedom to introduce foreign armies in India. It is significant and extraordinary that India's inexhaustible manpower should remain untapped, while India develops into a battleground between foreign armies fighting on her soil or on her frontiers, and her defence is not supposed to be a subject fit for popular control. India resents this treatment of her people as chattels to be disposed of by foreign authority.

The A.-I.C.C. is convinced that India will attain her freedom through her own strength and will retain it likewise. The present crisis, as

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present our non-co-operation with the British Government is limited. Were we to offer them complete non-co-operation when they are actually fighting: it would be tantamount to placing our country deliberately in Japanese hands. Therefore not to put any obstacle in the way of the British forces will often be the only way of demonstrating our non-co-operation with the Japanese. Neither may we assist the British in any active manner. *If we can* judge from their recent attitude, the British Government do not need any help from us beyond our non-interference. They desire our help only as slaves.

It is not necessary for the Committee to make a clear declaration in regard to the scorched earth policy. If, in spite of our non-violent resistance, any part of the country falls into Japanese hands we may not destroy our crops, water-supply, &c., if only because it will be our endeavour to regain them. The destruction of war material is another matter and may under certain circumstances be a military necessity. But it can never be the Congress policy to destroy what belongs to or is of no [sic] use to the masses.

Whilst non-co-operation against the Japanese forces will necessarily be limited *to a comparatively small number and must succeed if it is complete and genuine*, the true building up of Swaraj consists in the millions of India whole-heartedly working the constructive programme. Without it the whole nation cannot rise from its age-long torpor. Whether the British remain or not it is our duty always to wipe out unemployment, to bridge the gulf between rich and poor, often be the only way of demonstrating our non-co-operation with the Japanese. Neither may we assist the British in any active manner. Judging from their attitude, the British Government do not need any help from us beyond our non-interference. They desire our help as slaves—a position we can never accept.

If, in spite of our non-violent resistance, any part of the country fall into Japanese hands we may not destroy our crops, water-supply, &c., if only because it will be our endeavour to regain them. The destruction of war material is another matter and may under certain circumstances be a military necessity. But it can never be the Congress policy to destroy what belongs to or is of use to the masses.

Direct non-co-operation against the Japanese forces will necessarily be limited. *Its complete and lasting* success and also the true building up of Swaraj depend on the millions of India whole-heartedly working the constructive programme. Without it the whole nation cannot rise from its age-long torpor. Whether the British remain or not it is our duty always to wipe out unemployment, to bridge the gulf between rich and poor, to banish communal strife, to exorcise the demon of untouchability, to reform dacoits and save the people from them. If crores of people do not take a living interest in this nation-building work, freedom in *terms of the masses* must remain a dream and unattainable by either non-violence or violence.

well as the experience of the negotiations with Sir Stafford Cripps, makes it impossible for the Congress to consider any schemes or proposals which retain, even in a partial measure, British control and authority in India. Not only the interests of India but also Britain's safety, and world peace and freedom demand that Britain must abandon her hold on India. It is on the basis of independence alone that India can deal with Britain or other nations.

The Committee repudiates the idea that freedom can come to India through interference or invasion by any foreign nation, whatever the professions of that nation may be. In case an invasion takes place, it must be resisted. Such resistance can only take the form of non-violent non-co-operation as the British Government has prevented the organisation of national defence by the people in any other way. The Committee would therefore expect the people of India to offer complete non-violent non-co-operation to the invading forces and not to render any assistance to them. We may not bend the knee to the aggressor nor obey any of his orders. We may not look to him for favours nor fall to his bribes. If he wishes to take possession of our homes and our fields we will refuse to give them up even if we have to die in the effort to resist them. In places wherein the British and the invading forces are fighting our non-co-operation will be fruitless and unnecessary. Not to put any obstacle in the way of British forces will often be the only way of demonstrating our non-co-operation with the

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to banish communal strife, to exorcise the demon of untouchability, to reform dacoits and save the people from them. If crores of people do not take a living interest in this national building work, freedom must remain a dream and unattainable by either non-violence or violence.

Foreign soldiers.

The A.-I.C.C. is of opinion that it is harmful to India's interests and dangerous to the cause of India's freedom to introduce foreign soldiers in India. It therefore appeals to the British Government to remove these foreign legions and henceforth stop further introduction. It is a crying shame to bring foreign troops in spite of India's inexhaustible man-power and is a proof of the immorality that British Imperialism is.

(70)

invader. Judging from their attitude the British Government do not need any help from us beyond our non-interference.

The success of such a policy of non-co-operation and non-violent resistance to the invader will largely depend on the intensive working out of the Congress constructive programme and more especially the programme of self-sufficiency and self-protection in all parts of the country.

Note [which appears from L/P & J/8/596 to refer to the final para. of Draft No. 1.]—Opposite this place in the margin the following is written but is crossed out:—

The A.-I.C.C. therefore requests the Mahatma Gandhi to guide the Congress organisation in carrying out the programme of non-violent non-co-operation when and where it becomes necessary.

6th May 1942.

G. D. PARKIN,
Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., S.B., U.P.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *11 May 1942, 4.35 pm*
Received: 11 May, 7 pm

No. 1311–G. Following is summary of portion of article by Gandhi in *Harijan* of May 10th:—

Begins. I remain same friend of British today that I was at beginning of war. I do not deny existence of hatred of British among[1] general public nor its increase with march of events, but I claim that my national[2] prescription has kept it under subjection and even sterilized it. I am convinced that time has come during the war not after it for British and Indians to be reconciled to complete separation from each other. Estrangement between them is growing. Every act of British Government is being interpreted, and I think rightly, as being in its own interest and for its own safety. There is no such thing as joint common interest. I feel British cannot suddenly change their traditional nature; racial superiority is treated not as vice but as virtue not only in India but in Africa, Burma and Ceylon. This drastic disease requires drastic remedy—complete and immediate orderly withdrawal from India at least, in reality and properly from all Non-European possessions. It will be bravest and cleanest act of British people. Clean end of Imperialism is likely to be end of Fascism and Nazism; suggested action will certainly blunt edge of Fascism and Nazism which are offshoot of Imperialism. I feel I must devote whole of my energy to realisation of this supreme act. Presence of British in India is invitation to Japan to invade India. Their withdrawal removes the bait. Assume that it does not; free India will be better able to cope with invasion. Unadulterated non-co-operation will then have full sway. *Ends.*

[1] 'among' was received corrupt. [2] 'national' omitted in decipher.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *11 May 1942, 10 pm*
Received: 12 May, 2.30 am

No. 1314–G. Following is summary of press statement by Maulana Azad made in Calcutta on 8th May, about your comments in House of Commons[1] regarding Congress banned resolutions[2]:—

Begins. I affirm with fullest sense of responsibility that no phrase of resolutions is either based on unverified rumours or misrepresents facts. Whatever it said is based on solid facts derived from most responsible and reliable sources. How could Congress attempt to undermine public confidence in Government and armed forces, which does not exist? I would be first man to welcome non-occurrence of events in Malaya and Burma, if proved to be incorrect or based on rumours. I therefore ask Government whether it is prepared to let me know what parts of resolutions are based on unverified rumours or misrepresent facts, and give me chance to lay my information before it. If then convinced that our information is incorrect, I would unhesitatingly express regret on behalf of Working Committee and withdraw resolutions. Are Government of India and Secretary of State prepared to accept this offer? *Ends.*

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 379, 7 May 1942, cols. 1387–9.
[2] See Nos. 4, 5, 9, and 10.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/I/1/948: f 28

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *11 May 1942, 3.50 pm*
Received: 12 May

588. Your private and personal telegram, 7th May, 1270–S.[1] Three out of five talks have now taken place and from comments received from very different levels I gather that effect on the general listener in this country is as forecast at the end of the first paragraph of my 569.[2] In general, my feeling is that talks are proving much less dangerous and possibly much more positively helpful than I had apprehended. I have ascertained that Reuters have not and will not carry any reference to them in messages to India. I think it now unlikely that

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Cripps will pursue his suggestion in regard to All-India Radio, and I propose to let it drop, or if he does raise it again, to make it clear that its adoption is out of the question.

[1] No. 32. [2] No. 26.

47

Mr Aney to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

5, MAN SINGH ROAD, NEW DELHI, *11 May 1942*

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

I have read through the earlier correspondence[1] between Your Excellency and the Secretary of State on the subject of an exchange of High Commissioners between India and Canada and have given careful thought to the suggestion that the proposal should now be reopened informally. I am entirely in agreement with Your Excellency that the wider the representation of this nature that India can secure the better, and I have not been greatly impressed by the reasons hitherto urged against pressing the proposition further. In any case one of the objections, namely, a possible claim from the large Japanese population has no validity now, while, as regards the Chinese population, the fact remains that the Indian community is British, while the Chinese is not. That, however, is an argument which can be kept in reserve until we know what the first reactions to our approach are; similarly the question as to who should be appointed if the response is favourable.

I am, therefore, fully in agreement with Your Excellency's suggestion that the Secretary of State should now be sounded privately whether, in his judgment, the Canadian Government would be ready to consider the proposal again.

With my best regards,

Yours sincerely,

M. S. ANEY

[1] See No. 33, note 1.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

SECRET THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *11 May 1942*

My dear Hallett,

I am most grateful for your secret letter No. U.P.–137[1] of 10th May. I suspend any comment on the most interesting information contained in it until I have had further time to consider it and to check up with people here. But I write at once to thank you most warmly for it and for the photostat. I am sending copy of the papers to Amery by tomorrow's bag.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 43.

49

War Cabinet

Committee on India. I (42) 15th Meeting

L/P&J/8/544: ff 92–4

Those present at this meeting held in Mr Attlee's Room, 11 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 11 May 1942 at 3 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Viscount Simon, Sir John Anderson, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary)

The Committee had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (I. (42) 18)[1] covering a telegram from the Viceroy about the proposed re-constitution of the Governor-General's Executive Council. The Viceroy proposed to fill two existing vacancies and to add three further seats to his Council: (1) War Transport, (2) Defence Co-ordination, on lines proposed by Sir Stafford Cripps in the recent discussions, but subject to the Commander-in-Chief's views, and (3) a member without portfolio (to be the British Indian representative with the War Cabinet and on the Pacific War Council in London). He proposed to select for the five appointments representative non-officials not associated with the leading political parties.

After discussion, the Committee reached the following Conclusions:—

(1) It was not thought that the appointment of Sir E. Benthall to the Governor-General's Executive Council, holding the portfolio of War

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Transport, would be a sound move in present circumstances. The Committee was against dividing the present portfolio of Communications into "Communications" and "War Transport". If the need was felt for the appointment of an expert adviser on war movements, the right course would seem to be for the Commander-in-Chief to obtain a suitable adviser for this purpose from home.

(2) We were committed to the appointment of a member of the Governor-General's Council to be the British Indian representative on the War Cabinet and on the Pacific War Council in London. This would involve the appointment of an additional member of the Council without portfolio. The appointment to this post of Sir R. Mudaliar met with approval, provided that the Secretary of State for India was satisfied that Sir R. Mudaliar would find sufficient work to keep him fully employed in this country. Thus there might be work for him in connection with the Military Department of the India Office and the High Commissioner's Office.

(3) Two views were expressed about the proposal to create a new portfolio of Defence Co-ordination:—

On the one hand, it was argued that the creation of this post at the present time would carry no conviction, and that there was no real reason for creating it now that the declaration had been rejected.

On the other hand, it was urged that the creation of this post would show that the scheme which we had put forward, and which had been rejected, was not, as had been alleged, a sham, but was a practical scheme which met a real need.

The Committee's Conclusion was that the Secretary of State should telegraph to the Viceroy and ascertain whether the creation of this post was put forward on political or on administrative grounds. If the creation of this post was justified on administrative grounds and the Commander-in-Chief was in agreement with the proposal, then the Committee favoured the creation of the new post.

(4) Various comments were made on the personnel proposed. The appointment of Sir Jogendra Singh was opposed on the ground that he was too old and was ineffective. A younger man should be appointed. The name of H. S. Malik was mentioned.

The proposed appointment of B. R. Ambedkar met with approval.

It was thought that Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar should be appointed to a post of real importance—Civil Defence was mentioned, where he might take the place of Raghavendra Rao, whose retirement on grounds of health seemed to be indicated.

[1] No. 27.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *12 May 1942, 12.50 pm*
Received: 12 May, 1 pm

No. 1323-S. My telegram No. 1215-S[1] of 3rd May. Reconstitution of Executive Council. I have thrown a fly over Mudaliar as regards War Cabinet. To my great disappointment he indicated that if approached he would, for family reasons, find it difficult if not impossible, to accept. I am pressing him again and will let you know the result. If he declines Chetty is one possibility. But as Chetty is now resigning from his American post presumably to stay on in this country, and given difficulty in getting him to accept an overseas post when he went to America, he may not be too good a starter. Sapru has crossed my mind as a possibility but he is frail, rather old and somewhat peevish, and I might be awkwardly placed were he to decline the offer of War Cabinet but indicate his readiness to serve as an ordinary Member of Council. I have quite enough passengers there from the health point of view already with Sarkar and Raghavendra Rao. But I do not yet despair of Mudaliar.

2. It would be of great assistance to me to have earliest possible reply to my telegram of 3rd May. It will take me some time to sound these various individuals, and I may well have difficulty in persuading C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar to give up Travancore and will have to arrange for replacement for him there if he does. Meanwhile it is of course very inconvenient to have these vacancies in Communications and Information and Broadcasting, in addition to Rao's being out of action in Civil Defence.

3. I am tackling Rao about his health and asking for further particulars. He has a long and distinguished record of service and I agree with you that we must treat him gently. Much will depend on what his doctors say. But it might be necessary if we felt obliged to let him have his four months' leave to warn him that he would have to give up Civil Defence to a permanent incumbent and take one of the new portfolios available on the reconstitution of Council.

[1] No. 12.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *12 May 1942*

No. 1324-S. Your private and personal telegram of 9th May, No. 586.[1] I have no doubt whatever that a visit by His Royal Highness would do much good in many ways, and we should greatly welcome the opportunity of entertaining him, and would do our utmost to make him comfortable and arrange for him to see any people in places that he wished to. I think it only fair to him that I should let you know quite frankly so as to prevent any misunderstanding on his part the conditions under which we are living. We are on a war footing here. I have given up a large part of the Viceroy's House for office accommodation, and we have few spare bedrooms. Princes have almost all given up their New Delhi houses for offices and could not find accommodation in Delhi which is packed full. They would be most anxious to entertain His Royal Highness in their States, but I fear he would find conditions in most greatly trying in this heat. Troops as you know are very widely distributed with hardly any within reach of Delhi, and if His Royal Highness is to see any considerable number of formations, he would require to undertake extensive touring mostly by air. Lastly though with very great regret I fear that unremitting pressure of work would make it impossible for me to accompany His Royal Highness on his tours myself. But I feel sure that he will appreciate all these points and am only anxious to avoid any disappointment on his part. As I say we shall be only too delighted to see him and I think the visit is an excellent idea.

2. I have consulted the Commander-in-Chief who entirely agrees with me as to great value of visit and will provide all possible facilities for seeing troops, &c. Commander-in-Chief and I hope that, despite fact that we are in the hot weather and the inconveniences I have mentioned above, His Royal Highness will be able to cover a good deal of ground, and we will do our best to arrange a really good and constructive tour for him on whatever lines may suit him.

[1] No. 38.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/544: f 86

IMPORTANT — INDIA OFFICE, *12 May 1942, 10.45 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL — *Received: 13 May*

599. My private and personal telegram No. 595[1] of 12 May, para. 3. If Rao's portfolio has to be filled whether by Ramaswami Aiyar as Committee suggest or by new selection it occurs to me that it might be worth while to consider for it or for Information Member Krishnamachari or Gopalaswami Ayyangar from Kashmir. They both have much administrative experience and apparently either would fulfil requirement of ten years Crown Service[2] while neither would overlook States factor. But of course inclusion of either would add to already considerable representation of Madras and Chetty is in the offing for any further vacancy.

[1] No. 54. [2] Government of India Act 1935, Ninth Schedule, Sec. 36 (3).

53

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE — INDIA OFFICE, *12 May 1942*

I have just sent off a telegram[1] to you embodying the results of a meeting I arranged with the Cabinet India Committee yesterday. I ought perhaps to explain that Winston has very much got into the way of leaving Indian questions for this Committee and I am not therefore proposing to bring the question of your re-constituted Executive before the Cabinet as such but have asked you to go straight ahead now, subject to the views expressed by the Committee. On one point they were all of one opinion, and that was against the appointment of Benthall. I know you will be disappointed about this, but I think it would be definitely a mistake to try and re-open the question. Benthall is a good fellow and, as you know, when his appointment was mooted by you in pre-Cripps days I was quite prepared to endorse it. I do feel, however, that to make it now after what has happened would be provoking unnecessary controversy and hasn't enough to be said for it on the positive side. If Benthall had been an expert on traffic management by road or rail it might have been different. On the question of the Defence Department we were very much divided, but eventually compromised on what I think is the right answer,

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namely, to go ahead with the division if it can be justified on administrative merits, i.e., if it will neither impede Wavell nor produce in the new Defence, or Defence Co-ordination, Department an obvious make-believe office. If, on the other hand, the office proves of real value and importance, it will greatly strengthen our case retrospectively for having offered it in the negotiations with Congress. One or two other suggestions were made as regards individuals, but the Committee fully accepted my view that the detailed allocation of posts must obviously be one in which the final decision rests with yourself.

2. We also discussed the question of non-official advisers and I found the Committee generally sharing my view that it might be a very good thing to make such a move, rather on the lines suggested by Hallett,[2] wherever suitable individuals are available and the conditions favour it, but not to feel bound to apply it necessarily in every Province. I don't know what Rajagopalachari's prospects are in Madras, but I trust that Hope will give him any help he can if required, though naturally it would not help if the Governor were thought to be intervening prematurely. With a man like Rajagopalachari I think Hope could for instance run bigger risks in letting him resume office without a definite majority than you rightly insisted on in the case of Orissa. I feel R., once in office, would manage to win round not a few waverers. It would be a big thing if we could say that all the eastern seaboard Provinces were self-governing.

* * *

4. I have seen a certain amount of Azizul Huque since his arrival. On his first Sunday I took him down to Oxford and let him see something of its beauty in spring time as well as meet some of the academic people. I like him very much and think he ought to do well. He hasn't quite the same social distinction as Firoz, but his straightforward personality and his obviously keen interest in academic and cultural questions should find him a wide circle of friends. He is for the moment camping at the Waldorf Hotel opposite India House and finding the greatest difficulty in looking round for a furnished flat or small house. Furnished flats are very rare at this moment and expensive; but an unfurnished flat presents an even more difficult problem for him, for there has been an appalling ramp in furniture and prices pushed up to two and three times the normal. In any case, the cost of living here has gone up so much that I have very little doubt that when he has had a little time to look round and form some estimate of his expenses he will have to come to you for some increase in his allowances. If so, I hope you and Raisman will look on the matter favourably.

5. I haven't listened in to the Round Table talks on India here, but am told that the general effect on the public has been good, and that millions have

[1] No. 54. [2] See Vol. I, No. 620.

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become aware of at any rate the elementary facts of the internal Indian controversy. The Congress camp, on the other hand, are very angry, and Sorensen has a question[3] down for Brendan Bracken tomorrow, suggesting that there should be a more formal debate with speakers officially appointed by Congress. I trust Bracken will give a firm reply. Cripps has not returned to the charge since I told him that you and I definitely disapproved of the idea of this debate being relaid to India or of an Indian debate being broadcast here from India.

6. I must not omit to thank you for the admirable analysis of Congress tactics in the Cripps negotiations contained in your telegram No. 311-SC[4] of the 27th April. This very useful summary will be particularly helpful in connection with publicity work.

[3] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 379, 13 May, cols. 1715–16. [4] Vol. I, No. 700.

54

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/544: ff 88–91

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *13 May 1942*,[1] *12.10 am*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

595. I have now discussed your 1215-S[2] fully with Cabinet India Committee. Committee are unanimously opposed to Benthall. They consider his business connections might be open to criticism. They do not feel that European commercial community would really like appointment either in itself or because of resultant criticism which might be directed against them collectively. These objections might be off-set by Benthall being a real expert on transport, but that is not the case. If a transport expert is required the view held was that the real solution would be to keep Communications Department undivided as at present and if Commander-in-Chief feels it desirable, having regard to the existence of the Railway Board, to attach to it for war transport purposes some really first-rate technical man. It seems to me that there is much force in these views and I do not think you should press idea of including Benthall any further.

2. On question of dividing defence portfolio our conclusion was in favour provided that you and Wavell really feel that it is a good thing on merits and not merely a political move. If it is justified administratively and the new defence co-ordination member finds he really has work of importance to do that would incidentally dispose of the charge that Cripps only offered a "comic" department; failing that its creation would obviously tell just the other way. If created our preference would be also to follow the change of titles suggested by Cripps and call Wavell War Member, but I have no strong view as to that

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and it might have implications read into it in India that would prove inconvenient later on.

3. There was general approval of your proposal to bring in Ramaswami Ayyar but it was suggested that his undoubted ability might be used to fuller advantage in important post of civil defence if Rao vacates. But I do not overlook great importance of the Information portfolio nor the value of filling it by someone knowledgeable about States questions. I was also urged to ask you to see if you couldn't find a young and intelligent Sikh instead of Jogendra, even if of comparatively junior standing. H. S. Malik's name cropped up in that connection. I imagine you could spare him from New York now, but I realise it might not be practicable from point of view of his service standing.

4. We are agreed that Mudaliar is the best choice for here. It may not be easy to find him really enough to do outside the weekly Cabinet meetings and less regular meetings of Pacific Council and Defence Committee. But I daresay I can arrange a good deal outside and we may eventually have to revert to your original idea of a rotation of your members.

5. I am not quite sure that you have realised that there are two Pacific Councils. There is one at Washington which is run by the President and the combined Chiefs of Staff. So far the President has not agreed to India being represented.[3] If and when he does it will presumably be by Bajpai. The other meets here and includes Dutch, Chinese, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and probably American. It is at present rather dormant, meeting occasionally to discuss developments and is not likely to reassume active importance until we are nearer to the point of recovering naval control of the Indian Ocean and of assuming the offensive against lost Allied territories.

6. I think the above will have given you sufficient guidance as to the Cabinet view and you can now go ahead with the actual reconstitution as you think best.

7. We had discussion also on the question of non-official advisers in the Provinces and agreed that there is no reason why Governors should not make such appointments wherever suitable individuals are available. I think you might take this up preferably on the lines of Hallett's letter of 13th April,[4] excluding law and order responsibilities and finding places so far as possible directly in relation to war questions. Possibly suitable persons could be found from among those who took office in the provisional governments formed at the outset in 1937 which also perhaps might afford a fruitful field for any candidates you may still require for your Executive. More important of course would be restoration of popular government in Madras if Rajagopalachari can pull it off.

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 gives the date as 12 May. [2] No. 12. [3] Vol. I, Nos. 488 and 508.
[4] Vol. I, No. 620.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/544: ff 75–8

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *13 May 1942*,[1] *11.45 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

601. Your telegram 12th May, 1323-S[2] crossed my private and personal telegrams 595[3] and 599[4] latter of which is relevant to hint of difficulty about Ayyar. I too am sorry that Mudaliar is reluctant to accept London offer as he has always seemed to me one of the most suitable possibilities from among your Members of Council. But if he maintains his refusal I shall regret it the less for reasons shown below. I share your feelings about Sapru and hope you will not pursue the idea. I am sure he would not fit in well here.

2. As I indicated in paragraph 4 of my 595 the duties of Indian representatives attending War Cabinet and Pacific Council are likely to be something of a sinecure and I cannot help feeling that it might be waste of good material to send anyone who, like Mudaliar, has capacity to administer effectively important Department in your Government. On the other hand, a representative here might learn and see much which he could report to you and bring back to his colleagues on return. In any case we do not want India to accept H.M.G.'s invitation by sending someone clearly of no weight.

3. If you cast your mind back to correspondence in February (my official telegram of 17th February, 2764[5] conveying H.M.G.'s invitation, my private and personal telegram of same date, 190[6] and subsequent exchanges[7]) you will see that idea at that time was no more than that British Indian representative should be appointed by Governor-General in Council and Princely representative, if any, invited by Crown Representative in consultation with the Governor-General in Council. Suggestion that a Member of your Council should be detached to serve in London was of course made in my earlier private letter of 13th January[8] and I think commended itself to you as means of providing for surplus candidate for Council. It also fitted in with Australian plea that Australian Cabinet Minister should be "Member of War Cabinet" in London. That plea was however not fully accepted and in the event Earle Page has been representative appointed by Australian Government although not Australian Cabinet Minister. So far as analogy applies there is no actual need for Indian representation to be by Member of your Council.

4. In actual fact owing to Page's illness Australia was pending arrival of Evatt—a Cabinet Minister—represented by Bruce, High Commissioner, and if you are finding difficulty both in filling departmental portfolios in your Council

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and without wasting talent in finding suitable person to carry intermittent and not onerous task of attending War Cabinet and Pacific Council in London, there is no reason subject to Prime Minister agreeing why Governor-General in Council should not, if it proved the most convenient solution, make a temporary appointment for latter purpose of Indian High Commissioner. This might have useful effect of increasing status of that post. I do not in the least press my suggestion and offer it only as affording one possible way out of any immediate difficulty.

5. Another possibility which has occurred to me is that the Governor-General in Council might appoint a Prince, if one can be found acceptable both from the point of view of your Council and of yourself as Crown Representative, to represent all India. This too might be an easier solution if only made for a period and a successor then selected from your Council. This might fit in with my previous suggestion that one or more Princes might be invited to attend your Council regularly when matters directly bearing on the war are under discussion.

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 gives the date as 14 May. [2] No. 50. [3] No. 54. [4] No. 52.
[5] Vol. I, No. 117; the date should be 13 February.
[6] Vol. I, No. 114; the date should be 13 February.
[7] Vol. I, Nos. 136 and 149. [8] Vol. I, No. 11.

56

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *13 May 1942*

REPORT NO. 105

2. *Congress.*—Gandhi has visited Bombay for a week, and has now left. The object of his visit was stated to be the collection of funds for the Andrews Memorial,[1] and it is said that he has been successful in obtaining about five lakhs. He has created the impression, amongst those who have seen him, that he is more bitter against Great Britain than ever before, and there is expectation in some quarters that he may, before long, possibly when the Working Committee next meets, attempt some openly hostile move. From his writings in *Harijan* and from press interviews which he has given, this might take the form of demanding that we withdraw from India and that India should then be

[1] In *Harijan* of 24 May 1942 Mr Gandhi wrote that Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Sheth Ghanashyamdas Birla had asked him to go to Bombay for eight days for the purpose of finishing the Deenabhandhu (Reverend C. F. Andrews) Memorial collections.

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declared neutral in the war. I should doubt myself, whether the Working Committee would let him go as far as this, for I think such an attitude would shock a great many people. I notice that the *Bombay Chronicle*, in its leading article this morning, is at some pains to explain why such an attitude would be untenable. Nevertheless, Gandhi appears to be in a nasty mood, and Munshi, whom I saw a day or two ago, thinks that he is probably brewing up for something.

I found Munshi in a markedly realistic, and even reactionary, mood. He is convinced that it is no use attempting to form a National Government during the war, since neither the Congress nor the Muslim League will climb down from their positions, and every attempt that we make to induce them to do so only leaves the position between the two communities worse than it was before. He thinks it was probably a blessing that Congress did not agree to the Cripps proposals, as, if they had, a real battle would then have started between Congress and the Muslim League. I threw flies over him as to what more could be done to associate non-officials with Government, and he expressed himself as opposed to non-official Advisers. Men who could be got would lose much of their appeal if they became definitely associated with Government, and would provoke antagonism to Government from their opponents, which at present did not exist. In this Province, at any rate, nobody had much quarrel with the present régime and they felt comfortable, but that could easily alter if controversial personalities were imported. He was extremely sceptical about the value of any Congress volunteers, and put forward the thesis that only officials, and those who were now definitely supporting Government, could be relied upon to stay put in an emergency, and that it was better to rely upon them than to try and gather in Congress or other volunteers who, from his experience, would be useless. I would like Munshi as a non-official Adviser if we come to that, but, from his attitude expressed above, I doubt whether he would accept.

3. *National War Front.*—The National War Front is now under way. Masani, the leader, has held a number of conferences with the Press, commercial bodies, teachers, and so on, and I think has laid some good foundations. It was publicly inaugurated last Saturday, at a very full public meeting in Bombay, over which I presided, and which was really most encouraging and successful. All the speeches gave support to the Front without reservation. Even Sir Purshottamdas Thakurdas, who let me down very badly on a somewhat similar occasion two years ago, refrained, this time, from reading a Congress brief, and came out openly with the assertion that India's hope lay with the success of the British and that full support must be given to the war. We have been rather slow in starting, but I think that may have been to the good, as it looks as if we have got quite a solid foundation, which may last.

It has its pitfalls, however. Jamnadas Mehta has rather jumped the Front into

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taking on N. C. Kelkar as a leader in Poona. He is old, disgruntled, can make speeches as defeatist and fifth columnist as anyone, very critical of Government, and abhorrent to Muslims and Mahrattas, and will only gather the Mahasabha round him. That is the sort of problem which may arise. There is also a tendency for the Front to get too much embroiled with A.R.P.—in which pie everybody wants to have a finger—and with Home Guards. However, we shall, I hope, get through such difficulties, and, certainly, Cowasji Jehangir and Jamnadas Mehta are doing a great deal to help on the front at present.

57

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/220: f 82

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *14 May 1942, 1.40 am*

604. Paragraph 19 of your private letter of 14th April.[1] High Commissionership in Canada. Could you let me know what is present position? Are you following this up direct with Mackenzie King?

[1] Vol. I, No. 626.

58

Dr Savarkar to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

DADAR, BOMBAY, *14 May 1942*

Your Excellency,

I beg to forward a copy of the resolution passed by hundreds of meetings held at Bombay, Poona, Calcutta, Nagpur, Lucknow, Amritsar, Peshawar, Patna, and hundreds of other cities and towns all over India and were attended altogether by not less than a couple of millions of Hindus on the 10th of May last which was observed by the Hindu Mahasabha as the All-India Independence Day and the anti-Pakistan Day.

I hope the resolution will enable the Government to appraise the intensity of the determination of Hindudom as a whole to oppose any scheme like the Pakistan one which seeks to allow freedom for any Province to secede and thus to break up the unity and the integrity of Hindusthan as a consolidated Nation and a centralized State.

Yours sincerely,

V. D. SAVARKAR

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Enclosure to No. 58

THE RESOLUTION PASSED AT THE ANTI-PAKISTAN MEETINGS ON 10TH MAY, 1942

(1) We, Hindus, reassert our determination to continue the Battle of Freedom which began on this memorable day, the 10th of May, on the eve of our National Rising in 1857, and has been handed down to us from sire to son.

Our methods and means may tactically change from time to time even as they are restricted today to the constitutional and peaceful sphere. But our ideal remains unchanged—the achievement of *Swarajya*, the absolute Political Independence of Hindusthan! And we will continue the fight till this goal is ultimately won!

(2) But the independence of Hindusthan does and must inevitably imply in itself the unity and integrity of it. This unity of Hindusthan, our Motherland, and Holy Land from the Indus to the Seas, had been through a thousand generations of our people, the vision of our seers, the theme of our poets, the mandate of our law-givers and the battle-cry of our warriors—till at last it got identified with the oneness of our National Being itself. To us, Hindus, today this unity of our Motherland is an article of faith, the very life-breath of our National Being.

We, Hindus, take up therefore, a solemn vow today that we will resist, defy and defeat any attempt on the part of the Muslims to carve out any independent Pakistan federation by breaking up this unity of Hindusthan as an integral Nation and a centralised State.

(3) Nevertheless, we also make it clear once more that we, Hindus, are willing to share a common citizenship with all other non-Hindu minorities like the Parsees, Christians, Jews and others who bear patriotic and undivided loyalty to our common country, and stand by its unity as an integral Nation and a centralised State. There shall be constitutional safeguards guaranteeing to all citizens alike the Liberty of worship, of language, of script and even in representation, in proportion to population if it be insisted on by any cultural group. We hope that all our countrymen, irrespective of caste or creed or religion, will realise before long that the interests of everyone of us demand that we should all merge, on such sound and honest, democratic lines and on the basis of such rights and duties of equal citizenship, into a united and independent Hindusthan!

But if in spite of our earnest desire to meet all these requirements which true Nationalism demands, the Muslims try to browbeat the Hindus into yielding to them more than what is due to them in common with all Indian citizens, we, Hindusabhaites in particular and Hindu Sanghatanists in general shall resist them and even the British Government, in case it sides with the

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Muslims in pursuance of an anti-Hindu Policy. The Hindu Mahasabha does not claim today an inch more for the Hindus than what is due to them on National grounds, and in relation to their population proportions. But we are resolved and proclaim that we shall fight to the bitter end any effort on the part of any one to deprive an inch of what is due to the Hindus in virtue of their population strength and their equal rights held in common with all other Indian citizens.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: f 86

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *14 May 1942*[1]

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

607. Your private and personal telegram 12th May, 1324-S.[2] King has approved suggested visit to India of His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester who is being informed of decision by War Office and Commander-in-Chief, Mideast. Further telegram will follow as soon as possible in regard to detailed arrangements.

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 gives the date as 15 May. [2] No. 51.

60

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *15 May 1942*

Nothing has happened since I wrote to you a few days ago, except Auchinleck's suggestion that the Duke of Gloucester might visit India. This appealed to me very much and after hearing that you also welcomed the idea, I at once got in touch with Winston and with the Court. The Duke has done very well in Persia and I am sure will do well in India also. He is the easiest to talk to and the most soldier-like in appearance of the Royal Family, and his coming at this moment ought to be a real encouragement to various elements that have felt rather cold-shouldered by the Cripps visit. In particular, I hope you will get him to help you in making your Executive feel that they are regarded as of real consequence in the Government of India. I am sure, too, he can do a lot

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both with the Princes and the Army. I won't say more as we shall be settling all sorts of details by cable.

2. Congress seems to be going steadily in the wrong direction under Gandhi's influence. I certainly feel with one or two of the Governors who have written to you that we should show no hesitation in jumping firmly on any of them, from Gandhi downwards, who deliver really mischievous speeches. If later on there should be actual Japanese invasion, I hope we shall not hesitate to take the most extreme steps in making an example of any fifth columnists whom we may catch.

3. On the other hand, Rajagopalachari has shown great courage and is speaking out boldly on the right lines. Is it altogether beyond hope to get him and Jinnah, or him and Sikander, into your Executive in their individual capacity as real leaders of India, without raising the issue of actual proportion of representation of parties as such? If the thing were put to Jinnah in that way is it impossible that he might be willing to come in in his personal capacity or allow some one member of the League, also in his personal capacity, but without committing the League as such? That would be a sort of compromise between complete abstention and actual participation in the Government—a form, as it were, of co-operation, showing the League's goodwill, but not committing it in its corporate capacity to the policy of the Executive. However, it may be that Rajagopalachari himself would wish to concentrate primarily on the restoration of popular government in Madras. If he does then I imagine he would naturally also wish to attend the National Defence Council. I hope, by the way, that the meeting of the latter may coincide with the Duke's visit and enable him either formally or informally, to tell them something about his experiences in the Middle East and particularly what he has seen of the Indian troops.

R. shows no signs of wanting a place. Nor do I think he would do as much good unless he brought in some public support (of which commodity he seems now to be markedly short).

L.

4. I have had a talk with Catto, who asks me to express to you his great regret that Moore should once again have been so troublesome.[1] He has, as I think I told you before, set up a committee under Richardson to keep Moore straight on questions of policy, and empowered to dismiss him if he went too far. Apparently they very nearly did so not long before Cripps' visit, but somehow seem to have let him do what he liked when the visit was on. Any-

I am obliged to Catto, who has throughout my Viceroyalty been most considerate towards myself.

L.

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how, what Catto tells me he is now going to do is (*a*) send a telegram to Richardson suggesting that the committee ought to have functioned more effectively in this matter and telling them to deal more drastically with Moore in future; and (*b*) to Moore himself, giving him a stiff reprimand for his performances last month and telling him to pay more attention to news and less to airing his political views. Catto does not mean to retain Moore in any case after the expiration of his contract, which comes to an end in six months' time. On the other hand, he is rather afraid of Moore making trouble in India if he were dismissed off-hand and has been anxious to avoid that. He agrees, however, that if Moore does make real trouble again his committee should dismiss him without further ado and take the chance of whatever Moore may write or say before he leaves India. Moore would in any case, of course, get the balance of his salary up to the end of the contract.

Moore is a good journalist—but too vain and opinionated to be an even passably good Editor!

L.

[1] See Vol. I, No. 626, para. 8.

61

Note by Mr Spry[1]

L/PO/6/105f: ff 39–40

MR GRAHAM SPRY'S INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT, MAY 15TH, 1942

The President received me between 12.30 and 12.50 p.m. May 15th at the Executive Offices, the White House. The appointment was made at the request of H.E. the Ambassador who also asked the Canadian Minister[2] to intervene. The first appointment was arranged for 12.30 p.m. May 7th but was cancelled owing to the late arrival of the President of Peru.[3]

The President opened the conversation by enquiring if Sir Stafford Cripps was well and if I had accompanied Sir Stafford throughout the whole of the negotiations. He, then, discussed the following subjects in the order below:

1. His letter[4] to the Prime Minister prior to the departure of the Mission to India.

2. Relations between the Mission and the War Cabinet in the later stages of the negotiations.

[1] Enclosed in a letter of 4 August 1942 from Mr Spry to Mr Turnbull.

[2] Mr Lester Pearson. [3] Dr Manuel Prado.

[4] The reference is evidently to President Roosevelt's telegram to Mr Churchill of 11 March 1942. Vol. I, No. 311.

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3. Colonel Louis Johnson.
4. Comments on Indian leaders.
5. The population and defence: guerrillas.

1. The President asked if the Prime Minister had received the telegram he had sent a few days before the Mission's departure, in which he drew some parallels between the problems facing an Indian constitution-making body and those before the American States before the adoption of the American constitution. He emphasized the co-operation of the 13 colonies in the years immediately before the Constitution, mentioned their isolation, lack of communications, historical and religious differences, and suggested the differences between the various groups in India were similar. Something new for India yet tried by experience was required: American experience was new, but 150 years had proved its strength. Out of the period of co-operation prior to the American Constitution, the colonies had learned the value of federation and the necessity of both granting powers to a central authority and of sinking local differences in a wider unity. He twice or thrice spoke of the value of an interim experience of different states working together as a precursor to a stronger grouping.

I answered that indeed the Prime Minister had received the telegram and had given it to Sir Stafford who in turn allowed those accompanying him on the mission to study it. I said that the proposals, like the American experience, provided for both an interim period, in which the Indian political leaders were offered a full opportunity, during a war, to learn the value of working together, and for an ensuing constitution, framed by a constitution making body representing states, the Provinces and the Indian states. This constitution, I emphasized, would be drafted by Indians in India, not by Englishmen in England or in India, and the form and powers would be for Indians themselves to determine. I suggested that if the Indian political parties had accepted the very real measure of power offered to them except in the case of defence the experience in practical governance might have prepared the different parts of India for a new constitutional relationship.

The President discussed American constitutional history with a rather delightful and almost boyish relish; there was something charmingly human about his enthusiasm for America as a new phenomenon in world history.

2. The President then said, in almost these terms, "There is one question I would really like to put to you. I want it for my own information, and perhaps you cannot answer it." I assured him I would frankly answer any question on which I had information. "Some people believe that the mission would have been successful if the instructions had not been changed during the later stages of the negotiations. Can you tell me if there is anything to that—were there any restrictions placed on Cripps' instructions?"

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I answered that I was grateful to him for mentioning these comments and that similar comments had been made to me by several of his own officials. This point of view seemed so seriously held that I had telegraphed Sir Stafford two days ago for guidance, to supplement my own knowledge and conviction and that last night Sir Stafford had replied "Please convey to the President my personal assurance that throughout the Indian negotiations I was loyally supported by the War Cabinet, the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief." It was therefore possible with all emphasis to assure the President that there was no truth whatsoever in any such or similar interpretation. The President replied, "I am very glad to hear it; some of our papers have had that idea."

He said nothing precisely to indicate whether or not he had accepted this interpretation. But obviously it was on his mind and he raised the issue himself, very pointedly and early in the interview. Nor did he give any suggestion, except the newspapers, of the origin of the interpretation. I told him also that I had answered the officials who had spoken to me from my own knowledge as one who had been close to Sir Stafford throughout the negotiations and who had inevitably read every communication between the War Cabinet and Sir Stafford. My feeling was that this misconception had been definitely removed.

3. The President then referred very briefly and generally to the complexity of the Indian problem. "I think our people begin to see it is not easy. . . ."[5] He then asked if Colonel Johnson had been "helpful". I replied that Sir Stafford had said that he had been definitely helpful. The President said that Colonel Johnson had considerable drive but his "heart is in the right place". "When I sent him out there," he continued, "I told him he was not to interfere, I was quite insistent we should not interfere, but I wanted him to be helpful, if he could. I did not want him to get into these negotiations on his own initiative." I answered that Pandit J. Nehru had first approached the Colonel, that the Colonel had acted both helpfully and properly. The President interrupted smiling quite broadly, "Perhaps some of your people over there thought he was interfering." I answered that Sir Stafford was grateful for the Colonel's help and that there was no suggestion or question of interference, the Colonel was brought into the discussion by Congress and acted as an intermediary in his personal capacity only.

4. The President then commented that Nehru seemed to wish the negotiations to succeed and that he, the President thought Gandhi's "resurgence" had caused some surprise. What hope was there for any further developments in India? Was it not a misfortune that "practical men with experience in government had not been negotiating with Cripps". These questions were uttered more as comments than directly to me and led the President to the discussion of what the population would do in the event of a "Japanese invasion".

[5] The dots are in the original.

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5. He then outlined a proposal for organizing the Indian population for defence suggesting:

(*a*) enlisting under Indian officers able-bodied men in the coastal areas.
(*b*) quick training—three or four months—and discipline.
(*c*) expert advice—"but under Indian officers under their own control"—to be provided by British officers and "even from some of the Americans over there".
(*d*) the advantages he cited were, first to increase the proportion of disciplined people in Calcutta, Madras and "along that coast" and second, to create a basis for guerrilla warfare.
(*e*) "between us we could supply machine guns and rifles and that is what guerrillas need".

Time is the essence, he twice said. "I hope your people are doing what they can." "I don't want to interfere I only want to help. You see my job is the Pacific"—the more resistance India can offer, the more the Japs are contained and the easier "is my job in the Pacific".

I asked if it would be proper for me, should he so wish it, to pass on his suggestions and he quickly said he would like me to do so, adding "We don't want to interfere, we only want to help. This is our common war." I answered that I was sure such friendly interest would be appreciated and that I would carry his suggestion to the proper quarters.

At this point, the interview concluded.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

PERSONAL NEW DELHI, *17 May 1942, 4.40 pm*
Received: 17 May, 7 pm

No. 1386–S. Your telegram No. 562[1] of 5th May. Cripps was approached by All-India Students' Federation to secure release of their members detained or restricted under Defence of India Rules and on his departure I wrote a personal letter[2] to Governors asking them to help over release of young men with anti-Fascist views. My Home Department at the same time wrote to Provincial Governments asking them to review the lists of detained students. All-India Students' Federation thereafter supplied list of names which did contain the name of Dr. Subbarayan's son though Cripps had not mentioned him specially to me. He is the only convicted person in the list and the Madras Government

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is considering his case. Replies have not yet been received from all Governments but a number of detained students have already been released. I will let you have a complete picture later.[3]

[1] No. 19. [2] Vol. I, No. 638.
[3] See Lord Linlithgow's telegram 1721 of 9 June. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *17 May 1942, 4.40 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 18 May, 12.15 am*

No. 1388–S. Your private and personal telegram of 14th May, No. 604.[1] Canadian High Commissionership. I have been discussing with Aney and have just heard from him that he favours taking this matter further. I think it would probably be best that the preliminary discussion with Mackenzie King should be undertaken through you, and if you think that Canadian Government would still be prepared to proceed with the idea of exchange of High Commissionerships I should greatly welcome it. As you will see from paragraph 5[2] of my letter of 1st May 1942 we might be able to fit Fazlul Huq into it, and in that event we might at once ease the Bengal political position, provide suitably for Fazlul Huq and start the new High Commissionership off with someone of high standing who has been a Provincial Premier for over five years. But my mind remains open on that, and the first thing is of course to secure Canadian agreement to the creation of the post.

[1] No. 57.
[2] Discussing the problem of finding employment for Mr Fazlul Huq, should he demit the Chief Ministership of Bengal. MSS. EUR. F. 125/11.

64

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT *17 May 1942*
PERSONAL

No. 1400–S. My telegram No. 1264–S[1] dated the 7th May 1942. I returned from my tour to Madras, Vizagapatam and Calcutta yesterday. You may care

[1] No. 31.

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to have my general impressions. I was very favourably impressed by morale, civil and military, and what I saw confirmed my feeling that there has been a marked improvement in civilian morale in the last six weeks. This was particularly noticeable in Calcutta. In both Presidencies I have no doubt that this is largely due to the sight of increasing numbers of modern fighting aircraft, but I strongly suspect, too, that the long-range pledges given by His Majesty's Government *via* Cripps have been working beneficially under the surface even if for political reasons neither Congress nor the Muslim League are prepared to admit in public any advantage in them. Duke of Gloucester's visit could, I think, hardly in the circumstances be better timed.

2. I have much more confidence in the light of my local discussions and the local atmosphere in the capacity of Madras and Bengal to stand up to bombing though no doubt there will be difficulties here and there. I am not quite so sure that the police can be relied on to remain 100 per cent. firm in their first experiences, but we shall have to do our best over that.

3. Summing up I should say that there is a reasonably good prospect of a sufficient degree of civilian support to make effective the maximum military effort by forces available in the event of emergency.

65

Sir A. Hope (Madras) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/70

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *17 May 1942*

No. 72–M. We have just heard that Azad and Nehru are shortly going to tour Madras, to counteract Rajagopalachari's campaign. This may give rise to a certain amount of trouble and probably to anti-British speeches by both of them. C.I.D. are pressing for a prohibition of their entry into the Presidency but as this may have All-India repercussions I would like to hear your view. My own opinion is that if we prohibited it we shall be accused of taking sides with Rajagopalachari. Apart from muzzling two of Congress leaders I would prefer to allow them to come and start their campaign, and if they do make bad speeches then to prohibit any more. From a purely political point of view I think their visit may well split local Congress from top to bottom and will certainly bring to heel some of waverers who are inclined to follow Rajagopalachari. It is difficult to say at the moment how successful Rajagopalachari is likely to be, but general indication is that he will fail in his efforts to form a National Government. He is going on a tour throughout Tamil country for

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the next fortnight and nothing will happen till after his return. I do not know when Nehru is by way of coming but it will be shortly and I would like to have your opinion as soon as possible.

66

Sir Bijoy Singh Roy to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

15 LANSDOWNE ROAD, CALCUTTA, *17 May 1942*

Dear Sir Gilbert,

The failure of the Cripps Mission has left India politically more disunited and dissatisfied than before. The Congress by its resolution[1] adopted at Allahabad has reverted to its original attitude regarding the war and proposes to fight with non-violent non-co-operation an enemy armed with all modern weapons of oppression and manslaughter. Mahatma Gandhi in a recent article in the *Harijan* has gone further and has urged for complete and immediate separation between India and Great Britain. The Muslim League under Mr. Jinnah seems to be interested not even in the defence of the country unless Pakistan is conceded in advance. The attitude of the Hindu Mahasabha is no less uncompromising. It is not prepared even to discuss matters except on the basis of Akhand-Hindusthan. But neither the League nor the Hindu Mahasabha realises that their ideals will vanish in thin air unless we win the war. The result is complete stalemate and continuance of the static political condition in India while her defence remains unsupported by popular will. The sharp difference of opinion amongst the Congress, the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha is no doubt a great handicap to defence measures specially in a Province like Bengal where the two communities are more or less equally balanced. It is therefore desirable that fresh efforts should be made to bring about Indian unity which alone can help the creation of an effective National War Front, on the basis of India being granted autonomy immediately after the war, consideration of all the complex communal and minority questions being deferred at present, and both the League and the Mahasabha being given assurance to be allowed to urge their points of view before the new constitution is framed. In the meantime however all parties should settle down to the supreme duty of defending India as a united people. Regarding Defence and Cabinet decisions being accepted by the Viceroy during the present constitution, an agreement is not beyond possibility, if these points are reopened and reconsidered in a spirit of mutual understanding. Both the Hindus and the Muslims have developed mutual

[1] See enclosure to No. 43, col. 3.

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suspicion in a greater degree in course of the working of the present constitution on party lines since 1937. This suspicion and the ill-feeling can be removed only by fighting together for the protection of our own hearth and home and for preserving the integrity of our country.

It is evident from the recent utterances of the Secretary of State and Sir Stafford Cripps that the next move must come from the Indians themselves. But after the failure of the Cripps Mission the Indian leaders may not feel inclined to take initiative in the matter. The enemy having already crossed the border of India we cannot afford to wait any longer. The attitude of Sir Stafford Cripps, I regret to observe, in not giving sufficient attention to parties outside the Congress and the League has placed the Liberals who have helped the working [of] the Indian Constitution since 1921, in spite of all opposition and of even by incurring unpopularity, in an awkward position, affecting their usefulness for such a negotiation. In the circumstances may I appeal to His Excellency the Viceroy kindly to agree to make a fresh move for Indian unity so important for the defence of the country? Being above all parties he is the only person who can take initiative and achieve some practical result.

Yours sincerely,

B. P. SINGH ROY

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *18 May 1942, 6.5 pm*
Received: 18 May, 8 pm

No. 1407–G. Following is summary of portion of Gandhi's press interview at Bombay on May 16th, supplementing material sent by Reuters:—

Begins. I am watching and trying, if I am allowed to continue, to educate public opinion about my demand for withdrawal of British from India. I am trying to show that behind this demand there is no ill-will. It is a logical and friendly act in the interests of all. I am moving cautiously, not thoughtlessly, but with fixed determination. I am convinced we are living today in state of ordered anarchy. It is misnomer to call such rule as is established in India rule that promotes welfare of India. "Therefore, this orderly disciplined anarchy should go, and if as a result there is complete lawlessness I would risk it, though I believe or should like to believe that 22 years of continuous effort at educating India along lines of non-violence will not have gone in vain and people will evolve real popular order out of the chaos." If all efforts fail, I will certainly invite people to resist destruction of their property. *Ends.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir A. Hope (Madras)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/70

IMPORTANT *18 May 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1420-S. Your private and personal telegram of 17th May, No. 72-M.[1] There is a good deal to be said on both sides: but on the whole I am in general agreement with your view that it would be better to let Azad and Nehru start their campaign and if they do make bad speeches, then to prohibit anything further.

[1] No. 65.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *18 May 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

This week I have a series of letters from you to answer, dated 24th,[1] 29th[2] and 30th April.[3] I am most grateful for all of them. Coming through as quickly as they have done, they have given one an excellent impression of the atmosphere at home on Cripps' return. A good deal of the ground has, of course, as usual been covered by telegrams that have crossed between us since you wrote.

2. First of all for a word about the States. I fear that Cripps' comment[4] on the paramountcy issue is of a piece with certain other not very carefully considered statements which he made (so far as I can see without any authority from the Cabinet and certainly without consultation with me); and we shall have to regard our hands as free in regard to this, for the issue is one of fundamental importance. I am myself quite unconvinced by Cripps' arguments, but, apart from that, this is not the sort of major issue which can properly be given away by any individual Cabinet Minister, or even by the Cabinet as a whole, without a very close investigation. You may be perfectly certain that you are right in thinking that few, if any, of the Princes, even at the price of escaping from paramountcy, would dream of coming into a union in which their

[1] Vol. I, No. 683. [2] Vol. I, No. 706. [3] Vol. I, No. 709.
[4] See para. 1 of No. 683 in Vol. I.

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domestic affairs would be subject to control or interference by an Indian Government, more particularly an Indian Government to which, as you say, "local agitators in their States" would have pretty easy access.

3. I am not much impressed either by the suggestion that the States might form a federation or dominion of their own, and I doubt if Congress or the Muslim League would take any such proposal too seriously. It is a good debating suggestion but I would not treat it more seriously than that, and the practical difficulties presented by the existence of these minor States and the problem of adjusting relations between a "State Dominion", a Dominion of British India, and such units as might elect, whether in British India or in the States to remain outside either dominion would be not a very easy one.

4. I note what you say in paragraph 3[5] about Cripps and my Council. I fear that, in the pressure under which he has been, he has a little forgotten exactly what happened. After considerable pressure from me Cripps agreed to meet my Council in the first instance. He asked me whether they were likely to be absolutely water-tight about the scheme. I told him I could not guarantee him that, but that I thought the chance was one that ought to be taken. He met them in the morning[6] and talked to them accordingly in quite general terms, with the result that, the moment he and I left the room, the Council held an indignation meeting, in which both Europeans and Indians took part, and sent me a message to the effect that they felt they had been exceedingly ill-used, that they had every reason to complain most strongly of Cripps' attitude, and that they had been given no information as to what his plans were. I got hold of Cripps, explained the position to him, and got him to agree that, in these circumstances, he must show his hand. I then returned alone to my Council and told them that Cripps had felt, after leaving them, that, since pressure that morning had made it impossible for him to give them as full information as he could wish, he was anxious to see them again, so that he could develop what he had already said, and hoped they might find it possible to meet again after tea, so that he might explain His Majesty's Government's offer at length. We met accordingly,[7] and he then gave them a general outline of the scheme before his actual communication to Congress leaders, and told them that he was anxious to maintain contact with them individually and generally. There was in fact little effort made by Cripps to maintain any such contact, and this again was the subject of much soreness during the days that followed. Nor was there any suggestion that they were at any time throughout his tour taken into confidence to the same extent as were the political leaders. (I am not surprised that that should have been the case, for the accumulating weight of evidence from interception, &c., goes to show, I fear, that Cripps said a great deal more to the Congress in particular than was authorised by any instructions that I saw, or than he gave me any idea of!)

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5. I now move to the point at which the negotiations broke down. I suggested that he should see my Council and tell them what had happened, and he did so in very general terms.[8] The moment he sat down Mudaliar, as I have already told you,[9] arose, and with much bitterness commented on the way in which the Council had been treated, adding that Council had it in mind to make a representation on the subject to His Majesty's Government. I have been able with very considerable difficulty to get these people into line again over these last few weeks and to soothe them, but I can assure you that the task was an extremely awkward one, and that it will be a very long time before their soreness at the manner in which they were treated by Cripps evaporates, or before they cease to talk with considerable freedom to the outside world about this handling of a very delicate situation by the Cabinet's representative. I need not say anything about the point of conventions, which you mention in paragraph 3 of your letter of the 24th, for you know my mind about them, and the extremely embarrassing nature of the situation in which Cripps' somewhat ill-judged comments, regarding the possibility of establishing them, have landed us here. But I hope very much that I shall be able to keep the peace, and you can rely upon me to do my best. It would not, however, be fair to you or to the Prime Minister for that matter, that you should not know what, in fact, did happen, for it is clear from your letter that the description you received from Cripps errs on the side of understatement.

6. Let me before I pass on to other subjects touch on one or two other points arising out of the Mission, which you mention in your letters of 29th and 30th April. First your letter of 29th April. I am so grateful to you for what you were able to do to keep Cripps' speech in the debate on the right lines, and your own contribution was, if I may say so, invaluable. I need not add, too, how grateful I am to you for having stressed the continued confidence of His Majesty's Government in myself, as in the case of my Council. I think some such reaffirmation was desirable in the face of the suggestions that the Cripps Mission represented a certain lack of that confidence in both! I quite agree with what you say in paragraph 2 of your letter of the 29th, and I agree, too, as regards paragraph 1 of your letter of the 30th that you have done everything possible, if I may say so, to help to protect the position, and that we must continue to regard ourselves as having a good deal of elbow room in relation to any statements by Cripps not specifically and in terms covered by the original declaration.

7. The longer the gap that elapses between Cripps' departure and the time of writing, the more I feel that you and I were entirely justified in refusing to

[5] Of No. 683 in Vol. I.
[6] See Vol. I, No. 367 (where the time of the meeting is given as 3.30 pm) and No. 373.
[7] See Vol. I, No. 377; this meeting took place on the following day, 24 March.
[8] See Vol. I, No. 607. [9] Vol. I, No. 626, para. 6.

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subscribe to the very gloomy view of the possible consequences of failure sketched out in Cripps' telegram No. 890-S[10] of 4th April to the Prime Minister. As I have mentioned in one or two of my earlier letters, while I did not feel called on to controvert that view in detail, it went far beyond anything that I would have regarded as justified, and the way things have shaped since Cripps left India shows completely that you and I were right in our judgments and that he was not.

8. Now for a word about the reconstitution of my Council. I have just had your very useful telegram[11] giving the gist of the discussion in the India Committee of the Cabinet. I do not, however, propose to comment in any great detail here, as I shall have to telegraph (the matter being urgent) in the next day or two. I am glad to say that there now seems a good prospect that Mudaliar will accede to our request and will be willing to serve in the War Cabinet. If he does (this is exactly like playing a game of patience) quite a number of cards become available for us to deal with. I will reply by telegram as regards certain suggestions which you have made and for which I am very grateful, though I do not think that Krishnamachari or Ayyangar of Kashmir will fill my bill, and I do not want to over-weigh (as you rightly point out) either Madras or States experience. If I can get C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer, I shall have done very well. I am by no means convinced by the argument about Benthall, but propose to turn this over in my mind in the next few days. My recollection was that he was very much the reverse of *persona grata* to Grigg, and I suppose that that view reflects itself in the attitude of the Cabinet Committee. I am flirting with the idea of suggesting Begum Shah Nawaz, the only difficulty being that it rather over-weighs the Muslims and gives the Punjab a second representative. However, I shall get these matters straight and let you have my view long before this letter reaches you. I shall probably in my reply to you make it clear that, while I of course attach great weight to the views of the India Committee of the Cabinet, I must expect to be given a pretty free hand in the composition of my own Council, and that I shall not expect my view to be overruled, save for very strong and very cogent reasons.

9. I discussed in my last letter[12] Rajagopalachari's activities and their prospects. I was on the whole confirmed by my discussions in Madras in the view that nothing very much, at any rate at this stage, is likely to emerge from his much more realist approach to the problem of Pakistan, &c., and from a telegram[13] from Arthur Hope, which I did not think worth repeating to you but of which I send you a copy by this bag, you will see that there are now signs that Kalam Azad and Nehru may be going down to Madras to urge the opposite point of view. I should have thought myself that Rajagopalachari, who has about one in two of his supporters in his own Province, will have his work cut out to make anything constructive out of his apostasy

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for many a day to come, though, as you know, I should be myself perfectly content to see him form a government prepared to prosecute the war with a stable majority in the legislature, whether it was a purely Congress Government or, preferably, a Coalition Government.

10. The main event of last week so far as I am concerned has been my visit to Madras, Vizagapatam and Calcutta. This went exceedingly well. It is the first really long flight which I have done since I have been Viceroy (about 3,000 miles in all, covered in say 15 or 16 flying hours). I found it very comfortable, and one unquestionably arrived pretty fresh after four or five hours in the air free from the dust and noise of India's trains. Leaving here at 7 in the morning on the 12th I reached Bhopal at 9 and, after an hour there, Secunderabad at 12-15. Leaving Secunderabad at 1, I was in Madras at a quarter to three. I kept the tour entirely secret, and said nothing to either His Highness of Bhopal or to the Nizam. Arthur Hope was in very good form, and I was much impressed by the keenness of his A.R.P. people, the way in which the population of Madras (or what is left of it) is co-operating, and the general appearance of readiness. I inspected the anti-aircraft arrangements, the Fort and the units in Madras itself; and I spent some time watching the 19th Division, under Major-General Scoones, training outside the city. I was also able to make contact not only with the personnel manning the technical services such as A.R.P., &c., but with the Advisers and with those representative non-officials who were in Madras: and I have no doubt whatever that the effect of even this very brief visit with its immensely heavy programme was of real value locally.

11. Thence, leaving Madras at 7 a.m. on the morning of the 14th, I flew, accompanied by Arthur Hope, to Vizagapatam, where I spent a couple of hours talking to the various people who had distinguished themselves in the course of the recent Japanese raid. I gather that about half the population has now returned and that confidence has to a large extent been restored. From Vizagapatam, which I left about 11, I flew to Calcutta, arriving there at 1-30—in the highest degree of incognito! since owing to a misunderstanding of a signal Jack Herbert and his people had been informed that I was due to arrive at 5-30, and it was with some difficulty in a borrowed car and without the usual paraphernalia of police protection that I was able to get to Government House and persuade the sentries there that I was entitled to enter its august portals. Calcutta was a very heavy business and from the moment one got there one was inspecting A.R.P. control centres and the like. Life was also considerably diversified by a variety of alarms, and the first night I was there I was turned out of bed unceremoniously at 12-30 a.m. and despatched to Barrackpore 14 miles away, in view of a signal suggesting that a Japanese air division might be expected to land in Calcutta at 5-30 the next morning! That particular

[10] Vol. I, No. 519. [11] No. 54. [12] No. 41. [13] No. 65.

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piece of intelligence seemed to me and to all others concerned on the face of it perfectly absurd, and nothing in fact came of it: but the matter was not one that those concerned were prepared to run any risks over. (It has since emerged that an *air division* in Japan is a unit of the air force and does not connote airborne troops!) In Calcutta too I was able to make useful contacts with various personalities, official and non-official, and I have no doubt that my visit was worth while. I left Calcutta at 6-30 on the morning of Saturday the 16th, and got back here about twenty past twelve, feeling none the worse after a very long and strenuous tour, and much relieved to escape from the intense humidity of Madras and Calcutta into the higher temperature but very much dryer air of Northern India.

12. I am so glad that the Duke of Gloucester is to come here and most grateful to you for your help. I think the message[14] which you suggested that he should deliver on behalf of the King was, if I may say so, quite excellent, and I am telegraphing to you and to Auchinleck today to suggest the outline of a pretty strenuous tour. I think it is better probably to let H.R.H. have a very heavy programme and let him cut it down than give him something which he might not think adequate. But if he is able in fact to spend a month in this country we can show him practically everything that matters, and he will be able to do an immense amount in helping morale and encouraging people over war effort.

13. The Mahatma becomes more and more involved as time goes on, and the *Harijan* is beginning to be almost indecently outspoken. But I am quite content to take a certain chance over the *Harijan*, even if that results in the rest of the Press suggesting that I look on the Mahatma with too favourable an eye! Nothing, I am sure, would please our old friend better than that I should weigh in and suppress his paper save on a really clear case, and I am bound to say that the sort of stuff he has been putting out in terms of criticism of the Americans and others is calculated I think to do good rather than harm with any detached observer. Hallett I find on the other hand a good deal fussed about the activities of Nehru and the *National Herald*, and there it may be necessary to go some way to meet him, though my general attitude towards these matters has been to try to prevent official zeal outrunning the limits of political discretion.[15]

* * *

18. In paragraph 3 of your letter of 30th April, you mentioned Colonel Johnson. I would not say that he has been altogether a helpful influence here. In fact one might put it rather more strongly than that, and I think that I shall probably send you a telegram in the next day or two to consult you as to whether it would be a good thing to let Halifax know how matters stand. My Private Secretary has had a personal message from Graham Spry in Washington

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to the effect that Johnson's comments on the Cripps negotiations had rather confused the officials there. I know from other sources that he has been talking somewhat indiscreetly here, and I found with great interest that his relations with Grady and the American Supply Mission were most unsatisfactory—so much so in fact that Grady and his friends who, during Johnson's recent illness, have been on their own, were apparently anxious to avoid meeting Johnson again and had at one time a scheme of their own for flying back to America without taking leave of him or letting him know! Nor am I quite sure as to what his relations are with the President. It is true that he is the President's Personal Representative. But I am told that at an earlier stage he was a candidate for the Vice-Presidency but failed to secure Roosevelt's support, which went to his rival, and there is a slight suggestion that he has been sent to India to get him out of the way. I am of course perfectly indifferent to the personal side of this business and to Johnson's own future. But it would be unfortunate if on his return to Washington he were to give a jaundiced or misleading impression of the position here, and it is with that consideration in mind that I have been pondering the case for a confidential message to Halifax through you.

19. I quite agree with your general comment on the American attitude in paragraph 3 of your letter of 30th April. I am quite unconvinced by the suggestion in paragraph 4! There has been no lack of energy here. It is His Majesty's Government that has held us back and that I can prove at any time that I am invited to do so. I have had the case both on the military and on the supply side investigated in very great detail and I have with me now two very full memoranda which put the position beyond any doubt—one from Defence Department and the other from Jenkins. As for Burma, it is very difficult for any one to judge who has not actually been there. So far as the military side is concerned however, I am myself much inclined to think that Hutton and after him Alexander are both entitled to complain that they were asked to make bricks without straw, and to suggest that, had they had sufficient troops and more assistance from the air, they would have done very much better. I would prefer to say nothing about the civil side. One hears conflicting stories and I do not think that any one who has not been on the spot can express any opinion of value. I have not the least doubt that Dorman-Smith has done his utmost, and that he has been a real inspiration to people in Burma during these critical last few months.

[14] Not printed. [15] See No. 34.

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Mr Amery to Mr Massey

L/P&J/8/220: f 76

INDIA OFFICE, *18 May 1942*

My dear Vincent,

You may remember we had some correspondence last December on the question of an exchange of High Commissioners between Canada and India, and your Government telegraphed[1] at the time of the Cripps Mission offering to pursue the matter. I wrote[2] to Mackenzie King at the time, saying that I was taking it up with the Viceroy. I have now heard from Linlithgow[3] that he and Mr. Aney, who is the Member in charge of the Department of Indians Overseas, are both keen on the project.

I should be very grateful if you would communicate with Mackenzie King and let me know whether your Government is still prepared to proceed with the exchange. If so, we might get on without delay to the selection of the right people.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

[1] Vol. I, No. 258. [2] Vol. I, No. 338. [3] No. 63.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *19 May 1942, 11.5 pm*
Received: 20 May, 10.30 am

No. 1434-G. Following is summary of Gandhi's leading article "To every Briton" in *Harijan* of May 17th:—

Begins. I ask every Briton to support me in my appeal to British at this very hour to retire from every Asiatic and African possession and at least from India. That step is essential for safety of world and for destruction of Nazism, Fascism and Japan's "ism" which is good copy of other two. Acceptance of appeal will confound all military plans of all Axis powers and even of military advisers of Great Britain. British statesmen talk glibly of India's participation in the war. India was never even formally consulted on declaration of war. Why should it be? India does not belong to Indians but to British who practically do with it as they like. They make me, an all-war resister, pay war taxes in variety of indirect ways. If I was student of economics, I could produce

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startling figures of India's payments towards war apart from what are miscalled voluntary contributions. Britain may be said to be at perpetual war with India, which she holds by right of conquest and through army of occupation. How does India profit by enforced participation in Britain's war? Bravery of Indian soldiers profits India nothing. Before Japanese menace overtakes India, India's homesteads are being occupied by British troops. Dwellers are summarily ejected, expected to shift for themselves, and paid paltry compensation; these poor people should have been lodged suitably when asked to vacate. For an inhabitant of East Bengal to part with his canoe, for fear of Japanese using it, is almost like parting with his life; so those who take away his canoe he regards as his enemy. Falsity that envelops Indian life is suffocating; almost every Indian is discontented, but will not own it publicly. Government employees high and low are no exception. Many British officials know this but have evolved art of taking work from such elements. When slavery was abolished in America many slaves protested; but abolition was result of bloody civil war so, though negro's lot is considerably better, he remains outcast of high society. I am asking for something much higher, a bloodless end of an unnatural domination and a new era, despite protests from some of us. *Ends.*

2. Following is summary of Gandhi's answers in same issue of *Harijan* to three questions:—

Begins. First. What will Gandhi do if Government suppress *Harijan*? If Government permit *Harijan* to continue they will do so because it is proper from their point of view. They will not hesitate to suppress it when they think it is improper not to do so. I stated at time of resumption of publication that it was no part of my plan to persist in publication despite prohibition. I will therefore again suspend publication when Government desire it. If they do, it will be loss to public owing to wide circulation of articles. My writings[1] will not hinder war effort if it is voluntary. If they influence people, surely there is something wrong somewhere. It is not *Harijan* that should be stopped, but wrong it exposes should be undone. I look upon my writings as solid contributions to war effort, for he serves cause best who exposes its weaknesses or those of its representatives. I frankly confess I do not know what I would do if they suppress *Harijan*; but certainly suppression of *Harijan* can never mean suppression of me.

Second. Answering question by person who is intellectually convinced of ultimate correctness of non-violence, but who feels he should do his utmost to help war effort against Japanese, Gandhi writes that it is fallacy to say that Japanese have no right to invade India, since India is not in hands of Indians but of foreigners who can do what they like with it. "If Japanese have enmity against your masters, they have every right to attack what your masters

[1] Deciphered as 'writers'.

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possess. . . . Proper course for you is to ask wrongful possessor to vacate your country. . . . British do not want your help on your terms, as witness failure of Cripps Mission." If victory is achieved British hold will be much stronger; if they will not trust you now there is no warrant for supposing that they will after victory. They will then ask you with greater force than now to produce unity which cannot be produced whilst they are here. By my method, you tell British with greatest goodwill that if they leave India, she will take care of herself and will probably escape Japanese attention, and if she cannot, she will answer it with non-violence. By that simple act of justice British gain Indians' eternal friendship. It may stand them in good stead even during present war, for India will then of her own free-will help China, Russia and others. If India sets her own house in order, as I have no doubt it will, India can work wonders.

Third. In answer to question about Congress and Muslim League, Gandhi heartily endorses Maulana Azad's suggestion that Congress Working Committee will nominate five representatives to meet League representatives when latter desire it. "I have always felt there is something radically wrong with both, that most obvious thing, viz. coming together of wise men of both parties with will to find solution of deadlock, has not happened." *Ends.*

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Mr Massey to Mr Amery

L/P&J/8/220: f 75

CANADA HOUSE, LONDON, S.W.1, *19 May 1942*

My dear Leo,

Thank you for your letter of yesterday.[1] I have wired my Prime Minister to ask whether he wishes to go ahead with the exchange of representatives and will let you know when I hear from him.

Yours,

VINCENT MASSEY

[1] No. 70.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE *20 May 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1442–S. I have telegraphed separately[1] in reply to your telegram of May 12th,[2] about reconstitution of my Council. You may take it that I feel very

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strongly that I cannot allow composition of my Council, which I shall have to handle and to work, to be laid down in detail for me by Cabinet Committee, no member of which except Grigg has any recent experience of India, while Grigg (whose attitude is no doubt represented by the Committee's comment on Benthall) has strong prejudices of his own about individuals. I look to you to safeguard that position for me. It would be quite unreasonable that Governor-General should be required to accept responsibility for failure when responsibility for failure in fact rested with pressure to accept or reject certain individuals which he could not stand up to from Cabinet Committee. There is a clear obligation on me, responsible as I am for handling the local situation, to form my own judgment as to the right answer, and I am entitled to expect His Majesty's Government to respect it.

2. I should much welcome your ideas about[3] Begum Shah Nawaz. She is a speculation, and there is force in the objections that could be urged as stated in my official telegram. But she might very well be an excellent[4] piece of publicity for us and one that would go down well in the United States as well as at home, while[5] I dare say that we could do something ourselves to work it up. But it will be a difficult business to find her a portfolio, and that may prove to be the decisive objection. If Rao goes Chetty is at the moment my runner-up.

[1] No. 74. [2] No. 54; the date should be 13 May.
[3] 'ideas about' deciphered as 'idea for discussion with'. [4] Deciphered as 'credible'.
[5] 'while' deciphered as 'for information'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *20 May 1942, 6.30 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 20 May, 8.30 pm*

No. 1443–S. Your telegram of 12th May, No. 595.[1] Reconstitution of my Council. I am grateful to you and to Cabinet India Committee for your comment to which I have given fullest weight, though on certain important aspects I do not find it convincing. Before commenting on details I would premise that responsibility for running this Council and keeping it together must fall on the Governor-General, and that in my opinion save where really decisive arguments can be advanced against, his judgment in regard to selection of personnel should be allowed to prevail. You need not fear that I shall not

[1] No. 54.

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give fullest weight to views expressed by you and by Cabinet India Committee. But if against my judgment and against my considered advice I am urged and agree to take certain decisions either to accept or reject individuals you will not overlook that responsibility for failure would fall upon me. I think it essential that my view should in these circumstances prevail, save, as I say, where really decisive arguments which are convincing can be advanced to the contrary.

2. *Benthall.*—I fear I do not agree with view expressed by you and by Committee. There is already considerable speculation here in Indian Press as to probability of Benthall being appointed. Only argument taken against is that his appointment means an impediment in process of full and immediate Indianisation. He is not perhaps entirely outstanding and you and I are quite aware of his weak points. But it is a case of now or never so far as the representation of non-official European community is concerned. I see no one in the field preferable to Benthall. . . .[2] I remain therefore of my opinion that Benthall (whose selection you have yourself in the past consistently supported and who I gather from you is willing to serve) should go to the War Transport portfolio. My mind is however open to the extent that I would be prepared to consider him for another portfolio if necessary, and if you have any comment on that aspect I shall be glad to have it. I think there is a very strong case on merits for splitting Communications which in present form is an intolerably heavy charge, and War Transport aspect is of very great importance. Moreover the splitting need not be permanent and can be stated to be for war period only. I would only add that Benthall is of far higher calibre for administrative purposes than in my opinion any Indian *available* in India. What I need (and this has been my object in looking for Benthall) is someone who can work hard and get Europeans and Indians to pull together in improving the transportation picture. I have no reason to regard ourselves as short of *technical* skill in the railway field. Also I want as you will appreciate to keep a better balance between Hindus and Muslims than I can get from the Muslim Members by themselves.

3. *Defence Co-ordination.*—I have discussed with Wavell. I should have thought it was obvious that this was essentially a political matter (and entirely so if in that category we include more public confidence and support in and for the[3] forces in all regards), and that merits must be subordinate. There is the risk as I have already made clear to you that establishment of this portfolio with functions substantially comparable to those suggested in the Cripps discussions will come under some criticism as being an unreality. I do not attach too much importance to that. I think that its creation would be a useful gesture and would contribute to soothing political feeling here. The Chief agrees with me that decision is essentially political. He would be quite prepared to work to a Defence Co-ordination portfolio but urges that if it is to be created it should be filled by Firoz Khan Noon since he has not the requisite confidence in

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Sikander. With that view I agree, and I think that Firoz would do it admirably, and would fit in very well indeed with the Army. There would be the further advantage that if as I trust Mudaliar accepts the War Cabinet vacancy we should balance the selection of a Hindu for London by the selection of a Punjab Muslim for the Defence portfolio.

4. *C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar.*—I am very glad you agree. I doubt if it matters whether he goes to Civil Defence or Information. Decision must wait until we know whether Rao is handing over or not (see my telegram to you of 19th May, No. 1430-S).[4]

5. *Sikh.*—You may rest assured that I have fine-combed this community during the last couple of years in consultation with Glancy,[5] Craik and all those competent here to advise me about Sikh matters. It is lamentably short of men of the least quality. Strongest candidate on merits is probably Baldev Singh, but there is reason to think that he may be wanted for the Punjab Ministry, and there was earlier reason to suspect that he might be much more of a quisling in certain circumstances than we could contemplate.[6]

As my telegrams will have shown you I am fully alive to weaknesses of Jogendra Singh, and were we considering merits only there would be no question of my taking any Sikh at all. As it is, general feeling is that he is by far the best compromise and I accept that view. To appoint H. S. Malik would produce an outcry. He is a very junior Indian Civilian of average quality though considerable personal charm. We shall be accused of maintaining service minimum by the back door, and apart from that he is not of the standing to carry the requisite weight here. I hold therefore to Jogendra Singh for the Sikh vacancy.

6. Your private and personal telegram of 12th May, No. 599.[7] I agree with you that to put in either Krishnamachari or Gopalaswami Aiyengar in addition to C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar would (*a*) overweigh Madras: (*b*) overweigh representation of people who might be regarded as speaking with special knowledge of States interests. If we are to have a second man of that type Chetty is by far the best.

7. I will let you have final conclusions once I get a definite answer from Mudaliar. Meanwhile however I am much tempted by the idea of using Begum Shah Nawaz if I could fit her in. Only complications are (*a*) that she would mean a fourth Muslim in the Council (the remainder being Firoz Khan Noon, Mohammad Usman and Sultan Ahmed): (*b*) that it might be

[2] Personal comments omitted. [3] 'and for the' deciphered as '(? garrison)'.

[4] Proposing that, in view of the latest medical report on Rao, he should be asked to resign the Civil Defence portfolio. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22. In his telegram 9300 of 22 May Mr Amery agreed to this proposal. L/P&J/8/544: f 52.

[5] Deciphered as 'party'. [6] See Vol. I, No. 155, para. 2. [7] No. 52.

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suggested that the Punjab was over-represented given fact that we would have Firoz Khan Noon and a Sikh, and that if there was to be another Punjab representative it ought to be a non-Muslim. I am not sure that either is necessarily decisive and my main difficulty which may be insuperable is finding a portfolio for her. My general opinion is that her appointment would do no harm at the moment. We have had no help from the Congress or its friends. The Muslims on the other hand have been of real assistance despite Jinnah's intransigence: and we might be able to get round the suggestion that we were overweighting their representation in the Executive Council if we appointed the Begum by taking the line that she was a representative of women and not of Muslims. But my mind is open and I should welcome your reaction before considering further.

75

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 217

L/P&J/8/544: f 56

INDIA

PROPOSED RECONSTITUTION OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *21 May 1942*

I circulate for the urgent consideration of the War Cabinet the following papers on the above subject:

(1) My Memorandum to the India Committee dated 16th May, I (42) 18,[1] covering the Viceroy's telegram of 3rd May;[2]
(2) My telegram No. 595[3] of 12th May conveying the views of the India Committee and my telegram 599[4] of 12th May with a further suggestion of my own;
(3) The Viceroy's telegram No. 1443-S[5] dated 20th May, from which it is clear that he does not accept the views of the India Committee and adheres in substance to his original proposal.

A point of some controversy arises on the Viceroy's adherence to his recommendation of Sir E. Benthall.

Lord Linlithgow first made this recommendation early in the year. Its purpose was two-fold: (i) to retain unimpaired the impartial European element afforded by three European (official) members whose number was about to be reduced by the appointment of Sir Andrew Clow as Governor of Assam; (ii) to establish the principle that in a future wholly "political" Government of

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India the very important European business element in the Indian polity should reasonably be represented.

Attention was drawn to this particular recommendation of Sir E. Benthall in W.P. (42) 536 in which I submitted to the Cabinet the Viceroy's comprehensive proposals for the re-construction of his Council, and these proposals (including specifically the inclusion of a representative of the European community) were approved by the War Cabinet on 5th February (W.M. (42) 16 Conclusion 2).[7]

The consequential invitation was made to Sir E. Benthall and after some delay (due to domestic difficulties) accepted by him; but before any further steps could be taken to carry into effect it or the rest of the Viceroy's proposals, the mission of the Lord Privy Seal to India intervened.

L. S. A.

[1] No. 27; the date should be 6 May. [2] No. 12. [3] No. 54; the date should be 13 May.
[4] No. 52. [5] No. 74. [6] Vol. I, No. 57. [7] Vol. I, No. 66.

76

Sir J. Herbert (Bengal) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/42

CAMP, *21 May 1942*

9. *Visit.*—Your visit has done much to hearten all concerned with the defences of Calcutta, and the Services have expressed their appreciation of your tour of inspection. This brief unofficial flying visit has made people realise that Delhi is not so far and aloof as prejudice has made it out to be. May I repeat that your broadcasts and this short visit have done much to unite India in face of a danger common to all.

My personal view is that we must face the fact that here, as elsewhere, there is an active Fifth Column, but it is not a strong organisation yet owing to repressive measures taken and the general inefficiency of those who remain. The flames are there but the fuel is in our hands. Administrative inefficiency in the Services is something that Indians are watching, and I therefore thank you for your sound advice and for the talks you had with the Military Commanders. I hope that as a result they will no longer be frightened to collaborate with me so as to achieve a co-ordinated effort. If all the Services, including the Civil authority, are properly co-ordinated from top to bottom, it will show that we are prepared to sink our difference in the common effort and present to Indians an example for them to follow. Co-ordination is as yet far from perfect, but if the heads of the Services work together, I feel sure that the junior officers can also be made to co-operate.

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10. It is unfortunate that a few incidents have occurred between Indian troops and villagers, which have led to firing and some deaths. I hope that, by attaching one Policeman and a Civil Liaison Officer to Units, which are the equivalent of a Company, such incidents will be reduced in number. In each case the trouble has been started by a small detachment of three or four men falling foul of the local inhabitants and calling for help to extricate them from a difficult situation.

The excellent behaviour of British troops and Air Force personnel has caused comment from nationalist Indians, who are only too ready to find fault. The modern educated British soldier seems readily to make friends with middle class Indians, and I hope by various means to bring them together more. Through such contacts Indians may be made to realise that we are not as bad as some politicians make out, and one must always bear in mind that the average Bengali has never spoken to a British Officer or soldier.

77

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT *22 May 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1468–S. Your telegram No. 415[1] dated April 1st. We are as you know pledged to reserve 50 per cent. of vacancies in I.C.S. and I.P. to be available after war for candidates with war service. I believe most satisfactory solution of present problems as you and I see them would be to announce 100 per cent. reservation of vacancies in both services as from next year. This would leave us uncommitted as regards continuance of recruitment after war, while furnishing stimulus to recruitment to Defence Services in meantime. If in light of circumstances then subsisting it were decided to continue recruitment of Europeans hereafter, selection could be made from ex-Army Officers. Over-Indianization would thus be prevented and essential character of services maintained. If, on other hand, European recruitment ceases altogether, Indians with war service up to required number can be appointed. If recruitment to both services on present basis is finally abandoned, over-Indianization caused by addition of quota of Indians for remaining years of war will not matter greatly since existing character of services can in any case no longer be preserved. We need not tie ourselves by announcing actual number of vacancies but only increase of reservation. If you accept proposed reservation from next year, I suggest recruitment already announced for Indian Police should take place in

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India this year as well as selection of two Indian candidates in England for I.C.S. Holding of 1943 I.C.S. examination has been announced but not number of vacancies. Some applications have been received and part of fees paid but I see no insuperable objection to cancellation of examination and refund of any fees paid. If you agree, I will cause official communication to be sent to you on lines suggested.

[1] Vol. I, No. 489.

78

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/668: f 29

NEW DELHI, *22 May 1942, 6.40 pm*
Received: 23 May, 1 am

1471–G. Following is summary of press account of speech made by Nehru at mass meeting in Lahore on May 21st. *Begins:* During the next few months there are going to be big changes in this country. World history will be written in two countries—India and Russia. No party in India except Congress can face the coming danger. It is quite possible that Congress may not be able to face it, but if Congress cannot no other party can. It was my ardent wish that India should have participated in the war. We have been very sympathetic with Russia and China. But despite my ardent wish I cannot help China. There can be no compromise with the present British Government. Rajagopalachari's suggested solution of our difficulties is dangerous. It takes away from all we have built during last 22 years. He wants "popular" Government in Madras, but he ought to know that these are not normal times. If we express willingness to form Government under British Raj at this time, it would mean we accept British Raj, which I am not prepared to do for a moment. Rajagopalachari may not want to divide Congress, but he no longer commands Congress support.

2. Nehru said he was personally against vivisection of India, and was thinking of Federation of India, China, Iran and Afghanistan. He would fight separation issue with all the power he could command. Nevertheless if majority of people in particular territorial unit wanted to separate, it could not be withheld; but there was vast difference between him and Rajagopalachari as he would make every effort to prevent division of India. In conclusion Nehru discouraged jubilation over successes of enemy, and exhorted his audience to pursue Congress constructive programme. *Ends.*

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/544: f 50

INDIA OFFICE, *23 May 1942, 12.10 am*

9308. Your telegram 20 May 1443–S.[1] Matter is to come before War Cabinet on Tuesday.

2. As regards Begum Shah Nawaz you are best judge of her administrative capacity and of effect on India of her appointment. It would I think be welcomed in America and in many quarters in this country. It would also no doubt be acceptable to Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

3. You may possibly divide Education, Health and Lands still further. Or possibly in her case give her no portfolio but send her on special missions in India and perhaps even to America.

4. I notice by the way a Reuter message from Delhi today which suggests splitting Supply Department and creating Munitions Member. I suppose you will have seen it.

[1] No. 74.

80

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *25 May 1942, 5.25 pm*
Received: 25 May, 5.45 pm

No. 1499–G. Following is brief summary of speech made by Rajagopalachari at public meeting at Ramnad on May 22nd:—

Begins. Some held that unity could not be achieved while British were here, others that without unity we could not compel British to yield; this vicious circle must be broken. Unity was essential both for resisting aggression and for wresting power from unwilling Britain. If unity was achieved between Hindus and Muslims through Congress–League understanding, he was almost certain that Japanese would give up their aggressive intentions against India, and Britain would no longer be able to profit by these differences and continue to rule over India. Rejection of his resolution by the A.-I.C.C. did not take away his right as a Congressman to freedom of speech—the very right to establish

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which thousands went to jail not many months ago. He would not do anything to injure true interests of Congress, but he wanted his proposal examined on merits; he could hardly understand their attempt to deny their representative, and not long ago their leader, the right of freedom of expression of opinion. *Ends.*

81

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *25 May 1942, 7.35 pm*
Received: 26 May, 1.15 am

No. 1502–G. Following are two extracts from issue of *Harijan* of May 24th:—

Begins. First. There is confusion in some minds about my invitation to British to withdraw. India has no quarrel with British people. I have hundreds of British friends. Andrews' friendship was enough to tie me to British people. But we were both fixed in determination that British Rule in India in any shape or form must end. Hitherto Rulers have said "We would gladly retire if we know to whom we should hand over." My answer now is "Leave India to God. If that is too much, then leave her to anarchy[1]." I invite every Britisher who loves Britain, India and the world to join me in appeal to British power and, if it is rejected, to adopt such non-violent measures as would compel power to comply with appeal.

2. *Second.* Difference between Rajagopalachari's attitude and mine is that he yields right of secession now to buy unity in hope of keeping Japanese away. I consider vivisection of India to be a sin. Moreover, there is no unity whilst third party is there to prevent it. It created and maintains artificial division. In its presence both Hindus and Muslims indeed all disgruntled elements will look to it for support and will get it. No one need throw in my face my other statement that there is no independence without unity. I do not withdraw a word of this obvious truth. From its contemplation I have discovered formula of inviting British power to withdraw. Their withdrawal does not by itself bring independence. It may induce unity or it may lead to chaos. There is also risk of another power filling in vacancy. If however withdrawal is orderly and voluntary, British not only gain moral height but secure ungrudging friendship

[1] Deciphered as 'anarchists'.

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of great nation. I wish all conflicting elements and interests will make combined effort to rid India of foreign domination. *Ends.*

82

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

SECRET GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *25 May 1942*

D.-o. No. 282-H.E.

I saw Dr. Grady, and some other members of the American Technical Mission, before they left Bombay for Karachi, from where they were going to fly back to America. Dr. Grady told me that, at that time, they had almost completed their report, and I expect it is already in your hands. I understood from him that they were likely to make some recommendation about the Port of Bombay. They had all been perturbed, I gathered, at the large amount of shipping they found in the harbour, and at the comparatively slow turn round and the considerable waste of shipping involved. I gathered, too, that their recommendation was likely to take the form of suggesting some kind of Dictator of Transport for the Bombay Area.

* * *

3. Dr. Grady made some interesting comments about his visit to India. He thought the Supply Department had done a good job, and he was particularly impressed with Jenkins. He was most outspoken to me, in private, about Indian industrialists, Birla in particular, and had come to the conclusion that they were out for profit, and nothing else, and that to hand over to them any important part of the Supply effort would be disastrous. I gathered, too, that Walchand Hirachand's automobile factory had received very short shrift. They had sat for hours listening to the comments of Indian Chambers of Commerce, and they had learnt how necessary it was to be patient in this country, but they had been severely tried. Complaints about the Government of India, complaints and suspicions of the Supply Department, and, finally, suspicions of the objects of his own Mission, had been the chorus everywhere, and he had come to the conclusion that the Indian industrialists were a hopeless crowd.

Splendid.
L.

Pleasing.
L.

! Good.
L.

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Finally, he had seen Gandhi when in Bombay, and he told me that the old man had seemed, to him, to talk complete "hog wash". As I gather that Dr. Grady has the ear of the President, his impressions may be of interest. I also understood that the mission was hardly on speaking terms with Colonel Johnson, but I thought it better not to probe into the reasons.

! Better still.

L.

83

Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow
(Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/63

CAMP, *25 May 1942*

No. R.–101–G.

2. The Chief Secretary's report for the second half of April was rather belated and, when I came to write my usual letter, I thought that it would be as well to cover the period up to the middle of this month, especially as the subject of the greatest importance in this letter was then somewhat obscure. I refer to Gandhi's new antagonistic attitude towards Government and the war. I was at Jubbulpore on the 15th of this month and discussed this matter with Rai Sahib Shukul, the Central Intelligence Officer, in succession to Oakley who has gone to Ceylon. Shukul reported that Gandhi is telling all and sundry who go to Wardha that the British must be got rid of. This was confirmed almost immediately by the leading article in the *Harijan*—"To Every Briton".[1] The C.I.O. also reported Gandhi's intention to raise a small body of volunteers especially devoted to him and his views. Information is now to hand from the same officer that Gandhi is contemplating another mass movement designed with the twofold purpose of securing the "withdrawal of Britishers from India" and also for "resisting the scorched earth policy of the Government". This information also is confirmed by the local weekly review *New India*, dated the 18th May, in which it is stated: "The air is thick with rumours that Gandhi will start a new movement." The *Nagpur Times* (Misra's organ), dated the 21st May, publishes an article by its special correspondent who writes: "Gandhiji is on the eve of taking a great decision." There seems to be no doubt that something of this kind is under discussion at Wardha. It is fairly clear that the capitalist elements in the Congress Working Committee will go to almost any length to safeguard themselves and their property from the ill effects of a possible Japanese invasion. The losses incurred in Malaya and Burma have

[1] See No. 71.

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stricken the Banias and Marwaris to the soul. A little over two years ago it was commonly said in Calcutta that these classes were anxiously enquiring whether the war could be expected to last long. But a war which yields no profits, in the circumstances of the Excess Profits Tax, and which is accompanied by the sacrifices experienced at Singapore and Rangoon, is not at all to their taste. I should say that the possibility of invasion is a great deal more remote than it was a few weeks ago but Your Excellency is in a much better position to judge of this than I am. The reports that people are now returning to Bombay and Madras in large numbers seem to indicate a return of confidence. If that is so, Gandhi's plans may be affected thereby: but Rajagopalachariar's defection seems to have aroused the old man's spleen and he may persist in his projected new movement. If he does, the matter will require very serious consideration. Reluctant as I should be to have another tussle with Congress, I doubt very much whether one could allow a campaign of the kind indicated which would probably have injurious effects on the discipline of the army and war effort generally, apart from the encouragement thereby given to the enemy. So far as this Province is concerned, I should not feel any uneasiness about enforcing the law against the Congress because Congress supporters, although formidable numerically and in the Press and on the platform, are not formidable in other respects and would be lacking in resolution to carry through a movement of the kind envisaged. My own opinion is that Gandhi has not gained either in popularity or in prestige by the attitude which he has adopted since Sir Stafford Cripps' mission and has not strengthened his hold over the masses by his obvious sympathy with capitalist and Fascist elements.

3. His toying with the idea of starting a new mass movement may be inspired by a recognition of the sterility of the policy adopted at Allahabad which seems to have been designed with the object of obscuring rather than clarifying the issues. Gandhi's latest request to every Briton "to support me in my appeal to the British at this very hour to retire from every Asiatic and African possession and at least from India" is the most antagonising and prejudicial statement which he has yet made. I am preparing, and shall be sending to Your Excellency, extracts[2] from Gandhi's writings in the *Harijan* which indicate both his utter irreconcilability and the hopelessness of the Cripps negotiations once the Congress magnates—all of a flutter, I have no doubt, in the new situation created by Sir Stafford's visit—decided to reverse the Bardoli[3] position and reinstate the prophet of Wardha. At Nagpur, on the 7th May, Rajendra Prasad stated that the Congress has come nearer to Gandhism although it has not fully reverted to it. He said that the Congress demand is now for "full freedom". If that is conceded, the question of participation in the war might not arise because the country will be free to formulate its own foreign policy and the Japanese may not have any design on this country.

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4. Whether this line, developed by Gandhi's capitalist friends, is humbug or is mere "jitters" or is genuine ignorance, I am unable to say. I think that it is chiefly a combination of the last two: if so, could not something be done by the Publicity Department to expose the Japanese? A few days ago an American missionary presented me with a book published by Gollancz entitled *Secret Agent of Japan* (1938). It, together with the book to which it refers entitled *Menace of Japan* should be sufficient to expose the Japanese to all Indians. I would like to see copies of this book, and Indian translations thereof, on every book stall.

* * *

P.S.—The latest Intelligence Reports indicate that Gandhi has instructed Poonamchand Ranka and others to prepare the public mind for a mass movement and to increase the strength of the Congress volunteer corps. It is believed that the matter will be discussed by the A.-I.C.C. in the first week in June and, although local Congress Workers do not appear to be enthusiastic, Gandhi is believed to be determined to pursue his programme. As regards encouragement to the enemy, please see the current number of the analysis of Foreign Broadcasts which mentions Tokio as quoting Gandhi on every slightest pretext.

[2] MSS. EUR. F. 125/63. [3] See Vol. I, Appendix III.

84

Sir T. Stewart (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/49

SECRET *25 May 1942*

No. 380–G.B.

2. I am afraid that I cannot report any improvement in the public outlook towards the war but there are manifest signs that the Gandhian attitude of complete detachment is not favoured by many. The possibility of internal disorder in the event of invasion or air attack looms large in the public eye and great interest is being shown by all political groups in the formation of village defence parties. It has been realised too that there must be some co-ordination of the activities of the various groups and recently at Muzaffarpur the District Leader succeeded in getting into conference Rajendra Prasad, the ex-Prime Minister, the President of the District Muslim League and the President of the District Mahasabha. It was decided that the defence parties affiliated to Congress, the League and the Mahasabha should co-operate with the parties established under the ægis of the War Front. What was not decided

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was who would direct combined operations. The Provincial Leader recognises the necessity of that control vesting in the officers responsible for the maintenance of law and order and he hopes that this position will be accepted by all concerned. There is also a greater degree of readiness to co-operate in A.R.P. though the major parties are reluctant to commit themselves openly.

* * *

5. There is little doing in the way of domestic politics. The main feature of the period under report has been the manœuvring of the two rival sections of the Kisan Sabha. Congress appears to be backing the Socialist anti-war section while the Moderates support Swami Sahajanand. Government have been accused of taking sides and endeavouring by repressive measures to wreck the general meeting which is being arranged by the Socialist section. We have indeed had to "run in" one or two of the organisers for delivering poisonous speeches. Apart from political movements I find that there is a fairly general feeling of frustration at the impasse resulting from the breakdown of the Cripps negotiation. Disappointment, moreover, is turning to bitterness and my Chief Secretary very frankly informed me that Indian officers of Government shared in the general feeling that the attitude of the British towards India and Indians had changed of late. Cripps may have come out with the best of intention but he was "nobbled" at Delhi. I endeavoured to point out the absurdity of the proposition only to be told that no doubt what I said was true but nobody would believe it. There is undoubtedly a feeling of suspicion which may be a symptom of inferiority complex. Some time ago I asked my senior officers to meet the Military at Government House. It was no great success. The Indians formed a solid phalanx to which, if one was abstracted for the time being, he took the earliest opportunity to return.

6. Today's Press telegrams bring news that Gandhi is contemplating a new campaign. There have been no indications from Provincial leaders of Congress of the nature of the next move but it is of interest to note that twice in the past week I have been told that there is a feeling abroad that Government is about to embark on a policy of repression.

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85

Sir H. Lewis (Orissa) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/84

D.-o. No. 1918–G.O. CAMP, *25 May 1942*

REPORT NO. 10

3. We now have a visitor here in the person of Gandhi's disciple Mira Ben. She has recently seen the Chief Secretary and asked him a number of questions as regards, e.g., rounding up boats, bicycles and conveyances; voluntary defence organizations; evacuation of villagers from the neighbourhood of aerodromes and the need in that event to provide them with land elsewhere. Wood told me that behind many of her questions there was the veiled threat that, unless Congress were satisfied, Congress must oppose. He asked her how long she proposes to stay and she replied "indefinitely". She added that Orissa had been allotted to her as the zone in which she should operate. Her general plan no doubt is to develop Congress propaganda on the lines that if trouble comes here, the Government will withdraw and desert the people; but even if the districts are overrun by invaders Congress will stay with the people and look after them. In public Congress speakers have been keeping more or less to a moderate line and are occasionally helpful, but the Congress ex-Premier[1] recently made an ill-tempered speech; and I understand that it is being legally examined to settle the question of how far it is actionable.

It is a question whether she should be allowed to stay. What does Home Member say?

L.

[1] Mr Biswanath Das.

86

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL VICEROY'S CAMP, *25 May 1942*

Many thanks for your letter of the 6th May,[1] which I have been very glad to get. Since it was written the Madagascar operation has gone very well, and I need not say how great a relief this is to one on general grounds as well as because it means that the strain on our somewhat exiguous resources for the defence of India will be lessened.

* * *

[1] No. 28.

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6. I too would like to think that the Allahabad resolution[2] of Congress will open people's eyes at home and in America. I dare say that it has had some little effect. I comment elsewhere in this letter on my conversation with Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, which shows how desperate a corner these people are in; and you may be amused by the copy of the correspondence[3] between Gandhi and Desmond Young, which I am sending you by this bag about allegations against Indian and British soldiers.

7. Many thanks for what you say in paragraph 5 of your letter about the Cabinet and Cripps. I dare say there is a good deal in the last two sentences of that paragraph! As you know, I am most grateful to you for all your help over my Executive Council. I think I have got them pretty straight again now; though they need constant watching and it will be some little time before the memory of the Cripps discussions has quite disappeared. I am glad to think that you should have so far avoided, as you say, absorption in the Dominions Office, and I think Maurice Gwyer must be extremely relieved to have avoided having to take over my responsibilities out here![4] I doubt if his physical frame would stand them for more than two or three days, quite apart from any question of his possessing the requisite qualities for the head of an executive government! The sooner we can get the expanded Council together the better, and I was relieved to hear this morning from Mudaliar that he is after all, in deference to my appeal, willing to go to London. I am not myself disposed to attach too much importance to Cripps' views as to what is or is not wise in Indian circumstances, and I do feel strongly that in connection with the reconstruction of my Executive Council it must be for me to make recommendations and that advice must not be imposed upon me from home. I have your own approval of that view; but there are dangers in the India Committee and one has to watch that corner.

* * *

9. I sent you by the bag of 11th May copy of Hallett's letter No. U.P.–137[5] of 10th May and of the drafts referred to in it on the Congress "War" resolution. I have had investigations made here into the possible authorship of this document, and I enclose copy[6] of a minute recorded by Maxwell on 18th May, which gives the result.

10. I think you should see also the copy I send you by this bag of a letter[7] from the Central Intelligence Officer, Lahore, to the D.I.B. I do not myself take all this too seriously. The only assurance that Cripps can be said to have given is that relating to the protection of the minorities which is, of course, nothing new; and the most that you have ever said is that *if* Indians themselves can improve upon the British proposals it may be that "alternative methods might arise which might form a better basis for the definition of boundaries

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and might give representation for smaller elements such as Sikhs".[8] There is nothing definite in either case, and certainly no promise. But no doubt Sikh leaders are interpreting it as such, and are reading more into what has been said than is in fact justified. There may be difficulty over that later when adjustments can be made, and I think we can let things take their course, merely bearing this point in mind.

11. His Highness of Bikaner was here recently on his way back to his State after a holiday in the jungles of Central India. He was full of indignation against the treatment of the States during the course of Cripps' negotiations here—a matter which I touched on in paragraph 7 of my letter of the 14th April.[9] He took particular exception to Cripps' general attitude that the Congress and the League are the only elements in India that really matter: to the absence in his published "document" of any reference to the States' treaty rights and his apparent readiness to scrap such rights; and to his inability or unwillingness to recognise the States in general as a kind of "minority" which needed and deserved protection quite as much as the Muslims or Sikhs or any other British Indian element. His Highness had spent part of his holiday in compiling "rough notes" to elaborate this point of view. Copies[10] of these have been supplied to me as well as to Craik and Fitze, and I am enclosing five of them for your use. I imagine Bikaner's views are a fairly accurate reflection of the reactions of the Princes—or at any rate the more conservative Princes—to Cripps' visit and the subsequent debates in Parliament. Bikaner tells me that copies have also been sent to the Jam Sahib who is in full agreement with him, and that we may shortly expect to receive from the former, in his capacity as Chancellor, a more formal representation[11] in the general sense of Bikaner's "rough notes". If and when I receive this I will of course send it on to you, perhaps with some comments of my own.

12. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, with Gandhi's knowledge, asked me a few days ago if she could come and see me, as she thought she might be able to interpret the Mahatma's mind to me and let me know how it was moving. I of course received her, but I fear that it was a barren business. She had nothing whatever to say except that Congress were now in a more difficult position than they had ever been in; we had reduced them to pulp and destroyed the national spirit; the Mahatma did not know what to do; the Cripps plan had

[2] Enclosure to No. 43, col. 3. [3] L/P&J/8/596: ff 71–6. [4] See Vol. I, No. 626, para. 8.
[5] No. 43. [6] L/P&J/8/596: f 209.
[7] Pointing out, 'with reference to the last India debate in the Commons' (*Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 379, 28 April 1942, cols. 826–917) that Sir S. Cripps and Mr Amery had committed H.M. Government to definite promises to the Sikhs. 'The Sikhs themselves interpret the position in this way, i.e. Khalistan if Pakistan is conceded to the Muslims.' L/P&J/8/510: f 297.
[8] *Parl. Debs.*, *ibid.* col. 912. [9] Vol. I, No. 626. [10] L/P&S/13/230: ff 494–502.
[11] No. 115.

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been quite inadequate and so he had been unable to accept it or work with it; he had been and was under immense pressure to agree to some form of violence (I asked her if what he had in mind was a mass civil disobedience movement but she was not to be drawn on that); and that he most earnestly hoped that some assistance could be given from our side. When I pressed her on the particular kind of proposition she had in mind I could get nothing more than that the Americans (who are apparently bigger villains than we are!) should leave this country without delay, and should immediately be followed by ourselves, after which no doubt the Rajkumari and the Mahatma and others of the faithful would arrest the Japanese inroad. I took her through the drill; tried to bring out how very extensive in fact the Cripps offer was and how largely it met the Congress claims, &c., but all in vain. We had, she said, now robbed them of everything, and were breaking their hearts. A depressing interview, but interesting as showing the straits to which Congress have brought themselves, and the extreme difficulty which they are going to have in playing this hand. Reports from various other sources suggest that the Mahatma is very conscious that Congress have lost a good deal of influence and of ground in the last month or two—Rajagopalachari's activities having contributed markedly to that—and that he may be looking round rather desperately for something to revive Congress prestige and to get the spotlight a little more back on himself. I am telegraphing[12] to you today to tell you that there are many signs that the Mahatma is looking for trouble, and that we shall be wise to expect an attack in the near future from that quarter. I fear the truth is that the Cripps offer was too good, and the language in which it was couched too unequivocal. No Indian minds being hauled over the coals so long as the operation is performed by someone who loves him and in private. We have been guilty, this time, of exposing the weakness of his position to the whole world, and it will be a very long time before we are forgiven.

13. I send you by this bag copy of a letter[13] to my Private Secretary from Sir Bijoy Prasad Singh Roy. I dare say that what he says is indicative of what a good many people are thinking. But the letter itself, much as I respect Sir Bijoy, does bring out very forcibly the hopeless nature of the position with which we have to deal: for his argument is, put briefly, that the major parties having made a settlement impossible by their intransigence; the second rank parties being equally unhelpful; the Cabinet representative not having played his cards as well as he might have, and the Liberals now being on the shelf, something must be done; and cannot the Viceroy in these unpromising circumstances make a move for unity? Indians will have to come to understand, I fear, that unity cannot be imposed from outside, and that it is only by pulling together with one another, with I need not say the goodwill and help of His Majesty's Government so far as it can properly be made available, that any advance can be looked

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for. You will note, incidentally, Sir Bijoy's statement—undoubtedly correct—that Hindus and Muslims alike have developed mutual suspicion in a greater degree in the course of the working of the present Constitution on party lines since 1937.

* * *

20. Before the war with the Japanese came so close to this country, there was a certain amount of restlessness especially among the younger members of the Civil Services, who felt that they might be better employed on Military duty. I doubt if there is any of that feeling left now, and Hallett, who at one time was inclined to press me to release members of the Civil Services for the Army, has told me frankly that I was right to stand my ground over this. Nevertheless, I have recently tied the matter up by a letter[14] to Governors, of which you will have seen a copy, and which I have offered to let them show to Service Associations.

[12] This apparently refers to No. 92. [13] No. 66.
[14] Dated 12 May. MSS. EUR. F. 125/124.

87

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *26 May 1942, 9.5 pm*
Received: 26 May, 8 pm

No. 1513-S. My telegram No. 1323-S[1] of May 12th. I am glad to say that Mudaliar after further consideration has responded to my appeal to accept membership of War Cabinet (and our representation on Pacific Council) if offered. That clears the air. I have considered question of rotation but think we had better leave matters as they are for the moment in that regard. I will probably give Mudaliar a hint that I might at a pinch be able to relieve him if necessary in a year or so.

[1] No. 50.

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 68th Conclusions, Minute 5

L/P&J/8/544: f 49

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 26 May 1942 at 6.45 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton

Also present during discussion of item 5 were: Sir Kingsley Wood, Viscount Simon, Mr Herbert Morrison, Mr Amery, Viscount Cranborne, Mr A. V. Alexander, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Mr Brendan Bracken, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Sir Dudley Pound, Sir Charles Portal, Sir Alan Brooke

INDIA

The Governor-General's Executive Council.

The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the S/S for India (W.P. (42) 217).[1] Attached to this Paper were telegrams from the Viceroy, suggesting the creation of three new Portfolios in his Council, and setting out his proposals for filling these Portfolios and two existing vacancies.

A scheme somewhat on these lines had been approved by the War Cabinet on the 2nd February,[2] but had been held in abeyance during the Lord Privy Seal's Mission. Since the Mission's return, the Viceroy had reviewed his proposals as a whole, and had submitted them with certain modifications.

Certain comments on these proposals had been put to the Viceroy, after consideration by the India Committee. These comments related (*a*) to the proposed division of the Defence Portfolio, and (*b*) to certain of the proposed appointments.

As regards (*a*), the Viceroy had been asked whether the proposal to create the Portfolio of Defence Co-ordination was put forward at this juncture on merits and not merely as a political move. The Viceroy's answer was that the Commander-in-Chief, who agreed that the decision was essentially political, would be quite prepared to work to a Defence Co-ordination Portfolio, but added that, if it was created, it was essential that it should be filled by Sir Firozkhan Noon, as he (the Viceroy) proposed.

As regards the choice of members of his Council, the Viceroy in general adhered to his previous nominations.

The view taken by the War Cabinet was that it was appropriate that the views held by Ministers in this country on the Viceroy's proposals should be brought to his notice. Since, however, responsibility for running the Council must fall on the Viceroy, and the latter adhered to his original proposals which had the general support of the S/S for India, it would be right that these matters should be left to be adjusted between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State.

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The War Cabinet accordingly gave general approval to the proposals for the reconstitution of the Governor-General's Executive Council, and authorised the S/S for India to settle the details with the Viceroy.

[1] No. 75. [2] Vol. I, No. 66; the date should be 5 February.

89

Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL GOVT. HOUSE, LAHORE, *26 May 1942*

D.-o. No. 396

Pandit J. L. Nehru has passed through the Punjab and has indulged in a few speeches. He announced on his return from Kulu that his visit to the Himalayas had cleared his brain of confusion, though this was not altogether apparent from the tenor of his remarks. Incoherent and unconvincing though his speeches may have been, they have certainly tended to stir up ill-feeling against the British Government and Europeans in general. The same is true of many of Mr. Gandhi's recent utterances, and it is commonly believed that the Mahatma will before long resort to some sensational adventure in order to restore his position to the full glare of the political limelight.

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Note by Mr Pilditch

L/P&J/8/596: ff 138–43

SECRET INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, HOME DEPARTMENT, *26 May 1942*

Recent Weekly Reports have indicated the likelihood that Gandhi is hatching plans for some kind of popular movement. Information hitherto collected in this connexion is now briefly summarized in the attached note. Attached also is a copy of an intercepted document which has since come to hand. This letter, which is in the form of an account of actual conversations at which a young U.P. communist, formerly connected with the C.P.I. Central Propaganda Committee and now P. C. Joshi's contact in Bombay, was present, furnishes a clearer picture of what is at present occupying Gandhi's mind than we have hitherto received from anywhere. Action has been taken to ensure that further developments are promptly reported.

D. PILDITCH

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Enclosure 1 to No. 90

Reports received from independent sources indicate that Gandhi intends to launch some kind of a mass movement in the near future. Of late, he has been displaying extreme and increasing bitterness: in the *Harijan*, he has been deliberately stressing the racial issue and has been demanding in unequivocal terms the withdrawal of the British element from India. His present attitude may be summed up in his own words: "My firm opinion is that the British should leave India now in an orderly manner and need not run the risk that they did in Singapore, Malaya and Burma. Britain cannot defend India, much less herself, on Indian soil with any strength. The best thing she can do is to leave India to her fate. I feel somehow that India will not do badly then."

2. The mainspring of the new movement is to be the demand for an immediate and complete separation of Britain and India not after but during the war. The policy of so-called non-embarrassment of the British Government is to be abandoned and future agitation is to be anti-British as well as anti-war. Some reports state that resistance to the "scorched earth policy" and the slogan that the present war is Britain's war may be used to mobilize public support. Exact details of the nature of the movement are not available and it is doubtful if they have as yet been worked out. One report however suggests that the movement may take the form of, or may ultimately lead to, a no-tax campaign. Congressmen as well as non-Congressmen who are prepared to accept Gandhi's leadership may be permitted to join the movement which, according to available information, may be initiated in provinces such as Bombay and Bihar where Gandhi hopes to command the largest measure of public support. Lists of volunteers who have implicit faith in Gandhi are to be prepared and the support of the People's Volunteer Brigade in Bombay has apparently been already promised. Rajendra Prasad, Vallabhbhai Patel, Prafulla Chandra Ghosh and Shankarrao Deo have been instructed to preach the new gospel in their respective provinces. It is stated that the suppression of the *Harijan*, which Gandhi appears to expect in the near future, will constitute the signal for launching the campaign; other reports indicate that the movement may be started in one or two months' time.

Enclosure 2 to No. 90

COPY OF LETTER DATED 17–5–42 FROM SHARAF ATHAR ALI, A COMMUNIST WORKER, BOMBAY, TO P. C. JOSHI, COMMUNIST LEADER, NEW DELHI.

Gandhiji's interview to Bombay Suburban and Gujarat Congressmen on 15th May 1942. (The interview lasted for about 85 minutes.)

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At the outset of the interview during which Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Bhulabhai, Kher, Morarji, and prominent Congressmen were present, Gandhiji remarked that it would be better if questions were put to him instead of his just making a speech.

Q. 1. (*By . . .*[1]*?*) It is said that you are going to advise the British to leave India. Is this true? And if they do not listen to your advice, do you intend to non-cooperate with them?

Gandhi's reply: Usually an advice is given with the idea that it will be followed. But it may also not be heeded. The advice has, therefore, to be prepared for both contingencies. I do advise the British to leave India. I tell them to go away. And why do I say so? Because they will have to go anyway. They have been suffering defeats right from Singapore, through Burma and now even at the gates of India. Their continuation will therefore mean suffering for India. Yes, I ask them to go. And if they will not? Then I shall have to see. If my advice is not heeded by them, I shall have to force them to go, by non-cooperation or by civil disobedience. Or it may be by both. Of course you may ask that in the beginning of the war, I was for non-embarrassing the British and you may say: What is that policy now? Is this consistent with it? Let me tell you here that I think this is perfectly consistent with it. For the British need my advice. There will be no embarrassment for them; on the contrary. For I say that at present the war is far from their shores. On the Indian front they lack material. At home they have plenty. Let them therefore go back home. That will enable them to fight the Japs better. So, my policy is consistent. Of course, if they do not listen, I must cause them embarrassment. I am helpless. And I do not think it can be individual satyagraha this time. No, it will be mass satyagraha—an all-out satyagraha against the British demanding their withdrawal forthwith. Mind, I am not pro-Japanese. Indeed Japan is too much of an aggressor for me to be that. But I emphatically differ from Rajaji. For, with what can I fight the Japs? The British are the immediate aggressors. Indeed I believe that the entire danger to India would be less if British withdrew from here. I do not think Japan will invade India then. She wants to fight Britain. She has no concern whatsoever with India. What has India done to incur her wrath? It is Britain who has fought Japan and crossed her path. Therefore Japan wants to fight it. And therefore it is possible that when the British withdraw we shall be able to come to terms with Japan. And if even then she does not listen, then I have the same weapon against Japan that I have against Britain. Japan will not get a drop of water in India. We shall see to that. But resistance to the Japanese, by whom? By a free India, not by an India who is not asked whether she would enter the war or not. Here I may point out that I disagree with Rajaji. Rajaji is an old colleague of mine, and my love for him

[1] The dots indicating an omission are in the original.

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remains as strong as ever. But I do not feel like Rajaji that of the two Britain is better and can be dealt with later—now, Japan. For me an exploiter of other nations is an exploiter, whether he be imperialist or a totalitarian. Names do not matter. Besides who says the British are better? I do not want to say for a moment that Rajaji will accept National Government outside the Congress, i.e. without its sanction. But have the British offered it? Rajaji is prepared to help them in every way against the Japanese. Then why the hitch? Simply because they do not want us to get the power.

They will not give it. They are what they are and nothing will change them. Yes, Cripps has gone back. But why do they not negotiate again? Through Sapru or Jayakar or even Rajaji? Because as I said they do not want to. Their time to go has come. Rajaji concedes Pakistan. But has Jinnah even moved an inch to discuss matters with him? No. For Jinnah's game is to bring Government pressure on the Congress and Congress pressure on the Government, or both. Rajaji says, let India be split up. But I cannot agree. I cannot swallow the splitting of India. I alone know what pain the thought has caused me. Rajaji is an old friend and an astute politician. And only I know what I suffered to let him go. But he is strongwilled. He believes that he will achieve Hindu–Muslim unity. But what after all is Pakistan? What does it mean? Besides when Cripps came Rajaji was for acceptance. Jawaharlal tried his utmost to get the demand conceded. You know what Jawahar is: a straightforward man. But nothing doing. And that is what I had said all along with terrible suffering of mind. And that is what people—the millions of India told me at the station. No settlement. Don't settle! Even in Calcutta, some Muslims—quite good fellows you know—said: "You haven't accepted, have you?" That is what Indians felt. And how can the Government deny it? They go as far as to say, not a single Burman helped the Japs (laughter). But Rajaji still hopes to achieve that which the British have determined will not be achieved. Hindu–Muslim unity. What really is Pakistan? Jinnah has never really explained it. Can you tell me? (Turns to some one. The fellow fumbles: "But it is the demand of the Muslim masses.") Yes, yes, who denies that? but what is the demand? The masses are duped. Good Mussulmans have failed to explain it to me. Indeed when I am asked to solve the deadlock, I admit I can't do anything about it. The British make us fight, although I don't hide for a moment that we too want to fight. Else, we would never fight. But the only way to achieve unity is by getting India to ourselves and achieving it. Rajaji talks of the Lahore resolution.[2] But the resolution is out of consideration. For where is Independence? Anarchy is the only way. Some one asked me if there would be anarchy if the British go. Yes, it will be there. But I tell the British give us chaos. I say, in other words, leave India to God. But that is putting it in my language, in a language that the masses will not understand. Therefore, I say, leave India to anarchy. We shall have to face it. Better face it than the present state. The Congress mind is neither Hindu nor

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Muslim nor Christian nor Parsee. It is this Congress mind—a live reality—that will have to take charge—of the anarchy. And fashion it into Hindustan. I therefore ask the British to give us the gift of anarchy. If the British withdraw it will be given automatically. If not then we will create anarchy, by launching satyagraha. I know the general confusion. You find Maulana says one thing, Jawahar another, Rajaji a third and now I a fourth thing. What are we to do? My advice to you is to weigh all the four and decide which to accept for yourself. I have not yet met Jawahar nor Maulana. But as you know well, although Jawahar and myself have differed quite often, he has always been with me as far as action goes. And I hope to win him to me. As for Maulana, we have always stood together since years. So I hope to reduce the four different notes to two. Then there will be only my voice and the voice of Rajaji and you can decide which of the two to follow. I cannot say. But I can only say that in this decision do not be influenced by a Bhulabhai here or a Kher Sahib there. Decide for yourself. But decide with your reason, for if you just come my way then you will become an obstacle to me. And as for yourself, you will find yourself no more.

Q. 2 (By B. G. Kher). But will such a mass civil disobedience not mean direct help to the Japanese?

Reply: Oh, no! We are driving the British. We do not invite the Japanese. No, I disagree with those who think them liberators. Chinese history points that out. In fact, I advised Chiang Kai-shek when he came here to fight the Japs my way. In fact I believe that Subhas Bose will have to be resisted by us. I have no proof, but I have an idea that the Forward Bloc has a tremendous organization in India. Well Subhas has risked much for us; but if he means to set up a Government in India under the Japanese, he will be resisted by us. And I fear the Forward Bloc people will try their utmost to do so. And again as I said, we launch our movement only against the British. The Japs can expect us to sign a neutrality pact with them. And why not? Why should they invade us? But if they do we shall resist.

Q. 3 (By . . .[3]?): I am in charge of a public trust building. Soldiers want it. They say I should sign a paper saying I give the building willingly and give it, or they will take it by force. Have I to resist them?

Reply: Not at all—unless of course you want to start a satyagraha on your own. For the fight has not begun yet. It will take two months yet for me to launch it. And that is why I wish this talk with all of you today to be kept secret. Please see it does not get into the press. This language is too high for the press to grasp. As far as possible, do not let even your friends know.

[2] The Lahore resolution, passed by the 44th session of the Indian National Congress on 31 December 1929, declared for the first time that the aim of Congress was complete independence for India.

[3] The dots indicating an omission are in the original.

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Q. 4 (*By . . .*[4]*?*): I want to ask just this: A man is strangling me. Meanwhile another man comes to strangle him. Should I not help the other fellow to strangle my strangler?

Reply: I am a non-violent person, and I say by all means struggle for your freedom but then stop. My self-esteem will not allow me to help in strangling my strangler. No, I cannot help the Japanese. Having earned my freedom I remain neutral. But that is for a non-violent man like me. The ethics of the violent, as many of you are, are different. Indeed, Russia, erstwhile hater of Britain, can take her aid, and Britain, similar hater, give it to her because both have violence favouring mind. So to those of you to whom non-violence is not a belief but only a weapon, I say you needn't desist from helping Japan. Nay, to be true to yourselves, you should help it by every means, by even violent means, if possible.

Q. 5 (*By Hutheesing*): But Bapu—

Gandhiji: Sorry, I didn't know you were here (loud laughter).

Hutheesing: But Bapu, some people say that one's outlook should be wider. That India should not think of her own freedom, but should stand by the international forces of freedom. For example, the communists: they say that this is a people's war and India should fight Japan as China does. Needless to say, I don't agree with them. But what is your opinion?

Reply: None could be greater fools. (Loud laughter.) But where is this India? India as India does not exist. It is in Britain's pocket. How can such India help? And why? The British give us nothing while they demand everything. And after all what help are we not giving? I do not devour the newspapers like you but I have got the information that 150,000 recruits are recruited monthly out of which 50,000 are selected. That's not a small matter. Besides Britain gets financial help. Who is going to resist its taxes? The postcard has risen from six pies. But even if it rises to a rupee, am I going to stop writing letters? Then why this clamour for our help? Besides it's different with China. Her manpower is immense and her armies, unlike ours, are not mercenaries. And most of all her people are military minded. And what is all this talk of a new mode of life and of international freedom? Can we depend upon Britain and America, both whose hands are stained with blood?

India's name can be found nowhere on the Atlantic Charter. Even before the communists ever said it, I have been thinking of a new mode of life. But it is impossible unless Britain withdraws to let the Indians and the Negroes be free. Then talk to me of a new mode of life. For I believe that such an India will then really serve as an ideal nation in the world and render it service.

[4] The dots indicating an omission are in the original.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST SECRET *27 May 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 26–U. Take cypher U. My telegram No.[1] 23–U dated 25th April, gave detail of a conversation between Colonel Johnson and General Yo, in the course of which the former took line open to very strong objection from point of view of His Majesty's Government and Government of India in ignorance that third party present at interview was a British Officer. Personal telegram dated 15th May, No. 12,[2] received by my Private Secretary from Graham Spry through Ambassador, Washington, says "For your personal information may I express opinion that Colonel Louis Johnson's despatches on Cripps negotiations have tended to confuse officials here."[3] Reports from reliable sources suggest that Johnson's judgment on Cripps is that latter was sent out here by Winston in hope that he would burn his fingers, and was given for practical purposes carte blanche; that Winston finding discussions were likely to result in settlement telegraphed that His Majesty's Government would not ratify unless the Chief and I telegraphed direct that we agreed and that as we refused to do so, negotiations broke down; and that Cripps, who might have created sensation by publishing the facts in Parliament, failed to do so and can in the circumstances be regarded as a hypocrite masquerading as a Radical.

2. Relations between Johnson and Economic Mission under Grady have been very strained, so much so that Grady, I understand, avoided returning to Delhi towards conclusion of the Mission's work so as to escape any risk of having contact with Johnson. I have just had report of Mission, which clearly has been most anxious to be as helpful as possible. I gather that Herrington is Johnson's man, but I am not clear to what extent Grady has taken him into full confidence. If, as seems probable, he has not done so, it may be that on

[1] Reporting a conversation between General Yo, Chinese M.G.O. on an official visit to New Delhi, and Colonel Johnson. General Yo was accompanied by Captain Dobson of the British General Staff, who was in plain clothes and formed the impression that Colonel Johnson 'thought he belonged to China and was not a British Military Officer'. Colonel Johnson said he was 'fed up' with the 'complacency' of the authorities in India; that he saw no use in trying to help people who would not help themselves; and that he was going to withdraw his mission. He further advised Yo not to continue his tour, but to go straight back to Chungking. General Yo demurred very strongly; said that he had formed an entirely different impression; and was most pleasantly surprised by the atmosphere in India and by what he had seen and heard. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.

[2] Not printed.

[3] The remainder of this telegram, omitting the last two sentences of para. 2, was transmitted to Lord Halifax in Foreign Office telegram 3529 of 3 June. L/PO/6/105e: f 136.

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recommendations of Mission some divergence of view will disclose itself on Mission's return home, but I do not wish to elaborate that possibility here.

3. I am not myself much impressed by Johnson and do not know to what extent he really enjoys President's full confidence. I am not concerned by his manœuvrings in the Indian political field or the like, but I am very anxious that no false impressions which he may have formed or which he may convey to the President in the political or the supply field, should react injuriously on the American attitude towards us here over war supply, &c., or over politics, or over relations with His Majesty's Government. I realise extreme difficulty of Ambassador taking any *positive* steps to counter possible misstatements by Johnson but feel, if you agree, that he should be put into possession of whatever facts you think necessary for his own information as stated above, so that he may have the necessary background if he finds false impressions getting about. I hope that on the supply side we shall get some help from Grady when he returns to U.S.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *27 May 1942, 2.40 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 27 May, 5.45 pm*

No. 1517–S. At her request I saw Rajkumari Amrit Kaur[1] on Saturday.[2] She came with Gandhi's knowledge. Her general line was that Congress were in a desperate position, that we had beaten them to pulp, destroyed the national spirit, and that we must now do something to help them. Gandhi was under immense pressure to agree to a campaign of violence. The Cripps offer had been wholly inadequate and so he had been unable to consider it. I took her through the Cripps offer, bringing out its great advantages from the point of Congress and the extent to which it went to meet their claims. She was quite unconvinced. I asked what her positive solution was. I could get nothing more than that first the Americans and then the British should vacate India bag and baggage, leaving their country to be defended against the Japanese by Gandhi and the non-violent. I was unable to give her any encouragement to imagine that we were likely to agree to this.

2. Amrit Kaur's move coincides with other material which has been reaching me from secret sources recently and with the increasingly aggressive and petulant tone of Gandhi's comments in the *Harijan* suggests that he is up to mischief, probably on the lines of (*a*) let the British leave India, (*b*) this is

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Britain's War.[3] I have no doubt that actuating him there is not merely the possible desire to reinsure with the Japanese (though there is no reason to think that he likes them any better than he does us), but also the strong consciousness that Congress has lost a very great deal of ground as a result of its attitude towards the Cripps proposals, the onset of the Japanese, the obvious inadequacy of the non-violent programme in present conditions and Rajagopalachari's campaign in favour of co-operation with Government over the war and compromise with the Muslims on Pakistan. Not only has the general prestige of Congress suffered grievously, but Gandhi himself has seen his advice publicly rejected by Rajagopalachari, has suffered some loss of face, and been forced to some extent out of the centre of the platform. Knowing as we do his intense personal vanity and his anxiety also to keep Congress together, he may well be prepared to take substantial chances in order again to consolidate his followers and to get the spotlight back on to himself.

3. A report[4] which I have[5] just received, dated 17th May, regarding an interview given by him in Bombay on 15th May, is of substantial importance. It suggests that the line of any move by him will be to advise us to leave this country, and if we do not do so, "to force them to go by non-co-operation or by civil disobedience or, it may be, by both". The report goes on to suggest that he stated that satyagraha could not at this time be individual but must be mass satyagraha, demanding British withdrawal forthwith. "Indeed, I believe that the entire danger to India would be less if the British withdrew from here. I do not think Japan will invade India then. . . .[6] Rajaji talks of the Lahore[7] resolution, but the resolution is out of consideration for where is independence? Anarchy is the only way. Someone asked me if there would be anarchy after the British go. Yes, it will be there, but I tell the British to give us chaos. I say in other words, 'Leave India to God'. . . .[8] We shall have to face anarchy. Better face it than the present state." He went on to deny that such a mass civil disobedience would be a direct help to the Japanese and suggested that the fight had not yet begun and that it would take another two months for him to launch it.

4. Exact details of any movement which Gandhi might contemplate are not available, and it is doubtful whether they have yet been worked out. One report suggests, I gather, that the movement may take the form of and ultimately lead to a non-tax campaign, and it is suggested that the suppression of the *Harijan*, which Gandhi expects in the near future (and which I have been at particular pains to avoid on the ground that his statements are doing him

[1] Cf. No. 86, para. 12. [2] 23 May. [3] Deciphered as 'occasion'.
[4] No. 90, enclosure 2. [5] 'which I have' deciphered as 'the Governor has'.
[6] Decipher has 'Suspension (sic) which you (sic)' after 'then'. The dots indicating an omission are in the original.
[7] Deciphered as 'impending'. [8] The dots indicating an omission are in the original.

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more harm than good at the moment) will constitute the signal for launching the campaign.

5. I am pursuing all this matter with my advisers, but you should know at this stage of these possibilities of trouble. It is too early to gauge how matters are likely to develop but you may rely on me to keep a close eye on the position and to keep you in touch.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *27 May 1942, 5.10 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 27 May, 5.30 pm*

No. 1519–S. *Hindustan Times* of 27th May contains following statement dated Bombay, 26th May:—

Begins. The London correspondent of the *Bombay Chronicle* is responsible for the news that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is proceeding to Washington "as President Roosevelt is anxious to discuss with him India's defences and war production". The correspondent quotes the National Broadcasting Corporation as his source and says that the Corporation broadcast this report from New York. *Ends.*

Today's Reuter carries question about this to Bajpai by reporters on his emerging from White House.

2. I imagine that there is no foundation whatever for the suggestion, which clearly if correct would raise most serious issues and to which there would be the strongest objection. But you should know about it at once in case you think it wise to make enquiries of Halifax or to consider with him how best to head President off any such idea should it enter his mind. I am sure we ought not to wait till invitation to Nehru has issued but rather get in first word.

94

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/P&S/13/889: f 39

INDIA OFFICE, *27 May 1942*

My dear Linlithgow,

I wrote to you a year ago in my letter of the 16th May 1941, enclosing a note on possible future developments in relation to the Indian States which suggested

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that our policy should be directed towards strengthening the weaker brethren and putting them in a better position to stand up to the stresses and strains that will follow from political developments in British India. Recent events have not weakened the force of this conclusion and I confess to a feeling of uncertainty over the rate of progress that is being made in giving effect to it.

2. From the papers received I note that the views of Residents[1] are now available on the possibility of extending the system of Council Government among the medium-sized States, and it seems, particularly from the replies relating to the Central and Western India States, that there is only a limited field for this means of strengthening State administrations since comparatively few States appear capable of finding the men and the money to run an efficient Council. For the large number of smaller States you felt, when writing paragraph 7 of your letter of 28th July 1940, that the solution must be found in the administrative absorption of small units and the grouping of units for administrative purposes. In the latter direction, which you have repeatedly and powerfully urged upon the Princes at Chamber sessions, there has of course been some measure of achievement, as in the formation of the Orchha group in Central India and the Joint Police Force schemes in the Deccan and Eastern States Agencies. But in other Agencies, for instance in the Punjab Hill States, some of which appear to be particularly vulnerable, I have heard of no positive achievement.

3. The Shattock Report[2] on the future of the talukas in the Western India and Gujarat States Agencies, copies of which have recently been received here, has now been available for some time and proposals are no doubt being formulated in the light of it. I have telegraphed[3] separately to you about this. But I confess I should like to feel more assured that both administrative absorption and grouping were being pursued with all possible energy, and I should be glad to learn from you whether progress in either direction can be accelerated.

4. I hope I need not say how conscious I am of the heavy and urgent preoccupations that weigh upon you in respect of the situation in British India and the safety of the country as a whole. I do not at all overlook that when I suggest that the present time offers a particularly favourable opportunity for pressing on with the improvement of State administrations. The States have had full warning that we mean business and when we come to consider the best tactical approach it is surely the case that reforms can be pressed the more conveniently when they are not an obvious response to Congress agitation and

[1] L/P&S/13/997.

[2] J. S. H. Shattock, 'A Report on the Future of the Smaller States and Estates of Gujarat and Kathiawar.' Dated 1 November 1940 and received in the India Office 30 March 1942.

[3] Tel. 9495 of 27 May 1942. L/P&S/13/973: f 458.

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when the States must be increasingly conscious of their reliance on the protection of the Paramount Power? I should hope too that the more intelligent Rulers are more than ever conscious, particularly since the Cripps mission, that the interests of the States are bound up with putting their houses in order against the growing weight of public criticism of personal rule.

5. But that pressure, and sustained pressure, will be needed with the great majority of Rulers I have no doubt. While we must bear in mind the risk of antagonising the one undeniably loyal element in India, I feel we must squarely face the probability that without more strenuous and unremitting effort on our part the smaller States at any rate will in a not distant future be unable to save themselves and will go under. I hope you share my views of the urgency of the problem and feel able to increase the pace of these very necessary reforms.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *27 May 1942*

I hope I haven't kept you waiting too long for the Cabinet decision on the Executive. Anyhow, in view of my strong private representations to Winston, he played up admirably at yesterday's meeting and I got my way without difficulty. The Cabinet Minute[1] this morning records that "the view taken by the War Cabinet was that it was appropriate that the views held by Ministers in this country on the Viceroy's proposals should be brought to his notice. Since, however, responsibility for running the Council must fall on the Viceroy, and the latter adhered to his original proposals which had the general support of the Secretary of State for India, it would be right that these matters should be left to be adjusted between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. The War Cabinet accordingly gave general approval to the proposals for the reconstitution of the Governor-General's Executive Council and authorised the Secretary of State for India to settle the details with the Viceroy."

2. Incidentally, I think this may also be the last, for the time being at any rate, of the India Committee, Winston expressing the view that it should not be regarded as a permanent institution. This is as well, for although the views of people with past Indian experience may be helpful on major questions of policy, they are less helpful and may even be dangerous when they only reflect past impressions, or even prejudices, about personalities. Our friend Grigg,

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with all his ability, is a mass of prejudices, not altogether consistently held indeed, for while he is vehemently opposed to Congress, he is almost more contemptuous of any Indian who has not got a big party organisation behind him. Personally, I have always held the view that, in India, office in very large measure helps to make the man and give him status, whether he was originally elected or not or can command an electoral following. After all, even in this country, neither Cripps, nor Grigg, nor Anderson, nor Oliver Lyttelton, let alone Casey, can be regarded as embodiments of the popular will, though they undoubtedly command confidence. In fact, the one cry of the critics in the House last week was that Winston should have boldly picked his best men without any regard for party claims.

* * *

5. To return to your Council. I still hope you will give consideration to the idea that, when the problem of all-India defence is under discussion, you should have a couple of Princes attending on the same lines as the Indian Representatives at the War Cabinet here. After all, it would be a little anomalous if a Prince attended the War Cabinet here and did not attend India's War Cabinet. It might be that, for the occasions on which you bring in outsiders like that, you might wish to leave out those of your Executive who deal with purely internal questions, and call the enlarged body the All-India War Cabinet? Another person whom you might perhaps bring in when the question of the Burma Frontier or the reoccupation of Burma comes into the picture, is Dorman-Smith.

6. On the subject of the High Commissionership in Canada I got Vincent Massey, who is very keen on the matter, to telegraph to Mackenzie King some ten days ago. Mackenzie King has been very busy with an internal crisis over conscription, as well as with an air-training conference, and his delay in replying need not mean that he has cooled off from his previous suggestion. Meanwhile, I have also broached the subject to Evatt who, as Minister for External Affairs in Australia, naturally has the deciding voice in these matters. I imagine he is referring by telegram to Australia, but I should not be surprised if I heard from him in the next two or three days that Australia were eager for an exchange of High Commissioners. That would give you yet another alternative opening for Huq, though perhaps he would be even better value in Canada. In that case you may have someone else up your sleeve for Australia, unless indeed you felt like promoting Lall, who has done very well here.

7. I quite understood your anxiety at the time about the Round Table discussions[2] on India here, and in fact only sanctioned the idea with some misgiving myself. As a matter of fact the debate has, from our point of view at

[1] No. 88. [2] On the B.B.C.; see Nos. 26, 32, and 46.

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least, been an undoubted success. The discussions were really lively, because the different debaters felt keenly and expressed their several points of view forcibly, notably Iqbal Ali Shah, the Muslim League protagonist, who seems to have greatly impressed the ordinary listener. The result is that Krishna Menon and his crowd here are very angry and have even tried to voice their protest through questions directed to the Minister of Information. I enclose a cutting from *The Listener*[3] which gives not at all a bad picture of what happened. I am not sure that a similar debate in the United States might not do a lot of good if the right American Chairman could be found.

8. I understand that you, and the Punjab Government, have had before you certain memoranda by Colonel F. L. Brayne, dealing with the problem of how to fit the returned soldier back into civil life after the war. He raises incidentally the question whether it would not be good from that point of view to encourage as many I.C.S. as possible to join the fighting services now. I fully realise the objection to that and you have regarded them as conclusive and your recent allocution to them was admirable. On the other hand, he has made a number of other suggestions with regard to village life, &c., which seem to have much to commend them and will I hope receive careful consideration. I won't attempt to go into the merits of them, but they do raise a much wider issue to which I think we ought to be turning our minds. In this country it is universally agreed that we are not going to go back, as we did after the last war, to the old financial standards of what we can afford or not, but that we must, as in the war, go ahead doing all the reorganisation work we believe to be necessary and let the problem of financing it solve itself. In India so far we have been running the war on the old financial lines, i.e., on the basis of a substantial increase of normal taxation, but no complete transformation of our financial outlook. Is it possible to go on with that? Even if we do so in the war—and invasion may involve India in expenditure on an entirely new scale—can we afford to do so after the war? The current Congress charge, voiced by Nehru, that our administration is incompetent, is no doubt untrue judged by the test of what a Congress Government would do setting itself to the same task. But what if a Congress Government, like the Soviet Government, set itself to much bigger and bolder tasks regardless of conventional financial restraints as to what is possible and not possible? And what if we ourselves during the interval, which may well be one of years, between the war and Indian Self-Government, set ourselves in the same spirit to a complete overhaul of India's national life? I am thinking not only of public works on a gigantic scale, financed by loan, or issue of paper, but of a wholesale rebuilding and replanning of villages, regarding [regrading?] of cattle, intro-

Good Lord!

L.

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duction of new crops, &c., &c. Might it not be our duty after the war to put ourselves in the position of a bold, far-sighted and benevolent despot, determined in a few years, in a series of five-year plans, to raise India's millions to a new level of physical well-being and efficiency?

28 May 1942

9. I have just been reading your telegram[4] describing your talk with Amrit Kaur. It certainly is cheering to know that Congress is in a desperate position and "beaten to pulp" as the consequence of its unreasoning attitude towards Cripps and our proposals. I certainly see no reason for helping them out of their difficulties and nothing could be of greater benefit to India, or better help her future self-government, than that Congress should disintegrate and be replaced by more realist statesmanship. On the other hand, if Nehru and Co. are really prepared, Gandhi consentient with them, to embark on a policy of real mischief, then I hope you will not hesitate or lose a moment in acting firmly and swiftly. Don't refer to me if you want to arrest Gandhi or any of them, but do it and I shall back you up. Incidentally, I should not be surprised if Indian public opinion as a whole also backed you up if you deal promptly with any kind of quislingism, whatever its professed motive.

10. Meanwhile, I am hoping very much that the Duke of Gloucester's visit will be a real tonic to the loyal elements everywhere in India and not least to the Princes, who I gather from one of your telegrams[5] today are actually going to put their dissatisfaction with Cripps' treatment of them in the form of a memorandum of remonstrance. We may well be approaching a period in Indian affairs when we shall have to go all out in support of those who are with us as well as in suppression of those who are against us. Naturally, I should not like to see that decision forced on us unnecessarily or prematurely, because, if it were, it would affect not only the war situation, but the future for years afterwards.

11. I confess to sharing your apprehensions about Louis Johnson, who seems to be a real mischief-maker. I am in touch with Eden to see what he can usefully send over to Halifax by way of guidance. Your telegram[6] about the suggested Nehru visit to America coincided with Reuter's report of Nehru's statement that he is too busy in India to be able to go. I wish Reuter's would not give such unnecessary prominence to his sayings and doings. But there it is.

12. Grady seems obviously to be more helpful, though again the telegraphed reports of what he has said seem to be a little disparaging of what India has achieved so far. Possibly his report in full gives a fairer complexion

[3] Dated 14 May: 'The Spoken Word: A Lesson for Goebbels.'
[4] No. 92. [5] Telegram 1509-P of 26 May. L/P&S/13/966: f 79. [6] No. 93.

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to the whole business. I am always rather afraid of a Parliamentary attack on the Government of India, stimulated by Nehru's talk of incompetence and American pressmen's descriptions of Calcutta menus, and am anxious to be able to do justice to the really good work which I know has been done and to which you have applied so continuous a stimulus.

* * *

14. In paragraph 13 of your letter of the 1st May[7] you asked me whether Dr. Narayan Roy was the person of whom Lytton had spoken to me in connection with the Sundarbans. You will see from my letter of the 24th March[8] that it was not Lytton but Edward Thompson who mentioned the man. I understand that it is not Narayan Roy, but our old friend Jai Prakash Narain, the leader of the Congress Socialist Party.

* * *

29 May 1942

18. Your trip to the east coast was, I am sure, most valuable and encouraging. Incidentally, I suppose the bombing of Vizagapatam has postponed indefinitely our friend Walchand Hirachand's shipbuilding schemes? Your broadcast too—and the same is true of Wavell's[9]—has evidently done a lot of good. The more the Government of India, from the top downwards, can publicise itself and put itself across, the better. It is ridiculous the way the Press has got into the habit of making much of the least utterance or even movement of these Congress politicians and tends to ignore the doings and sayings of those who have the real responsibility and much greater ability as well. This suggestion of the incompetence of the Government, with its further implied suggestion of the competence of the political leaders, wants to be vigorously combated all the time.

19. The Labour Conference, led off by Arthur Greenwood, has passed a foolish resolution urging a further approach to "India". That Greenwood should do this, and talk as he does, rather makes me smile, when I think that he never even opened his mouth to support me when Winston was in his most diehard mood and objected to anything and everything that I suggested. However, I don't suppose the Cabinet will even be asked to express any view on this resolution. I am quite clear myself that there is no case now for anything in the nature of "appeasing" those who by conviction and the inescapable logic of their own mistakes are unappeasable.

Later

20. Since dictating the above I have read Hallett's most interesting letter[10] on the genesis of the Allahabad resolution and on the mischievous part played by Gandhi. There is, I fear, a real danger of the old man's wounded vanity and Nehru's unreasoning bitterness drawing the two together into something near

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open revolution. I shall be telegraphing to you to consider how far he can be countered by publicity in India and here before we are drawn to sterner courses. Meanwhile you may care to see Sir Alfred Watson's article in *Great Britain and the East*[11] which I enclose.

21. Dorman-Smith is, I know, most grateful to you for all your kindness to him. I am sure that the sooner he comes home and gets a little real rest the better. I have just had his telegram in which he thinks he can get away in a fortnight's time.

All good wishes.

The tale of primrose paths, post bellum, *is worth nothing!—L.*

[7] No. 8. [8] Vol. I, No. 375. [9] Of 7 May and 21 April respectively. [10] No. 43.
[11] Dated 30 May: 'Gandhism the Blight of India.'

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/544: f 48

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *28 May 1942, 12 am*
PERSONAL

9494. Your telegram 20th May 1443-S.[1] War Cabinet approve in general your proposals (including appointment of Benthall) for reconstruction of Executive Council and leave settlement of details to our joint decision. They recorded no particular views as to Begum. You can therefore go ahead without further delay. Possible division of munitions and supply would create new portfolio into which Benthall might fit more conveniently but you must use your own judgment as to best method of employment. I will renew your invitation to him as soon as I know whether it is Transport or another post that is to be offered. Firoz Khan Noon is certainly right man for Defence Co-ordination, but you have not incidentally replied to suggestion in last sentence in paragraph 2 of my telegram of 12th May, 595,[2] that we should employ designations Defence and War Departments, Wavell being War Member. For the rest, do as you think best.

[1] No. 74. [2] No. 54; the date should be 13 May.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE *28 May 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1544–S. My private and personal telegrams of 27th May, Nos. 26–U[1] and 1519–S.[2] Nalini Sarker mentioned in conversation today apropos of Press rumours that Nehru was to go to the United States that he had been asked by Colonel Johnson whether he thought that Nehru was the right man to settle things with the President if invited to the United States for that purpose. He had replied that Nehru was quite incapable of delivering the goods in such an event.

2. I have no reason to doubt entire accuracy of Sarker's statement, but it shows very clearly dangers involved in Johnson's method of handling business here, and brings out also extreme importance of our putting a stop at once to any idea of an invitation of this type from the United States Government. Political issues involved, as I am sure both you and the Prime Minister will at once agree, would be of profound significance and importance. Whether in the light of all that has taken place Johnson remains the right man to return here to represent the President is not for me to say, but you will no doubt be able to form your own judgment.

[1] No. 91. [2] No. 93.

98

Mr Amery to Mr Eden

L/PO/6/105c: f 147

INDIA OFFICE, *28 May 1942*

My dear Anthony,

I enclose a copy of a most secret telegram[1] I have had this morning from the Viceroy in his personal cypher about Colonel Louis Johnson's activities. You will see that Linlithgow suggests that Halifax should be put in possession of the facts and I think this is very desirable. I should see no objection to letting Halifax have the full facts as Linlithgow states them provided you send them for his own eye alone. I am sending a copy of this letter and the telegram to the Prime Minister.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

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P.S. I also enclose a copy of an official telegram[2] about Johnson which is being sent to the Foreign Office departmentally.

[1] No. 91. [2] This telegram has not been traced.

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Mr Churchill to Mr Hopkins

Telegram, L/PO/6/105e: f 145

28 May 1942

I have heard from Egypt that Colonel Louis Johnson recently expressed himself there in critical terms about the handling of the Indian negotiations, and that he has given alarmist reports about the attitude of the Indian population.

You will know how to assess the value of what he says, but frankly we do not think his comments have very much weight.

100

Sir G. S. Bajpai to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via Foreign Office and India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST SECRET *29 May 1942*

No. 9624. From Washington to Foreign Office, No. 2966, 26th May 1942. Following from Agent-General for His Excellency the Viceroy. Most Secret. President saw me today. The main points of conversation[1] are set out below—

1. *Defence.*—The President did not seem to realise that Indian iron ore and manganese may tempt Japanese to attempt an invasion. He has heard direct that Chittagong stood the recent bombing well. He is alive to strategic importance of India but will limit aid only to what His Majesty's Government who have main responsibility of defence of that country will ask for.

2. *Politics.*—Gandhi's attitude towards war so recently revealed has obviously displeased him. He still seems to retain fondness for Nehru and to regard him as Gandhi's victim rather than a political Hamlet. He seems to be toying with idea of inviting Sir S. Cripps to America ostensibly to discuss general war situation but really to talk about India. As Colonel Johnson's report may be

[1] There is a fuller account of this conversation in Sir G. S. Bajpai's letter of 1 June to Sir G. Laithwaite. MSS. EUR. F. 125/130.

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unfriendly I venture to suggest visit by Cripps might not only be antidote to such report but may promote clearer and more permanent appreciation by President of complexities of Indian problem and choke off prospective embarrassing political pilgrims like Nehru. I recognise however that this is primarily matter of His Majesty's Government.

3. *Propaganda.*—President will help us to get powerful transmitters we want (see my telegram No. 137,[2] dated 15th May, to Puckle) if he can be assured that they will be located in reasonably safe areas.

[2] Not printed.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/105e: f 143

INDIA OFFICE, *29 May 1942*

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 38/42

Prime Minister
This fellow Johnson is rather too much of a good thing.[1] Is it at all possible to prevent his return to India?

L. S. A.

[1] From its position on the file it appears that this refers to Mr Churchill's telegram to Mr Hopkins of 28 May (No. 98).

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *29 May 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of 12th May.[1] I was greatly interested in the full account given in the first paragraph of the discussion in the Cabinet India Committee. Since then, matters have progressed a good deal, for in the light of my representations, you and the Committee have agreed for practical purposes to let me have a free hand as regards the reconstitution of my Council. I am most grateful for your own support and I have no doubt whatever that that is the wisest course. We may have a little trouble here over Benthall—

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the possibility of that I have never concealed from you. But on the whole I think him worth while, for the reasons that I have already given you. I see incidentally that the *National Herald* in a leader (not otherwise too favourable!) on the reshuffling of my Council says: "It would no doubt be of interest if a non-official European is added to the team." I have been thinking further about the Begum,[2] who is the other uncertain factor in my sum. On the whole I am now moving to the view that she perhaps carries hardly enough guns for inclusion in the Council itself, and I am considering whether I could get round this by making her a Parliamentary Under Secretary or the like. So far as the Defence Department is concerned, I fully appreciate the doubts which may have been felt in the India Committee, and we shall not get much thanks for anything we do, but on the whole I think the move worth making.

2. I comment separately on the position as regards non-official Advisers. Things have moved rather in the last two or three weeks.

3. I have written to Rao I hope in suitably tactful terms. I will send you a copy of my letter[3] by this bag. It will be a great disappointment for him if he has to give up, but I cannot honestly say that he has done much work for a considerable time past, and the portfolio is one of really vital importance.

4. Thank you so much for your kindness to the new High Commissioner. He is a good fellow and while, as you say, of a different type socially from Firoz, is a good mixer with much intellectual interest and needness [keenness?] and likely, I should have thought, to go down pretty well. I hope he will not find it too difficult to settle into English conditions. He is hampered, of course, by the fact that he has never before left this country. I note what you say about his allowances and I am letting Raisman know privately in case matters should develop later.

5. Many thanks for your help over the Round Table[4] talks on India.

* * *

8. I asked Hallett to come up for a couple of days this week, so that I could renew contact with him. I was glad to see him again and we had a useful talk on various matters of common interest. I was very anxious to get him going more vigorously about the National War Front for the United Provinces, where progress in that respect has been very slow—largely owing to the absence of any very obvious leader and also, in his judgment, owing to the unfortunate effect of the existence of a hostile Press, of which the most important element is

[1] No. 53. [2] i.e. Begum Shah Nawaz.

[3] Dated 27 May. MSS. EUR. F. 125/124. In his telegram 1590-S of 31 May Lord Linlithgow informed Mr Amery that Rao had agreed to resign and that he was formally inviting Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar to serve in his Council as Member for Civil Defence. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.

[4] On the B.B.C.; see Nos. 26, 32, and 46.

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the *National Herald*. But the Editor of the *National Herald* has lately been rather over-stepping bounds and Hallett has just forfeited his security of Rs. 6,000, and I think he now feels, particularly in the light of our conversation, a greater confidence in the possibility of getting the National War Front going.

9. He has completely changed his view about non-official Advisers, and I shall be mentioning that in a telegram[5] which I will send you on that question generally. He is entirely satisfied now, he tells me, that there is no possibility of any real advantage resulting from the appointment of non-official Advisers in the United Provinces, and that, indeed, their appointment would be likely to be damaging to war effort, to the extent that it would involve greater delays and the greater necessity to compromise over certain essential things than could possibly be compensated by any political reaction to our having put these gentlemen in. That being so, there are only two out of the Section 93 Governors who favour non-official Advisers—Lumley and Hope. I have thought a good deal about the necessity for uniformity in this matter, and have pondered very carefully whether we could not let Madras and Bombay go ahead on their own lines (on the general basis suggested by Hallett) while retaining official Advisers in the remaining Section 93 provinces. But in the result, I am clear that that would be exceedingly difficult to do. There would be immediate and natural pressure, and pressure of considerable strength, on the provinces proposing to retain "official" Advisers, to dilute them with a proportion of non-official Advisers: and the principle having been admitted in the case of two provinces, so important and so different as Madras and Bombay, it would be exceedingly difficult, I think, to resist such pressure. I fear, therefore, that we shall have to drop this idea, but you and I can feel that we have once again given it a very fair run in the new situation which has emerged from the Government's recent declaration and the Cripps discussions.

10. I am sending you by this bag a note[6] of the discussions at Bombay in which Gandhi showed so much of his hand as regards his future programme, and from which I quoted extensively in my telegram to you of 27th May, No. 1517-S.[7] I asked Pilditch to let me have a note to bring things up-to-date, and I send copy of that note[8] to you by this bag (dated 30th May). But my latest information is that the papers seized, when the police, a few days ago raided the Congress offices in Anand Bhawan, Allahabad, have produced very important evidence as to the dissensions inside the Working Committee and the difference of view between Gandhi and certain other leaders.[9] I have not yet seen the documents themselves, but it may well be that we shall think the wise course to be to give the utmost publicity to them, and any such action would of course fit in closely with the arrangements for getting across in America (as well as at home) what is in effect Gandhi's present pro-Japanese attitude, on which you commented in your telegram No. 9739[10] of 30th May. While I am

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on that subject, let me say that I wholly agree with you as to the case for Members of my Council stumping the country on this sort of point. I had considerable hopes that the political Members of my present team would do so, but for one reason or other they have not quite come up to expectation in that regard, though Sarker has been useful, and Noon is always game to have a go. The Cripps interlude did, of course, discourage them woefully. I will certainly do all I can to try to ginger the new team in putting their backs into a little platform propaganda.

* * *

13. I have received from Gwyer an interesting and thoughtful letter[11] on the subject of Communism among Indian students who go to British Universities. His reply makes the same point as several Governors that young Indians who go to Universities in England, especially the non-residential ones, would benefit more from University life if they had somebody of standing to whom they could go for help and advice; but he seems not to appreciate that in England Communism is an economic creed, while in India this creed is distorted into a racial, usually anti-British, policy and it is for this reason that the police aspect is of such great importance here. A copy of his letter goes by this week's bag and I shall be interested to see Lall's memorandum, which you referred to in your letter of the 24th of March,[12] when it is ready. This enquiry, I feel, has been well worth pursuing. Although at the moment the question is not one of immediate importance, it is a subject to which it will be worth while our paying a great deal of attention after the war.

All the best.

[5] No. 122. [6] No. 90. [7] No. 92. [8] No. 108. [9] See No. 113.
[10] No. 105. [11] Dated 18 May. MSS. EUR. F. 125/124. [12] Vol. I, No. 375.

103

Minute by Sir D. Monteath

L/P&J/8/596: f 240

29 May 1942

S of S

You may wish to discuss these two interrelated drafts[1] before approving them; but I thought you might like to look at them before coming to office.

I confess that, regarding Gandhi as a potential enemy at the moment busy in an attempt to rally his forces (i.e. Congress which is a bit split between the "non-violence" and "resistance-to-the enemy" schools), I should like to see

[1] Of Nos. 104 and 105.

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something done on the public platform which would hamper this attempt. The difficulty is to find anyone big enough to take this on effectively. A Moslem speaker, however trenchant, would not be likely to succeed—he might even so put the Hindu's back up as to help the rallying process: and the Hindu Members of Council are presumably so regarded as having sold themselves to the British that they would have little more appeal to Congress followers. But it is really for the Indian Members to weigh the probable outcome of such action as they undertake. We can but put the idea to the Viceroy to consider.

D. T. M.

104

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: ff 238–9

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *30 May 1942, 12.30 am*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

660. I have telegraphed to you separately[1] about mobilising press support here for any essential action you may be forced to take in consequence of Gandhi's new campaign. Question occurs to me whether limelight could be somewhat deflected from Congress spokesmen if you could stimulate members of your reconstituted Council, such as C. P. Ramaswami Ayyar and Ambedkar if they are included, to tour and deliver stirring speeches on War effort. By acceptance of your invitation to join Executive members will be pledged to full support of war front. It would certainly be helpful here and in U.S.A. and I should have thought to loyal elements, including Army in India, for them to confess publicly their faith in resistance to Japanese menace citing China's example and determination to rouse their countrymen from passive acquiescence to active resistance to enemy.

2. If any of your Council could be mobilised to undertake such a campaign it would be for consideration whether in the course of it they should directly attack Gandhi's ideas of non-violent non-co-operation both with the enemy and with those who are disposed to resist the enemy. If this tactic were adopted an incidental feature of it (which might be given prominence in the U.S.A. and in China which looks to U.S.A. for help) might be to traverse Gandhi's dictum (see first paragraph of your 1517-S[2]) that though the British must vacate and leave India to chaos it is the Americans that must get out first.

3. In this connection I am now inclined to think that your first instinct in proposing C. P. Ramaswami Ayyar for Information portfolio may have been

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right. His ability and record of spirited resistance to Gandhi's encouragement of Travancore seditionists seem to mark him out for vigorous leadership on these lines. But this is a matter I must leave entirely to you in arranging your team.

[1] No. 105. [2] No. 92.

105

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: ff 242–3

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *30 May 1942, 8.10 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 31 May*

9739. Your personal telegram of 27th May No. 1517-S.[1] I am grateful to you for the report of your conversation with Rajkumari Amrit Kaur and for your comments as to the possibilities inherent in the situation.

2. Considerable publicity has been given in the Press here (and I think we may assume in the U.S.A.) to the recent line taken by Gandhi and you will doubtless agree with me that it is important that we should provide at the earliest possible moment guidance to the U.S.A. and other posts, as well as to the British Press, as to the interpretation of the situation and its implications.

3. As we see it present tendency of Press here at any rate is to take possibly superficial view and to regard Gandhi's statements as product of senility. You yourself have, I think most wisely, taken the line that publicity for Gandhi's views is calculated to do him more harm than good at the moment. This is certainly the case in this country and the U.S.A. but I should be grateful for your views as to the desirability of our beginning to prepare public opinion against the possible revelation of Gandhi's real purpose, whatever it may be, and of its effect in India.

4. I quite realise that it is impossible in present circumstances to estimate the course of events with any certainty, but I am anxious, as I know you will be, that the public mind in this country and in America should not be left a moment longer than is prudent under any misapprehension as to the potential dangers of situation and that the ground should be prepared against the necessity of your having to take drastic measures to deal with it. Judicious advance guidance to the Press here and in U.S.A. might well preserve us against ill-informed criticism of "repressive" measures and enable us to line up the Press fairly

[1] No. 92.

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solidly behind you and your Government in any steps that it may be necessary for you to take to carry out your responsibilities for the defence of India.

5. I should therefore be most grateful if I could have your views as quickly as possible, and your suggestions as to the lines on which confidential guidance might be given to the Press and the B.B.C., and as to the most profitable course that could be followed editorially in the immediate future. The matter will of course need the most careful and delicate handling and once we have agreed as to the line that should be taken I should be ready to consider meeting responsible[2] British and American press representatives in an entirely confidential conference.

6. The above represents only the first and interim stage and an insurance in case later on we want public support for a policy of the firm hand.

In the event of the assumption by Gandhi of the open leadership of Congress on the platform of his recent statements in *Harijan*, or of the developments foreshadowed in your telegram and in the Reuter report[3] just received of Gandhi's statement on Friday,[4] we shall of course have to agree on a positive line of vigorous propaganda. But obviously this must follow decisions on policy itself (on which I take it you would seek to carry your Council with you) and such decisions will necessarily be dictated by considerations of the war situation.

[2] Deciphered as 'responsibility for'.

[3] Reporting Mr Gandhi as saying *inter alia*: 'My first task is to educate the public mind in India and world opinion in so far as I am allowed to do so and when I [have] finished that process to my satisfaction I may have to do something. That something may be very big if Congress and the people are with me.' L/P&J/8/596: f 247.

[4] 29 May.

106

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT *30 May 1942*

PERSONAL

No. 1564–S. I send you by each weekly bag copies of Gandhi's *Harijan*. Certain of his articles show him up in very unfavourable light and certain of them also are critical of the Americans. I hope that you will be able to secure that anything of this type gets full publicity in America.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT DELHI, *30 May 1942, 2.40 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 30 May, 4.15 pm*

No. 1565–S. Mudaliar enquires when you are likely to need him. My own feeling is that the sooner he moves off, once my Council is reconstituted, the better. He might for instance go say by the middle or end of June. I now propose to get in touch with the Jam Saheb and ask him if he would be willing to serve on behalf of the Princes. Do you agree?[1]

[1] Mr Amery's Private Secretary conveyed the substance of this telegram to Mr Churchill's Private Secretary in a letter dated 3 June, adding that Mr Amery proposed to reply that Sir R. Mudaliar would be welcome as soon as it was convenient for him to arrive; and that he agreed to the proposed invitation to the Jam Saheb, who should follow Sir Ramaswami at his convenience. On 5 June Mr Churchill's Private Secretary replied that the Prime Minister had minuted: 'We cannot have them both at Cabinet at the same time'; but that with this reservation he had approved the proposal. L/P&J/8/560: ff 160, 166.

108

Note by Mr Pilditch

L/P&J/8/596: f 144

SECRET INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, HOME DEPARTMENT, *30 May 1942*

In continuation of my note dated 26th May, 1942,[1] forwarding a summary of information relating to Gandhi's intention to launch some kind of a mass movement, I send a summarized version of information since received. The form which the movement will possibly take has begun to reveal itself, but it would seem that the present ideas attributed to Gandhi are not yet definitely decided on and that, besides holding consultations with his leading followers, he will put out some more feelers to test public reactions before he commits himself to any definite line or sends Government his ultimatum.

D. PILDITCH

Enclosure to No. 108

The information summarized in our note of May 25th[2] has been confirmed by reports subsequently received. There seems little doubt that Gandhi intends to start a mass movement designed to secure the withdrawal of the British from

[1] No. 90. [2] Evidently Enclosure 1 to No. 90.

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India and that this movement will not be restricted either by attempts to avoid embarrassment of the British Government or any anxiety on the part of Gandhi to avoid the creation of internal chaos or disorder—a restriction which, he claims, has governed all previous movements led by him.

2. Details as to the form the movement will take are still not available and it appears likely that these have not as yet been fully worked out. The *National Herald* surmises that the new movement "will partake of the nature of self-protection but in a larger meaning of that word than has been understood hitherto". Several reports indicate that it will take the form of organised resistance to the "scorched earth" policy. Abul Kalam Azad, the Congress President, is reported to have told Bengal Congressmen, however, not to be inquisitive about the new programme as it might be changed, amended or developed according to the changes in the war situation. The most circumstantial report we have so far received indicates that the plan at present is to organise collective civil disobedience in zones immediately threatened by the Japanese, which have been declared emergency areas. There will be two phases: in the first resistance to demands for the delivery of property, both moveable and immoveable, and to evacuation orders is to be organised and, when the first phase has gained sufficient momentum, the second phase will consist of organising the return of evacuated families and attempts on their part to take possession of their houses, lands, boats, conveyances and sealed stocks of grain, etc.

3. Gandhi is reported to have prepared to take full responsibility for the movement himself, if necessary; but he wishes to carry Congress and the public at large with him, if possible. To this end he has deputed Khurshed Ben Naoroji, Mira Ben and Rammanohar Lohia to carry out propaganda on his behalf in Bengal and Orissa and he is utilising the services of Mridula Ben Sarabhai for the same purpose in Bombay. His next move is the discussion of his plans with Jawaharlal Nehru and Abul Kalam Azad, after which he intends to place his programme before the Congress Working Committee and possibly the All India Congress Committee. Nehru has already had preliminary conversations at Wardha and we have received a report that his first reaction has not been favourable to Gandhi's proposals but he has promised to place them before the United Provinces Provincial Congress Committee, at its meeting on May 30th and 31st.

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109

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT *31 May 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
No. 1586–S

* * *

(*d*) You and I have been in correspondence separately about certain aspects of Colonel Johnson's work here. But I should greatly welcome it if Halifax could let us know whether there was any noticeable results[1] on high-level American opinion in regard to Indian problems as a result of Johnson's return to Washington, and if so what their nature has been and whether in his judgment they are likely to affect U.S.A.'s conception of India's strategic value with consequent repercussion on Lease Lend supplies.

Repeated to Ambassador, Washington.

[1] Deciphered as '(?reluctance)'.

110

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: f 97

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *31 May 1942*

664. Your telegram 1468–S,[1] dated 22nd May. I agree in substance except that I feel that objections to cancellation of 1943 I.C.S. examination in India are very strong and that unless anything happens in meantime to render its cancellation clearly necessary it should be held. As I gather that you agree to abandonment of any attempt to obtain European recruits this year decision would then be in effect to reserve forthwith all vacancies except those to filling of which in 1942 we are committed and in 1943 will be understood to be committed by public announcement of examination to be held.

Official communication recommending accordingly might be sent by fast air mail.

[1] No. 77.

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Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/105e: f 140

PERSONAL AND SECRET *31 May 1942, 5.30 pm*

22–U. Following from Prime Minister. *Begins.* Your 26–U[1] of May 27. During his last visit here Mr. Hopkins expressed himself in scathing terms about Johnson who carries no special weight with President. I have already telegraphed once[2] to Hopkins warning him about Johnson, and I am sending another telegram[3] today asking definitely he should not return to India. Good wishes.

[1] No. 91. [2] No. 99. [3] No. 112.

112

Mr Churchill to Mr Hopkins

Telegram, L/PO/6/105e: f 141

PERSONAL AND SECRET *31 May 1942*

There are rumours that the President will invite Pandit Nehru to the United States. I hope there is no truth in this, and that anyway the President will consult me beforehand. We do not at all relish the prospect of Johnson's return to India. The Viceroy is also much perturbed at the prospect. We are fighting to defend this vast mass of helpless Indians from imminent invasion. I know you will remember my many difficulties.

113

Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

SECRET *31 May 1942*

No. U.P.–140

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

This is in continuation of my letter No. U.P.–137,[1] dated May 10th 1942.

I told Your Excellency while I was in Delhi that in view of information received that the Congress Committee contemplated broadcasting the banned

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resolution[2] about molestation of women, I had agreed to a search being made of their office at Allahabad. I also gave Your Excellency a telegram showing the results of the search. I have not seen all the various documents which were seized but I think it desirable to bring to your notice a very important document and I therefore enclose a copy of it. This appears to be a record of the discussion in the Congress Working Committee on the "war resolution". This record removes the few doubts which I previously felt about the authorship of the typed draft of which I have sent you a photostat;[3] it is clear that Gandhi was responsible for the first draft and that the final draft was by Nehru. Nehru apparently took the realistic view, that if Gandhi's draft was accepted, Congress became a passive partner of the Axis powers. He also, it may be noted, said that it was Gandhi's view that Japan and Germany will win.

2. Briefly the cleavage of opinion was as follows:—

Nehru, Rajagopalachari, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu and Bhulabhai Desai took the commonsense view that withdrawal of British at this stage must inevitably mean Japanese occupation. Rajendra Prasad, Kripalani and Vallabhbhai Patel seemed to be blind followers of Gandhi's lead and to regard him as infallible. The two United Provinces representatives, Pant and Acharya Narendra Deo, seemed to have their heads in the clouds and to hold that if given self-government, all problems would solve themselves.

The voting is interesting as showing the cleavage of opinion.

3. The general impression formed is that though there are differences of opinion about Japan and the war, there is complete unanimity about hatred of Britain. There is also as usual no sign of recognition that there is any other Indian opinion other than that of Congress.

4. It is hardly profitable to speculate about Gandhi's next move, though of course there are numerous rumours. But it looks to me as if now that the Japanese menace has apparently decreased, partly owing to the monsoon, partly owing to our growing air power, Nehru and his followers may swing round more to the anti-British policy of Gandhi.

5. The most recent reports which I have had from districts show that Congress is interesting itself in compensation for lands taken up for aerodrome construction. In Benares the ex-Minister, Sampurnanand, had offered to help to get the matter settled, which is satisfactory. The Congress policy of urging cultivators to store and hoard their grain still continues and may give rise to trouble.

Yours sincerely,

M. G. HALLETT

No. 43 [2] No. 4. [3] See No. 43, para. 1.

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Enclosure to No. 113

COPY OF DOCUMENT

Gandhiji was not present at this meeting of the Working Committee. But he sent from Wardha a draft resolution for the consideration of the committee. Miraben who brought the draft explained how Gandhiji's mind was working along the lines sketched in it. The Committee gave earnest and careful consideration to the draft.

The draft contained the following points:—

(i) A demand to the British Government to clear out.
(ii) India is a zone of war as a result of British Imperialism.
(iii) No foreign assistance needed for the freedom of the country.
(iv) India has no quarrel with any country.
(v) If Japan invaded India it shall meet with non-violent resistance.
(vi) Form of non-co-operation laid down.
(vii) Foreign soldiers a grave menace to Indian freedom.

Jawaharlalji: Gandhiji's draft is an approach which needs careful consideration. Independence means, among other things, the withdrawal of British troops. It is proper; but has it any meaning our demanding withdrawal. Nor can they reasonably do it even if they recognise independence. Withdrawal of troops and the whole apparatus of civil administration will create a vacuum which cannot be filled up immediately.

If we said to Japan that her fight was with British Imperialism and not us she would say "we are glad the British army is withdrawn; we recognise your independence. But we want certain facilities now. We shall defend you against aggression. We want aerodromes, freedom to pass our troops through your country. This is necessary in self-defence." They might seize strategic points and proceed to Iraq, &c. The masses won't be touched if only the strategic points are captured. Japan is an imperialist country. Conquest of India is in their plan. If Bapu's approach is accepted we become passive partners of the Axis powers. This approach is contrary to the Congress policy for the last two years and a half. The Allied Countries will have a feeling that we are their enemies.

Kripalaniji intervening said that the draft was a declaration of their stand. England and America might put what interpretation they liked but they (the Congress) had no designs against them.

Maulana Sahib: What is our position. Shall we tell the British Government to go and allow the Japanese and Germans to come or do we want the British Government to stay and stem the new aggression.

Pantji: I want the right of self-Government and we shall exercise it as we like. If the British troops and the rest must withdraw let them do so by all means and we shall shift for ourselves.

Jawaharlalji: A draft like this weakens their (the British Government's)

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position. They will treat India as an enemy country and reduce it to dust and ashes. They will do here what they did in Rangoon.

Vallabhbhai Patel: The draft says to the British "you have proved your utter incompetence. You cannot defend India. We cannot defend it either because you won't let us to do. But if you withdraw there is a chance for us."

Asaf Ali: The draft asks us to accept non-violence for all time.

Achut Patwardhan: It was put to Gandhiji. He said that the Congress can take *the stand* that under existing circumstances non-violence was the best policy.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The whole background of the draft is one which will inevitably make the world think that we are passively lining up with the Axis powers. The British are asked to withdraw. After the withdrawal we are to negotiate with Japan and possibly come to some terms with her. These terms may include a large measure of civil control by us, a certain measure of military control by them, passage of armies through India, &c.

Kripalaniji: Why should it mean passage of armies through India, &c. Just as we call upon the British and the Americans to withdraw their armies so also we ask others to keep out of our frontiers. If they do not, we fight.

Jawaharlal Nehru: Whether you will like it or not, the exigencies of the war situation will compel them to make India a battle ground. In sheer self-defence they cannot afford to keep out. They will walk through the country. You can't stop it by non-violent [non-?]co-operation. Most of the population will not be affected by the march. Individuals may resist in a symbolic way. The Japanese armies will go to Iraq, Persia, &c., throttle China and make the Russian situation more difficult.

The British will refuse our demand for military reasons apart from others. They can't allow India to be used by Japan against them. Our reaction in the event of refusal will be a passive, theoretical lining up with the Axis powers. Japan may have an excuse for attack. We get involved in a hopeless logical quandary. We get hostility from every other element outside the Axis powers. Japan will occupy strategic points. We get no chance to offer mass C.D. Our policy of sympathy with one group is completely changed.

So far as the main action is concerned there is no difficulty about Bapu's draft. But the whole thought and background of the draft is one of favouring Japan. It may not be conscious. Three factors influence our decisions in the present emergency. (i) Indian freedom, (ii) sympathy for certain larger causes, (iii) probable outcome of the war who is going to win? It is Gandhiji's feeling that Japan and Germany will win. This feeling unconsciously governs his decision. The approach in the draft is different from mine.

Achut Patwardhan: I agree with Jawaharlalji's background but there are certain difficulties. The British Government is behaving in a suicidal manner. If we do not take decisions Jawaharlalji's attitude will lead to abject and

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unconditional co-operation with British machinery which must collapse. If the battle of India is to be fought by Wavell, we shall do ourselves discredit if we attach ourselves to him. We talk of allying ourselves with the Allied nations. I doubt if America is a progressive force. The existence of the American army in India is not a fact which improves our situation. I was opposed to the Poona offer[4] but not to talks with Cripps. Jawaharlalji's statement[5] after the negotiations broke down distressed me. The trend of thought it disclosed lands us in a position which obliges us to offer unconditional co-operation to British. Our co-operation with British is an invitation to Japan.

Rajendra Babu: We cannot produce the proper atmosphere unless we adopt Bapu's draft. The Government has closed the door on armed resistance. We have only unarmed resistance to offer. We have therefore to strengthen Bapu's hands.

Govind Ballabh Pant: There is no difference of opinion so far as non-violence is concerned. There may be two opinions as to its effectiveness. Non-violent non-co-operation is not meant to be a demonstration. It is designed to prevent invasion or resist occupation, what will be our attitude to armed resistance? Shall we assist it or at least do nothing to hamper it?

Jawaharlal Nehru: It[6] retains the approach in Bapu's original draft. The approach is a variation from the attitude we have taken up about allies. At least I have committed myself to that sympathy 100 per cent. It would be dishonourable for me to resign from that position. There is no reason why that choice should arise. But it has arisen somewhat in this approach. The portion of the draft about resistance has some substance. The portion about minorities, princes, is unrealistic. We go on thinking in terms of what was and not what is and that is a dangerous thing in a rapidly changing situation. There is no difference among us about (i) our reactions to Government, (ii) our total inability to co-operate with the Government. Our programme of self-sufficiency and self-protection helps the Government but that cannot be helped, (iii) we do not embarrass the British war-effort because that in itself would mean aid to the invader. We agree on these points but we have different ways of getting at them. It is true that since my approach is different my emphasis too would be different.

Pantji: One test to apply to the draft is: whether it is consistent with our previous resolutions. The language about the condemnation of Cripps proposals is highly exaggerated. If the proposals were so bad why did we spend so much time over them? My attitude today is: we must do our utmost to defend the country and swallow many things. If I can't co-operate with the British it is because it is not consistent with our dignity. But the approach in the draft makes every soldier I see my enemy.

Asaf Ali: The draft will (not?) make any effective appeal to the Axis powers. Telling the British to withdraw will do nobody any good.

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Bhulabhai Desai: No resolution is called for. We passed at Wardha [one?] which expressed our definite position. The resolution is made in an unreal way. It is inconsistent with our previous stand. We have said that if offered an opportunity we shall side with the Allies.

Rajaji: I do not think the changed draft is different from the original. We appeal to Britain and Japan. The appeal to Britain will fail but certain tangible results will follow. The entire policy of the Congress will be reinterpreted and the new interpretation will go terribly against us. Japan will say "excellent".

I do not agree that if Britain goes away India will have some scope for organising itself even if Japan should make some headway. Japan will fill the vacuum created by the British withdrawal. Our reaction to evils of Britain should not make us lose our sense of perspective. It is no use getting upset on small matters. Do not run into the arms of Japan, which is what the resolution comes to.

Dr. Pattabhi: It is a comprehensive and appropriate draft. A time has come when we must realise ourselves. After the rejection of Cripps proposals we must reconsider our attitude and restate our position. We have varied our position from time to time during the time the war has been on. Poona was a variation from the old position. Bombay[7] was a variation from Poona. Bombay was followed by C.D. and C.D. by Cripps.

Sarojini Naidu: The changed draft is much better than the original. There is however a great deal of unnecessary matter in the resolution. The appeal is a rhetorical gesture. It is however good as an expression of our extreme disgust and dislike and hatred of the British Government.

The appeal to Japan is a useless gesture. India is a part of the map they have drawn.

I agree with the non-violent non-co-operation part of the resolution. It can be recast keeping the substance of the original.

The draft is a narrowing of sympathies not consistent with the position we have taken up.

I do not like foreign soldiers. The portion dealing with them is good.

Bishwanath Das: I see two conflicting views in the Committee. This division of opinion is fatal at this juncture. I generally agree with the draft. The Cripps proposals if accepted would have kept us in permanent bondage. The appeal to Britain to withdraw is very proper. We can tell them that neither will they defend us nor allow us to defend ourselves.

The protest against the introduction of American soldiers in the country is also proper. They have brought in troops from dominions and other foreign nations. This is highly objectionable and dangerous.

[4] See Vol. I, No. 7, note 4. [5] Vol. I, No. 637. [6] Evidently an alternative draft.
[7] Vol. I, Appendix II.

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Bardoloi: One portion of the draft is operative and another ideological. If we lay emphasis on the operative portion the differences will be greatly minimised. For joint action I should be prepared to delete the portion which deals with the ideological background. We are already in the danger zone. This is no time for ideological discussion. Let us concentrate on the present action which cannot be anything else than non-violent non-co-operation.

Satyamurti: The changed draft is an improvement. I do not agree with the objection to the entry of foreign soldiers. India may defend herself even with the aid of foreign soldiers. I think we must make an approach to the Muslim League.

Achut Patwardhan: I am in general agreement with the draft. The open-door policy is at an end. The resolution emphasises a factor which has been emphasised by every intelligent man, i.e., the war is lost unless the people are in it. The war is an imperialist war. Our policy can be that we take no sides. The world is in the grip of fear complex. I would reconsider the position if the Allies could defeat the Axis. But I see clearly that Britain is going towards the deep. We want to create neutrality. Do not look to Japan or Britain.

Jairamdasji: The criticism that the draft is pro-Japanese is wrong. Opposition to the Japanese invasion is there in the draft.

The mention of foreign armies in the draft is very appropriate. The Indian History bears ample testimony of the highly undesirable consequences which foreign armies have led to. The draft creates an atmosphere of neutrality. The attempt is worth making.

Vallabhbhai Patel: I see that there are two distinct opinions in the Committee. We have ever since the outbreak of war tried to pull together. But it may not be possible on this occasion. Gandhiji has taken a definite stand. If his background is unsuitable to some members of the committee there is the other background which is unsuitable to us. The first four or five paragraphs of the draft is a reply to the Cripps mission. Cripps is a clever fellow. He has gone about saying that his mission has not been a failure. The draft is a perfect reply to his propaganda.

I am not in favour of making any approach to Jinnah. We have made repeated attempts and courted many insults. The Congress today is reeling under two blows, one Cripps' and the other Rajaji's resolutions have done us enormous harm.

I have placed myself in the hands of Gandhiji. I feel that he is instinctively right, the lead he gives in all critical situations.

In Bombay, at the time of the A.-I.C.C. meeting there was a difference in approach but the door to negotiation was closed. In Bardoli[8] it was made clear that the door was still open and our sympathies were with allies. It is time the door is finally closed after the repeated insults heaped upon us. I agree with the draft before us. If there is any pro-fascist hint in the draft let it be removed.

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Acharya Narendra Deo: I do not agree with the view that war is one and indivisible. The aims of Russia and China are not identical with those of Britain and America. If it is one we should join the war and side with Britain. Our position has not been that we want power because without it we cannot kindle the national spirit; our position has been that if the war was a people's war and there was proof of it in action we are willing to throw in our weight on the side of democracies.

It is necessary to counteract the mischievous propaganda of Cripps. Cripps has been saying that internal differences have prevented a settlement. Rajaji has strengthened his hands. Japanese threat has also influenced our attitude to Britain. It has led us to even modify Poona.

We have to make it clear that Japanese threat has not unnerved us. We can tell the British to go, leaving us to our fate.

Whatever unreality there is in Indian politics is due to the British rule. Let it go and the unreality will disappear.

I am not interested in defeating Hitlerite Germany, I am more interested in war-aims and peace-aims.

Maulana Sahib: The discussion has been useful. But it is not clear to me, the differences that divide the two groups.

Cripps was a great hope. He came here with the reputation of a radical. But he proved a great disappointment. He made things worse. Cripps in his statements after the failure of negotiations has emphasised two points: (i) his mission has proved the sincerity of the intentions of the British Government towards India, (ii) the anti-Japanese front is the outcome of his mission.

All this is false propaganda. Great Britain has made it impossible for us to defend our country. But we have something to do about the Japanese aggression.

It is my firm belief that nationalism is the only religion for a subject nation. If I feel that Japan was better than Britain and her invasion was for the good of India I would have said so in public. But it is not so. Gandhiji's prescription is the only alternative though I doubt its effectiveness.

Since the draft presented by Rajendra Babu was not acceptable to Jawaharlalji and a few other members of the Committee, the President asked Jawaharlalji to prepare a draft of his own. Jawaharlalji presented the following draft in the next sitting of the Committee:—[9]

The draft sought to cover the points contained in Bapu's draft but the approach was different. The discussions that (followed?) showed that the division of opinion revealed in the earlier discussions persisted. Jawaharlalji modified his draft with a view to accommodate better the other group but

[8] Vol. I, Appendix III.

[9] The copy of this document forwarded by Lord Linlithgow's Private Secretary to Mr Amery's Private Secretary has '(Quote)' at this point, but does not give the text of the draft. L/P&J/8/596: f 136.

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the difference in approach remained. The draft was not acceptable to the whole committee. Thereupon the President put the two drafts to vote. Those who voted for Gandhiji's draft as modified by Rajendra Babu were Sardar Vallabhbhai, Rajendra Babu, J. P. Kripalani, Shankar Rao Deo, Sarojini Naidu, Profulla Chandra Ghosh. Those who voted for Jawaharlalji's draft were, Jawaharlal Nehru, Govind Ballabh Pant, Bhulabhai Desai and Asaf Ali. Among the invitees Shri Jairamdas Daulatram, Acharya Narendra Deo, Achut Patwardhan, Bardoloi, Bishwanath Das voted for Rajendra Babu's draft and Shri Satyamurti and Mrs. R. S. Pandit voted for Jawaharlalji's draft.

Rajendra Babu's draft was passed by the Committee in the morning sitting on May 1st. The subject was however reopened by the President in the afternoon sitting. He pleaded with those who supported Rajendra Babu's draft to accept Jawaharlalji's draft and make it a unanimous resolution. It was President's opinion that there was practically no difference between the two drafts though the protagonists of both the drafts held that a vital difference in approach persisted. Supporters of Rajendra Babu's draft yielded to the wish of the President and accepted Jawaharlalji's draft.[10]

[10] L/P&J/8/596: f 137 concludes: 'The draft resolution for the A.-I.C.C. as was finally passed by the Committee is as follows: (Quote).' The text of this draft is given in column 3 in the Enclosure to No. 43.

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Mr Hopkins to Mr Churchill (Extract)

Telegram, L/PO/6/105e: f 138

SECRET *1 June 1942*

Rumours relative to invitation to Nehru[1] entirely unfounded Johnson ill and has no plans to return to India.[2]

[1] See No. 112.

[2] Mr Hopkins' message was transmitted by Mr Amery to Lord Linlithgow in telegram 23-U of 2 June.

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Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar to Sir H. Craik

L/P&S/13/230: ff 434-44

SECRET COUNCIL HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *1 June 1942*

My dear Sir Henry,

The Indian Princes have no desire to raise any controversial issues in the duration of the war and wish to concentrate all thought and energy on ensuring

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a speedy and decisive victory. Accordingly, as you are aware, it has been my policy as Chancellor to postpone all avoidable matters which have no direct bearing on war effort and which may be inconvenient to meet at this juncture. Nevertheless, certain recent happenings, arising out of the Cripps Mission, have caused, and are bound to accentuate, grave anxiety to the Princes and their loyal subjects, and have occasioned intense feeling of profound disappointment in the States. These developments, I must state in all frankness, have been a particular shock to the Indian Princes who feel special personal attachment to His Majesty the King Emperor, and have full faith in Britain's respect for Treaties and in the bona fides of His Majesty's Government and His Excellency the Crown Representative. I feel confident that it could not have been the intention of His Majesty's Government to create an impression which unfortunately has been created and is being exploited by those who are opposed to war effort and who wish to put a damper even on the unconditional and spontaneous war effort of the States. Accordingly, I deem it my duty to state briefly but in all frankness the more important of these points, so that you may submit them to His Excellency the Crown Representative with the request that he may urge upon His Majesty's Government the necessity of reassuring the States, unequivocally and without delay, on these points and thereby dispel the misgivings which are apt to do great harm:—

I. (*a*) The Indian Princes regard their Treaties and Engagements and the protection guaranteed thereunder as the sheet-anchor of their relationship with the British Crown.

(*b*) The scrupulous respect for these Treaties and Engagements has been solemnly assured to the States by Her Majesty the late Queen Empress Victoria, by the Emperors who succeeded her and by successive Viceroys on behalf of His Majesty's Government. In this connection, attention may be invited, by way of illustration, to the following solemn declarations lest they be forgotten:—

(i) Her Imperial Majesty the late Queen Victoria gave the following assurance in her famous Proclamation of 1858:—[1]

> "We hereby announce to the Native Princes of India that all Treaties and Engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company are by US accepted and will be scrupulously maintained. . . . We shall respect the Rights, Dignity and Honour of Native Princes as Our own."

(ii) The following significant words were used by Lord Morley, then Secretary of State for India, when referring to the aforesaid Proclamation of Queen Victoria at the Second Reading of Indian Councils Bill, House of Lords, February 23, 1909—[2]

[1] H. of C. 1859 Session 1 XVIII 110, p. 283. [2] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of L., vol. 1, col. 129.

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". . . the noble promise in Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1858—a promise of which every Englishman ought to be for ever proud if he tries to adhere to it, and ashamed if he tries to betray or to mock it. . . ."

(iii) In a message,[3] on the outbreak of the Great War 1914, His Majesty the late King Emperor George V, announced that—

"Paramount regard for treaty, faith and pledged word of rulers, and peoples is the common heritage of England and India."

Later in his Proclamation of 1921,[4] His Majesty the late King George V was pleased to state—

"In My former Proclamation I repeated the assurance given on many occasions by My Royal predecessors and Myself, of My determination *ever to maintain unimpaired* the privileges, rights and dignities of the Princes of India. *The Princes may rest assured that this pledge remains inviolate and inviolable.*"

(iv) Lord Halifax, a former Viceroy of India, in a recent speech[5] stated with reference to Princes—

"They and their States do not fit easily into the picture of India as the Congress Party would like to draw it. Yet the independence of the Princes is enshrined in solemn treaties with the King Emperor and as such are only alterable by negotiations. To scrap these or any other treaties unilaterally would be to scrap one of the principles for which we went to war with Germany."

"the Congress, the Muslim League, the Depressed Classes and the Princes were four major factors which must combine if India was to be sufficiently united to assume the rights and duties of full manhood among nations."

(v) The Montagu–Chelmsford Report[6] stated as follows in para 305—

". . . we think that the Princes should be assured in the fullest and freest manner that no constitutional changes which may take place will impair the rights, dignities, and privileges secured to them by treaties, sanads, and engagements, or by established practice."

(vi) The following relevant and important statement was made by the Butler Committee (1928–29)—[7]

"58 . . . the States demand that without their own agreement the rights and obligations of the Paramount Power should not be assigned to persons who are not under its control, for instance, an Indian Government in British India responsible to an Indian legislature. If any government in the nature of a dominion government should be constituted in British India, such a government would clearly be a new government resting on a new and written constitution. The contingency has not arisen; we are not directly

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concerned with it; the relations of the States to such a government would raise questions of law and policy which we cannot now and here foreshadow in detail. We feel bound, however, to draw attention to the really grave apprehension of the Princes on this score, and to record our strong opinion that, in view of the historical nature of the relationship between the Paramount Power and the Princes, the latter should not be transferred without their own agreement to a relationship with a new government in British India responsible to an Indian legislature."

"106. . . we hold that the treaties, engagements and sanads have been made with the Crown and that the relationship between the Paramount Power and the Princes should not be transferred, without the agreement of the latter, to a new government in British India responsible to an Indian legislature."

(vii) It will be conceded that Princes and States are not a hindrance but an asset to the Empire both in peace and war. As stated by Lord Canning, in a Despatch dated the 30th April 1860[8] to the Secretary of State for India—

"The safety of our rule is increased, not diminished, by the maintenance of Native Chiefs well-affected to us. . . ." In the Mutiny "these patches of Native government served as breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over us in one great wave. And in quiet times they have their uses; . . . And should the day come when India shall be threatened by an external enemy, or when the interests of England elsewhere may require that her Eastern Empire shall incur more than ordinary risk, one of our best mainstays will be found in these Native States. But to make them so, we must treat their Chiefs . . . with consideration and generosity, teaching them that in spite of all suspicions to the contrary their independence is safe, . . . It was long ago said by Sir John Malcolm, that if we made all India into Zillas it was not in the nature of things that our Empire should last fifty years; but that if we could keep up a number of Native States, . . . as royal instruments, we should exist in India as long as our Naval superiority in Europe was maintained."

(*c*) His Excellency the present Viceroy also has, in his public addresses as also in private conversations, repeatedly assured us of the scrupulous respect for the Treaties and Engagements which bind the Indian Princes and their loyal subjects to their beloved King Emperor. Moreover, the Indian Princes have been

[3] Cd. 7624 of 1914–16. *Papers relating to the support offered by the Princes and Peoples of India to His Majesty in connection with the War*, No. 1, p. 3.

[4] On the inauguration of the Chamber of Princes. Published in *The Times*, 8 February 1921. Also in L/P&S/10/916: f 38.

[5] At New York Town Hall, 7 April 1942. See *The Times of India*, 9 April, p. 4.

[6] Cd. 9109 of 1918. *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms.*

[7] Cmd. 3302 of 1928–9. *Report of the Indian States Committee.*

[8] Foreign letters from India, Vol. 3. Governor-General's letter No. 43A.

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inspired by the fact that His Majesty's Government has gone to war for the high principles of civilisation which specifically include respect for Treaties and Engagements.

(*d*) It was, therefore, that the Indian Princes noted with particular satisfaction that the Declaration of August 1940,[9] as elucidated authoritatively in Parliament by the Secretary of State for India[10] was intended specifically to ensure the Crown's Treaty obligations to States. As such, it has been a great disappointment to the Indian Princes that the new draft Declaration[11] brought by Sir Stafford Cripps which, in the words of the Prime Minister, sought to clothe with precision the Declaration of August 1940, omits altogether the reference to Crown's Treaty obligations to States which had been one of the basic planks of all previous Declarations relating to the constitutional advance of India. This inexplicable and unexpected omission, of the Crown's obligations to States, in the Draft Declaration has not unnaturally caused great misgivings in the minds of the Princes and their loyal subjects. In fact it has openly been asked whether the Princes were being ignored as they had no nuisance value; while the Princes themselves feel that their spontaneous and unconditional war effort deserved better than the deletion in the Draft Declaration of the express guarantee of the Crown's obligations to them assured in the Declaration of August 1940.

(*e*) Moreover, it has given occasion to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and others to declare publicly with great flutter that these Treaties must be scrapped, and in fact he (Pandit Jawaharlal) has recently gone to the extent of declaring that those who talk of Treaties with Indian States are "lunatics, knaves or fools". He appears to have forgotten, of which he was reminded in a published statement by my Secretary, that even the All Parties Report,[12] presided over by the late Pandit Motilal Nehru (father of Pandit Jawaharlal) and signed among others by the Rt. Hon'ble Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru specifically recognised that the States' Treaties must be respected in any future constitution of India.

(*f*) It is significant that the Draft Declaration makes special mention of the protection of 'racial and religious minorities', and in referring to this point Sir Stafford in his recent statement in the House of Commons stated that—

> "In view of our *pledges*, we could not leave the minorities to rely upon this alone. We, therefore, inserted an express clause as to the treaty governing minority protection which will be found in paragraph *c*(ii) of the Draft Declaration."[13]

The States are surely entitled to claim even more than the minorities that the solemn undertakings with them must be scrupulously respected, particularly as they have the honour of alliance and friendship with the British Crown and have consecrated it by their unconditional assistance and co-operation in all crises which faced the Empire.

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(*g*) In this connection, attention may also be invited to the provision at the end of clause (*c*) of the draft Declaration that—

> "whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the Constitution it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its Treaty arrangements so far as this may be required in the new situation."

This statement has created the impression that it is proposed to have a compulsory revision of Treaty arrangements whether or not the States concerned consent to such revision. In later elucidation[14] we were told that this provision was intended to apply to economic matters of common concern to British India and the States, but this has not been clearly stated in the Declaration itself. Moreover, even if it be so, it is obvious that the objective in view could be secured by negotiating *supplemental* Treaties with regard to these economic matters arising out of the new Constitution without affecting or revising the *whole* of the original Treaties or Engagements. Besides it should be made clear that the execution of these supplemental treaties would obviously be subject to free consent of the States concerned.

(*h*) Apart from considerations of Treaty obligations and faith in plighted word which bind the British Crown and the Princes in relationship which is inviolate and inviolable, the Princes are imbued with genuine and deep loyalty to the person of His Majesty the King Emperor. As such, I personally, and many others who share my views decline to believe that the Crown wishes to give up its obligations to States or has no further use of them or finds their alliance, their loyal cooperation, services and assistance of no value, or that the Crown is advised that it will not be in a position effectively to discharge its obligations towards States.

(*i*) Nevertheless some of these recent utterances have caused grave concern and personal shock to many of us, and it is felt that if matters are left as they are in the present position, they are bound to have serious repercussions on the younger and future generations of Princes, a consequence which must be deplored in the interests of the British Commonwealth of Nations as much as in the interest of India and the States. Moreover, the situation is already being exploited by some of the British Indian Political Parties who are hostile to the British connection.

(*j*) In view of the aforesaid considerations, I would urge with all the emphasis at my command that the earliest opportunity may be utilised to ensure the

[9] Vol. I, Appendix I.

[10] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 364, 14 August 1940, col. 922.

[11] Vol. I, No. 456.

[12] *All Parties Conference, 1928; Report of the Committee appointed by the Conference to determine the principles of the Constitution for India* (Allahabad, The General Secretary, All-India Congress Committee, 1942).

[13] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 379, 28 April 1942, cols. 835–6.

[14] Vol. I, Enclosure to No. 527, answer to Question 9.

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States, through an authoritative statement on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that the British Government stands true to, and firmly by, its Treaty obligations to the States and will continue to protect them according to these solemn obligations.

II. (*a*) The other matter which has recently caused grave concern to the Indian Princes is the following statement reported to have been made by Sir Stafford Cripps in the course of his recent speech in the India Debate in the House of Commons on his return from India:—

> "Unfortunately in my view representative institutions have not yet developed in a great majority of the Indian States . . . I am certain this House would wish the British administration in India to do all it can to encourage and expedite the development of suitable representative institutions in all Indian States."[15]

If this report be correct, you will appreciate that Sir Stafford appears to have been misinformed, and his statement is in conflict with the unequivocal declaration on this subject made on behalf of His Majesty's Government by His Excellency the Viceroy at the Session of the Chamber of Princes held in 1939.

(*b*) In this connection attention may be invited to the following extracts:—

(i) In the course of his address to the Chamber Session 1939, His Excellency the Viceroy stated as follows:—[16]

> "Your Highnesses will have seen the declarations recently made in Parliament on behalf of His Majesty's Government, declarations which I have myself repeated in public utterances, in regard to constitutional changes or developments in the Indian States. Those statements will have made clear the attitude in this matter of His Majesty's Government, which is, I repeat, that the decision as to the constitution best suited to the needs of his people and his State rests with the Ruler himself to take, and that no pressure will be brought to bear on him in this respect by the Paramount Power. Nor will any obstruction be placed in his way by the Paramount Power should he wish to give effect to constitutional advance consistently with his Treaty obligations."

(ii) In the statement[17] of constitutional and administrative reforms introduced in the States since 1st January 1936, up to 15th April 1942, issued by the Political Department, it is stated that—

> "In regard to Constitutional developments, the policy of the Paramount Power has been clearly laid down and repeated in recent declarations in Parliament. It is for the Ruler himself to decide what form of constitution is best suited to the needs of his subjects and the Crown Representative and his Officers refrain from offering advice in this respect unless they are invited to do so. Several Indian States already possess highly developed Constitutions,

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and the general tendency is to advance in a genuine attempt to associate the subjects of the State with the administration."

(iii) In the course of my review at the last Chamber Session, following figures were cited by me—

"90·5 per cent. of the population of our States possess local bodies with non-official majorities. States with 72 per cent. of the population have got Legislative Assemblies, out of which 35·3 per cent. have majority of elected members and 5 per cent. have equality of elected and nominated members of the Assembly. States representing more than half of our total population have recently reviewed and enlarged the scope of association of their subjects with their administration."[18]

(*c*) The aforesaid statement of Sir Stafford has caused anxious concern amongst the Indian Princes, who had already been seriously perturbed over the omission of any reference to the Crown's Treaty obligations to States in the Draft Declaration brought by Sir Stafford Cripps and by the recent loose talk about the revision of Treaties.

(*d*) I feel confident that the Indian Princes can rely on His Majesty's Government and His Excellency the Crown Representative to reassure them, at the earliest opportunity, that the aforesaid statement of Sir Stafford does not in any manner prejudice the sacred assurances given by the late Queen Victoria and successive Emperors and Viceroys and confirmed in the declaration made on behalf of His Majesty's Government by His Excellency the Viceroy as reproduced in sub-para (*b*) of this para.

III. Let me also refer briefly to a few other factors which have contributed to the aforesaid anxiety of the Princes; I am citing them in the confident hope that the view-point of the Princes will be kept in view if and when similar circumstances recur again.

(*a*) Certain important matters relating to Defence, were discussed in connection with the Cripps Mission, and representatives of the Congress and Muslim League were brought in consultation with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to evolve proposals connected with the appointment of an Indian Defence Member. You will appreciate, that both under their Treaties

[15] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 379, 28 April 1942, col. 834.

[16] The Marquess of Linlithgow, *Speeches and Statements* (New Delhi, Bureau of Public Information, Government of India, 1945), p. 184.

[17] In reply to an enquiry from the India Office, the Secretary to the Crown Representative telegraphed that the statement referred to was the latest issue corrected up to 15 July 1941 (not 15 April 1942). L/P&S/13/998: f 445. A copy of this issue is in L/P&S/13/993; the passage quoted by the Jam Saheb is on p. 3.

[18] *Proceedings of the Meetings of the Chamber of Princes*, 17 March 1942. (New Delhi, Government of India, 1942), p. 23. Also in L/P&S/13/288.

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and otherwise, the States are vitally concerned in this matter, and yet in these negotiations the States have entirely been ignored.

(*b*) Various important references, made in connection with the Cripps Mission both in India and in the House of Commons, have been confined to British India and Indian leaders as if the Indian States did not matter. So much so, that it was stated that representatives of certain parties and communities, which were specifically mentioned, had expressed their readiness to stand by Great Britain in the defence of their country. No reference to the spontaneous and unconditional support of the Indian Princes and their loyal subjects was made in this authoritative statement by the Lord Privy Seal.

(*c*) Throughout the R.T.C. and previous constitutional discussions, the Rulers and their Ministers were treated by His Majesty's Government and their representatives, as they should be treated, as the sole accredited representatives of the States. This time however, presumably through the efforts of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and others, Sir Stafford Cripps received a British Indian as representative[19] of the so-called State Subjects Conference, which is an adjunct of the Congress and generally speaking is a self-assumed tribune of the very small minority of disgruntled elements in the Indian States. We do not know whether this step was taken with the concurrence of His Majesty's Government, but at any rate it has placed the Princes in a very awkward position *vis-à-vis* their loyal subjects. In this connection, it may be pointed out that even the All-Parties Report of 1928 to which reference has been made in sub-para (*e*) of para I above recognised "that the Rulers of the Indian States alone represent their governments".

(*d*) It seems authoritatively indicated that once a State adheres to the proposed Indian Union it will have to remain there even if the Union should declare itself a Republic, or decides to break away from the British Empire, or decrees that monarchical rule in the States should be replaced by Republics.

(*e*) We have been told[20] that the proposed constitution-making body would be free to discuss internal affairs of the States, though on previous occasions it was clearly understood that constitutional discussions will be *limited* to matters of common concern to British India and the States which appertain to the Centre. In this connection, let me invite attention to the resolution (copy attached Appendix A)[21] passed unanimously at the last Session of the Chamber of Princes and the relevant extracts (copy attached Appendix B)[22] from my speech in moving the aforesaid Resolution, which would show that the Indian Princes are sympathetic to, and are prepared to make every reasonable contribution for, the constitutional advance of India. They desire, however, that they should be kept free from purely British Indian controversies and that British India should not interfere with the internal affairs of the States.

(*f*) During the Cripps Negotiations, reference has been made to only 'a representative of India on the Imperial War Cabinet',[23] and the names of

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certain British Indian leaders were openly canvassed for it. In this connection, it may be pointed out that in the Imperial War Cabinet and Conference of 1917 as also at the Peace Conference of 1919, both Indian States and British India were separately represented.

IV. It is appreciated that in the interests of India and the Empire as a whole, a single Union would undoubtedly be the best solution of India's constitutional problem; at the same time, it may be that unforeseen circumstances may compel a large number of States or groups of States not to adhere to the new Union. Accordingly the States Delegation asked[24] Sir Stafford Cripps that in that contingency, the non-adhering States should be accorded the option of having a Union of their own with full sovereign status in accordance with a suitable and agreed procedure devised for the purpose. It was pointed out that provision to that effect had been made for non-adhering Provinces. We were told that this eventuality had not been considered in connection with the Draft Declaration. This shows that apart [far?] from receiving treatment better than the Provinces to which the States are entitled on constitutional and historic grounds, they were not being treated even on par with the Provinces in respect of future constitutional developments.

2. Many of the aforesaid points have already formed subject of my talks with His Excellency the Crown Representative and yourself, and some of them have also been intimated to you under my directions by my Secretary. Moreover, they have recently been taken up by His Highness the Maharaja Sahib of Bikaner, with his characteristic thoroughness and ability, personally with His Excellency the Viceroy. At the same time, in view of the importance of this matter both to the future of the Empire, India and the States, as also to the successful prosecution of the war, I have felt it my duty to address this official letter in the confident hope that His Excellency the Crown Representative will be pleased to impress it, with his personal support and authority, on the urgent and sympathetic consideration of His Majesty's Government, so that an authoritative and early announcement on this subject may be forthcoming to eliminate the Princes' serious concern and misgivings on these matters.

Yours sincerely,

DIGVIJAYSINHJI,
Chancellor,
Chamber of Princes

[19] Dr Pattabhi Sitaramayya. See Vol. I, No. 461.
[20] Vol. I, Enclosure to No. 527, answer to Question 6.
[21] See Vol. I, Enclosure to No. 591.
[22] See *Proceedings of the Meetings of the Chamber of Princes*, 17 March 1942. (New Delhi, Government of India, 1942), pp. 26–9. Also in L/P&S/13/288.
[23] See Vol. I, Nos. 440, 457, and 543.
[24] See Vol. I, Nos. 437–8, 498, Enclosure to No. 527, para. 1, and 593–5.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to the Maharaja of Indore

Verbal communication, MSS. EUR. F. 125/137

3 June 1942

I have observed, with pain and astonishment, that you have made yourself responsible for the issue of an open letter to President Roosevelt, which appeared in the Press on May 28th.

The substance of that letter is an invitation to the President of the U.S.A. to arbitrate between His Majesty's Government and "the various groups in India".

And Your Highness proceeds to descant at length upon your view of the part which China and the U.S.S.R. ought to take in this operation.

It is my urgent duty, as Crown Representative in India, to draw Your Highness' attention to the grave irregularity of the step you have taken in framing and publishing this letter to the President.

I cannot suppose that you are ignorant of the rule and practice by which the Rulers of Indian States are required to avoid "connections, engagements, or communications with foreign powers".

Your Highness' position in India and before the world is that of a great Ruling Prince. Before the public you cannot disassociate yourself from that position, with all its great responsibilities, its privileges, and its obligations.

Amongst the advantages which you enjoy is that of receiving good advice from persons of experience in public affairs.

I wonder who advised Your Highness on this occasion?

You might have consulted my Resident, whose duty and pleasure it would have been to aid Your Highness in this or any other matter. But you did not consult the Resident.

Or you might have sought the advice of one of Your Highness' own servants. I do not know whether you did so. But this I can tell you, that any one of Your Highness' advisers who recommended you to publish this letter was quite undeserving of your confidence, and utterly incompetent to give you counsel. I should thus be astonished if Your Highness were to tell me that your late Prime Minister[1] was consulted and advised you to act as you have.

And in this connection, I feel bound to add that Your Highness takes upon yourself an immense responsibility in writing, before the public, that you are prepared to do in and with Indore, that which certain arbitrators may recommend you to do. There be it noted, you wrote not in your personal capacity, but as the Ruler of your State. Is that the measure of Your Highness' sense of trusteeship for the great charge which is yours? And there is the solemn treaty

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which has regulated, since 1818,[2] the relations between the Paramount Power and the Rulers of Indore.

Did you ask yourself whether this affirmation of your willingness to consult and follow the instructions of foreign powers as to the Government of Indore was compatible with that vital instrument which has been the prized charter of your State for these 124 years?

Your Highness knows the value set by your brother Princes upon the sanctity of those treaties and engagements which they have with the Crown—particularly in these days of anxiety and uncertainty.

How unwise, how ill-advised then, has Your Highness been in allowing yourself to be betrayed by some sudden impulse into committing the grave indiscretion of which it is my duty now most formally to complain. I hope to hear from your lips before Your Highness withdraws this morning not only any explanation which you may wish to offer, but also the expression of your firm resolve not again to venture into any irregularity of this kind.

[1] Colonel Dinanath.

[2] See C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, vol. IV (Calcutta, Government of India, 1933).

117

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/105e: f 122

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *4 June 1942, 7.40 am*

1635-S. Following for Prime Minister. Warmest thanks for your 22-U[1] and your 23-U.[2] Most grateful for all your interest and help.

I am so glad you have good news of Randolph.

[1] No. 111. [2] See No. 114, note 2.

118

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *4 June 1942, 7.50 pm*

Received: 4 June, 9.15 pm

No. 1647-S. My Council have formally selected Mudaliar to be our representative on the War Cabinet and the Pacific War Council. I would not propose

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to make any announcement, however, until we can announce remainder of changes in my Council. Sarker has agreed to serve as Commerce Member in succession to Mudaliar, and I am inviting Sir Jogendra Singh to serve as Member for Education, Health and Lands in succession to Sarker. I still await Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar's reply to my offer of the Civil Defence portfolio.

2. Would you now make a firm offer from me to Benthall of the War Transport portfolio and ask him to start from home as soon as he possibly can, and facilitate his coming out by the shortest route. Importance of his arriving here early is that date of his joining will affect his place at the Council table. He might have to be in India for a day or two before any actual announcement was made, but that does not matter. Please explain to him position about directorships,[1] and also that for reasons he will appreciate I cannot offer him a fixed term of five years, and that like all other Members of my Council I would have to ask him to place his office at my disposal in what seems the unlikely event of reconstitution of the Council on the basis of the co-operation of the major parties. You may care to know that Sarker thinks selection of a non-official European, and Benthall in particular, an excellent one.

3. I accept your views[2] as regards title of Information portfolio and do not press my suggestion of "Public Relations". I will consider further whether to call it simply "Information" in future or retain the existing title "Information and Broadcasting" which has the advantage of emphasizing the A.I.R. side.

4. I am discussing precise definition of content of new Civil Defence portfolio with Wavell, Reforms, and Defence Department. Wavell agrees that, if and when change is made, Firoz's new portfolio should be called Defence portfolio, and that he, Wavell, should become War Member in charge of War Department.

5. I have decided not to pursue for the present question of Begum Shah Nawaz, and will think about this again once I have got my Council together.

6. I assume that you are in agreement with me as to Jam Saheb as the Princely representative on the Executive Council and propose to take soundings of him. If he accepts and my Council agree,[3] I will then make formal offer to him.

7. You touched in a recent telegram[4] on possibility of splitting Supply into Munitions, Supply, &c. Grady's report has been under consideration by Members of my Council affected as a sub-Committee, but I am pretty clear in the outcome that the question of splitting will not arise and that we shall carry on as at present, probably with a War Resources Committee of the Executive Council to help us out.

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[1] Deciphered as 'Director Shipping'.
[2] In his telegram 665 of 31 May, Mr Amery had suggested naming this portfolio 'Information' rather than 'Public Relations'. L/P&J/8/544: f 46.
[3] 'If he accepts and my Council agree' omitted in decipher.
[4] No. 96.

119

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: f 165

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *4 June 1942, 3 am*

682. Your personal telegram 30th May, 1565–S.[1] I have taken matter up with Prime Minister and will reply as soon as possible.

[1] No. 107.

120

Viscount Halifax to Mr Amery (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/PO/3/3b: f 123

WASHINGTON, *4 June 1942, 2.48 am*
Received: 4 June, 11.15 am

No. 3088. Following for Secretary of State for India.

Mr. Hull asked me to see him this morning to tell me of the general anxiety he felt about the situation and morale in China and the possibility of further trouble in India.

He had been disturbed to read reports of possible start of new civil resistance movement by Gandhi, and he said he was always wondering whether there was anything more we could do to prevent the possible risk of collapse of China with development of the new trouble in India, both of which, in the present circumstances, were necessarily of interest to all the United Nations.

The two were to some extent psychologically connected in American thought, and there was always the possibility of American opinion, that had been to some extent educated by Sir S. Cripps' mission, slipping back.

2. I told him that as regards India, I had no special information, but that I should doubt whether a civil resistance movement by Gandhi, launched in the present circumstances, would be likely to elicit any general response.

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On the general question of the education of American opinion, which was clearly important, I asked him whether he had in mind any such suggestion as has been from time to time put forward in the press here, in effect that it might be useful to have some unofficial reputable objective enquiry into Indian problem under American auspices.

Mr. Hull was careful, however, to disclaim any such thought. He did not know enough about it; it was not his business to volunteer suggestions, and so on.

3. None the less the conversation, which was quite informal and most friendly, left on my mind the impression that something of the kind was moving in his thought and I do not know whether you and the Cabinet would think that anything of the kind might be useful.

4. Some time ago in conversation with the President, the matter came up whether it might be practicable to find some American like Coupland whose examination of the realities of the Indian problem might do much to counteract well-intentioned but ignorant drift of thought in intellectual circles here.

I imagine though that if the idea of any such impartial enquiry was to be entertained, it ought to aim at achieving two ends; i.e. education of American opinion and also restraint of unwise action in India.

I doubt from what I have read whether any American enquiry alone, even if we thought this might have value from American side and maintain the ground gained here by Sir Stafford Cripps' visit, would in the present circumstances, do much to achieve the second purpose that I have stated.

Chinese association might no doubt correct this, but would, no doubt, also involve other more difficult considerations.

5. It is the case that there is much American opinion that is exercised about all these Eastern and Far Eastern problems; the common form that this takes being to express the hope that they are not fighting merely for restoration of what are commonly called imperialistic (gp. undec.)s.

6. Mr. Hull told me in confidence that he was (?meditating) a speech on the general question of how people achieve freedom which, as he described in his thought to me, seemed to me entirely helpful and realist.

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121

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

SECRET THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *4 June 1942*

My dear Hallett,

Very many thanks for your secret letter of the 31st May, No. U.P.–140.[1] I entirely agree with you that the record of discussion in the Congress Working Committee on the War Resolution, seized at Allahabad, is of the first importance. I have already had copies from the Intelligence people and I have been considering it with my advisers here. It is a most revealing paper, and I have sent copies of it to the Secretary of State.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 113.

122

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *5 June 1942, 2.20 pm*
Received: 5 June, 2.5 pm

No. 1652–S. I have been discussing question of non-official Advisers on the lines suggested by Hallett in his letter of 13th April, No. U.P–132,[1] with Section 93 Governors. I have sent you their replies as received and subject to what follows you will be fully in possession of their views. Position is briefly that Lumley[2] and Hope[3] for reasons which they give both favour a non-official element. Clow[4] in principle also favours appointment of non-officials and has raised an interesting suggestion as regards possibility of small advisory council for legislation. Other Governors are opposed and Hallett, who originally was sympathetic and whose specific suggestion was referred by me to Governors, tells me[5] that he is now satisfied that non-official Advisers in the United Provinces are out of the question and that he wishes to go back on what he previously said.

2. I have considered position very carefully in the light of these conflicting views. I have also considered whether there need necessarily be uniformity as between provinces. My mind has been open on that, and I have taken note

[1] Vol. I, No. 620. [2] No. 2. [3] No. 23. [4] No. 39. [5] See No. 102, para. 9.

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of the views expressed in the India Committee as reported in your telegram No. 595[6] of 12th May.

3. In the result my conclusion is (*a*) that we must continue to make for uniformity. I am fully conscious of the argument against. But I am also conscious that it would be extremely difficult for Provinces[7] which stood out on this matter to continue to stand out were public opinion and the Press to be able to point to smooth working of non-official Advisers in other provinces. Hallett has made very clear to me the strength of his own opinion on the matter, and I attach importance to his opposition and to that of the others who are against; (*b*) that in these circumstances I would not feel justified in going ahead with non-official Advisers for Bombay, Madras and Assam. I would however be very ready to see Clow have an official Adviser and will consult him about this.

4. I shall be rather surprised if the decision to carry on as we are has any very adverse political effect. The major political parties would I suspect much rather see adviserships in the hands of officials than in the hands of their political opponents. Administratively there can be no question as to the greater advantage of official Advisers, and that would be likely to be still more marked in provinces immediately threatened by the war. I think there is something in Hallett's fear that in such provinces non-official Advisers might tend to confuse and darken counsel rather than help. There is of course no reason why we should make any public declaration of our intentions.

5. If you agree I would propose therefore to go ahead on the lines indicated above on hearing from you.

[6] No. 54; the date should be 13 May. [7] Deciphered as '(?one or two)'.

123

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *6 June 1942, 11.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 7 June, 12.45 am*

No. 1679–S. Your personal telegram of 30th May, No. 9739.[1] Publicity. I entirely agree with your view[2] as to the importance of propaganda in England and America in case action against Congress becomes necessary, and have considered further with my Advisers in the light of your views. In the result you will be receiving today from Home Department a telegram[3] giving a

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general appreciation of the Congress position and of the points which should be brought out in the course of propaganda, and indicating also supplementary steps which we are taking here. (I think you will agree with me that we can appropriately deal with this issue through the official channel.)

2. I also fully appreciate importance of point taken in your private and personal telegram of 31st May, No. 660,[4] and once I get my new Council together I will do all I can to stimulate them. Existing Council have done a certain amount from time to time but not as much perhaps as one could have hoped. One difficulty confronting us, which has been put to me forcibly from time to time, is of course that Members of my Council, in the event of their taking a strong line about Congress and its errors, would find themselves placed in a very difficult position by any change of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government such as that represented by the Cripps Mission, particularly given the attention paid by Cripps to Congress while out here.

[1] No. 105. [2] Deciphered as 'story'. [3] No. 131.
[4] No. 104; the date should be 30 May.

124

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: f 161

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *6 June 1942, 12.45 pm*

10123. Your telegram of the 4th June 1647-S.[1] I am in general agreement throughout. Your Council's selection of Mudaliar for War Cabinet and Pacific War Council is gratefully appreciated and he will be welcome whenever he finds it convenient to come here. Your proposed invitation to Jam Saheb which I interpret to be as Princely representative on War Cabinet, &c., is also approved. It is of course not essential that he should come as soon as Mudaliar if that is inconvenient to him. I presume you will wish to make a fairly early announcement once the Jam Saheb accepts. There has apparently been some leakage as both appointments were forecast here in the Press on 3rd June and announcement is reported to have been heard over the wireless from New Delhi on Sunday.

2. I am approaching Benthall forthwith.

[1] No. 118.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/591: f 104

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *6 June 1942, 8.10 pm*

10152. Your telegram of the 5th June 1652 S.[1] I note that you have given full weight to the arguments against insistence on uniformity. I am not wholly convinced that it would be indefensible position were we to have non-official advisers functioning in Madras and Bombay and perhaps Assam, and at the same time to decline to appoint them in the other section 93 Provinces. But I am much impressed by Hallett's change of view and as I admit the force of what you say in your paragraph 4 I am willing to defer to your views, the more so because the introduction of non-official advisers in Madras and Bombay might be interpreted as designed to side-track any popular movement in favour of a return to ministerial government.

[1] No. 122.

126

Minute by Sir D. Monteath

L/P&J/8/560: f 159

6 June 1942

As recorded in the Cabinet minute of 5th Feb[ruar]y[1] the proposal that was approved was that "a representative of the Indian Government, and, if and when desired by the Viceroy, an Indian Prince, should attend, with the Sec[retary] of State, meetings of the War Cabinet at times when the war effort, with special reference to India,[2] was under discussion".

It does not appear that the words underlined arose from any specific suggestion by the Viceroy; they seem to have been due to the natural assumption that it would not be feasible for any Prince to be absent from his duties in India so continuously as a British Indian specifically nominated to represent the Gov[ernmen]t of India's interests.

In subsequent correspondence[3] with the Viceroy it was brought out that the Prince, though naturally representative from a particular angle, would equally with the British Indian be a "representative of *India*", not of the Princely Order alone: just as has been the case with Imperial Conferences, the "last War" Cabinet, and Geneva delegations: i.e. that adequate representation of the

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complex structure of "India" requires two representatives capable each of speaking for the "half" from which he is drawn.

The inference, in relation to the P[rime] M[inister]'s minute,[4] seems to be that though it is likely that the Prince will not be available so soon as, or so continuously as the British Indian, when they are both in London the ability of one to attend a meeting should not debar the other from attendance—but rather the contrary, the one being required to balance the other, if a proper representation of the "Indian view" is to be afforded.

D. T. M.

[1] Vol. I, No. 66.

[2] Against 'with special reference to India' Mr Amery noted: 'superseded with P[rime] M[inister]'s consent in my answer in H[ouse] of C[ommons].' See *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 377, 12 February 1942, col. 1569.

[3] Vol. I, Nos. 84, 100, 114, 136. [4] See No. 107, note 1.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/P&J/8/560: ff 157–8

INDIA OFFICE, *6 June 1942*

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 40/42

Prime Minister

I am afraid it is not possible to make a definite stipulation that the representative of the Governor-General in Council, i.e. of British India, and the representative of the Princes should never attend the War Cabinet together. After all, British India and Princely India are two entirely different entities politically and, though the two together give a picture of India as a whole, and in some respects balance each other, they are not interchangeable any more than either of them would be interchangeable with the Australian representative. You will remember that in the last war the representatives of the two Indias both attended all the meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet, and of the Peace Conference and have attended at all Imperial Conferences since. It would create the gravest embarrassment if it were now laid down that this procedure were to be reversed.

In practice, the Princely representative is likely to arrive later and may very well go back again earlier, possibly to make way for another Prince. It may also be possible to find country engagements for one or other, especially for the Prince, which would prevent their being together every time. In any case, my experience of Indians at these meetings is that they are not vocal and you need not fear a couple of additional brown Earle Pages.

L. S. A.

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128

The Marquess of Linlithgow to General Wavell

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *6 June 1942*

My dear Commander-in-Chief,

The more I think about Gandhi's possible campaign against us, the more convinced I am that at the back of his mind there is the feeling that the Japanese are going to get, at least, Eastern India. I think myself that much the best propaganda for the purpose of steadying Gandhi would be for us to take the line that the Japanese are going to do nothing of the kind. I have been greatly impressed by the extent to which your broadcasts have carried weight with the general public in this country, and if any opportunity should offer itself in the fairly near future, either in statements to Press conferences, or when you are broadcasting, or issuing any formal indication of your views, I would like to suggest that you might feel able to take a little risk by saying categorically that we are going to defeat the Japanese, and that there is no foundation for any misapprehensions of this order. I have very little doubt that the effect might be substantial both generally and to the extent that it would strengthen the hands of those intimates of Gandhi, who may be disposed, for whatever reasons, to bring a little restraining pressure upon him over his campaign.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

129

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/63

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *6 June 1942*

Very many thanks for your interesting letter of 25th May, No. R.–101–G.C.P.[1] I was very much interested in the analysis which it contains of Gandhi's probable intentions. I am keeping a very close eye on the Mahatma at the moment, all the more so as evidence from a wide variety of sources tends to suggest that the pressure on him is such, and his feeling, at the extent to which Congress and he himself may have lost ground in these last couple of months, is so great, that he may think that he has no choice but to go forward with a dramatic move. So far as I can judge, the line of any such move is likely to be

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either "get out Britain" (much the more likely) or else "This is Britain's War". But he is an extremely astute politician of great experience and it will never do for him to back a losing horse, particularly in present circumstances, and I should be very surprised if he moves, unless he feels the ground pretty firm underneath him. We on our side equally must be careful not to help to consolidate his position by premature action, or by playing on a bad wicket. In addition to the motives which I have mentioned before as probably actuating Gandhi in his desire to do something spectacular, I have no doubt whatever that you are right in thinking that the desire on the part of important capitalist elements in the Congress to reinsure and to try to safeguard their property and themselves from the ill-effects of a possible Japanese invasion is of much significance. I think myself that, on the point you raise, India and/or Ceylon are unlikely to be attacked before at the earliest July, but I have no intention of saying anything so reassuring publicly for fear of encouraging people in an attitude of complacency, which would unquestionably be very dangerous.

2. As regards action to be taken, while I have said above that we must be careful not to allow ourselves to be manœuvred on to bad ground, and while very much must depend on circumstances when the time comes and on the nature of the Congress move against us, I myself share your view that it would be very difficult at a critical point in the war to allow a campaign, the effects of which would be definitely injurious on army discipline and on war effort generally.

3. I am grateful to you for putting me on to the *Secret Agent of Japan* and I am having a word with my Publicity people about it.

[1] No. 83.

130

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CAMP, MAHABLESHWAR, *6 June 1942*

This report covers the last half of May. I write it from Mahableshwar whither I have returned in order to recuperate after some indisposition.

War Reactions.—A marked improvement in public confidence is noticeable. In fact one might say that morale is quite good. There has been an absence of rumour, and I think the attention which has been focussed on the ludicrous aspect of so many rumours has had some effect. Many people have returned to Bombay and Ahmedabad. It is now the trains coming in to Bombay which

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are overcrowded instead of those going out. During the last fortnight attendances in the mills of Bombay have increased by about 25,000. It seems probable that a number of mill-hands evacuated their families and after waiting a while to see what was going to happen, have now come back, mostly without their families. This improvement in public confidence extends also to the districts, although it was only in one or two places like Ahmedabad that confidence was ever seriously affected; most districts remained unconcerned, except for problems about food supplies and prices.

The main cause for this return of confidence is that nothing has happened on this side of India since the alarm created two months ago by the attack on Ceylon and the Japanese naval activities in the Bay of Bengal. The final result of the campaign in Burma has attracted surprisingly little attention, no doubt because we are far away and very few evacuees from Burma have come to this Province. I think, too, that the attention paid in the Press to the start of the National War Front has helped to rally opinion, or at least to have made the defeatists and panic-mongers feel uncomfortable. The recent news of the thousand-plane bombing attacks on Germany have, I would judge, still further increased confidence probably to a very marked degree. Markets have risen noticeably. In fact some embarrassment may be caused to our campaign to grow more food and less cotton by the rise in cotton which has recently occurred. The only disturbing feature during the fortnight has been the continued rise in the cost of living, but that is to some extent seasonal in Bombay, and I hope the rise may not continue.

The Province seems to have taken the news of my six months' extension quite bravely.

2. *Congress.*—I can give no further clarification of Gandhi's intended move. It has continued to give rise to much speculation but, judging by the Press comments, any movement which he may launch would not at the moment meet with much response. It is possible for Gandhi to change the whole situation in a week and I do not therefore ignore the possibility that he may produce something which will be embarrassing to us, so far, however, his ideas have not met with a good reception. He may get the support of the Congress-Socialists, but they are of no great consequence, and I have little doubt that Vallabhbhai Patel and Shankarrao Deo will support him. Patel has been in Bardoli and it was rumoured that he had gone there to make sure that the "faithful Gujarat" would follow Gandhi. There is, however, another rumour that Patel is not at all well and is believed to be dying. I can, however, give no confirmation at present of either of these rumours. Naturally the suggestion that there may be some no-tax campaign places us on the alert, so far as Gujarat is concerned, but until Gandhi's intentions become clearer it is hardly possible to make definite plans to deal with it. Shankarrao Deo has been making some

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bad defeatist speeches, but he does not count for very much, and I think it would be unwise to present Gandhi with an excuse for launching his movement, except on a really important issue. There seems to be good reason for the view that Congress may split if Gandhi insists on going on with his projected move. Even such a stalwart Congressman as Morarji Desai is reported to be against it, and according to Low, who may have communicated with you already, Bhulabhai Desai has recently given him the clear impression that he would like to break with Congress and be taken into your Executive Council. These are but a few of the indications of the trend of opinion in this Province on Gandhi's professed intentions. We shall no doubt have to wait and see how the situation develops before we make up our minds how to deal with it, but I am inclined to think that, so far as this Province is concerned, we could afford to let him do his worst and allow opinion to turn against him without giving him the halo of martyrdom which action against him would provide. That, however, is a very tentative opinion. The general war position will, I expect, play an important part in the development of public opinion towards Gandhi. If things go well for us in Germany, Russia and Libya, and if the Japanese threat to India appears less acute, there will be less disposition to offend the winning side by backing Gandhi.

So far as I can make out, the tales of discrimination in Burma and elsewhere have been largely responsible for the anti-British attitude on which Gandhi appears to be founding his new position. There has been very little propaganda on what British officials, planters and women have done for refugees on both sides of the Burmese frontier. If more publicity could be given to instances in which British individuals have assisted Indian refugees the effect would be healthy.

131

Government of India, Home Department, to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: ff 207–8

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *7 June 1942, 1.25 am*
Received: 7 June, 5.45 am

4484. Congress War Resolution of May 1st[1] was based on Draft which we had reason to believe was Gandhi's. This has now been confirmed by search of Congress Office and seizure *inter alia* of most illuminating summary[2] of Working Committee's discussion on the Draft Resolution. Summary shows that Gandhi's Draft was opposed by Nehru and others on the ground that it would be generally interpreted as definite line-up with the Axis Powers and identify

[1] Enclosure to No. 43, col. 3. [2] Enclosure to No. 113.

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Congress in the eyes of the world as their passive partner. Draft was therefore revised by Nehru and although voting originally went against his version, President finally succeeded in persuading Working Committee to accept it. Nehru made it clear that his opposition to Gandhi was not based on any desire to help the British Government and final Draft as published may fairly be regarded, against this background, as merely disguising what Gandhi wished to proclaim openly.

2. Since then Gandhi had shown clearly both by his writings in *Harijan* and also by what he said at secret interview with Congress Workers in Bombay, record[3] of which has come into our hands, that he is either feeling his way or has decided to launch fresh civil disobedience movement.

His motive presumably is to re-establish Congress prestige, which has been badly damaged by their failure with Cripps and by Rajagopalachari's defection, and more particularly to re-assert his own personal ascendancy. We have no definite information yet what form the movement will take nor what support he will succeed in getting either from Working Committee or from public, but we have more than one indication that he is in desperate mood. It is indeed possible that he may launch personal movement if he cannot carry Working Committee with him; and present indications are that he will throw off all pretensions of non-embarrassment, declare himself openly anti-British, as indeed he has always been, and endeavour to organise mass movement based on exploitation of anti-British sentiment. Movement may start in threatened provinces by organised opposition to acquisition of lands for aerodromes etc., and evacuation of villages for military purposes. Slogans selected will almost certainly be connected with his plan for British withdrawal from India. So far he has not had a good press; there has been considerable criticism of his policy both from public men and even in Nationalist press; and it is clear that he and Nehru still do not see eye to eye. In accordance with his usual practice Gandhi has already made it clear that he will give us due notice of his intentions.

3. In all these circumstances it would be unwise for us to enter the arena at present. Any intervention on our part would merely stiffen Gandhi's attitude and might well rally present opponents or waverers to his cause. We therefore propose to wait and see. But we must have our plans ready and one matter that we consider of prime importance is that public opinion in England and even more in America should be prepared well in advance for any strong action we may eventually decide to take. We suggest that Press in England and important American correspondents should be taken into confidence with object of exposing Gandhi and Congress.

4. We are preparing here

(*a*) an official paper on Congress policy based on both published and secret documents which we suggest should be supplied to American Government and

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(*b*) a popular pamphlet based on published material which will revise and bring up to date our previous pamphlet entitled *Congress and the War*. These will be sent to you as soon as ready but this will take considerable time. Meanwhile we understand most of documents on which this telegram is based have already been supplied you and we are sending copies officially by next fast air mail. Reference may also be made to summaries of important speeches and *Harijan* articles sent by Secretary to Governor-General (Public) and material supplied by Information and Broadcasting Department for guidance of Press and B.B.C.

5. We suggest theme should be developed on following lines:—(1) It has always been long-term object of Congress, despite opportunist changes to meet particular situations, to establish permanent Congress–Hindu–bourgeois domination supported in power by British Army or Congress-controlled Indian Army. (2) It was because we would not lend ourselves to this that Congress hostility to British connection arose and Congress has since refused every offer meant to ensure fair play for all. (3) Congress have always looked forward to world war as giving them chance of obtaining a bargain by pressure. (4) Hence their opposition to this war and willingness to obtain their long-term object through Japan if it cannot be obtained from England. (5) Similarly Cripps' proposals were rejected because they did not give control over defence or power to make independent terms with Japan.

6. Evidence available in support of points (4) and (5) above, which constitute immediate issue, includes (*a*) opposition to so-called "scorched earth policy", i.e. obstruction to defence preparations promoted partly by reluctance of big business behind Congress to forgo profits from war industries and to [by?] hopes of doing business after Japanese occupation (*b*) frequent suggestions that Japan has no quarrel with India or *vice versa* (*c*) some approval of Japan's pan-Asiatic policy (*d*) frequent suggestions that resistance to Japan is useless (*e*) much talk and writing about desire for neutrality implying willingness to make terms with Japan (*f*) organised campaign based on alleged incidents, most of which have been found false or grossly exaggerated, designed to excite hostility against armed forces, not only British and Indian but also American (*g*) emphasis on non-violent resistance meaning, of course, no resistance at all.

7. Other points of importance are (1) attack Gandhi's policy but not Gandhi personally (2) emphasise prejudice to American war efforts and to safety of American troops in India which may result from Gandhi's plans (3) dispel suggestion, which has been made in certain American quarters here, that mass movement would be so embarrassing as to compel His Majesty's

[3] No. 90.

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Government to make fresh concessions in political field. Although mass movement in circumstances and areas suggested could hardly be faced with complete equanimity, confidence may be expressed in the Government's ability to deal with it.

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Mr Churchill to Mr Amery

L/P&J/8/560: f 156

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, *7 June 1942*

Reference Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 40/42, June 6, 1942[1]

We shall have to take the Albert Hall for our War Cabinet meetings.[2]

W. S. C.

[1] No. 127. [2] On this minute Mr Amery noted: 'A reluctant acquiescence.'

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *8 June 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your private letter of 15th May[1] which has just arrived. I think that all our arrangements for the Duke's visit are now well in train and I hope he will enjoy himself. We have, I fear, suggested a very strenuous programme for him, but if he is able to go through with it he will carry away a very good general picture of India. I have not the least doubt as to the political and military value of the visit particularly at this moment, and I am much relieved both on political grounds and for the Duke's own sake that he should have decided to get here early in June instead of waiting until the monsoon had broken.

2. I quite agree with you, as you will have gathered from communications, official and personal, that have passed between us, as to the unhappy nature of Gandhi's influence on Congress at the moment, and I agree also that if there is trouble there can be no question but that we shall have to face up to it. I shall probably be sending you a telegram[2] in the course of the next few days, once you have received the text of a document[3] seized in the search of the Congress

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headquarters at Allahabad which reveals various strains inside that organisation and in particular throws light on the attitude of Gandhi, to suggest that we should let the Cabinet know how things are going. It is quite likely that if the old man finds that he cannot get behind him the degree of support that he would like he will think better of his proposed campaign. But his influence is so great and he carries so much weight in this country that he may well by himself be able to turn a scale that would otherwise be rather doubtful, and I think you and I would both feel that it would be as well that the Cabinet should be warned in advance of the unpleasant possibilities that the future might hold for us.

3. As regards Rajagopalachari, whom you mention in paragraph 3 of your letter, I think I can fairly say that he shows no signs of wanting a place. Nor do I think that he would do us much good unless he brought in some public support (of which commodity he seems now to be markedly short). I am very doubtful indeed of our being able to make any advance with Jinnah on the lines you suggest, though I fully recognise the arguments that have weighed with you. Incidentally, I fear that the arrangements for the meeting of the National Defence Council are such that it will not be possible for the Duke to address them, though I feel just a little doubtful in any case as to whether he would be very anxious to make a speech to them.

4. Thank you so much for what you say in paragraph 4 of your letter about Arthur Moore. I am greatly obliged to Catto. He has throughout my Viceroyalty been most considerate towards myself, and I hope you will tell him how very greatly I appreciate what he has done and all the help he has given me. . . .[4]

* * *

9. We have been busily engaged on the report[5] of Dr. Grady's American Mission, the text of which you will have seen by now. It is clearly designed to be helpful, and one appreciates the trouble which the Mission have taken over it. It is at the same time a little woolly and amateurish in some respects, and not free from inconsistencies. (It would be a deal worse if Grady had not had close preliminary conference with Jenkins over a good deal of the ground.) The recommendation which has of course attracted most attention here is the suggestion for the establishment of a War Cabinet, a suggestion made without I think a sufficient appreciation of the difficulties and implications. We have been into this carefully in Council, and in the result, as you will be hearing by telegram,[6] have decided instead to set up a War Resources Committee of Council with Hutton, late C.G.S. and G.O.C. in Burma as its Secretary. I

[1] No. 60. [2] No. 142. [3] Enclosure to No. 113. [4] Personal comments omitted.
[5] Enclosed in Dr Grady's letter to Lord Linlithgow of 20 May. MSS. EUR. F. 125/124.
[6] Not printed.

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send you by this bag an amusing letter of 25th May[7] from Lumley. I need not trouble you with what he says in it about the transport and shipping problems of Bombay, with which I am dealing, but his account of Dr. Grady's conversations with him are worth reading!

10. While I am on that subject I should like to say again how grateful I am to you and to the Prime Minister for your help over Johnson and his activities.[8]

11. You will have noticed in a recent fortnightly letter[9] from Lewis a reference to the activities of Mira Ben in Orissa. Information from other sources suggests that Gandhi is paying a good deal of attention to the use to which he can turn women agents in connection with this possible campaign of his. Thus the papers seized at Congress headquarters at Allahabad contained a large number of copies of the banned resolution[10] addressed to women's organizations—no doubt Gandhi's idea was to play on the fact that one of those resolutions broadcast accusations of rape, &c., against soldiers. There were also signs that he has working for him not only Mira Ben but other ladies in other parts of the country, more particularly Assam, Bengal and Orissa. We are not very clear as to whether the main objective of these envoys is to collect information, on the basis of which he may eventually start his agitation, or launch a definite campaign of obstruction to necessary defence measures, or themselves to work up popular feeling against such measures. The Home Department have asked the Governments concerned for an appreciation and for advice as to the nature of the action proposed, if they consider it necessary to stop them. We have not failed to draw their attention to the fact that action against Gandhi's emissaries, e.g., prohibition of their entry into operational areas, would precipitate conflict with him. On the other hand, if they are actually inflaming popular opinion by false or exaggerated statements, it is clearly essential to take active counter-propaganda measures in consultation with the military authorities, and equally to intercept and withhold reports which they may be sending to Gandhi. A curious feature of his campaign thus far has been that all the cases Gandhi has recently cited of alleged misbehaviour of troops towards women and other civilians have been those in which Indian troops are involved. Can this indicate an intention to render the Indian army unpopular in order to strengthen a subsequent appeal to that army to refuse to obey orders to remove carts and boats in threatened areas, and otherwise to regulate civilian conduct in operational areas?

12. I have touched once or twice on States' reactions to the Cripps negotiations, and have mentioned that we had reason to believe that a formal representation from the Chancellor, supporting the line already taken by Bikaner and embodied in his printed note,[11] of which I have sent you copies, might be expected. The Chancellor's representation[12] has now arrived. It is on the lines anticipated,

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and I have suggested to Craik that he should arrange for a copy to be sent to the India Office officially.

* * *

15. As I close this letter I see what seems to me an extremely sensible leader in today's *Civil & Military Gazette*,[13] and I send you a copy of it. I am sure they are right in thinking that Gandhi does much more harm to himself by the sort of stuff he is putting out now in the *Harijan*, &c., than we could do by closing him down, though the time may come when we are driven to consider doing so.

All the best!

[7] No. 82. [8] See Nos. 98, 99, 101, 111, 112, and 114. [9] No. 85. [10] See Nos. 4–5.
[11] See No. 86, note 10. [12] No. 115. [13] Dated 9 June: 'From the Sublime.'

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *9 June 1942, 11.10 pm*
Received: 10 June, 10.15 am

No. 1725–G. *Harijan* of 7th June. Following is summary of note entitled "A triple[1] tragedy":—

Begins. What do Government expect from repressive policy? Triple[2] act of forfeiture of *National Herald* security,[3] arrest of Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, ex-Minister, and wanton and almost indecent search of A.-I.C.C. office is in my opinion great hindrance to national war effort. It is so mad as to amount to invitation to Japanese to walk into India. "It is a justification for my friendly invitation to foreign government to abdicate in favour of the nation[4] whatever it may be." Let British take risk of abdication and it will be their greatest war effort. It alone can save situation, if anything can, so far as India is concerned. As first step let them revoke forfeiture order, discharge Rafi Sahib, and return papers seized from A.-I.C.C. *Ends.*

2. Gandhi replies to questioner who asks whether his present attitude towards England and Japan is, as very important Congress leader avers on basis of

[1] and [2] Deciphered as 'trifling'.

[3] The security of Rs 3,000 deposited by the Keeper of the National Herald Press and another of the same amount deposited by the publisher of the *National Herald* newspaper had been forfeited under sections 4 (1) and 8 (1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act 1931 (XXIII of 1931) respectively on account of 'prejudicial reports' published by the paper in certain issues of February, April, and May 1942. L/P&J/5/271: f 123.

[4] 'the nation' deciphered as 'national'.

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personal talks with Gandhi, influenced by belief that Britain and Allies will be defeated. Gandhi denies this. The anonymous leader must have misunderstood him or been misunderstood. Gandhi has not decisive opinion about result of the war, but "what is decisive with me is that I am[5] by nature to side with weak parties". Proposal for British withdrawal is as much in Britain's interest as India's.

3. Following is summary of portion of article by Mahadev Desai entitled "To resist slave drivers" giving account of discussion between Gandhi and some volunteers of Central Provinces:—

Begins. In answer to question whether anarchy resulting from Gandhi's policy may not be worse than "present anarchy", Gandhi is reported to have said: I waited until country should develop non-violent strength necessary to throw off foreign yoke. But my attitude has now undergone change. I feel I cannot afford to wait for I may be enveloped and overwhelmed by flames that threaten all of us. That is why I have decided that even at certain obvious risks I must ask people to resist slavery. I am sure that the anarchy that may result from British withdrawal or their refusal to listen to us and our decision to defy their authority will in no way be worse than present ordered anarchy around us. After all, those who are unarmed cannot produce frightful amount of violence or anarchy, and I have faith that out of that anarchy may arise pure non-violence. But I cannot be passive witness of terrible violence and anarchy that is going on in name of resisting possible foreign aggression. *Ends.*

[5] *Harijan* inserts 'made' here.

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Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/77

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE GOVERNOR'S REPORT NO. 11, DATED THE 9TH JUNE 1942

Gandhi's threatened campaign demanding that the British should leave India has been discussed in political circles here, but so far has not caused any excitement. I do not think many people will treat it seriously, though I fear that Dr. Khan Sahib—who always echoes Gandhi—may say something foolish. It will not be difficult to represent Gandhi's move as a threat to Muslim interests, and I do not believe there will be much anti-British talk in any quarter. I think the main danger here is that serious communal friction might result.

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Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/63

CAMP, *9 June 1942*

No. R.–106–G.C.P.

I was about to sign my fortnightly letter when I received Your Excellency's letter, dated the 6th June,[1] which deals with what is still the chief topic of interest, namely, Gandhi's intentions.

In Congress circles in Nagpur, it is anticipated that Gandhi may launch his new movement by the end of this month. It is thought that it may take the form of picketing the bungalows of European officers and even door to door propaganda requesting persons not to help the British Government in the war, together with picketing the houses of those who support Government. If this is to be the line of action a very appropriate remedy exists in Section 7[2] of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932, which, subject to further examination, I should feel inclined to bring into force in all areas affected.

If I may say so, I entirely agree with Your Excellency that we must be careful not to help Gandhi "to consolidate his position by premature action or by playing on a bad wicket". But if Gandhi does move on the lines indicated, my own reaction would be that the psychological moment has arrived to drop the policy of appeasement and to let it be known that the British Government have no intention of doing business with him or a Congress dominated by him. It seems to me that there is a close parallel between the present situation and 1930–32, when Lord Irwin's policy of appeasement encouraged Gandhi to embark on the second civil disobedience movement of 1932 which was quickly brought under control by Lord Willingdon's Government. I confess that I was in complete sympathy with the policy pursued during the last satyagraha movement, when Gandhi was left alone, the Congress was not declared an unlawful association and, with the solitary exception of Jawaharlal Nehru's case, leniency was shown in sentences. That policy, I think, was also in accord with the general feeling as expressed in Parliament, the explanation being that we all felt some sympathy for India's subordinate position in the Commonwealth. But if Gandhi is going to embark on a subversive movement with a slogan designed to arouse racial feeling, with all its dangerous possibilities, after the British Government has shown its good intentions by the Cripps mission, I feel, myself that no progress will ever be made unless Gandhi is

[1] No. 129.

[2] Imposing penalties of imprisonment up to six months, or fines up to Rs 500, or both, for 'molesting a person to prejudice of employment or business'.

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"Deflated" as he was in 1932, when undoubtedly, Congress was crushed and Gandhi was compelled to retire from Congress and politics, although perhaps not from interference with Congress policy. With Gandhi's obscurantist, impractical and anti-British leadership, it seems to me clear that we shall never get anywhere and that the sooner we make this plain the better. Many Congressmen, e.g., Ramrao Deshmukh, are only Congressmen because they regard the Congress as the only party for ambitious men: they will not give their support to a leadership which is likely to lead nowhere. I shall be rather surprised if Gandhi wins over Congress on this occasion to another movement involving the discomfort of jail life but present indications are that he is resolved to go ahead on his own probably because, as Your Excellency suggests, he may think that he has no choice but to do something dramatic and spectacular. That may be so, but how long are we going to allow this Britain-hater to stage subversive movement after subversive movement when there is obviously, from his own writings, no possibility of ever coming to terms with him? My own personal feeling is that, while there may be something to be said for not arresting him, the time seems to have arrived when we should make it clear that we will never do business with him, and so put the boot on the other foot. I doubt whether we shall ever be on as good a wicket again, in view of the present external threat to the very existence of the British Government, which Gandhi is doing his best to enhance, for dealing with Gandhi as he deserves. If he raises the slogan "get out Britain", I am sure that he will lose the support of many moderate men. Since 1920, Gandhi has been the Hitler of Indian politics and I can see no hope for the future unless we make it plain that we shall have nothing to do with him, or a Congress led by him. I believe that this would be a cold douche which would cool the ardour of his followers immediately.

Personally, I have little doubt that, in this Province at any rate, any movement of the kind contemplated by Gandhi will be a "flop" and will not be widespread.

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Sir H. Lewis (Orissa) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/84

D.-o. No. 1942-G.O. CAMP, *10 June 1942*

REPORT NO. 11

Mira Ben.—

6. I have seen the recent reference[1] from the Government of India on the subject of Mira Ben. She has certainly not confined herself to collecting information, but has been busy putting across the type of propaganda approved

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at Wardha. I gather that she has not had as good a reception as she would have liked, and that local Congressmen are not anxious to court imprisonment and leave their wives and families unprotected at a time when these districts are threatened by invasion. Nevertheless the Provincial Government take a serious view of her activities and the Prime Minister has recently recorded his opinion that this emissary should not be left at large. In view of the general aspects action will be taken only in concert with the Central Government and in consultation with the Military authorities. Legal aspects relative to an externment order are being examined, including the question whether it is more appropriate that the order should be passed by the Central or by the Provincial Government.

[1] Not printed, but see No. 133, para. 11.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *10 June 1942*

Things on the whole look a great deal better than seemed likely three months ago. The Libyan battle is still undecided, but we have a feeling that Auchinleck is deliberately avoiding optimism and that we may hear any day that Rommel's resistance is really broken. If so, the possibilities are great. But even putting things at the lowest, there is clearly no danger to Egypt in the near future and the Germans have sacrificed hundreds of aeroplanes against Malta in order to ship over tanks which have been knocked out in the desert. The big Russian offensive in the Kharkov area has been checked and no doubt heavily damaged; but this has meant the Germans using up many units they meant to keep fresh for the big push and has delayed that push itself. Last but far from least, the long range naval and air battles of the Coral Sea and Midway would seem to have been a definite setback to the Japanese. In view of that, I imagine that they are all the more likely to concentrate upon the reduction of China, or even on knocking out the Russians, than on still further extending themselves into India or even Ceylon. If that is so, then the opportunity for our offensive into Upper Burma—or, if we can really regain command of the sea, then to Rangoon —may become possible sooner than anybody could have expected a month ago. No doubt Wavell has got this fully in mind.

2. Anyhow, it seems to me that everything in India is now subordinate to getting ahead with the war. Even from the political point of view the most important thing is to show to the world the absurdity of the Nehru

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parrot cry of an "incompetent Government". I know well how hard you have worked in this field and how strong a case you could make if criticised, against the home authorities over the last three years; but I know that will not have discouraged you and that you will continue to put every ounce of your energy into getting all the move on you can. I trust that from this point of view the Grady Mission will have been a real help, even if there are things in its report that may encourage some of the critics.

3. There is, of course, one form of criticism that one gets in a good many letters as well as in the journalistic reports, which it is difficult either to appraise exactly or indeed to deal with. That is the general criticism that India, official and European as well as Indian India, is still not really war-minded, that it still has little idea of what war austerity means here or of the kind of concentration of effort and elimination of unessentials that is going on in the other combatant countries. How far do you feel yourself that the general charge is justified and if so how far can the situation be remedied? I certainly myself discount much of what the Press people say. After all, one has only to go to lunch at Claridge's to get a very false impression of England at war. But some of the private letters are more disturbing.

4. I originally decided to let Winston see paragraphs 4–7 of your letter of May 18th,[1] received a day or two ago. But on second thoughts I came to the conclusion that he would only be impatient over the back wash of the Cripps Mission, which has by now receded far into the background of his mind. For him, the main thing about it has been the good effect in America; for the rest, he isn't interested, really disliking the whole problem as much as ever before. The main difference perhaps is that he now looks upon me as a steady and supporting influence and not as a dangerous innovator!

5. Looking back, I sometimes feel that if you had been allowed in July 1940 to issue the clear-cut declaration, including the treaty provision, which we had then agreed upon, it might have been much better, at any rate from the point of view of opinion here and in America, possibly also from that of moderate Indian opinion. It would certainly not have influenced Gandhi or the inner ring of Congress, who are only concerned with power for Congress and hate the idea of a constitutional development which would frustrate that.

6. You will have had my telegram[2] accepting, a little reluctantly, your decision that the disadvantages at the present moment of initiating anything in the direction of unofficial advisers outweigh the advantages. In doing so I have been naturally influenced by the hope, slender though it may be, of popular government being restored in some of the Provinces. It doesn't look at present as if Rajagopalachari could muster a majority, and Khare, as Twynam points out,[3] is not to be trusted in his optimistic predictions. All the

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same, I should be disposed, on this issue, to take a somewhat greater risk than I should have been six months ago. I think a Governor today can be much firmer in his stipulation as to support of the war effort, but, given that, take a bigger chance of a new Government being defeated or collapsing soon after its formation and of Section 93 government being restored.

7. You have no doubt seen the telegrams passing between Krishna Menon here and Nehru. The former is obviously very unhappy over the effect of the Congress attitude on even the most ardent India League sympathisers, specially no doubt among the Communists, whom Menon increasingly frequents. I don't think Nehru's unpleasant answer, with its implications of direct embarrassment and of possible conflict between Congress-organised civil defence bodies and the Government, is likely to give him much comfort. Incidentally it is obvious that Nehru is still bent on working up the grievance over discrimination in the evacuation from Burma and I think it might be a very good thing for me to act on your suggestion and have a question asked.

* * *

Later.

11. Since dictating the above I have received your letter of the 25th,[4] with its batch of enclosures. Of these one of the most important is Bikaner's memorandum, with which I confess I am in very considerable sympathy. Cripps, to my mind, struck the wrong note all the time in dealing with the Princes, and I am quite clear in my own mind that much of what he said, outside the actual terms of the draft Declaration, in this connection will have to be ignored in future and may have to be corrected by definite statements on your part or mine to make it clear that we are not going back on our treaty obligations, and shall certainly find ways and means of protecting the Princes who stay out of an Indian Union, or, having joined it, are not prepared to leave the Empire. To my mind, any State is fully entitled to make it a stipulation of accession that the Union which it joins remains under the Crown and part of the Empire, and to call upon us to defend it if it exercises that stipulation and an Indian Government tries to coerce it. Exactly how we should do that will no doubt remain to be seen. We have managed in South Africa to protect our Native Dependencies without armed force. On the other hand, we also gave our protection to Poland before we knew how or when we could fulfil our pledge. All this, however, does mean that we are entitled both to insist on the Princes putting their house in order, and on getting the major Princes to agree with us that the tidying up and if necessary liquidation of the impossible smaller units is in their interest.

[1] No. 69. [2] No. 125. [3] Letter of 30 April 1942. MSS. EUR. F. 125/63.
[4] No. 86.

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12. I read with interest too Sir Bijoy Prasad's letter[5] and entirely agree with his conclusion that it is for you to take the initiative in securing Indian unity during the present crisis. But the only way that initiative can now be taken is not by going hat in hand to impossible political leaders, but by going ahead all out with the organization of India's defence through the army, the Services, and all loyal people who are prepared to work wholeheartedly, including of course the Princes. In fact the time has come when it is much more important to secure the support of a dozen wholehearted loyalists than of many times that number of wobblers, who do not really mean to do anything except pay lip service to the common cause, may only get in the way, and at worst even let you down.

[5] No. 66.

139

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay)[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *10–12 June 1942*

My dear Lumley,

You will remember our correspondence about the possibility of establishing non-official Advisers in some or all of the Section 93 Provinces, and the specific suggestion which I put to you that it might be possible (as had indeed been suggested by one Governor)[2] to have a mixed team of official and non-official Advisers. I have now been able to review the whole position in the light of the considered opinions of all the Governors affected. I have been in consultation with Amery, who has had all the correspondence, and in the result I am in a position to let you have a decision.

2. Let me say, first of all, that Hope[3] and yourself[4] were both disposed to favour (though not entirely on the same basis) the appointment of non-official Advisers. Clow,[5] though not without some reservation, was equally favourably disposed. Hallett at one stage had been definitely in favour.[6] The remaining Governors were against.[7] Hallett has since, in the light of developments in these last couple of months, withdrawn from his view and is definitely hostile to non-official Advisers; and when he recently stayed with me here, and I had the opportunity of probing his mind rather more fully, I was quite clear that his conclusion was a considered one and that it had solid foundation.[8]

3. The conclusion which, in these circumstances, the Secretary of State and I have reached is that we will have to carry on as at present, at any rate for the time being. The arguments which weighed with us, I need not reiterate.

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They are very largely contained in the earlier correspondence that has taken place between us, and which I have brought up for review in one form or other at regular intervals. I did consider, and so did Amery, as to whether it would not be possible to depart from the principle of uniformity and perhaps to allow Governors, such as Hope and yourself who are favourably disposed in one form or other to non-official Advisers, to appoint them. But the Secretary of State and I were satisfied in the outcome, after the most sympathetic consideration of that possibility, that it was not practicable: and that were we to agree to anything on those lines, the pressure, which would fall on those Governors who, for reasons connected, no doubt, to some extent with the special conditions of their Provinces, were wholly opposed to non-official Advisers, would be so great as to be embarrassing to a very high degree. Moreover, we both of us felt that the old arguments against, though they might not in every respect carry entirely the weight which they had at an earlier stage, retained their substantial force.

4. It is in these circumstances that, as a general decision, Amery and I have reached the conclusion that we must carry on as at present. I fully sympathise with your own desire to see non-officials more closely associated with the war work of the Government of your Province by the appointment of non-official Advisers. But I think the arguments against are decisive. I can but hope that in such circumstances, it may still be possible for you, through the National War Front and otherwise, to tap the non-official element.

5. I would only add in conclusion that, given the development in the political field over the last month or so, the risk, that the introduction of non-official Advisers in Bombay and Madras might be interpreted as designed to side-track any popular movement in favour of a return to ministerial government, is one the relevance of which will have been present to you.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

[1] A similar letter was sent to Sir A. Hope (Madras).
[2] Sir M. Hallett. See Vol. I, No. 620. [3] No. 23. [4] No. 2. [5] No. 39.
[6] Vol. I, No. 620. [7] Nos. 3, 13, and 14. [8] No. 102, para. 9.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *11 June 1942, 2.55 pm*
Received: 11 June, 2.15 pm

No. 1753–S. I have discussed with Wavell content of new Defence Department, and in the result we suggest the content in my immediately following telegram.

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2. I am considering terms of formula to be used when announcement is made, but am rather inclined to take refuge in generalities, if possible, in the interest of avoiding suggestion that we are transferring substantially only subjects under discussion when Cripps was here, inadequacy of which was subject of comment at that time in certain quarters. Would you telegraph as early as possible whether you have any comment?

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *11 June 1942, 2.55 pm*
Received: 11 June, 2.15 pm

No. 1754-S. Following are subjects proposed for inclusion in new Defence Department:—

Begins. 1. Co-ordination of all questions concerning Defence which involve the co-operation of the Civil Departments of the Government of India.

2. War Legislation, including—

(i) The Defence of India Act and Rules, and amendments thereof.
(ii) Examination from the point of view of legality and propriety, and co-ordination of the activities of Departments of the Government of India and Provincial Governments in connection with the Defence of India Act and Rules.
(iii) General scrutiny of proposals for emergency war legislation and securing the approval of Government thereof.
(iv) Scrutiny of U.K. emergency legislation to see whether its counter-part is required in India.

3. Administration of Cantonments and Military Lands.

4. Co-ordination of the provision, storage, location, transport, &c. of petroleum products of all kinds including those required by the Defence Forces.

5. Directorate of the Prisoners of War dealing with enemy prisoners in India and our Prisoners of War in enemy hands.

6. Demobilisation and post-war reconstruction as far as the Defence Forces and Labour Forces are concerned.

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7. Amenities for and welfare of troops—British and Indian—and their dependants, including—

(i) Indian Soldiers' Boards;
(ii) Canteen organisations; and
(iii) The Lawrence, King George's Royal Indian Military Schools and Prince of Wales' Indian Military College.

8. National Defence Council.

9. Miscellaneous—

(i) Control and Supply of printing, stationery and forms for the Defence Forces.
(ii) Medal Section.
(iii) Indian Army List.
(iv) Compilation of the "History of the War".
(v) Collation and preparation for the information of the Executive Council of summaries of the War Work of all Departments.

10. *Policy.*—Explaining the policy of the Government of India as regards the above matters in the Central Legislature and to the public. *Ends.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *11 June 1942, 4.10 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 11 June, 6 pm*

No. 1757-S. I sent you by bag of 2nd June text of document[1] seized from office of All-India Congress Committee during police search on 26th May, giving discussion on Gandhi's resolution for the consideration of the Committee. These papers are illuminating in a high degree and bring out forcibly not only the various trends of opinion inside the Working Committee, but the extent to which certain members of that body recognise that the attitude taken by Gandhi admits of being represented as reinsurance against Japanese, or approximating to positive assistance to them in the event of invasion.

2. Much will depend, as I have always maintained, on progress of War and extent to which we are able to confront left-wing nationalist India and those elements, commercial and political, which are anxious to reinsure, with victories in the field, in the air or at sea, and so make them think again about

[1] Enclosure to No. 113.

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possibility of victory for our enemies. I think I detect already, even in the case of Gandhi himself, slight indication in his latest utterances in *Harijan* that he may feel a little less certain than he did as to ultimate outcome of the War. I have no intention of allowing myself to be stampeded into a rush decision on the line to be taken, and I am not unduly alarmed or disturbed by attitude of Congress or Gandhi's own machinations. But I think you will probably agree with me as to advantage of letting Cabinet see this very important document, for circumstances might arise in which were Gandhi to press his point [of] view and endeavour to get us in a corner, we might have to take drastic action against him, either by depriving him of his liberty, or, possibly, even by removing him from the country.

3. I have no intention of debating a hypothetical position by telegram. I would only comment that I appreciate to the full arguments against such action so long as it can be avoided. I realise in particular (as the result of the close contact with American correspondents here) the extent to which it would be open to misunderstanding and would be damaging to us in the United States, and fact, that Gandhi's publicity value in that country is so great that there is very little that he could not hope to get away with even in face of argument that his policy was one likely to result in loss of American lives and in injury to American interests. There is not the least likelihood, in those circumstances that I shall act in a hurry (or unless circumstances make it inevitable) at all: and in any event, I shall of course report anything I have in mind for consideration of the Cabinet and yourself. If there are any points about which, when you have seen the Allahabad discussions, you would like to consult me further, I hope you will not fail to do so.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE *15 June 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1807–S. My personal telegram of 11th June, No. 1757–S,[1] and connected correspondence, Gandhi and his plans. I have sent you by bag of 2nd June various documents bearing on this position, and we have also exchanged a number of telegrams in the last three weeks. Once you receive text of Allahabad resolution,[2] I will let you have my considered views as to policy we ought to adopt and as to alternative possibilities. Latest indications are that there is no improvement in Gandhi's attitude, while Nehru is reported to have given in

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to him. Risk that we may have to face serious trouble later in the summer is therefore no less than before.

2. Maxwell has frequently in the past urged on me that we should let Congress know that in face of their hostile attitude we will have no further dealings with them as a political party either now or in the future. For reasons familiar to you, I have not so far been able to accept that proposition as politically sound. Maxwell is now however reinforced by Twynam, whose last fortnightly letter[3] (copy being sent to you by bag of 16th June) takes the same line. If Gandhi pushes us far enough I am disposed to feel that in the existing war position we may be forced to take very drastic action indeed. I will discuss this possibility among others when I will let you have appreciation promised above.

[1] No. 142. [2] Enclosure to No. 43, col. 3. [3] No. 136.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *15 June 1942, 7.35 pm*
Received: 15 June, 11 pm

No. 1809–G. Following is summary of article by Gandhi dealing with a friend's queries under heading "Important Questions" in *Harijan*, June 14th:—

Begins. If withdrawal of British Government takes place in orderly manner, a provisional Government is likely to be set up by and from among present leaders, but it may happen that those who have no thought of nation but only of themselves may make bid for power and get together turbulent forces with which they would seek to gain control somewhere and somehow. I should hope that with final withdrawal of British power, wise leaders will realise responsibility, forget differences and set up provisional Government out of material left by British power. As there would be no power regulating admission or rejection of parties or persons to or from council board, restraint alone will be the guide. Probably Congress, League and States representatives will be allowed to function and will come to loose understanding on formation of provisional national Government. Its first act would be to enter into treaty with United Nations for defensive operations against aggressive powers, it being common cause that India will have nothing to do with any Fascist powers and would be morally bound to help United Nations. Asked what further assistance this national Government would render to United Nations in present war, Gandhi replied that if he has any hand in guiding it there would be no further

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assistance save toleration of United Nations on Indian soil under well-defined conditions. There will be no prohibition against any Indian giving personal help as recruit or by gift of money. It should be understood that Indian army will have been disbanded with withdrawal of British power. If I have any say, all power, prestige and resources of national Government would be used for world peace. But of course after formation of national Government my voice may be voice in wilderness and nationalist India may go war-mad. Let me sum up. This unnatural prostration of a great nation must cease if victory of Allies is to be ensured. They lack moral basis. I see no difference between Fascist or Nazi powers and Allies. All are exploiters, all resort to ruthlessness to extent required to compass their end. America and Britain are great nations, but their greatness will count as dust before bar of dumb humanity whether African or Asiatic. They have no right to talk of human liberty unless they have washed hands clean of pollution, and so gained surest insurance of success in good wishes, unexpressed but certain, of millions of dumb Asiatics and Africans. Then but not till then they will be fighting for new order. *Ends.*

2. Same *Harijan* contains long account by Mahadev Desai of talk between Gandhi and two American journalists at Sevagram. Gandhi explained non-violent technique against invasion of India in familiar terms. As regards presence of American troops in India, it is bad enough that Indians were not consulted before being dragged into this war but to have brought American forces is to have made stranglehold on Indians all the tighter. Gandhi then denounced what is happening in India, viz., thousands of villagers summarily required to vacate homes on paltry compensation and without sufficient notice. This kind of thing will not happen in independent country. American and British soldiers may remain if at all by virtue of compact with Free India. Asked whether he regarded American Technical Mission in same light, he said he had had cordial talks with Grady and had hundreds if not thousands of friends in America. But we cannot look on things happening in India with calmness, e.g., hundreds if not thousands of refugees from Burma perished, with discrimination between whites and blacks. India is being ground down to dust and humiliated, even before Japanese advent, not for India's defence, no one knows for whose defence. Asked whether Free India would declare war against Japan, Gandhi replied that Free India need not do so. It simply becomes ally of Allied Powers out of gratitude. Indians may or may not show non-violence when supreme test comes. Asked what Free India means if Muslims will not accept Hindu rule, Gandhi replied—I have not asked British to hand over India to Congress or Hindus. Let them entrust India to God or in modern parlance to anarchy. Parties will then fight like dogs or will when real responsibility faces them come to reasonable agreement. I shall expect non-violence to arise out of that chaos. Let British say to the world—"India is free". Automatically

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Indian army is disbanded and they decide to pack up as soon as they can. Or they may declare they would pack up only after war is over but that they would expect no help from India, impose no taxes, raise no recruits, beyond what help India chooses to give voluntarily. America should insist on the implementing of the Indian demand as condition of financing Britain and supplying war machines. Since America has become predominant partner in Allied cause she is partner also in Britain's guilt. Allies have no right to call their cause morally superior to Nazi cause so long as they hold in custody fairest part of one of most ancient nations of earth.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/543: ff 30–2

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *15 June 1942, 3.30 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 16 June*

731. Your telegram of the 11th June, 1753–S.[1] Defence Department. Your suggestion as to form of announcement seems suitable and I am content to leave decision to you.

2. As regards suggested content of Department I agree generally, subject to following comment:

(*a*) Item 2 (i). I assume that this item would not cover those aspects of the Defence of India Act and Rules which relate to the work of other Departments (Home and Civil Defence).

(*b*) Item 6. I presume that in regard to demobilisation what is intended is machinery rather than policy i.e. processes of demobilisation apart from General Staff aspect.[2] But as you propose announcement in general terms only I do not suggest any amendment of item provided scope intended is clearly understood.

(*c*) Item 9 (iv). I feel some doubts. *Prima facie* compilation of history of war would seem to fall more appropriately to War Department especially as it would have to be largely compiled from General Staff sources and in continuous touch with General Staff. Allocation to Defence Department suggests possibility of risk that history might contain views unacceptable to Imperial General Staff or H.M.G. or other British Commonwealth opinion or be coloured by internal political affiliations. Presumably both Imperial General Staff and General Staff India would in practice have considerable say in approving draft and

[1] No. 140.

[2] MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 has "process desired of demobilisation apart from general aspect".

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differences of opinion if they arose could be smoothed out between Commander-in-Chief and Defence Minister or if necessary in Executive Council. I should be glad to be reassured that you and Commander-in-Chief are satisfied over this item.

3. I note however that you aim to avoid criticism that you are including only the inadequate measure offered by Cripps. But his offer as stated in part 2 of enclosure in letter of 7th April[3] to Azad covered also denial policy, evacuation, signals co-ordination and economic warfare. I realise that in the interval some of these subjects may have become departmentally allocated but in case question is raised should be glad of reasoned explanation for exclusion now contemplated.

[3] Vol. I, No. 543.

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 74th Conclusions, Minute 3

L/P&J/8/596: f 84

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 15 June 1942 at 5.30 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Ernest Bevin

Also present during discussion of item 3 were: Mr S. M. Bruce, Sir Kingsley Wood, Mr Herbert Morrison, Mr Amery, Viscount Cranborne, Mr A. V. Alexander, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Mr Brendan Bracken, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Sir Dudley Pound, Sir Charles Portal, Sir Alan Brooke

INDIA

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA informed the War Cabinet that the Viceroy was becoming increasingly convinced that Gandhi was meditating a line of action which would cause serious interference with the war effort in India. The Secretary of State proposed to circulate an appreciation of the position so that the War Cabinet might consider, at an early date, what guidance could be given to the Viceroy regarding the action which he should take when it became clear that Gandhi was about to stir up serious trouble.

In discussion it was emphasised that quick and decisive action should be taken as soon as it was clear that Gandhi's activities must be repressed.

The War Cabinet took note that the S/S for India would circulate a memorandum on this point for consideration at an early date.

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Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

D.-o. No. 283–H.E. GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *15 June 1942*

My dear Linlithgow,

It was with some relief that I received your letter of June 10th/12th,[1] telling me of the decision not to proceed further with the appointment of non-official Advisers. When I gave my opinion[2] in favour of non-official Advisers, the occasion—which was the situation following the failure of the Cripps negotiations—seemed to warrant it, and it appeared to me necessary to make an attempt to associate non-official opinion more closely with the Provincial Government. Nearly everything which has happened since I gave my opinion has tended gradually to make me doubt its wisdom. The more I considered, in my own mind, possible personnel, the more difficult did it appear that I should be able to get anything but a very second-rate team. In addition, current experience with the National War Front underlined the regrettable fact that if non-officials are given their head, one is very soon required to step in to guide activities away from communal, or even personal, ends. There has also been some discussion of the subject in the Press, based on messages from Delhi suggesting that some move in this direction was likely, and it was noticeable that there was some comment against the suggestion, particularly in the nationalist press, the point taken being the one, which we have all along recognised to be crucial, that the existing form of Government, if not popular, at any rate held the scales fairly between parties and communities, and that this would very soon cease to be the case if non-officials with political ambitions were imported into the Government. For these reasons, I, too, had almost reached the conclusion that it was still undesirable to go in for non-official Advisers. I am the more convinced of this view now, since it seems to me that the political situation is once again in the melting pot, with Gandhi's new attitude and the possibility of a split in Congress, and that it would be desirable to await further developments before changing the character of Section 93 Governments. Like Hallett, therefore, I have come round to the view that it would be unwise to take the step.

Yours sincerely,
ROGER LUMLEY

P.S.V.—
An important letter.
L.,—18.6

[1] No. 139. [2] No. 2.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *15 June 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I have no letter from you to answer, but send you one or two comments on the way things are going. First of all we were delighted to see the Duke of Gloucester who arrived here a couple of days ago. So far as I can judge his tour is going admirably so far. He had a very good reception at Karachi, and not only did a pretty extensive inspection of military, naval, air, and Civil Defence establishments, but saw the Americans and met a large number of officers and men. It was, I am quite certain, a great encouragement to all concerned. He then had a tiresome air journey from Karachi here arriving, owing to intense dust storms, &c., some three hours late, during which time I and the heads of the Defence Services had been standing in a temperature of between 115 and 120 on the aerodrome awaiting his arrival. The only thing that worried me at the time over this long delay was the fear that they might have run out of petrol, but that proved to be unfounded. For all that, as you may imagine, I was greatly relieved to see him safely on the ground and none the worse for his experience. I now know that having flown clean over the Delhi landing ground in a dust cloud, they did not find their position till they were over Saharanpur, which is too near the *Siwaliks* for comfort.

2. He spent three days with us very pleasantly here and I was delighted that his visit should have coincided with the ceremony of the United Flag Day. We had as representative a parade as we could get together (it was not a bad one for it included not only Americans and Chinese but some Dutchmen as well as British and Indian troops and detachments from local volunteer Services). The salute at the March Past, which at my request was taken by H.R.H. (with the Chief and myself standing by) gave, I have no doubt, much satisfaction to those concerned. H.R.H. has been quite admirable here—an excellent mixer, taking great pains to talk to the somewhat diversified and not too easy audience that one had to produce for him, and friendly and easy in the highest degree—qualities which, whether displayed in public or in private, are even more valuable in India than elsewhere in the world. He left us this morning for Ranchi, a little alarmed I think at the extreme strenuousness of the tour that has been mapped out for him, but hopeful that he would be able to manage it all right. We are looking forward to seeing him here about the middle of July, when he will I am sure be only too relieved to get a few quiet days and

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take a rest after so much travelling and so much work in the difficult conditions of the monsoon.

3. I thought it would not be a bad thing to give the Chinese detachment (a particularly tough looking lot) who marched past at the parade a little entertainment, and I accordingly had a meal sent up from the Chinese Restaurant, to which they did full justice. It seems to have been a great success, and when I went to look in at the Party for a few minutes myself they gave me an excellent reception.

4. Before I go on to general politics let me say a word about the expansion of my Council. My best thanks for your help, and for your telegrams,[1] about Benthall. As regards the remainder I cannot tell you how sorry I am that we should be having all this delay, but of course one has to go bit by bit in this business, and the first stage has clearly got to be Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar's decision. I cannot quite guess what is holding him up or why he felt unable either to accept or tentatively to refuse as soon as he got my offer. It is possible that his local attachments may be such that he is reluctant to sever them even for a post of the importance of that which has been offered to him and at a time such as the present. I should imagine that that was unlikely to be the explanation; and that if it was he could have found some excuse for not accepting without giving himself the trouble of a journey up here in this exhausting climate. Other possibilities are that he would like to bargain for an alternative portfolio, such as Commerce, which he held some years ago as an Acting Member (if that is so, I am afraid he will be disappointed as I have offered that portfolio to Sarker who has accepted it), or that he wants some assurance as what would happen to him in the event of a subsequent political expansion of my Council consequent on which he would be obliged to resign his post (on that point I must see, if he does raise it, what he has to say. I dare say we could do something for him over Travancore: but I cannot clearly commit myself until I know what his proposition is and what my Advisers think about it). But once I get C. P. firmly fixed, if I do, I can then move at once as regards people such as Ambedkar, Mohammad Usman, Jogendra Singh, &c., and we might, if we were lucky, be in a position to make an announcement, say, by the 24th or 25th of June—I entirely agree with you that the sooner the better.

5. The only other outstanding points in connection with the expansion are I think first the content of the new Defence portfolio, on which I await your reply; secondly, the question whether I would not do better to find a Hindu member for the odd portfolio from somewhere other than Madras. Madras will have done very well indeed with C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, Mohammad

[1] Nos. 702 of 9 June and 712 of 10 June. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 and L/P&J/8/544: f 42.

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Usman, Mudaliar (even though in the War Cabinet); and I am not, to be frank, very zealous about the addition of Shanmukham Chetty, though we might find ourselves with no choice but to offer him a post. I should much have preferred, if I could manage it, to find a man either from the United Provinces or from Bombay. In the United Provinces, Pandit Kunzru is an able person though an incurable niggler, and you and I have discussed him as a possibility at earlier stages when I created the National Defence Council: but as you will remember he was then not willing to serve as a Member of the National Defence Council, and his latest pronouncement[2] (made only yesterday) about the functions of my Executive Council makes it clear that in his judgment that body ought to be one in which the Viceroy's position was that of a constitutional King and in which Defence, save for the purely operational side, must be in the hands of an Indian Minister. That confirms me in my view that even if I were to make an offer to Kunzru he would be unlikely to accept it. The only other possibility from the United Provinces, which I have felt called on to consider at all seriously, is Sir J. P. Srivastava. I have pondered him a good deal, but I have in the outcome come down against. He is active, he does a great deal of public work; he is a member of my National Defence Council and quite a useful member; he has previous experience as a Minister in the United Provinces. On the other hand I am bound to say that his previous political career has not been one of outstanding success, that while he ran the election campaign for the more conservative elements in the United Provinces, at the first elections under the Act of 1935, he was singularly unsuccessful. That may have been due to a variety of causes, but it does not encourage one to rate too high his political judgment or his capacity to deliver the goods in the present political market. Apart from that, his personal commercial interests are very substantial indeed. I should doubt whether he would find it easy to sever himself completely from them, and with these immense sums of money coming within the purview of my Council over Supply, &c., at the moment, I should be extremely reluctant in a community so apt to form critical judgments as this to run even the least risk of having it suggested that the apportionment of contracts, &c., was in any way influenced by the fact that I had a particular individual on my Council.

6. Bombay is not very much better as a source than the United Provinces. I am however consulting Lumley[3] and it is just conceivable that he may have some suggestions to make which would be worth following up. Jamnadas Mehta is of course a possible, and he is a name that stands for something in the country. He would be very far from an easy colleague, but that at a pinch might have to be put up with. Another name which has been put to me is that of Sir V. N. Chandavarkar, who is much concerned with the Sapru group. I have not enough personal knowledge of him to have any definite view, but I am asking Lumley what he thinks about him.

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7. So much for the expansion of my Council, and as I say the sooner we get that out of the way the better from every point of view. In the general political field the main item of major interest is still Gandhi's plan. I do not propose to comment on that at any length in this letter since I sent you a telegram[4] yesterday promising an appreciation in the immediate future. As I said in an earlier telegram[5] I have not the least intention of allowing myself to be rushed into any premature conclusions either as to the nature of Gandhi's campaign or as to the steps wisely to be taken to deal with it. Moreover, the old man has lost none of his political skill with age. I shall be astonished if he moves unless he really feels that he has got a sufficient degree of substantial support behind him (for if he tries again and fails, especially in the middle of the war, the blow to his own prestige and to that of Congress, both of them very dear to him, will be immense). On the other hand, I think him still, as I have always thought him, the one man capable of uniting all the various threads of thought in Congress, and I find it difficult to conceive of circumstances in which any lengthy resistance to him on the part of Congress leaders, however prominent, can be looked for. Rajagopalachari has, not for the first time, made a violent attempt to escape and to secure freedom for a saner policy: but as you will agree with me, there is not the very slightest sign of his succeeding, and the importance of his revolt diminishes every day. The latest indications from the Press are that Nehru has come back to complete support for Gandhi, and that he and Gandhi are at one about the future. Nehru may be a considerable orator and in many ways he has the qualities of a leader. But he is torn at all times by an internal conflict of ideals and he is too lacking in consistency ever in my judgment to be the sort of basis on which one could build with confidence. But the absence of any opposition from Nehru (to put it no higher) is of course an accession of strength to the side of the Mahatma. Well, we must just see how things work out.

8. As I mentioned in my telegram Maxwell is again urging on me that we should say that if Congress misbehave now, that is the end of them as a political party so far as we are concerned. Twynam, as you will see from his letter,[6] copy of which goes by this bag, has begun to take the same line. While I attach importance to Twynam's view, in the past I have myself always been moved by the political impracticability, as I have always seen it in terms of experience at home and given the existence of a Parliamentary system, of proscribing a great political party, and of taking the line that in no circumstances shall we be prepared to discuss or do business with it. There is too much of the ostrich about that line, and we after all are not the masters of events. If Congress or any other organised political party, however obnoxious its

[2] *Times of India*, 13 June, p. 7. [3] Telegram 1808-S of 15 June. MSS. EUR. F. 125/56.
[4] No. 143. [5] No. 142. [6] No. 136.

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leaders may be, does in fact represent an organisation sufficiently powerful to be able to speak with authority for a vast proportion of the electors in this country, its view cannot be ignored; and the difficulty which I have felt in the past about committing ourselves to a line of policy in regard to it from which we might have to resile with grave loss of face does not seem to me to be much less than it was in the past. I think that Congress leaders probably realise that quite as well as we do, and would be prepared to call our bluff were we to try those tactics. There is too the danger, though I do not exaggerate that, that by, so to say, outlawing Congress from the political point of view we might encourage them still more on the lines of the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland to develop their own parallel and opposing system. The last thing that I would want to take on in this country in the middle of the war at a time when all our energies ought to be devoted to winning the war is a major internal political battle, though if we are driven to engage in that battle, then it goes without saying that our object must be to win it, and to win quickly.

9. But if we should unluckily find ourselves confronted with such developments in the Congress camp as make it essential for us, however reluctantly, to accept the challenge, there will arise the difficult question of how best to deal with Gandhi himself (and also with Nehru, though Nehru in my judgment is far less important). I told you in a recent telegram[7] that conversations with some of the American Press Correspondents here left me with a feeling that opinion in the United States may on this, as on other matters, be far more ready to be critical than constructive, and that while up to a point we may expect some appreciation of our difficulties, some realisation of the detrimental effect on war effort, and on the winning of the war, of letting Congress and its supporters have their own way, and some appreciation even of the fact that to let Congress go its own way may result in the loss of American lives as well as in damage to American interests, I suspect that we may still, when the squeeze comes, find that Gandhi's publicity value in America and its appeal to the more emotional side of opinion in the United States is so great that his cause may command some measure of support.

10. But, even should that be the case, we cannot, as I see it, let the Mahatma interfere with our war effort, and upset our arrangements for defending India against the Japanese; and, if he goes too far, we shall, as I have said in my telegram, have to be prepared to contemplate drastic steps, including his incarceration somewhere. The question then arises at once whether it would be wiser to put him in jail, in conditions of comfort, somewhere in India, on the lines we had in view when this matter last showed signs of becoming a live issue; or to deport him (and possibly Nehru with him) by aeroplane and in secrecy to some place outside India and keep him there. There is a great deal to be said on both sides. But against the second alternative there is the fact that, even if our

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case is a hundred per cent. right, that will not prevent people like Sorensen and his friends from asking questions in Parliament and endeavouring to bring pressure on the Government of the day, and, so long as those questions continue to be asked, so long will supporters of Gandhi, &c. in this country believe that it is the questioners, and not either His Majesty's Government or the Government of India, who represent the true mind of Parliament. However, I will try to deal with these points in my appreciation. Meantime, I am arranging to see other members of the group of U.S.A. correspondents at present in Delhi, and will try to move them to prepare their public for the emergency that may arise.

* * *

13. As I dictate I have just had the news of Raghavendra Rao's death and I am telegraphing[8] to let you know. I regret it very much. I had formed the highest opinion of him, as you know, while he was still serving in the Central Provinces, first as a Member and afterwards as Acting Governor. When I recommended him for one of your Adviserships, I could think of no one more likely to give valuable service, and equally I was delighted to be able to look forward to his co-operation as a Member of my Council when I offered him that appointment last year. Through reasons entirely outside his own control, he has been unable to play as active a part in my Council, or to do as much for the Civil Defence portfolio, as he could have wished. But he was one of the best type of Indian statesman-politicians and the office that he leaves is one that is going to be very difficult indeed to fill. While, as you know, he tendered his resignation, and I accepted it, no publicity had been given to it, and I am suggesting to you that we had better say nothing about it now and treat him as having died in office. No technical difficulty arises over that, since his place has not, in fact, been filled.

14. I have telegraphed[9] to let you have my suggestions for the content of the proposed Defence portfolio. As you will have seen, it is very much on lines of the Cripps discussions, with certain variations here and there. Wavell is quite content with the arrangements suggested, which are based to a very large extent on the suggestions of the Defence Department and, while we shall no doubt be criticised on the ground that we have not gone far enough, I am not much moved by that, and think that the really important contribution we are making is the establishment of a Defence portfolio under a non-official Indian.

* * *

16. I was interested in Bajpai's account (repeated in your telegram of 29th May, No. 9624)[10] of his talk with Roosevelt on the question of a possible invasion of India by the Japanese on account of Indian iron ore and manganese.

[7] No. 142. [8] MSS. EUR. F. 125/22. [9] Nos. 140 and 141. [10] No. 100.

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The Chief has been kind enough to let me have a note, and I enclose a copy[11] of it. As you will see, he is not disposed to take too seriously the probable shortage either of manganese or iron ore being a factor in inducing Japan to invade India.

[11] Not printed.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: ff 187–8

IMMEDIATE — INDIA OFFICE, *16 June, 10 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL — *Received: 17 June*

738. Your private and personal telegram 1807-S[1] of 15th June. Gandhi. At Prime Minister's request I explained situation orally to War Cabinet yesterday and I am circulating for their information a memorandum[2] containing as appendices (1) paras. 1 to 3 inclusive of your official telegram 4484[3] of 7th June and your personal telegram 1757[4] of 11th June, (2) the text of the Congress War Resolution as adopted and the original draft of that Resolution,[5] (3) a series of extracts from Gandhi's recent utterances. This will be available as background for consideration of further developments.

2. The view was expressed in the Cabinet[6] that quick and decisive action would be called for once it became clear that Gandhi's activities must be repressed. My own leaning would be to put him in an aeroplane for Uganda. When I receive document[7] referred to in your 1757 I will certainly make it available to the Cabinet and I shall be glad to have your considered views on the policy to be adopted for consideration by the War Cabinet simultaneously.

3. I agree that we may well have to be drastic but it seems to me to be out of the question to say we will have no dealings with Congress as a political party in the future. Possibility even though remote of a section of Congress co-operating must be borne in mind. It seems from Reuter of 15th June that Rajagopalachari is reacting usefully against Gandhi and he may possibly gain ground if Gandhi and Nehru go too far.

4. In the meantime I am taking the preliminary measures, for guidance of Press abroad and at home, set out in my official reply[8] to Home Department telegram, dated 7th June, No. 4484.

[1] No. 143. [2] No. 150. [3] No. 131. [4] No. 142.
[5] Enclosure to No. 43, cols. 1 and 3. [6] See No. 146. [7] Enclosure to No. 113.
[8] No. 159.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 255

L/P&J/8/596: ff 173–81

POLICY TO BE ADOPTED TOWARDS MR GANDHI

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *16 June 1942*

As I mentioned to the War Cabinet on 15th June (War Cabinet Conclusions 74 (42) Minute 3)[1] there are increasing indications that Gandhi is abandoning his previously declared policy of refraining from embarrassing Government and is planning to lead Congress into some widespread movement with the aim of compelling the British to withdraw from India. I now circulate for information an extract from the Viceroy's telegram of 7th June[2] and a copy of his telegram of 11th June[3] (already circulated) together with a copy of the published Congress War Resolution of May 1st compared with the original draft[4] (now established to be the work of Gandhi himself) and a selection of recent significant statements by Gandhi. A copy of the document[5] referred to at the beginning of the Viceroy's telegram of 11th June will be circulated later when received.

So far it is uncertain what degree of support Gandhi may receive from Nehru (though in a recent utterance Gandhi says that he and Nehru have drawn closer together of late and the Viceroy has received reports that Nehru has given way to Gandhi's views),[6] or from the Congress Working Committee which was in session last week. There has undoubtedly been a division of opinion in Congress circles but no evidence yet of a substantial breakaway from Gandhi's unofficial leadership. Nor is it clear what form the threatened movement will take: mass civil disobedience is suggested, which may be in the form of a no-tax campaign, or resistance to military measures in Eastern India (evacuation of villages, clearance of ground for aerodromes etc.). Whatever the actual plans may be, we must be prepared for a movement instigated by Gandhi to defy the law of the land, and incidentally to obstruct the war effort.

A further statement by Gandhi reported in the *Times* of 15th June[7] bears on the surface a less sinister colour: it may however be no more than a deliberate *diminuendo* for the purpose of keeping matters from openly reaching the boiling point before the Working Committee of Congress meets at the beginning of July.

[1] No. 146. [2] No. 131. [3] No. 142. [4] Enclosure to No. 43, cols. 1 and 3.
[5] Enclosure to No. 113. [6] See No. 143.
[7] Quoting from *Harijan* of 14 June, p. 189. 'Question Box: If They Come.'

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The Viceroy, while recognising the hold that Gandhi has won on world opinion, particularly in the U.S.A., sees that the time may be imminent when active measures will have to be taken to restrain Gandhi and Congress. He is anxious that the Cabinet should be aware beforehand of the situation which may develop shortly and which may involve repressive measures: even Gandhi cannot be permitted to flout the law of the land and must be treated like any other law-breaker, particularly if it is evident that his actions are directed to the frustration of our war effort in the East and to the undermining of our position in India.

As it is highly important that opinion (particularly in America) should not be taken by surprise if repressive measures are forced on us, I am taking steps to warn His Majesty's Representatives in Washington,[8] Kuibyshev and Chungking[9] and the United Kingdom High Commissioners in the Dominions, of the present situation and its possible outcome in a message[10] which might be used as guidance to responsible Editors.

This memorandum is for the information only of the War Cabinet at the present stage, and is circulated in order that the background of possible developments may be readily available. It is not unlikely that early next month a decision of great importance may have to be taken—and at short notice.

L. S. A.

Appendix I to No. 150

[*There follow the texts of Nos. 131, paras. 1–3, and 142.*]

Appendix II to No. 150

[*There follows the text of Enclosure to No. 43, cols. 1 and 3.*]

Appendix III to No. 150

RECENT UTTERANCES OF GANDHI[11]

Harijan: April 26th. American aid amounts in the end to American influence if not to American rule added to British. . . . If the British left India to her fate as they had to leave Singapore, non-violent India would not lose anything. Probably the Japanese would leave India alone. . . . Whatever the consequences to India, the real safety of India and Britain lies in the orderly and timely British withdrawal from India.

Harijan: May 3rd. I feel convinced that the presence of the British is the incentive for Japanese attack. If the British wisely decided to withdraw and

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leave India to manage her own affairs the Japanese would be bound to reconsider their plans. The very novelty of the British stroke will confound the Japanese. . . .

Harijan: May 10th. This drastic disease (racial superiority) requires a drastic remedy—the complete and immediate orderly withdrawal from India. . . . The presence of the British in India is an invitation to Japan to invade India. Their withdrawal removes the bait.

Press interview: May 15th. Line of any move will be to advise the British to leave the country, and if they do not do so to force them to go by non-cooperation or by civil disobedience or it may be by both. . . . Satyagraha could not at this time be individual but must be mass satyagraha, demanding the British to withdraw forthwith. . . . Anarchy is the only way. Someone asked me if there would be anarchy after the British go. Yes, it will be there, but I tell the British to give us chaos. . . . The fight had not yet begun and it would take another two months for me to launch it.

Press interview: May 16th. I am watching and trying, if I am allowed, to educate public opinion about my demand for the withdrawal of the British from India.

Harijan: May 24th. . . . British rule in India in any shape or form must end. Hitherto the rulers have said "We would gladly retire if we know to whom we should hand over." My answer now is, Leave India to God. If that is too much, then leave her to anarchists.[12] . . . I wish all conflicting elements and interests will make a combined effort to rid India of foreign domination.

(Reuter): May 29th. There are many plans floating in my brain. My first task is to educate the public mind in India and world opinion in so far as I am allowed to do so, and when I have finished that to my satisfaction I may have to do something. That something may be very big, if Congress and the people are with me.

Harijan: June 7th.

[*There follows the text of No. 134, paras. 1 and 3.*]

[8] No. 152. [9] No. 153. [10] No. 163.

[11] Fuller versions of the utterances of 3, 10, 15, 16, and 24 May are in Nos. 24, 44, Enclosure 1 to 90, 67, and 81 respectively.

[12] The original has 'anarchy'.

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Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

SECRET *16 June 1942*

No. U.P.–142

2. At the outset may I refer to three recent decisions communicated by Your Excellency or by the Home Department and may I say how fully I agree with these decisions? The first is regarding non-official advisers.[1]

* * *

The second matter is the recent letter[2] of the Home Department about Communists and the decision to cancel the ban on the Communist Party of India, imposed after the Meerut trial when I was Home Secretary. There is no doubt that Communists, especially *bona fide* Communists, are greater realists than Congress and those so far released have given no trouble. Some of those still in detention are more revolutionaries than communists, but I am prepared to take risks. The recent treaty with the U.S.S.R. which seems to me most satisfactory is a very strong additional reason for trying to make friends with communists.

Finally, there is the appreciation[3] which the Government of India have recently given the Secretary of State regarding Congress and Gandhi. I am very glad that the information[4] discovered as a result of our police search of the Congress office has proved so useful in corroborating the suspicions which we had. Of course there are dozens of rumours as to what he intends to do and nearly every district has reported rumours, but it is not much use speculating what his final decision will be. I agree however with the general appreciation given by the Home Department.

3. I presume that where in paragraph 3 of the telegram it is said that "it would be unwise for us to enter the arena at present. Any intervention on our part would merely stiffen Gandhi's attitude and might well rally present opponents or waverers to his cause", the reference is mainly to action against Gandhi himself. We are of course being attacked here because of our action against the *Herald*[5] and because of the arrests of Kidwai, Paliwal and one or two others, but I think myself that the action taken has done good. The *Herald* has been much more restrained recently and there have, I think, been fewer objectionable speeches, now that people realise that such speeches will not be overlooked. If Congress is regarded as a fifth column, there is also a sixth column which gives it support on occasions, consisting of all those persons who have a lawyer's mentality and are prone to indulge at all times in destructive

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criticism, especially of Government, and to show sympathy for the accused rather than for the complainant. They are also many who are still impressed by the power of Congress. One of my senior Indian officers gives an opinion on this point which merits quotation:—

"Congress are admittedly bitter opponents of British Imperialism. Their dislike of the British and British rule is intense: yet Sir Stafford Cripps came to negotiate with this organisation first and last and made it clear to all other parties that unless the Congress and the British Government could come to terms it was useless attempting to negotiate with any one else. Not only has this attitude and method been disliked greatly by those who are not in the ranks of the Congress but it has made those who believed in marching to the goal of independence without severing British connections feel that whatever the results of the war, Congress must and shall come into power over a large part of this land again. It is only natural that people of this belief should lose faith in the British and begin seriously to consider whether it would not be in their own interests and those of India at large to enter the Congress fold. To put it bluntly, why should an Indian help whole-heartedly in the war when the Congress obstructs and is certain to control the destinies of this land, whatever may be the outcome of the present struggle."

He goes on to refer to the Muslim attitude and again there is a good deal of truth in what he says, so I make a further quotation from him:—

"The Muslims are undoubtedly the strongest and the best organised minority community in India. Though treated by Sir Stafford Cripps with far greater respect than other organisations, the Muslim League felt that whatever might be their answer to the British offer a final decision would rest wholly and solely on the manner in which the Congress reacted. This accounts for the reply of the Muslim League, refusing the offer, being delayed till the Congress refusal was in Sir Stafford Cripps' hands. As a result, Muslims in general have come to the conclusion that it would be far wiser to do nothing worth the name for the British than to help them in their time of need. There is a definite feeling that Congress obstruction has led to their being given a place of a supreme importance and that the wisest plan is to follow more or less in their footsteps. A Muhammadan gentleman when explaining this attitude to me employed the following language—This is why the Muslim League is a second-rate imitation of the Congress."

4. This is all rather disheartening; Congress may have lost a certain amount of prestige and probably has less influence with labour and peasants than in the past. But it still has influence with the intelligentsia and this I attribute largely

[1] Lord Linlithgow's letter 10–12 June. MSS. EUR. F. 125/105.
[2] Of 8 June: L/P&J/8/681: ff 72–3. [3] No. 131. [4] Enclosure to No. 113.
[5] See No. 134, note 3.

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to the support which it gets from the Indian Press and also to the undue publicity which is given to its activities by the news agencies. I was not surprised therefore that even the *Pioneer* had an article criticising our orders against the *Herald*; for that the Editor . . .[6] was responsible; he had backed up the *Herald* before the Press Advisory Committee and presumably he wanted to make friends with, or not to quarrel with, the mammon of unrighteousness. Maxwell wrote to me about this article and I replied on these lines. I do not think Sir Jwala Prasad Srivastava was responsible; he was very ill at the time and I hope that now he has recovered and has received the honour of the K.B.E., he will be more helpful. But he is rather a typical waverer. He [We?] shall never be [get?] a party putting up a really effective opposition to Congress out of people of this type and this is a reason for encouraging people like M. N. Roy and other communists. I am considering for example whether we cannot make more use of the spirited anti-Congress articles which Roy produces in his paper *Independent India*. Maxwell drew my attention to this paper which I had rather overlooked and I am grateful to him.

5. Another example of the use which we may make of people whom we formerly regarded as leftists is shown by the fact that recently in Cawnpore when discussing A.R.P. measures, my Chief Secretary established useful contacts with labour representatives and I hope this will help to improve labour morale. My Chief Secretary and others have also established liaison with Nimbkar and I think his appointment by your Labour Department will prove valuable.

6. But to revert to Gandhi and Congress, I assume from the Home Department telegram that if Gandhi goes off the deep end, prompt action will be taken against him. After all when Gandhi has been arrested in the past, the heavens have not fallen and possibly the mistake in the past has been delay over taking action. In 1930 Gandhi was given two months' grace and the movement grew more widespread and that is a risk we cannot take in time of war. I agree with the final sentence of the Home Department telegram that "although mass movement in circumstances and areas suggested could hardly be faced with complete equanimity, confidence may be expressed in Government's ability to deal with it". A mass movement would be a bit of a nuisance but if prompt action is taken against leaders, I doubt if the movement will spread. Shortage of food grains, which is still giving trouble in some districts, would no doubt encourage say [any?] such movement and one of the greatest difficulties we are up against now is the hesitation of the cultivator to bring his crops to market, partly due to Congress propaganda.

[6] Personal comment omitted.

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Mr Amery to Viscount Halifax (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, R/30/1/2: f 73

IMPORTANT AND SECRET *17 June 1942, 7.40 pm*

3849. Following from Secretary of State for India.

You will be aware from Press reports of statements made by Gandhi since the Cripps Mission that some trouble is brewing in that quarter. For some weeks past he has been advocating the immediate withdrawal of the British from India as the only action which will save India from Japanese aggression. He has also denounced the arrival of American personnel and material and has urged the withdrawal of all "foreign" troops. He has indicated that once he has preached his slogan sufficiently to win popular consent and once he has obtained Congress support he will launch some movement with the object of hastening the British withdrawal.

2. It seems at present unlikely that Gandhi will take action before the situation has been discussed by the Working Committee of the Congress Party early in July, and at present it is not clear what degree of support Gandhi has obtained e.g. from Nehru or what form his movement is likely to take. But it is sufficiently clear that he hopes to start a widespread movement for disregard of the law of the land and possibly for a degree of non-co-operation with military measures in Eastern India which will seriously impede them and possibly India's war effort generally. It would be impossible for Government to ignore a movement of this kind and fatal to try to do so, and circumstances may therefore compel the Government of India to take drastic measures against Gandhi and Congress which will be a shock to world opinion if not prepared for them. Hence the steps which are being taken (see my immediately following telegram[1] which please give to Campbell and Bajpai) to warn the Press in the Dominions and in Allied and neutral countries.

3. I should hope to be able to warn you in advance before any drastic action is taken. But events may move quickly and you may think it desirable to take an early opportunity to let the Secretary of State, or even the President, know how we regard the position as it now stands.

[1] No. 163.

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Mr Amery to Sir H. Seymour and Sir A. Clark Kerr (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/P&J/8/607: f 31

IMPORTANT AND SECRET *17 June 1942, 7.55 pm*

836 (to Chungking)
57 (to Moscow)
Following from Secretary of State for India.
Situation in India. Statements made by Gandhi in recent weeks make it increasingly probable that he intends to drop his policy of non-embarrassment and to launch some widespread movement in the hope of hastening a withdrawal of the British from India. Hence circumstances may shortly arise which will compel the Government of India to take drastic measures against Gandhi and Congress. Steps are being taken (see my immediately following telegram)[1] to prepare the Press in all countries closely concerned beforehand, and you may think it desirable to let the Generalissimo / appropriate authorities in U.S.S.R. know how His Majesty's Government view the position at the present stage.

(To Chungking only.) He has his own views on the Indian question but I imagine he will appreciate the military necessity of suppressing any influences or movements within India which would gravely embarrass the prosecution of the war and impede still further slender means of helping China. Please give copy to Zafrulla Khan.

[1] No. 163.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *17 June 1942*

I am afraid it looks as if the Libyan battle has gone very much the wrong way, apparently owing to the heavier weight of guns which the Germans still seem to have with their tanks. I don't suppose we shall be driven across the present Egyptian frontier or lose Tobruk, and it may be that Ritchie can still pull his force together and surprise Rommel. But on the whole it looks as if we shall be back to where we were before Auchinleck opened his push last November. As against this check we have to set the further sinking of Japanese ships by the Americans, and in the long run that may mean even more.

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2. I brought the question of Gandhi's meditated mischief before the Cabinet[1] in very general terms two days ago and am now circulating a Memorandum[2] which I shall follow up with your recommendations as soon as they arrive. I have no doubt that the Cabinet will support me in asking for as free a hand as possible for you if an emergency occurs in which you may have to act quickly. My own feeling, as I have already suggested in a telegram, is that if Gandhi is really troublesome the best thing will be to put him in a plane and fly him straight to join U Saw in Uganda. As long as he is in India the Press will be talking about him daily, whereas if he disappears there just will not be anything to say, and he can then fast to death or do what he likes. The same remedy may also have to be applied to Nehru and such others as you think had better be got out of the way. Once we are forced to act we had much better act uncompromisingly. Meanwhile, I am sending a note of warning to all Editors here and having it telegraphed[3] to the representatives of the M.O.I. abroad, as well as to Washington and Chungking. The *Daily Telegraph* and *Birmingham Post* have already on their own come out with excellent leaders denouncing Gandhi and suggesting that the time will shortly come for dealing firmly with him.

3. I am having the Office take up the Grady Report and your telegram asking for guidance about it. As a matter of fact the report strikes me as a very general document, in no sense comparable in importance to the Roger Reports,[4] and mainly of value in so far as we can use it as a plea for more materials or skilled personnel from America. I realise, however, that there is to be a fuller report prepared in America, and possibly this may give more detailed guidance. It may, of course, also suggest a good many things which fuller knowledge of local conditions would show to be unrealisable.

I agree—very thin—but well intentioned.

L.

4. I was indeed sorry to hear of poor Rao's death. But it may have been as well coming as it did, for it may have spared him months of lingering pain and misery, as well as the mortification of being obliged to resign. I greatly admired the unhesitating way in which he originally accepted your invitation, throwing up a comfortable and secure job here.

[1] No. 146. [2] No. 150. [3] No. 163.

[4] Sir Alexander Roger was Chairman of the Ministry of Supply Mission which visited India, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Burma, and the Malay States during 1940–1. The task of the Mission was to advise the Governments of the United Kingdom and India as to the steps necessary to increase munitions production on the scale suggested by the Eastern Group Conference which met in Delhi in October 1940. The Mission submitted twenty-five reports on problems concerning India in particular; six reports on the results of visits to other countries of the Eastern Group; and a final report No. 26 dated 15 March 1941. L/E/8/2356–82.

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5. I was glad to hear from you that Mirza Ismail has found a niche in which to exercise his activities. It would have been a pity to have left him unemployed and restless even if you had no direct use for him yourself. I hope that this may also facilitate the liberation of Ramaswami Aiyar for your Council. No news, by the way, from Mackenzie King.[5]

* * *

8. Coupland's summary[6] of the Cripps negotiations should be out in the next few days. It is very well done and, without any direct strong language about Congress and Gandhi, leaves no doubt as to who wrecked the negotiations. I also hope in another fortnight or so to publish a little volume of my speeches under the heading *India and Freedom*.[7] Their object is to answer the charge that our policy in India is inconsistent with our general professions about fighting for freedom, as well as the even more humiliating charge that, if we are prepared to make concessions to India now, it is simply the result of a decadent Imperialism realising that the game is up. By bringing out the continuity and consistency of our policy I think I have also succeeded in putting the Cripps Mission into its right perspective. No book of collected speeches can be a best seller, but I have done my best by arrangement and elimination to make the speeches themselves sustain a connected argument and tell a continuous story.

* * *

11. Walter Monckton has come home from the Middle East and does not feel it worth while going back to be merely an understudy to Casey. He has no plans for the future except going over to America in September as guest of the American Bar Association. It is just possible that he might be tempted to accept the post of Political Adviser, at any rate for a time. I don't know whether he could be tempted to abandon altogether his very lucrative position at the Bar, but he is the sort of person who would make an excellent Provincial Governor after a spell with you and your successor in Delhi.

P.S.—I sat next to a man at lunch today who was recently talking to one of your keepers and asked him what he thought of Cripps' mission. It might amuse you to know your loyal retainer's comment: "The cheek of the man to think that he could do in a fortnight what His Lordship hasn't been able to do in six years."

I agree with my Mr. Watt!
L.

[5] See Nos. 70 and 72. [6] *The Cripps Mission* (Oxford University Press, 1942).
[7] Oxford University Press, 1942.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE *18 June 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1841–S. I saw C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar today, I think he will accept, but he is still undecided. He makes the point of his reluctance to sever his connection with Travancore, I told him he could (so far as I was concerned) revert there once his term of office ended if[1] he felt his usefulness had ceased. I added that I hoped his great experience, &c., would however remain available to me and my successor not only during the concluding stages of the war but during reconstruction (assuming that the basis of the Council remained as at present). I warned him that if he accepted his[2] severance with Travancore must while in my Council be complete.

2. I have decided subject to your concurrence to offer remaining Hindu portfolio to Srivastava. He may decline because of magnitude of his business interests (in regard to which he would if he accepted[3] have to be treated on the same footing as Benthall). I am not blind to his weak points and as a politician he did not come well out of the 1936–37 United Provinces elections. But field is now entirely empty[4] save for Chetty about whom I am not enthusiastic, while I do not want to overweight Madras, a lamentable commentary on the capacity of India to produce public men of even average quality; Lumley tells me that Jamnadas Mehta (otherwise a probable) may be involved in a damaging court case and has no other effective suggestion: and there is much to be said for representing the United Provinces. Srivastava has at any rate courage and intelligence and can be relied on to fight the Congress camp. Grateful if you would telegraph most immediate whether you agree. I would probably offer him Information.

[1] Deciphered as 'or'. [2] Deciphered as 'at this stage'.
[3] Deciphered as 'went'. [4] Deciphered as 'narrow'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

DELHI, *18 June 1942, 6.45 pm*[1]
Received: 19 June, 1.5 am

No. 1845–G. Following is summary of Press report of speech of Rajagopalachari at Madura, June 15th, replying to address from District Board:—

Begins. He wished he had courage to practise true non-violence but self-deception and make believe, indifference and inaction were not non-violence but contrary to it. They were terrible snare and temptation. Escape to British prison was not fulfilment of duty nor heroism. It was far too easy and routine to be either. Britain was guilty of many crimes against us, especially emasculating people full of potential military strength. Britain misjudged her own trust and exaggerated capacity to defend country without people's assistance. She now realised error but could not possibly add to her crimes by crowning offence of leaving country in chaos to become certain prey to foreign ambition. There is no reality in fond expectation that Britain will leave in simple response to Congress slogan and that vacuum will be created wherein we can begin with fundamental national organisation. Every inch vacated by Britain will be occupied by Japan. Enemy will deliberately foster and exploit existing chaos to make his work easy and reduce country to hopeless subjection. Japan is not mere nightmare; it is most real and serious danger which threatens us and our daily lives, not those who have usurped authority over us. We must give [up?] notion that it is impossible for us to resist Japanese aggression. If we do not blind ourselves through anger and if we make up our minds to resist we can prevent our land from becoming property and slave factory of Japan. Only if we allow India to become more or less friendly and if people are submissive and accommodating can Japan reduce land to her possession. Let us realise advantages of our position and our potential strength and not give way to defeatism. Is anything more real and urgent than settlement immediately to be achieved between Congress and Muslim League? Gandhi's position is out of question. Jawaharlal Nehru and Jinnah should come together and save the nation. Incitement of organisational wrath against me is not action. I do not care what happens to me; it is enough if Jawaharlal Nehru and Jinnah bestir themselves and achieve the one thing now needed which will save the country. *Ends.*

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/29 gives the date as 17 June. The dates and times given here are from L/P&J/8/510: f 430.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *18 June 1942, 7.10 pm*
Received: 18 June, 11.45 pm

No. 1846–G. Reuter telegraphed on June 17th summary of press interview of Jawaharlal Nehru at Bombay. Following summarised passages reported by Associated Press but not telegraphed by Reuter:—

Begins. He began by referring to his and Azad's recent long talks with Gandhi and said—I was greatly gratified to find how near we are to each other in spite of different approaches and occasional differences of opinion. I saw and heard the passion in Mahatma's eyes and words. That is the passion that is moving vast numbers of Indians today; and before it petty arguments and controversies become small and meaningless.

2. He described Gandhi's recent statement about presence of foreign troops (for which see my telegram No. 1809–G[1] of June 15th) as something extraordinary as coming from him.

3. In long passage about Rajagopalachari he condemned his campaign but referring to his suggestion that Nehru and Jinnah should meet for communal settlement, Nehru said he and Congressmen would willingly meet Jinnah but such meeting could only be profitable if there is common subject to discuss on which there is measure of basic agreement. There is no point in discussing Pakistan because we have no common ground on that, but it would be very much to the point to discuss means of achieving independence for India or, to put it differently, means of eliminating foreign authority and leaving Indians to determine problems without foreign interference. On that common basis we could join, leaving conflict on other issues unsolved for the moment. If such an agreement is reached other problems are simplified tremendously.

4. He discussed possible support that Congress could get from masses in any future movement. It was always difficult to judge psychology of masses, but Gandhi reflected in large measure passion of India, i.e. the masses, including intelligentsia. There is today very general looking up to Congress even among those who have nothing to do with Congress. This is due to extraordinary events of the war and belief that present order of things is bound to go. Thus only nucleus[2] round which masses might gather is Congress.

5. Reaffirming his opposition to Fascism and Nazism both he and Gandhi had expressed themselves strongly in that sense. As regards support to Britain

[1] No. 144. [2] 'nucleus' was received corrupt.

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every nation did what is considered best for its own interests. Defence of India is primarily Indian concern, and free India would defend herself to utmost and would align herself with others who helped her in doing so. Though we might have had sympathies with certain countries yet we might have remained neutral. How long we could have maintained neutrality is different matter. We see every country dragged into the war. We cannot wipe out events of last two or three years. Question of India remaining neutral hardly arises. Her armies are on so many frontiers and I do not see how free India can remain neutral. Nationalist India or[3] Congress has not been neutral in attitude to the war. It has had sympathies with certain cause and certain countries.

6. Passage omitted by Reuter on Press advice and omitted also by Associated Press is following near end of statement. "Apart from any other movement, serious situation is arising in many parts of India, notably in his own Province, United Provinces. He warned that they would not submit to British Government if it misbehaved." *Ends.*

[3] 'or' omitted in decipher.

158

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *18 June 1942, 6.45 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 18 June, 7.45 pm*

No. 1848–S. My personal telegram of 18th June, No. 1841–S.[1] C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar has accepted, but wishes no announcement made until I have informed the Maharaja and the latter has replied. He will probably not take his seat till beginning of August. That is a nuisance, but cannot be helped. The main thing was to have got him into Council.

[1] No. 155.

159

Secretary of State to Government of India, Home Department

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: f 157

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *18 June 1942, 2.45 pm*

10853. Your telegram of the 7th June, 4484,[1] and connected correspondence. Gandhi and Congress. After careful consideration I have decided that in place

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of direct contacts with the foreign press here it would be more effective and appropriate to deal with the matter on a higher level. You will see the line I have taken from my immediately succeeding telegram[2] which repeats a circular telegram I have had sent to Washington (for Bajpai and Campbell) Chungking (for Zafrulla Khan), and other Foreign Office posts abroad[3] as well as to the United Kingdom High Commissioners in the Dominions.[4] A covering telegram is also being sent to Halifax[5] and Seymour[6] suggesting that the present situation as we see it might be explained to the U.S.A. and Chinese authorities. If there is any additional guidance which you think should be given to Agents-General in Washington and Chungking I presume you will address them and repeat your telegram to me.

I am assuming from a press report that the Working Committee is to discuss the situation early in July that Gandhi is unlikely to act within the next fortnight. I propose therefore to wait until nearer the end of the month before I take any action with the press generally in this country although I am getting into touch at once with selected editors.

[1] No. 131. [2] No. 163.

[3] A letter of 17 June from Mr Turnbull to Mr Eden's Private Secretary said that on the Ministry of Information's advice Mr Amery would like the appreciation telegram only (No. 163) sent to the Minister of State, Cairo, to the British Ambassadors in Ankara, Cairo, Baghdad, Madrid, Lisbon, Rio, Santiago, and Buenos Aires, and to the British Ministers in Tehran, Mexico, Stockholm, Berne, and to the Mission at Beirut. L/P&J/8/596: f 163.

Against the list of posts abroad Mr Eden minuted to Sir A. Cadogan: 'I am doubtful about this list. What do you say? Too much chance enemy will learn.' Sir A. Cadogan replied on 18 June: 'The list seems designed to cover all important neutral or non-belligerent centres. It might be pruned by the omission of Madrid, Lisbon, the Latin American posts, Stockholm and Berne.' On the same date Mr Eden minuted: 'I agree. So prune.' R/30/1/2: f 72.

[4] The circular telegram (No. 163) was in fact sent by the Dominions Office to the Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, and to Newfoundland and Southern Rhodesia. In para. 8, first sentence, 'to appreciate' was substituted for the words from 'that those to whom responsibility falls' to 'should appreciate'; in the following sentence 'world' was substituted for 'the Empire and our Allies'; and at the end of the telegram the following sentence was added: 'We should be grateful for any action which $\frac{\text{you}}{\text{your Ministers}}$ can take, if need arises, for ensuring that position is explained in proper light.' L/I/1/756: *ff* 298–300.

[5] No. 152. [6] No. 153.

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160

Viscount Halifax to Mr Amery (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: f 156

WASHINGTON, *18 June 1942, 10.51 pm*
Received: 19 June, 7.40 am

3329. Following for Secretary of State for India.
Your telegram No. 384.[1]

I spoke to Mr. Hull in this sense (sic ?in the sense of) your telegram this morning. President is away. Mr. Hull much appreciated the information you gave him.

I shall be grateful if so far as possible you can keep me informed so that I may pass it on.

[1] This should read '3849', namely No. 152.

161

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/63

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *18 June 1942*

Many thanks for your very interesting letter of 9th June, No. R.-106-G.C.P.[1] I have read with particular care your comments on the all important question of Gandhi's present intentions, and I am grateful for them. I should doubt myself if there is much likelihood of his committing himself finally by the end of this month, but I recognise to the full that he will be guided entirely by circumstances and by his own sense of what is opportune. As for the method of handling him if trouble does come, I agree with you in thinking that we must be perfectly firm and that we cannot possibly let Congress or Gandhi as leader of the Congress get away in time of war with an anti-war movement the effect of which might be very considerably to cramp our war effort. I am not wholly without hope (though I am not very optimistic) as I write that the old man may think better of things. I believe that in the last resort his influence remains so very great that he may be sure of marshalling behind him a very substantial following and one quite sufficient to justify him in going ahead; but he is the last man in the world to back a loser if he identifies it as a probable loser in advance. And it is I think arguable that the pronouncements that have been made

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over the last few days are aimed a little at clouding the issue in accordance with the new slogan of "Britain get out!" Nehru's statement of today[2] had in particular an air of sweet reasonableness which may well deceive opinion in America and those of us who are not sadly familiar with the past tactics of Congress in these matters. All that one can do is to remain wholly on the alert. I have warned Amery and the Cabinet of how things stand and have kept them fully briefed with all the material that comes my way, and I trust that they will keep prominently before them the very great importance of mobilising opinion in America and avoiding misunderstanding in that country of any action which we may be driven to take.

2. The suggestion you make in your letter that we should definitely tell Gandhi that we have no intention of doing business with Gandhi or a Congress dominated by him is one that has often been in my mind, and one that has from time to time been put to me by some of the most trusted of my advisers. It is the sort of point on which it is extremely difficult to satisfy oneself. Superficially the attraction of action on these lines is very great. It is quite conceivable, too, as you suggest that were we to utter such a threat we might be able to bluff our way through. Were we working a more autocratic system I have little doubt that we should in fact be able to get through on this basis. But the main difficulty that has always confronted me as I have pondered the arguments for and against is the practical difficulty when one is working with a democratic system such as ours of so to speak "outlawing" a major political party with a first-class machine and with unquestionably a very substantial degree of actual or potential support in the country. If one could be certain of getting away with it, well and good. But if having used the heavy weapon of outlawry we failed in our purpose the loss of face involved would be very great and our political defeat very serious. And so long as we are dealing with matters here under the ultimate control of Parliament, and so long as, whatever the merits or demerits of the Indian case, a tiny group of left wingers such as Sorensen, &c. can without any fear of interruption ask questions in Parliament wholly misleading to those of us who know the facts but plausibly convincing to the audience at home, and so long again as Parliament admits of being swept off its feet either by emotional waves or by the feeling that action of a particular type in India will have valuable repercussions in the Empire or outside the Empire, it is, as I see it, extremely hard to feel real confidence that we shall be left free to see through a policy such as I have now been talking about. Circumstances arise from time to time (1932 is a good example) when the course of events itself eliminates any risk of early Parliamentary reaction of the type that I have mentioned. But I gravely doubt, though I may be wrong, if that atmosphere prevails at home today. And if I am right in these hesitations then you

[1] No. 136. [2] No. 157.

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would agree with me I think that the wise course is to play a more cautious hand than perhaps one's instincts may at all times altogether commend to one. Do not however think that my mind is in any way closed—very far from it, and your suggestion is one which I have already mentioned to the Secretary of State[3] and which when I let the Cabinet have my final review I will not fail to bring prominently to their notice with the arguments for and against as I see them.

3. So much for the broad issue. Let me only say before I pass from this matter how glad I am to think in terms of the last sub-paragraph of paragraph 1 of your letter that your judgment of the probable failure at any rate in the Central Provinces of a movement of the type that Gandhi has in view should be what it is.

[3] No. 155.

162

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *18 June 1942*

My dear Lumley,

Very many thanks for your letter of 15th June, No. 283-H.E.[1] It is a relief to me to know that your own considered judgment on this matter of non-official Advisers has moved in the direction that it has: and it confirms me in my feeling that the decision which we have taken is the right one. I am letting Amery have a copy of your letter.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 147.

163

Secretary of State to Government of India, Home Department

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: ff 158–60

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *19 June 1942, 1.40 am*

10854. Following is text of circular telegram referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.[1] *Begins.*

Following appreciation of the political situation in India, with special reference to Gandhi's policy, is for your information and for confidential guidance to Editors at your discretion.

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Begins.
While the war effort of India grows from day to day and the military situation, both from the point of view of defence and offence, is becoming more and more satisfactory with the arrival of substantial reinforcements of all arms, including American Forces, there are ominous signs in the political sphere which render it desirable that you should be informed at once of His Majesty's Government's estimate of the situation and of its possibilities in order that confidential guidance may be given to responsible editors and representatives of the Press, not so much with the object of inspiring comment at this stage, but in order that they may be forewarned and may be able to interpret developments in their proper light.

2. Gandhi is once again in the centre of the political stage. Though he now holds no office in the Indian National Congress Party his personal ascendancy and influence is such that he virtually controls its policy and there is no doubt whatever that he was chiefly responsible for the terms of a resolution[2] passed by the All-India Congress Committee on the 1st May, the essence of which is contained in the following extract from that document:—

"The present crisis and experience of the Cripps negotiations make it impossible for Congress to consider any schemes or proposals which retain, even in partial measure, British control and authority in India. Not only the interests of India but also Britain's safety and world peace and freedom demand that Britain must abandon her hold on India. It is on the basis of independence alone that India can deal with Britain or with other nations."

3. The prestige of the Congress Party suffered severely as the result of the failure of the negotiations with Sir Stafford Cripps, the most important internal result being the defection of Rajagopalachari, an influential member of the Working Committee of Congress and a former Premier of Madras, whose new policy is one of seeking agreement with the Moslems and the restoration of "popular government" in the former Congress governed Provinces.

4. During the last few weeks Gandhi has developed an entirely new and increasingly emphatic line in his published statements and interviews, particularly in his own paper the *Harijan*, and his attitude is summed up in the following extracts from an article[3] published on the 10th May:—

"I am convinced that the time has come during the war, not after it, for British and Indians to be reconciled to complete separation from each other."

"I feel I must devote the whole of my energy to the realisation of this supreme act. The presence of the British in India is an invitation to Japan to invade India. Their withdrawal removes the bait."

[1] No. 159. [2] Enclosure to No. 43, col. 3. [3] Summarised in No. 44.

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During the last few days, Gandhi, in a special interview[4] with the correspondent of a British newspaper re-emphasised his attitude and it is significant that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in an interview[5] published at the same time, said that he had no alternative but to support Gandhi.

5. Gandhi's motives and tactics are incalculable but there is accumulating a considerable mass of evidence that he is either feeling his way or has in fact decided to launch a fresh civil disobedience movement in India designed to re-establish the prestige of Congress and consolidate its ranks, and to put to the supreme test his policy of non-violence even though its success would in his own words, result in chaos and anarchy (and all that that would entail for the conduct of a successful war by the United Nations). We do not yet know what form the movement may take, nor what support Gandhi will succeed in obtaining either from the Working Committee of the Congress Party or from the Indian public, but everything points to his being in a thoroughly determined mood. It is possible that if he is unable to carry the Working Committee with him he may launch a personal movement and there are indications that he may even declare himself openly anti-British and organise a mass movement based on the exploitation of anti-British sentiment.

6. The movement, if it comes, may start in the threatened Provinces such as Bengal, Orissa and Madras and its purpose will be to embarrass in every possible way the war effort and the defence of India. It may, for example, take the line of organised opposition, among other things, to the acquisition of lands for aerodromes etc., and the evacuation of villages for military purposes. There is little doubt from Gandhi's statements, and the attitude of some at least of his supporters among Indian industrialists, that there will be strong opposition to any "scorched earth" policy.

7. In view of the fact that Gandhi has not yet fully disclosed his hand and has made no definite move, the Government of India do not propose at this stage to take any step which would bring them into open conflict with him or with the Indian National Congress Party. Any such intervention at this juncture might merely stiffen Gandhi's attitude and rally present opponents or waverers to his cause. The Government of India's policy is therefore one of "wait and see". The possibility, not to say the probability however, that the administration may be faced, in the near future and with very little warning, with the necessity of arresting or forbidding freedom of movement to Gandhi, with all the consequences that might arise therefrom in relation to action against the Indian National Congress Party Leaders and the Congress organisation as such, has to be faced.

8. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that those to whom responsibility falls for the guidance of public opinion (through the Press and otherwise) in

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the Empire and abroad, and in particular in the United States of America, should appreciate that His Majesty's Government and the Government of India may find themselves forced to take very firm measures to deal with the situation. If such measures should unfortunately become necessary it is imperative that the issue should be made crystal clear to the Empire and our Allies and that it should be realised that our action is dictated solely by our responsibility for the defence of India and the vital interests in connexion therewith of the United Nations. For it cannot be forgotten that the defence of India is bound up with the problem of Allied strategy as a whole, not least in relation to the Far East, and is obviously a factor of vital consequence in the overthrow of Japan. Gandhi professes his sympathy for China, but in the same breath he tells the world that he would give her no aid, and his invitation to United States and United Kingdom forces to withdraw from India is not only a request that we should leave the people of India to their fate, but that we should abandon all our friends and leave China to face the struggle alone. To any such challenge the answer of His Majesty's Government must be clear and unmistakable. It cannot be too strongly emphasised therefore that any action against Gandhi or the Indian National Congress Party in the circumstances envisaged would arise wholly from considerations for the security of India and our clear duty to nip in the bud any movement calculated to hinder the war effort or imperil the conduct of military operations.

9. Efforts will no doubt be made in some quarters, and especially in India, to side-track the issue on political lines. It will be alleged that if only the political claims of the Congress Party for a declaration of the immediate independence of India and the placing of complete responsibility for the government of the country and of its defence in the hands of an Indian ministry (responsible to no one but themselves) had been conceded the situation would never have arisen. The history of our repeated attempts since the commencement of the war to secure the co-operation in the Government of India of representative leaders of the main political parties in the country and of the recent efforts of Sir Stafford Cripps, not only to secure such co-operation but to seek the broad agreement of the Indian political parties to proposals that would achieve the complete self-government of India after the war is well-known and has placed British sincerity beyond question. Failure is to be attributed in the main to the unbending attitude of the Congress Party that it alone has the right to speak for India as a whole, a claim which is hotly repudiated by other vitally important elements in the Indian body politic, e.g. the Moslems, the Depressed Classes, the Sikhs, etc., not to mention the special position of the Indian States. If we were to acknowledge this claim India might well be plunged into chaos and even into a state of civil war and it would be the greatest single step that

[4] With Mr Jack Belden; *Daily Herald*, 11 June. [5] *Ibid.*

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could be taken to menace the victory of the United Nations, quite apart from its involving the unthinkable course of our going back on the solemn pledges we have given for the protection of the Indian Minorities.

164

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE *19 June 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1858–S. My private and personal telegram of 18th June, No. 1841–S.[1] Executive Council. Thinking things over again I now think that wise course would be to give Information to C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, and Civil Defence to Srivastava. C. P. has in a very high degree the qualities which would make him an excellent Information Member (as you have indeed yourself previously suggested)[2] and I think he would be more at home there than Srivastava would be likely to be. If you agree, I will go ahead accordingly. C. P. has made it clear to me that he is indifferent what portfolio he holds.

[1] No. 155. [2] No. 104, para. 3.

165

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *19 June 1942, 6.20 pm*
Received: 19 June, 9.45 pm

No. 1861–G. Following is summary of Press report of speech made by Jawaharlal Nehru at public meeting, Bombay, 18th June. Bhulabhai Desai presided and Vallabhbhai Patel was present:—

Begins. Referring to his recent talks with Gandhi he said Working Committee would meet in about fortnight and give lead to country. Whatever the decision he was confident general public would carry it out. At this point section of audience shouted: This is people's war. Nehru retorted that slogans were no reply to problems confronting country. When slogans persisted Nehru denied that this is people's war. "Out of 400[1] million people you will hardly find a few thousands on your side." Proceeding he reiterated opposition to Fascism

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and Nazism but India could not leave aside her fight for independence. "I will oppose Japanese aggression not with *Ahimsa* alone but even with sword and this is possible only if we are free. Even today I am confident that Free India can put up much stiffer resistance to Japanese aggression than in her present state. A vast country like India cannot be overrun easily by invader. With whole country offering stiff resistance, invader cannot subjugate us." Only issue before India today is elimination of foreign domination. In 25 years of political life he had never seen greater yearning in masses for independence than today. Whole world is in throes of gigantic struggle and he hated India being mere spectator. He would not mind people of this country experiencing some of misery prevailing in world if that would open their eyes.

2. Presence of American military personnel in India is explained to some extent by importance of India in this war. India occupies strategically vital place. If India fell, China would fall and Russian resistance might also be affected. It would be intolerable situation if Japan won and dominated Asia. He drew attention to Gandhi's writings in *Harijan*[2] which stated that Gandhi would not object to stationing of foreign troops in India if with consent of Free India as ally and not as subject nation.

3. Referring to civil defence and Congressmen's part in it he stressed importance of organising villages on basis of self-sufficiency and self-protection programme as laid down by Working Committee. *Ends.*

[1] '400' deciphered as '4'. [2] See No. 144.

166

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/544: f 36

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *19 June 1942, 11.30 am*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

749. Your private and personal telegram, 1841–S[1] of 18th June. I see no objection to Srivastava in preference to Chetty, particularly if it will gratify United Provinces. But in view of increasing importance of Information portfolio inside as well as outside India is there not much to be said for offering this to C. P. Ramaswami Ayyar and Civil Defence to Srivastava? I should have thought that latter's association with *Pioneer* might prove handicap in more ways than one, whereas what C. P. does not know about using press and engineering publicity is not worth knowing. But it is of course for you to decide allocations.

[1] No. 155.

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167

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *19 June 1942*

REPORT NO. 107

This report covers the first half of June.

1. *Congress.*—Nehru is at present in Bombay. In his public utterances he does not appear to me to have said anything very important, and, if one were to go only by them, it might appear that there had been some whittling down of Gandhi's idea that we should withdraw from India. But a very different picture is presented by an account, which has been given to me by Low, of what he is saying in private. He has been meeting Hindu businessmen, notably at a private lunch given to him by Walchand Hirachand, and he has created the impression that Congress means business and intends to go ahead with some move. He has been arguing at these private meetings that, first, it is necessary to take some positive action in order to justify Congress and pull it together; secondly, that the so-called "repressive" policy of Government has forced Congress to take action immediately; and, thirdly, that action must this time be effective and must be some kind of mass movement. To this can be added the further impression from Wardha that Gandhi is convinced that one of the first necessities is to oust Jinnah, and that he is to turn all his energies to that task, but with what means is not clear.

It is difficult to believe that any sane man could, at this stage in the war, pursue the line which Nehru has been advocating here in private. But it seems that, in the case of Nehru, he has convinced himself that the present situation is intolerable and that action is necessary to break out of it and, in the case of Gandhi, he is moved by the anxiety that, at his age, he will be unable to realise his political ambition unless he takes action now. It is also being attributed to Nehru, by those who have been in close touch with him here, that Hindus must face up to the fact that they must fight the Muslims, or any other minority which "revolts" against a Congress attempt at domination. Those are, in brief, the impressions which appear to have been created by Nehru in his private talks.

There is, as yet, no information as to the precise form which Congress action may take, and Nehru has given the impression that that has not yet been decided. Some form of no-tax campaign seems to be favoured.

Congress leaders profess to believe that they will get considerable support for any move which they may make, but although they are bound always to

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get some support, I shall be surprised if they are not exaggerating the support which they will get. One thing which appears to be worrying the Hindu businessmen in Bombay is the readiness with which both Gandhi and Nehru are prepared to face anarchy to achieve their ends.

Jinnah is said to be watching the situation and to have stated that, if any Congress movement is announced, he will at once call the Working Committee of the Muslim League to consider what action to take. I hear that leading Muslims in Bombay are taking the view strongly that any Congress movement will be blackmail, intended to get us to concede the Congress demands, and that it will be opposed by the Muslim League. Communal strife, therefore, seems likely to be the first fruit of any Congress move.

The meeting of the Congress Working Committee early in July looks as it it will be important, but I still find it difficult to believe that insanity of this nature will, in the end, prevail.

* * *

P.S.—Since dictating this I have heard some reports of the reactions of Bombay business leaders to Nehru's visit. It is said that they told him that they could hardly be expected to support a Civil Disobedience Movement, but that they might give money "at a later stage". The Chairman of the Indian Merchants' Chamber was against giving even financial support, and a suggestion that the business community should not do war work was definitely turned down. I hope this lukewarm reception from the *Banias* will make the Working Committee think again. Possibly Nehru's visit was a *ballon d'essai*, and that its seemingly poor result may have a deterrent influence.

R. L.

168

Sir J. Herbert (Bengal) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/42

GOVT. HOUSE, CALCUTTA, *19 June 1942*

This is my report for the first half of June. I enclose the Home Department's report[1] for that period.

2. *Political.*—I have now seen the telegram[2] to the Secretary of State regarding Gandhi's projected movement. Although I agree with the conclusion that at present we have no alternative but to watch developments, I venture to suggest that if Congress is to be exposed in the eyes of the world, it would be best to

[1] Not printed. [2] Apparently No. 131.

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make as complete an exposure as possible, by publishing *inter alia* the papers[3] seized during the search of the Congress office at Allahabad.

3. The present indications are that a movement will not be successful in Bengal. The *Amrita Bazar Patrika* made a half-hearted attempt to support Gandhi, but the nationalist Press as a whole has not been in his favour, and secret reports of conversations between Kiran Sankar Roy, Dr. B. C. Roy and others indicate that they are not inclined to support the movement. Nevertheless, it has a potential source of danger in areas where villagers have been evacuated for military reasons and where the denial policy has led to a certain amount of hardship. I have in mind particularly the area around Comilla where, as you know, there have also been several unfortunate incidents between the Military and Civil population. It is evident that if ignorant villagers are going to be urged to take back their evacuated homestead and lands, by force if necessary, we shall have to take all possible measures now to render Gandhi's plan inoperative. This can best be done by ensuring goodwill between the Military and Civil population, and by easing the hardship caused by evacuating villages, and by the denial policy. I shall be touring this area next week and shall take with me the Organiser of the National War Front to enable him to establish contacts between the local War Front leaders and the Military. I need hardly say that I attach the greatest importance to this tour, since I feel that a certain amount of time and perhaps money judiciously outlayed now may save us a great deal of trouble at a later stage.

[3] Enclosure to No. 113.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *20 June 1942, 6 pm*
Received: 21 June, 5 am

No. 1873–G. Following is summary of Press statement made by Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, Bombay, 19th June:—

Begins. It is amazing how people of great intelligence and patriotism like Gandhi and Nehru shut their eyes to realities and practise self-deception. They want immediate withdrawal of British bag and baggage from India. They say that first requisite is independence of India and when that is attained by withdrawal of British, India will deal with Japanese menace. All Indians of whatever political shade desire independence but question is whether India will gain and keep independence under present war conditions by mere withdrawal of

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British. First result would be complete anarchy. But Gandhi apostle of non-violence is prepared to let India be plunged into anarchy. If British withdraw India will not be able to defend herself against Japanese aggression because of short-sighted policy of British Government in not trusting India and making her self-sufficient for defence. However that may be, inevitable result of British withdrawal would be that Japan would easily conquer India which will thus pass from one slavery to another. Sanest course is to join whole-heartedly in war effort and keep off aggression. When menace is gone there will be time enough to adjust relations with England and decide either to be equal partner in British Commonwealth or to be independent altogether. For this first essential is complete unity between different sections. Gandhi says that such unity can only come about when British power is withdrawn and Japanese menace has abated. He forgets that in order to bring about withdrawal of British there must be unity first and also that if British power is entirely withdrawn at this stage Japanese menace will not abate but would become real. Gandhi further says that when British power is withdrawn Indians would come to amicable decision about Pakistan or fight. He further says that Muslims will take Pakistan by vote or sword. Thus he does not mind Hindus and Muslims fighting against each other but does not like them fighting together against Japanese. Unless all India pulls together and makes tremendous war effort there is sure to be Japanistan which will be graveyard of all Indian hopes of independence. *Ends.*

170

Government of India, External Affairs Department to Sir G. S. Bajpai

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: f 154

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *20 June 1942, 4.5 am*

4817. Addressed to Washington for Bajpai repeated to Secretary of State for India.

Government of India have reason to believe Gandhi is concerned to repair possible loss of sympathy in America resulting from his public demands for withdrawal of American troops from India by misrepresentation of his own utterances which he will contend have been misinterpreted by divorce from context. Line he is likely to take for benefit of U.S. of America is that if India were granted freedom he would welcome presence here of American and British troops as allies against Japan and that request for their withdrawal was only for withdrawal from India that was not free. Government of India suggest messages cabled by American Press correspondents this country to above effect

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might be countered by drawing attention to actual wording of previous statements, which spoke of foreign soldiers as positive danger and British presence as incentive for Japanese attack. In latest issue of *Harijan*[1] Gandhi envisages toleration of British troops in free India on well defined conditions but disbandment of Indian Army. First act of free India will be to make treaty with United Nations (as Gandhi anticipates anarchy and chaos immediately on withdrawal of British it is not clear what authority in India will enter into treaty). My next succeeding telegram contains actual quotations from recent issues of *Harijan*.

2. Government of India are anxious that you should use all your efforts to impress these inconsistencies on American opinion both official and public, and they consider plain speaking to be essential.

[1] See Nos. 144 and 171.

171

Government of India, External Affairs Department to Sir G. S. Bajpai

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: f 155

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *20 June 1942, 4.5 am*

4818. Addressed to Washington for Bajpai repeated to Secretary of State for India. My immediately preceding telegram.

Extract from *Harijan* dated April 26th 1942.

Foreign soldiers in India. (By M. K. Gandhi.)

Among the multitude of questions contained in my correspondence is the one referring to advantage[1] of foreign soldiers in India. We have foreign prisoners enough. Now we have promise of a never ending stream of soldiers from America and possibly China. I must confess that I do not look upon this event with equanimity. Cannot a limitless number of soldiers be trained out of India's millions? Would they not make as good fighting material as any in the world? Then settle[2] the foreigners? We know what American aid means. It amounts in the end to American influence if not American rule added to British. It is a tremendous price to pay for possible success of allied arms.

Holding the views I do it is clear why I look upon introduction of foreign soldiers as a positive danger thoroughly to be (?deplored) and distrusted.

Extract from *Harijan* dated May 3rd 1942.

Question box.

(By M. K. Gandhi).

Are you (?not) inviting Japanese?

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Question. It is all very well for you to invite bravery but are you not inviting the Japanese to attack India by asking the British rulers to withdraw?

Answer. I am not. I feel convinced that British presence is the incentive for Japanese attack. If British wisely decided to withdraw and leave India to manage her own affairs in best way she could the Japanese would be bound to reconsider their plans.

Extract from *Harijan* dated May 24th, 1942.

The beauty and the (?necessity) for withdrawal lie in its being immediate. They and we are both in the midst of fire. If they go there is a likelihood of both of us being safe. If they do not, heaven only knows what will happen. I have said in plainest terms that in my proposal there is no question of entrusting the administration to any person or party. That would be a necessary consideration if the withdrawal was part of a settlement. Under my proposal they have to leave India in God's hands—but in modern parlance to anarchy[3] may lead to internecine warfare for a time or to unrestrained dacoities. From these a true India will rise in place of false one we see.

Extract from *Harijan* dated June 14th, 1942.

1 Question. You ask the British Government to withdraw immediately from India. Would Indians thereupon form a National Government and what groups or parties would participate in such an Indian Government?

2 Question. Would that Indian National Government permit United Nations to use Indian territory as a base of military operations against Japan and other Axis powers?

Answer. Assuming that National Government is formed and if it answers my expectations its first act would be to enter into a treaty with the United Nations for defensive operations against aggressive Powers (?it) being the common cause that India will have nothing to do with any of the Fascist Powers and India would be morally bound to help the United Nations.

3 Question. What further assistance would this Indian National Government be ready to render the United Nations in the course of the present war against Fascist aggressors?

Answer. If I have any hand in guiding the imagined National Government there would be no further assistance save toleration of United Nations on Indian soil under well defined conditions. Naturally there will be no prohibition against any Indian giving his own personal help by way of being a recruit or/and of giving financial aid. It should be understood that Indian Army has been disbanded with the withdrawal of British power.

Extract from *Harijan* dated June 14th.

Question. But what does a free India mean if as Mr. Jinnah said Muslims will not accept Hindu rule?

[1] *Harijan* has 'the advent' instead of 'advantage'.
[2] *Harijan* has 'why' instead of 'settle the'.
[3] *Harijan* has 'and that anarchy' after 'anarchy'.

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Answer. I have not asked the British to hand over India to Congress or to Hindus. Let them entrust India to God or in modern parlance to anarchy. Then all parties will fight one another like dogs or will, when responsibility faces them, come to a reasonable agreement. I shall expect non-violence to arise out of that chaos.

172

Sir T. Stewart (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/49

SECRET *21 June 1942*

No. 435–G.B.

7. We are still in the dark as to Gandhi's intentions. It is paradoxical that with his threat in the air, Rajendra Prasad has been showing marked signs of co-operation with Government. He will not of course come out into the open but he is advising his followers to assist in Civil Defence measures and he himself has recently made personal approaches in regard to Price Control policy and the question of compensation for land acquired for aerodrome construction. Judging from what Lewis says[1] of Mira Ben's activities in Orissa, it is a possibility that Gandhi's movement in Bihar might take the form of passive resistance in respect of such lands. We are doing our best to get ahead of agitation by arranging for the prompt payment of compensation on a liberal scale and, in cases where the assessment is disputed, by the tender of 75% of the proposed compensation pending arbitration. We must be generous for it is a very grievous hardship on the cultivator to be ejected at the beginning of an agricultural season when it is too late to arrange for another holding. Whatever happens, it would appear that Gandhi is alone in his convictions though he will undoubtedly find a considerable, if not very enthusiastic, following. It was suggested to me a few days ago by a very astute observer of the political scene that Gandhi's desire is to be "put away" with the more prominent Congress leaders in order to provide an "alibi" when he is called upon by his followers to answer the charge that he has let down the Party by a policy of sterility.

[1] See Nos. 85 and 137.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *22 June 1942, 9.50 am*
Received: 23 June, 3.45 am

No. 1886-G. Following is summary of three answers by Gandhi in "Question Box" in *Harijan* of June 21st:—

Begins. Asked to elucidate meaning of his appeal to British power to withdraw from India, Gandhi writes that, in his own opinion, British authority should end completely irrespective of the wishes or demand of various parties. But military necessity of British may require them to remain in India for sake of China and to prevent Japanese occupation, which prevention is "common cause between them and us. Therefore I would tolerate their presence in India not in any sense as rulers, but as allies of free India." This assumes that after British declaration of withdrawal there will be stable government established in India. Immediately hindrance of foreign power is altogether removed union of parties should be easy matter. Terms on which Allied powers may operate will be purely for government of free state to determine. Existing parties will have dissolved into national governments; if they survive it will be for parties' purposes and not for dealings with external world.

2. Asked to what extent he will carry out policy of non-violence after freedom is gained, Gandhi expresses inability to say what policy national government will adopt, but expects that, since all martial races will have voice in government, national policy will incline towards modified militarism; but he hopes that strong party representing true non-violence will exist in country. Free India in alliance with Allied powers must be of great help to their cause, whereas India held in bondage must be drag upon war-chariot and may prove source of real danger at most critical moment.

3. Asked about enemy radio[1] interpretation of his writings as showing readiness to receive outside help to overthrow British rule, Gandhi denies any desire whatsoever to woo any power to help India in her endeavour to free herself from foreign yoke. "I have no desire to exchange British for any other rule. Better the enemy I know than one I do not. I have never attached slightest importance to friendly professions of Axis powers. If they come to India they will come not as deliverers but as sharers in spoil." My appreciation of Subhas Bose's patriotism and sacrifice cannot blind me to fact that he is misguided and that his way can never lead to India's deliverance. I am impatient of British yoke

[1] 'radio' was received corrupt.

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because India's sullenness and suppressed delight over British reverses are dangerous symptoms which may lead to success of Japanese designs upon India, whereas completely free India will never want Japanese to enter India. "India's sullenness and discontent will be changed as if by magic into joyful and hearty co-operation with Allies in consolidating and preserving her liberty from every evil design." *Ends.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE *22 June 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1887–S. Your private and personal telegram of 19th June.[1] I am most grateful and am approaching Srivastava. As you have gathered from my telegram No. 1858–S[2] of 19th June, I have already reached conclusion that C. P. would do better in Information and that Srivastava should be offered Civil Defence, and I am going ahead on this basis. I will let you know once I get Srivastava's reply.

2. I have now written formally inviting Usman, Ambedkar and Jogendra Singh to serve in charge of balance of Communications, Labour and Education, Health and Lands respectively. Sarker has already accepted Commerce in succession to Mudaliar: I am asking C. P. to accept Information instead of Civil Defence, and Benthall has accepted War Transport. I am seeing Firoz Khan Noon tomorrow and then will make formal offer to him of new Defence portfolio (I am telegraphing separately[3] to you about its content) and trust no difficulty will arise there.

[1] No. 166. [2] No. 164. [3] No. 179.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

INDIA OFFICE, *22 June 1942*
Received: 23 June

No. 11130. It would probably be useful in present circumstances if Washington and possibly also Chungking could receive your telegraphed extractions from

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Harijan and I suggest that you may wish to repeat future telegrams to Bajpai and possibly to Zafrullah. Unless you see any objection it would probably be more convenient all round if extracts were telegraphed as press telegrams.

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Viscount Halifax to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, *22 June 1942*

No. 17. 1. Viceroy's telegram No. 1586-S[1] to Secretary of State for India is not very easy to answer within scope of a telegram.

* * *

11. With regard to India, United States military opinion now realises that defence of India and Indian Ocean in conjunction with Middle East theatre is vital factor in preventing Germans and Japanese joining hands and exchanging the raw materials and weapons of which they are respectively short.

I think civil opinion too fully realises importance of defence of India and necessity of doing whatever is possible to send material to assist from United States to India.

(*d*) Johnson has been ill since his return and in none of the talks I have had with President, Hull, or other leading personalities, have I seen any sign that they have been unduly influenced by his reports or views. I do not think he is very highly regarded here, and I shall not be surprised if he does not return to India.

12. There is always a good deal of loose talk floating about both in and outside the administration about India and on the general problem of backward peoples, which we can expect to give us a certain amount of trouble.

Addressed to Foreign Office, No. 272-Saving, 22nd June.

[1] No. 109.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *22 June 1942*

Your letter of the 29th May/1st June[1] came in this morning and now I hear there is a last mail off the first thing tomorrow morning. I have just had time to

[1] No. 102.

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read through the very interesting account of the Congress discussions at Allahabad.[2] It is difficult to believe that the speakers are altogether sane or living in any world other than that of their own creation. I must consider how much of this I should now distribute to the War Cabinet, or whether to wait for your definite proposals. Judging by Gandhi's remarks over the week-end, he is evidently for the time being retracing his footsteps to some extent in order to keep in line with Nehru and Co. But he still means mischief, I imagine, and once his action becomes overt you may be forced to take uncompromising measures, including, I dare say, the declaration of Congress as an illegal organisation and the deportation of Gandhi and other leaders. It is difficult for me at this distance to judge what would happen in that case, but my instinct tells me that there would be very little trouble, and that India as a whole would be immensely relieved.

* * *

5. I have just had a talk with Walter Monckton, who is, I think, definitely attracted by the idea of taking the Political Adviserships. I pointed out to him what a big field for constructive policy is open there, even if things go well from the point of view of peaceful constitutional evolution, and how much bigger and more difficult the field may be if we have to carry out our obligations to the Princes in face of an independent or at any rate unfriendly Hindu dominion. He said he felt considerable difficulty if it meant accepting a five-years' appointment, because, coming back, it would be difficult to resume at the Bar at the end of that time. On the other hand, if he need not be committed for more than a couple of years or so, he could regard it as war work and then make up his mind whether to come back to the Bar or continue in the service of India. In the latter event he would of course make eventually an admirable Provincial Governor, say, for the United Provinces or Punjab. I don't think he would see any insuperable difficulty in the financial side of it, though I think in order to secure a person of his standing and to enhance the importance of the post as I know you want to do, it might only be fair to give it the same pay as that of your Executive. While, of course, far less than what he would normally earn at the Bar, the difference between Indian and British taxation would make the loss of salary a much smaller matter. He has asked to be allowed to consider it during this week and to consult with Cripps, who is a great personal friend of his. I am by no means unhopeful that he may accept. That would be a really fine solution.

[2] No. 113.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *23 June 1942, 5.50 pm*
Received: 24 June, 5.30 am

No. 1890-G. Following is full summary of statement to press by Jinnah at Bombay on June 22nd:—

Begins. I am glad Gandhi has at last openly declared that unity and Hindu–Muslim settlement can only come after achievement of India's independence, and has thereby thrown off cloak that he has worn for last 22 years. He has tried to fool Muslims but has at last shown himself in true colours. I have held that Gandhi never wanted to settle Hindu–Muslim question except on his own terms of Hindu domination. He alone has dashed our hopes whenever there was chance of agreement. Now we are presented with new formula "Quit India". But after having said that British should withdraw he adds—he always keeps loophole—"in an orderly manner". Since his first pronouncement he has made explanation after explanation. It is clear to those who understand Gandhi's language that he wants British Government to accept that Congress means India and Gandhi means Congress, and to come to terms with him as spokesman of all-India with regard transfer of power of government to self-styled Indian National Congress, and to keep him in power by means of British bayonet, so that Hindu Congress raj can dominate Muslims and other minorities.

2. He does not mean to achieve India's independence. He and Nehru are both indulging in slogans and catchwords. If they can persuade British Government to withdraw immediately, even without qualification of "orderliness", Muslim League would welcome it. It is libel to say that League favours continuation[1] of British raj. Nehru has made it quite clear that he is not prepared to discuss Pakistan nor communal question in any shape or form "until India's independence is achieved and foreign authority eliminated". But he says "I believe Congressmen would willingly meet Jinnah if that serves cause we have at heart." But he is not prepared to consider cause that we (Muslims) have at heart, and he says that discussion of means of achieving India's independence first would be very much to the point, and then other questions would be considered.

3. It is no use talking in abstract terms of wanting to achieve India's independence. Independence and freedom of all peoples of this sub-continent should be thought of not only in negative terms of elimination of foreign

[1] Deciphered as 'contribution'.

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authority resulting in anarchy, as Gandhi promises, but in definite positive form of constitution and setting up of government to which power and authority of British can be transferred, and that could take place of foreign authority which Gandhi wants to end today. Such a government would command confidence and allegiance of different nationalities and interests in sub-continent. So long as Congress maintains present deception and false propaganda, India's progress will continue in jeopardy. Present threat of "big move" is intended to coerce distress and shake Britain to accede to Gandhi's demand. Britain will be making greatest blunder if she surrenders to Congress in any manner detrimental to interests of Muslim India. We do not know what this "big move" is going to be. Nothing is going to move us from purpose of achieving Pakistan. When time comes League Working Committee will decide how to face new situation, and I will call Working Committee meeting as soon as occasion arises. *Ends.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE *23 June 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1893-S. Your private and personal telegram of 15th June, No. 731.[1] Defence. Very many thanks for these useful comments. The position is as follows:—

Your paragraph 2 (*a*). Your assumption is correct.

Your paragraph 2 (*b*). Policy relating to demobilization would be the function of the new Defence Department; but any such policy would naturally be worked out in close consultation with the War Department. The actual carrying out of the policy would be the function of the departments concerned, i.e. of the War Department, so far as demobilization of the Army is concerned, and of the Civil Departments concerned in regard to the absorption of the demobilized forces in civil life.

Your paragraph 2 (*c*). In deference to your view, Wavell and I agree to leave this item with the War Department. It was not, in any event, one of those included in the Cripps offer.

Your paragraph 3. This raises more substantial issues and I have discussed in detail with Commander-in-Chief. Of matters you mention, evacuation is dealt with by Civil Defence, Signals Co-ordination by Communications and Economic Warfare by Commerce. I am myself inclined to think that distribution is administratively the soundest. As regards denial, Defence Department

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take the view that this is essentially a military responsibility and so must remain with War Department. They appreciate risk of criticism on ground that it might have been transferred under the Cripps proposal, but attach so much importance to its staying where it is that they feel that they must be prepared to face criticism.

2. It is worth bearing in mind, in event of criticism, that we have added, as compared with Cripps' list: (*a*) Military Lands and Cantonments, (*b*) Directorate of Prisoners of War, (*c*) National Defence Council (which is probably, to say nothing about two further light additions, viz., the Medal Section and the Indian Army List, of little importance). Play can also be made with fact that Civil Defence and Economic Warfare are both in charge of Indian Members, and that that will also be true of Signals Co-ordination if as I assume it goes into Usman's portfolio.

3. In the interests of completeness, we have also dropped following items included in the Cripps list: (*a*) Public Relations, (*b*) Indian Representation on Eastern Group Supply Council, (*c*) Reception, &c., for foreign missions. Of these, the first is now being dealt with by General Staff and has absorbed some of the sections of the Intelligence Branch and is no longer appropriate[2] for transfer outside War[3] Department. The second is of very little importance in practice, and is, I should have thought, unlikely to attract active interest. As for the third, present practice under which each Department deals with Missions, &c. with which it is directly concerned has in its favour obvious arguments of convenience.

[1] No. 145. [2] 'appropriate' omitted in decipher. [3] Deciphered as 'main'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: ff 124–5

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *23 June 1942, 7 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 24 June*

769. My private and personal telegram 738,[1] dated 16th June. Gandhi. I have now received documents[2] referred to in your personal telegram 1757[3] of 11th June. I agree that it is most illuminating to those who have been watching these manœuvres closely but feel that it is too long and in some places too obscure for circulation to Cabinet. Moreover, it seems that Congress and Gandhi himself have shifted their ground somewhat in the last few days and that these

[1] No. 149. [2] Enclosure to No. 113. [3] No. 142.

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proceedings of Working Committee may be somewhat out of date. What I would propose to do therefore is to include in my next memorandum to Cabinet on this subject a brief summary of the differences of view within the Congress exposed by this document, bringing out the fact that the majority were more or less indifferent as to whether or not the policy they chose to follow amounted to passive assistance to the Axis Powers, and that it was only to meet the views of Nehru and his followers that they adopted his draft in place of modified version of Gandhi's.

2. I should be grateful if you would now let me know whether you will be telegraphing appreciation referred to in para. 1 of your private and personal telegram 1807-S[4] within the next few days and whether you see your way yet to propose line of action, or whether you wish to wait developments after the Congress Working Committee before doing so. Cabinet are at present expecting to consider the matter further at an early date and as you may have to take immediate action if Working Committee decide for civil disobedience or overt obstruction of war effort, you may like to have indication of Cabinet's attitude in advance of Working Committee's decision, even though while actual form of any Congress campaign is still uncertain, your proposals would necessarily be on hypothetical basis which you deprecate in para. 4[5] of your personal telegram 1757 of 11th June.

[4] No. 143. [5] This should read 'para. 3'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *23 June 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of 27th/29th May[1] which has just arrived and for which I am most grateful. I was amused and interested by your comments on the discussions in the Cabinet about my new Councillors. Thank you again so much for all your help. I am perfectly certain that the principle set out in paragraph 1 of your letter is a sound one. Obviously it must be of assistance to the Secretary of State and to the Governor-General to know the feeling of important members of the Cabinet with Indian experience about possible selections. Obviously equally it must be left to those directly responsible for the administration of this country and the handling in Council of the new men to reach a decision as to who will best fill the bill. That is what you have secured, and I am sure that it is eminently sound and satisfactory.

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2. You know from my telegrams how I stand about the filling of the vacancies and I need not enter into any very great detail here. As I write I await answers from Usman, Ambedkar, Jogendra Singh and Srivastava. But I am much relieved to have pinned down C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar. I had better send you, I think, for record copies of the correspondence I have had with him. He ought to be of first class quality, and I quite agree on further consideration of all the people available to me that he is much the best man to put in charge of the Information portfolio, if he will take it. I have now made him a formal offer of it in substitution for Civil Defence and have offered the latter to Srivastava. I send you for record copies of the letters[2] I have sent to these various gentlemen, as I thought it necessary in each of them to protect the position of a fixed term of five years such as they might normally have expected, and also, particularly in the case of Srivastava, to bring out the position as regards directorships and business interests which might be of concern to Government. I send you also copy of the letter[3] which I have sent to the Maharaja of Travancore by way of squaring things so far as C. P. is concerned.

3. You mention in paragraph 2 of your letter (and also in your manuscript letter about Philip Gordon, for which my very best thanks) the demise of the India Committee. I am frankly not altogether sorry. I can quite conceive that in circumstances in which Winston himself is too busy to get down to these Indian matters, which must inevitably be of somewhat secondary interest to him save on very exceptional occasions, and when he wants to be certain that the proposals you and I put up stand close consideration by a number of people with some local knowledge, a body of this sort has its use. But in the ordinary way I should myself be a little apprehensive that it might cramp the style of the Secretary of State of the day rather considerably; while so far as the Governor-General of the day is concerned, there is always a risk, as you yourself mention in your letter, of somewhat obsolete knowledge, and obsolete, but strongly held, prejudices resulting in decisions being taken which are not in themselves sound, or in pressure being brought to bear on the Governor-General which we cannot regard as appropriate and which might lead to a marked difference of opinion between him and the authorities at home. So I think that you and I can both feel well satisfied with the way things have gone in that regard.

4. Reverting to my Expanded Council, I have been trying to calculate when I can get all of them together. As usual there is likely to be more delay

[1] No. 95.

[2] MSS. EUR. F. 125/124. In these letters Lord Linlithgow said that he could not offer a fixed term of appointment, but would have to ask the addressees to serve, like the other members of his Council, on the basis that if the Council were to be reconstituted on a political basis, their offices would have to be placed at his disposal.

[3] MSS. EUR. F. 125/124.

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than one could wish. But I think the main thing is to get the names out. C. P. does not want to turn up until the end of July: Mudaliar does not now want to hand over until 20th July, which postpones the entry of Jogendra Singh in succession to Sarker. We cannot hope for Benthall before the middle of July, and certain of the others also may want time to adjust their present affairs, that being particularly true of Srivastava.

5. I quite see the force of the comment you make in paragraph 5 of your letter about the possibility of bringing in Princes to certain of the deliberations of the expanded body: but though it is attractive on the face of it I am very doubtful. The Government of India after all, and the Governor-General's Executive Council, are not responsible for the States, and the position is thus not comparable to that of the Cabinet. This is not a War Cabinet for the whole of India. It is a British India body, though clearly the Governor-General and the Crown Representative (those beings whose joint and several existences so closely resemble those of the Secretaries of State for India and Burma) should keep in pretty close contact with one another about what is happening. I am certain, too, that there would be bitter resentment on the part of those of my colleagues who deal with internal questions were they to be excluded, and even over the establishment of the War Resources Committee of Council there have been clear signs of anxiety on the part of members not included in the Committee as to their position and the reaction on it of their exclusion.

6. I think in fact that we shall have to carry on very much as at present, though with some little hope that the high quality of the men one will have in Council will enable our general contribution to be even better than it has been in the past.

* * *

8. I must confess that the Libyan news is disturbing and depressing. One has not of course had yet the full story, and it is very difficult to piece together what has happened even with the very full information contained in the daily situation telegrams and other material received here by Wavell and seen of course by me. I can well imagine that the reactions at home may be all the more marked because of the curious and not very solidly-based wave of optimism which from one's private correspondence seems in the last couple of months to have been sweeping the country. But so far as we here are concerned, it is a most unlucky business, both in terms of possible reaction on general public confidence, and because it must, I fear, put out of court for the time being the offensive into Burma which one had been so anxious to see started and which might have had so valuable and important a reaction on the development of the general campaign if things went well. Nor can I conceal from myself (though I have not yet been able to discuss with Wavell who is only just back from Colombo and whom I shall not be able to see until this afternoon, just

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as this letter is due to go out) the probability that so far from Libya being able to help us by lending their young officers or even lending us rifles or the like (I am most grateful for your endeavours to help us—your letter to Auchinleck of 29th May, of which you were good enough to send me a copy; and the comments in paragraphs 15 and 16 of your letter)[4] we are much more likely to have to respond to an appeal to help them and to have to face the diversion to Mideast of further forces and of equipment on which we have been relying for the defence of India. However, we must take things as they are, and try to make the best of them, and we of course here will be only too glad and too anxious to do anything that we properly can in the way of taking risks, while I recognise to the full the vital importance of the Libyan front from our own point of view in India.

9. We have had a good deal of correspondence about Gandhi by telegram. I do not propose to say a great deal today. I am holding up my promised appreciation so that I can get the situation here a little clearer than it is at the moment. Briefly, the Mahatma has shown signs over the last week or ten days of some little apprehension as to the construction that is being placed (and I may add the only construction that could be placed by any intelligent human being) on his earlier appeals to us and to the Americans to get out of this country and leave it to be defended by soul force, and he has devoted all his energies to clouding the issue by a series of sophistical interpretations of what exactly he meant. I could not help laughing when I read in the latest of them—quoted in today's *Hindustan Times*, that he felt he had cause for complaint since any clear statement made on behalf of Congress was at once subjected to a variety of interpretations designed to confuse the public mind. That exactly describes the process to which the Mahatma has been subjecting his own statements during these last few days! and I have no doubt that he has had a certain amount of success, for few enjoy the unhappy familiarity which you and I have had to obtain of this problem, and which is so necessary if one is to be able to see through the old man's agreeable words, and to collate the various conflicting statements which he makes from day to day. I am glad to say that Jinnah, at any rate, has now been moved to express himself.[5] While, as you will see, he too is delighted to think that the country should be rid of our obnoxious presence, he accompanies that progressive suggestion with a clear indication that the Muslim League are going to stand no nonsense from Congress, from His Majesty's Government or from any one else. It is just as well that he has come out with this, for it is a useful counterblast to the Congress statements which so often tend to become dangerous simply because there is no answer to them from any other Indian party. I am beginning to form the impression, in the light of all that has been said in the last week or ten days,

[4] Not printed. [5] No. 178.

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that the Mahatma does not feel the ground so firm under his feet as he had hoped for this policy of his, while provincial reactions have not been too encouraging from his point of view, and Jinnah's latest utterance to which I have just referred makes clear what will be his attitude in the matter of the Muslim League. Had the Libyan situation gone better than it has I should have felt definitely hopeful in these circumstances that he might have thought caution and some further delay was the wise course. Even given the turn of events in Libya (and on the assumption that we shall be able to hold there all right) I am still not without hope that he may procrastinate. From our point of view, if he does, so much the better. I agree with you that if he forces our hands we shall have to deal drastically with him: but if he is content to make gestures of hostility without very actively following them up the position may be rather different, and, when we have as much on our hands as we have at present, we might well be thankful in such circumstances to be spared the additional burden of having to put down a civil disobedience movement or the like.

10. We are working hard here on publicity, &c. in connection with Gandhi. I read with great interest your telegrams to Home Department of 18th June, Nos. 10853[6] and 10854,[7] and I thought, if I may say so, that the India Office circular telegram was an admirable statement of the case. I asked Maxwell some little time ago to get the experts here to put together a note on the course of the war. I have only this morning received a very lengthy note (some 30 pages) from the D.I.B. which has been written by a Mr. Ahmed, one of his officers who has in the past produced excellent summaries. I shall not have time either to consider this memorandum or indeed for that matter even to glance through it before I close this letter. But I think the best thing that I can do, as it may be of importance to you to have this material without delay, will be to send a copy of the memorandum[8] as a provisional document by this bag and telegraph any corrections that may prove to be necessary later—there may be one or two minor points of fact on which further verification is being sought, and it may also be that after discussion with Maxwell I shall want to make one or two minor drafting alterations. But I hope that it will be useful material from your point of view.

11. The Duke's tour, so far as I can see, continues to go extremely well though the burden on him must be pretty considerable, particularly now that we are moving into the monsoon. I quite agree with you in feeling that it ought to be a definite tonic to loyal and conservative elements in this country. I think he has it in mind to say a few words on the air at the conclusion of his tour, and that may give an opportunity for getting something really useful across as part of his impressions of India.

12. You mention in that connection in paragraph 10 of your letter about the Princes. You will by now have had both the memorandum[9] submitted by the

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Jam Saheb as Chancellor of the Chamber, and copies of Bikaner's memorandum[10] (these were sent to you by the bag of 26th May). The last thing I want is post-mortems if they can be avoided: but the Jam Saheb's memorandum is rather an awkward one to deal with, and particular difficulty arises in connection with the words used by Cripps in the House of Commons which are quoted in paragraph II (*a*) of the Chancellor's letter, given the impossibility of reconciling the sentiments expressed by him with the declared policy of His Majesty's Government as announced on more than one occasion in Parliament and as repeated in my address to the Chamber of Princes in 1939. That speech has, in the view of my Advisers, created a really serious dilemma, from which His Majesty's Government must extricate themselves, since there now exists a direct discrepancy in a matter of cardinal importance between the policy as formally laid down by His Majesty's Government and the Crown Representative and the statement made in the House of Commons by Cripps. I am considering how best to deal with this business. Naturally, the last thing I want to do at this moment is to add to the difficulties of His Majesty's Government, or in any way to put you as Secretary of State in an awkward position. I think that probably the best thing would be that I should send the Chancellor's letter officially to you with a covering letter[11] setting out various points and very directly expressing our view and our sense of the awkwardness of the position. I shall have to ask at the same time that we should be authoritatively told where His Majesty's Government stands on the important points covered by the Jam Saheb's letter. I shall probably at the same time suggest, through the private channel, that you should discuss the matter once the Jam Saheb arrives in London with him and thereafter decide whether a written reply from yourself to the Chancellor is ripe and how best to frame it. Do not regard what I have said on this matter as final—it is my present judgment of the best method of dealing with a thoroughly difficult situation. But I doubt whether my judgment on that matter is very likely to change.

13. Indeed, while I had never felt any doubt that the Cripps Mission, even if it had strictly confined itself to the actual wording of His Majesty's Government's declaration, would leave us, if it failed, with a lot of nasty stuff to clear up, I had no conception of the amount of difficulty to which the statements which he seems to have made in conversation with all and sundry of those with whom he did business was likely to give rise: and I fear that the effect of those statements which it is impossible to reconcile with one another has been not merely to damage Cripps' reputation out here for complete veracity and dependability, but to encourage a great many of our numerous would-be critics to take the line that His Majesty's Government were trying to be clever

[6] No. 159. [7] No. 163. [8] Not printed. [9] No. 115. [10] See No. 86, note 10.
[11] No. 187.

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and have been caught. I send you in that connection the statement[12] which has been issued by Satyamurti, which appears in today's Press, and which (I am bound to say, I suspect, with some little justification) makes damaging play with what Cripps is alleged to have said about "National Governments", "Cabinets", &c. However, that is all past history, and all that you and I can do is to try to make the best of the situation with which we are confronted.

14. On this matter of the Princes, I think there is a very great deal in what you say in paragraph 10 of your letter; and I am likely, in the near future, to be sending you an answer to the long letter which you sent me, very nearly a year ago,[13] about general policy in relation to the States. There is a good deal that wants careful handling, but I am bound to say that I am moving more and more to the view, which you yourself express, that in conditions such as the present, where the help of the Princes means a great deal to us, and where we may well be approaching a period in Indian affairs when we shall have to go all out in support of those who are with us, as well as in suppression of those who are against us, it might prove to be a cardinal mistake to press the Princes too hard. But I will develop that point in greater length later.

15. Thank you so much for your help about the High Commissionership in Canada. I look forward very much to the results of the soundings you have taken. I have separately suggested[14] the possibility of Huq in connection with the meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is pretty clear from Herbert's latest fortnightly letter,[15] copy of which goes to you by this bag, that the Bengal team must be a rather uncomfortable one.

16. I am very glad that these "Round Table" discussions on India have gone off as well as they have. I think we have probably been lucky! But I can quite see that they probably came at rather a fortunate juncture, and the Chairman seems to have been exceptionally skilful in his handling of them. You mention in paragraph 7 of your letter Krishna Menon. I would ask again (I have often bothered you about him) whether it is not possible to do something to impede his freedom of action. You have a good deal of material about him, and if there were any way in which we could bring him under a little closer control of whatever type, I do think there would be a great deal to be said for it. He, and this little group of somewhat malcontent people in the Commons, like Sorensen, give rise to quite a disproportionate amount of difficulty out here, where, not unnaturally, the ordinary politician is quite unable to estimate the importance or otherwise of the interests for which they speak.

17. I saw Brayne's memorandum, which you mention in paragraph 8 of your letter. (Incidentally, on the matter of members of the I.C.S., &c. joining the fighting services, I have been much encouraged by the response I have had to my circular letter[16] to Governors, for I get the impression that the arguments

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in it are generally regarded as pretty conclusive.) Brayne is a man whom you (and the India Office) know so well. He is full of ideas, a considerable proportion of which are usually worth looking at more closely. His imagination tends to run ahead of his realisation of what is practical and what is not. We may very well, as you say, in post-war conditions be pressed to stop [start?] looking at all these matters from a completely different standpoint: and when I say a completely different standpoint, I mean as regards financial orthodoxy also (though I myself believe that even in Russia, 2 + 2 make no more than 4!). But though I am all for projecting my mind into the future, and trying to lay foundations, as far in advance as I can, for buildings that are likely to be needed, I confess that a programme on the scale you suggest in your letter, while it commands my sympathy and my admiration, also a little overwhelms me! Were we dealing with this country in the happy conditions of 70 years ago, when it was our business to clean up a mess into which India had got itself, and we were in a position to do so without any interference that mattered, things would be very different. At a moment when our energies are devoted to finding someone to take over our own burdens from us, and to convince the world that we are anxious to make over those burdens, and when, too, financially, we must consider the post-war blizzard, whether we are going to be here to face it, or whether it is going to be faced by an Indian Dominion Government, one has, I am driven to believe, to walk a little more delicately, and we are, I fear, not the free agents that we were, say, after the Mutiny!

18. In paragraph 11 of your letter, you mention Louis Johnson. We have already been in correspondence[17] about him. I would only like to take this opportunity to thank you again, and also Winston, most warmly for all your help.

* * *

21. Many thanks for what you were kind enough to say in paragraph 18 about my trip to the East coast. I think it was well worth while and that it has had a good effect. The Vizagapatam ship-building, about which you ask, is

[12] Mr Satyamurti's statement, as reported by the *Hindustan Times* of 23 June, contained the following passage: 'Referring to the Congress demand for real transfer of power to the people of India and unfairly characterising it as the demand for the tyranny of the majority Sir Stafford Cripps now admits that they (himself and the Congress leaders) never discussed the composition of the National Government, but he has not got the fairness to withdraw his statement. He is still more ingenious, if not actually dishonest, when he says that he used terms like "National Government" and "Cabinet" not in their accepted sense but illustrating his ideas. Pray, what were those ideas? The Congress leaders understood these words in their ordinary sense. Now Sir Stafford Cripps goes back on them.' A copy of the statement is in L/P&J/8/510: f 422.

[13] On 16 May 1941. L/P&S/13/889: ff 63–72.

[14] Telegrams 1654-S of 5 June and 1737-S of 10 June. L/I/1/1090: f 430 and f 437.

[15] No. 168. The passages to which Lord Linlithgow is presumably referring are not printed.

[16] See No. 86, para. 20. [17] See Nos. 97, 109, and 114.

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dead, the plant being in process of removal to Bombay. As to what you say about publicity, one of the reasons why I rather regret that C. P. (if he accepts Information) is likely to be so long in taking over, is that I particularly want to get that Department going. I have a feeling that it has become very departmental indeed, and that it badly needs a little zip. It is certainly very lacking in initiative. But I am perhaps doing it an injustice, and it is, of course, always extremely difficult to be certain of one's own estimate in matters such as these.

22. Thank you so much for Alfred Watson's letter that you mention in paragraph 20. I am most grateful for it, and it is much to the point. I have said a good deal about Gandhi and need not amplify here. But you are quite right, I am certain, in referring to his wounded vanity, and it may well prove that all this present chatter about Britain leaving India, &c. is designed essentially, firstly, to bring him back to the centre of the platform and under the spot-light (and in that it has succeeded); secondly, to heal the rifts in Congress (and in that also it is succeeding rapidly, for Rajagopalachariar, though he continues to fight, matters less every day, and Nehru has now joined up with Gandhi on the "Get out Britain" slogan); and finally, possibly, to manœuvre himself into a position in which the Working Committee will again beg him to take the responsibility for handling a policy, which they will admit that they do not themselves entirely understand, or do not feel up to taking over, thereafter leaving the Mahatma, unless he is foolish enough to wish to force the issue, to bemuse himself and everyone else concerned with a fog of words.

We are both so glad that Mrs. Amery and you like our John, and grateful for the kindness you have shown him.

All luck.

P.S.—As you know I let the Section 93 Governors know that you and I have decided against non-official Advisers. I was much interested in reply to receive the letter from Lumley of 15th June,[18] of which I send you a copy by this bag, from which you will see that he, too, like Hallett, has now come round to the view that it would be unwise to pursue the idea of non-official Advisers. I am much interested in this for I had had no interim indication from Lumley of how his mind was moving; and I think you will agree with me, given his very sane and sober judgment, that his decision is a substantial affirmation of the wisdom of the decision which you and I have reached.

[18] No. 147.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT *24 June 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1903–S. Your telegram No. 10372[1] dated 11th. I have no doubt that cry of repression has been deliberately raised by Nehru to create suitable background of bitterness for Gandhi's projected new movement. (See also Home Department telegram No. 4484[2] dated 6th June.) This background is also being prepared through press in India. Complaint of repression relates to United Provinces where during May and June eight prominent Congressmen including one ex-Minister, one President of Provincial Congress Committee and four members of Legislature were arrested and office of All-India Congress Committee was searched for copies of banned Working Committee's resolution. Arrests were in each case made for objectionable anti-war speeches which no Government could afford to overlook at this juncture. We have no information of any arrests on large scale either in United Provinces or any other Province. Action to forfeit security of *National Herald* was taken with full consent of Central Government and was based on series of defeatist and anti-war articles appearing in *Herald* between February 5th and May 12th. These articles each of which was in itself probably actionable were placed before Press Advisory Committee. Latter largely under influence of Editor of *Herald* consistently refused countenance any action to curb paper's activities. It was felt tone of *National Herald* was contributing largely to increase of defeatism and anti-war activity throughout United Provinces and that effective attempt to improve morale could only be made if preceded by action against this paper.

[1] Referring to a cable of 5 June from Mr Nehru to Mr Krishna Menon justifying Congress non-co-operation on grounds of 'Cripps' attitude subsequent repression continuing arrests forfeiture *Herald* security and especially exceedingly bad differential treatment Indian evacuees Burma'; and asking for material for reply to probable Parliamentary enquiries. L/P&J/8/596: f 79.

[2] No. 131; the date should be 7 June.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *24 June, 5.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 24 June, 8.30 pm*

No. 1905–S. Your personal telegram of 19th June, No. 11004.[1] Mudaliar is now likely to hand over as Commerce Member on 20th July and leave for London about 20th August. I am suggesting to him that there might be advantage in his advancing his date perhaps to the end of the first week in August. I imagine there is no difficulty about his serving here as the Member of my Council who is also a Member of the War Cabinet in anticipation of his joining the latter body from the date he hands over as Commerce Member?

[1] Agreeing with the proposal in Lord Linlithgow's telegram 1839–S of 17 June that the Jam Saheb (who had most readily agreed to serve as a Member of the War Cabinet) and Sir R. Mudaliar should leave for London before the end of July. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.

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Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/63

CAMP, *24 June 1942*

No. R.–110–G.C.P.

I have read with very great interest Your Excellency's observations in the letter dated the 18th June 1942,[1] on the subject of Gandhi's intentions and possible counter-measures. As regards the former, the date of the All-India Congress Committee meeting at Wardha has now been fixed for the 6th July next. I think that there is a great deal in Your Excellency's surmise that "the pronouncements that have been made over the last few days are aimed a little at clouding the issue". I was discussing this very point with my Secretary before the receipt of your letter and his suggestion is that Gandhi, on the one hand, and Nehru and Azad—particularly, I should say, the former—on the other, have reached a bargain whereby virtual acceptance of continued allied military presence in India will be conceded by Gandhi as the price for the support of Nehru and Azad in endeavouring to get the All-India Congress Committee to approve Gandhi's new subversive movement plan. It is perhaps hardly worth while indulging in speculation except that it has the advantage of keeping

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us on the alert, the importance of which is rightly stressed in Your Excellency's letter. It is quite possible that action which may be taken in some Province—and the United Provinces is perhaps the obvious locale—will be used as a peg on which to fasten a cry of "repression" followed by an unlawful agitation.

As regards the counter-measures, I fully recognise the difficulties in the way of attempting Gandhi's political "outlawry": it will go against the grain more at this juncture than ever before to have to recognise him as a politician with whom we may again have to do business but I realise fully that Your Excellency and His Majesty's Government must weigh considerations, Parliamentary and otherwise, which are not so apparent from the Provincial point of view.

In my last letter, I expressed confidence that any subversive movement launched by Gandhi will not be a success in this Province: it may be of interest if I analyse the position a little more closely. I can count on Berar remaining almost wholly aloof: in fact, there are large purses waiting for me there which have been collected without any pressure and which are larger than anything that Gandhi would be able to collect, I venture to say, for any of his schemes. Also, of course, Ramrao Deshmukh's group of Berar M.L.As. would be very willing to co-operate with Government in the war if there were any prospect of a stable Ministry. Then, in the Nagpur Division, including Gandhi's home town district of Wardha, there is a large Maratha and Marathi-speaking element which thinks on much the same lines as Berar, although demonstrations could be successfully staged in Nagpur City. Part only of the Jubbulpore Division is enthusiastically pro-Congress, much of the area being inhabited by aboriginals, and Jubbulpore town being such a hive of activity from the Supply and Defence Departments point of view, the Congress would have difficulty in making its voice heard. There remains the Chhattisgarh Division which is certainly not particularly friendly to Government, but I should not expect any great activity except on the part of the "bourgeoisie" elements. Apart from these local considerations, the monsoon has made a good start, cultivators are busy and the demand for labour is enormous. These are considerations of an all-India character which make me think that the All-India Congress Committee will choose a particularly inappropriate time if they decide to embark on a mass movement now.

2. I have lately had my old Chief, Sir Nazimuddin, staying with me in pursuance of his programme of visits on behalf of the Muslim Defence Council. It was a pleasure to meet him again as we always got on extremely well in Bengal notwithstanding a few occasions when we definitely did not see eye to eye over communal questions. I know that Nazimuddin will keep very little, if anything, back in conversations with me. His argument is that Gandhi, realising that His Majesty's Government are finally committed to the principle

[1] No. 161.

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of self-determination for the Muslim areas, is determined to try to frighten them out of it. He promised that the Muslims would have nothing to do with any movement set on foot by Gandhi except perhaps in Bengal where local politics may obscure the main issue.

On leaving, Sir Nazimuddin asked me whether, in the event of Congress staging a mass movement, the Muslim community could not be used to suppress the Hindus! I smiled at this and said that it was not possible. He then mentioned a matter which he evidently wished me to convey to Your Excellency and which is of some importance, I think. He said that the Muslim case was going by default in the U.S.A. largely because our representatives to the U.S.A. have hitherto been Hindus. He suggested that it was very desirable that the next time an official representative of the Government of India goes to the U.S.A., he should be a Muslim; he added that even Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai could hardly avoid creating the impression that there was no minority problem in India. Nazimuddin would, I have no doubt, make an excellent representative himself. He gets on very well with Britishers, particularly enjoys a game of bridge, &c., and would probably get on equally well with Americans.

Judging by the results of the Natore bye-election, I have little doubt that we shall see him as the Chief Minister in Bengal in due course, in which event I am confident that he will prove to be another Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan. Incidentally, he mentioned to me that out of 51 elections which have been held since the advent of Provincial Autonomy, in which Muslims were concerned, 50 had been won by the League. This is rather an important fact in view of the line taken in the Congress publication, "Congress and the War crisis", where much is made of the fact that at the 1936 elections only 106, out of 1,485 Muslim seats, returned League candidates. I have asked Sir Nazimuddin to let me have particulars of these elections but he is terribly dilatory in disposing of business unless he has someone beside him to keep his nose to the grindstone.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE *25 June 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1915–S. Your private and personal telegram No. 769[1] June 23rd. I quite appreciate force of what you say in paragraph 1 and agree entirely.

2. Your paragraph 2. I will let you have brief appreciation in general terms in next two or three days. I would judge situation to have eased a little

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to the extent that Gandhi has found his new platform *not too comfortable or sound, and is probably*[2] not too certain as to wise line of advance; while he has on the other hand, and without a break with us, achieved (*a*) restoration of the spotlight to himself, (*b*) substantial reconsolidation of Congress with himself as the principal figure, (*c*) further obscuration of activities of Rajagopalachari.

3. In almost entire absence at the moment of any indication of importance of line Gandhi is likely to take in Working Committee, any suggestions for action will necessarily have to be in most general terms, and (subject to any developments during next fortnight) I should not be surprised if we had to await outcome of Working Committee meeting before I could let you have definite proposals.

[1] No. 180. [2] The words in italics omitted in decipher.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *25 June 1942, 10.30 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 26 June, 12.30 pm*

No. 1920–S. My personal telegram of 24th June, No. 1905–S.[1] Mudaliar's dates. I discussed with him this morning. He very strongly urges that because of a series of important conferences on matters which he has been handling and which he feels it would be unfair to ask Sarker to take over as his first act, he should be allowed to postpone handing over as Commerce Member till towards the end of July and not before the 27th. In that event he would fly home on any date after 15th August. I would have preferred earlier demission of Mudaliar's present appointment, but I am sure that his motives are of the best and have told him that I agree. One result would be that Jogendra Singh will not be able to take his seat till the end of July when Sarker will vacate E[ducation], H[ealth] & L[ands] for Commerce.

2. Mudaliar also raised question as to his precise position while a Member of the Cabinet. His attention has been drawn to the fact that the 1917 Indian representation in Cabinet was on basis of Advisers to Secretary of State, who was himself a Member of the War Cabinet (compare Lloyd George's War Memoirs, Vol. IV, p. 1737).[2] He is apprehensive that he will be pressed on this

[1] No. 183.

[2] On this page is reproduced the following statement, which the Secretary of State for India was authorised to publish on 19 January 1917: 'As already announced, the Secretary of State for India,

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point by the Press here. I told him that so far as I was aware while the Secretary of State was not a Member of the War Cabinet, Mudaliar and the Jam Saheb would in fact be full Members of it and would not be merely Advisers to the Secretary of State as was the case in 1917. Grateful for confirmation though I imagine there is no doubt about it.

when representing India at the special sittings of the War Cabinet, will have the assistance of two gentlemen specially selected for the purpose. In pursuance of this decision, the Secretary of State has, with the advice of the Governor-General in Council, selected Sir James Meston, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, and Sir Satyendra Prasanna Sinha. In accordance with a further decision of His Majesty's Government, the Secretary of State for India will also have the assistance of one of the Ruling Chiefs of India. With the advice of the Governor-General in Council, he has invited His Highness the Maharajah of Bikanir, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., A.D.C., to accompany him, and His Highness has accepted the offer.'

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Sir K. Fitze to Mr Patrick

L/P&S/13/230: ff 431–3

SECRET
No. D. 494–P(C)/42

NEW DELHI, *25 June 1942*
Received: 27 July

SUBJECT—DRAFT DECLARATION OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS INDIA

Sir,

I am directed to forward for the information of His Majesty's Government a copy of a letter dated the 1st June 1942[1] on the above subject from His Highness the Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar.

2. His Highness's letter is carefully documented and it will be seen that it is signed by him in his capacity as Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes and is described in the final sentence as an official letter. It concludes with a specific request that "an authoritative and early announcement" should be made by His Majesty's Government in order "to eliminate the Princes' serious concern and misgivings on these matters".

3. His Excellency the Crown Representative has little doubt that such concern and misgivings are in fact genuinely entertained by the great majority of Indian Princes, particularly by the more conservative among them, and is not inclined to attach any great importance to such public declarations in the opposite sense as have been made by Their Highnesses of Kashmir and Indore. The Princes may to some extent derive comfort and re-assurance from the generous terms in which His Majesty has referred in his message to India

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published on the 13th June 1942[2] to "their traditions of loyalty and attachment to his Throne" and to their unstinting offers of men and money and personal services for the war. But they are not likely to be reassured by a reference to the fact that Sir Stafford Cripps' offer was in terms withdrawn when the negotiations broke down. The Princes probably feel that should negotiations be resumed in the event of the great political parties in British India showing a more responsive attitude, the Cripps declaration would certainly form the starting point of such negotiations and would be regarded as the minimum measure of concession and advance open to discussion.

4. In particular, perplexity is expressed in para. II(*a*) of the Chancellor's letter with regard to the statement made by the Lord Privy Seal in the House of Commons to the effect that he was "certain that this House would wish the British Administration in India to do all it can to encourage and expedite the development of suitable representative institutions in all Indian States". It is impossible to reconcile this statement with the earlier declarations of policy of His Majesty's Government made in the form of replies to questions asked in Parliament in 1938 and referred to in His Excellency the Crown Representative's address to the Chamber of Princes in 1939. On the first occasion, on 21st February, 1938, the Under Secretary of State replied that "it is not the policy of the Paramount Power in ordinary circumstances to intervene in the internal administration of full powered States".[3] This was confirmed on the 16th December of the same year when the reply given to Sir John Wardlaw-Milne was that "His Majesty's Government have no intention of bringing any form of pressure to bear upon Rulers to initiate constitutional changes. It rests with the Rulers themselves to decide what form of Government they should adopt in the diverse conditions of Indian States."[4]

5. There thus exists a direct discrepancy in a matter of cardinal importance, which, in His Excellency's opinion, requires elucidation at the earliest possible opportunity, since, if the view expressed by the Lord Privy Seal is to be interpreted as the considered view of His Majesty's Government as now constituted, our existing policy in regard to constitutional reforms in States stands in need of radical revision.

6. I am also to invite particular attention to paragraph III(*d*) of the Chancellor's letter which contains a brief and surprisingly restrained reference to what is perhaps the most legitimate of all the objections which the Princes could raise to the draft declaration, namely, that by acceding to the new Union they would be committed to a possible—perhaps even probable—severance of their cherished relations with the British Crown. His Highness has not mentioned

[1] No. 115. [2] See *The Times* of that date, p. 4.
[3] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 332, col. 4.
[4] *Ibid.* vol. 342, col. 2352.

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the obvious remedy, i.e. that in joining the Union the States should be allowed to reserve the right to secede from it if at any time the Union were to decide to leave the British Commonwealth of Nations. His Excellency believes that, in the absence of such a provision, few, if any, of the great States would join the Union.

7. In conclusion I am to make it clear that His Excellency is strongly of opinion that so fully documented a communication, emanating from such a source and couched in terms of genuine apprehension, clearly calls for a definite answer, the nature of which can only be determined by His Majesty's Government.

I have etc.
K. S. FITZE
Secretary to His Excellency the Crown Representative

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *26 June 1942, 8.50 pm*
Received: 26 June, 11.30 pm

No. 1928-S. Following is appreciation of present position *vis-à-vis* of Gandhi and Congress.

2. Cabinet will be familiar with recent happenings. Position as I see it is briefly that Cripps' negotiations disclosed—

(*a*) a certain readiness on the part of Congress to retreat which was not shared[1] by Gandhi and which he did his best to offset;
(*b*) they also involved a much more formal acceptance of the principle of Pakistan, &c.,
(*c*) while negotiations broke down Congress had become involved in them to an extent which considerably weakened their position of entire refusal to accept *bona fides* of His Majesty's Government and of antagonism to retention of British connection with this country. Nehru himself was as deeply implicated as any one;
(*d*) following on collapse of Cripps' negotiations Gandhi suffered defeat and consequent loss of face in Allahabad discussions[2] over his war resolution.

This was followed by defection of Rajagopalachariar who is still running his own opposition campaign for which he has received a measure of support.

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3. I have always thought that the two matters which weigh with Gandhi were first his personal vanity, and second his desire to keep Congress together. Situation described in preceding paragraph threatened both. Congress showed signs of disintegration, had lost prestige and position in the country, and it had been made clear that Gandhi's words were no longer entirely authoritative with it. He was bound in these circumstances either to let the process of disintegration (and parallel process of increasing loss of face on his own part) continue or to endeavour by a dramatic gesture to reconcentrate attention on himself and to reconsolidate the divided ranks of Congress.

4. The first method of achieving these objects was the "Britain get out" slogan. To that very general proposition he has endeavoured to hitch first the general fears of the Japanese with suggestion that were we not here India would have nothing to fear about Japanese aggression: secondly, grievances minor but obviously far more acutely felt by the rank and file, which may arise in operational areas in connection with orders to evacuate houses and holdings; as a result of our denial policy, &c. He has secured utmost publicity both here and in the United States for the "Britain get out" slogan, and a fortnight ago it looked as though assuming that that slogan were a success and that if it was followed by an appeal for mass civil disobedience movement, non-payment of land revenue or other movement designed to interfere with our war effort, we might have to take on a serious battle with Congress in the immediate future.

5. The last fortnight, however, has in my judgment eased the situation. Gandhi, somewhat unwisely perhaps, made it clear that it was not only the British but the Americans who must leave the country. The *Harijan* contained a series of somewhat insulting comments on American coloured policy, treatment of Negroes &c., while American soldiers have been bracketed with the British as unwelcome.[3] And while Gandhi has seen a large number of American Press correspondents the accounts in the *Harijan* show that his talks with them have at least on one occasion led to "some exasperation" on the part of his visitor.[4] He has not so far as I am aware had a good American Press, and he is of course very sensitive to that. So far as India is concerned, unreal character of his proposals, failure to accept reality of Japanese menace, &c., has probably been contributory cause of what is undoubtedly a fact that he did not get too good a press even in Indian papers which support Congress. There are indications also that soundings taken of provinces had not been too encouraging from his point of view: and while he has got Nehru and Kalam Azad on his side, our information suggests that neither of them is prepared to

[1] 'not shared' deciphered as 'danger (?check)ed'. In the text circulated to the War Cabinet (No. 196, App. I) this was altered to 'danger envisaged'.

[2] See Enclosure to No. 113. [3] See e.g. No. 144. [4] *Harijan*, 14 June 1942, p. 187.

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go in for mass civil disobedience. Finally, Jinnah has now published statement,[5] gist of which you have seen, which shows that he is not prepared to acquiesce in Gandhi's policy, or in any action by His Majesty's Government or Gandhi which may prejudice Muslim claims.

6. The Mahatma's reactions to this position are shown by the fact that in the last ten days he has spared no opportunity "to interpret" (and in the process to cloud and befog) his original slogan. No metaphysician could now draw any really firm conclusion from the original slogan read with the various riders which Gandhi has passed upon it. He is thus, so far as broad policy stands, in the position, which he always tries to create, in which he has the operation of a policy not clearly understood by either his followers or the world at large and the definition of which remains entirely in his own hands.

7. At the same time, while he may not have had the response for which he had hoped, he has with singular success again focussed attention in this country (and I should have thought also abroad) on himself. By securing the support (under whatever limitations) of Nehru and Azad he has got the backing of the main figures in the Working Committee, and the attention concentrated on Gandhi has still further detracted from the significance and activities of Rajagopalachariar. He has thus secured without any open clash with us certain of objects which he may be presumed to have had in view in launching his present agitation, and to that extent the need for extreme measures may perhaps be rather less from his point of view than it was at an earlier stage. It is very relevant, too, that Gandhi, so far as I can judge, has lost none of his political astuteness and I remain of opinion that he is as unlikely as in the past, particularly at his age and given the somewhat shaky condition of Congress, to engage in a battle in which he does not [feel?] fairly confident of victory.

8. I see no sign of any particular excitement in the country. As suggested above, I doubt if the response to an appeal for mass civil disobedience by Gandhi would be in any sense whole-hearted. Nor do I think such an appeal likely.

9. The next stage is the meeting of the Working Committee of Congress on 6th July. There is at this moment no clear indication of what proposition Gandhi is likely to put before them. I doubt myself if he is really yet clear in his mind. Moreover he is essentially an opportunist. It may be that the course of the Libyan campaign over the next fortnight will materially affect the line which the Working Committee and Gandhi will take. That we cannot judge.

10. I am however advised that whatever the Working Committee decide, it would be impossible for them to implement it, particularly if they have to go for confirmation to the All-India Congress Committee, within at least a fortnight from the date of their meeting. On that assumption, there is not a great deal to be gained at this stage by my examining for the benefit of the

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Cabinet alternative possibilities. I would prefer on the whole therefore to wait until the Working Committee has met and thereafter to advise you and the Cabinet in the light of their conclusions. There need be no delay about that and I should be able to avoid wasting your time by examining a series of hypotheses. Meanwhile I will of course keep you in the closest touch with any developments that may affect the general situation.

11. But I think I can properly at this stage record the following general propositions:—

(*a*) Neither His Majesty's Government nor I have any desire to take on Congress if we can avoid that consistently with maintaining war effort, and the provisions of the law, &c. We have quite enough on our hands already.

(*b*) On the other hand, if Congress attitude forces us to take them on, we must be prepared to do so and with the utmost vigour. That would be the case whether Congress attempt a policy of mass or individual civil disobedience throughout the whole country, or alternatively to slow down work in connection with war effort, or alternatively (perhaps in some ways as likely as any) issue instructions to refuse to pay land revenue, or to individuals in operational areas to get in the way of military arrangements for evacuation of areas, occupation of building, &c., and denial policy.

(*c*) We must[6] be prepared to contemplate the arrest of Gandhi, and if necessary of other leaders if circumstances so dictate. I attach relatively little importance to the other leaders, but Gandhi is a special case. If we are forced to arrest him, alternatives are to intern him outside India or in India. I have carefully considered these alternatives. In the result I conclude in favour of interning him in this country on the same lines as we had in view previously, viz. in a comfortable house probably in the Bombay Presidency, and giving all due consideration to him. He will, in my judgment, have far less popular appeal if he is interned here and be far less of a focus. I think effect too in the United States will probably be less unfortunate if he is kept in his own country in comfortable surroundings than if he is deported to Uganda or the like. Finally we avoid any risk of difficulties over food, medical attention, physical strain on him of a long air or sea passage.

12. I would however also add the following comments:—

(*a*) If we are faced with serious trouble here and are to come through it successfully, I must be assured of the complete backing of His Majesty's Government. My Council have made a very strong point of this. They

[5] No. 178. [6] Deciphered as 'might'.

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complain that when they are invited to go all out against Congress they cannot risk position being radically changed at a moment's notice without consultation with them by a Mission sent such as Cripps' from home which concentrates on Congress, and they urge very strongly that if they are to get on platforms and expose the fallacies of the Congress policy they should do so with an assurance that they will not be thrown overboard. I recognise that politics being what they are there cannot be any last word in matters such as these. But I should like to be able to assure my Council that in the event of their taking the line (and the political risk to themselves) involved they would do so with complete backing of His Majesty's Government.

(*b*) His Majesty's Government must be prepared to prepare the way in the United States and at home, and to do really active propaganda for our course of action. I thought your telegrams to Home Department, No. 10853 and No. 10854[7] admirable on those lines, but the ground requires very careful preparation.

(*c*) We must be prepared to take a much more rigid line as regards news, broadcasts, &c. I am telegraphing separately[8] to you about the B.B.C. and suggesting that a far greater degree of control over Indian material put out by it is called for. I can do a good deal myself with Reuters; but I should have to look to you and to His Majesty's Government to help so far as they could with Reuters and with the Press generally. I recognise that we cannot prevent people like Sorensen, &c. from asking questions in Parliament.

13. In concluding this appreciation I would only add that I have been strongly urged by certain of my advisers (and Twynam, the very experienced Governor of the Central Provinces, has recently taken the same line)[9] to dissuade Congress from any extreme action now by a formal warning on behalf of His Majesty's Government that if they now go against us in war His Majesty's Government would in no circumstances be prepared to deal with them again as a political party. I quite see the arguments on both sides. But after most careful consideration I am clear that it would not be politically practicable to take action on these lines. We cannot for ever ostracise a great political party which, misguided and malevolent as it may be, still has a first-class electoral machine and commands the votes (however obtained) of an immense preponderance of the Hindu population of this country. We should do ourselves far more harm than good if having taken the line suggested we then had to resile. I cannot, either, see any Government at home or Parliament committing themselves to a proposition of this order. I have little doubt that Congress realise that quite as well as we do and would be delighted to call our bluff were we to try something of this nature. My own considered view is

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therefore definitely against it, though I fully appreciate the motives that have actuated those who have tendered this advice to me.

14. There is a[10] further alternative less extreme than that discussed in the preceding paragraph which has also been urged on me by certain of my advisers to whose opinion I attach much importance. That is that we should make it clear to Congress that if they attempt to embarrass us now we will have nothing to do with them before the end of the war and that we shall certainly not be prepared to make any terms with them on the basis of blackmail, a statement which might be coupled with an indication that in any post-war settlement we might find ourselves bound to give weight to the views and feelings of those who had given us active support as against those who had adopted a policy of embarrassment at a critical moment. Here again, while fully appreciating the argument, I fear I gravely doubt whether even this would be practical policy. Governments cannot bind their successors. Nor would the reference to the post-war settlement be easy to reconcile with line taken in His Majesty's Government's recent declaration; while risk of driving Congress to extreme courses on pretext that nothing could be hoped for from us cannot be overlooked.

15. I have for the reasons given deliberately refrained from any examination of alternative courses of action in this telegram, but will only be too glad to let you have any supplementary information or comment on any point or aspect of this question which you or Cabinet may wish for the purpose of your discussions.

[7] Nos. 159 and 163. [8] No. 189. [9] No. 136.
[10] 'There is a' deciphered as 'This (sic) was'.

189

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *26 June 1942*

4. I was glad to get a telegram[1] from you this morning to the effect that you have now got practically all your Executive team together and hope it may not be many days now before you announce it. Meanwhile, I see Rajagopalachari has been having talks with Jinnah. This is all to the good so far as it goes. I don't imagine it is going far enough to make us reconsider the possibility of displacing your new Executive by a coalition of Muslim League,

[1] No. 1921-S of 25 June. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.

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moderate Congressmen, &c. However, sufficient for the day, and I will say the same about Gandhi and his manœuvres. If we can afford, when he comes into the open, to shrug our shoulders at him, so much the better. If not, then we shall have to act promptly and firmly.

190

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *27 June 1942, 2.15 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 27 June, 7 pm*

No. 1929-S. I have been very much disturbed by the prominence lately given to Nehru's and Gandhi's utterances in the B.B.C. overseas Broadcast. An instance is Nehru's Press interview in Bombay on 17th June,[1] which was quoted at quite disproportionate length in the B.B.C. overseas Broadcast at 21.30 I.S.T. on that day. The extracts given were as usual selected in such a way as to present Nehru's attitude in the most favourable light. You are as well aware as I am that the whole object of Congress propaganda is to present the Congress demands in a reasonable light so as to discredit British policy in the eyes of the world and particularly America and under pressure of world sympathy to make things go the Congress way, which is the Axis way. Why our sole national Broadcasting organization, which is presumably under the control of His Majesty's Government at least in war, should lend itself to this propaganda passes my comprehension. In doing so not only does it help the Congress case but it creates a world-wide impression that Nehru and Gandhi are entitled to speak for all India and are our natural and only successors in the event of the transfer of power which they demand. It is bad enough to have to contend with the misrepresentations of American correspondents without this additional help rendered to the enemy by the B.B.C. It is clear that there has been a radical change in the situation since the failure of the Cripps Mission. To that date we had still some slight hope that Congress might be prepared to co-operate on the very generous terms then offered. The failure of the Mission showed that that was not the case. There is now as you are aware from our separate correspondence quite a possibility that Gandhi may endeavour still further to embarrass us over war effort, &c. I can see no justification whatever in such circumstances for giving Gandhi and his friends any more publicity than we must. I recognize that in dealing with B.B.C. His Majesty's Government must give weight to certain arguments of a political character. But subject to that I would suggest for consideration that if it is not possible (which would

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be the ideal) to debar the B.B.C. from giving any publicity whatever to the utterances of Gandhi or Nehru or any other tendentious Congress news in the same way as they would be, I take it, prevented from broadcasting propaganda or tendentious news from any alien enemy source, such matter should be subjected to the closest scrutiny and that the minimum of publicity should be accorded to it.

2. We can of course prevent Reuter from carrying material of the nature under discussion. This is a more delicate and difficult matter and should not be necessary if the proper control could be exercised over the B.B.C., importance of whose broadcasts is so great, given the immensely wider audience which they tap. I greatly hope that you will be able to take up this matter successfully and should be grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible what you can do since the present state of Congress propaganda will do serious harm unless promptly checked.

[1] See No. 157.

191

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: ff 129–33

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *27 June 1942, 8 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 28 June*

11468. Your personal telegrams 24th and 25th June 1905–S[1] and 1920–S.[2] Mudaliar. I fear there is some misunderstanding. There seem to be two aspects to be clear about. First is position here and second is position in relation to your Council.

2. As regards the first, it is clearly undesirable in light of wording used in my answer in Commons on 12th February[3] and Prime Minister's answer in Commons on 5th February[4] to use phrase having any different connotation from that used for Dominions representatives occupying same position here and formula used in relation to Bruce by Attlee on 24th June (I am telegraphing full questions and answers)[5] was "accredited representative of Commonwealth Government at, repeat at, War Cabinet". Mudaliar cannot be "member" of War Cabinet in the sense that this would imply responsibility to Parliament of

[1] No. 183. [2] No. 186. [3] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 377, col. 1569.
[4] *Ibid.* cols. 1275–6; reproduced in Vol. I, No. 86, para. 2.
[5] In his telegram 11469 of 27 June Mr Amery transmitted to Lord Linlithgow the question and answer, with supplementary questions and answers, under the heading *War Cabinet* (*Australian Representative*). *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 380, cols. 1970–1.

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United Kingdom which he cannot possess any more than can the representative of the Australian or any Dominion Government but only in the same sense as the Australian representative. See Attlee's reply to supplementary. The Indian representatives will attend the War Cabinet as I do myself at the meetings at which there is a general review of the war situation but not meetings dealing with purely domestic matters. When attending they will of course participate in deliberations as fully as the British War Cabinet members. I agree that position of Mudaliar and Jam Sahib will be different from that of Advisers to Secretary of State, for they will be representatives of the Government of India appointed respectively by the Governor-General in Council and by the Crown Representative in consultation with the Governor-General in Council, and not, as in 1917, by the Secretary of State, and the logical consequence is no doubt that they will be competent to express their views independently of, though I hope not in conflict with, those of the Secretary of State.

3. As regards Mudaliar's position *vis-à-vis* your Council, I had understood from the outset that British Indian representative would be a member of your Council and would participate in deliberations of War Cabinet with the authority attaching to that position. It would, of course, be necessary for Mudaliar to hand over departmental responsibilities of member for Commerce to Sarkar, but there would be no need for him to demit office as member of Council and I see no difficulty about his continuing to hold that position even while resident here, though without any departmental portfolio. It may be objected that Section 92(3) of the Ninth Schedule[6] requires the appointment of a temporary Member of Council in Mudaliar's place, but I am advised that the "special duty" there mentioned may reasonably be taken to mean some mission the duties and purpose of which bear no relation to the person's position as Member of the Executive Council and that as our present intention, in view of war conditions not contemplated when the Act was formulated, is that the function of one Member of your Council should now be to represent the rest in London, this provision is irrelevant to the present case.

4. I fear it will be necessary to explain the position to Mudaliar on the foregoing basis, but I hope that he will not find proposition less attractive on that account.

5. I have no objection to dates of assumption of office proposed in your telegram 1920–S. But you might consider whether Jogendra Singh should not take office without portfolio at same time as other new members.

[6] Government of India Act 1935.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/543: f 28

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *27 June 1942, 1.45 am*

786. Your private and personal telegram of the 23rd June 1893–S.[1] Defence Department. Many thanks. I am content to accept the position now stated by you and do not wish to comment further.

[1] No. 179.

193

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: ff 134–6

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *27 June 1942, 4.50 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 28 June*

787. In connection with my personal telegram No. 11468[1] replying to your 1905–S[2] and 1920–S,[3] I have built my supposition that Mudaliar would remain Member of your Council on your private and personal telegram of 30th January, 188–S,[4] and subsequent correspondence has not disturbed it till now. As regards question of "membership" of War Cabinet, I had thought the position was clear from my private and personal telegrams 166, 167 and 169.[5] For your personal information the difficulties alluded to in my 166 arose from fact that in the rather tense atmosphere obtaining at that date Australian Government asked for membership of War Cabinet and it had to be explained to them with some difficulty that representation proposed could not without embarrassing consequences be described as membership since this connotes responsibility to Parliament here, which the representative of Dominion Government whether or not he is also[6] member of it cannot have. The questions and[7] answers given in Parliament on 24th June in regard to position of Bruce, which I am repeating in following personal telegram[8] and which should be read with reference to those repeated in my 169, show the correct formula to describe the position of overseas representative and also indicate the undesirability of attempting to define scope of his functions in public too closely.

[1] No. 191. [2] No. 183. [3] No. 186. [4] Vol. I, No. 47.
[5] Vol. I, Nos. 83, 84, and 86. [6] Deciphered as 'incorporated'. [7] Deciphered as 'suggest'.
[8] See No. 191, note 5.

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2. I will not disguise from you my apprehension that the Indian representative may find his duties of only intermittent importance and that he may get bored and discontented. It is for that reason that I am rather in favour of getting Mudaliar over to America to the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference, which is likely to be important in itself and afford a wider outlook. For the same reason I still see advantages in your representation being rotational, for example Mudaliar with insight into Imperial strategical problems acquired by association with War Cabinet might, after reasonable period here, 6 to 8 months, change places with say Firoz, who would come to War Cabinet with an intimate knowledge of Indian Defence Department. With reference to your telegram 1513-S[9] of 26th May, would it be worth while to hint something of this to Mudaliar?

[9] No. 87.

194

Sir H. Seymour to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 221

SECRET CHUNGKING, *27 June 1942, 8.42 pm*
Received: 27 June, 10.45 pm

901. Your telegrams No. 836[1] and No. 837.[2]
I had long interview with Chiang Kai-shek on June 25th and explained the present situation in India on the lines of your telegrams.

2. Later in the day Chiang Kai-shek asked me, before telegraphing to you, to let him see my note of the discussion. I accordingly sent him a summary in which had been made some small modifications and my immediately succeeding telegram contains the text as agreed by him.

3. It is fairly clear that while Chiang Kai-shek still does not fully realise the difficulties of the political solution in India, he is becoming increasingly anxious about the situation.
Repeated to Government of India.

[1] No. 153. [2] See Nos. 153 and 163.

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Sir H. Seymour to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 222

SECRET CHUNGKING, *27 June 1942, 10.15 am*
Received: 27 June, 9.45 pm

902. My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is summary referred to.

Chiang Kai-shek received me on the evening of June 25th. I laid before him the views of His Majesty's Government on the situation in India, the possibility of some movement being started by Gandhi, and the necessity, if this occurred, of measures being taken to prevent any interference with the war effort.

2. His Excellency said that if developments of this kind occurred they would of course constitute an internal (grp. undec.? British) problem and he would not like to say anything on the matter.

3. India was indeed of vital importance to the war effort of the United Nations and he would like to have a talk on these questions speaking quite informally and in his private capacity. During his visit to India in February last, he had seen Gandhi who had then spoken entirely on the lines of non-violent resistance. Since that time Chiang Kai-shek had not corresponded with Gandhi but he had told Gandhi indirectly more than once that he should refrain from starting any movement which would embarrass the war effort.

4. A few days ago Chiang Kai-shek had received letter[1] from Gandhi of which the main points were the following:—

(i) Gandhi favoured resistance to the Japanese invasion of India.
(ii) He would do nothing to embarrass China and would do anything he could to help her.
(iii) There should be Treaty of Alliance between India and the Allied Governments of such nature as to enable India to assist the Allied war effort and under which India could form a basis of Allied resistance to Japan; (while not specifically named Great Britain was clearly included among the Allied Governments).
(iv) Gandhi stated that he would not start any movement.

5. Chiang Kai-shek had indirectly asked Gandhi not to publish this letter saying that he would not publish it himself. He felt however that the line taken by Gandhi in the letter constituted a great advance in his attitude at the time of their meeting in February.

[1] No. 231.

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6. Point number (iii) of the letter brought up the question, which had already been mentioned earlier in the conversation, of the difficulties in the way of constituting a government in India unless differences of view between different communities could be first resolved. Chiang Kai-shek said that after his return from India, he had, when making a report of his tour, expressed the view that the formation of a government which would receive sufficient measure of general assent would depend entirely on the British policy towards India. He still believes this to be the case.

7. Returning to the question of Gandhi, Chiang Kai-shek observed that according to common experience, it was always easier to hinder a task than to carry it to completion. And the power of obstruction was often increased rather than diminished by drastic measures taken against it.

8. Chiang Kai-shek spoke very frankly on these subjects and made it quite clear that he was simply expressing his personal reflections and that he was not to be taken as wishing to intervene in the matter which would have to be dealt with by the British and Indian authorities.

9. Information with regard to the letter addressed to Chiang Kai-shek by Gandhi was given me in strict confidence and must not be disclosed.

Repeated to Government of India.

196

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 271

L/P&J/8/596: ff 96–8

Policy to be Adopted towards Mr. Gandhi

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India

INDIA OFFICE, *27 June 1942*

With reference to War Cabinet Conclusions of the 15th June, 74 (42), Minute 3,[1] and to my Memorandum W.P. (42) 255[2] of the 16th June, I circulate (Appendix I) for the consideration of the War Cabinet a telegram from the Viceroy, giving his appreciation of the situation.

I also circulate (Appendix II) a summary of a report of the discussion in the Congress Working Committee on Gandhi's original draft of the Congress War Resolution, the text of which will be found in W.P. (42) 255. This throws much light on the differences of opinion in the Committee.

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Appendix I to No. 196

[*There follows the text of No. 188, paras. 1–12.*]

Appendix II to No. 196

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION[3] IN CONGRESS WORKING COMMITTEE ON THE CONGRESS WAR RESOLUTION FINALLY ADOPTED ON MAY 1[4]

Nehru urged that Gandhi's draft made the wrong approach. The British could not reasonably withdraw their troops even if they recognised independence; withdrawal of troops and the whole apparatus of civil administration would create a vacuum which could not be filled immediately. Moreover, the conquest of India is in the Japanese plan. If the British withdrew, the Japanese would insist on certain facilities—aerodromes, occupation of strategic points, passage for troops to the Middle East. Acceptance of the policy in Gandhi's draft would make India a passive partner of the Axis Powers. He repeatedly emphasised this last point and said that the Japanese could not be stopped by non-violent non-co-operation, while Congress would get hostility from every other element outside the Axis Powers. The whole thought and background of Gandhi's draft was one of favouring Japan. It was Gandhi's feeling that Japan and Germany would win. He thought Congress were agreed (1) on their reactions to Government; (2) on their total inability to co-operate with Government; (3) on their policy not to embarrass Government because that would help the invader.

Points made by speakers who supported Nehru were:—

Pandit Pant: The language about condemnation of the Cripps proposals is highly exaggerated—if the proposals were so bad, why did we spend so much time over them? We must do our utmost to defend the country and swallow many things. If I can't co-operate with the British it is because it is not consistent with our dignity. But the approach in Gandhi's draft makes every soldier I see my enemy.

Asaf Ali: Telling the British to withdraw will do nobody any good.

Bhulabhai Desai: The resolution is inconsistent with our previous stand. We have said that if offered an opportunity we shall side with the Allies.

Satyamurti: I do not agree with the objection to the entry of foreign soldiers. India may defend herself even with the aid of foreign soldiers.

Rajagopalachariar also criticised the original draft and its amendment by Rajendra Prasad. The new interpretation of Congress policy would go terribly against them, and Japan would say: "Excellent!" Japan would fill the vacuum

[1] No. 146. [2] No. 150.

[3] Cf. Enclosure to No. 113. [4] Enclosure to No. 43, col. 3.

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created by the British withdrawal. "Our reaction to the evils of Britain should not make us lose our sense of perspective. Do not run into the arms of Japan, which is what the resolution comes to."

But in spite of Nehru's criticisms the majority of the Working Committee supported Gandhi's draft, as amended by Rajendra Prasad.

Kripalani: The resolution will not necessarily lead to the passage of Japanese armies through India. Congress have asked British and Americans to withdraw their armies, and so also they ask others to keep out of their frontiers. "If they do not, we fight."

Patwardhan: If we do not take decisions Nehru's attitude will lead to abject and unconditional co-operation with British machinery which must collapse. Co-operation with Britain is an invitation to Japan. The war is an imperialist war. Our policy can be that we take no sides. I would reconsider the position if the Allies could defeat the Axis. But I see clearly that Britain is going towards the deep. We want to create neutrality.

Vallabh[bh]ai Patel: The British cannot defend India. We cannot defend it either because they won't let us. But if they withdraw there is a chance for us. Congress to-day is reeling under two blows, one Cripps and the other Rajagopalachariar's resolutions. I feel Gandhi is instinctively right in the lead he gives in all critical situations. It is time the door (to negotiations with the British Government) was finally closed after the repeated insults heaped on us.

Sarojini Naidu: The draft is good as an expression of our extreme disgust and dislike and hatred of the British Government.

Bishwanath Das: The Cripps proposals if accepted would have kept us in permanent bondage. The appeal to Britain to withdraw is very proper.

A. N. Deo: Whatever unreality there is in Indian politics is due to British rule. Let it go and the unreality will disappear. I am not interested in defeating Hitlerite Germany.

Maulana Kalam Azad: Great Britain has made it impossible for us to defend our country. If I felt that Japan was better than Britain and her invasion was for the good of India I would have said so in public. Gandhi's prescription is the only alternative, though I doubt its effectiveness.

Gandhi's resolution, as amended by Rajendra Prasad, and an alternative resolution submitted by Nehru were put to the vote. The former was adopted at the morning session on the 1st May, but the matter was reopened at the afternoon session and Nehru's draft was finally adopted.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *28 June 1942, 5 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1942–S. Council. Srivastava has accepted. I now only await formal confirmation from C. P. and Jogendra Singh. Like you, I am anxious to get out announcement as early as possible, though I doubt whether we can do so before morning papers of Friday, July 3rd. Would it be possible now to get either formal or informal approval of those who have accepted (Ambedkar, Srivastava, Usman, Benthall) and informal contingent approval of Jogendra Singh and C. P. I am not sure whether His Majesty's approval is necessary for appointment of Firoz and Sarker to their new portfolios, but if so it could be obtained simultaneously. It will *not* be possible to announce dates of assumption, which may take some time to settle, but for His Majesty's information I would aim at making the changes as early as possible and in any event by end of July. Announcement when made will also have to cover appointments of Mudaliar and Jam Saheb to War Cabinet, which will also I assume require His Majesty's approval.

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The Maharaja of Indore to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

28 June 1942

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am writing with reference to the interview[1] I had with Your Excellency in Delhi. I should like to place beyond all shadow of doubt my real intentions in writing my open letter and the circumstances in which I came to write it. Above all, I wish to express my deep regret that its publication should have caused Your Excellency any embarrassment.

The intention of my open letter, which was written, not on advice but on my own initiative, was that its publication might contribute to a solution of the political tangle which is so widely being made an excuse, by certain political factions, for failure to assist in India's war effort, and which, in fact, does seriously obstruct the building up of India's military strength.

[1] See No. 116.

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With the failure of the Cripps mission and the visibly growing hostility between the various political and religious groups in India, I do firmly believe that an attempt to close our ranks, by employing the method of arbitration, with the help of representatives of the United Nations, would not only relieve the British Government of an immense burden, but would cut the ground from beneath the feet of those who, deliberately or misguidedly, at present oppose the creation of a united war front in India.

With this exposition of my motives, I trust Your Excellency will realise that, in issuing my open letter to the Press, I had no other object than to promote resistance to the enemy by arousing public interest in a new and practical method of solving India's problems.

That this attempt might be construed as an attempt to hold communication with Foreign Powers, or as a breach of my Treaty Obligations, simply did not occur to me and has occasioned me deep regret, especially as I am able to assure Your Excellency that no actual letter or communication, from me to President Roosevelt, was ever contemplated or despatched.

In conclusion, I wish again to assure Your Excellency that you have, as always, my most earnest and continuing support in your efforts for the eventual victory of the United Nations.

Yours sincerely,

JASHWANT RAO HOLKAR

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *29 June 1942, 6.15 pm*
Received: 29 June, 6.15 pm

No. 1948–S. Patiala has written agreeing to spare Jogendra Singh. I understand Travancore has also agreed to make C. P. available. We are therefore now complete, and I hope you will be able to make necessary submission to the King. If you agree we could make announcement in the morning papers of either Thursday, 2nd July or Friday, 3rd July.

2. I am telegraphing separately about Mudaliar's position in reply to your telegrams just received. How ought we to describe him and the Jam Saheb in the communiqué? I do not want to give rise to a great deal of embarrassing speculation about precise nature of their membership of War Cabinet which from what you tell me is clearly highly technical. We might say either (*a*) "The King has also approved the appointment of X and Y as the Representative

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of India at the Imperial War Cabinet and on the Pacific Council" or (*b*) "the accredited[1] representatives" (I dislike this a little though it may be technically correct since it expands the announcement and distracts people's attention from the War Cabinet) or (*c*) thirdly we might amend (*a*) above by leaving out reference to the Pacific Council altogether and concentrate on the War Cabinet. Would you telegraph urgently?

3. I am rather inclined to call the new "balance of communications" portfolio "Posts and air" since its most important components are the Posts and Telegraphs Department and Civil Aviation. What do you think?

[1] Deciphered as '(?Moslem)'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *29 June 1942, 8.50 pm*
Received: 30 June, 12.45 am

No. 1951-G. Following is summary of article by Gandhi entitled "Two actions" in *Harijan* of June 28th:—

Begins. My proposal for withdrawal of British power involves two actions, one to deal with present emergency and other to secure freedom from British supremacy. Second admits of delay; there is much confusion about its implications which I am trying to deal with as questions arise. First admits of no delay and demands specific action irrespective of proposal for British withdrawal. This is in connection with (1) behaviour of troops, (2) impending salt famine, (3) control of food grains, (4) evacuation for sake of military, and (5) discrimination between Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Anglo-Burmans on one hand and Indians on the other.

2. (1) People have law and public opinion wholly on their side. Government machinery always slow to move is more so now, when mortgaged for military preparations. People must everywhere learn to defend themselves against misbehaving individuals. No doubt non-violent way is always best, but where that does not come naturally violent way is both necessary and honourable. Inaction here is rank cowardice and unmanly. It must be shunned at all cost. (2) Law is not quite on people's side but right is wholly on their side. I hope Government will put widest construction on clause referring to salt in Gandhi–Irwin Pact[1] and allow people to manufacture salt wherever they can. I would advise them to manufacture salt even at risk of prosecution. Necessity knows no law. (3) This is

[1] See No. 290, note 2.

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difficult but same rule applies. Food cannot be manufactured as easily as salt. It is up to merchants to co-operate and force hands of Government by suggesting wise rules for supply of food to poor people at fixed prices, otherwise looting shops is sure to be daily event. (4) Authorities may not ask people to vacate except where they are ready to offer equivalent land and buildings and cart people and belongings to places prepared for them and pay them living wage till they find suitable occupation. People, if they have nowhere to move, should simply refuse to vacate and suffer consequences. (5) People should refuse to submit to discrimination and it will break down. Most of these difficulties take place because we have cultivated habit of submitting to them. *Ends.*

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: f 62

MOST SECRET WASHINGTON, *29 June 1942*
Received: 3 July, 1.30 pm

298 Saving. Your telegrams Nos. 3849[1] and 3850.[2]

As I was seeing Mr. Hull on another subject on June 18th shortly after the receipt of the first of these telegrams, I took the opportunity of speaking to him on the lines of the telegram and of warning him how matters stood. After our conversation, I sent the substance of the telegram to Mr. Hull in writing and subsequently, on receipt of your telegram No. 3850, I sent him a copy of this message also.

2. I have since discussed the matter with the Indian Agent General who has undertaken to speak to suitable newspaper representatives on the whole question. Sir G. Bajpai feels, and I agree, that it would be preferable for no action to be taken here in the direction of preparing the ground until after the Working Committee of Congress has taken its decision early next month. Our position will be much stronger if we comment on a decisive act by the Committee rather than if we were to take anticipatory action. Sir G. Bajpai also thinks that it might be better if, instead of following the "guidance" set out in your telegram No. 3850, he were to take the line with the newspaper representatives of producing an anthology of the hostile comments upon America and the Americans made recently by Gandhi and of pointing out how damaging such an attitude of mind is to the United Nations in their struggle against the Axis. He thinks that this approach is best calculated to make American journalists more ready to appreciate the necessity of checking Gandhi's anti-British movements in the interests of the common cause.

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He has drawn the attention of various key persons to this anthology with good effect.

3. While all this is useful, and while at present opinion here is disposed to condemn Gandhi's unreason, we must not disguise from ourselves that if and when the Government of India have to arrest Gandhi, there will be considerable danger of American opinion being again switched back on to idea of British repression etc.

[1] No. 152. [2] See Nos. 152 and 163.

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Mr Amery to Sir A. Hardinge

L/P&J/8/544: ff 29–30

INDIA OFFICE, *29 June 1942*

My dear Alec,

As His Majesty is aware, the Viceroy has for some time been considering the addition of certain new Members to his Executive Council. Of the twelve Members, Hydari and Raghavendra Rao have died and Clow has been appointed Governor of Assam, so that there are three vacancies. Linlithgow has for some time felt that it would be advantageous to enlarge his Council still further in order to include representatives of the Sikhs, the Depressed Classes, and the European community. In order to achieve this it is now proposed that two new portfolios be created, by separating War Transport, which will cover railways and ports, from Communications, which include such matters as posts and telegraphs; and by creating a portfolio for Defence to be held by an Indian, the Commander-in-Chief becoming War Member, their respective functions being broadly those discussed by Cripps when he was in India. It is intended that Mudaliar, the present Commerce Member, should come over here to be one of India's representatives at the War Cabinet, and the other would be the Jam Sahib. I have suggested to Linlithgow, and I think he will agree, that Mudaliar should remain a member of the Executive Council without portfolio, so that he will be here as an actual member of the Government of India and not merely as a representative.

On this basis there are six places to be filled and Linlithgow has now put forward the names of Sir Mahomed Usman, Sir J. P. Srivastava and Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, in addition to Benthall, whose appointment has already been approved by The King. I enclose a formal submission[1] to His Majesty for the appointment of these three new Members.

[1] Not printed.

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The other two places it is proposed to fill by the appointment of Sir Jogendra Singh to represent the Sikhs and Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, the present Diwan of Travancore, who will replace the element of States experience previously found in Hydari. Unfortunately, the way is not quite clear to make a formal submission in regard to these two, as although they have themselves agreed to serve, the assent of the Indian Princes by whom they are now employed has still to be obtained. Linlithgow is anxious to make a very early announcement of all the new appointments together and I should be most grateful if His Majesty would also give his informal approval to the appointment of these two members and allow an announcement to be made as soon as their final acceptances are received. I will of course submit a further formal submission at the earliest possible date for His Majesty's signature.

I enclose for His Majesty's information a statement[2] showing the present holders of the different portfolios and the allocation now proposed, and also short particulars about the proposed new members.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

[2] Not printed.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT *30 June 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1955-S. I have replied separately[1] to your personal telegram No. 11468.[2] I will send you copy of my letter to Mudaliar by bag of 30th June. I quite appreciate point you take in paragraph 2 of your private and personal telegram of 27th June, No. 787,[3] and you will by now have had my telegram strongly supporting idea of Mudaliar for Institute of Pacific Relations. I have also written to him telling him that this is in the air, and that you and I hope that he would be willing to serve if representation materialises. As for rotation, I quite see argument, and hinted somewhat obliquely to Mudaliar at possibility of relief after a while. But I am disposed to let him have a run and see how things go, and I want Firoz to have a chance of working up the Defence portfolio, while, equally, in fairness to Azizul Haque (an argument which you brought to my notice sometime ago)[4] I do not want him to return to London too soon after handing over as High Commissioner.

[1] No. 204. [2] No. 191. [3] No. 193. [4] No. 11, para. 2.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *30 June 1942, 1.10 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 30 June, 3.45 pm*

No. 1956–S. Many thanks for your personal telegram of 27th June, No. 11468.[1] Mudaliar.

2. I am sorry if there is any misunderstanding about his position as a Member of my Council. There is no question of his vacating that position, and he will retain it while serving with the War Cabinet. The only point which I was anxious to clear was whether he could, in fact, assume those new responsibilities while in India. Your reply makes it clear that there is no obstacle to his doing so, and I have so informed him.

3. As regards "membership", I have written to Mudaliar, who is on tour, to explain the position and that he and the Jam Saheb will be accredited representatives of India at the War Cabinet and on the Pacific Council. I am consulting you separately[2] as to phrase to be used in announcement of expansion of my Council. Explanation which I have given him follows general line indicated by you, and I have sent him text of Parliamentary questions of 5th February and 24th June, which you let me have. I have also made it clear that the position of Indian representatives will be the same as that of those of the Dominions. I hope that this will satisfy him.

[1] No. 191. [2] No. 199.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/544: ff 11–12

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *30 June 1942, 8.15 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 1 July*

798. Your telegram of the 29th June, 1948–S.[1]

Necessary submissions have been approved by King. My immediately following telegram contains a suggested draft of the announcement which if you agree might be made in the morning papers of Thursday, 2nd July.

[1] No. 199.

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2. With regard to your paragraph 2. I am satisfied that it is unnecessary to obtain King's approval as Dominions Office have not done so in case of Australian representative. Position has been explained to Palace informally. I therefore suggest reversion to the form of announcement agreed between us last February (my telegram of the 22nd February, 3102).[2] It is perhaps rather long but at least states the position more clearly. Perhaps you will specify in replying the correct order in which the full list of Members should appear.

3. I should myself prefer "Aviation and Posts" for the new Department's title but will substitute your choice in the draft announcement if you prefer it.

4. Benthall left here by Air on 29th June.

5. Please telegraph most immediate whether you agree text of communiqué and publication on Thursday.

[2] Vol. I, No. 149; the date should be 18 February.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/544: ff 13–15

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *30 June*[1] *1942, 8.50 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

799. Following is draft announcement:—

Begins. His Majesty the King has been pleased to approve the appointment of Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Sir E. C. Benthall, Sir Jogendra Singh, Sir J. P. Srivastava and Sir Mohammed Usman to the Executive Council of the Governor-General of India. These appointments have been made in order to fill the vacancies caused by the deaths of the Rt. Hon. Sir Akbar Hydari and Mr. Raghavendra Rao and by the appointment of Sir Andrew Clow to be Governor of Assam, and also to fill additional seats which have been created to meet the expanding work of the Council.

2. The portfolio of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has been designated that of War. The functions of the Defence Member will include the work of the Defence Co-ordination Department with such other matters relating to the defence of India as are not included in the War and Civil Defence portfolios.

3. The distribution of portfolios among the Members of the Executive Council (other than the Governor-General) will be as follows:—

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H.E. the Commander-in-Chief ...	War.
Sir R. Maxwell	Home.
Sir J. Raisman	Finance.
Sir R. Mudaliar	Member without Portfolio, &c., &c.

4. His Majesty's Government have invited the Government of India if they so desire to arrange for the representation of India at the War Cabinet and on the Pacific War Council in London. This invitation has been accepted and the Governor-General in Council has accordingly nominated Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar for this purpose and has suggested to His Excellency the Crown Representative that he should invite a member of the Order of Princes to join Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar in representing India at the War Cabinet and on the Pacific War Council. His Excellency in consultation with the Governor-General in Council has invited His Highness the Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar to serve for the present in this capacity and His Highness has accepted the invitation. *Ends.*

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 gives the date as 1 July.

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Sir A. Hardinge to Mr Amery

L/P&J/8/544: f 25

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *30 June 1942*

My dear Leo,

I write to thank you for your letter[1] of yesterday giving an explanation of the appointments which the Viceroy wishes to make to his Executive Council, and enclosing a statement of the present and future constitutions of the Council. The King has read these with much interest; and has signed the submission relative to three of them, which I now return.

His Majesty is pleased to give his informal approval in regard to Sir Jogendra Singh and Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, in respect of whom a formal submission will be made as soon as the assent of the Indian Princes concerned has been received.

Ever yours,

ALEXANDER HARDINGE

[1] No. 202.

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Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL BARNES COURT, SIMLA, *30 June 1942*

D.-o. No. 400-F.L.

News of the set-backs in Libya and Egypt has, as is only natural, been exercising a very disheartening effect though it has not produced the same degree of consternation as an immediate threat to India from the East. Another factor which is persistently lowering the morale of certain classes is Mr. Gandhi's pernicious writings in the *Harijan*. From his latest lucubrations there would seem to be some grounds for believing that he is now thinking better of indulging in the particular form of anti-Government activity which he originally contemplated. But there is a general belief that he will before long resort to some spectacular variety of mischief designed to restore the prestige of Congress and to focus the limelight on himself. The advice that he gives to the public, illogical and confused though it may be, is undoubtedly disseminating poison, and there are many, both among officials and non-officials, who express no little surprise that the Congress campaign to undermine the war effort is allowed to continue. I have no hesitation in agreeing with Hallett's view that if Gandhi oversteps the mark, we cannot on this occasion afford to give him any interval of grace.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *30 June 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

5. I turn now to your letter of 10th June.[1] Let me first of all on the political side say that I hope you may have found my appreciation of 26th June, No. 1928-S,[2] useful to you. As always it probably tends to err a little on the side of length: but while I have full sympathy for Winston and with over-pressed Members of the Cabinet in having to read long telegrams or long despatches it is in fact entirely out of the question, save at the risk of giving a false impression or of provoking enquiries and lengthy exchanges of telegrams, to convey from here one's conclusions on issues of really first class importance, and to give the material necessary to judge those issues to the Cabinet, except at some little length. Moreover, as you will have gathered from paragraphs 13

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and 14 of my telegram, there are occasions on which there are other factors to be considered, and one has to be ready to insert in one's recommendations propositions of the unsoundness of which one is oneself entirely convinced, but which one cannot well refuse to bring to the notice of the ultimate authorities without some risk of unduly depressing trusted and well-meaning advisers. Nothing has happened in the few days since that appreciation issued to make me alter my views in any way, though I have been a good deal amused by Gandhi's latest statements, the text of which you will find in the issue of the *Harijan*[3] which goes to you by this bag, and which almost justify the compressed version given of them by one newspaper correspondent as "Gandhi's explanation that he had forgotten that if the British vacated India it might be occupied by the Japanese". That is indeed too compressed a version. But it is not too far off the truth, and the statement on which it is based shows the Mahatma moving even more rapidly than before into the fog, and away from the agreeable precision and conciseness of his original slogan.

6. Before I leave the constitutional side, let me say a word about paragraph 11 of your letter and the effect of the Cripps mission on the Princes. It has undoubtedly been very bad, and you will have had by now not only Bikaner's memorandum but the Jam Saheb's reasoned remonstrance.[4] I commented on that at some length in a preliminary way in last week's letter.[5] I have now approved an official communication[6] to you from the Political Department covering it, and if I can possibly find time I will send you by today's bag a personal letter[7] which is likely to take very much the line which I took in my letter of last week. I fear there is no question that Cripps has seriously disturbed the Princes. I particularly regret this at a time when I am anxious to press on with reforms in the States as rapidly as possible consistently with not hurting the Princes so hard as to disturb their war effort; and I am by no means certain that one effect of his mission is not going to be to make it far more difficult than would otherwise have been to reconcile those sometimes conflicting objectives. I heartily agree with you (and it is indeed very much the suggestion which I put to you last week) that much of what Cripps said outside the actual terms of the draft Declaration in connection with the Princes will have to be ignored in future, and may have to be corrected by definite statements on the part of the Secretary of State or the Viceroy to make it clear that we are not going back on our treaty obligations, and that we shall certainly find ways and means of protecting the Princes who stay out of an Indian Union, or who, having joined it, are not prepared to leave the Empire.

7. I also quite agree with your comment in paragraph 12 of your letter on Bijoy Prasad Singh Roy's letter.[8] Of course, I can do, and always will do

[1] No. 138. [2] No. 188. [3] Of 28 June. [4] No. 115. [5] No. 181, para. 12.
[6] No. 187. [7] No. 232. [8] No. 66.

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(and I think I can claim always to have done) everything I possibly can to secure and to consolidate the unity of India—it was indeed one of the themes on which in the earlier part of my Viceroyalty I thought it wise to harp with unending insistence. But I wholly agree with you that the right way, and the only way, to bring that much desired consummation about is, as you say, not by going hat in hand to impossible political leaders, but by consolidating India so far as one can in her own defence by getting together over war effort, the martial classes, the Princes, the services, the solid middle classes and the responsible elements in this country.

8. As I write I think I have got the balance of my Council and I am telegraphing[9] to say so. I send you copy of my correspondence[10] with Patiala by this bag—as in the case of Travancore I have of course had to make it clear that there could be no question of Jogendra Singh continuing, while a Member of my Council, to have any responsibility whatever for the Patiala State affairs. Srivastava is well pleased—I hope we shall not have too much trouble over his business interests. But, as you will see from his letter,[11] he proposes to let me have specific propositions in that regard. C. P. amused me by sending me a draft of a communiqué which should say that while he "has been invited in view of the present emergency to accept office . . . and with the consent of the Maharaja has agreed to do so . . . it is understood that he expects to resume service in the State when the present emergency is over"! I am not prepared to go so far as that, and C. P. will have to take his place in the general announcement with the others. But I will of course be at pains through the Press to let it be known that he does expect to resume service in Travancore once the emergency is over and he has relinquished his seat on my Council. I am bound to say that looking at the expanded Council as a whole I think it is a pretty good body. Jogendra Singh is probably much the weakest link in it, but in his case at any rate one can feel that one has had a certain *quid pro quo*, if Patiala is right in his conclusion (and I have no doubt that he is, since Baldev Singh has also written to support it) that Jogendra Singh's appointment will go on well with the Sikhs.

9. Many thanks for your useful telegrams[12] about the position of our representatives in the War Cabinet. They have cleared the air. There had never been any question of Mudaliar ceasing to be a Member of my Council and I am telegraphing[13] to make that clear. The other business is more complicated, for we do not want to say anything in public here which will in any way detract from the value of membership of the Cabinet. Neither of course do we want to say anything which will have embarrassing reactions on the Dominions, or will not correspond to the facts. I have therefore been at pains to write at some length to Mudaliar, and I will send you copy of my letter[14] to him by this bag. I hope that he will not be disappointed, and I have done my best, as you

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will see, to avoid any suggestion that what is in fact the position is other than a matter of course. I have thought it better to say nothing about rotation in the letter. I think there is a good deal of force in what you say on that point. But beyond touching in very general terms in my conversations with him on the possibility of relief in due course it has seemed to me best to let the situation take shape a little further. And as regards the replacement of Mudaliar by Firoz (for which I agree there is a great deal to be said both on communal and on other grounds) I have always had in mind the point which you made at an earlier stage[15] that, if there is to be any question of Firoz returning to London, there would be advantage in his doing so after his successor had been sufficiently long as High Commissioner to be able to stand on his own feet.

* * *

13. I am not disposed to take too seriously the criticism you mention in paragraph 3 of your letter about war-mindedness out here. In a country of the size of India, a good deal must turn on where exactly one is. Conditions in the threatened areas on the east coast, with black-outs and the like, can fall very little short, if at all, of conditions at home at the present time. Conditions in the centre of the country, a thousand or fifteen hundred miles from the sea, comparatively free from any risk of air attack, are naturally different so far as lighting restrictions go and the like: but there too, as throughout the country, there has been a very substantial and very marked change in the social make-up. The old lavish entertaining which was so characteristic of India has gone, and people are living in war conditions, though it goes without saying again that food rationing and the like have not, so long as there is no marked shortage, advanced to anything like the same point as at home. Most of the austerities at home come presumably from shortages of goods and services. Here there is no dearth of Indian servants, and very few shortages in creature comforts manufactured or grown in this country. So far as hours of work go, we are dealing with a population, Indian as well as European, which is affected by the summer climate, while as regards Europeans I think it would be a profound mistake either to overpress personnel (already so far as I can judge pretty hard driven—I feel little doubt that this hot weather in Delhi, and the hours and conditions under which we are working is going to tell very heavily on many individuals) or to insist on gloom and discomfort before we need. You know as well as I do the sapping effect in any circumstances of long residence in the tropics, and while life has probably always been a little more large in the east than it is at home, I have not much doubt that that fact corresponds to some extent to certain necessities of the situation, while the photographs one sees in the picture papers received from home of general entertainment in London expose

[9] No. 199. [10] Not printed. [11] Not printed. [12] Nos. 191 and 193.
[13] No. 204. [14] Not printed. [15] No. 11, para. 2.

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themselves, as you say, to much the same sort of criticism as that with which I am dealing.

14. Many thanks for what you say in paragraph 4 of your letter about the Cripps Mission—what I am chiefly concerned about is that the facts should be on record! This business has had too many somewhat curious aspects for me to think it wise to run any risk of misconception as to what actually took place; and I have been impressed by the extremely bad Press which Cripps has had among Congress papers, &c. for the interview which he gave a few days ago to the *Hindu*, which in its explanation of what he actually meant when he talked about "National Government" or "Cabinet" does, I fear, ask for a good deal of the rather venomous criticism that has been levelled at it.

15. As for non-official Advisers, I have no doubt that we were right in our decision (I added a postscript touching on this matter to my last letter).[16] There is a possibility of a Government in Assam, and until he knows where he stands about that Clow has let me know that he does not propose to appoint an *official* Adviser. My own disposition on his letters is to advise him to go rather slow with Saadulla if the price of getting Saadulla in is to be any further attack on the financial position of the Province—already far from ideal. Rajagopalachari, so far as I can judge, is losing his fight in Madras, but he is causing a good deal of heart searching among many of the "high ups" in Congress and outside it. I agree with Twynam that Khare equally is not a sufficient foundation to build on. Nor, to be frank, do I at this moment feel that, e.g. the restoration of Parliamentary Government in Assam or even the Central Provinces has anything like the interest or significance from the Parliamentary or world point of view that it might have had eight or ten months ago.

16. I have seen a great deal of correspondence between Krishna Menon and Nehru at various times recently, and in a recent letter[17] again suggested to you the possibility of doing something to curb Krishna Menon's activities at your end. I am not quite certain that I have seen all the telegrams which you clearly have in mind in paragraph 7 of your letter. But I will look again and make sure. Nehru, in my judgment, has lost a great deal of ground and he knows it. Over this Burma evacuation business I have sent you a long telegram[18] as a result of considerable discussion with Aney—it goes less far than I could have wished, but I feel some sympathy for Aney's personal difficulties. You will be glad to hear that he has readily agreed to convey the formal thanks of the Government of India to the workers on evacuation.

* * *

22. I see from some Parliamentary questions on the 5th March,[19] copies of which have recently come out, that Vernon Bartlett raised the question of informal Press conferences by the Viceroy on the same lines as those held by

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Roosevelt, and that you promised to pass that suggestion to me. I have often considered the possibility of my seeing the Press, but the objections and the dangers are very real. I, after all, am the head of the Executive Government here, and also the representative of the Crown, but I am under the control of His Majesty's Government in the terms of the Act, and I am not therefore a free agent to the extent that is the President of the United States. Again, so far as departmental matters here are concerned, I cannot (as could a Minister on a short visit to this country, e.g. Cripps) take refuge in saying that the decision is really one for the Viceroy or for some other authority—the moment one found oneself in a Press conference, one would rather refuse to answer questions at the risk of making a bad impression, or on occasion to expose surface that might be very embarrassing. There is nothing that the Governor-General of India can say unofficially, or off the record, and anything that he might say immediately commits his government; and to a very large extent, if not completely, His Majesty's Government, whose only remedy, if they disagree with what has been said by the Viceroy, is replacement. Again, we are dealing here with a vast and politically unsophisticated population, which, despite the trend of the times, continues to regard the Viceroyalty with something of superstitious awe. I doubt whether we should do well, in the present phase of political development, to expose its incumbent for the time being to the processes of cross-examination by a highly critical and often deeply prejudiced Press, or, in an Oriental country, to run the risk of destroying a mystery built up over so many decades, and which still has its evident uses. In this connection, remember we are not dealing with Press representatives of the standing of those in London or Washington. Incidentally, I hear that Roosevelt rules his interviewers with a rod of iron, and that the least transgression brings down upon the offender the terrible punishment of permanent banishment from the Presidential Study! There may of course on special occasions be justification for my seeing the Press, but such an occasion is not too easy to envisage, and I would much prefer to keep myself entirely uncommitted. I have no doubt that if Bartlett shows any sign of pressing this point, you would be able to make clear to him, privately and informally, the considerations (if as I trust you accept their force) that weigh with both of us.

[16] No. 181. [17] *Ibid.* para. 16. [18] Not printed.
[19] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 378, cols. 792–3.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *1 July 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1967–S. Your private and personal telegram of 30th June, No. 798.[1] I have telegraphed[2] suggesting publication on Friday[3] morning, and imagine you will see no difficulty about that.

2. I note position as stated in paragraph 2 of your telegram. On consideration I would prefer myself a different form of communiqué and its text follows in my immediately succeeding telegram. I quite accept necessity for form of announcement agreed between us last February.

3. I have thought about "Aviation and Posts"; but on the whole I think I would prefer "Posts and Air" not least for the reason that Civil Aviation, though potentially very important, will be only a relatively small fraction of the work of the new department, and I would like to reflect the balance of work so far as possible in title.

4. I am so glad to hear of Benthall's departure.

[1] No. 205. [2] Not printed. [3] 3 July.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *1 July 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1968–S. Your private and personal telegram No. 799[1] of July 1st. I would prefer (*a*) to issue announcement in paragraph 4 as a separate announcement, and to accompany it with (*b*) a communiqué in the following terms:—

Begins. His Majesty the King has been pleased to approve the appointment of Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Sir E. C. Benthall, Sir Jogendra Singh, Sir J. P. Srivastava and Sir Mohammad Usman to the Executive Council of the Governor-General of India.

The following appointments to portfolios have been made by the Governor-General:—

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As Member in charge of "Information" Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar in succession to the late Right Hon'ble Sir Akbar Hydari.

As Member in charge of "Civil Defence" Sir J. P. Srivastava in succession to the late Dr. Raghavendra Rao.

As Members for "War Transport" and for "Posts and Air" respectively consequent on the appointment of Sir Andrew Clow, late Member in charge of "Communications", to be Governor of Assam, Sir E. C. Benthall and Sir Mohammad Usman.

As Member for "Defence" Sir Firoz Khan Noon.

To succeed Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar as Commerce Member on his appointment as a Representative of India at the War Cabinet, Mr. N. R. Sarker.

As Member in charge of the Department of Education, Health and Lands in succession to Mr. Sarker, Sir Jogendra Singh.

As Member in charge of the Department of Labour in succession to Sir Firoz Khan Noon, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar.

The portfolio of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will in future be designated the "War" portfolio.

The new Defence Member will be responsible for the work at present discharged by the Defence Co-ordination Department, together with such other matters relating to the defence of India as are not included in the portfolios of "War" and "Civil Defence". *Ends.*

[1] No. 206.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 208

SECRET WASHINGTON, *2 July 1942, 2.7 am*
Received: 2 July, 10.5 am

No. 3523. T. V. Soong came to see me to-day and had two points:

The extreme importance of avoiding a head-on collision with Gandhi, if by any means we could keep the ball rolling; and military situation in China.

2. As to the first I told him that I thought that it could not be other than helpful if the Generalissimo would use his influence with Gandhi to make him less unreasonable.

3. As to the second T. V. Soong said that the Generalissimo was very anxious about what was evidently a Japanese concentration against Yunnan and Kwangsi; and about possible interruption of supplies for India, and through India for China, consequent upon the deterioration of the Middle East position.

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He said that the Chinese fully appreciated the necessity of diversion of material, in the present juncture, to the Middle East, but it was vital to China to get this diversion made up again for China, as soon as possible.

4. I told him I would certainly transmit what he had said, and assured him that all these considerations were constantly in your mind.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/544: f 4

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *2 July 1942, 12.15 am*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

805. Your private and personal telegrams 1967–S & 1968–S.[1] I agree to announcement in Friday morning's papers in form and terms proposed but in order to make Mudaliar's position clear suggest addition after "Sarkar" of following sentence. *Begins* "Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar will remain a Member of the Executive Council but will hold no portfolio" *Ends*. Without some addition implication is that he ceases to be Member. Please telegraph Most Immediate whether you agree.

2. I accept your view as to "Posts & Air".

[1] Nos. 210 and 211.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *2 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1975–S. Your private and personal telegram of 2nd July, No. 805.[1] I agree that we must make Mudaliar's position clear. But I particularly want to avoid anything suggesting "members without portfolio". I think we can achieve both objects by following redraft of sentence *re* Sarker: "As Commerce Member, Mr. N. R. Sarker, to succeed Sir R. Mudaliar (who will remain a Member of the Council) on his appointment as a representative of India at the War Cabinet."

2. I will release both communiqués this afternoon for publication in tomorrow morning's papers.

[1] No. 213.

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Mr Gandhi to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

SEVAGRAM, WARDHA, C.P., *2 July 1942*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I venture to approach you again on humanitarian matter wholly unconnected with politics.

Dr. Rajendra Prasad who has been touring in Bihar, brings me the news that British and American troops are spread all over Bihar and that numberless cattle are slaughtered for their beef. These include milch cows and plough cattle. Though the number of cattle in India is great, a vast number if not the majority, are, as you are aware, a burden upon the land. Now if plough cattle and milch cows are slaughtered the burden increases and ploughing becomes difficult and the milk supply which is already poor suffers further reduction. I wonder if you can use your influence with the Military so as to save milch cows and plough cattle from slaughter.

When you write to them please send my regards to Lady Anne[1] and Southby. I hope they and the baby are getting on well.

I am,
Yours sincerely,
M. K. GANDHI

[1] Lady Anne Hope, eldest daughter of Lord Linlithgow, had married in 1939 Lt.-Comdr. Patrick H. J. Southby, R.N.

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Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

SECRET *2 July 1942*

No. U.P.–144.

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am very grateful to Your Excellency for your reply[1] to my last report[2] and in particular for your appreciation of the Gandhi position. As you say, it is not much use speculating as to what form the movement will take, if indeed it is ever started. I agree that he started the movement out of pique and in order to get into the limelight again, but he has not got into a very favourable light and

[1] Not printed; it expressed views similar to those in No. 188. [2] No. 151.

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the criticisms of the *Times*[3] and the American papers must have been a rude shock to him. Incidentally they show we are in a much better position to get our views across. No doubt it is because of these home criticisms and because of Nehru's sympathy with China that he has modified his views. His open letter[4] to Chiang Kai-shek which I have seen and to which D.I.B. refers in his report of June 27th is interesting; it is curious that publication has been held up but possibly they are waiting for the meeting at Wardha. The local people are holding a meeting at Gorakhpur before going off to Wardha. This is a district on which they always have an eye, partly because Nehru was convicted there, partly because it was a hotbed of Congress underlings ready to make capital out of any agrarian discontent there was, but now kept in order by the District Magistrate. Doubtless they hope to find more instances of repression. I cannot see that Gandhi's utterances have as yet had any very deleterious effect, but I cannot help wishing at times that it was possible to give less publicity to them. I recognise the difficulty; publicity does in some cases result in showing him up in the true light, at least to some people, but one must always remember that Gandhi is full of the most overweening conceit; publicity is his breath of life and if he got less, he might be less troublesome.

2. As I have indicated, Gandhi's statements have as yet had no bad effect and the Province seems quiet. If Gandhi does start any subversive movement, I do not anticipate that we shall have any trouble in dealing with it; the only risk is that it might accentuate communal feeling, but fortunately there are no major festivals in the near future and the cultivation season is always pretty free from communal riots. The monsoon, I may mention, has started well, and I think recent rainfall has been widespread over the Province.

[The remainder of para. 2, on the monsoon and wheat situation, para. 3, on aerodrome construction, para. 4, on talks with General Willcox, and para. 5, on tour of Rohilkhand, omitted.]

[3] Sir M. Hallett was presumably referring to *The Times*' third leading article of 20 June to which Gandhi replied in a statement dated 22 June.

[4] No. 231.

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Mr Eden to Viscount Halifax

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 207

MOST SECRET FOREIGN OFFICE, *3 July 1942, 12.25 am*

No. 4122. Your telegram No. 3451.[1]

Chiang Kai-shek has asked Gandhi not to publish his letter. Please telegraph full text, repeating your telegram to Viceroy, New Delhi.

[1] Not printed.

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Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *3 July 1942*

REPORT NO. 108

My dear Linlithgow,
This report covers the last half of June.

1. *Morale.*—Up till now, the reverse in the Western Desert has not created panic, and morale has remained, so far, remarkably steady. I think there is a fairly widespread belief that, though we have suffered a defeat, we shall be able to check the Axis advance, and possibly drive him back. If, however, the enemy were to get into the Nile valley, I should expect to see some kind or panic again. It is satisfactory that public opinion has remained fairly steady up till now, but there can be little doubt that this further reverse has again affected our prestige, and, in some quarters, is leading to a revival of the view that we shall not win the war.

The steadiness of opinion so far is all the more remarkable considering the outspoken criticisms at Home. I should like to record my view that, however necessary for the well-being of Parliamentary institutions at Home this "unbridled freedom of expression" may be, its result here is undoubtedly to undermine confidence. The ordinary person here does not appreciate the fact that these criticisms are made by a section of the Press only, and by a small handful of Members of Parliament. What is telegraphed out here is taken as the general view in England, and it creates an impression of alarm and disunity, instead of a dogged determination to endure whatever hard knocks have to be taken before we finally get on top. The fact that these critics are defeated in Parliament by an overwhelming majority a week or so later, does little to remove the first impression which is created. I feel most strongly that critics of the conduct of the war at Home ought to temper their criticisms with the knowledge that overseas, and particularly in India, exaggerated interpretations are bound to be placed on what they say and on the votes of censure which they move.

The announcement of the expansion of your Executive Council has only appeared today, and so it is too early to say what the reactions are. The local Press makes the expected criticism about the retention of officials, but the general reception appears to be mild, and I expect Hindus to be fairly well satisfied with the number of Hindus or semi-Hindus in the new Council.

2. *Congress.*—The impression continues to prevail in Bombay that we shall not hear much more of Gandhi's projected move. That is certainly the view

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of the business world. On the other hand, Vallabhbhai Patel has just told his followers in Gujarat that they must be prepared for action at any moment, and has suggested that he will soon be taken from them. I expect that Patel will, if he can, force action on the Working Committee, but I hope he will not succeed.

It has been announced that Bhulabhai Desai has resigned from the Working Committee and from the presidentship of the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee. The reason given is ill-health, and there is certainly some truth in that, and I hear that he has been very queer lately. It is also well known that he is in sympathy with Rajagopalacharia, although he has not yet openly supported him. I also understand that he has been briefed by the Maharaja of Rewa,[1] who is said to have wanted someone with Congress connections to defend him, and that this may also have had some part in his resignation. Whatever the truth may be, I think that, in his present state of health, Bhulabhai is not likely to play much further part in politics.

You will have seen that Rajagopalacharia has been in Bombay and has had several long talks with Jinnah. Low has seen Rajagopalacharia more than once, and has given me the following account of what, according to Rajagopalacharia, has been going on. He first went to Wardha, where he talked with Gandhi. He was most emphatic that, during these discussions, he retained his position completely, and that there is no question of his backing out of it. He says that he cleared up misunderstandings which Gandhi had about his position on one or two points, but that, in general, they remained at variance. In the course of these conversations, Gandhi expressed himself as very grieved at the distrust in which the Muslims held him, particularly when he recalled the confidence which the Muslims used to have in him at the time of the Khilafat agitation.[2] He appears to have asked Rajagopalacharia whether nothing could be done to remove this distrust. The latter made this a good excuse for going to see Jinnah, although I do not suppose that that was his only motive. At his first interview with Jinnah, he began by saying how grieved Gandhi was, whereupon Jinnah took out of a drawer a dossier containing everything which Gandhi had written or said about Hindu–Muslim unity for many years' past, and proceeded to talk about Gandhi's inconsistencies on this subject for several hours. During subsequent talks with Jinnah, Rajagopalacharia tried to find a basis for agreement between Hindus and Muslims. At the end of them, he told Low that Jinnah had definitely not committed himself, but that he (Rajagopalacharia) knew what Jinnah was likely to accept, and that he proposed to return to Wardha and try and get Gandhi to agree to it. He had, however, little hope that he would be successful in that. That is the general outline, as revealed by Rajagopalacharia. There may, of course, be much that he did not reveal to Low, but the conclusion appears to be that he has not much hope of anything coming out of it.

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[Para. 3, on food supplies and prices, para. 4, on the monsoon, para. 5, on recruiting, and para. 6, on the collapse of a block of flats and the experience in rescue work gained by A.R.P. services therefrom, omitted.]

[1] In the event Mr Desai was not among the counsel who represented the Maharaja before the Commission of Enquiry which the Crown Representative had set up in June to investigate criminal charges against him.

[2] The Sultan of Turkey was Caliph or supreme head of the Muslim world and the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire after the war of 1914–18 led to great resentment and anti-British feeling among Indian Muslims. The Khilafat or Caliphate agitation—lasting from 1919 to 1921—demanded the restoration of the Turkish Empire to its pre-war position. Gandhi saw the movement as 'such an opportunity of uniting Hindus and Muhammadans as would not arise in a hundred years' and the non-co-operation campaign of 1920 was undertaken largely in its support.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *4 July 1942, 3.10 pm*
Received: 4 July, 5.15 pm

No. 1995–G. Following is summary of brief Press account of speech by Nehru at public meeting in Gorakhpur on July 3rd:—

Begins. We do not want Germans or Japanese to come to India. We will fight them with or without arms. Japanese like British broadcast sweet words promising freedom to India, but neither wants to give independence to India unless compelled. Situation is worsening every day; Germans have entered Egypt and Japanese have reached borders of India. British have themselves been inviting trouble, and unless they make up their mind to free India and other enslaved countries there will be no end to their troubles. Gandhi is about to launch *satyagraha* or some other move to wrest independence, and public should keep themselves in readiness. Gandhi wants British Government to withdraw and leave defence of country in hands of Indians who cannot protect it while they remain in bondage. We have waited for long and could have waited for a year or two more, but owing to war we can wait no longer. We cannot see India changing masters from day to day. That will spell disaster for her. Therefore it becomes imperative for us to free India and then fight Japanese or any other invader with or without arms. Nehru concluded by saying that it would not be easy for Japanese to conquer India, citing example of China; and he appealed for unity among various communities and organizations to protect country and achieve freedom. *Ends.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *5 July 1942, 5.25 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 5 July, 4.40 pm*

No. 2003–S. Reaction to expansion of Council and new appointments has been remarkably good and much better than might have been feared. Representation for Sikhs and Scheduled Castes has gone down well, and there has been astonishingly little criticism of appointment of a non-official European.

2. Gandhi has sent me temperate letter[1] about killing of milch and plough cattle for use of troops in Eastern India, concluding with friendly personal message to my family. It would be unwise to base any conclusion on this, but if he were contemplating any immediate extreme step, I should be surprised if he would have written quite in that vein.

[1] No. 215.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Gandhi

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *5 July 1942*

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

Very many thanks for your letter of 2nd July.[1] I am causing enquiries to be made at once on the point you raise, and hope to write to you further after I have the result.

2. Very many thanks indeed for your kind personal message for my daughter Lady Anne and Southby. They will much appreciate it and I am passing it on to them at once. We have a photo of "Richard", now almost a year old, that shows him to be a fine fellow. It is evident that he has already taken almost entire charge of the household!

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 215.

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Dr Savarkar to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

DADAR, BOMBAY, *5 July 1942*

Your Excellency,

I am enclosing under this cover a copy of a statement issued by me in connection with the expansion of the Executive Council, for favour of Your Excellency's perusal.

I wish to draw your special attention to that part of the statement which insists upon the declaration on the part of the British Parliament to the effect that India is granted full Political freedom and equal co-partnership in the Indo-British-Commonwealth equal with Great Britain herself. The first clause in the Cripps scheme, had it stood by itself without being encumbered by the vivisection clause and such other controversial details, would have appealed to the largest possible section of the Indian public. Even a mere declaration to that effect would even now deprive the enemies of Britain to keep dangling before the eyes of the Indian public any bait whatsoever so as to put the Great Britain in the wrong. To be plain, the Japanese or the Germans can only promise Independence to India after the conclusion of the War. If but [*sic*] the British Government promises unequivocally to grant that very Independence added to co-partnership in the Indo-British-Commonwealth on equal terms, the Japanese and the Germans would be surely deprived of the only stunt they can utilise today with some effect against England so as to nullify the democratic objective which Britain professes to defend and maintains to be the cause which forced the War on her.

I urge, Your Excellency, to try your best in convincing the British Cabinet of the imperative necessity of such a declaration and to acquaint them with the pressing demand to that effect on the part of the Hindu Mahasabha in particular and the overwhelming majority of the Hindus in general. I do not doubt that, the reasonable minorities like the Parsees, the Christians or the Jews are also sure to join the Hindus and would welcome such a declaration.

Yours sincerely,

V. D. SAVARKAR

Enclosure to No. 222

HINDU MAHASABHA PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE, DADAR, BOMBAY, *5 July 1942*

The following statement is released to the Press by Bar. V. D. Savarkar the President, Hindu Mahasabha, in connection with the expanded Viceregal Council:—

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"In spite of some glaring defects, I appreciate the recent expansion of the Viceregal Executive Council, as it constitutes a step forward in the right direction on the path of constitutional progress. The larger Indianisation and the Non-Officialisation of the Council is also an improvement on the present state of things. So far as the personal merit is concerned, the majority of the members are doubtless men of proved ability and of highly distinguished administrative experience. Whatever the disappointed self-seekers or partisans may say, the representative character of men like Sir C. P. Ramaswami, Sir Jwala Prasad Shrivastava, President of the Agra and Oudh Provincial Hindu Sabhas and a member of the Working Committee of All-India Hindu Mahasabha, Dr. Ambedkar or Sir Jogendra Singh, stands unchallengeable and they are sure to carry with them the confidence of the large and important sections of the Indian Public they lead. The Viceroy has done well of showing those their right place who wanted to grab even that which was other's due and fancied that the Earth would cease to rotate if they ceased to move with it. Nor has he committed the serious mistake, of making this expansion of the Council conditional on any controversial questions, which may arise or not arise at all, after the war ends—an error which was alone responsible for the tragic failure of the Cripps scheme.

But the Government must bear in mind that, detailed steps as the expansion of the Council, nomination of the Indians to the War Cabinet or any other patchwork, can never help the Government in the main objective of persuading the Indian people for whole-hearted efforts which are indispensable now for the Britishers to win the war. You can never enthuse a whole people to wage and win a war unless and until the objective is so exalted and inspiring as to make a people forget altogether the terrors of death and disaster and render any sacrifices at too cheap a price, for the attainment of that national objective. The Hindu Mahasabha has been ceaselessly pointing out that, an unambiguous declaration by the British Government should be made granting complete political freedom and equal co-partnership to Hindustan in an Indo-British-Commonwealth with a right to secede.

Such a clearcut declaration on the part of the British Government unencumbered with any mischievous condition as was the case with the vivisection clause in the Cripps scheme and which is implemented by an immediate transfer, of at least that much substantial power as Canada or Australia exercises today in the Councils of the Commonwealth—can alone enthuse the Indian people to fight in this war with such a fervour as to risk their all in all, in the glorious hope of regaining their national independence.

IN SHORT THE BRITISH MUST OFFER VOLUNTARILY SO COMPLETE A POLITICAL FREEDOM AND POWER TO INDIA AS TO RENDER IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY ENEMY OF BRITAIN TO OFFER ANYTHING MORE ALLURING TO LEAD INDIA ASTRAY."

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *6 July 1942, 8.55 pm*
Received: 7 July, 11.30 am

No. 2012-G. Following is summary of press statement issued by Sapru on July 5th regarding expansion of Viceroy's Council:—

Begins. Though expansion raises number of Indians to ten it cannot be taken as any change in political and constitutional character of Council or its powers. It is only continuation of policy of August offer.[1] Many Provinces are now represented and I am glad Sikhs and Depressed Classes will also be represented. All this might have been done two years or at least one year ago. Since then events have moved fast and far. It will be absurd for any one to imagine that this expansion is going to satisfy Congress or Muslim League. Cripps, admired so much in England, from my personal knowledge bungled hopelessly. He alienated all other sections of politicians by telling them he was anxious to secure consent of Congress and League only. He failed in that. Perhaps Amery and Linlithgow fully realise that the changes will produce no impression on Congress and League, but if they think they will produce any impression on the despised others they are greatly mistaken.

2. I approve of creation of sort of defence portfolio, which was anathema at beginning of Cripps conversations, to extent to which it makes breach in citadel, but I do not think we need attach any exaggerated importance to it. Home and Finance portfolios remain in British hands and War Transport portfolio goes to non-official British representative of big business. Admittedly Indians hold ten portfolios against five British portfolios but it would be wrong to think that present change is anything in neighbourhood of national government; it is not even fully Indianized or non-official Executive Council. In ordinary circumstances control of Secretary of State over Council, which is invisible to outsider, is very real and persistent; it cannot be less so in these days particularly with a man like Amery. Viceroy cannot be regarded as benevolent dictator. Morley once described Viceroy as Secretary of State's agent, a view unfortunately justified by present situation. True dictator now is Amery—one man in British Empire most distrusted by Congressmen and non-Congressman and politicians of nearly every school. It is impossible to rouse spirit of trust and confidence in this country or to fortify position of those who honestly like to help British Government as against Japan and Germany unless there is change of personnel, and first man to go should be Amery. I

[1] Vol. I, Appendix I.

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admit that some of new Councillors are able and good men, but what matters is their powers and their freedom from paralysing control of India Office. If trust begets trust, distrust also begets distrust. *Ends.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *6 July 1942, 8.55 pm*
Received: 7 July, 6 am

No. 2013-G. Following is summary of resolutions passed at annual meeting of Council of National Liberal Federation at Poona on July 5th. Sir Bijoy Prasad Singh Roy presiding:—

Begins. War and India.—Council views with growing concern recent reverses of United Nations, particularly conquest of Malaya and Burma by Japan. It fervently hopes that by pooling resources and co-ordinating strategy more fully United Nations will soon achieve complete victory over Axis powers. Council has no doubt that overwhelming majority of Indians are more anxious that India should take full share in prosecution of war and postwar reconstruction. But present attitude of Britain bars India's enthusiastic co-operation in war effort. Unless present psychological conditions are radically modified by establishment of national government in India there is no prospect of India putting forth her maximum efforts for prosecution of war. Council hopes that, notwithstanding failure of Cripps mission, British Government will take early steps to renew negotiations with Indian leaders to establish national government, and trusts that major political parties will take more accommodating view of mutual relations.

2. *National government.*—Expansion of Executive Council lamentably fails to create psychological conditions necessary to secure India's maximum support in war. Functions assigned to Indian Defence Member are of secondary importance; Home and Finance portfolios are retained by British members of Indian Civil Service; War Transport portfolio has been entrusted to British non-official despite repeated demands for complete Indianisation of Council. Transfer of portfolios in reconstituted Council falls far short of Federation's repeated proposals and even falls short of Cripps' revised proposals. Council repeats view that Executive Council should consist entirely of non-official Indians and should by convention function as a Cabinet and Viceroy should ordinarily accept its decisions.

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3. *Unity of India.*—Scheme of partitioning India is not in best interests of India as a whole or any section thereof including Muslims; it is bound to create greater communal antagonism and weaken defence of India. *Civil Disobedience.* Council trusts that no civil disobedience movement will be started as it will be prejudicial to best interests of country in respect of defence and other matters. *Evacuees.* Council strongly protests against racial discrimination against Indian refugees from Malaya and Burma, and demands early elimination of all traces of discrimination in rules relating to reception, accommodation, allowances, &c. of refugees. *Price control.* Council views with grave concern continued rise in prices of essential commodities and urges Government to adopt more vigorous and co-ordinated policy in order to control prices effectively and persuade Indian States to co-operate fully. *Ends.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *6 July 1942, 11.30 pm*
Received: 7 July, 2 am

No. 2014-G. Following is summary of leading article by Gandhi in *Harijan* of July 5th entitled "Oh, the Troops".—

Begins. I have to pay heavy price for having drawn entrancing picture of free India without single British soldier. Friends are confounded now to discover that my proposal admits of presence of British and even American troops under any circumstance at all. I argue in vain that Allied troops, if they remain, will do so not to exercise authority over people, or at India's expense, but under treaty with Government of free India at United Nations' expense for sole purpose of repelling Japanese attack and helping China. It has been pointed out that not to consent to Allied troops remaining in India during war is to hand over India and China to Japan, and to ensure defeat of Allied Powers. This could never have been contemplated by me. Only answer therefore was to suffer presence of troops but under circumstances reverse of those existing; they will remain under permission of free India and in rôle of friends not masters.

2. It will be most assuredly an event of the country[1] and may be turning point in the war if Britain can honestly renounce India. Virtue and value of renunciation will not be affected in the least because Allied troops will be operating in India with sole object of preventing Japanese attack. After all

[1] *Harijan* has 'century' instead of 'country'.

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India is as much interested as Allies in warding off attack, yet under my proposal India will not have to pay a single pie over the expenses of the troops.

3. As I have previously said, British acceptance of my proposal may itself lead to most honourable peace and hence automatic withdrawal of troops. I therefore ask doubters to concentrate attention upon grandeur of proposed renunciation and help to utmost fruition of great act. Let them not dread presence of troops in India for purpose indicated, but regard it as inevitable part of proposal so as to make it not only justifiable but fool-proof. So far as I can see free India will run no risk by their presence. Her freedom will certainly suffer no diminution thereby. Implications of my proposal are (1) India becomes free of all financial obligation to Britain; (2) annual drain to Great Britain stops automatically; (3) all taxation ceases except what replacing Government imposes or retains; (4) deadweight of all-powerful authority keeping under subjection tallest in land is lifted at once; (5) India begins new chapter in national life, as I shall hope to affect fortunes of the war with non-violence as her predominant sanction. This non-violence will no longer take shape of non-co-operation. It will express itself in her ambassadors going to Axis powers not to beg for peace but to show futility of war for achieving honourable end. This can only be done if and when Britain sheds grains[2] of perhaps most organised and successful violence the world has seen.

4. All this may not come to pass. I do not mind. It is worth fighting for and staking all that nation has. *Ends.*

[2] *Harijan* has 'gains' instead of 'grains'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *6 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of 17th June[1] which arrived yesterday. I fear that since its first paragraph was written, the Libyan situation has taken a pretty considerable turn for the worse and we have had some anxious days here as a result. But the latest indications seem to me that we are holding the Germans at El Alamein, and if we can do so I should not be surprised if they have to go back a pretty considerable distance, for I gather that the intermediate area between, say, Tobruk and Mersa Matruh is not a country in which one can

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consolidate very comfortably. Public opinion here has been astonishingly steady. You will see references to it in various of the Governors' reports, but whether it is lassitude or what, the fact remains that there has been nothing like the injury to general morale which one might have anticipated from events so serious.

2. I have discussed in considerable detail both by telegram and in my last two letters about the Mahatma and his tactics. Matters as I dictate seem to be working out very much on the lines one had anticipated—in other words, the lack of any very active response to his blandishments from the country and the absence of any enthusiastic press support look as though they have confirmed him in his view that he would do well to think again about his "Britain get out" slogan. His latest explanation which appears in this week's *Harijan*[2] is not without its humorous side. As you will see he protests vigorously against the unfairness of those who in dealing with matters of this nature attack the weak instead of welcoming the strong points of a scheme, and with considerable deftness he has endeavoured to turn the whole business into an altruistic readiness by India to agree that China shall be defended from Indian soil on the understanding that India has no financial liability in that connection! He has in fact been so tortuous and so involved in these last five or six weeks that it ought to tell against him to some extent in America and at home; but the difficulty of course is that people's memories are so short and that now-a-days they have so many matters of far greater moment and urgency to occupy them than the collating of the Mahatma's all too frequent explanations of what he is really after. Meantime, I think the American journalists here have got the old gentleman pretty well "taped". One very obvious point that emerges of course from the latest comment of his on the slogan is that he speaks (as he always does) as though he was in a position to speak for the whole of India and the only person able to deliver the goods, whereas that is I fear nothing like the case, and Jinnah's statements in the last few days have brought out emphatically the continued reluctance of the Muslim League to see any compromise reached save on their own terms.

3. I am glad to be able to report that the expansion of my Council has so far gone very well. Indeed I have been somewhat surprised by the excellence of the press we have had. Inevitably there have been points of criticism here and there. But Benthall's selection has produced nothing like the volume of adverse comment which one might have expected. C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar has had a surprisingly good press. The Sikhs and the Depressed Classes are respectively delighted to have got in Jogendra Singh and Ambedkar. Srivastava is identified as a contribution to the Mahasabha; and old Sir Mohammed Usman, with his high character and long experience, seems to have been pretty generally accepted

[1] No. 154. [2] See No. 225.

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also. I do not look like getting the team together much before the end of July: Ambedkar does not want to join till then; Srivastava has his business affairs to settle, and thinks it will take him about 25th July; C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar will not be available till the beginning of August; I have not yet heard from Usman; Jogendra Singh will be ready to join by the middle of this month, but I do not want to encourage the idea of Ministers without portfolio, and his portfolio will not be available for him till Sarker takes over from Mudaliar at the end of July. But I do not think these delays matter very much, though I should have been glad to see C. P. in the saddle earlier. The main thing is to have got through the expansion and got it out of the way; and there is pretty general recognition that it is a genuine attempt on our part to produce as representative and as political a Council as we can in circumstances in which the two major political parties refuse to play. I think myself that it is a strong and highly respectable body and that we ought to get good work out of it.

4. Many thanks for what you are doing about the Grady report. I entirely agree with your criticism of it. It is very thin, but it is on the other hand very well-intentioned, and I have no doubt that Grady was really anxious to help us.

* * *

8. I shall look forward to seeing Coupland's summary of the Cripps negotiations, and am sure, judging by the very full Reuter reports which have come out here, that it will be a useful contribution. My best good wishes for the success of your volume of speeches. I often feel that we fail to make the best of our case in matters such as these by insufficient fighting of our corner.

* * *

11. Talking of which,[3] I am still much puzzled, as I have been all along, as to why Walter Monckton with his quite unusual experience and very high standing should think of a job of the type of Political Adviser. We now of course know that he is not in fact willing to accept it, though from your telegram it is clear that that is for well-considered reasons and that in certain other circumstances he might have been ready to entertain the idea. I should doubt if we have any chance of getting him as a Federal Chief Justice, but I think you and I would both feel that if there was any hope of that, we could find no better man and few anything like as good. I should have thought myself that Monckton's quality was so high, and his contacts so wide, that it was a pity not to employ him governmentally at home. But of course I do not know how matters stand there now. I quite agree that he would make an admirable Governor, say, of one of the Presidencies; but there again would not that mean his abandoning any ambitions or plans for work at the centre of the Empire?

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14. When Hood was here, he discussed with Caroe and with my Private Secretary the curious and not very satisfactory position that, with the exception of *The Times*, no British newspaper of any standing maintains a permanent correspondent either here or in Chungking, with the result that the British Press is dependent for its reports on news cabled by Americans or other foreigners acting as its agents, whereas many of the best known American correspondents of famous journals are, or have been recently, in India. I cannot help thinking it important, now that India is something of a focal point, that British newspapers should be more widely represented in this country and that every effort should be made to bring this about. It has even been suggested to me that subsidization should be used if there is no other means, but, considering how affluent many of the British newspapers are, I should hardly have thought that this course was necessary. However, I understand that Hood intended to take up the matter when he returned and I have no doubt that, if you agree that the point is worth watching, you will lend him your support.

15. Many thanks for your amusing *P.S.* about Cripps' Mission. I agree entirely with my Mr. Watt!

Best of luck.

P.S.—In paragraph 6 of my letter of 30th June[4] I commented on certain remarks in paragraph 11 of your letter of 10th June[5] on the effect of the Cripps Mission on the Princes. I had previously, in paragraph 12 of my letter of 23rd June,[6] dealt in some little detail with the same subject, with particular reference to the memorandum[7] submitted by the Jam Saheb, and the separate memorandum[8] prepared by Bikaner.

Further consideration has confirmed me in my view that the procedure which I tentatively foreshadowed in paragraph 12 of my letter of 23rd June is probably in all the circumstances the best. You will by now have had the official letter[9] sent from the Political Department forwarding the Jam Saheb's memorandum, and I send you by this mail a short personal demi-official letter[10] commenting on the position in broad terms. As you know I fully appreciate your own difficulties, and we are both of us only too familiar with the trouble which loose wording and careless statement has given rise to in connection with His Majesty's Government's Declaration. But in this business of the States we are on really important stuff and we must, I fear, get it clear.

[3] Response to Sir M. Gwyer's appeal on behalf of Delhi University.
[4] No. 209. [5] No. 138. [6] No. 181. [7] No. 115. [8] See No. 86, note 10.
[9] No. 187. [10] No. 232.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 283

L/P&J/8/510: ff 407–16

Report on Mission to India[1]

MEMORANDUM BY THE LORD PRIVY SEAL

6 July 1942

I think it is desirable for purposes of official record and for the assistance of any similar Mission to India in future that I should provide a detailed account of the discussions which I had with Indian leaders during my recent visit to India.

The purpose of the Mission with which I was entrusted by the War Cabinet[2] was to ascertain, by personal consultation with the leaders of Indian opinion, whether the conclusions of His Majesty's Government embodied in the draft Declaration[3] would meet a sufficient measure of assent to enable it to be promulgated with reasonable assurance that this would promote the solidarity of Indian opinion and would result during the war in the co-operation of representative Indian leaders in the existing machinery of government. Two separate but interconnected issues were therefore involved—firstly, the acceptability or otherwise of the basic principles and the procedure proposed for the framing of the post-war Indian Constitution, and, secondly, the manner in which the immediate and effective participation of Indian leaders might be secured under the existing machinery of government during the war and pending the introduction of a new Indian Constitution. It was the intention of the War Cabinet that, if I succeeded in securing a sufficient general measure of assent in principle to the draft Declaration as a whole, the Governor-General should discuss with Indian leaders the precise manner in which their immediate participation in the existing forms of government should be given expression. In the event, however, Congress leaders were not prepared to commit themselves in regard to the Declaration without assurances in regard to the immediate future. From an early stage the discussions with them centred on paragraph (*e*), and, although opposition to individual provisions of the long-term proposals was expressed, it was upon this paragraph that the breakdown of the negotiations came.

PRELIMINARY CONVERSATIONS

I left England by air on Saturday, the 14th March, and arrived in New Delhi at midday on the 23rd March. I had arranged to spend the first two days at the Viceroy's House and subsequently to move to a private residence, where I could hold my conversations with the Indian leaders in an unofficial atmosphere. At my request, the Viceroy had invited the three Presidency Governors and the Governors of the North-West Frontier and United Provinces and the Punjab

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to meet me and, during my stay at the Viceroy's House, I had valuable conversations with them and with the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief. I disclosed to the Governors the text of the Declaration and, with the exception of the Governor of the Punjab, who repeated to me his anxieties regarding their effect on the communal situation in the Punjab, which had already been reported to the War Cabinet by telegram,[4] they were on the whole favourably inclined towards the proposals.

The Governor-General had strongly impressed upon me the desirability of taking his Executive Council into confidence before I disclosed the terms of the Declaration to the Party leaders. I therefore arranged to meet the Executive Council for this purpose on the morning of Wednesday, the 25th March,[5] on which day I had arranged to meet the Congress and Muslim League representatives in the afternoon. At this meeting Sir Firozkhan Noon pointed out that, owing to the weightage given to minorities in the Legislatures, in the Punjab and in Bengal, the Muslims, although the majority of the population, had not a statutory majority in the Legislatures and that, therefore, the provision in the Declaration enabling Provinces not to adhere to a new Indian union would be of no value to the Muslims if the decisions were to be by vote of the Legislature. As it was clearly necessary to find some means of meeting this point, I decided to suggest to the leaders of the different parties, as I saw them, that each Province should reach its decision by a vote in the Legislative Assembly on a resolution that the Province should join the proposed Union, and that, failing a majority of 60 per cent. in favour of this resolution, the minority should have the right to demand a plebiscite of the adult male population. In spite of the obvious disadvantages of the plebiscite proposal this appeared to be the only satisfactory means of securing that the wishes of the majority of the population should be effective. This proposition was not dissented from by any of the party leaders when put to them. But in their final resolution the Muslim League demanded that the plebiscite be confined to the Muslim majority of the population only, and the Sikhs and the Hindu Mahasabha also opposed this method of reaching a decision on this point.

The Viceroy had also impressed upon me the importance of my giving early information about the proposals to Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, the Prime Minister of the Punjab, in view of his important position in relation to the war effort. As I was anxious to preserve strictly the position that the discussions were primarily with the principal party organisations, I felt some difficulty about this in view of the strained relations known to exist between Sir Sikander

[1] The period of Cripps' Mission to India, 23 March–11 April 1942, is covered by Nos. 367–610 in Vol. I; see Chapter 4 (pp. xlv–lvii) of the Summary of Documents in Vol. I. Cross-references to Vol. I have been given only for documents falling outside this period.

[2] See Vol. I, Nos. 282 and 283. [3] [By Cripps] See Appendix.

[4] Vol. I, Nos. 236 and 248.

[5] According to the Notes of the meeting, it took place on 24 March; see Vol. I, Nos. 373 and 377.

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Hayat Khan and Mr. Jinnah. It was arranged, however, that Sir Sikander should come to the Viceroy's House ostensibly to visit Sir Bertrand Glancy, and I was able to receive him privately and discuss confidentially the terms of the Declaration with him before I saw any of the Indian leaders officially. Sir Sikander's reactions to the draft Declaration were favourable and he did not appear to anticipate any serious difficulties in the Punjab. I had, however, been warned by the Governor of the Punjab that Sir Sikander frequently revised his original opinions after a period of reflection.

SELECTION OF INDIAN REPRESENTATIVES

At the suggestion of the Governor-General I had agreed during my journey to India that he should invite the principal political organisations to nominate their own representatives to hold discussions with me.[6] Accordingly, the Congress had nominated for this purpose Maulana Kalam Azad, their President, and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Muslim League had nominated Mr. Jinnah as their sole representative. The Chamber of Princes and the Hindu Mahasabha had also been invited to nominate delegations, and after my arrival in India I issued similar invitations to the Europeans, the Indian Christians and the Justice Party. In order to secure representation of other sections of opinion, I invited certain individuals chosen in consultation with the Governor-General, to meet me. These included Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Rajah, whom I saw together as representatives of the Depressed Classes, Sir Henry Gidney for Anglo-Indians, and Mr. Joshi as a representative of Labour. In the case of the Sikhs, I dealt primarily with the delegation nominated by the Sikh All-Parties Conference, but since this delegation was not representative of some elements of Sikh opinion, I saw separately Sirdar Kirpal Singh, at the suggestion of the Governor of the Punjab, and later, at the suggestion of Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, Sirdar Dasaundha Singh and Captain Naunihal Singh.

With the object of broadening the scope of my contacts and of hearing provincial points of view without opening the door to all and sundry, I invited the Premiers of Provincial Governments and the ex-Premiers of the Provinces now administered under Section 93 to come and see me. Not all of these were able to accept, but I had valuable discussions with Mr. Rajagopalachari and Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, with whom, as I was dealing primarily with Party organisations, I should otherwise have found it difficult to renew contact. I also saw Mr. Fazlul Huq, Premier of Bengal, and the Rajah of Parlakimedi, Premier of Orissa, Pandit Pant, Mr. Kher, Sir Muhammad Saadullah and Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh,[7] ex-Premiers of the United Provinces, Bombay, Assam and Sind, respectively, and Mr. Shukla, ex-Premier of the Central Provinces. I also invited Mr. Gandhi to come to Delhi to meet me, a step which was suggested to me by Lord Linlithgow. I should, in any case, have felt it essential to success, and was glad that the Viceroy felt no difficulty about it. In addition, I invited

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Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar to see me together, and at a late stage in the negotiations I received representatives of the National Liberal Federation and of the Andhras.

Although in the later stages of the negotiations I interviewed a number of other people, including Mr. M. N. Roy and Mr. Jamnadas Mehta and Mr. Mohammed Yusafar, a Communist, recommended to me by Mr. Joshi, those named above were all that I felt it necessary to consult as representative leaders of Indian opinion. So far as I am aware, no serious criticism of this selection was raised in any quarter. Naturally, I was pressed to receive other interests, such as the Momins, landlords, and various rival organisations claiming to represent the Depressed Classes, but I excused myself on the ground of lack of time. I expressed my desire at an early Press Conference to meet representative women and young people. As a result, I saw a delegation of the All-India Students' Federation. I heard subsequently that the Congress women's organisation had desired to come, but had been prevented from doing so by the Congress Party. I found it necessary to receive a separate delegation from Hyderabad State, but otherwise I refused to receive representatives of individual States and dealt exclusively with the Chamber delegation, though I met informally the Maharajahs of Indore and Gwalior.

During the last week of my stay, when the pressure of interviews had somewhat relaxed, I saw all the members of the Governor-General's Executive Council individually.

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE INDIAN LEADERS

At midday on Wednesday, the 25th March, I moved with my staff to 3 Queen Victoria Road, and immediately began consultations with the Indian leaders.

During the opening days of these conversations, the text of the draft Declarations was kept secret. It was clear to me that it would be most difficult to maintain this position for long owing to the pitch of public expectations at the time of my arrival, which increased daily when the conversations started. In order to prevent leakage of the text after it had been disclosed to the Indian representatives, I had had prepared a number of versions of the text which differed in minor points of wording, and I let it be known that the texts given to different interests were not identical, so that, if there were any leakage, I should be able to identify its source. This device was most successful in preventing leakages of the actual text, but it did not prevent the general sense of the document from reaching the Press. There was, in fact, a considerable leakage immediately after the text had been read to the Executive Council. It was evident, however, that it could not be expected that secrecy could be maintained indefinitely, and I felt that there might well be possibilities of securing public support for the proposals if publication were made. With the concurrence

[6] See Vol. I, Nos. 331 and 348. [7] Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh was in fact still Premier of Sind.

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of the War Cabinet I therefore arranged for publication on the morning of Monday, the 30th March. There is, however, no doubt in my mind that considerable advantages were gained by disclosing the document to the party leaders before it was made public. It gave me the opportunity of making minor alterations in the text to meet the views of individual leaders, and, as will appear, two such alterations were in fact made. It also released the Indian Party leaders from the necessity of making immediate press announcements of their reactions to the statement before they had heard my explanation of it and had had time for reflection and consultation with their friends. As soon as the text was published the minority representatives began to put out critical statements containing their views on the Declaration, and were no doubt impelled to do so to forestall criticism from their followers.

Before publication I had communicated the text confidentially to the representatives of all the main Indian interests with the exception of the Depressed Classes, the Indian Christians and the Justice Party, who, owing to their inability to arrive in Delhi in time, were unable to see me until the day on which the document appeared in the press.

I think it will make for clarity if I describe separately my discussions with each of the main parties or interests and their final attitude to the proposals, although, in fact, I dealt with them concurrently. Owing to the waiting attitude adopted by the Muslim League, the conversations with Congress were the crucial factor throughout the discussions, and I have little doubt myself that, had the outcome of these been different, the final attitude of the Muslim League and the other minorities would have been considerably affected, if not entirely reversed.

(*a*) THE CONGRESS

On the afternoon of the 25th March I received Maulana Kalam Azad with his secretary, Mr. Asaf Ali, acting as interpreter, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru being unable to come to Delhi owing to ill-health. At this meeting I gave the Maulana a text of the Declaration and offered to expound any points on which he desired explanation. He immediately raised the issue of the control of defence under an interim Government under paragraph (*e*) of the Declaration. He said that the Congress view was that it was necessary, in order to mobilise effectively the full force of the Indian people, to give them control of the defence of their country. I gave him a detailed explanation of the reasons why it was essential for the efficient conduct of the war that the strategic and operational control should remain the responsibility of His Majesty's Government acting through the Commander-in-Chief, and pointed out that we were offering to India representation in the War Cabinet to enable her voice to be heard in the decisions made there. The Maulana argued that, whatever might be necessary in the sphere of strategic control, some gesture, such as the transfer of the Defence Department

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to an Indian Member, was essential to enable the support of the Indian people to be fully mobilised. The interview was extremely friendly and the Maulana promised to see me again after consulting the Working Committee which was coming to Delhi.

On the 27th March I had a 2¼ hours' interview with Mr. Gandhi, who had come to Delhi at my request to meet me. Throughout the conversation he adopted a discouraging attitude, although he spoke entirely in friendly terms. Having explained to me that, of course, he was not now officially connected with Congress, he expressed the definite view that Congress would not accept the Declaration, owing, firstly, to the provisions regarding Indian States, and, secondly, those dealing with accession or non-accession of Provinces. He also (although more vaguely) questioned the retention of defence in British hands during the interim period. So far as the States were concerned, he argued that Congress could not tolerate the continued existence of autocratic States under the ægis of the British Government with the right to call upon the armed forces of Britain to enforce the power of their Rulers. I pointed out that the first basis for any reform in States administration was the setting up of an independent British India, the influence of which would inevitably set up a movement of democratisation in the States, and said that I was certain that under a Constitution of the kind envisaged it would be the object of British policy to encourage a greater amount of democratic government in the States. I asked him what his positive proposals in regard to the States were, and he said he was against any idea of compelling them into an Indian Union, but would like to see them converted into independent States with no reliance on British authority, as this would accelerate the movement for transfer of power to the States' peoples. He did not wish to see the Rulers disappear immediately, but wished them to convert their States into constitutional democracies, the smaller ones being absorbed in the larger, or in the Indian Union. After a lengthy argument on this subject, I thought that he seemed inclined to moderate his view of the document on this point.

As regards the right of non-accession, he started by asserting that the document was an invitation to the Muslims to insist on the creation of a Pakistan. He acknowledged the great influence of Jinnah and admitted that the Pakistan movement had grown greatly in strength, but he remained firmly opposed to the division of India. I pointed out to him that the document was primarily based on the conception of a united India, and that it was only if Congress failed to come to an agreement with the Muslims in the constitution-making body that the danger of non-accession would arise. I said that I had always understood him to take the view that, if the British Government stood aside, there would be no difficulty in reaching such an agreement, and stressed my belief that such an agreement was more likely if the Muslim Provinces had the option of not coming into a Constitution framed by a constituent Assembly.

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At the conclusion of our discussion Mr. Gandhi pressed me most earnestly not to publish the document. I told him that it was intended to publish it on the following Monday, and he urged me many times not to do so. He asked me what Jinnah's attitude to publication was, and I told him that Jinnah was in favour of publication before long owing to the risk of leakage. He interpreted this (as I had myself) as being an indication that Jinnah would accept the scheme. I rather formed the view that he was afraid of the pressure of public opinion on Congress to accept the scheme, which would to some extent deprive them of the ability to bargain in regard to it.

On the 28th March I had an interview with Mr. Rajagopalachari, who came to see me as the late Premier of Madras. As he was not acting as a representative of Congress, he was not prepared to discuss points of detail, but he stressed three points which he thought were likely to prejudice the chances of success with the Congress: firstly, the use of the word "Dominion" in the opening paragraph, for which he would like to see substituted "free Member State"; secondly, the right of non-accession, which, however, he did not stress strongly; and, thirdly, the question of defence. Here he used the same arguments as Azad, saying that it was essential that the Indian leaders should be able to give some clarion call to their people which would stimulate them from their present defeatist attitude. He argued that something should be done to improve the last paragraph of the document to this end, and was of opinion that the chances of success would be much increased if it were made to read as follows:—

> "During the critical period which now faces India, the peoples of India must take upon themselves the defence of their own country and the task of organising this defence must fall upon the Government of India; yet His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear the full responsibility for the successful prosecution of the war in India both for historical reasons and by virtue of the world-wide nature of the war. They desire and invite, &c. . . ."

On the same day I saw Maulana Azad again and went over with him once more the whole ground regarding the defence question.

It was now evident that the question of defence would become the crucial issue, and on the evening of the 28th March I consulted the Viceroy regarding the possibility of an amendment of paragraph (*e*) of the Declaration in the direction suggested by Rajagopalachari. As a result we agreed upon the formula which, with the approval of the War Cabinet, was included in the final text of the draft Declaration when the document was published on the following Monday morning. This definitely stated that the task of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the co-operation of the peoples of India, while His Majesty's Government must retain control and direction of the defence of India. A copy of the revised paragraph (*e*) was sent to the

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leaders of all the delegations to whom I had given copies of the document itself, before the revised text was published.

On the morning of the 29th March I invited Pandit Nehru, who had just arrived in Delhi, to come to breakfast with me and subsequently I went with him to call on Mr. Gandhi at Birla House. Nothing except courtesies passed between myself and Mr. Gandhi, but, at his suggestion, I had a conversation with Pandit Pant and Mr. Kher, which lasted for an hour and a half. These two argued on the same lines as the other Congress representatives whom I had seen, Pandit Pant being particularly strong against the non-accession provisions as being an incitement to Pakistan. After referring to the Indian States question, Mr. Kher raised the defence issue. I again went over the arguments as regards the necessity for the unified control of operations and I think that I produced some impression on them, although they remained unconvinced that control of operations by the War Cabinet was inconsistent with the transfer of the Defence Member's portfolio to an Indian.

DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE DEFENCE FORMULA

It was clear to me from all these conversations and from other sources of information that, unless we could go some way to meet the Congress view on the defence question, there was little prospect of success. The reception of the draft Declaration by the Indian Press had been on the whole favourable, and I decided to seek some means of compromise on the defence issue. On the 30th March I therefore wrote to the Congress President and to Mr. Jinnah the letter which is reproduced as No. 1 in the White Paper (Command 6350). The terms of this letter were agreed between myself and the Viceroy. The letter made it clear that, while the division of responsibility between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India would be as stated in paragraph (*e*) of the Declaration, "the Viceroy would be prepared to consult with Indian leaders on this basis to see whether it were possible to designate an Indian to some office connected with the Government of India's defence responsibilities, without in any way impinging upon the functions and duties of the Commander-in-Chief, either in his capacity as supreme Commander of the armed forces in India, or as the Member of the Executive Council in charge of defence."

On the 1st April I received further reliable information that the Congress intended to reject the proposals mainly on the defence issue, and I was privately informed that they had already drafted a resolution in this sense. I therefore invited Maulana Azad and Pandit Nehru to meet the Commander-in-Chief in order that they might receive from him in person an explanation of the difficulties in the way of the transfer of the Defence Portfolio. I hoped that the personal opinion of the Commander-in-Chief would carry weight, and also that personal contact with General Wavell would have the effect of increasing the Congress leaders' confidence in his personal collaboration on any interim

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Executive on which they might agree to serve. The invitation was accepted, but on the same afternoon they came to see me and handed me the text of the Congress Resolution. They said, however, that the Resolution would not be published at present and gave me to understand that, if they could be satisfied in regard to defence, the remainder of the Resolution might be subject to substantial modification.

The interview between the Congress leaders and General Wavell took place on the evening of the 3rd April,[8] but, although they called on me immediately afterwards, I could form no estimate of the impression which had been produced upon them. But however this might be, I felt that we should be wrong to let the negotiations break down on the defence question without making every endeavour to reach a compromise. I therefore despatched on the evening of the 4th April a telegram reviewing the general position and the possible alternative courses of action, as a result of which I was authorised by the War Cabinet to offer the creation of a new portfolio connected with defence which could be held by an Indian Member of the Governor-General's Executive, and which would take over such functions of the existing Defence Department as the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief considered could be transferred without impairing the position of the latter. Accordingly, on the 7th April, I wrote to Maulana Azad and Mr. Jinnah a letter (No. 7 in the White Paper) which proposed that the Commander-in-Chief should remain a Member of the Executive Council, but should be entitled "War Member". In this capacity he would retain full control over all the war activities of the armed forces in India. A new portfolio, which could be held by a representative Indian, would be created, which would take over those sections of the Defence Department which could be separated immediately from the War Department, and, in addition, the Defence Co-ordination Department and other important functions directly related to defence, such as economic warfare and denial policy. The new member would be entitled "Defence Co-ordination Member".

It was at this point that Colonel Louis Johnson, President Roosevelt's personal representative on supply matters, who had just arrived in India, first participated in the conversations. From the outset he assured me that he was giving his good offices as a go-between and was not in any way seeking to intervene as a representative of the President or of the U.S.A. He was, however, able, by forcible expression of his personal opinion that, if Congress broke off the conversations on the defence issue, they would forfeit all public support in the U.S.A., to produce no small effect upon the minds of the Congress leaders.

Colonel Johnson had, with the approval of the Viceroy, already had two conversations with Pandit Nehru, at the latter's request. As a result of these, he came on the evening of the 7th April to tell me that he understood that the offer we had made would be more acceptable to Congress if it purported at least to transfer the Defence Department to Indian hands, even though this were

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accompanied by the transfer to the Commander-in-Chief, as War Member, of those functions of the Defence Department which we held it necessary for the Commander-in-Chief to retain. After personal discussion between myself, Colonel Johnson and the Viceroy, the latter agreed to consider a formula on this basis. I then drafted a formula and showed it to the Viceroy, who simultaneously produced a much longer draft of his own. The upshot was that a formula in the following terms was agreed with the Viceroy:—

"In amplification of the Clause (*e*) of the draft Declaration, His Majesty's Government make the following proposition upon the subject matter of the defence of India:—

(*a*) The Defence Department shall be placed in charge of a representative Indian member with the exception of functions to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief as War Member of the Executive Council.

(*b*) A War Department will be constituted which will take over such functions of the Defence Department as are not retained by the Defence Member. A list of all the retained functions has been agreed, to which will be added further important responsibilities, including the matters now dealt with by the Defence Co-ordination Department and other vital matters related to the defence of India."

The list of retained functions was the same as that already communicated to the Congress leaders in my letter of the 7th April, as being the functions of the Defence Department which could be transferred to an Indian Member.

This draft formula was handed to the Congress leaders by Colonel Johnson early on the 8th April as one which, he understood, might be acceptable. On the evening of the 8th April Colonel Johnson came to see me again after a further conversation with Pandit Nehru. He said that he now understood that the formula would be more acceptable if, instead of defining the functions of the Defence Department to be retained by the Indian Defence Member, it defined the functions which the War Member would take over from the Defence Department. This was, of course, only a change of form, the subject matter to be retained by an Indian Defence Member being the same as before. Colonel Johnson and I then drafted a formula in the following terms:—

"(*a*) The Defence Department shall be placed in the charge of a representative Indian Member, but certain functions relating to the conduct of the war will be exercised, until the new constitution comes into operation, by the Commander-in-Chief, who will be in control of the war activities of the armed forces in India and who will be a Member of the Executive Council for that purpose.

[8] It appears from Vol. I, Nos. 513, 520, 524, para. 2, and 525, para. 1, that the interview took place on 4 April.

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(*b*) A War Department will be constituted under the Commander-in-Chief. This Department will take over such functions as are to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief. A list of such functions has been prepared and is attached.

(*c*) The Defence Member shall be in charge of all other matters relating to defence in the Defence Department and those now dealt with by the Defence Co-ordination Department, in addition to other important matters closely related to defence.

(*d*) In the event of any new functions falling to be discharged in relation to defence or any dispute arising as to the allocation of any old functions, it shall be decided by His Majesty's Government."

LIST OF WAR DEPARTMENT'S FUNCTIONS

"The War Department, for which the Commander-in-Chief will be Member, will be responsible for the governmental relations of G.H.Q., N.H.Q., and A.H.Q., which include:—

(1) Examining and sanctioning of proposals emanating from G.H.Q., N.H.Q., and A.H.Q.

(2) Representing the policy of Government on all questions connected with the war which originate in or concern G.H.Q., N.H.Q., or A.H.Q.

(3) Acting as the channel of communication between the Government of India and His Majesty's Government on all such questions.

(4) Acting as liaison between these headquarters and the other departments of Government and Provincial Governments."

The definition of the War Member's functions in this formula was taken from the Viceroy's own draft, which had not been adopted when the first formula[9] was framed. Mr. Hodson, the Reforms Commissioner of the Government of India, who was present when I saw Colonel Johnson, was asked to take copies of the new formula to the Commander-in-Chief and the Viceroy, and Colonel Johnson went to communicate the revised version to the Congress leaders, again, not as a final offer, but as a formula which he understood might be acceptable. I did not consult the Viceroy before taking this step, as unless action was taken at once it was probable that the Congress would finally reject the proposals and the formula included his own definition of the War Member's functions. Subsequently, the Viceroy asked me to make some alterations in the wording of this formula, and I was able when I saw the Congress leaders to secure these amendments without difficulty. The Congress leaders, however, asked for the omission of the words "until a new constitution comes into operation", to which I agreed. The final form of the formula which I understood to be acceptable to the Congress leaders is published as No. 8 in the White Paper (Command 6350).

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The Congress Working Committee met to consider this formula on the morning of Thursday, the 9th April. An atmosphere of tense expectation prevailed in Delhi at this time, and there is no doubt that there was very general public anticipation of an agreement. At lunch time on that day it was reported through press channels that Mr. Rajagopalachari had said on leaving the Congress meeting that agreement was now certain.

Consequently it was with some hope that I received Maulana Azad and Pandit Nehru at their request at 5.30 that afternoon. So far as defence was concerned, this hope appeared to be justified. The Congress leaders accepted the Viceroy's amendments and raised no objection to the formula as so revised. But it may be that the Congress leaders at this stage had determined not to reach agreement and did not dispute the proposed formula regarding defence because they had decided to break on other issues. In any event they turned the conversation to the wider question of the general position of the Executive Council and the Viceroy's powers under the proposed interim arrangements. At earlier interviews this question had come up in a general way and we had discussed it from various aspects. I had, however, uniformly taken the view that this was a matter which I could not settle with them. I had stated that I was sure they would be able to come to some agreement with the Viceroy, but that it was for the Viceroy and not for myself to decide the actual terms upon which the new Government would be carried on.

I stated that I was sure the Viceroy had in mind—if representative Indians were on his executive—to treat it more as a cabinet than as an executive council.

At this final interview, however, the Congress representatives brought up the subject as a bar to further progress towards agreement and stated that they could not agree to the other matters unless I could then and there give them the assurances they asked for. I pressed them to accept the declaration provisionally with any comments or reservations they wished to make, so that talks with the Viceroy could be started on the implementation of paragraph (*e*).

I pointed out that this could not bind them to accept any conditions laid down by the Viceroy, as it would always be open to them to refuse to enter the Executive, just as a person offered a place in the British Cabinet could refuse if the Prime Minister's conditions were not acceptable. I further pointed out that if—as I understood—they feared that the Viceroy might prove too difficult to work with in practice, which I considered most unlikely, they would always have the power to resign, which would put them in a strong position to press their point of view.

The demand which they made was that the Viceroy should undertake to accept the majority decision of the Executive Council and should not do more than act as a constitutional monarch. I pointed out that this was not possible but that the degree of compromise towards such a position could only be

[9] Namely, the formula evolved during the discussions of the evening of 7 April.

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determined if they would discuss it with the Viceroy on the basis of their general acceptance of the rest of the declaration.

It seemed to me clear from the course of our conversation that they had come determined to find a reason for refusal and that, having discarded the earlier objections as valid causes, they had been driven to find this new reason.

On the following afternoon I received Maulana Azad's letter (No. 9 in the White Paper) which, with my reply and Maulana Azad's rejoinder, closed the negotiations with the Congress.

I think it is quite clear that the Congress decision to reject the proposals was a last minute change of front. I base this opinion not only on the reported statement of Rajagopalachari at midday on the 9th April, but also on a telephone conversation which I had with Mr. J. C. Gupta on the morning of the 10th April. Mr. Gupta was then in Calcutta, but had been in Delhi and had played a valuable part as a go-between between myself and the Congress leaders. He telephoned to congratulate me on the decision of Congress to accept the scheme. He had evidently been informed that the Working Committee had come to such a decision on the previous day, but had not heard of the later developments as a result of my conversation with the Congress leaders the preceding day. As he is one of Azad's closest friends I was certain he had been given this information by Azad himself; in fact, he so implied in the course of the conversation. I attribute this change of front by the Congress to the personal intervention of Mr. Gandhi during the afternoon of Thursday, the 9th April.

(*b*) THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

Mr. Jinnah was the sole official representative of the Muslim League throughout the conversations. I had my first interview with him on the 25th March immediately after I had received the President of the Congress. I opened the conversation by telling him that, while the views I had held about the Muslim League's Pakistan policy two years ago were sincerely taken, I had revised them considerably during the past two years in view of the growing strength of the support for the Pakistan policy of the League. Mr. Jinnah responded very well to this, and the conversation thus began on an entirely friendly basis. I gave him a copy of the draft Declaration, and I think it rather surprised him in the distance that it went to meet the Pakistan case. We had a long discussion as to the effect of the Declaration, especially as regards Bengal and Punjab. Mr. Jinnah was mainly interested in whether these Provinces would have an effective right to opt out of the proposed Indian Union if they so wished, and I explained to him my proposal that there should be a vote of the Legislature on a resolution to join the Union, and that, if there were a majority of less than 60 per cent., the minority should have the right to challenge a plebiscite of the adult male population. Mr. Jinnah said that he thought a plebiscite was the only fair idea, and that the only question was whether 40 per cent. was the right figure to

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apply to the minority. As regards paragraph (*e*), Mr. Jinnah did not seem to think there would be any insuperable difficulty provided the Viceroy would consult the Congress and himself on the composition of the Executive Council, and would treat the Council as a Cabinet rather than as an Executive according to the present constitution.

The only substantial suggestion Mr. Jinnah made as regards any alteration in the document was that paragraph (*c*) (i) should make it clear that the status of the Provinces which did not accede would be in no way inferior to that of the main Union, and I was able to meet him on this point by an amendment before the document was published.

After this meeting I saw Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, who told me that the Muslim League Working Committee had accepted the scheme unanimously, and I am sure that this was true.

I saw Mr. Jinnah again on the 28th March, when he came ostensibly for further elucidation of the document, but did not, in fact, ask any questions which he had not asked before. It seemed clear from his attitude that the Muslim League Working Committee had accepted the scheme in principle and were prepared to proceed to settle the details, especially those under clause (*e*), with regard to which we had some general and rather vague conversation.

After this interview Mr. Jinnah left Delhi to attend the Muslim League Conference, and he did not return until the closing stages of the conversations. I had one further discussion with him before it was known that the Congress had rejected the proposals, though he then took the view that rejection was certain. He had asked me to let him know the Congress decision confidentially in advance, as he was anxious not to give the Muslim League decision till he was aware of what Congress was going to do. He was obviously hard put to it to think out reasons for refusal. He was almost apologetic when he put forward the suggestion in this conversation that the plebiscite on the question of accession should be confined to the Muslim population, as it was so obviously fantastic! The final resolution of the Muslim League which was eventually brought to me by Mr. Jinnah was far more uncompromising than anything which he had said to me in conversation. It takes exception both to the form of the constituent assembly proposed in the Declaration, and to my proposal that the question of accession should be decided by a 60 per cent. majority of the Legislature, failing which the minority might demand a plebiscite of the adult male population. On this point it demands that the plebiscite should be confined to the Muslim population in order that they may have the right of self-determination.

(*c*) THE INDIAN STATES

In accordance with the Viceroy's advice,[10] I dealt with the Indian States through a delegation nominated by the Chamber of Princes, but as a matter of form I

[10] See Vol. I, Nos. 331, para. 4, and 352, para. 2.

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received also a delegation from Hyderabad in order to conform with past practice.

In the first instance I received on the 26th March the Chancellor of the Chamber, H.H. the Jam Sahib, and the pro-Chancellor, H.H. the Maharajah of Bikaner. This was a short interview, at which I gave them a text of the draft Declaration and a general explanation of its provisions. Subsequently I had two meetings with the full delegation, which, in addition to these two Maharajahs, included the Maharajahs of Patiala and Bhopal and four Diwans.

At these meetings a wide range of questions, many of them hypothetical, were raised. I assured the delegation in reply to specific enquiries that the States would have not only the option of taking part in the constitution-making body, but, if they chose to take part, the option of refusing to adhere to the constitution resulting from the deliberations of the constitution-making body; and, further, that if a State did not adhere, its treaties with the Crown would remain unaffected save in such matters as railways, in which their present relations with British India might have to be revised in the new circumstances. I was asked whether the Governor-General and the Crown Representative would, in the new circumstances, be the same individual and replied that, so far as I could see, these offices would have to be held by different persons as the interests to be regarded by them would be quite distinct and sometimes antagonistic. If so, the Crown Representative might have to have his seat in one of the States. So far as the implementation of our obligations for the defence of the States was concerned, I said that the means by which this would be achieved would depend on the number and position of the States which did not adhere to the Indian Union, but that there was no insuperable difficulty from the naval point of view so long as we held Ceylon or, so long as we had aerodromes in some of the States, from the air point of view. We should have to make provision, in the Treaty with the Indian Union, for any necessary facilities, such as passage of troops, which might be required to enable us to carry out this obligation. In general, we should stand by our treaties with the States unless they asked us to revoke them. So far as all matters of paramountcy were concerned, if they wished these relationships to be revised and for us to give up paramountcy, I indicated that we should be unlikely to take any objection.

A point on which the delegation showed much interest was whether States which did not join the proposed Indian Union might form a separate Union under the scheme, having the same status. I said that the scheme did not contemplate such a development, but only that the States could adhere or not to the Indian Union. I added, however, that, if the scheme went through, I would submit this point to His Majesty's Government for consideration. It is clearly a point which will have to be considered in connection with any offer made in the future on the same lines as these proposals, but its admission, while it might strengthen the position of the States in the constitution-making body, would

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be likely to increase the opposition of the Congress and of the Hindu Mahasabha to the proposals.

I put it to the delegation that I understood that the scheme was generally satisfactory from their point of view and they replied that that was so. The delegation left with me a memorandum of points on which they desired written explanations and in my replies to these I made, *inter alia*, the following main points:—

(1) The effect of adherence to the Indian Union upon a State's internal sovereignty and constitutional arrangements would depend entirely upon the nature of the Union's constitution as framed by the constitution-making body.

(2) States which adhere will become part of the Union and the Crown will cease to exercise paramountcy over them or to give them special protection, since the Crown clearly could not exercise such powers over a portion of the Union, which, as a whole, will enjoy Dominion Status. As regards the personal and dynastic affairs of a Ruler, these might by agreement with the Union remain subject to the jurisdiction of the Crown.

(3) His Majesty's Government will make the necessary provision to implement their treaty obligations to non-adhering States—not excluding the possible use of force in the last resort.

(4) Non-acceding States need have no fear that their treaties, so far as these are concerned with their relations with the Crown, will be revised without their own consent.

(*d*) THE HINDU MAHASABHA

The Hindu Mahasabha delegation, led by Dr. Savarkar, expressed themselves as strongly opposed to the principle of non-accession. They asked whether the Declaration must be accepted or rejected as a whole, as they were in favour of a declaration on the lines of the first paragraph but opposed to non-accession. I told them that non-accession was fundamental, and gathered that on this basis they would reject the proposals.

As regards the defence question, they were strongly of the opinion that the Defence Portfolio should be put into Indian hands, but said that they could not trust a Muslim Defence Minister, and would want two Defence Advisers, one Hindu and one Muslim, whose advice the Viceroy would undertake to accept. I pointed out that this was hardly practicable.

The Resolution subsequently passed by the Hindu Mahasabha rejected the proposals on the grounds both that the right of non-accession and a constituent assembly based on the communal award[11] were unacceptable. The Mahasabha

[11] In a statement dated 4 August 1932, His Majesty's Government announced that, in the absence of any agreement between the Indian communities, it had itself decided how seats in the Provincial

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Resolution also emphasised the necessity for Indian control of Defence and the raising of Militias, their views on these matters being similar to those of the Congress.

At the time when it appeared possible that the Congress might accept the proposals I became aware that they felt some anxiety lest, if they were to accept the proposals and co-operate in an interim government, they would be open to attack by the Hindu Mahasabha on the ground that they had sacrificed Hindu interests to a dangerous degree. On the 9th April I therefore sent a telegram to Dr. Savarkar through the Governor of Bombay, asking whether the Mahasabha would be prepared to come into an interim government if the Congress and the Muslim League were willing to do so. This telegram was in the following terms:—

> "I am sorry that you have left New Delhi before the negotiations terminated as I wanted to see you again before making an announcement on Friday morning. I expect to receive final answers from the Congress and Muslim League to-morrow and, if these are favourable, I shall have to advise the Viceroy as to which parties are willing to come in on the basis of the document for the formation of a new National Government under section (*e*). If you are unable to appoint someone to see me on your behalf, will you please communicate your answer through the Governor of Bombay as to whether your party is prepared to come into a National Government on the basis of the draft declaration, making such reservation as you deem fit."

Dr. Savarkar's reply was as follows:—

> "(1) If a National Government is to be formed for the period of the war for carrying on the war effectively in the defence of India, then the Hindu Mahasabha will have no hesitation in joining such a National Government provided that: (*a*) this act does not bind the Mahasabha to accept every letter or clause of the Cripps scheme; and (*b*) that the representation of the Hindus in the National Government is more or less proportionate to the strength of the Hindus in relation to that of the Muslims.
>
> "(2) If a National Government is to be set up forthwith, then the President of the Hindu Mahasabha should be immediately informed as to how the seats will be apportioned, and how many representatives the Hindu Mahasabha will obtain. He wishes to be consulted about the choice of members from the Hindu Mahasabha."

In conversation with the Governor of Bombay Dr. Savarkar explained that, as regards the proportion of Hindus to Muslims in a National Government, he

Legislatures were to be allocated among the communities under the proposed new Indian Constitution then under discussion by the Round Table Conference (Cmd. 4147). This allocation, known as the Communal Award, was, with some modification, to form the basis of the distribution of seats in Provincial Legislatures eventually laid down by the Government of India Act 1935.

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would be prepared to regard representatives of the Sikhs and Depressed Classes as Hindus. He also said that he hoped that the declaration would be confined to the first and last paragraphs of the document, and that the Mahasabha and the Sikhs would be prepared to abandon their anti-Pakistan campaign if the Muslims refrained from a pro-Pakistan campaign during the interim régime.

As a result of this exchange of messages I was able to assure the Congress that the Mahasabha would come into the interim Government if the Congress were willing to work the scheme.

(*e*) THE SIKHS

The main Sikh Delegation consisted of four members—Sirdar Baldev Singh, Sirdar Ujjal Singh, Master Tara Singh and Sir Jogendra Singh, and was nominated by the Sikh All Parties Committee.

Their main interest seemed to be the possibility of having some redistribution of Provincial boundaries in order to carve out a Province in which the Sikhs would have a decisive voice as a large balancing party between the Hindus and Muslims. I pointed out to them the successive stages at which, under the procedure proposed in the draft Declaration, they might reasonably hope to be able to exert pressure which would enable them either to bring the Punjab into the main Indian Union, or to get some measure of autonomy within the second Union if one were formed. These stages were—

(1) In the Constituent Assembly Congress would have at most only a small majority and would desire to get the minorities, such as the Sikhs, on their side by making the most ample provision for their protection within the main Union. This would set a standard of minority protection which might well be satisfactory to the Sikhs, and might even entail the sub-division of the Punjab into two Provinces or the setting up within that Province of a semi-autonomous district for the Sikhs on the Soviet model. If, however, the Sikhs did not get satisfaction in this way, the British Government would be able to insist on minority protection clauses in the treaty, the terms of which would be a matter for negotiation.

(2) If the Muslims were dissatisfied with the Constitution and wished the Punjab to remain outside it, they would have to obtain a vote of non-accession by plebiscite, and would no doubt be anxious to increase their narrow population majority by securing the Sikh vote. They would therefore be likely to offer the most favourable minority protection to the Sikhs to secure their support. There would then be the second Constitution-making body in which the Sikhs could exert their influence, but there would also be a treaty between His Majesty's Government and the second Union in which we should be able to insist on minority protection clauses. I emphasised that, given the right of self-determination

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for India, there was no other means than treaty protection by which we could give protection to the minorities.

As regards the immediate future the Sikh delegation emphasised the need for an Indian Member of the Executive to be in some way associated with Defence, and wanted Sikh representation on the Executive. I told them that the latter was a matter for the Viceroy.

On the 31st March I saw the delegation again, when they said that they could not approve the Declaration, as it did not give them sufficient protection. They said that they would like a special Sikh area in which a vote could be taken as to whether, if there were more than one Union, the Sikhs should join the main Union or the Muslim Union. I promised to bear this in mind.

The delegation handed to me a letter and a memorandum giving a detailed statement of the Sikhs' views. The full text of these documents is contained in the White Paper and it is only necessary here to draw attention to three points. The first is their view that a plebiscite on the question of accession would lead to serious communal disturbances. The second is their claim for partition of the Punjab by the creation of a new Province consisting of the Ambala and Jullundur divisions (which have a non-Muslim majority) together with the Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Lahore Districts (which have a balanced population). This it is claimed would give a non-Muslim majority of 63 per cent. in the new Province, while the Muslim majority in the remainder of the Province would be 77 per cent. The third is the criticism of the proposal for Treaty protection on the ground that the kind of protection desired, namely, political rights such as a fixed proportion of service appointments, a fixed proportion of representation in the Central and Provincial Legislatures, and a maintenance of the Sikhs' position in the Indian Army, can hardly be provided by means of a Treaty.

(f) THE DEPRESSED CLASSES

I received Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Rajah as representatives of the Depressed Classes on the 30th March. They pointed out that, under the present system of election of Depressed Class representatives to Provincial Legislatures imposed by the Poona Pact,[12] the Depressed Classes would get very small representation in the Constituent Assembly, as most of their so-called representatives would be Congressmen. They asked me whether we considered the Depressed Classes to be one of the racial and religious minorities, and I replied that we did. They then asked what kind of provisions were likely to be made in the Treaty for their protection. I said that these would be on the lines of the League of Nations minority treaties, and that, if there were special provisions in the Constitution, these would probably be repeated in the Treaty, and that there would be some obligation to refer the matter to some outside authority in the event of a dispute, the Government of the Indian Union undertaking to abide by the decision so given. If the Indian Government failed to do so this would constitute a breach

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of treaty, and the British Government could take such steps as it considered wise in the particular circumstances. I said that, though this form of protection might seem to them inadequate, it was the only possible one, once granted the principle of self-determination for India.

On the following day Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Rajah wrote to me saying that the proposals were unacceptable to the Depressed Classes, as they would place them under an unmitigated system of Hindu rule, and would be resisted by them by all the means at their disposal. They requested me to convey their anxieties to His Majesty's Government, and to impress upon them that the Depressed Classes would regard it as a breach of faith if a Constitution were forced upon them by His Majesty's Government which had not received their free and voluntary consent, and did not contain within itself the provisions necessary for safeguarding their interests.

(*g*) THE EUROPEANS

I received a delegation of five representatives of the Europeans on two occasions. The delegation was led by Sir Henry Richardson. They were primarily interested in the protection of European interests, both during the transition period and under the permanent constitution of a new Indian Union.

I explained that the whole spirit and intention of the draft Declaration was that we should give India complete freedom and self-government, including freedom to frame her own Constitution in her own way, and that the British Government had decided not to interfere with the form of the Constitution by insisting upon special rights for Europeans. I also told them that we had decided, as a matter of principle, that we would not demand safeguards for the commercial interests of European British subjects in the main Treaty. Such matters would have to be dealt with in a separate trade or commercial agreement, the conclusion of which would not be a condition of implementing the new Constitution, but a normal trade agreement freely negotiated. So far as possible, in such negotiations, we should try to secure protection for British commercial interests.

The delegation enquired what would be the position of United Kingdom British subjects who found themselves deprived of their livelihood in consequence of the granting of self-government. I said that, in my opinion, there was

[12] The Poona Pact between Hindu and Depressed Class leaders modified the Communal Award of 4 August 1932 (see note 11). Its principal provisions were as follows: 148 instead of 71 seats were to be reserved for the Depressed Classes but their representatives were to be elected jointly by Caste Hindu as well as Depressed Class voters; however, the joint electorate's choice was to be confined to a panel of four candidates selected in a primary election in which only Depressed Class voters could take part. The Pact was reached under pressure from Gandhi (then in gaol at Poona) who regarded the Depressed Classes as members of the Hindu community and opposed separate electorates for them. He threatened a fast (begun on 20 September) 'unto death' unless the Communal Award was altered to meet his objections. The Pact was agreed on 24 September and the acquiescence of H.M.G. was announced on 26 September 1932.

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no reason why such British subjects should not be allowed to continue to operate their businesses in India under the new Constitution, but that, if as a direct result of the constitutional change individual British subjects found themselves deprived of their livelihood, I felt certain that the British Government would give due consideration to any claims they might put forward with a view to alleviating the position of such persons. The delegates assured me of their desire to assist in resolving the deadlock which prevented the co-operation of the main parties in the present Government, and their desire to help in mobilising Indian opinion behind the war effort, the importance of doing which they fully appreciated. They were, however, insistent that the European community should be regarded as a recognised minority for the purpose of treaty protection under Clause (*c*) (ii) of the draft Declaration. On this point I informed them that, while European British subjects domiciled in India were clearly a racial minority, it would not be possible under a Constitution framed as contemplated in the draft Declaration to regard United Kingdom British subjects, who did not qualify as Indian citizens under any legislation which might define such citizenship, as a racial minority for purposes of Treaty protection under Clause (*c*) (ii). Before I left India the delegation sent me a memorandum[13] giving their views on this subject at some length. They argued that the Europeans, irrespective of domicile, had for years been regarded as one of the recognised political minorities, and, in particular, had been so recognised for the purpose of representation in the Legislatures under the communal award. They therefore claim to be one of the minorities referred to by the Prime Minister in his speech in the House of Commons on the 11th March,[14] and entitled as such to Treaty protection on the same lines as other minorities. They expressed their intention of pressing their claim to that position through their representatives both in India and in London, and contended that the recognition of this claim is in no way inconsistent with or damaging to the achievement of the general purpose of the draft Declaration.

(*h*) THE ANGLO-INDIANS

I saw Sir Henry Gidney, as representative of the Anglo-Indian Community, on the 26th March. I explained to him that, as a very small numerical minority, the best that the Anglo-Indians could hope for, given that India was to have the right of self-determination, was that, with other minorities, they would receive reasonable safeguards from the majority in the Constituent Assembly. Sir Henry appeared to accept this position, but was anxious that His Majesty's Government should render his community some special assistance, as they were likely, after the transfer of power, to be in a very difficult position, especially in regard to education. I told him that I could give no promise in regard to such matters, but that, if he put up some reasonable request, it would, I felt sure, receive consideration in view of the special position of his community.

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Subsequently Sir Henry Gidney sent me a considered statement[15] of the views of the Anglo-Indians on the draft Declaration. This document, while acquiescing in the general purpose of the draft Declaration, expressed disagreement on the following main points:—

(1) The proposals for a Constituent Assembly are such that the Anglo-Indians, whose total membership in the Provincial Legislative Assemblies is only 12 out of 1,585 seats, cannot under strict proportional representation expect any representation at all in the Constitution-making body.

(2) While appreciating the reasons for including the right of non-accession, the Anglo-Indians feel that the position of smaller minorities, hitherto strengthened by the existence of a large Muslim minority, will be much weakened by the partition of India and the exclusion of the bulk of the Muslims from the main Indian Union if this occurs.

(3) They feel grave doubt as to the effectiveness of protection by means of a Treaty of the kind contemplated. If India has the right of secession they regard it as unlikely that His Majesty's Government will be willing to quarrel with the Indian Government over the rights of a small community, since this would increase the risk of India's secession. The history of the League of Nations does not promote confidence in such minority protection.

The community also ask that, in view of its special position and the responsibility which the British people owe to it, His Majesty's Government should, if the proposed policy is carried out, assist them specially in two ways:—

(*a*) By the grant of a substantial sum of money to enable the special needs of the community for European Christian education to be provided for in an independent India.

(*b*) By procuring for the community a substantial area of land to enable employment and means of livelihood to be provided for Anglo-Indians who must inevitably expect to be displaced under an independent Indian Government from their present special position in Government Services.

(*i*) THE INDIAN CHRISTIANS

A delegation nominated by the All-India Indian Christian Conference, consisting of Sir Maharaj Singh, Mr. F. X. D'Souza and Mr. Rallia Ram, came to see me on the 30th March. I gave them a general explanation of the draft Declaration, and they pointed out, as had the other lesser minorities, that they would get very small representation in the constitution-making body. In reply to their enquiry whether they would be regarded as a religious minority, I replied in the

[13] Not printed in Vol. I. [14] See Vol. I, Nos. 308 and 309. [15] Not printed in Vol. I.

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affirmative, and I gave them the same explanation as regards minority protection by the Treaty as I had given to the Depressed Classes representatives. Their general attitude was that, while there were points in the draft Declaration which they could not easily agree with, they would not take any objection to it as a whole.

They asked whether they would be regarded as one of the minorities whom the Viceroy was to consult regarding interim arrangements under paragraph (*e*). I said that this would be for the Viceroy to decide, but that I thought it unlikely that they would be consulted.

The delegation also raised the question of the control of defence and I explained the reasons why we considered it essential to retain control of defence during the interim period.

INDIAN STUDENTS

These, together with the representative of the Communist Party whom I saw, were the most left-wing of all those whom I interviewed. They informed me that the Indian Students were split into two groups, the one to which they were attached, which was for an all-out war effort against Japan, and the other, strong especially in Allahabad, which adopted the line of Mr. Gandhi. They were most anxious to do all they could to help in the Defence of India and I was able to put them in touch with the General Staff and the Government of India, who were anxious to make use of their services. One of the matters of which they complained was that a number of their keenest propagandists and leaders were in detention owing to their left-wing views. I arranged with the Viceroy before I left for the liberation of a great number of them so that they might play their active part in forwarding the war effort.

INDIAN LABOUR

I saw Mr. Joshi and Mr. M. N. Roy as representatives of Indian Labour. The former was whole-hearted in his support of the declaration. The latter was very impatient with the attitude of Congress and seemed to think that the real solution of the Indian problem was to hand over to him the Government of India, in association with the Viceroy.

I have always regarded Mr. Roy as an unreliable and self-seeking politician and I do not think that he has any real influence in India.

INDIAN LIBERALS

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar came to see me twice and put forward ideas which Sir Tej had publicised before my arrival. Their subsequent communications to the press disclose their attitude. They were both most anxious for a settlement and were very insistent upon the necessity of placing the Defence Portfolio in the hands of an Indian. They did their best to get accommodation

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with Congress and to help towards a settlement. The actual body of opinion which they represent is small, but Sir Tej has a personal influence and following which is of value.

THE PRESS

From the time of my arrival in India I was careful to adopt as frank and friendly an attitude as possible towards the Indian Press. I held a Press Conference on the day of my arrival, at which I undertook to hold further Conferences every other morning during my stay, and at all these Conferences I answered questions. Indian journalists are a formidable audience, but they responded extremely well to frank treatment. The main Press Conference was held on Sunday evening, the 29th March, when I disclosed the text of the draft Declaration in preparation for its publication next morning, and was questioned on it for 2 hours. This enabled me to emphasise publicly the great advance over previous proposals which the Declaration embodied, and undoubtedly secured for it a much more favourable reception in the Press generally than it would otherwise have received. The Press generally maintained a responsible and hopeful attitude towards the proposals until the closing stages of the conversations, when it began to concentrate on the Defence issue and sought to suggest differences of view between the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief, and myself. I am sure, however, that the policy of treating the Indian Press with candour, as is now generally done in this country, proved itself to be fully justified, and made possible a direct appeal to the forces of public opinion in India.

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, I do not find it easy to assess with precision either the causes which led to the failure to secure agreement or the width of the gap which lay between the failure and success. From the outset there were powerful influences working against a settlement, the most powerful of which was Mr. Gandhi. The decline in confidence in our prospects of victory due to the Japanese successes in the Far East, and especially our defeats in Malaya and Burma, had also a considerable effect. There is no doubt that there was a wide-spread feeling, especially among Hindus, that if the Japanese were to be victorious it might be better for Indian interests if Indian politicians had taken no overt part in India's defence, and also, especially in Hindu business circles, a feeling that the process of defending India on a national basis would involve disproportionately great material and financial losses which would not be offset by any political gain. On the other hand, there were powerful elements in favour of all-out resistance, which included some of the principal Congress Leaders such as Nehru as well as the Muslims and Sikhs and much Middle and Left-Wing opinion. I have no doubt at all that Maulana Azad and Nehru, in addition to Rajagopalachari and Bhulabhai Desai were anxious to find a basis on which

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Congress could join in the defence of India, and would, if agreement had been reached, have co-operated to this end with complete loyalty. But throughout the negotiations Mr. Gandhi exerted his influence against any agreement. His motives are always difficult to discern, but his non-violent doctrine alone made his opposition natural. This would induce him to any course of action which would prevent Congress from being drawn into the active organisation of India for its own defence by violent means. Another factor of importance was Mr. Gandhi's appreciation of the challenge of his own position. Had agreement been reached he must have been superseded in his leadership of Congress by Nehru or some other supporter of violent resistance, and he may well have foreseen that in such circumstances it would have been extremely difficult for him to stage a come-back. He was, therefore, I think, determined to fight against agreement at all cost. In any event, Mr. Gandhi's followers in the Working Committee consistently opposed agreement and it is probably not without significance that on the afternoon of Thursday, the 9th April, on the morning of which day the Working Committee were reported to have decided to accept the proposed basis of agreement on defence, a telephone conversation between the Congress Leaders in Delhi and Mr. Gandhi at Wardha lasting 2 hours was reported by the Government of India to have taken place, after which there was a complete change in the Congress attitude. It is reported that before this conversation the voting in the Working Committee had been 7 to 5 in favour of acceptance and that after it became 8 to 4 against.

It is alleged by the Congress leaders that they were misled as to the position regarding the Executive Council under paragraph (*e*) and had not understood that the Viceroy would retain all his statutory powers of overruling the Council. I am confident that what I said to the Congress representatives did not bear the interpretation which they placed upon it, and my belief is that there was no real misunderstanding but that, having decided to break off the conversations, the Congress chose this point as a better ground on which to do so than the defence question.

The tactics of the Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah's own attitude, together with Sir Sikander Hyat Khan's statement that the League had passed a resolution accepting the proposals, conclusively show, I consider, that the League would have been ready to accept the proposals if Congress had been prepared to do so. The Sikhs, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Depressed Classes and the Anglo-Indians all expressed strong opposition to the long-term proposals, though not on the same grounds. While none of the minorities are prepared openly to oppose the claim for Indian self-determination, and all of them professedly support that demand, they are none of them ready to abandon the idea that the British Government should in some way interfere in the process of making the constitution of a free India to secure provisions in the constitution for their

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protection. I hope that my conversations have helped to bring them face to face with the inconsistency of their position, and to a recognition that it is only by Treaty protection that we can, once granted the right of self-determination for India, secure minority rights. It must, however, be admitted that even had the Congress and the Muslim League been prepared to accept the scheme it would have been difficult to say that the other minorities which had already expressed opposition were in agreement with the scheme as a whole. But all of them would, I think, have been willing to co-operate in interim arrangements under paragraph (*e*) if it had been possible, with the co-operation of Congress and the League, to proceed with the policy proposed in the draft Declaration. Their attitude, however, is to my mind conclusive evidence that if agreement by all of these minorities is made a condition of accepting a constitution framed by Indians no such constitution will ever be acceptable and the road of progress is indefinitely closed.

The correct attitude to adopt in these circumstances is, in my opinion, that all we ask is the co-operation in the immediate Government upon the basis of the main part of the declaration. That is to say, that we have no objection to reservations or criticism of particular provisions of the long-term proposals, provided it is accepted that we propose to proceed upon that basis, failing any agreement between the principal parties and communities in India upon some other alternative. If, accepting that basis, the parties were then prepared to co-operate with us in the immediate Government of India, we should have taken a very real step forward, and should have substantially overcome the deadlock. The fact that the various sections of Indian opinion then worked together on the immediate problems would provide the best possible basis for an ultimate satisfactory solution of the whole matter.

I feel that, as a result of my visit, India has itself been made to face the practical problem of self-government in a way that it has never had to face it before, and that, although there must be a period of great confusion of thought and difficulty as a result, this is a necessary stage through which we must pass. When the matter comes to be considered again this period of thought will, I believe, help in making a solution more possible.

R. S. C.

APPENDIX

DRAFT DECLARATION FOR DISCUSSION WITH INDIAN LEADERS PUBLISHED MARCH 30, 1942

[*There follows the text of Vol. I, No. 456. In footnotes, Sir S. Cripps gave the original version of para.* (*c*) (*i*) *second sentence, and of para.* (*e*) *as agreed by the War Cabinet on the eve of the Mission's departure; see Vol. I, Annex to No. 265.*]

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 86th Conclusions, Minute 5

L/P&J/8/596: f 89

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 6 July 1942 at 5.30 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Ernest Bevin, Viscount Halifax[1]

Also present during discussion of item 5 were: Mr S. M. Bruce, Sir Kingsley Wood, Viscount Simon, Mr Herbert Morrison, Mr Amery, Viscount Cranborne, Mr A. V. Alexander, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Mr Brendan Bracken

The War Cabinet had before them two Memoranda by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (42) 255[2] and W.P. (42) 271[3]) setting out the policy likely to be adopted by Gandhi and the Congress Party, and the counter-action which might be necessary.

The War Cabinet:—

Decided to take note of these Memoranda, without at this stage endorsing all the Viceroy's suggestions.

[1] Viscount Halifax had the right to attend the War Cabinet whenever he was in the United Kingdom.
[2] No. 150. [3] No. 196.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: f 88

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *7 July 1942, 11 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 8 July*

828. Your personal telegram 1928–S[1] of 26th June. Gandhi. I brought your appreciation before the War Cabinet on Monday.[2] They did not feel it necessary to come to any conclusion as to how the situation should be handled until it becomes clear that action must be taken.

[1] No. 188. [2] See No. 228.

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Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/681: f 69

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *7 July 1942, 6.45 am*
Received: 7 July, 2 am

5261. Provincial Governments have agreed to policy outlined in Home Department letter 7/2/42—Political (I)[1] dated June 8th 1942 copy of which despatched to you by fast bag on June 16th. We propose therefore to issue following announcement. *Begins.* The Communist party of India in their announcements and circulars to party members have recently indicated a change of front and, recognising this war as a people's war, in which Indian people must in their own interest make common cause with united freedom-loving nations, have decided, if permitted, to throw their energies into task of co-operating with existing war effort. According to their statement of policy, if members of party are free to act they will devote all their energies to teaching people what war means and organising them for self-defence and resistance to the enemy. Government of India accept this statement of their intentions as sincere and desire that full opportunity should be given them of putting those intentions into practice. In order therefore that they may function legally as a party the Government of India have decided to remove the ban on the Communist party of India, and its organs—*The National Front* and *The New Age.*

The Government of India and Provincial Governments have already released from detention or restriction a number of individuals associated with Communist party of whose intentions they were satisfied. They will continue, and as far as possible accelerate, this process in the light of policy now adopted, dealing with each case on its merits and not excluding from review the cases of members of Communist party who, as such, have been convicted by criminal courts of offences not involving violence.

While the Governments concerned must naturally reserve all freedom of action should they find their expectations not fulfilled, they are proceeding on the understanding that persons released will, as a matter of personal conviction, avoid any course of action which might tend to impede production, create discord, spread disaffection, or in any other way prejudice the public's safety and that they will use their liberty to give their fullest assistance in the war effort. *Ends.* Please telegraph your concurrence as early as possible.

[1] The main points are summarised in No. 240, but the Home Department's letter also makes it clear that the Government of India felt that the public announcement should state that persons were released on the understanding that they would co-operate with the war effort and that their liberty would be withdrawn if this expectation was not fulfilled. L/P&J/8/681: ff 72–3.

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Sir R. Campbell to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: ff 202–3

MOST SECRET WASHINGTON, *7 July 1942, 10.55 am*
Received: 8 July, 8 am

No. 3597. Your telegram No. 4122.[1]
Following is the text of Gandhi's letter to Chiang Kai-shek:

"Dear Generalissimo; I can never forget the five hours close contact I had with you and your noble wife in Calcutta. I had always felt drawn towards you in your fight for freedom, and that contact and our conversation brought China and her problems still nearer to me. Long ago, between 1905 and 1913, when I was in South Africa, I was in constant touch with the small Chinese colony in Johannesburg. I knew them first as clients and then as comrades in Indian passive resistance struggle in South Africa. I came in touch with them in Mauritius also. I learnt then to admire their thrift, industry, resourcefulness, and internal unity. Later in India I had a very fine Chinese friend living with me for a few years and we all learnt to like him.

"I have thus felt greatly attracted towards your great country and, in common with my countrymen, our sympathy has gone out to you in your terrible struggle. Our mutual friend Jawahar Lal Nehru, whose love of China is only excelled, if at all, by his love of his own country, has kept us in intimate touch with developments of the Chinese struggle.

"Because of this feeling I have towards China and my earnest desire that our two great countries should come closer to one another and co-operate to their mutual advantage, I am[2] anxious to explain to you that my appeal to British power to withdraw from India is not meant in any shape or form to weaken India's defence against the Japanese or embarrass you in your struggle. India must not submit to any aggressor or invader and must resist him. I would not be guilty of purchasing the freedom of my country at the cost of your country's freedom. That problem does not arise before me as I am clear that India cannot gain her freedom in this way and a Japanese domination of either India or China would be equally injurious to the other country[3] and to world peace. That domination must therefore be prevented and I should like India to play her natural and rightful part in this. I feel that India cannot do so while she is in bondage. India has been a helpless witness of withdrawals from Malay, Singapore, and Burma. We must learn the lesson from these tragic events and prevent by all means at our disposal a repetition of what befell these unfortunate countries. But (? grp. omit.) [unless?] we are free we can do nothing to prevent it and the same process might well occur again, crippling India and China disastrously. I do not want a repetition of this tragic tale of woe.

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"Our proffered help has repeatedly been rejected by the British Government and the recent failure of the Cripps mission has left a deep wound which is still running. Out of that anguish has come the cry for immediate withdrawal of British power so that India can look after herself and help China to the best of her ability.

"I have told you of my faith in non-violence and of my belief in the effectiveness of this method if the whole nation could turn to it. That faith in it is as firm as ever. But I realise that India today, as a whole, has not faith and belief, and the Government in free India would be formed from the various elements composing the nation.

"Today the whole of India is impotent and feels frustrated (the Indian army consists largely of people who have joined up because of economic pressure). They have no feeling of a cause to fight for, and in no sense are they a national army. Those of us who would fight for a cause, for India and China, with the armed forces or with non-violence, cannot, under the foreign heel, function as they want to. And yet our people know for certain that India, free,[4] can play even a decisive part, not only on her behalf, but also on behalf of China and the world of peace. Many, like me, feel that it is not manly to remain in this helpless state and allow events to overwhelm us when a way of effective action can be opened to us. They feel, therefore, that every possible effort should be made to ensure independence and that freedom of action which is so urgently needed. This is the origin of my appeal to British power to end immediately the unnatural connection between Britain and India.

"Unless we make that effort, there is grave danger of public feeling[5] in India going into wrong and harmful channels. There is every likelihood of subterranean sympathy for Japan growing simply in order to weaken and oust British authority in India. This feeling may take the place of robust confidence in our ability never to look to outsiders for help in winning our freedom. We have to learn self-reliance and develop strength to work out our own salvation. This is only possible if we make a determined effort to free ourselves from bondage. That freedom has become a present necessity to enable us to take our due place among the free nations of the world.

"To make it perfectly clear that we want to prevent in every way Japanese aggression, I would personally agree, and I am sure the Government of free India would agree that the Allied powers might under treaty with us, keep their armed forces in India and use the country as a base for operations against the threatened Japanese attack.

[1] No. 217.

[2] In the version repeated to the Viceroy 'to their mutual advantage, I am' appeared as '(group corrupt) now in all good faith'. MSS. EUR. F. 125/30.

[3] MSS. EUR. F. 125/30 has 'other countries' instead of 'the other country'.

[4] MSS. EUR. F. 125/30 has 'India's freedom' instead of 'India, free'.

[5] 'feeling' omitted in MSS. EUR. F. 125/30.

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"I need hardly give you my assurance that, as the author of the new movement in India, I shall take no hasty action. And whatever action I may recommend will be governed by the consideration that it should not injure China, or encourage Japanese aggression in India or China. I am trying to enlist world opinion in favour of a proposition which, to me, appears self-proved and which must lead to the strengthening of India and China's defence. I am also educating public opinion in India and conferring with my colleagues. Needless to say any movement against the British Government with which I may be connected will be essentially non-violent, I am straining every nerve to avoid a conflict with British authority. But if in vindication of the freedom which has become an immediate desideratum, this becomes inevitable, I shall not hesitate to run any risk, however great.

"Very soon you will have completed five years of war against Japanese aggression and invasion and all the sorrows and misery that these have brought to China. My heart goes out to the people of China in deep sympathy and in admiration for their heroic struggle and endless sacrifices in the cause of their country's freedom and integrity against tremendous odds. I am convinced that this heroism and sacrifice cannot be in vain: they must bear fruit. To you, to Madame Chiang and to the great people of China, I send my earnest and sincere wishes for your success. I look forward to the day when a free India and a free China will co-operate together in friendship and brotherhood for their own good and for the good of Asia and the world.

"In anticipation of your permission, I am taking the liberty of publishing this letter in *Harijan*.[6]

Yours sincerely, M. K. Gandhi."

Repeated to Viceroy New Delhi.

[6] In his telegram 2119-S of 18 July, Lord Linlithgow stated in reply to Mr Amery's enquiry in telegram 12652 of 16 July that neither Gandhi's letter nor the Generalissimo's reply (see No. 235) had been published. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23; L/P&J/8/607: f 8.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

L/P&S/13/998: ff 471–2

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *7 July 1942*

No. H.E/10

My dear Amery,

In our personal correspondence I have referred[1] to the reactions of the Indian Princes to certain of the statements made at the time or arising out of Cripps' recent mission to this country. A copy of the formal official representation[2]

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made in the matter by the Chancellor dated the 1st June was sent to the India Office officially by the bag of 9th June. I have also separately sent you a copy of a representation[3] on the same subject from His Highness of Bikaner: and you will by now have received the official letter from the Secretary to the Crown Representative No. D494-P(C)/42[4] commenting on the Jam Sahib's letter.

2. I think that the official letter to which I have just referred sets out the various points, and expresses very clearly and directly our views and our sense of the awkwardness of the position. I fully recognize the difficulty of that position so far as the Secretary of State is concerned, and I need not say that (while feeling that a clarification is essential within the limits and on the points indicated in the official letter) I am most anxious not to add to your difficulties or to those of His Majesty's Government. So far as procedure goes the position is possibly slightly eased by the approaching visit to London of the Jam Sahib as one of India's Representatives at the War Cabinet, and I am inclined to suggest that you might think it well to take advantage of His Highness's impending arrival in order to discuss the whole position with him, after which you could decide whether a written reply by yourself (or by me on your instructions) to the Chancellor was required and how best to frame it.

3. I do at the same time feel bound to convey to you my view that I, and the Crown Representative's Department, are entitled to know exactly where we stand on the important points covered by the Jam Sahib's letter, and I feel no doubt that that will be your own view.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[1] See Nos. 181, para. 12 and 209, para. 6. [2] No. 115. [3] See No. 86, note 10.
[4] No. 187.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *7 July 1942*

I am glad your Council has started so well and met with so little criticism. I only trust that nothing will happen to make it feel uncertain about its position for the rest of the war. I do not believe that Jinnah and Rajagopalachari will really pull off anything that would justify setting up a new Executive, though I would always be willing to take in the pair of them if they came to an agreement, making it quite clear that that is now the most they can hope for.

2. While I agree with you that we cannot very well publicly announce that we shall never again have dealing with Congress, or even that we shall

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not have dealings with them again in the present war, I am not sure that the latter should not in fact be our policy. There is, of course, the alternative way of in fact doing so, namely, that of having as active dealings as possible with all other organisations besides Congress. I think there is really something in Jinnah's complaint—and still more the Princes' complaint—that we are always wooing the people who are irreconcilable and do very little to conciliate those who are really out to help. I am not sure that a little definite encouragement of Jinnah and the Muslims generally would not now be a good thing. Going even further, I believe there may be much to be said for giving much more open encouragement to Roy and every kind of left wing, communist, student, peasant or trade union organisation that declares itself anti-Fascist. That is, after all, the line that Winston took whole-heartedly the moment Russia was attacked, knowing quite well not only the deficiencies but the possible dishonesty of intention behind Russia's future actions. It may be that the elements we encourage now may not be reliable in the future: but they may be influenced in a better direction in the sunshine of official favour. Even if that doesn't happen, their emergence as a favoured political power, likely to dominate the future of India in a very leftward sense, may exercise a decidedly steadying influence on Birla *et hoc genus omne*.[1]

[Paras. 3 and 4, on airborne troops, and air force and army co-operation; paras. 5 and 6, on the non-arrival in India of plans for parachute production and for the folding bicycle; para. 7, on administrative shortcomings at Ranchi Clearing Station; and para. 8, on the administration of smaller States, omitted.]

[1] 'and all that class'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/I/1/1122: f 10

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *8 July 1942, 5.5 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 9 July*

12162. Your personal telegram of 27th June 1929–S.[1] B.B.C. overseas broadcasts. I entirely share your anxiety that B.B.C. should exercise greatest possible care in handling news from Congress sources and especially statements of leaders like Gandhi and Nehru. I have discussed matter fully with Graves (Joint Director-General B.B.C.) and with Radcliffe, who agree that B.B.C. have a very special responsibility in this matter and are anxious to do all that is possible to preserve a proper balance in the news and to avoid embarrassment to you.

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2. I am sure you will agree that no absolutely hard and fast line in the treatment of political news from India is desirable. There have indeed been advantages to us in giving some prominence to certain recent statements by Gandhi which serve to emphasise hollowness of his policy and his constant change of tactics. No completely satisfactory solution of this difficult problem may be found. Yet Graves and Radcliffe have acknowledged that treatment of Indian news in B.B.C. Overseas Services could be much improved by closer collaboration between latter's News Departments on the one hand and this office and Ministry of Information on the other, and steps are at once being taken to tighten up the liaison arrangements.

3. I think that, for the present at any rate, your Government is wise not to contemplate action to stop Reuters from carrying material in question. This might give rise to awkward repercussions both in India and from newspapers here. I am hopeful however that as the result of representations to Reuters Congress propaganda will be more carefully[2] sub-edited in their London office with regard to its relative importance to world news as a whole and enormous pressure in these days on newspaper space.

4. Telegrams have recently been exchanged between Joyce and Puckle regarding a proposal by the B.B.C. that Kennard who is attached to the Far Eastern Bureau of the Ministry of Information and did successful work as a commentator during the Cripps Mission should provide the B.B.C. with regular commentaries on the situation for use in Home and Overseas Programmes. This should be a useful step and should help the public at home and abroad to understand the trend of events and to put[3] individual items of news or views into better perspective.

[1] No. 190. [2] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'considered' after 'carefully'.
[3] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'as to putting' instead of 'and to put'.

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Sir H. Seymour to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 197

SECRET CHUNGKING, *8 July 1942, 12.25 am*
Received: 8 July, 2.5 am

No. 946. My telegrams Nos. 901[1] and 902.[2]
Chiang Kai-shek sent the Minister of Information yesterday evening to tell me that he had been very reluctant to send any answer to Gandhi's letter.[3] In view

[1] No. 194. [2] No. 195. [3] No. 231.

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of the situation in the Middle East he had later decided to do so and he sent message to the following effect: Situation in Egypt appears to be at critical stage and Chiang Kai-shek's fervent wish is that nothing should take place in India to harm the prosecution of the war and which would also harm India in those countries sympathetic to her.

Repeated to Government of India.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to the Maharaja of Indore

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *8 July 1942*

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

I am grateful to Your Highness for your letter of 28th June[1] and for the clear and friendly terms in which you have amplified what you said to me during our recent interview.

My views[2] as to the wisdom and propriety of Your Highness' action in publishing an open letter to President Roosevelt remain unchanged and I am glad to note your expression of regret for the embarrassment which it caused. I accept, of course, fully and readily your account of the motives which inspired it. But however good your intentions, I feel it is my duty to reiterate my view that for one so highly placed as Your Highness there are grave dangers in entering impulsively, and without prior consultation with experienced advisers, into the sphere of high political controversy.

I would only add that I greatly appreciate the assurances conveyed in your letter which, so far as I, as Crown Representative, am concerned, enable me to regard the incident as satisfactorily closed.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 198. [2] See No. 116.

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Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/77

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE GOVERNOR'S REPORT NO. 13, DATED THE 8TH JULY, 1942

Though Congress prestige is still very low, a few individual Congress workers have been showing more signs of activity than for some time past. If Gandhi's "Quit India" campaign is carried into effect, it seems fairly clear that it will be supported here with considerable energy and publicity, though not by large numbers. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who is now at the Wardha meeting, will, I understand, press for the campaign to be started. And if it is, he will certainly take a leading part, as he is seeking for some means to recover the reputation he has lost over his niece's marriage to Jaswant Singh.[1] The District authorities, particularly in Peshawar and Mardan, are apprehensive that he will whip up all extreme Congress and Ahrar elements that he can find. Abdul Ghaffar is obviously in a nervous state. I had a letter from him ten days ago—the first, I fancy, that he has ever written to a Government official—in which he purports to charge certain Government officers with having shown prejudice against him or his family. But reading between the lines I got the impression that he was merely trying to bolster up his own courage. He is frightened of losing all his influence, and also possibly of actual physical violence because of the marriage.

2. Gandhi will find little sympathy here except in extreme Congress circles. One or two leading citizens of Peshawar have asked me with some resentment why All-India Radio should assist Congress by broadcasting extracts from the *Harijan*, thus announcing to many thousands what would otherwise be read by only a few hundreds.

[Para. 3, on the wheat situation in Peshawar, omitted.]

4. The news of our reverses in Libya depressed people more than anything that has happened for many months. The depression was all the greater because

[1] Abdul Ghaffar Khan's niece, the daughter of Dr Khan Sahib, the North-West Frontier Province's ex-Prime Minister, had recently married Flight-Lieutenant Jaswant Singh, a Christian. In his Report No. 10, of 23 May, Sir G. Cunningham referred to the excitement and bitterness of feeling aroused by the marriage, adding that its general effect was temporarily to weaken the power of Congress in the whole Province; and in his Report No. 11 of 9 June, he mentioned that it seemed the most important result of the marriage incident would be that it might lead to Abdul Ghaffar Khan's decline. MSS. EUR. F. 125/77.

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of the optimistic reports at the beginning, particularly the one in which the B.B.C. said "Rommel now has two alternatives: retreat or annihilation." But with the depression there has been no sign of panic. The main impression that I get, watching the ups and downs of public feeling with regard to the War, is that we are better off in this respect than we were two years ago. At that time, there was a certain malicious glee in hearing of British reverses. Now it seems to me that the average Indian month by month is learning more and more to identify his own interests—which no doubt come first—with the fortunes of Great Britain and her Allies.

[Para. 5, on the tribal areas, omitted.]

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/543: f 23

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *9 July 1942, 10 pm*

12282. Reference your telegram of the 11th June, 1753-S.[1] Milner proposes to put down a question in the House asking what is the scope of the new Defence Portfolio, how it differs from that outlined by Sir Stafford Cripps, and what is the size of the Army which the new Defence Member is going to recruit.

2. If last part of question is actually put down I should say that it would not be in the public interest to give this information. As regards the first two parts, I can scarcely avoid replying in detail in view of the fact that, notwithstanding what you said in your telegram, detailed statement of the content of the Defence Portfolio was given in a press note issued a week ago in New Delhi in connexion with the Council appointments. I should propose to reply that the content of the new Defence Portfolio was settled by you[2] in consultation & agreement with the C. in C., that it includes such and such subjects (as given in press note) & that the member will be able to see how it differs from the Cripps formulae by comparison with the White Paper. Have you any comment?

[1] No. 140. [2] 'you' omitted in MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

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The Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/P&J/8/560: f 102

NEW DELHI, *9 July 1942*

Your Excellency,

The Standing Committee of the Chamber of Princes at its meeting held last week in Bombay unanimously adopted the resolution quoted below, relating to the recent announcement regarding my appointment as one of the representatives of India on the Imperial War Cabinet and the Pacific War Council in London:—

(*i*) that this meeting of the Standing Committee of Princes places on record its sense of sincere gratification at the appointment of His Highness the Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, the distinguished Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes as one of the representatives of India on the Imperial War Cabinet and the Pacific War Council in London and desires that the thanks of the Princes be conveyed to His Majesty's Government and to His Excellency the Crown Representative.

(*ii*) that this meeting offers its most cordial congratulations to His Highness the Chancellor on this well-deserved appointment, and feels confident that His Highness' association with the Imperial War Cabinet and the Pacific War Council will assist towards the objective of closer collaboration between the allied nations for the successful termination of the War, and for the constitutional advance of India with due regard to the interests of the States.

2. As desired in the first para. of this resolution, I wish to convey Your Excellency the thanks of the Princes on this appointment, and request that their thanks may also be conveyed to His Majesty's Government.

Yours sincerely,

DIGVIJAYSINHJI

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Mr Amery to Mr Morrison

L/P&J/8/681: f 64

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *9 July 1942*

My dear Morrison,

I enclose a telegram[1] from the Government of India proposing to remove the ban on the Communist Party of India. I have just had a copy of the circular

[1] No. 230.

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letter of 8th June to which they refer. In it they state that the Communist Party of India has announced that its official policy is now in line with that of the Communist Party in England and that it regards the war as a People's war deserving the support of the people of India. The Government of India add that they have received recommendations from their Reviewing Committee in favour of releasing sixteen out of nineteen leading communists who are detained under Defence Regulations and that many communist students of proved anti-fascist views have been or are being released. At the present juncture they feel that it is of primary importance to allow freedom of action to the adherents of any party in India who are prepared to help the prosecution of the war and to make use of any elements in the population whose activities will form an effective makeweight to the defeatist tactics of Congress. For this purpose they are prepared to face the difficulty of trying to distinguish between genuine communist co-operators and persons concerned merely with consolidating their own position with an eye on post-war power, and to take the risks involved (e.g. the possible unsettling of labour) in the release of people who have long been bitter opponents of government. They propose to remove the ban on the Communist Party, making it no longer an illegal organisation, and to release gradually (reviewing the situation at each stage) such Communists as they are satisfied are genuine war-co-operators.

The various local Governments have accepted the Government of India's proposals, which I am now asked to sanction.

I can see no good reason against doing so, indeed I am entirely in favour of the action proposed. I do not like the draft announcement very much, and enclose a draft telegram,[2] which I am proposing to send, suggesting various amendments.

But before I give my formal approval I should like to be assured that an announcement of this kind at the present juncture would not cause you embarrassment. You will see that the organs of the Communist Party of India are to be freed from the ban upon them. This might I suppose be used as a further argument in favour of raising the ban on the *Daily Worker*, but I imagine that it would make very little difference to the agitation on that subject and obviously such matters must be judged in the light of local circumstances.

I should be grateful for an early reply.

If you see strong objection to the Government of India's proposals the matter will have to come before the War Cabinet; but I hope you may not think it necessary to ask for that.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[2] See No. 262.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *9 July 1942*

In my last letter[1] I suggested that the time had come for us to give more active encouragement to all the elements with us in this war, whatever their previous record. It was therefore with interest and complete agreement that I read your telegram[2] coming immediately afterwards saying that you proposed to lift the ban on the Communist Party. I would have replied immediately to express my complete agreement, but in view of Herbert Morrison's difficulties about lifting the ban on *The Daily Worker* here, I felt bound at any rate to give him a chance of objecting[3] and, if he sustains his objection, bringing it before the Cabinet. However, I hope he will accept my view that Indian conditions are very different from those here and that the Indian precedent needn't force his hand.

I greatly fear we are to have little reward and a deal of disappointment, but we will see.

L.

* * *

4. I should be immensely interested to hear how the Members of your new Council are shaping. The public reception has been quite as good as one could have hoped for in India and very favourable here on the whole.

5. I see Gandhi is suffering from high blood pressure. The pity is that it was not high enough three months ago to prevent him talking for two hours on the telephone from Wardha to Delhi and definitely wrecking the Cripps Mission. However, it may have been the best thing in the long run and one can only hope that the present bout of high blood pressure may have weakened his power for mischief at this week's meeting of the Congress Committee.

6. This mail takes with it a copy of my little volume of collected speeches[4] which you may care to look through or at any rate keep handy for purposes of reference. It brings out, I think, very clearly the continuity of our policy and the fact that the Cripps proposals were only the natural expansion and clarification of what Indians could have had for the asking at any time during the last two years. I am rather amused in this connection by the vehemence of old Sapru about myself.[5] I really cannot see why he should see in me the arch-fiend

Thank you so much.

L.

[1] No. 233, para. 2. [2] No. 230. [3] No. 240.
[4] *India and Freedom* (Oxford University Press, 1942). [5] See No. 223.

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of reactionary diehardism. The reason, I imagine, may be that, to him, as to Congress, the recasting of thought involved in finding a scheme for an Indian Constitution that Muslims and Princes could possibly look at is more than he is prepared to face.

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The Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar to Sir H. Craik

L/P&S/13/998: f 378

OFFICE OF HIS HIGHNESS THE CHANCELLOR,
CHAMBER OF PRINCES, NEW DELHI, *10 July 1942*

PERSONAL AND SECRET

Negotiations with political parties in British India

My dear Sir Henry,

Maqbool has already apprised you, under my instructions, that the Standing Committee of Princes at its recent meeting in Bombay approved the following proposals of the Drafting Committee on the above subject:—

(*a*) Sir Stafford Cripps informed the States Delegation that in his opinion it would be desirable, in view of the impending developments, that the Indian Princes should make contacts with the major political parties in British India. But this, he said, was a matter not for him but for the Viceroy. He suggested that the Princes should discuss this matter with H.E. when they met him.[1] The matter will presumably be taken up by H.H. the Chancellor with H.E. the Crown Representative.

(*b*) In our opinion, this is not the appropriate time for initiating formal negotiations with the political parties. At the same time, informal exchange of views, in their individual capacity, between leading Rulers and Representatives of States and a few outstanding British Indian leaders, irrespective of their party alignments, should go a long way towards eliminating misunderstandings and suspicions, and should assist in the appreciation of each other's point of view. On the other hand, it will doubtless be realised that unless the approach is made with tact and discretion it is likely to prove harmful to the interests of the States.

(*c*) In view of these considerations and subject to the result of H.H. the Chancellor's talks with His Excellency the Crown Representative referred to in (*a*) above, we would recommend that H.H. the Chancellor may take a few leading Princes and Ministers into confidence and request them individually to establish informal contacts with certain specified British Indian leaders . . .[2] The results of these informal talks should be intimated to H.H. the Chancellor.

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2. This matter has already been mentioned by me informally to His Excellency the Crown Representative. I do not wish to trouble him with further details now when he is fully occupied with other important work. I would, however, be obliged if you would inform me privately if His Excellency may have any reactions against the proposed approach to this question, on the informal basis indicated above, at the appropriate time. It is understood that further action in this matter must necessarily await till the political horizon is a bit clearer than what it is to-day.

Yours sincerely,
DIGVIJAYSINHJI

[1] See Vol. I, Nos. 498 and 527, Answer to Question 7.
[2] The dots indicating an omission are in the original.

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Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

CONFIDENTIAL GOVT. HOUSE, LAHORE, *10 July 1942*

D.-o. No. 401

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Your Excellency will be interested in seeing the enclosed note which Sikander gave me just before we left Simla, setting forth his tentative formula for the solution of the communal problem. The proposal amounts, as you will see, to a scheme that in the absence of a 75 per cent. majority of members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly in favour of either accession or non-accession to the Indian Federation, the Muslim community should by means of a referendum be given an opportunity of deciding on non-accession and that, if they so decide, the non-Muslim portions of the Punjab should by a similar referendum be accorded the right to cut themselves adrift from the Province as constituted at present. If it actually came to the point of non-Muslims deciding to break adrift, this would mean that, assuming the unit concerned to be a district, the Ambala Division and a large part of the Jullundur Division and also the Amritsar District would cease to belong to the Punjab. If a smaller unit such as a *tahsil*, as is, I gather, Sikander's idea, is taken, at least a very large part of the areas I have mentioned and possibly certain others would disappear from the Province. In either case a disastrous dismemberment of the Punjab would be involved. The underlying idea of the scheme is therefore to bring it home to all reasonably-minded men that Pakistan, should it ever eventuate, would smash the Province as it now exists.

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Sikander's position is that he has now succeeded in bringing about a rapprochement with the Sikhs, he has in hand a proposal for placating the urban population by means of further concessions relating to the Sales Tax Act,[1] and the only other remaining menace which he fears as being likely to impede the War effort of the Province is the controversy for and against Pakistan. He believes that his present formula has a good chance of relegating the Pakistan issue to the background until the War is over; the action for which the formula provides would not come into operation until the Central constitutional issue has been decided; Sikander hopes that during the next few years his formula will have the effect of laying the Pakistan controversy to rest.

Sikander has asked me to let you know what his intentions are, so that you may judge, before he takes action, whether the move which he now contemplates would be likely to prove an embarrassment in the light of the all-India political situation. Should you see no objection to his proceeding with his plan, he would in the first instance consult the Muslim members of his party, after that he would lay the proposal before the Sikh members of the party, then he would consult the party as a whole and, if the reactions remain favourable, the Provincial Assembly would be invited to pass a resolution endorsing the scheme.

The formula evolved by Sikander appears to me, as I have told him, to have much to commend it so far as those who are inclined to be reasonable and fair-minded are concerned. Unfortunately the proportion of reasonable men is lamentably low, and I am very doubtful as to the effect which the scheme is likely to produce on Jinnah. Sikander agrees with me that Jinnah's personal feelings will be seriously offended, because the scheme does not emanate from himself as the head of the Muslim League. I am inclined to think that, apart from his personal feelings, Jinnah may be genuinely opposed to the whole idea as amounting in effect to an exposure of the weaknesses of Pakistan. Whether Jinnah genuinely believes in Pakistan as a practical proposition may be open to doubt; but he appears to be consistently reluctant to explain its detailed workings, and the term "Pakistan" has become so sacred and mystic that any attempt to analyse and define its consequences would appear to be little short of profanity. Sikander is disposed to the view that Jinnah will not oppose the scheme, as he is already committed to the principle of self-determination; I doubt this personally, since many people, like for instance the inhabitants of southern Ireland, are liable to hold inconsistent opinions as regards the doctrine of self-determination when applied to themselves and when applied to others. Sikander also thinks that Jinnah may be inclined to regard the scheme as indicating that Pakistan is thereby proved to be a practical proposition in regard to one of the most vital and important parts of India, thus strengthening Jinnah's chances of pressing for a high proportion of Muslim representation at the Centre. Here again I have my doubts; it appears to me not unlikely that

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Jinnah may look upon this exposure as a detraction from the value of the Pakistan bogy designed for the terrorisation of Congress and the British Government. There would seem to be a distinct possibility that Jinnah may raise the cry that Sikander's formula places Islam in danger and that confusion may become worse confounded. But I must admit that Sikander knows Jinnah a great deal better than I do, and I can make no kind of pretence to be able to fathom the workings of Jinnah's mind. If Sikander's plan of campaign is carried out, Jinnah will presumably come to know, through the Nawab of Mamdot (the head of the Provincial Muslim League) or through other informants, what is afoot as soon as the Muslim members of the Unionist Party have been approached; it is difficult to say in this event how long it would take him to make his reactions plain.

I shall be grateful if Your Excellency will be good enough, as soon as you conveniently can, to let me know whether you would prefer Sikander to proceed with his intentions or to hold his hand.

Yours sincerely,

B. J. GLANCY

Enclosure to No. 243

CONFIDENTIAL

A TENTATIVE FORMULA FOR SOLVING THE COMMUNAL PROBLEM

(*a*) If not less than 75 per cent. of the total strength of the elected members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly pass a resolution either in favour of or against non-accession to the Indian Federation, that verdict shall be regarded by all the communities of the Punjab as final and binding.

(*b*) If neither a resolution advocating nor a resolution negativing non-accession is moved, or if such resolution, when moved, fails to be passed by the majority indicated in (*a*) above, but a demand for non-accession continues, then the wishes of the Muslim community as a whole shall be ascertained by means of a referendum in which all the Muslim electors on the electoral roll of the Punjab Legislative Assembly shall have the right to vote provided such a referendum is claimed in a formal resolution passed by the vote of not less than 60 per cent. of the Muslim members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly.

(*c*) If as the result of a referendum suggested in (*b*) above the Muslim community gives its verdict in favour of non-accession, Indian non-Muslims will, for the ascertainment of the wishes of their community as a whole, have

[1] In January 1941, the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, IV of 1941, imposed a levy on annual turnover in excess of Rs 5,000 p.a. The measure aroused strong opposition including *hartals* from shop-keepers, and in February 1942, the Punjab General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, III of 1942, was passed, raising the exemption limit from Rs 5,000 to Rs 10,000 p.a. In November, further alterations relating to the time and manner of payment were made by the Punjab General Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act, XII of 1942.

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the right to claim, whether with a view to accession to the Indian Federation or formation of a separate sovereign State by themselves or in mutually agreed upon combination with other contiguous territories bordering on the east, a referendum, in which all the non-Muslim Indian electors on the electoral roll of the Punjab Legislative Assembly shall have the right to vote, for the separation from the present Punjab Province of those contiguous portions of it in which non-Muslims constitute a majority provided that such a referendum is claimed in a formal resolution passed by the vote of not less than 60 per cent. of the total strength of the non-Muslim Indian members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly.

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Sir S. Cripps to Master Tara Singh

L/P&J/8/510: f 275

GWYDYR HOUSE, WHITEHALL, S.W.1, *10 July 1942*

Dear Master,

Thank you very much for your letter of May 4.[1] I am very delighted to hear that the speeches of myself and Mr. Amery have helped to remove the misgivings created by my proposals in the minds of the Sikhs.

As I told you when I was in Delhi both the British Government and the British people have the most kindly and grateful feelings towards your community.

I am sure anything you can do to bring about an agreement on the Indian situation will be much appreciated by all of us.

Yours sincerely,

R. STAFFORD CRIPPS

[1] No. 17.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *11 July 1942, 8.50 pm*
Received: 12 July, 1.15 am

No. 2056-G. Following is full summary of resolution passed by Congress Working Committee at Wardha on July 10th, as published in *Hindustan Times*:—

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Begins. Whereas various complaints have been received regarding Government orders for evacuation of villages, lands and buildings without due notice and proper compensation, seizure and destruction of country-boats, even where life is impossible without them, requisition of vehicles without proper compensation and regard for needs of civil population, Working Committee issue following instructions for guidance of people concerned and hope that Government will take immediate and necessary steps to remove grievances and that people will carry out their instructions as circumstances demand, provided that in all cases before final decision to disobey an order or resist any measure is taken, all avenues of negotiations shall be thoroughly explored.

2. With regard to evacuation and other orders involving temporary or permanent loss of landed property full compensation should be demanded. In fixing compensation factors to be taken into consideration are value of land and crops, inconvenience and expense likely to be caused to holder of land by having to move to another place and difficulty and delay in obtaining other land where dispossessed landholder could settle. If no agreement is reached between authorities and evacuees regarding amount of compensation and matter has to be referred to tribunal amount proposed by authorities should be paid forthwith and not withheld pending adjudication. There should be no interference with use or disposal of private property except with consent of owner or on payment of adequate compensation. In case of requisition of boats full compensation should be demanded and no boats should be surrendered till question of compensation is settled. In areas surrounded by water where boats are indispensable for normal everyday life they should not be surrendered at all. Fishermen dependent on boats for earning livelihood should be compensated for loss of employment in addition to price of boats. In case of requisition of vehicles full compensation should be demanded and until question of compensation is settled they should not be parted with.

3. In view of scarcity of salt and apprehended famine of it due to war conditions, facilities should be provided for collection, preparation and transport of salt on sea coast and in inland areas free of duty by individuals. People may manufacture salt for their own and their cattle's consumption.

4. Committee considers it inherent right of all to protect their own and their neighbours' life and property, so all restrictions on organisation for self-protection should be disregarded.

5. Wherever possible dispossessed agriculturists should be provided with other land; where impossible, money compensation should be paid including values of trees, water-channels, wells, &c. In case of temporary acquisition full value of crops *plus* 15 per cent. should be paid and when Government occupation terminates compensation should be paid for restoring land to

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previous condition for agricultural purposes. Where bulk of land is acquired and balance is so small that it may not be worth cultivating, balance too should be acquired. Houses where acquired should be fully paid for. Where bulk of agricultural land is acquired and only house is left over, house should also be acquired by paying full compensation if agriculturist so desires. Where house is occupied temporarily fair rent should be paid and owner compensated for inconvenience caused. No one should be required to vacate house without arrangement being made elsewhere for residence, and full compensation should be paid for transport of evacuee's belongings and his maintenance for reasonable period to enable him to find suitable occupation in new surroundings. Compensation should in all cases be paid promptly on the spot by responsible officers and not at district headquarters. *Ends.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, *11 July 1942, 5.30 pm*
Received: 11 July, 11.15 pm

No. 2057-G. Following is summary of press statement issued by Rajagopalachari at Madras on July 10th:—

Begins. I do not admit claim that Congress members are not free to criticise present Congress policy and seek to convert Congress opinion. My resignation[1] is not surrender but protest. I do not want everyone who agrees with me to do like me; freedom can be secured by giving up executive responsibility; primary membership and membership in deliberative committees like A.-I.C.C. and Provincial Congress Committees need not be relinquished. I do not believe that Working Committee has yet decided to make Congress a one-opinion organisation—close corporation with policy of purging dissentient members and admitting only people with same views as present executive. I want to convert Congress and chief purpose of my resignation is to secure greater freedom of action. My campaign regarding Hindu–Muslim settlement cannot ease until it is attained. I am out of Congress in body, but not in spirit. I have got out of cart not to abandon it, but to extricate it out of bog wherein it has stuck and push it forward.

2. Many important men have decided that (1) effective resistance against Japan is impossible, (2) that do what we might, British will dodge us and not transfer power to enable us to organise national defence, and (3) that even if both these were possible Jinnah will never agree to work with us.

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3. I disagree with first proposition. Hope for national regeneration lies only in resistance, not in surrender upon calculation of respective strength of armed forces. For Japan to reduce India to possession is not so easy as our defeatists imagine. Japan does not think so, hence our opportunity to put things in order; we have lost much precious time given us by Japan but there is still some time available.

4. I disagree with second proposition. Total distrust in British is not sign of strength or sturdy patriotism. It amounts to want of confidence in ourselves, knocks bottom out of any non-violent theory of action, and can only lead to violent revolution.

5. As regards third proposition, even if Congressmen believe Jinnah will ever remain a bargainer, we should put him to test. Hindu–Muslim settlement is worth any cost. Blank cheque formula was not mere generosity but necessary corollary of theory of non-violence on which we built our plans. It cannot be interpreted in any other way unless we revalue evil of British domination and deem it a lesser evil. Does any one with eyes believe we can dislodge League from its position in Muslim community within next three years? Does any one believe we can change League policy by merely waiting? My proposal is only way to put League and Jinnah to test of their sincerity. I am convinced that if Congress accepts principle of territorial self-determination proposed in my A.-I.C.C. resolution[2] we can make Jinnah and League accept it and join Congress in united political front. *Ends.*

[1] In a letter of 9 July published in the Press Mr Rajagopalachari had replied to a letter from the President of the Tamilnad Congress Committee asking for reasons why disciplinary action should not be taken against him, and had announced that, in order to be absolutely free to carry on his campaign for converting Congress from its present policy, he had decided to resign his membership of Congress and to tender his resignation of Assembly membership at the party meeting of 15 July. MSS. EUR. F. 125/29.

[2] See No. 16, note 5.

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Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: f 55

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *11 July 1942, 11.50 pm*
Received: 12 July, 4.15 am

5419. Final form of resolution of Congress Working Committee is likely to be released shortly. Indications derived mainly from intelligent anticipations in messages of press correspondents seen in censorship are that it will attribute regrettable spirit of defeatism in this country to British political treatment of

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India and will appeal to the Allied Powers to bring pressure on His Majesty's Government to grant India freedom for ostensible purpose of galvanizing war effort. With threat that if this appeal is rejected or proves unsuccessful, Congress will launch whirlwind mass civil disobedience movement on the lines of earlier movements. It will be under Gandhi's supreme direction and control and will discard any attempt at non-embarrassment.

2. Resolution in these terms, apart from disingenuousness on its (?premises) which are no doubt designed to secure American and Chinese sympathy, would be sheer blackmail and could not be allowed to pass unchallenged. We propose to await final test [text?] and then consider whether to ban publication either in India or outside or both, but we believe that such a course would be neither effective nor desirable from our own point of view. In any case action against Congress organisation will have to follow if the threat is implemented and need for effective propaganda on the lines of my telegram No. 4484[1] dated June 6th becomes of immediate and vital importance both in England, America and other allied countries.

3. Until final text is released we are holding up all out-going press messages referred to in paragraph No. 1 since we see no reason why advance Congress propaganda should be permitted and before publication of resolution we propose to hold press conference here at which our case would be explained. We are also warning Provincial Governments to overhaul plans for dealing with mass civil disobedience movement on the lines explained in my letter of August 2nd 1940[2] which was communicated to you with Home Department letter 3/13/(?40)[3] dated August 12th 1940. We shall of course address you again if we consider it necessary to promulgate Emergency Powers Ordinance.[4] Much will depend on the character of the movement threatened. In any case we assume considerable interval will elapse before movement itself is launched and Gandhi will give us full notice of his intentions.

[1] No. 131; the date should be 7 June.

[2] Home Department letter 3/13/40—Political (I) of 2 August 1940 to Chief Secretaries of all Provincial Governments infers that during an emergency the Government of India's major responsibility would be to ensure that nothing impeded the war effort. It outlined the policy to deal with 'revolutionary movements'. (Lord Linlithgow in his letter of 8 August 1940 to all Provincial Governors explained that a Civil Disobedience Movement directed by Congress was the situation primarily envisaged. L/P&J/8/507: f 135.) During the preparatory stage of such a movement the ordinary law or the Defence of India Rules were to be enforced against its supporters, including prominent persons. Even where breaches of the law were not involved, it might be necessary to employ the power of preventive detention under the Defence of India Rules. Once the preparatory stage was passed and a definite and recognizable movement had been initiated, the Government of India felt it essential to crush it at the outset and prevent it obtaining any momentum. All necessary powers would be taken in a single comprehensive Ordinance.

The letter outlined forms of action on the occurrence of a revolutionary movement, requiring preliminary preparation in the Provinces: namely, immediate action against any organisation launching or supporting the movement; the preventive arrest and detention of leaders; the seizure of

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buildings and funds; and the provision of adequate jail accommodation. Separate memoranda were attached, or to follow, on the Control of the Press; Postal and Telegraphic Censorship; Government Publicity and Intelligence; policy to deal with a no-tax campaign; policy to deal with meetings, processions and arrests concerned therewith, and the scale of punishments; and policy for 'Economic Warfare'. L/P&J/8/585: ff 118–27.

[3] Home Department letter 3/13/40—Political (I) of 12 August 1940 forwarded to the India Office the letter summarised in note 2. L/P&J/8/585: f 117.

[4] The draft of an 'Emergency Powers Ordinance' (previously named 'Revolutionary Movement Ordinance') had been prepared should the circumstances arise for which it would be required. L/P&J/8/585.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir B. Glancy (Punjab)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *11 July 1942*

My dear Glancy,

Many thanks for your private and personal letter No. 400–F.L.[1] of 30th June. Since it was written, the Congress position has cleared a little, though we shall not know where we stand until we have had the outcome of the discussions which are now going on in the Working Committee. I feel very great sympathy with your view as to the character of the stuff that appears in the *Harijan*, but I feel equally that this is one of the cases in which it is wise to give the Mahatma a good deal of rope. I gather that he has done himself very great harm indeed, both in America and at home, by the sort of article that he has been putting out, and I am quite certain that we could not by any means in our power have done nearly as much to lower his reputation, or shake the confidence of people outside India in his commonsense and realism, as he has managed to do himself through his own publicity. Against that we have, of course, to set, as I fully recognise, the unfortunate effect of these articles here: and I do not underestimate the importance of their effect. But taking it by and large I think the balance of advantage is still in letting him go ahead, and I have good reason to believe that he has been much disappointed not to have received the advertisement, and also the plausible excuse for action, which the suppression of *Harijan* would have given him.

2. As for his movement, I quite agree with you that, if he does really start serious business, we should have to be prepared to deal with him with the gloves off. I am sure that in that event I could look for full Cabinet support. But we have still to see what he is going to do. He has been pushed off his slogan of a month ago. It is now so covered with interpretations by the Mahatma that it would defy the wit of any man to discover what exactly it meant at the

[1] No. 208.

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present day. He has had, what must for him be, the mortification of finding that he has not really had a good response from the Provinces, or even from his own Working Committee, to his slogan, and that the response in the world press has been equally unfavourable, and while he has restored unity in the Congress, and got the spotlight back on himself, that unity has been secured only at the cost of completely dropping Rajagopalachariar. Jinnah is as unconverted as ever, and has been at some pains to make it clear that that is the case. In other words, Congress remain, in my view, in a difficult position and, though it would be most dangerous to prophesy, particularly at this moment, I still find it a little difficult to believe that they will take on an out-and-out campaign against us. I think it much more likely that Gandhi will continue to frame resolutions designed to make our blood curdle and to keep public nerves on the stretch, but to avoid any major battle, and to have ready as many avenues of escape as he can, if he finds that his new nostrum is not going as it should. As I say, prophecy is most dangerous, and the events of the next couple of days, with the light they will give us, may produce quite a different situation. But subject to such new development, my own view is, at the moment, much on the general lines I have indicated above.

[Para. 3, on the Khaksars; para. 4, on the appointments of Baldev Singh and Sir Jogendra Singh; para. 5, on the Simla–Kalka rail-motor incident; and para. 6, on delays in Courts in the disposal of murder cases, omitted.]

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *11 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of 22nd June[1] which has just arrived. I start my reply to you now but I will postpone comment on the operations of the Working Committee until we know what line their resolution is going to take. For the moment, I am, I am bound to say, by no means unduly perturbed. I think that the discussions so far reported in the press bring out with remarkable clearness the awkwardness of the position in which Gandhi and his friends find themselves, and Nehru's suggestion that the best way to help China is for us to evacuate India and leave her free, and available as a base for operations for the assistance of China are so absurd that one rubs one's eyes as one reads them. I am inclined to think myself that the old man will play for time and (as so often

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happened in the past) produce a threatening resolution drafted so as to attract as much attention as possible here, at home and in the United States but also worded so carefully as to leave ample opportunity for Congress to get out without too much loss of face if things look like going badly for it later on.

* * *

7. You will remember mentioning to me (paragraph 14 of your letter of 27th/29th May)[2] Edward Thompson's suggestion that we might make use of Jai Prakash Narain in connection with the preparation of the Sundarbans for amphibious guerilla warfare. Narain is at present detained under the orders of the United Provinces Government and we have heard nothing about his release or impending release, so that I think it is safe to assume that he is still in jail and likely to remain there. His influence generally must, I think, have been damaged by the publication of the letters[3] he attempted to smuggle out of Deoli and he of course belongs to the Congress Socialist Party, which is still openly opposed to the war. There is no reason to suppose that he is in any way an expert in guerilla warfare and it is hardly conceivable that if he were released he would agree to assist in the training of guerillas even if he were capable of doing so. I think you will agree therefore that Edward Thompson's suggestion is hardly one which I could support!

* * *

15 July 1942

Since I dictated paragraph No. 1 of this letter, Gandhi has put out some baddish stuff, and we now have the Working Committee's Resolution.[4] My telegrams will have shown you that I do not much like the look of things.

His Royal Highness made a good "get-away" this morning for Karachi and Cairo. He has done very well, and the visit has been widely appreciated. I think he enjoyed himself on the whole.

All the best.

[1] No. 177. [2] No. 95.

[3] These letters, published on 17 October 1941, stated that the Congress Socialist Party (of which, until his imprisonment, Narain had been the General Secretary) should adopt an independent policy of action to contrast with 'the farce of satyagraha'. They advocated the organisation of an 'illegal' underground wing of the party and referred to the collection of necessary funds by 'the old method' —which the context indicated meant political dacoities.

[4] No. 265.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *12 July 1942, 10.45 pm*
Received: 12 July, 9.30 pm

No. 2075–S. Your telegrams No. 12282,[1] dated 10th July, and No. 12364[2] of 11th July. I agree to reply you propose to first two parts of Milner's question. As regards last part new Defence Department is not (repeat not) concerned with recruitment to Defence services which will be wholly under War Department. Manpower, mentioned in Press Note dealing with scope of Defence portfolio, is concerned only with the following civil manpower, viz. administration of[3] National Service (European British subjects) Act and as employment bureau for civilians volunteering for war work.

[1] No. 238.
[2] Requesting immediate reply to No. 238, as Parliamentary Question had been put down for 14 July. L/P&J/8/543: f 20.
[3] 'administration of' omitted in decipher.

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Mr Eden to Sir H. Seymour

Telegram, L/P&J/8/607: f 11

MOST SECRET FOREIGN OFFICE, *12 July 1942, 3.40 pm*

No. 952. Your telegram No. 946.[1]

We and Viceroy of India have received from Mr. Welles through His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington the full text of Gandhi's letter[2] to Chiang Kai-shek. In this, far from saying he will not start any movement,[3] Gandhi definitely foreshadows the possibility of a new movement, which will be essentially non-violent.

2. Is the full text already available to you in Chungking? If not please ask Viceroy if he would kindly send it to you.

Repeated to Viceroy of India.

[1] No. 235. [2] No. 231. [3] Cf. No. 195, para. 4 (iv).

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Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/63

SECRET CAMP, *12 July 1942*

No. R–111–G.C.P.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

As I write, in reply to Your Excellency's letter, dated the 2nd of July 1942,[1] the outcome of the meeting of the Working Committee at Wardha is still in doubt. But the lines on which the meeting is likely to develop are, I think, now fairly obvious and I will add a postscript on the subject when the terms of the resolution on which the Committee are now debating are definitely known.

The latest Intelligence report to hand is to the effect that Congress must take some action and can no longer pursue the "non-embarrassment" policy.

A decision in favour of an immediate mass movement seems unlikely and any such movement would, in existing circumstances, probably be impracticable. Apart from the doubts felt by leading Congressmen as to the time being suitable for a mass movement, there can be little doubt that the agricultural population is fully preoccupied with cultivation and with the question of how best to take advantage of the present situation in respect of food-grains. Further, the middle, non-agricultural, classes are not eager to repeat their *satyagraha* martyrdom, especially when jails are congested areas and conspicuous targets, in the event of an enemy attack, while families are confronted with difficult problems arising from the shortage of essential commodities and the general rise in the cost of living.

It seems likely that Gandhi will be given discretion to strike, as and when he thinks fit, after he has perhaps endeavoured to cover up his traces in respect of his egregious blunders in *Harijan* in connection with "Britain get out" and American aid which, for a brief moment revealed the real Gandhi with results extremely damaging to Congress in American eyes and even perhaps in the eyes of our own "wild men" at home.

Nevertheless, it does seem that Gandhi is himself getting desperate now that he sees that it is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve his aim of a Congress dominated India.

Undoubtedly, his entourage have fed him with stories of "atrocities" and the leading article in the last issue of *Harijan*[2] appears under the caption "Oh! the troops". Would it not be worth while to publish a comprehensive statement of the allegations indicating the cases in which those allegations have proved to be unfounded, or grossly exaggerated, and frankly admitting the

[1] Not printed. [2] See No. 225.

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charges where they are true, pointing out at the same time that cases of this kind, although deeply regrettable, are very few in proportion to the number of men under arms in India and that instructions have been issued to officers for a general tightening up of discipline in this respect?

I believe *ad hoc* communiqués have been issued from time to time but so much attention has been devoted to this subject in *Harijan* that it seems worth while putting out a comprehensive statement, especially as it seems that we may have come to the end of a period in regard to allegations of misbehaviour.

As Your Excellency observes, the Mahatma has piped down considerably lately and indeed M. N. Roy in *Independent India* observes that "he has climbed down to such an extent that his original demand for the withdrawal of the British now becomes an empty formula". "The conclusion is therefore inevitable that the demand is just a slogan to whip up enthusiasm for the Congress and a bargaining counter for the British Government."

What however is, I think, unfortunate, is that Gandhi apparently has again been successful in confusing the minds of people at home [and?] in the U.S.A., so that they are once more beginning to think that, given certain concessions, Gandhi will go all out for full support to the allied cause. I notice that a leading American newspaper is reported as informing its readers that Gandhi is undoubtedly the one man who can deliver the goods. This, of course, is an entirely erroneous impression, as the extracts which I collected from *Harijan*[3] show, and an Intelligence Report, dated the 9th July, records that Gandhi has been emphatic at the current Wardha meeting that India should be free to negotiate with enemy countries on an equal basis.

Your Excellency will have seen reports about Gandhi's health. This is a matter to which I drew attention several months ago and which I have been keeping an eye on since. There have been several references to his inability to function owing to rise in blood pressure, &c. He is now about to complete his 72nd year and I feel that, in the circumstances of his malady, I may at any moment be confronted with the problem regarding the flag and closure of the offices on which we have been in correspondence.[4] For this reason, I should welcome instructions on the subject as soon as may be convenient.

2. Your Excellency will have perused the comments on the expansion of the Executive Council and I need only say that, while reception of this move locally has been unenthusiastic, there is nevertheless underlying satisfaction which however is not likely to be given expression to.

3. Our main domestic problem remains the shortage of foodstuffs and I was threatened by Ruikar yesterday with a march of textile workers to Government House to set forth their grievances which included a demand for the opening of grain shops, among many other controversial demands. Actually, we had just decided that Government would open grain shops but, apart from

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this consideration, I have always resolutely set my face against processions to Government House which I regard as demonstrations calculated to create a spirit of disorder and unruliness, although Wylie had allowed a procession of Muslims to Government House on one occasion. I therefore caused a message to be conveyed to Ruikar that I would in no circumstances tolerate a procession along the road which leads to Government House and he dropped the proposal with remarkable alacrity. As it has been pouring with rain incessantly since 7 a.m. yesterday, the demonstration would have been a fiasco in any event.

This problem of the supply of food-grains is rapidly becoming an all-India one affecting seriously the law and order position. The Gun Carriage Factory at Jubbulpore was compelled to shut down on two occasions for a day to enable their staff to get food. I am glad to say that in response to an S.O.S. from me to the Agent, N.-W. Railway, trucks have been provided for the shipment of wheat to Jubbulpore but we are still in great difficulties at Nagpur.

Our local politicians have apparently secured Gandhi's support in making a grievance of this matter. This is interesting because it is an indication of how Gandhi's mind seems to be working less efficiently than usual. For the professed protector of the masses to take a narrow view of the problem is surprising. What is the townsman's poison is of course the cultivator's milk and one would have expected Gandhi to rejoice in the fact that the agriculturist is at last coming into his own after a succession of many lean years. Not only that, but the ultimate solution of India's problems lies in higher prices for agricultural produce of all kinds. But Gandhi has completely ignored this aspect of the question in order to snatch at a stick with which to beat the Government. On a long view, it is much better that we should have to pay out dearness allowance and provide for higher wages and salaries than that the cultivating 90 per cent. of the population should be subjected to slump prices for agricultural produce. While I rejoice in improved conditions for the vast mass of the population, owing to the higher prices, I am taking the next opportunity of warning *malguzars* and cultivators, with whom wheat and *juar* are probably being hoarded, to "cash-in" while the going is good. The bumper crops in the U.S.A. and Canada are bound to affect the situation even in India sooner or later and the agriculturist is now assured of good prices, if he parts with his produce and, if we can get the stuff to the market, it will greatly ease the situation in the towns.

[Para. 4, on A.R.P., omitted.]

14 July 1942

5. I have just seen the I.N.A. telegram giving a summary of the Congress Working Committee's resolution.[5] Its substance appears to be that, if this

[3] MSS. EUR. F. 125/63.

[4] This correspondence, on whether the Union Jack should be half-masted and public offices and courts closed in the event of Gandhi's death, is in L/P&J/7/851.

[5] No. 265.

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final appeal fails, the Congress will be compelled to utilise all its non-violent strength for the vindication of political rights and the liberty of India under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi.

This is more or less what was anticipated but it is a great deal milder in tone than Gandhi's utterances in *Harijan*. In fact, quite a lot seems to have been borrowed from the Draft Declaration. I do not think that there is anything in this to give cause for anxiety. The resolution is to be referred to the A.-I.C.C. for final decision, so that there is time to consider our attitude. The date given in the telegram is July 7th but I presume that this is a clerical error for August 7th. I have not seen the text of the resolution and the I.N.A. telegram containing the summary is Press advised. The summary seems to indicate that the resolution has been converted into a bargaining counter, as M. N. Roy suggested, and that Gandhi's splenetic policy and also his policy of neutrality in the war have been defeated. Rajagopalachariar's defection and the lukewarmness of the Muslim members of the Working Committee towards any mass movement have produced a rather amazing change of front as compared with Gandhi's attitude.

Yours sincerely,

H. J. TWYNAM

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: ff 51–3

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *13 July 1942, 4 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

850. Your telegram of 11th July 2056–G.[1]

If *Hindustan Times* summary of Resolution is correct and if the Resolution has been properly passed and cannot be disavowed by Congress, it amounts to issue of "instructions for guidance of people concerned" by parallel authority acting in defiance of established Government in respect of[2] measures necessary for the prosecution of the war. Such action here would, of course, involve not only internment but prosecution and drastic punishment.

2. Though this Resolution is apparently not the general one anticipated in second sentence of Home Department telegram 5419,[3] and though some more general resolution in that sense is still to be expected, that surely does not affect the fact that the issue of these instructions to the public has been made. It appears to be not repeat not subsidiary measure but essential preparatory action for campaign designed to create number of individual grievances and cases of open conflict & armed suppression on which universal movement will be based

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justifying appeal to Allied powers. If this is your reading of Gandhi's plan, it would be sheer folly to allow such a challenge to pass on ground that acts of defiance against Government have not yet followed and to leave Gandhi time to work up his campaign. "Twice armed is he that has his quarrel just but thrice armed he who gets his blow in fust."[4]

3. I am bringing matter before Cabinet this afternoon as a matter of urgency but if, before their conclusions can reach you, you think it right to take drastic action with Gandhi and Working Committee (such as immediate arrest pending prosecution) and with Press (in any case it would seem necessary to impound so far as possible all copies of papers carrying the Resolution) you should not hesitate to act on your own responsibility and mine. You know the story of the telegram from the station clerk to Calcutta headquarters "Tiger on platform eating stationmaster. Please wire instructions."

[1] No. 245. [2] 'in respect of' deciphered as 'or other'. [3] No. 247.
[4] 'Thrice is he armed that has his quarrel just And four times he who gets his fist in fust.' Artemus Ward, *Shakespeare Up-to-date*.

254

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: f 48

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *13 July 1942, 5.30 pm*
PERSONAL

852. No doubt requisition of boats in certain areas and of bicycles and other vehicles causes hardship to individuals and possibly transport difficulties may in certain areas be making purchase of salt from legitimate sources difficult.[1] If such hardships due to war conditions are going to be exploited by Gandhi it is up to us to make sure that burden on individuals caused by requisition is eased as much as possible by adequate and prompt compensation. I suppose hardship due to shortage of salt could be eased by relaxing normal restrictions locally where situation really demands it but there may be difficulty of issuing suitable instructions. I should be glad however to be assured that compensation is given promptly even if on provisional basis for requisitions and to have information about salt situation and its treatment.

[1] See No. 245.

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Sir D. Monteath to Sir G. Laithwaite

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: f 47

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *13 July 1942, 6.20 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 14 July*

853. Laithwaite from Monteath. Reference S of S's most immediate telegrams.[1] May we assume that Bajpai will be informed by G. of I. direct of any action decided upon in relation to Congress and supplied fully with material justifying it? What about Chungking? The Mahatma's tactics and technique seem to us strongly reminiscent of Hitler's in exaggerating or manufacturing grievances of Sudeten Germans and appealing to world for moral support for his rectification of alleged situation.

[1] Nos. 253 and 254.

256

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/P&J/8/596: ff 49–50

INDIA OFFICE, *13 July 1942*

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 42/42

Prime Minister

I hope you can find time to read the enclosed telegram[1] before the Cabinet this afternoon. It amounts to the issue of instructions to the public, by an authority setting itself up as parallel to the Government, to defy measures taken by the Government for the prosecution of the war. Such action here would of course involve not only internment but prosecution and drastic punishment.

The object of the resolution, which is apparently preliminary to a more general resolution telling us to clear out of India, is obviously to create a general atmosphere of disturbance and to provoke cases of open conflict with the authorities so as to poison the atmosphere by the time we have the courage to take action against Congress later on. To my mind, the only course is to act promptly now:

"Twice armed is he that has his quarrel just;
But thrice armed he who gets his blow in fust."

I hope the Cabinet will this afternoon authorise Linlithgow to arrest Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee at once if the resolution is in fact in the terms published in the *Hindustan Times*. We are dealing with men who are now

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definitely our enemies, inclined to believe in the victory of Japan, and anyhow determined to make the most mischief they can. To appease them or delay in striking at them can only discourage the army and all other loyal elements. I don't believe the effect in America would be serious: anyhow, nothing like as serious as the effect of hesitation and weakness.

L. S. AMERY

[1] No. 245.

257

War Cabinet W.M. (42) 91st Conclusions, Minutes 8–9

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 13 July 1942 at 5.30 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Ernest Bevin

Also present during discussion of items 8–9 were: Mr S. M. Bruce, Sir Kingsley Wood, Viscount Simon, Mr Herbert Morrison, Mr Amery, Viscount Cranborne, Mr A. V. Alexander, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Lord Woolton, Mr Brendan Bracken, Mr James Stuart, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Sir Dudley Pound, Sir Charles Portal, Sir Alan Brooke

INDIA

Minute 8

L/P&J/8/596: f 46

The War Cabinet had before them:

(*a*) Telegram 2056–G[1] from the Viceroy to the S/S for India, summarising a Resolution passed by the Congress Working Committee on 10th July, as published in the *Hindustan Times*.

(*b*) Telegram 5419,[2] dated 11th July, from the Government of India Home Department.

THE S/S FOR INDIA said that while the final Resolution of the Congress Working Committee referred to in telegram 5419 had not yet been textually agreed upon, the Resolution summarised in the former telegram was too serious to ignore. The Congress Working Committee, claiming the position of an authority parallel to that of the Government, deliberately instructed people to resist the Government's action in regard to measures such as the removal of boats or vehicles. This was an intolerable challenge, and was made worse when read together with paragraph 4 of the Resolution which said that "All restrictions or [on] organisation for self-protection should be disregarded."

[1] No. 245. [2] No. 247.

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Continuing, the S/S said that he thought it right to bring this Resolution to the immediate notice of the War Cabinet who should authorise the Viceroy, if the terms of the Resolution were confirmed, to take such action as he thought necessary, including possibly the immediate arrest of Gandhi.

In discussion, the War Cabinet were reminded that in paragraph 10 of his telegram dated 26th June[3] (circulated as W.P. (42) 271),[4] the Viceroy had said that there was not a great deal to be gained at that stage by examining for the benefit of the Cabinet, alternative possibilities; he would prefer to wait until the Working Committee had met, and thereafter to advise the Cabinet in the light of their conclusions. It was pointed out that the Viceroy had not yet put forward any proposals as to the action which should be taken, consequent upon the passing of this Resolution of the 10th July.

The view was also expressed that it by no means followed that the Congress Working Committee possessed the power which they claimed, or that their so-called instructions would be at all generally acted upon.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that we were responsible for the defence of India. It was essential that we should have the same facilities for the defence of India as we had for the defence of this country. He thought that it would be reasonable that the S/S for India should give the Viceroy an immediate assurance that if, in the opinion of the Government of India the situation should make it necessary to take strong measures in order to ensure the same co-operation in the defence of India as we had in this country, they would receive the fullest support from H.M.G.

The War Cabinet:—

Approved this suggestion, and authorised the S/S for India to send a telegram[5] to the Viceroy on the lines proposed by the Prime Minister.

Minute 9

L/P&J/8/681: f 52

Communist Party

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that, during the Lord Privy Seal's visit to India, the question had been raised whether the Government of India should adopt a more lenient attitude towards members of the Communist Party in India who were anxious to play their part in the fight against Fascism. A number of students had been released, and the Government of India now desired to make an announcement raising the ban on the Communist Party in India, and on its newspapers.[6]

THE HOME SECRETARY AND MINISTER OF HOME SECURITY said that, while he raised no objection to the action proposed, he thought it might be made a debating point in parliament, in connection with our attitude towards

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the *Daily Worker*, and that it was therefore right that it had been mentioned to the War Cabinet.

The War Cabinet:—

Agreed that no objection need be raised to the course of action proposed.

[3] No. 188. [4] No. 196. [5] See No. 258. [6] See Nos. 230 and 240.

258

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102 a : f 98

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *13 July 1942, 11.40 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

857. My private and personal telegram of 13th July[1] re Congress Resolution of 10th July. Cabinet did not come to any conclusion on action to be taken pending receipt of your recommendations but they authorised me[2] to give you immediately an assurance that if in the opinion of the Government of India the situation should make it necessary to take strong measures in order to ensure the same co-operation for the defence of India as we have in this country you would have the fullest support of H.M.G.

2. In my own view resolution of July 10th is sufficient to justify taking action but you may prefer to await main Congress Resolution. Cabinet would wish to consider any action you propose if time permits but I think that if you feel immediate action to be vital you can rely on the above assurance.

[1] No. 253. [2] See No. 257, Minute 8.

259

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *13 July 1942*

I have just seen your telegram[1] giving the *Hindustan Times* summary of the preliminary resolution of the Congress Working Committee and am sending you an immediate telegram[2] pending any decision the Cabinet may take on the matter when I bring it up before them this evening. As the fast mail goes tomorrow morning, I shall not, in this letter at any rate, be able to give you the result of the Cabinet meeting.

[1] No. 245. [2] No. 253.

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2. What I feel is that Congress has definitely shown its hand as claiming to be an authority parallel to the Government of India and entitled to tell the public to defy the authority of the latter. That is a quite impossible position and one that we ought not to trifle with on the grounds that actual action has not been taken by any particular individual. What they have done would certainly lead to their immediate arrest and prosecution here and no doubt to very drastic punishment. The object of it all seems to me very obvious: namely, to create a general atmosphere of defiance of Government and of ill-feeling, in the course of which the Government will be driven to a series of actions which will be increasingly misrepresented in order to fan the flame of resistance and to create the kind of situation in which the Americans and some of our people will begin to say that there is already a civil war in India and that things cannot be worse if we give Congress what they demand. Alternatively, that when we do find ourselves forced to deal drastically with the Congress leaders, the volume of outcry will be tremendous and the reaction really dangerous to the defence of India. This they don't care about, being, as Rajagopalachari has pointed out, mainly defeatists anyhow.

3. The only answer to my mind in such a situation is to act at once, take up the challenge to our authority and arrest the Working Committee and as many more as you think necessary, to show India that we mean business. Whether you should then prosecute them or not, or whether you should take further steps in dealing with Congress generally, must depend on a great many local factors which I cannot pretend to estimate at this end. Naturally, too, you will have to take prompt measures with the Press to prevent the circulation of resolutions or of information about Congress generally. This may necessitate putting an end to the gentleman's agreement,[3] but that can't be helped.

O.K.!

L.

4. In any case, it seems to me clearly that the point has been reached where we should not hesitate to act first and act vigorously so as to leave no doubt in the minds of both friends and enemies in India where we stand. I believe myself that the effect of action now will be to confound Congress, who are already sufficiently disunited over the country as a whole, and to strengthen all our supporters. I don't know how far in this matter you feel you have got to carry the whole of your Executive with you, but I should have thought you could make it clear to them that prompt action now, and the consequent burning of our boats as regards appeasing Congress,

They are doing well, so far. I don't want to give them a chance of running out on what must be a nasty and most unpopular job which they would be tempted to do if I "high-hatted" them.

L.

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will not only strengthen their hands, but effectively put out of the picture any question of their being replaced by Congress nominees in the near future.

5. I don't know, of course, what elements of weakness and hesitation there may be in the Cabinet here, but I have no doubt that they will not be able to stand up to the two of us together if we decide on a clear course of action or even take it ahead of Cabinet sanction.
This is a time when a fire brigade cannot wait to ring up headquarters, but must turn the hose on the flames at once. I have no fear of being able to hold the position in the House of Commons.

Good for you!
L.

[3] Resulting from conversations held in Delhi in November 1940 between the Government of India and representatives of the Press. In return for an assurance that the Press would not impede the war effort, the Government of India rescinded an order under Defence of India Rule 41 (1) (*b*) prohibiting publication of any matter calculated to foment opposition to the successful prosecution of the war. L/P&J/8/791: f 190.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *14 July 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2084–S. Your private and personal telegrams of 13th July, Nos. 850,[1] 852,[2] 853[3] and 857.[4] I am most grateful for keen interest that you and Cabinet have taken in this delicate situation. Main Congress resolution may be available today, but possibly not till tomorrow. We will of course send you full text immediately on receipt.

2. I quite appreciate force of what you say about denial resolution. But make-up of position here is wholly different from what it is at home. Apart from that you will remember that violent[5] language in resolutions not necessarily intended to be followed by action of any sort is a well settled safety-valve in this country. I have no intention of allowing these people to break the law, and if they endeavour to do so, will deal with them. But equally I suspect strongly that their tactics are to try to provoke us to take action or show our hands on these preliminary resolutions about denial, &c., and I am certain that being so that it would be a great mistake were we to do so.

3. My own suspicion is that Congress will concentrate on the main resolution and endeavour to confine that to fundamentals. I think it would be a mistake

[1] No. 253. [2] No. 254. [3] No. 255. [4] No. 258. [5] Deciphered as '(? finally)'.

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to settle our policy until we see text of main resolution. I have no doubt we shall have time to settle our policy in full consultation with you (and of course after discussion in my Council) once text is available, and I am sure it will be wise to wait.

4. Meanwhile I am not unduly fussed, and feel that we shall have time to complete our preparatory arrangements before situation arises.

5. I fully appreciate importance of points taken as regards denial,[6] salt situation, and compensation in your No. 852. Instructions have already been issued by Home Department to Provincial Governments to see that legitimate grievances as regards compensation and denial are remedied and they have already asked for summaries of action being taken. I am now asking that these shall be telegraphed urgently, and repeated direct to you. Salt question, which is not free from difficulties, is under our urgent examination here, and we will telegraph officially separately.

6. Monteath's telegram No. 853. We will keep both Bajpai and Chungking in close touch with developments, and fully appreciate importance of doing so.

[6] Deciphered as 'Legislature'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMMEDIATE *14 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2085–S. You will have seen Home Department telegram of July 11th[1] about main Congress resolution. So far we have only had text of denial resolution. That resolution is of course in certain respects objectionable. But I suspect that Congress tactics are to try to provoke us by it into showing our hands, and I am sure we should make a great mistake if we played into their hands by doing so. It remains to be seen what the main resolution (in which I suspect they will try to concentrate on fundamentals) contains. I do not propose to reach a final conclusion until its terms are available and have been considered. But I am of course keeping Amery in the closest touch and I have every reason to believe that we can look for fullest possible support from him and from Cabinet if terms of resolution should be such as to force us to take really drastic action against Congress.

2. You will have had Home Department telegram No. 5425[2] asking for certain information as regards denial policy, &c. Amery has since telegraphed[3]

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privately to me that it is no doubt possible that the requisitioning of boats in certain areas and of bicycles and other vehicles causes hardships to individuals and that possible transport difficulty may in certain areas be making purchase of salt from legitimate sources difficult, and has taken the point that if such hardships due to war conditions are going to be exploited by Gandhi, it is important to make sure that the burden on individuals caused by requisitioning is eased as much as possible by adequate and prompt compensation. He has asked me for an assurance that compensation is given promptly even if on a provisional basis for requisitions. He has also asked for urgent information about the salt situation and its treatment, and has commented that he supposes that hardship due to shortage of salt could be eased by relaxing normal restrictions locally where situation really demands it, though he recognizes there may be difficulty in issuing suitable instructions.

3. I should be most grateful if in your official reply to Home Department (which that Department are asking may be repeated direct to the Secretary of State) you could deal in fullest possible detail with points covered in the preceding paragraph so far as they arise in your province. Matter is of real urgency, and I would ask for earliest possible report. You will appreciate parliamentary considerations which make Amery anxious to be fully briefed in advance.

[1] No. 247. [2] This telegram has not been traced. [3] No. 254.

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Secretary of State to Government of India, Home Department

Telegram, L/P&J/8/681: ff 60–1

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *14 July 1942, 12.30 am*

12502. Your telegram 7th July, 5261.[1] I welcome your proposal to remove ban which is I am sure wise policy and will incidentally provide good propaganda. From latter aspect it is clearly desirable to capture imagination by generosity of gesture and while I quite agree with general lines of draft announcement I suggest following amendments.

2. Paragraph 1, third sentence, substitute for beginning "Government of India welcome this statement of their intentions and desire" etc. as before. Paragraph 2, first sentence, for last six words substitute "who desire to assist the war effort". Paragraph 3, substitute "The Governments concerned are confident that those who are released will make use of their freedom by

[1] No. 230.

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devoting themselves whole-heartedly to giving their fullest assistance in the war effort."

3. I entirely agree that any released person who uses his liberty for subversive purposes should at once be dealt with. But above formula shows clearly the object of the releases and I am sure that effect of announcement e.g. in America and Russia will be far greater if it does not include specific threat.

4. Please let me know in advance the date on which you are issuing announcement and say whether you accept foregoing suggestions.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: f 43

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *14 July 1942, 1.15 pm*
PERSONAL

858. My private and personal telegram 857[1] dated 13th July.
Attorney General explained that action of Congress would certainly here come within mischief of Defence Regulations as well as of older law of sedition. This accounts for somewhat peculiar wording of Cabinet Resolution[2] with regard to insuring same co-operation in India as here.

[1] No. 258. [2] No. 257, Minute 8.

264

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: ff 40–1

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *14 July 1942, 8.45 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 15 July*

862. My private and personal telegram 852.[1]
As I am addressing private meeting of Members of House of Commons next Tuesday[2] I should be glad of early information on points raised in that telegram and also on the following:

(1) I suppose in all these cases of taking over land, impounding boats, etc., the military necessity of the action taken is explained to those concerned? Is the actual taking over carried out by the civil or the military authorities and

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if by the latter is there some representative of the former present to explain matters?

(2) What are the arrangements for assessing and paying compensation in these cases and for notifying to those concerned the procedure for obtaining it? As regards boats, please let me know on what principle seizure is made. I presume that those essential for carrying on of agriculture are not removed except where danger of invasion is imminent, & are released if danger recedes.[3]

[1] No. 254. [2] 21 July.

[3] In telegram 2096-S of 15 July to all Provincial Governors, Lord Linlithgow explained that Mr Amery's anxiety for early information arose because he was due to address a private meeting of M.P.s, and transmitted paras. (1) and (2) above. MSS. EUR. F. 125/110.

265

Resolution of the Congress Working Committee

Cmd. 6430

WARDHA, *14 July 1942*

The events happening from day to day and the experience that the people of India are passing through confirm the opinion of Congressmen that British rule in India must end immediately, not merely because foreign domination even at its best is an evil in itself and a continuing injury to the subject people, but because India in bondage can play no effective part in defending herself and in affecting the fortunes of the war that is desolating humanity. The freedom of India is thus necessary not only in the interest of India, but also for the safety of the world and for the ending of Nazism, Fascism, militarism and other forms of imperialism, and the aggression of one nation over another. Ever since the outbreak of the world war, the Congress has studiedly pursued a policy of non-embarrassment. Even at the risk of making its satyagraha ineffective, it deliberately gave it a symbolic character in the hope that this policy of non-embarrassment carried to its logical extreme would be duly appreciated and that real power would be transferred to popular representatives so as to enable the nation to make its fullest contribution towards the realisation of human freedom throughout the world, which is in danger of being crushed. It had also hoped that negatively nothing would be done which was calculated to tighten Britain's hold on India.

These hopes have, however, been dashed to pieces. The abortive Cripps' proposals showed in the clearest possible manner that there was no change in the British Government's attitude towards India and that the British hold on India was in no way to be relaxed. In the negotiations with Sir Stafford Cripps, Congress Representatives tried their utmost to achieve a minimum, consistent

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with the national demand, but to no avail. This frustration has resulted in a rapid and widespread increase of ill-will against Britain and a growing satisfaction at the success of Japanese arms.

The Working Committee view this development with grave apprehension as this, unless checked, will inevitably lead to a passive acceptance of aggression. The Committee hold that all aggression must be resisted, for any submission to it must mean the degradation of the Indian people and the continuation of their subjection. The Congress is anxious to avoid the experience of Malaya, Singapore, and Burma and desires to build up resistance to any aggression on or invasion of India by the Japanese or any foreign Power. The Congress would change the present ill-will against Britain into goodwill and make India a willing partner in a joint enterprise of securing freedom for the nations and peoples of the world and in the trials and tribulations which accompany it. This is only possible if India feels the glow of freedom.

The Congress representatives have tried their utmost to bring about a solution of the communal tangle. But this has been made impossible by the presence of the foreign power and only after the ending of foreign domination and intervention, can the present unreality give place to reality and the people of India, belonging to all groups and parties, face India's problems and solve them on a mutually agreed basis.

The present political parties formed chiefly with a view to attract the attention of and influence the British power, will then probably cease to function. For the first time in India's history, the realisation will come home that the princes, 'jagirdars', 'zamindars' and propertied and monied classes derive their wealth and property from the workers in the fields and factories and elsewhere, to whom essentially power and authority must belong. On the withdrawal of British rule in India, responsible men and women of the country will come together to form a provisional government, representative of all important sections of the people of India which will later evolve a scheme by which a constituent Assembly can be convened in order to prepare a constitution for the Government of India acceptable to all sections of the people. Representatives of free India and representatives of Great Britain will confer together for the adjustment of future relations and for the co-operation of the two countries as allies in the common task of meeting aggression.

It is the earnest desire of the Congress to enable India to resist aggression effectively with the peoples' united will and strength behind it. In making the proposal for the withdrawal of the British rule from India, the Congress has no desire whatsoever to embarrass Great Britain or the Allied Powers in their prosecution of the war, or in any way to encourage aggression on India or increase pressure on China by the Japanese or any other Power associated with the Axis group. Nor does the Congress intend to jeopardise the defensive capacity of the Allied powers.

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The Congress is, therefore, agreeable to the stationing of the armed forces of the Allies in India, should they so desire, in order to ward off and resist Japanese or other aggression and to protect and help China. The proposal of withdrawal of the British power from India was never intended to mean the physical withdrawal of all Britishers from India, and certainly not of those who would make India their home and live there as citizens and as equals with the others. If such a withdrawal takes place with goodwill it would result in the establishing of a stable provisional government in India and co-operation between this government and the United Nations in resisting aggression and helping China. The Congress realises that there may be risks involved in such a course. Such risks, however, have to be faced by any country in order to achieve freedom, and more especially at the present critical juncture in order to save the country and the larger cause of freedom the world over from far greater risks and perils. While, therefore, the Congress is impatient to achieve the national purpose it wishes to take no hasty steps and would like to avoid, in so far as is possible, any course of action that might embarrass the United Nations. The Congress would be pleased with the British Power if it accepts the very reasonable and just proposal herein made not only in the interest of India but also that of Britain and of the cause of freedom to which the United Nations proclaim their adherence. Should, however, this appeal fail the Congress cannot view without the gravest apprehension the continuation of the present state of affairs involving a progressive deterioration in the situation and the weakening of India's will and power to resist aggression. The Congress will then be reluctantly compelled to utilise all the non-violent strength it might have gathered since 1920 when it adopted non-violence as part of its policy for the vindication of the political rights and liberty.[1] Such a widespread struggle would inevitably be under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. As issues raised are of the most vital and far-reaching importance to the people of India as well as to the peoples of the United Nations the Working Committee refer them to the All-India Congress Committee for final decision. For this purpose the A.-I.C.C. will meet in Bombay on the 7th of August, 1942.

[1] In September 1920, a special session of Congress held at Calcutta passed a resolution accepting Gandhi's policy of non-violent non-co-operation. In December of the same year, the 35th session of Congress held at Nagpur reaffirmed this policy, and furthermore, Gandhi was able to secure the alteration of the Congress creed 'in such a fashion as to eliminate the declared adherence of that body to the British connection and to constitutional methods of agitation'. *Statement exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India during the year 1920* (London, H.M.S.O., 1921), pp. 57, 67.

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Sir J. Herbert (Bengal) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

15 July 1942

No. 3-T. Your telegram No. 2085-S[1] of July 14th. I have informed my Home Department points raised in paragraph 2 and action is being taken by Departments concerned. I feel sure we have a good case on the question of payment of compensation, but problem of salt and other supplies is not easy and will require careful examination.

[1] No. 261.

267

Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMMEDIATE *15 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 33-G. Your private and personal telegram No. 2085-S,[1] July 14th. We are replying today to Home Department telegram No. 4425[2] of July 12th and am sending a copy direct to Secretary of State.

Though effects of Congress move may be less embarrassing in the Punjab than in other Provinces it appears that the situation is becoming increasingly dangerous and that positive action will soon be unavoidable. Publicity is Gandhi's main weapon and there would seem much to be said in favour of minimising this: (*a*) by imposing pre-censorship order on Congress pronouncements and on *Harijan* and any similar publications, and (*b*) intensive counter-propaganda at home and abroad. It might be salutary to point to Rajkot[3] parallel in which Gandhi resorted to sensational and quite unjustifiable action mainly in order to distract attention from dissensions in the Congress ranks. Use might also be made of Gandhi's open admission before his retreat from Kathiawar that his fast had been a sinful departure from the path of non-violence.

[1] No. 261. [2] This should read 5425; see No. 261, para. 2.

[3] In March 1939, as part of a Congress campaign to bring about responsible government in the Princely States, Gandhi undertook a fast in Rajkot, a State in the Kathiawar peninsula. At his request Lord Linlithgow intervened, and the Chief Justice of India was asked to arbitrate between the Thakor Saheb of Rajkot and Gandhi, who thereupon broke his fast. He later issued a statement apologising for his action in attempting to put pressure on the Thakor and the Paramount Power by undertaking a fast, which he now realised had been coercive and therefore not in accordance with the principles of non-violence.

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Sir T. Stewart (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/49

SECRET *15 July 1942*

No. 501–G.B.

2. Events in Libya and Russia are causing no little dismay and feeling is abroad that Germany's superiority on land is definitely established. In Muslim circles the possibility of Muslim countries being involved in war is being canvassed with some anxiety. On the other hand Japanese inactivity against India has restored to some extent confidence for the immediate future and an observer on the main Railway lines cannot but be struck by the complete reversal of passenger traffic as compared with a few months ago, it is the train proceeding to Calcutta which is now crowded.

3. I venture to think, however, that critical as the war situation may be, it takes a place in the public mind only after the political crisis and the food supply and price control situation. The expansion of Your Excellency's Council was received somewhat coldly, moderate opinion choosing to follow the lead set by Sapru. Unsatisfactory as the arrangement is—Benthall's appointment is particularly criticised—the situation would be acceptable for the time being if the Governor-General's veto were, by convention, put into cold storage. There is more interest and, indeed, apprehension over the happenings at Wardha. Our Press is curiously silent on the subject of Gandhi's desire to launch mass Civil Disobedience and in this it reflects the undoubted distaste of the man in the street, be he Congress or non-Congress, for such a programme at the present moment. I was much impressed by the anxiety shown by our leading Elder Statesman, the Vice-Chancellor, as to the outcome of Gandhi's move. He feels certain that Bihar would in no circumstances revolt against a Gandhian ukase backed by Rajendra Prasad and that there are grave dangers of a clash between Congress demonstrators and the Muslim Leaguers who are not in a mood to bow to insult or interference. Dr. Sinha, though claiming as a journalist of long standing to be jealous of the privileges of the Press, made it very clear that if it comes to a fight we must immediately and effectively silence Congress organs. We have reviewed the plan of campaign drawn up in 1940. It appears to require little modification unless events take a turn which we do not anticipate. We are removing the Communist element from the lists of the "taller poppies" as it does not seem likely that they will join with Congress. One point however has arisen which is being put to Home Department for their consideration. The Draft Resolution of the Working Committee will shortly be published. Is this zero hour for the start of mass

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Civil Disobedience or will zero hour not arrive until the Resolution has been ratified by the A.-I.C.C.? If the latter be the case there may be a considerable interval within which propaganda in support of the Resolution may be put across in a prejudicial way. Do we necessarily hold our hand till zero hour and give the movement a flying start? I am inclined to the opposite opinion even though it may be urged as a debating point—it can be nothing else—that we have forced the A.-I.C.C. into opposition and revolt by our repressive measures. It is perhaps futile to speculate on the degree of success which a mass movement will achieve here in Bihar. Godbole, my Chief Secretary, is inclined to think that it will be as much of a "flop" as the last. He is a wise man but Russell and I are inclined to think that he is over-optimistic and that there may be a sufficiency of *pro-forma* martyrs to embarrass us in regard to jail accommodation.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *15 July 1942*

I found the Cabinet very reasonable on Monday night[1] and no one really attempted to disagree with Winston's summing up as embodied in the conclusion which I telegraphed to you.[2] The particular wording, as I explained in a subsequent telegram,[3] was based on the Attorney-General's opinion as to what would happen if any resolution such as the first resolution of the Congress Committee were passed here. I am telegraphing[4] to you today asking you to make sure how the position stands with reference to the Defence of India Rules. Without differing from your practical conclusion not to take action at once upon the first resolution, I am not altogether happy about the argument you use in paragraph 2 of your No. 2084-S[5] in which you refer to resolutions "not necessarily intended to be followed by action" as being a "well settled safety-valve in this country". I should have thought that a resolution passed by a body as authoritative as Congress, and claiming the right to instruct the people, in a matter where feeling inevitably may run high among ignorant villagers and people on whom hardship will necessarily be inflicted, was undoubtedly intended to be followed by action, and was deliberately meant to create disturbance and foster animosity. You say that you have no intention of "allowing these people to break the law"; but surely they have already broken the law by their resolution? In any case, I trust that if any law-breaking in action should result you will then proceed to deal with Gandhi and the Working Committee and not merely punish the wretched villager who refuses to hand over his boat or his bullock-cart.

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2. After all, we are dealing with people who are more and more advancing the claim to be considered as the alternative Government of India and ingeniously fortifying that claim step by step. At some point or other we have got to make it quite clear that *we* are the Government of India and that the claim is a bubble to be pricked. It is of course arguable that the bubble may prick itself by the sheer failure of Congress to produce any action. That was what happened over the last *Satyagraha* movement, and if it looked at all likely that the result would be the same this time it might be safe to take the same line. But is it?

3. Meanwhile, the major resolution[6] has come in, though I haven't yet had your comments on it. It seems to me a very ingenious blend of Nehru and Gandhi, aimed at befogging opinion in America and elsewhere. What it asks for is, of course, hopelessly absurd, as its authors must know. I dare say a good deal can be made of the absurdity of the provisional Government of wise men coming together the day after we have abdicated, when the different elements have never yet been prepared to come together either when Cripps was there or since. One has only got to ask the question: Who is to take charge of the decisions of Government pending the wise men agreeing to form a provisional Government? The serious thing, however, is not the absurdity of the proposition in itself, as the threat of a direct struggle with the Government. I don't know how far this would come under the existing Defence of India Rules, but I gather the major resolution would come well within the mischief of the Emergency Powers Ordinance[7] and you may have to consider whether you should not put that Ordinance into effect between this and the All-India Congress Committee meeting in August.

4. One thing, I think, is of the first importance: and that is that you should make clear either yourself, or through your Council, that there is not the slightest question of our abdicating the functions of Government during the war, or going beyond what was said here on April 28th.[8] I am really sorry that Ayyar will not be available till the beginning of August, for you might have got him at once to punch Congress hard and make it clear that there is not going to be any kind of surrender or negotiation.

[Para. 5, on Indian students at British Universities, omitted.]

6. I quite understand the difficulties which you mentioned (in paragraph 5 of your letter of June 23rd)[9] in the way of inviting Princes to sit with your expanded Council. The position would of course be to some extent constitutionally anomalous, though not more so than either the Jam Saheb or Mudaliar

[1] See No. 257. [2] No. 258. [3] No. 263. [4] No. 270. [5] No. 260.
[6] No. 265. [7] See No. 247, note 4.
[8] In the Debate on the Cripps Mission. *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 379, cols. 826–917.
[9] No. 181.

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sitting with the Cabinet here. However, my point was not so much that they should sit necessarily with your Executive as a whole, as that it was desirable in some way or other to get Princes and British Indian Members of Council to acquire the habit of working together round a table on matters of common concern to the whole of India, and certainly the war is of such common concern. Habits of mind developed during the war would surely make the constitutional plunge into a union much easier afterwards. I quite agree that the Defence Council has already been a useful step in that direction, but possibly you might find it feasible to arrange something in the nature of periodic meetings between your Resources Committee or at any rate Members in charge of portfolios connected with the war, and such Rulers as Bhopal, Gwalior, Bikaner, Mysore, Jaipur and perhaps Travancore (or their Dewans) for the discussion of matters of common concern. I cannot claim that the idea is original, for since making it I have discovered that like many other good ideas it figures among the recommendations of the Simon Report.[10] In any case I throw it out for what it is worth and should be very glad if you would give it further consideration.

7. It may well be that the political solution to the Indian problem may be pretty remote yet, owing to the hopeless differences between the organisations and leaders in the political field. That is no reason why we should not go ahead with the building up of an increasingly self-dependent all-India round the nucleus of the existing system of Government, gradually modified from within and supported, without communal rivalry, by Princes, administrators, the army, the civil service and a growing body of the public. Anything that encourages these various elements to feel confident in the Government of the country is a great thing. Politically I dare say it is impossible, but there might be much to be said for openly announcing that we regard a political solution of the Indian problem as impossible and mean to develop a self-governing India on administrative lines allowing political development towards Self-Government in the democratic sense to take place later. However, even if that is impossible, it seems to me there is still everything to be said for going on with the kind of development which has already taken place during the war and whose full significance few have realised.

[10] Cmd. 3569. *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, vol. II, 1930, para. 368.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: ff 238–9

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *16 July 1942, 2 am*

PERSONAL

12635. Your telegram 11th July 2056–G[1] and Home Department telegram of the same date 5419.[2] I have now received through Reuter full text of Working Committee's main resolution adopted 14th July,[3] and await your comments. Whatever view may be taken of it as calling for preventive action against Congress (though last sentence of paragraph 2 of Home Department telegram 5419 seems to contemplate only consequential action) it seems possible that the resolution of 10th July[4] may lead to local incidents and so by design to the situation described in paragraph 6 of Home Department circular letter of 2nd August 1940.[5] To what extent do you regard the resolution of 10th July itself as a breach of the law? I am advised that it would appear that action should be taken in respect of it under Defence Rules 38 (1) (*a*)[6] or possibly 121.[7] If your advisers agree in this opinion you already have ground for action if and when expedient against Working Committee, but I am not clear whether Gandhi himself could be proved to be party to resolution.

2. I should be glad to know whether Commander-in-Chief takes serious view of possible consequences of that resolution as causing impediment to military operations.

3. If your view is that main resolution of 14th July does not call for immediate action would you nevertheless see advantage in promulgating Emergency Powers Ordinance[8] as a warning measure in anticipation of All-India Congress Committee adopting the resolution when it meets in August?

[1] No. 245. [2] No. 247. [3] No. 265. [4] No. 245.

[5] See No. 247, note 2. Para. 6 noted that trouble might begin in the form of local agitation not immediately recognisable as the start of a mass movement, but that, under pressure from extreme elements, such agitation would probably soon pass beyond the control of its organisers and call for the measures required to deal with a mass movement.

[6] Rule 38 (1) (*a*) stated that 'No person shall, without lawful authority or excuse, do any prejudicial act'. The definitions of a prejudicial act were laid down by Rule 34 (6) and included 'any act which is intended or is likely' (*e*) to bring into contempt His Majesty, the Crown Representative or the Government in British India or in any of His Majesty's dominions, (*g*) to cause fear or alarm to the Public, (*h*) to impede transport necessary to the war effort, (*k*) to influence the public in a manner prejudicial to the defence of British India or prosecution of the war, or finally (*p*) 'otherwise to prejudice the efficient prosecution of the war and the defence of British India, or the public safety or interest'.

[7] Rule 121 stated that 'Any person who attempts to contravene, or abets, or attempts to abet, or does any act preparatory to, a contravention of, any of the provisions of these Rules, shall be deemed to have contravened that provision'.

[8] See No. 247, note 4.

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4. Could one or more of the Indian members of your Council find opportunity this month to make statements exposing futility and danger of passages in resolution of 14th July? If they did it would, I imagine, have considerable propaganda value in this country and in U.S.A. even if less in India.

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Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/681: f 55

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *16 July 1942, 2.55 am*
Received: 16 July, 3.30 am

5526. Reference your tel. No. 12502[1] dated 14th July. Your amendments accepted. Announcement will issue 20th July.[2] Provincial Governments have been requested to withdraw ban on or as soon as possible before that date.

[1] No. 262. [2] The announcement was eventually made on 23 July.

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Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 231

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *16 July 1942, 4.25 am*
Received: 16 July, 9.45 am

No. 5529. Full text of main Congress resolution[1] released yesterday afternoon has been telegraphed to London by Reuters. It contains objectionable passages; much of it is blatantly hypocritical; and threat of civil disobedience remains. On the other hand, language is more conciliatory than we expected, while appeal to Allied powers and abandonment of non-embarrassment policy has been dropped, although we have reason to believe that these were essential points in Gandhi's original draft. He must have encountered considerable opposition.

After careful consideration, we have come to conclusions (*a*) that resolution, as worded, does not afford good ground for immediate action against Congress at any rate until it has been ratified by A.-I.C.C., and (*b*) that it would do us more harm than good to attempt to suppress it or even prohibit its publication pending ratification. We have accordingly passed it for publication in India and transmission abroad.

We are conscious that interval before ratification may give Congress further opportunity for propaganda and maturing their plans, but we shall keep a close

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censorship on outgoing comment, and shall also make the most of the interval to develop our own counter propaganda and (?settle) our own plans of action. Analysis of resolution and lines of suggested counter propaganda will follow and will be repeated to Washington and Chungking. Meanwhile, we have decided not to hold immediate press conference here but shall do what we can with individual American press correspondents.

Assuming that the resolution is ratified by A.-I.C.C. its terms, if they mean anything, will necessitate a further interval to allow of consideration of appeal by His Majesty's Government with result that Congress will not expect to be in a position to launch civil disobedience much before September. If we are to take up the Congress challenge as we feel we must, it will clearly be desirable to strike before they are ready and the best moment for doing so may well be immediately after ratification by All-India Congress Committee. Resolution, it is true, does not disclose the form that the movement will take and it is, therefore, difficult to decide upon the appropriate instrument to use against it. We are however examining the question of whether the resolution as it stands provides basis for proclamation[2] of Congress and arrest of Congress leaders. We shall communicate our conclusion on this point and as to further tactics as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, we are asking Provincial Governments to have their plans in complete readiness by August 7th and in the interval to confine action to enforcing the law against those individuals who clearly break it and especially those who instigate others to offer defiance in pursuance of first Working Committee resolution[3] dealing with alleged grievances. We doubt whether it would be practicable or wise to attempt pre-censorship of press comment in India but we propose to ask All-India Newspaper Editors Conference, which is meeting this week in Bombay, for declaration of their attitude towards civil disobedience movement in the light of their previously expressed intention[4] not to support any obstruction to the war effort.

[1] See No. 265.
[2] i.e. the declaration of Congress as an unlawful association under the Criminal Law Amendment Act.
[3] No. 245. [4] See No. 259, note 3.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

IMMEDIATE *16 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2107-S. I think it is most important in face of Gandhi's agitation to get the various parties and prominent individuals who do not sympathise with his view

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to come out in public condemnation of it; and anything we can discreetly do to produce that result would, I am sure, be well worth while. You may have opportunities of encouraging critical comment in Bombay.

2. I should also be most grateful if you would let Ambedkar know from me for his private and personal information that this matter was discussed yesterday in my Council; that we agreed that we should postpone final decision until matter had been before All-India Congress Committee on 7th August, and that if that body did ratify Gandhi's resolution and subject to any developments that there might be in between we should have to take immediate and drastic action against Congress and its leaders. It was also the clear sense of the meeting that what was possible should be done to encourage either parties or individuals not agreeing with Gandhi's view to make their position clear in public. Otherwise there is of course grave danger of the case going by default in the United States and even at home. If as I trust Ambedkar is in agreement with the general feeling of Council I hope he will do all that he can if opportunity offers in Bombay to swing the depressed classes definitely against Congress and to organise such demonstrations or public statements as may be practicable in reasoned condemnation of the line of the main Congress Resolution.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir J. Herbert (Bengal)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/42

IMMEDIATE *16 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2109–S. I think it is very important that we should so far as we tactfully and wisely can, try to mobilize opinion and encourage those parties and prominent individuals who do not in fact agree with Gandhi's policy and the Congress resolution to say so in public and point out the inconsistencies and weaknesses in it. Jinnah has of course made his position clear on one or two occasions in the last month. It occurs to me that if Huq could at all tactfully be encouraged, on the assumption that he does not agree with Gandhi and the Congress, to say so in public, it might be of very considerable value. There is always the risk of our case being let go by default merely because prominent Indians and Indian parties, which do not accept the Congress point of view, are not prepared or fail to say so in public, thus leaving Congress undisputed domination of the field so far as the United States and even opinion at home is concerned. On the other hand I quite realise that this is a delicate business, needing the most careful handling, but I have every confidence in your skill and tact. It would of course

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be essential that any statement made should represent personal conviction and not bear any relation to a possible *quid pro quo*, for there could be no question of our considering a *quid pro quo*.[1]

[1] In telegram 2108-S of 16 July to Sir A. Hope (Madras), Lord Linlithgow suggested in similar terms that prominent members of the non-Brahmin community be encouraged to oppose Gandhi's policy publicly. MSS. EUR. F. 125/70.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *16 July 1942, 1.25 am*
Received: 16 July, 2.30 am

No. 2100-S. Home Department telegram of today[1] will have given you our decision as regards Congress resolution. Position has been aggravated by statement[2] today by Gandhi which has been repeated to you officially that "there is no question of one more chance. After all, it is an open rebellion." "The conception is that of a mass movement on the widest possible scale. It will include what is possible to include in a mass movement or what people are capable of doing. This will be a mass movement of a purely non-violent character." and "There is no room left in the proposal for withdrawal or negotiation; either they recognise India's independence or they don't." I am confirmed by this in my feeling that the formal[3] Congress resolution to some extent represents a compromise and that Gandhi is anxious to keep the temperature high.

2. I am quite clear at the same time that the wise course is to have allowed publication of the resolution, to await reactions to it, and pending meeting of the All-India Congress Committee, to complete our preparations and to be ready to strike at once thereafter. Issue generally was discussed in my Council today, those present in addition to the Chief and myself being Mody, Sultan Ahmed, Aney, Sarker, Firoz Khan Noon, and Benthall. I was greatly impressed by their unanimity as to necessity for dealing swiftly and sternly with Congress if they force the issue. General estimate was that All-India Congress Committee (though in very many cases with grave misgiving) would ratify resolution of Working Committee, and Council were very insistent on necessity

[1] No. 272.

[2] In fact, the statement from which Lord Linlithgow quotes was made on 14 July, following the passage of the Congress Working Committee resolution. For the full text of Gandhi's statement, see *The Times of India*, 15 July, p. 7; extracts were reported in *The Times*, 15 July, p. 4.

[3] 'formal' deciphered as 'formation of'.

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for as much advance propaganda as we could arrange to bring out our side of the case and to stimulate those elements in this country such as the Muslims, Depressed Classes, &c. who do not accept the Congress principles to make it clear that they did not accept them and also on necessity for putting our case across in the United States and China. On all these points as you know I am in complete agreement (as are you) with the view of my Council, and I am doing my utmost to energise propaganda here and see that it is really effective and good. You have already given us great help in that regard through Joyce, and I hope that you will continue to do so.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir B. Glancy (Punjab)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

SECRET THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *16 July 1942*

My dear Glancy,

Very many thanks for your telegram[1] just received about the information which we need for the Secretary of State in connection with denial policy, &c. I am most grateful. I also entirely agree with you that once this business develops we shall have to take a stiff line. For your own personal information, I had a very useful discussion about it in Council yesterday. There were no Europeans present except Benthall, but I was greatly relieved to find general solidarity on the point that while it would be wise to wait and see whether the All-India Congress Committee ratified the Working Committee's resolution when they met on 7th August, we must be prepared (subject of course always to any more helpful developments in between) to take immediate action thereafter in the event of ratification. My colleagues, with whom I need not say I wholly agree, were also very emphatic as to the importance of propaganda here, at home, in the United States and in China, and I am doing what I can to help on these lines. The suggestion was also made that it was of real importance that we should mobilize so far as possible those individuals and parties throughout the country which did not agree with the Congress resolution or with Gandhi's policy, and endeavour to persuade them by such means as we thought proper and expedient to come out in open condemnation of it.

2. Now one of the most important of these elements is the Sikh community. I should be most grateful if you would do what you can with Jogendra Singh (with whom I should of course have discussed this matter myself had he been up here) and see what can be done to try to get the Sikhs to come out in reasoned criticism and in opposition. There is otherwise the grave and obvious risk that

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the case may go by default, and that the United States and even people at home may think that Gandhi is right in claiming that he is the sole mouthpiece of India and that there is no opposition to his views. Jinnah has already indicated pretty clearly on one or two occasions in the last month his attitude towards Gandhi's propositions. I should like to think that he would do so again, though I have no knowledge of what his attitude is likely to be, and for obvious reasons I have no intention of approaching him on the subject. But anything that Sikander could say would, I am certain, be of real value, and I am certain that my publicity people here would see to it that critical comment was transmitted to those quarters likely to be most interested in it.

3. I quite agree with you that we may have to consider the *Harijan* position, though I am still not quite certain that Gandhi, whose very extreme statements —far more extreme than the actual Congress resolution—are likely to do him a good deal of harm and to worry people in this country as well as discrediting him still further outside, may not, on a balance of considerations, wisely be left to express his views with his present freedom a little longer. But I will think about this again after I see what the next number of *Harijan* contains.

4. This is of course a delicate business and we must walk very circumspectly. But I am certain that you will agree with me as to the importance of preparing the ground in every possible way by propaganda, refutation, analysis of the grave and obvious weaknesses of the Congress resolution, contrast between the terms of the resolution and Gandhi's statement, contrast again between the demands in that resolution and the proposals projected at the time of the Cripps negotiations, and the fact that whereas Congress resolution suggests that acceptance of their view will mean a move from unreality to reality, the actual effect would be precisely the reverse.

5. I do not believe that Gandhi's followers are too happy about all this business, and it is quite obvious that he is trying to force the pace. But I am confident that we shall be able to deal with him, though if we can get our propaganda going properly and a sufficient stream of adverse comment from the United States in particular, he may well, being no fool, think again before 7th August, as may also some of his advisers.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 267.

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277

Miss Mira Ben to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

BIRLA HOUSE, ALBUQUERQUE ROAD, NEW DELHI, *16 July 1942*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

It may be you will not recognize me by my signature. I must therefore explain that I am that daughter of the late Admiral Sir Edmond Slade, who came to Gandhiji seventeen years ago, and has, ever since, been closely associated with him in all his activities.

When the present crisis came to a head at the meeting of the Congress Working Committee in Sevagram, and in view also of the experiences I have had recently in Orissa, I felt a strong desire to meet you. I consulted Gandhiji, and he approved; that was before the main resolution of the Working Committee had been passed. After it had been passed, and after Gandhiji had held his Press Conference, he called me and said he would like me to leave the next morning for New Delhi. He then talked to me for over half an hour pouring out his whole heart, that I might be the better able to interpret his mind to you at this most critical moment.

I have therefore come here and write you this note forthwith, in the ardent hope that I may be able to see you.

Believe me,
Yours sincerely,
MIRA

278

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *17 July 1942, 1.45 pm*
Received: 17 July, 3.45 pm

No. 2111–S. Your personal telegram of 16th July, No. 12635.[1] I will comment separately[2] on paragraphs 1 and 3.

2. I have shown paragraph 2 to the Commander-in-Chief. No reports have so far come in to suggest that resolution may affect adversely any military operations: nor does Wavell anticipate that anything of the kind will occur. Position is being carefully watched, and I will at once inform you of any signs of trouble.

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3. Your paragraph 4. I have already taken this up. I am also telegraphing to Lumley, Herbert and Hope to suggest importance of getting Ambedkar, Huq, Madras non-Brahmins and any other persons or parties who in fact disagree with Congress policy and Gandhi's views to say so publicly without delay, and will endeavour to organize best possible publicity if and when they do so. I recognise, and have so informed Governors, that this is a delicate matter in which we must walk circumspectly, but I have every confidence in their capacity to avoid embarrassing themselves or us. I have made a similar approach to Glancy as regards Sikhs and Sikander, and will consider what other opportunities of the same sort offer and follow them up.

[1] No. 270. [2] See No. 292.

279

Sir G. S. Bajpai to Government of India, External Affairs Department

Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: f 357

MOST SECRET WASHINGTON, *17 July 1942, 1.51 am*
Received: 17 July, 10.20 am

No. 172. Following from Agent-General.
Continuation of my telegram No. 151[1] of July 6th. I have had two important conversations since, which I wish to report.

(1) Political adviser, Near East Section, State Department,[2] now holds the view that American criticism of the Congress rejection of Cripps' proposal was premature and the sinister distrust of British promises of post-war Dominion status was justified by the slow and grudging character of past British attitude to Indian pleas for freedom. His personal view seems to be that the risks of refusing the new Congress demand may be greater than those involved in compliance which might be physically resisted by the Muslims.

(2) Influential and friendly radio commentator Gram Swing holds the view that the proposal for war time Indian Government contained in the Cripps plan did not go far enough and that without offending the Muslims a compromise central government of representatives of provinces and states which would have been immediately recognised as sovereign state, could have been formed for the duration of the war. He told me that Nehru had informed the President that such a plan, if offered, would have been accepted by Congress. This plan resembles in broad outline the one which the President is understood to have communicated to the Prime Minister[3] just before Cripps left for India.

[1] Not printed. [2] Mr Wallace Murray. [3] See Vol. I, No. 311.

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2. It is impossible to say to what extent the official mentioned in (1) may influence the policy of the United States Government. (2) Rather confirmed the impression that while the latest resolution of the working committee may be deplored by the American press, counter-measures taken by the Government of India against Gandhi's movement are likely to revive the demand for fresh conciliatory move by His Majesty's Government, especially if the movement meets with any measure of success.

3. Conversations summarised in this telegram were strictly private.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir B. Glancy (Punjab)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

CONFIDENTIAL THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *17 July 1942*

My dear Glancy,

Many thanks for your confidential letter of 10th July, No. 401,[1] and the note enclosed in it embodying Sikander's tentative formula for the solution of the communal problem. This is an important issue, and I have taken a day or two to consider it. It is obvious that Sikander's proposals are related to those embodied in the Cripps Declaration which has been withdrawn, and they impinge directly upon a most controversial aspect of the post-war constitutional settlement, which is very definitely the business of His Majesty's Government.

2. Let me in a preliminary way comment on the formal position, which is in my judgment quite clear. It is that the Cripps draft declaration has been withdrawn by His Majesty's Government, and that while I appreciate they might well find it difficult were they to renew the attempt to find an acceptable procedure for framing India's post-war constitution, unless some totally different approach could be adopted, to diverge far from the terms of the draft declaration, they remain quite uncommitted as to the particular terms of the draft declaration including such elements as Provincial option. I am quite clear that no representative of the Crown ought to put himself into the position of implying that the specific terms of the draft declaration remain the policy of His Majesty's Government or of encouraging a ministerial policy which would imply the same thing.

3. On the other hand, there is of course nothing to prevent any unofficial individual in India from making such assumptions as he pleases about the future of His Majesty's Government's policy, or from proposing his own emendations, and that is as true of a provincial Premier as of anyone else

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since a provincial Premier is in no sense a representative of His Majesty's Government, nor is he necessarily committed to their policies. On this issue the formal position is that while it would not be possible for you, as I am advised, to encourage your Premier to promote a plan which makes unjustifiable assumption as to the future policy of His Majesty's Government, it would equally not be possible for the Governor to tell his Premier not to propose such a plan, outside the provincial sphere though it may be.

4. I myself entirely agree, for your own information, with your criticisms of Sikander's formula, and with your estimate of the risks that might be involved in its promulgation. I should have thought it was quite likely that it might indeed heighten rather than ease the communal tension, while I am profoundly sceptical as to the probability of its showing up effectively the impossibility of Pakistan. My general conclusion in the circumstances that I have mentioned above is thus first that it would not be possible for me to express any view or give any advice to Sikander on this matter; secondly that I think it would be well for you, in the light of the remarks above, equally to walk cautiously; but finally that friendly personal advice which on a purely personal basis and arising out of your personal relations with Sikander you may care to give him as to the desirability of what he has in mind might, I have little doubt, be of some value in saving him from error.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 243.

281

Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL BARNES COURT, SIMLA, *17 July 1942*

D.-o. No. 402

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Sikander has asked me to bring to Your Excellency's notice a further suggestion which he has evolved for the constitutional advance of India with reference to the composition of the Governor-General's Executive Council. His idea is that for the period antecedent to the final framing of the all-India constitution the Governor-General should continue to exercise full control in the matter of choosing his Councillors in respect to Defence, Finance, Customs and External Affairs, and that all other Members of Council should be selected by the Governor-General from a panel of names to be put forward by the existing Provincial Legislative Assemblies.

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The object of this suggested manœuvre would be to show that the Central Government is being made more representative and responsible, and thus to take the wind out of the Congress sails. Apart from dislocations and embarrassments which the manœuvre would involve, I am very doubtful, as I have told Sikander, whether it would have any substantial effect; it would not, as Sikander admits, be acceptable to the Congress, and I should have thought that, as far as reasonably-minded men are concerned, the Congress leaders have already shown themselves to be so utterly intransigent that a concession such as that contemplated would be superfluous.

Sikander appears to be seriously disturbed by the possibility that Gandhi, if he fails to induce the British Government to yield to his demands, may make terms with Jinnah by an out-and-out offer of Pakistan and then present a united front to Government. It seems to me that, even if Jinnah were amenable, it would be very difficult for Gandhi with all his political agility to adopt an attitude which has brought Rajagopalachariar into such complete disrepute with the orthodox Congress party. Sikander, however, has a strong suspicion that the split between Gandhi and Rajagopalachariar was prearranged by the Congress leaders; I have myself seen no evidence of this.

Sikander is also disturbed by the fact that there are now only three Muslim Members on the Executive Council; he would like to see the proportion of Muslims amongst the Indian Members of Council adjusted to at least one-third, in order to prevent Jinnah and others from making capital out of this deficiency. I think there is a good deal to be said in favour of such an adjustment when it becomes practicable.

Yours sincerely,

B. J. GLANCY

282

Sir G. Laithwaite to Miss Mira Ben

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *17 July 1942*

Dear Mira Ben,

His Excellency asks me to thank you for your letter.[1] He would have been very glad to see you, and he is at all times glad to know Mr. Gandhi's views and feelings. But he feels sure that you will appreciate his difficulty in giving an interview to a direct representative of Mr. Gandhi, such as yourself, having regard to the conclusions of the main resolution of the Working Committee, and to the fact that Mr. Gandhi is himself, in the interviews given by him to the Press before, as His Excellency understands it, you left Wardha on your present

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mission, stated to have described the position *vis-à-vis* of Government as one of "open rebellion".[2] His Excellency would much regret it, for all that, were he not to be in possession of any message or information which Mr. Gandhi should desire to convey to him: and he asks me to say that, in the circumstances, he hopes that you will feel able to convey any such information to him through me. I shall be at The Viceroy's House all day and, if you would be kind enough to have a telephone message sent to me, will make convenient here any time that might be most convenient to you.

Yours sincerely,
J. G. LAITHWAITE

[1] No. 277. [2] See No. 275.

283

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *17 July 1942*

REPORT NO. 109

2. *Congress.*—The first reactions to the Congress resolution are not unhealthy, and are certainly more downright than on previous occasions. Sir Chimanlal Setalvad and Sir Cowasji Jehangir came out at once, and spontaneously, with statements expressing strong opposition. In the Press, the *Times of India* is taking a strong line, and it is significant that the *Bombay Chronicle*, which expresses the Congress view in Bombay, is not at all happy about it. Before the resolution appeared, it had an unusually strong article deprecating any kind of civil disobedience, and it has continued to express apprehensions since the resolution appeared. In particular, it stresses the danger of any movement without Hindu–Muslim agreement. The *Bombay Sentinel* is even more openly antagonistic to the resolution. Extracts from the vernacular Press have not yet reached me, but I do not anticipate anything very encouraging from them.

Ambedkar, in conversation, expressed the view that Congress would not receive much support from Labour, and thought that it would receive so little general support that it might be possible to ignore it. I have sent him the message contained in your telegram of July the 16th,[1] which arrived after I had seen him. The National War Front, I understand from Griffiths, who happened to be here, is producing a reasoned statement.

These first spontaneous reactions indicate no great enthusiasm for Gandhi's agitation. I do not, however have much doubt that the A.-I.C.C. will ratify

[1] No. 273.

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the resolution nor do I think that it would be wise to count on the ultimate support which Gandhi can work up proving negligible. He will always command a following. I find myself therefore in full agreement with the tactical line which you have proposed, and we are reviewing our preparations for dealing drastically with Congress. It is well, I am sure, not to make a precipitate move before the A.-I.C.C. meeting, so that any chance which there may be that lack of enthusiasm may cause Gandhi to alter his attitude may have full rein. But once the resolution is ratified, and provided there is no good reason to believe that civil disobedience will not be worked up, I think it will be important to strike before they have time to perfect their plans and stir up feeling. This seems, to me, more necessary on account of the difficulties created by the high prices of food-stuffs, which are not likely to be resolved in the near future. I have little doubt that Gandhi will work on that subject as much as possible.

With regard to Gandhi himself, we still have the Aga Khan's house[2] at Yeravda available. I am not, of course, enthusiastic to have him on my hands, but, if required, we shall be prepared to have him. I suggest however, that if he is to be interned, and not imprisoned, it might look better to opinion in the United States if he were interned in his own Ashram at Wardha, rather than removed elsewhere, especially as his health is said to be causing some anxiety.

[2] In 1940, arrangements had been made to accommodate Gandhi in the Aga Khan's house, if his detention became necessary, in order to avoid the adverse effect his presence would have on jail discipline. L/P&J/8/590.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces), Sir T. Stewart (Bihar), Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces), Sir A. Clow (Assam), Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province), Sir H. Lewis (Orissa), and Sir H. Dow (Sind)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMMEDIATE *18 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2117-S. I think it important at the point things have now reached that we should (with all circumspection for the matter is of some delicacy) do all we can discreetly to stimulate those elements in the various Provinces, who, by conviction, are opposed to Gandhi and the principles of the Congress resolution, to get up in public and say so. There is a grave risk always present of the non-Congress element going by default at home and in the United States because of the silence of those who, while opposed to it, are not prepared to be vocal.

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2. Can I help at all by providing propaganda points or the like? The Congress case is weak in the extreme and it would be a great mistake so far as we can avoid this discreetly (and I have every confidence in your tact and skill) to let it get away unchallenged.

3. I hope you will keep me fully informed of all reactions to the Congress resolution.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir A. Hope (Madras), Sir R. Lumley (Bombay), Sir J. Herbert (Bengal), and Sir B. Glancy (Punjab)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMMEDIATE *18 July 1942*
PERSONAL
No. 2120–S. I should be most grateful if you could keep me in closest touch with reactions in your Province to present Congress agitation.

286

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *18 July 1942, 9.50 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 18 July, 11 pm*
No. 2128–S. Mira Ben (Miss Slade) has arrived here and asked[1] to see me so that she could explain Gandhi's mind. I explained[2] that I could not see her in face of terms of Congress resolution and Gandhi's latest statement, but arranged for her to see my Private Secretary.

2. Note of interview[3] goes by the next bag. Main points that emerged were—

(*a*) She continued to insist on vital necessity for full acceptance of Gandhi's demand for recognition of Indian independence. Nothing else could possibly save a situation which was very rapidly deteriorating. Gandhi was inspired by pure friendship for us. We were loathed[4] through the country by all parties, Congress or non-Congress. Only Congress (subject to the declaration of independence) could remedy the situation. Once the declaration had been made everything would fall properly into its place. Disunity would disappear, &c., &c.

[1] No. 277. [2] No. 282. [3] L/P&J/8/597: ff 18–22.
[4] 'loathed' could not be deciphered.

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(*b*) Gandhi had on the last occasion taken steps to call off the movement where there had been cases of violence. On this occasion, he would do his very utmost to ensure non-violence. But he would not feel justified in calling movement off, merely because cases of violence occurred. He could not do so without doing greater violence to the ideals for which he was working.

(*c*) Gandhi was greatly moved in his decision to press this policy by state of moral degradation into which he thought the country had fallen. It must regain its own soul. At the moment it was prepared, while hating the British, to lick their boots. This is an intolerable position and no price was too high to pay to remedy it.

(*d*) On the last occasion Congressmen put in prison had obeyed the rules and been strictly non-violent. That would not be so now. It would be a case of victory or death. Gandhi might be put in prison, &c., but could not be kept there. She hinted definitely that he intended to see the business to a finish, even at the cost of his own life. He would do all he could to guide the movement on non-violent lines, but must be left free to guide it. If he was not left to guide it by word or writing there was nothing left for him but death. (That no doubt may be the meaning of Gandhi's statement to the press[5] about a short and swift struggle.)

3. She was given no reason to hope that any modification of our attitude could be looked for or that the Congress claim could be entertained.

4. I doubt if above calls for any special comment save that it is likely that we shall have to contemplate Gandhi starving himself to death or the like, and organise our publicity to deal with that situation as far as possible in advance.

[5] See No. 275, note 2.

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Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL BARNES COURT, SIMLA, *18 July 1942*

D.-o. No. 403

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Many thanks for Your Excellency's letter of the 16th July.[1] I am very glad to hear what you have been good enough to tell me about the discussion that took place in Council, and I entirely agree about the value of counter-propaganda.

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I should not think that there will be any lack of articles in various sections of the Indian Press strongly condemning the attitude which the Congress has adopted. Jinnah has been sufficiently outspoken not long ago in the *Dawn* and elsewhere conveying his warning to the British Government of the consequences which they are to expect if they yield to Congress demands; it seems scarcely likely that the Muslim Press in general will adopt a different line. I see that the *Eastern Times* of Lahore, which describes itself as the "premier Indian Muslim journal and leading English organ in northern India", contained quite a helpful article in yesterday's issue about "Wardha's ultimatum"; it ended up with the remark that Mr. Gandhi's recent performance was "undoubtedly the greatest and most unashamed attempt at blackmailing in history". Sikh newspapers may be less downright than this, but they are likely to have a good deal to say on the subject. We will collect extracts from various newspapers and send to Delhi anything that is likely to be of assistance by way of propaganda in case it may not have come to notice.

I am getting into touch today with Sikander who has not yet returned from Lahore. As to Jogendra Singh, I am arranging to try and get into contact with him, but, as you are so well aware, he will have to be talked [to] with considerable caution. Master Tara Singh and his Akalis are notorious for their habit of "sailing in two boats" and, in spite of the Sikander–Baldev Singh pact,[2] they have by no means severed their connection with the Congress. I am doubtful whether either prominent Akalis or Jogendra Singh, who takes his cue from them, will be as outspoken as one would like. However, I will see what can be done.

Yours sincerely,

B. J. GLANCY

[1] No. 276.

[2] Since the 1937 elections, when the Unionist Party won a clear majority in the Punjab Legislature, its leader—Sir Sikander Hyat Khan—had held office as Prime Minister with a Cabinet consisting of 3 Muslims, 2 Hindus, and 1 Sikh. By the so-called Sikander–Baldev Singh Pact, announced on 15 June 1942, the Prime Minister promised certain concessions to the Sikh community in return for which Baldev Singh, who now entered the Ministry, undertook to support the Unionist Government in the interests of communal unity and the defence of the country.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *19 July 1942, 2.50 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 19 July, 5.30 pm*

No. 2130–S. I have been considering the expediency, if a break is forced upon us by Congress, of keeping Gandhi here (in the Aga Khan's house in Poona),

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an arrangement which we have always had in view, while imprisoning elsewhere in India those members of the Working Committee whose health would make long journeys difficult for them, and of deporting the balance of the Working Committee, as Gandhi and the others are arrested, to Uganda, the local authorities there being asked to ensure, so far as they could, that no communication remained open to the people so interned with their followers in India. I keep an entirely open mind over the whole of this business as regards both tactics and the handling of details, for one cannot tell what developments there may be between now and 7th August, and one must remain flexible. But several of my advisers are greatly attracted by the suggestion set out above and feel that a dramatic move of this nature might well produce a deep impression on followers of the Congress and create a degree of confidence which would be of value among other individuals who, from fear that there would be an early settlement with Congress, may be disposed to give us more lukewarm assistance than might otherwise be the case. Gandhi might fast to secure repatriation of his colleagues and I should hope to hear that His Majesty's Government would be ready to support me to the end in resisting such pressure. I should much value your reaction.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *19 July 1942, 2.50 pm*
Received: 19 July, 4.45 pm

No. 2131-S. Puckle has strongly urged on me the desirability for propaganda purposes of using the slogan "Great Britain has promised India the choice between Dominion Status and Independence as soon as the Axis is beaten. Win the Victory and take your choice": this line to be supplemented by a Parliamentary question asking whether it is the policy of His Majesty's Government that as soon as the Axis is defeated India should have the choice between Dominion Status and Independence, to which the answer would be in the affirmative.

2. I am bound to say that I am not very happy about this formula, which I have discussed with Reforms Commissioner. He comments that it implies that the choice between Dominion Status and Independence is vital and that therefore the practical difference between them is substantial. To suggest that there is a substantial difference is to weaken our own case and give a handle to

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the Congress. He suggests as an alternative either of the following two formulæ:—

(*a*) Great Britain has promised Independence to India after the war, Independence either within the British Commonwealth or outside it at India's own choice. Win the war and help to build the new India, or

(*b*) Great Britain has promised that India shall choose her own form of independent Government as soon as the enemy is beaten. Win the war and help to build the new India.

3. I agree that something[1] on these lines is a little less open than Puckle's formula. I should welcome your general view. But, while freely accepting the attractiveness of a concise and telling slogan, you and I must consider the future and we must avoid saying anything that will either go in any way beyond what has so far been promised by His Majesty's Government [or] embarrass our successors. The antithesis between "Dominion Status" and "Independence" seems to me too marked. Nor can we, as prudent men, overlook the fact that conditions may be such that, on the collapse of the Axis, circumstances here would make it impossible for us to give effect either to our desire to see India a dominion or to see her independent. I fear that in these circumstances there is a good deal to be said for sacrificing the propaganda value of these phrases in the interests of longer-term security, but I would welcome your view.

[1] Deciphered as '(?announcement)'.

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Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/596: f 11

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *19 July 1942, 7.25 am*
Received: 19 July, 12.30 pm

5640. Reference Congress Working Committee Resolution dated June 10th.[1] So far as it concerns alleged salt difficulties. There is no scarcity of salt in India nor is any salt famine apprehended. Stocks are plentiful though temporary shortages are anticipated in Bengal, Bihar and Assam, due to stoppage of seaborne supplies of fine white quality salt from Aden, Port Said and Western India ports. Present stocks in Calcutta will however last about a month and steps are being taken to meet anticipated deficit by tapping Karachi and Western India States sources where similar quality salt is manufactured and by increasing production at private and government sources. Shipping difficulty being solved

[1] No. 245; the date should be 10 July.

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by Commerce Department chartering ships through Ministry of War Transport to carry surpluses from Western India and if necessary from Aden where ample stocks available. Railway authorities have also arranged place additional 43 wagons per diem to transport salt from Karachi to Bihar. In other parts of the country temporary local shortages and rises in price have occurred due to shortage of wagons, but these are transitory and arrangements are being made to provide better transport of salt to these areas. Prices of salt in other parts of the country not unreasonably high having regard to rise in other commodity prices and in any case considering that annual average consumption per individual is only 1/6 maund incidence per capita is so small as not to affect to any great extent even the poorest villager. Manufacture of salt under Gandhi–Irwin pact[2] allowed in all saliferous areas, coastal as well as inland, but confined to domestic purposes including agricultural and fish-curing and sale within villages. Congress resolution, if put forward as remedy for shortage, has no justification in any part of India save Bengal, Bihar and Assam, and even in these Provinces there is no connection between shortage and duty. Similar proposal was put forward by Government of Bengal who were told informally that we would be prepared to consider any scheme for manufacture of salt by villagers which provided proper safeguards for revenue. No constructive proposal has yet been received from them. Controlled salt prices at Calcutta have ample margin for profit and there is no reason why villagers who take up salt manufacture for profit should be made a present of duty or should not compete on equal terms with other manufacturers who have invested their capital in business. In any case village manufacture no remedy now monsoon has broken and facilities available to villagers are so poor as to preclude them from manufacturing fine grade salt. We propose to issue communiqué on the subject.

[2] The Indian salt laws empowered the Government to raise revenue from the manufacture of salt and, for this purpose, to control its manufacture and fix prices. Gandhi made opposition to the salt laws one of the main issues of his campaign of civil disobedience of 1930. On 5 March 1931, the terms of a settlement to end the Civil Disobedience campaign, agreed between Gandhi and the Governor-General, Lord Irwin, were published. Clause 20 stated that the Government were unable to condone breaches of the salt laws or make substantial alterations in them, but for the sake 'of giving relief to certain of the poorer classes', they would extend their administrative provisions 'to permit local residents in villages, immediately adjoining areas where salt can be collected or made, to collect or make salt for domestic consumption or sale within such villages, but not for sale to, or trading with, individuals living outside them'.

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Tabular Statement by Mr Gibson[1]

L/P&J/8/596: ff 5–7

20 July 1942

	Military measures	*Compensation arrangements*	*Salt & food shortage*	*Behaviour of troops*
MADRAS	Some villages had to be evacuated owing to construction of aerodromes. No boats requisitioned. Fishing prohibited in certain areas in & near Madras City. Some difficulty caused by military occupying lands & destroying trees etc. without asking civil authorities to requisition them; but although demands for compensation were made in no case did the owner question the necessity for such occupation.	Adequate compensation is being paid on the spot; in lieu of cash, new sites & building materials are being given in some cases. Amount of compensation for acquired lands & buildings has never been disputed, though delay has in some cases been caused by difficulty of valuation. Fishermen were paid adequate compensation for removing boats etc., & arrangements made to provide them with alternative residential occupation.	No shortage of salt, nor of foodstuffs generally though there has been some fluctuation of prices.	Some complaints earlier of misbehaviour but none since April. Complaints were usually vague but were reported for mil[itar]y action where they admitted of investigation.

[1] This statement summarises telegrams from Provincial Governments replying to enquiries from the Home Department, Government of India, as to the local situation regarding the grievances detailed in the Congress Working Committee resolution of 10 July (No. 245). The Provincial Governments' telegrams were repeated to the India Office and are in L/P&J/8/596.

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	Military measures	*Compensation arrangements*	*Salt & food shortage*	*Behaviour of troops*
BENGAL	Evacuation of *lands & buildings*: main grievances: *a.* Short notice *b.* Demand for removal expenses in advance *c.* Demand for increased house-building expenses in advance *d.* Transport difficulties *e.* Resulting unemployment of local labourers.	Remedies: *a.* depends on mil[itar]y requirements but 8 days minimum notice will now be given normally. *b.* This has been met. *c.* Rates are being enhanced. *d.* Unavoidable, but sometimes relieved by mil[itar]y help. *e.* Summary compensation up to 2 months earnings given when justified.	Salt shortage was caused principally by temporary closing of Calcutta Port. No need for relaxation of salt law, but existence of restrictions on free import of coastal salt may be hard to defend politically. Some difficulty over shortage of kerosene and high prices of cloth (but price control transcends Provincial sphere).	Behaviour of British officers & other ranks universally reported on favourably. There have been major clashes in four cases resulting in death of four villagers, & there have been some minor clashes due to misunderstandings between troops from distant Provinces and population unused to soldiery; but incidents have been few and relations are ordinarily cordial.
	Requisitionings are made by civil authorities on mil[itar]y request.	Part compensation is now invariably paid before removal, though final adjustment may take time. Removal costs, loss of income, value of accommodation vacated, & any permanent damage to land are all taken into account. Compensation is paid in respect of boats & vehicles & includes limited compensation for loss of earnings. In the case of fishermen monthly compensation for earnings up to 3 months is paid & alternative employment offered where possible.		
	Boats: Denial policy applied to all boats in coastal belt, except those carrying under 10 persons, those req[uire]d for essential agricultural purposes or communications, those admitted under temporary permits (freely issued for short periods).			

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	Bicycles & other vehicles in coastal belt also removed with few exceptions.	Generally it is true that inconveniences are being caused as the consequence of military necessity, but what can be done is being done to mitigate them.		
UNITED PROVINCES	As yet no application of denial policy or compulsory acquisition of land. Three forms of requisitioning— (1) acquisition of land for aerodromes. (2) requisitioning of movable property e.g. lorries & carts. (3) limited requisitioning of houses. Permanent or temporary acquisition of land etc. is carried out by civil authorities.	Assessment of compensation carried out by civil authorities & follows principles established by law. All concerned aware of their rights & get them. Special magistrate at each aerodrome to assess & pay compensation. Immediate compensation is paid on land acquired for Provincial purposes & for aerodromes, which form the main item. Where villages are requisitioned and inhabitants desire it, compensation is to take the form of new houses.	Little or no complaint of salt shortage. Main grievance is food shortage, particularly wheat, partly from transport difficulties, partly because of local price levels being above the controlled price fixed by Govt. of India.	Little or no complaint.
BOMBAY	Limited requisitioning of motor vehicles. Requisitioning & acquisition of immovable property for defence purposes confined mostly to towns or neighbourhood. No grievances or serious complaints. Only important exception is requisitioning of	Collectors warned to handle cases sympathetically and expeditiously. They have been instructed to give advances pending payment of final compensation. Temporary shelters arranged for housing evacuated persons till new houses are	No salt shortage. Price fluctuations have caused some discontent. Transport and distribution difficulties have caused food shortages in urban centres. Bombay Transport Advisory Board has been endeavouring to secure preferential move-	Certain cases of drunkenness & misbehaviour reported in Feby. & March: prompt measures taken to prevent repetition. No serious incidents between troops and civilians. No serious crimes by troops (except one recent case).

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	Military measures	*Compensation arrangements*	*Salt & food shortage*	*Behaviour of troops*
BOMBAY (*cont.*)	agricultural land & houses in Satara district, involving evacuation of 6,000 people.	ready. Measures to grant doles to infirm & aged evacuees & employment to others are under consideration. Compensation arrangements regarded by nationalist press as on the whole sound and satisfactory.	ment of essentials to needy areas.	Good relations fostered by work done by British troops in recent serious house collapse.
ASSAM	Land for aerodromes acquired but no grievances reported. Requisitioning of tea factories, lorries, cattle in Manipur, educational & other buildings.	Delay experienced in securing acknowledgment & payment for 420 lorries secured for Burma road, but Govt. ordered provisional payment of 75%. Difficulty experienced by requisitioning of buildings by subordinate military authorities, but procedure is being corrected, & arrangements made for prompt assessment of rent in all cases.	No report.	No report.
ORISSA	Land has been acquired for aerodromes. Boats & vehicles have been taken over in pursuance of denial policy: military necessity for this has been fully explained & public co-operation has been most satisfactory.	Compensation for land acquired has been paid promptly & adequately, after being assessed by agreement. Compensation for boats & vehicles is assessed in accord[an]ce with principles approved by the Provincial	Shortage of salt has been experienced—due to transport difficulties chiefly. Question of extending arrangements for local manufacture under the Gandhi–Irwin salt pact has been taken up with G. of I.[2] Shortages felt in wheat,	No serious complaints regarding behaviour of troops. Relations with civil population very good. There has however been rather serious trouble caused by outside labour imported for work on an aerodrome.

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	No complaints received regarding immobilisation of motor transport.	Govt. and is paid on the spot. With the advent of the monsoon 50% of smaller boats and 10% of larger have been released.	sugar, rice & kerosene but Govt. has taken steps to relieve the situation.	
PUNJAB	No seizure of boats, vehicles etc. Some acquisition of land.	All care taken to give compensation on generous scale. Compensation generally in form of recurring payments by military authorities. Steps taken where necessary to provide land for temporary cultivation elsewhere. Financial arrangements exist to ensure prompt disbursement of compensation.	Ample supplies of salt. Any shortage due to lack of rolling stock. Question of rights of local manufacture does not arise. Other essentials: control being exercised in conformity with policy of Central Govt. Wheat: check permit system required later in year to control export from the Province.	Complaints hitherto made grossly exaggerated & have tended to subside.
SIND	(*a*) Some requisitioning of house property for military in Karachi & of land for aerodrome. (*b*) Certain areas have been evacuated in martial law area.	(*a*) not reported (*b*) funds have been placed at disposal of local authorities to relieve real distress in emergency areas.	Very large stocks of salt; no trouble expected. Difficulties over sugar shortage and high prices are being dealt with.	Little complaint of late about behaviour of troops in Karachi. In martial law area behaviour on the whole favourably commented on.
N.W.F.P.	No grievances reported.			
CENTRAL PROVINCES	Considerable acquisitions of land (areas reported cover about 13,500 acres).	Compensation duly paid by agreement with cultivators, and alternative sites for	No shortage of salt. Shortage of food grains & certain other essential commodities,	No report made on this.

[2] See No. 290, note 2.

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	Military measures	*Compensation arrangements*	*Salt & food shortage*	*Behaviour of troops*
CENTRAL PROVINCES (*cont.*)	Most of it has been acquired in accordance with procedure prescribed in the Land Acquisition Act. Some requisitioning of goods vehicles for which compensation paid at rates fixed by G. of I. which are considered generous.	villages & hamlets found where necessary. In case of aerodrome sites Deputy Commissioners have allotments for payment of compensation on the spot, & no complaints received.	but Govt. doing utmost to secure supplies.	
BIHAR	There has been acquisition of land, requisitioning of houses & of motor lorries, & some temporary evacuation of villages. In requisitioning of land, the instructions are to avoid habitations & cultivation as far as possible. Requisitioning has been carried out by the civil authorities except in a few cases where the military took possession before formal requisition.	Compensation for requisitioned land is being paid, pending final adjustment, on valuation of one year's produce. Compensation is paid at once if owners accept valuation, otherwise reference is made to arbitration. Fair rents are fixed for requisitioned houses & have been agreed to by owners. As a rule, in all cases of requisitioning or acquisition or temporary evacuation of villages, compens[atio]n has been paid on the spot. Help is given in finding new land for settlement.	Stocks of salt low, but position improving. Shortage of rice, kerosene & coal with high prices, due to holding up of stocks, shortage of imports, & lack of rolling stock (wagons) & trucks. Export of rice now banned.	Behaviour of troops now generally satisfactory & relations with public improving. A joint investigation procedure has been prescribed.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *20 July 1942, 1.25 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 20 July, 12.50 pm*

No. 2136–S. My personal telegram of 17th July, No. 2111–S,[1] and paragraphs 1 and 3 of your personal telegram of 16th July, No. 12635.[2]

2. I have discussed with my Advisers. We agree that your paragraphs 1 and 3 refer to two points which must be taken into consideration in laying down our general policy and plan of action in the face of Congress threat: and the comprehensive arrangements which we are working out here will cover these points as well as others.

3. For the moment I would only say, as regards paragraph 1, that the view of my Advisers is that the resolution of July 10th[3] could be regarded as a prejudicial report,[4] and therefore open to action under the Defence of India Rules. It might also afford sufficient legal ground for declaring Congress an unlawful association.[5] But my Advisers, with whom I agree, are of opinion that it would be inexpedient to take action as such, either on the basis of that resolution alone or on the basis of the main resolution of 14th July, until after the meeting of the A.-I.C.C. in Bombay. When it eventually comes to the point of taking action, I agree that we should make use of both resolutions. It is incidentally true that Gandhi is not a Member of the Working Committee, nor even a four-anna Member of Congress. The legal difficulty may be overcome if, as we expect, the A.-I.C.C. meeting puts him in charge of Congress policy: and, if even then he were still to remain a non-Member in the eyes of the law, he could certainly be proceeded against for assisting the operations of Congress once it has been declared an unlawful association. But, while I think it well to make our view on these points clear, the argument is somewhat academic since, if action is to be taken against Gandhi, it is most likely that it will take the form of arrest under the State Prisoner's Regulations.[6]

[1] No. 278. [2] No. 270. [3] No. 245.

[4] Rule 38 (1) (*c*) stated that 'No person shall, without lawful authority or excuse, make, print, publish or distribute any document containing, or spread by any other means whatsoever, any prejudicial report'. Rule 34 (7) defined a 'prejudicial report' as 'any report, statement or visible representation, whether true or false, which, or the publishing of which, is, or is an incitement to the commission of, a prejudicial act as defined in this rule'. For the definition of a 'prejudicial act' see No. 270, note 6.

[5] Under the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act 1908, Sec. 16.

[6] These included Bengal Regulation III of 1818; see No. 321, note 3.

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4. Paragraph 3 of your No. 12635. It might be legal to promulgate the Emergency Powers Ordinance now. But I am quite certain that it would be unwise to do so. It would have no deterrent effect but rather the opposite, and would only give Congress advance warning of our plans.

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Sir A. Clow (Assam) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

GOVT. HOUSE, SHILLONG, *20 July 1942*

No. 36

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

In reply to Your Excellency's telegram No. 2117-S[1] on the subject of the Congress Resolution, I write to say that I have received a series of talking points from the Department of Information. It will be difficult to find effective speakers in the Province, where meetings of any size are infrequent. But I hope, as suggested in the Home Department's Circular Telegram No. 5528[2] of 16th July, to utilise our National War Front organization as far as possible.

2. There has been no noticeable reaction to the Congress Resolution as yet. Even the press correspondents here, who have for the most part Congress sympathies, appear to be waiting for a line on it from Calcutta. The public in Assam are at all times parochial and they are almost entirely absorbed at present by our local troubles. Even the possible advent of a Ministry arouses very little interest.

3. If I may venture to offer a comment on the Home Department's Circular Telegram No. 5528[3] of 16th July, I recognise the force of the arguments used in paragraph 2, especially at the present stage. At the same time I feel that, if a fight with Congress actually comes, the denial of publicity to their efforts at that stage (or a little earlier) is one of the strongest weapons in our armoury. My own view for what it is worth is that, when the conflict is joined, the advantages of "blanketing" the whole movement would greatly outweigh the disadvantages involved in press antagonism. Such a course might also render it unnecessary to proceed in other directions to lengths which would arouse equal or greater antagonism.

Yours sincerely,

A. G. CLOW

[1] No. 284. [2] Not printed. [3] This telegram has not been traced.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir B. Glancy (Punjab)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *20 July 1942*

My dear Glancy,

Many thanks for your private and personal letter No. 402[1] of 17th July. I am grateful to you for keeping me in touch with the movement of Sikander's mind. For your personal information, I entirely agree with your criticisms of this latest idea of his, and I feel pretty clear, too, that His Majesty's Government will be most unlikely to consider any further move during the war, unless there is some marked change in circumstances, having regard to the fate of the Cripps Declaration.

2. I agree also, again for your own information, with your comments on Sikander's fears that Gandhi may make a united front with Jinnah. Indeed, I am left a little with the feeling that in all this political business, Sikander feels that he is a shade out in the cold, and is anxious to keep himself a little near to the spot light. I have written to you separately[2] about his ideas for solving the communal problem.

3. I note what you say as regards the Muslim proportion in the Executive Council.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 281. [2] No. 280.

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Mr Churchill to Mr Amery

L/P&J/8/596: f 35

10 DOWNING STREET, *21 July 1942*

Reference: Tel. 19234[1] from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India dated 19.7.42.

Secretary of State for India.

Let me see draft[2] please before it is sent. The recent Cabinet decision[3] which you obtained should now be of assistance to you.

W. S. C.

[1] Mr Churchill was referring to telegram 2130-S (No. 288) by the number which appeared at the top right-hand corner of the decipher.

[2] Mr Turnbull sent the draft of No. 321 to Mr Churchill's Private Secretary on 23 July explaining that it had been found best to reply to Nos. 278, 288, and 292 together, and was notified of Mr Churchill's approval on 24 July. L/P&J/8/597: ff 201, 214.

[3] See No. 257, Minute 8.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *21 July 1942, 12.50 pm*
Received: 21 July, 8 pm

No. 2143-S. Following telegram No. 35, dated the 19th July 1942, from the Governor of Bihar is repeated for information:—

Begins. Your telegram No. 2117-S.[1] I respectfully agree with Your Excellency's view that we should endeavour to stimulate public criticism of Congress Resolution. Roy's lieutenants are already at work in this direction and we are approaching Sahajanand of Kisan Sabha with a view to his taking similar action. We have also asked Provincial Leader of the War Front to consider how best to counter a movement which is obviously subversive of everything for which the War Front stands. Chandreshvar and his fellow Zamindars are however unlikely to come into the open before they are given definite lead by Government and though I have given him to understand that we shall unhesitatingly take up the challenge of Congress he will probably wait for an authoritative public pronouncement before committing himself too far to war with Congress. I am meeting District Leaders of the War Front on 1st August at Muzzaffarpur and this might be suitable occasion to give War Front a lead. I should be very grateful for Your Excellency's advice and suggestions as to approach to this problem which has its difficulties in view of our previous insistence that War Front was essentially non-political.[2]

2. I do not think that the Muslim League or the Mahasabha are likely to help us before we ourselves have made our position clear *vis-à-vis* Congress. The Provincial branches will not in any case make a move without directions from their High Commands.

3. Public attitude towards the Resolution is one of little enthusiasm. Congress elements are awaiting the return of Rajendra from Wardha to learn more of its implications. Congress paper *Searchlight* published a very subdued leader on the lines: whatever the verdict of history on correctness or otherwise of the Resolution it marks a definite stage in the fight for freedom. The *Indian National*[3] after professing to be "relieved" on reading advance summary of Resolution has thereafter kept complete silence.

4. I shall keep Your Excellency informed of any further important developments. *Ends.*

[1] No. 284.

[2] Lord Linlithgow replied in telegram 2173-S of 23 July that the National War Front's approach was not political so long as it did not 'enter into merits of independence, British withdrawal, &c.' Its

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aim was to counter 'anything calculated to sabotage the war resistance, such as a mass movement'. MSS. EUR. F. 125/110.

[3] '*Indian National*' deciphered as 'Indian nation'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir G. S. Bajpai[1]

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/13

IMMEDIATE *21 July 1942*

No. 2144-S. Following from Viceroy for Agent-General for India:—

Begins. I have read with interest and close attention your telegram No. 172[2] of 16th July. I note that conversations summarized were strictly private, but general issues are of course of great importance.

2. To those who may be tempted to regard the establishment of Congress Hindu raj as a lesser risk than infuriating the Muslims, the answer is that it is not only a question of irritating 90 millions of Muslims. Communal outbreak of a serious[3] kind would certainly damage very dangerously the Indian Army, and if protracted might well lead to the disintegration of a large and important part of our forces in Egypt and the Middle East, as well as in India. No one doubts that a climb-down to Congress at this stage would immediately give rise to a country-wide communal struggle, in which the Sikhs would be involved equally with the Hindus and Muhammadans. You should also miss no opportunity of stressing the critical value of India's direct and massive military contribution to the allied cause, for there is danger that this may be minimized by so much talk about the absence of popular support for the war effort.

3. The general impression given by conversations you report is favourable to recognition of the Congress Party as a practical force in Indian politics. This impression of the American attitude is rather belied by reports that have reached me of responsible American pronouncements, and by the signs of disillusionment with Congress evident in certain American circles here, not[4] excluding some correspondents.

4. I hope the above makes the position clear. But I think it very important that you should have the picture, as I see it, clear before you for your guidance in handling your difficult and responsible task. *Ends.*

[1] Lord Linlithgow repeated this telegram to Mr Amery in telegram 2250-S of 31 July. L/P&J/8/510: f 352.

[2] No. 279. [3] L/P&J/8/510 has 'continuous'. [4] L/P&J/8/510 has '(? necessarily)'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *21 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2146–S. My private and personal telegram No. 2130–S[1] of 19th July. I await your reactions with interest. Meanwhile, I have told my people to get on with working out detailed plans for deportation of up to 15 people by air, preferably using the Arabian route, *via* Muscat, Aden, Khartoum, to Uganda so that, if we decide in favour of this course, there need be no delay and all details may be covered in advance. I should be most grateful if provisional arrangements could be made with Governor of Uganda for their reception, if it comes to that point. I should of course like to feel that they were accommodated in circumstances of proper comfort, &c., but that they were completely cut off from communication with India.

[1] No. 288.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *21 July 1942, 6 pm*

Received: 21 July, 5.45 pm

No. 2150–S. Following telegram No. 51–T, dated the 20th July 1942, from the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, is repeated for information:—

Begins. Your Excellency's telegram No. 2117–S[1] of July 18th. Congress resolution has so far created little interest in this Province. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, however, returns from Wardha today and will no doubt try to stimulate interest. In the meantime am doing all I can to encourage opinion in opposite direction. Aurangzeb Khan, leader of Muslim League, has made a speech condemning Congress. *Ends.*

[1] No. 284.

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Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMPORTANT *21 July 1942*

No. G.–229. Your telegram No. 2117–S,[1] dated 18th July. I agree on the importance of counter-propaganda and am doing what I can to stimulate it. Propaganda points would be useful especially for District Magistrates. In particular Intelligence Bureau pamphlet *Congress and War*, even if parts had to be omitted, would give excellent background for propaganda.

[1] No. 284.

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Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

SECRET *21 July 1942*

No. U.P.–148

8. I was at one time inclined to think that we should go for Congress at once, but the arguments the Home Department put forward in a recent telegram[1] showed conclusively that the balance of advantage lay in waiting. British Press opinion is favourable to our position, so too is U.S.A. opinion. But there is some risk, as Your Excellency represented in a recent telegram,[2] that the anti-Congress point of view will go by default. Provided our news agencies are sensible—it often appals me the amount of power which they wield—I think it will be possible to show that Congress do not represent the country, partly by giving full publicity to anti-Congress statements, such as the excellent one by Firoz Khan Noon, partly by showing that in spite of Congress, war work is going on well. I will do all I can to get the anti-Congress people in the United Provinces to be vocal but even if I succeed, their names may be unknown and any speeches or statements which they make will not carry very much weight at home or in the U.S.A. but may do something. One difficulty in this Province, apart from the power of Congress, is the sympathy of the Liberals with Congress; they may not approve of their methods but they are in favour of their objects. Sapru, whose attitude is, to put it mildly, regrettable, attacks Amery and the India Office; others of course attack Your Excellency's recent

[1] Cf. No. 272. [2] No. 284.

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appointments to the Executive Council. They are as usual purely destructive. Unfortunately there probably are many people at home who consider that the view of the Liberals merits careful consideration and that some more negotiations are needed. When I was on my recent tour, and indeed for some time past, I have been impressed by the fear of the Muslims, that His Majesty's Government will again enter into negotiations with Congress; it has also even been suggested to me that Hindu Government officers are half-hearted in opposing Congress. That is a half truth but Hindu officers are like the Liberals, anxious not to offend the party which they feel will ultimately be in power. I am glad to see that Sir Maharaj Singh issued a useful statement lately. I hope Sir J. P.[3] will do the same. I understand that he is getting Sir Digby Drake Brockman to be Managing Director of the *Pioneer*.

9. But still under present conditions, most Indians have a respect for the ruling power, provided it does rule and rule effectively. Hence if we can go for the Congress, at zero hour whenever it may be, I do not anticipate much support for the movement whatever form it may take. I do not think that during the period up till the meeting of the A.-I.C.C. the situation will deteriorate. There is of course a risk, which personally I consider slight, that Congress will increase its influence, but on the other hand their statements may become more and more stupid and that will help us in reconciling British opinion to "repressive action".

10. I am afraid this letter is as usual rather "thinking aloud". I do feel strongly that we must get Congress out of the way and I think we can do so. I admit that action against Nehru and Azad is not easy, in view of the anti-Axis statements, but we must go for Gandhi, whatever may happen, and for the Congress organisation and for the Congress Press.

[3] Sir J. P. Srivastava.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *22 July 1942*

No. 2154–S. I am not quite sure how you stand personally in relation to Coupland's big book[1] now I imagine nearing completion. I have not of course myself seen the proofs, and while we have been able to help him on the factual side I have no idea of the conclusions he may have reached in his assessment of and suggestions for policy.

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2. I myself have great regard for Coupland and his ability and experience. He has a considerable Indian background (though his last visit was a very compressed one), and his integrity is beyond any question.

3. The point has now been put to me here (based I think on conversations which he had with individuals during his recent visit) that his conclusions may be dominated by the facts (*a*) that he has a real desire to see India fully independent since he fears that we may get into awkward entanglements if the British connection persists, and fears also the effects of these upon our relations with the United States of America; (*b*) that while he recognises clearly that we cannot simply "vacate" India at short notice, he would be satisfied if an autonomous government could be brought into being to which we could transfer power regardless of whether that government would have much chance of survival in the long run. In other words, that while anxious to provide for an orderly and honourable winding up of our affairs in this country so that when we leave all is in good working order, he would regard it as no disaster to ourselves if within ten years thereafter all had fallen into chaos; (*c*) that he did not fully understand or take much interest in the defence problem, and was too much disposed to think that it would solve itself and that a complete and overwhelming Anglo-American victory, as a result of which all the rest of the world would be disarmed, would dispose of any serious menace to India, all the defence which was needed for her admitting of being adequately provided by an allied air-base somewhere in the North-West Frontier.

4. Suggestion is made that while Coupland undoubtedly modified some of his original conceptions while here, an outlook such as that described comes very close to that of moderate liberal Americans such as McLeish and Frankfurter who may have much influence on the President during the peace settlement, and that if his book were to follow these lines, it might be quoted with damaging effect against us.

5. I give you what has been put to me as I have received it. I have not the means myself to assess the extent to which it is likely in fact to be a true picture of Coupland, though there are elements in it which correspond to remarks which he made to me in our private conversations. I should expect myself that he would be most reluctant, and would probably refuse, to allow us to censor or control the content of his book, and that he would be very sensitive about any official interference. Moreover the book is in no sense a governmental production, but is being financed by the Nuffield Trust. But given your own close personal relations with him, you might find it possible (without suggesting that we feel any qualms) to get a look at his manuscript so far as the policy section is concerned, and possibly even to get us an opportunity out here of looking

[1] Professor R. Coupland, *A Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*. Three Parts (London, Oxford University Press, 1942–3).

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at it. Alternatively it might be possible, if you think there is anything in the suggestions which I have reported above, to do something indirectly through Hailey with whom his relations are very close.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

Telegram, L/P&J/8/609: f 409[1]

IMMEDIATE *22 July 1942, 12.15 pm*

2157-S. I should be grateful if you could let me have before the end of the month an appreciation of the state and morale of your police force with particular regard to possible action against Congress.

[1] Copies of this telegram and of the Governors' replies were enclosed in the weekly letters of 29 July and 5 August from the Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *22 July 1942, 4.55 pm*
Received: 22 July, 6.15 pm

No. 2160-S. Following telegram from Governor of the Central Provinces, No. 360-M.S, dated the 20th July, is repeated for information:—

Begins. Your Excellency's private and personal telegram No. 2117-S,[1] dated 18th July. Have just returned from tour and at Puldana in Berar I openly characterised the Congress resolution as "an invitation to sabotage the Allied cause at its most critical time". There was no indication of dissent and the Maharashtra generally is said seriously to doubt Gandhi's sincerity and is said to think that he is playing a game of dilatory tactics and has no intention of launching a movement. Kanitar, my National War Front organiser for Berar, expressed the view that the resolution is a Congress way of inviting the British Government to reopen negotiations. This rather confirms the view expressed in my last fortnightly that the resolution is, to quote M. N. Roy, another bargaining counter. Muhammadans I have met on tour are eager for preventive measures against forthcoming meeting of A.-I.C.C. Personally I do not expect that anything serious will arise from threatened movement which may very

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well develop on familiar lines into a newspaper campaign and some prejudicial acts of symbolic character. I feel convinced that a sensational mass movement is not feasible especially in view of Muhammadan hostility. The situation changes so rapidly however that I would like to reserve final opinion in the light of fresh information. The local newspaper *Hitavada*, organ of Servants of India Society,[2] has a leader [by] Kodand Rao, known to me personally, which puts situation in a nutshell. It is to effect that real issue has nothing to do with independence or war but is whether His Majesty's Government are going to support Hindu case or Muhammadan case. I doubt whether our American friends realise this. We should certainly welcome propaganda points and I have taken note of Your Excellency's advice about urging anti-Congress elements to have the courage to set forth their convictions. *Ends.*

[1] No. 284.

[2] A non-communal, non-sectarian society, recognising no caste distinctions, founded in 1905 by G. K. Gokhale as a body of men pledged to the service of their country on such allowances as the Society might be able to give. The Society's object was to promote the interests of the Indian people by all constitutional means. In addition to political work, the Society undertook social, economic, educational, labour and depressed class activities. In 1942, the Society had 26 ordinary members and its President was Pandit H. N. Kunzru.

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Note by Mr Amery[1]

L/P&J/8/597: f 159

NOTE ON CONVERSATION WITH MR MAISKY, 22.7.42[2]

I had a talk of nearly an hour with Mr. Maisky this morning. I began by saying that I knew he was anxious as to the possible reactions of the present political situation in India upon India's power to play her part in the war. I explained that the Congress demand for an immediate British abdication would indeed paralyse India's whole war effort and put her at the mercy of Japan, involving not only the permanent cutting off of China but the linking up of Japan with the Axis Powers in the West through the Middle East. There was however not the remotest question of His Majesty's Government considering anything of the sort. Nor indeed was the Congress demand put forward seriously with

[1] On 7 August, the Foreign Office telegraphed a summary of this note and the note of Mr Amery's subsequent conversation with the Chinese Ambassador to H.M. Ambassadors at Moscow (Tel. 124), Washington (Tel. 4731), and Chungking (Tel. 1055). R/30/1/2: f 65.

[2] Mr Amery enclosed a copy of this note in a letter to Mr Eden dated 22 July in which he referred to 'my talk with Maisky today'. However, in a further letter also dated 22 July (see No. 306, note 2) Mr Amery referred to 'my talk with Maisky yesterday'. L/P&J/8/597: ff 158, 161.

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the slightest idea of its being accepted. It was all, just like their professions of wishing to help the Allied cause, eye-wash, and had nothing to do with the real object of their move. This was to cover up the discredit which had progressively attached itself to Congress leadership ever since the war and more particularly since the rejection of the Cripps proposals, by getting up a mass movement which was bound to lead to incidents between Congress followers and the police, and so create an emotional situation in which Congress would be advertised and many of its critics in India brought back into the fold under the influence of misrepresentation of police action, sympathy for "martyrs" in prison etc., possibly for Gandhi himself. Whether this attempt to make trouble would really secure enough support to warrant its being treated very seriously by the Government was still uncertain. A similar attempt in 1940 had been a complete fiasco. If, however, it looked like becoming really serious the Government would not hesitate at once to take firm measures and put the leaders in prison. Even at its worst there was no fear of the movement being more than could be effectively handled by the police with just conceivably intervention of security troops in the event of communal riots.

Mr. Maisky was very anxious to know whether the Army would be at all affected. I told him that the Army were entirely indifferent to Congress and either hostile to it or contemptuous of its pretensions. He asked about railway and harbour workers etc. I said that on the whole the more active elements in Trade Unionism, especially railway workers and seamen's unions, were entirely at variance with Congress in their attitude over the war. Indeed so much were the advanced and leftward elements in the right frame of mind about supporting the war that the Government of India was in the next few days going to announce the lifting of the ban on the Communist Party. All this seemed to give Mr. Maisky considerable satisfaction.

Apropos of the extent to which Congress had been alienating and was alienating its friends here as well as in India, I referred to the strong condemnation in this morning's *Daily Herald*, and so to Krishna Menon, remarking that I knew the Ambassador saw him occasionally and adding that he had a way of magnifying his importance with Congress in India by dwelling on his ambassadorial and other contacts. Maisky took the warning in very good part and I gather did not really attach any importance to Menon.[3]

[3] In his covering letter to Mr Eden, Mr Amery remarked that 'My reference to Menon came in purely incidentally but I think the warning was sufficient'. L/P&J/8/597: f 158.

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Note by Mr Amery[1]

L/P&J/8/597: f 162

NOTE OF INTERVIEW WITH THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR ON THE 22ND JULY 1942[2]

I told the Ambassador that at the Foreign Secretary's suggestion I was anxious to reassure him as to the possible effects of the Congress Civil Disobedience Campaign on India's military effort and on her co-operation in Burma to reopen the route to China. I explained that Gandhi's action was entirely influenced by internal considerations of Congress politics and was meant to create an emotional situation in order to cover up the blunders of Congress and to rally sentimentally those who were now criticising it in India and elsewhere. Whether this campaign could be treated with a shrug of the shoulders, like the last, or would involve the prompt imprisonment at some early stage of the Congress leaders, in neither case would it be more than a police matter. There was no question of the loyalty of the troops or of the co-operation of munition workers, railway transport workers, etc. being affected. On the contrary, the industrial Left were more and more coming out in direct condemnation of Congress. The Congress policy, if we really acceded to their demand now, or had acceded at the time of the Cripps Mission, would have meant chaos in India and gravely imperilled the whole military situation. The fact is that Congress is entirely indifferent to anything but its own domestic position in India. Nehru's affection for China and dislike for Japan went far enough to affect the wording of the Congress Resolution, but made no real difference to his action. He would in the last resort follow Gandhi regardless of whether the war effort were in fact embarrassed or not.

Incidentally, I was also able to warn the Ambassador about Krishna Menon and to correct the statements that had been made about lack of courtesy in receiving Chiang Kai-shek. He was glad to have the facts and told me that he had been distinctly embarrassed by the speeches made at the Chinese meeting,[3] not only Jordan's on this matter, but also Shinwell's. He did tell me, however, that the Chiang Kai-sheks were apparently surprised that at Delhi dinner parties the Viceroy and Vicereine went in first! I explained that in all these matters the Viceroy's position was exactly the same as that of The King here and that he would go in before any member of the Royal Family.

[1] See No. 305, note 1.

[2] Mr Amery enclosed a copy of this note in a letter to Mr Eden dated 22 July. L/P&J/8/597: f 161.

[3] Probably the 'Salute to China' meeting organised by the China Campaign Committee and held on 7 July at the Kingsway Hall.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *22 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of 26th June.[1] I have, as you may imagine, been under very great pressure during these last few days owing to the situation *vis-à-vis* of Congress, and I fear that my letter today will be rather hastily put together and may not cover very much ground.

2. Let me in the first place thank you (and the India Office) most warmly for all the help you have given us over propaganda and publicity. I am sure that it has been of first-class value here, and one can clearly see how acute a disappointment it has been to the Congress to find not only that it has a hostile American Press but that even its normal supporters such as the *New Statesman*, the *Daily Herald*, &c. at home are critical of the attitude it is proposing to adopt. Equally there is very little sign of real zeal in what I may call the Hindu nationalist Press here, and certain papers which one would have expected to have taken a somewhat different line have in fact actually come out in a critical sense. I have in mind in particular the *Bombay Chronicle*. That is all to the good. This solidarity of critical opinion may conceivably make Mahatma think again, though I do not myself see how he is to escape from the net. Even if it does not, it is of real value as increasing the doubts and shaking the confidence of his supporters, so many of whom I believe to be thoroughly reluctant supporters, even though they may not dare to make their reluctance public.

3. I have telegraphed to say that Mira Ben had asked for an interview with me but that I had declined to see her, and had turned her on to my Private Secretary. You have had by telegram[2] the gist of what emerged from their talk; but I send you the full text by this bag. Her visit was followed by a letter from Birla, chiefly directed to the question of personal contact, as a result of which he had a long talk with my Private Secretary yesterday. Copy of that record[3] also goes by this bag. There is nothing much in the Birla conversation. Mira Ben's remarks equally do not carry us very much forward, save for the clear indication which they seem to me to contain that the Mahatma may contemplate pushing matters to an extreme in which he himself may be the victim. I should not be a bit surprised if what he was aiming at in all this was some sort of declaration by the United Nations, or a commitment by the United States as regards the post-war position, to be extorted by the pressure of a public opinion disturbed by the thought of his coming to a premature end.

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The objections to any such arrangement from our point of view go without saying, and I hope very much that the hopelessly impractical character of the Congress proposals, and the lack of support for them, will help us in steering through the difficult situation which we may undoubtedly have to face if the A.-I.C.C. reaffirm (as I imagine they will) the Working Committee's resolution and force our hands.

4. My Council are I think pretty solid. We had a further long discussion this morning largely on the question of publicity and propaganda as affecting this situation, for we thought (and I am sure wisely), that a detailed consideration of what we shall do if and when the A.-I.C.C. reaffirm had better stand by for the present. We have a fortnight to go. In any event the less detailed discussion there is even in Council at this stage the less are the chances of information of our intentions getting out. I have no doubt that the High Command are exceedingly anxious to know what our intentions are. To revert to the question of propaganda and publicity, I need not trouble you with minor details of the arrangements we have in view for getting our point of view across still more effectively here. But there was a very general indication of a desire for some reaffirmation, preferably in general terms, by His Majesty's Government of their attitude towards Indian policy, such reaffirmation to be designed to reassure those elements in this country which apprehend that with the collapse of the Cripps Mission the policy of His Majesty's Government becomes retrograde. Mody in fact went so far as to produce a draft[4] of what he would like the Prime Minister to say. Council as a whole recognised that there were dangers in a precise reaffirmation of the Cripps formulæ as the ideal, given the fact that it had had a very indifferent Press in certain quarters in this country, and in particular that there was the risk of upsetting the Sikhs on the one hand, and the Muslims on the other. It may not be too easy to find any general form of words which could be commended to you for a reply to an arranged question, but I will do my best, and will hope to telegraph to you in the next day or two. Council (Raisman and Maxwell were both away, and Benthall was the only European present except the Chief and myself) were very anxious that if anything was going to be said by His Majesty's Government it should carry the personal authority of the Prime Minister—in other words that he should answer any question. I did not encourage them to think that that was very likely, but I will of course put the point in telegraphing to you.

5. I think we are getting on pretty well with our preparations both in the Centre and in the Provinces, and I have every reason to hope that if our hands are forced and we are driven to go all out against Congress, we shall be able to make a pretty good show.

* * *

[1] Not printed. [2] No. 286. [3] L/P&J/8/597: ff 23–8. [4] See No. 317.

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7. To revert to the political situation, Firoz Khan Noon has issued an excellent statement to the Press about the Congress position. Nalini Sarker who, poor man, is under a good deal of pressure from his old friends and has shown very well, is anxious to issue a statement also, though it will approach the matter from a rather different angle from that adopted by Firoz, and will be in the nature of a reasoned appeal to Congress from one who has had very close associations with Congress for many years past. C.P.Ramaswami Aiyar has characteristically made a short but effective statement from Travancore in which while professing the utmost admiration for that very great man Mr. Gandhi whom "he has admired and loved for many years", he confesses himself as completely baffled by the Mahatma's latest utterances, and was at a loss to know what they can possibly mean. I urged my other colleagues in Council today to take every opportunity that offered of making their view (which is of course the view of Council) clear, and told them that the Information and Broadcasting Department would be only too glad to co-operate in any way they could. One or two of them are not too anxious I suspect to bell the cat. I would include in that category Mody. But I dare say we shall get something done.

* * *

13. It is some relief to have the Libyan situation at any rate stabilised, even if we are not pushing them back very far, though they remain too close to Alexandria for our peace of mind. The Russian situation has given one a good deal of cause for anxiety in these last few days, but the latest news seems rather more cheerful, and from the intelligence telegrams I gather that the Russians themselves are pretty confident. Let us hope that all will go well.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

NEW DELHI, *22 July 1942, 11.55 pm*
Received: 23 July, 3.30 am

No. 2163-S. Following is Governor of Bombay's telegram No. 538, dated 21st July:—

Begins. Your telegram No. 2120-S[1] of 18th July. There is no marked crystallisation of opinion yet, and a good deal of bewilderment prevails. Those on whose support we could count are taking a stronger line than usual. More statements will I hope follow. Provincial leader of National War Front is about

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to issue a statement which, though lengthy, is good. National War Front is assisting Communists and Royists[2] to produce leaflets. No sign yet from Muslim League, but Jinnah is away in Bhopal, and no doubt nothing will be said until his return.

2. Supporters of Congress are said to have no enthusiasm for a movement, but few are expected to go against the party line. If the movement were allowed to gather momentum, the anti-British feeling which exists in Nationalist circles would probably, according to one competent observer, provide it with appreciable support. Some Congress supporters look for intervention from America and other United Nations countries, and believe that to be the object of the resolution, but the more widely held belief is that Gandhi means business.

3. A close contact of Patel's says that no definite plan of action for civil disobedience has yet been prepared.

4. National War Front leader has suggested to me that it would help to rally support if an authoritative pronouncement could make it clear that, though the Cripps declaration has been withdrawn, the principle that Indians will be free to draw up their own constitution remains. This seems worth considering, though the danger of alarming Muslims and others is apparent.

5. One important feature to be reckoned with is the rise in cost of living. Although its ramifications are not simple and will not necessarily all play into Congress hands, Congress will no doubt try and exploit it, particularly in its approach to labour. *Ends.*

[1] No. 285. [2] Deciphered as 'royalists'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

NEW DELHI, *22 July 1942, 11.55 pm*[1]
Received: 23 July, 4 am

No. 2164–S. Following is Governor of Bengal's telegram No. 4–T, dated 21st July:—

Begins. Your telegram No. 2120–S[2] of July 18th. General tendency of Nationalist press has been to emphasize reasonable nature of Congress Working

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 gives the date as 23 July. The dates and times of despatch and receipt given here are taken from L/P&J/8/597: f 203.
[2] No. 285.

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Committee's resolution. It is described as friendly gesture which is designed in no way to embarrass the war effort of Britain or the United Nations. Foreign press reactions, particularly in Britain and America, are criticised as blinded by ignorance and devoid of any attempt to understand Congress position. Responsibility is thrown on the British Government for consequences of refusing to accept Congress offer of co-operation. *Star of India* regards the resolution as attempt to evade problem of Indian unity, and criticises it as disregarding interests of Muslim and other minorities.

2. On the other hand Nationalist press has at present avoided any expression of attitude towards open civil disobedience movement or its possible consequences. Nor are there indications yet of public support in such a movement.

3. I have discussed the position with Huq and other leading Ministers. Huq's attitude is not entirely satisfactory. Although he and other Ministers are inclined not to regard consequences of open movement as likely to be serious in Bengal, he feels diffident about making counter-propaganda since he is unable at present to join forces with Jinnah in opposing Gandhi. That would not preclude declaration by him as Chief Minister and I hope to be able to persuade him. Speeches or statements from influential Hindus would also be helpful, but before attempting to arrange any public statements I should like to discuss policy towards the movement in Cabinet.[3] *Ends.*

[3] In the final sentence, the words 'policy towards' and 'in Cabinet' were received corrupt.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *23 July 1942, 5.35 pm*
Received: 23 July, 5.30 pm

No. 2169–S. Following from Lumley, dated July 22nd:—

Begins. Ambedkar made a strong speech last night declaring civil disobedience at this time "treachery to India" and "playing the enemy's game" and urging all Indians as a patriotic duty "to resist with all the power and resources at their command any attempt on the part of Congress to launch civil disobedience".

2. He also announced that before he left for Delhi he would issue a statement explaining the line of policy which the Independent Labour Party and other allied organizations *must* follow. He asked his audience (of his followers) to study that statement and implicitly carry out its instructions. *Ends.*

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I am asking Puckle to make special arrangements to have this statement when it appears telegraphed to U.K. and U.S.A. and feel sure that you will be able to turn it to good use.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: ff 358–9

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *23 July 1942, 6.45 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 24 July*

13060. Your 2131-S.[1] I agree entirely with you in deprecating any suggestion that Dominion Status and independence are two substantially different things especially if the implication is that independence is something that goes beyond Dominion Status. The offer of the latter is in fact one of independence plus the privilege of remaining in the Commonwealth if India so desires. But I don't like emphasising the point which in any case is self-evident to serious constitutionalists that the offer included the practical power to leave the Commonwealth. This feature of Cripps' proposals which of course is wholly distasteful to the Princes loses much of its attractiveness even for Congress by reason of requirement of some measure of prior agreement with other elements implicit in offer of Union and in proviso for Treaty and by reason of alternative offer of option for partition. From that point of view I would prefer something on the lines of Hodson's (*b*) if (repeat if) any such slogan is to be used at all. As to that I should be guided by your judgment as to whether the immediate propaganda value really amounts to much. If future developments should compel our going back upon or seriously postponing policy of Cripps' declaration, speeches, articles and slogans explanatory of that declaration will have been equally superseded by the force of circumstances, so I would not let that possibility unduly cramp your propaganda style.

At the same time it is evidently desirable to avoid so far as possible any definitely committing implication and I suggest for consideration something such as "Indians! join the world's fight for freedom! The freedom Britain has promised you depends on victory." It might be advisable to vary such general theme to suit different recipients and changing circumstances.

[1] No. 289.

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Mr Amery to Viscount Cranborne

L/P&J/8/599: f 104

INDIA OFFICE, *23 July 1942*

My dear Bobbety,

You will be aware of our present anxieties in India caused by the threat of the Congress Working Committee's Resolution of 14th July to launch a mass civil disobedience movement if the British Government declines to withdraw from India at the request of Congress. This Resolution requires to be approved by the All-India Congress Committee, which is due to meet on the 7th August, and presumably within a short period thereafter we may expect a mass movement to be started which of course will be a direct challenge to the authority of Government and will have to be dealt with as such. The War Cabinet recently authorised[1] the taking of strong measures against Congress, if necessary, and we have to contemplate therefore the probable arrest of Gandhi and of the members of the Working Committee.

If this becomes necessary the Viceroy and his advisers are greatly attracted by the suggestion that if possible the principal Congress leaders, or such of them as are strong enough to face the journey (a consideration that would probably exclude Gandhi and one or two of the Working Committee) should be removed to detention in Uganda, or elsewhere in East Africa. This would greatly facilitate the task of cutting off communication between the arrested leaders and their followers, and the Viceroy believes that the move would have very valuable consequences, both as a deterrent on those who aspire to take the place of the arrested men and as a means of giving confidence to waverers who will more readily believe that Government do not intend to compromise with Congress. The idea is that the persons removed should be removed by air. It seems to be accepted that Gandhi, with his very high blood pressure, could not be so moved. It might however be feasible to transport him by sea to Aden, where the altitude is suitable enough and the climate not much worse than that of Western India. I am putting this to Linlithgow.

I am myself attracted by the suggestion. It is not necessary to decide here and now whether it should be adopted, but it is very desirable to make all preparations for that eventuality. I should therefore be most grateful if you could see your way, at your early convenience, to ascertain if the East African authorities could undertake the custody—in reasonable comfort but cut off as far as possible from communication with India—of up to 12 or 15 of the Congress leaders, and if the Aden authorities could deal similarly with Gandhi. It is of course of great importance that the enquiries should be secret. The legal side

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of such a step was worked out between our Departments last April in the case of the Pir Pagaro[2] (who is still in India) and should present no difficulty. Other than Gandhi the arrested men would be flown from India and our arrangements should therefore be completed within the next month.

I very much hope you will be able to help.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

[1] See No. 257, Minute 8.

[2] The Pir Pagaro was the leader of a professedly Muslim sect, the Hurs, who had been responsible for a long series of disturbances in Upper Sind and the state of Khairpur. His arrest in October 1941 led to further serious unrest and arrangements were made with the Colonial Office to deport the Pir to Uganda in order to cut him off from all communication with his followers (which it was feared could never be prevented while the Pir was imprisoned in India) and to hearten law-abiding sections of the population who feared his early return.

The examination by the Colonial Office and the India Office of the legal aspects of deportation indicated that persons lawfully detained in India could equally be detained in a Colonial territory, provided that the Indian authorities could effect their deportation and transfer from India to the Colonial destination. The India Office believed that, on a reasonable construction of the Government of India Act 1935, Seventh Schedule, List I, No. 17, the powers of the Indian legislature, and therefore the Governor-General's ordinance-making powers, extended to deportation, though they felt some doubt whether they extended to detention while in transit. But they advised the Government of India that the deportation ordinance should provide for this. L/P&J/7/4736: ff 264, 325–59.

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Sir J. Herbert (Bengal) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/42

GOVT. HOUSE, CALCUTTA, *23 July 1942*

Dear Linlithgow,

This is my report for the first half of July. I enclose the Home Department's report[1] for that period.

* * *

4. *Political.*—I am sending you telegraphic reports at intervals regarding reactions to the Congress Working Committee's resolution, but it may also be of interest to you to have a rather more detailed account of reactions of Ministers. I am not satisfied with Huq's attitude. His "manifesto" consists of a few sentences connected with the National War Front. I had a talk with him yesterday and he was inclined to dismiss the threat of an open Civil Disobedience movement as being unlikely to attain any success in Bengal. He remarked rather airily that the Muslim League and the Mahasabha "would be

[1] L/P&J/5, April–Sept. 1942.

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enough to deal with it". He also seemed reluctant to issue any statement, or to carry out any counter-propaganda against Gandhi's movement, on the ground that his present relations with Jinnah made it difficult for him to identify himself with statements which Jinnah has already issued. Nor am I altogether happy about the attitude of the Mahasabha. A recent interception, in which the Provincial Headquarters of the Mahasabha sent out instructions regarding the Home Guards, concluded with the rather significant statement that in respect of Gandhi's projected movement, district associations should consider where their duty lay. I have also seen a Police report from Bihar which shows that the intention of the C.P.I. is to support Gandhi's movement and to get as many of their members as possible into Congress before the movement begins. Although there has been no such definite information regarding the C.P.I. in Bengal, we clearly cannot discount the possibility of their joining in an open movement. The bait to the C.P.I. in the Working Committee's Resolution is contained in the section which states that with the withdrawal of British power, the zamindars, jagirdars and others will realise that the source of their wealth comes from the tillers of the soil and the workers in the factories.

On the other hand, Banerji and Basu seem to be steady, and the former considers that the action which has been taken to compensate evacuees will go a long way to obviate agitation. He has been in personal touch with one of Gandhi's emissaries, who has been making enquiries in the Feni area, and will be meeting him in a few days' time at Feni where he will try to impress upon him the reasonable basis of the compensation granted. Banerji tells me that he has also written to Nehru and has sent him a copy of the Revenue Department's instructions regarding the payment of compensation. He believes that as a result of his letter Congress announced that the question of rates of compensation was one to be settled between Provincial Governments and evacuees.

It is still too early to say with any certainty what the attitude of Ministers would be towards an open movement, but there is an undercurrent of feeling which it is hard to define, but which is disquieting.

I referred in paragraph 10 of my last report[2] to the possible danger inherent in adopting too liberal a policy towards the C.P.I. The trend of events during the past fortnight has tended to confirm that view, and the present position has been described in paragraphs 2 and 15 to 17 of the Home Department's report. I think that we are in danger of getting our labels mixed. Many Members of the Communist Party and of the Students' Federation in this Province are not Communists at all in the true sense of the word, and it seems to me that there is at present far too pronounced a tendency to assume the support of these parties to the war effort without sufficient enquiry into individual cases. It is quite clear from the speeches that have been made at anti-Japanese meetings that some of the Members have no intention of stopping anti-Government and subversive propaganda, and information in our possession shows that the C.P.I. as an

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organisation has no intention whatever of having anything to do with the National War Front.

The same holds good in the case of the Students' Federation. I have already written to you regarding G.H.Q.'s scheme for appointing Liaison Officers from Members of the A.-I.S.F., and we have now seen the G.H.Q. letter on the organisation of a Public Liaison Section. I notice that this letter contains the erroneous statement that the A.-I.S.F. have already provided voluntary liaison workers with success in Chittagong, and I still feel very strongly that the scheme may result in the appointment of liaison officers who are not only of little value, but who may prove to be dangerous. I have already commented on the fact that the scheme was put into operation without consulting Provincial Governments, and if it is intended to proceed with it, I can only hope that the military authorities will ask Provincial Governments to make careful enquiries into the antecedents of persons whom they propose to appoint. They might have saved themselves a good deal of trouble in the first instance by asking Provincial Governments to get District Officers to select suitable men.

[2] Of 7 July; not printed. Para. 10 noted certain points raised at a recent Conference of Commissioners, one of which was that members of organisations like the Communist Party of India were carrying on anti-British propaganda under the cloak of anti-Fascist speeches. Sir J. Herbert added that he was having it made clear that local officers must have full discretion in deciding whether such persons might address public meetings and were to point out that restrictions on Communists might be reimposed if they made obnoxious anti-British or anti-Government propaganda. MSS. EUR. F. 125/42.

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Sir A. Hope (Madras) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/70

SECRET GUINDY, *23 July 1942*

REPORT NO. 6 OF 1942

My dear Linlithgow,

The reactions to the expansion of your Council have been very much what I expected. The Congress party and their near followers have of course belittled it, and say that it is still unrepresentative, but the non-Congress and non-political people have on the whole welcomed it. Mohammad Usman's appointment has been well received and, in their heart of hearts, also Sir C. P.'s, but naturally the non-Brahmin elements are annoyed, or pretend to be, at a Brahmin being taken as a representative of South India rather than a non-Brahmin. This was however to be expected and, although I have no doubt that Muthiah Chettiar & Co. are disappointed, I do not think that they feel any real genuine grievance.

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2. I had a long talk with Usman yesterday and he certainly is very keen on his job, not for the portfolio itself, but for the fact, as I said before, that he can influence opinion at Delhi.

3. As regards the Congress threat, I have made very close enquiries and have received many gratuitous opinions and the great consensus of opinion is that Congress are thinking of committing an act of criminal folly. For the first time since I have been here, non-Congress people, and even those with some sympathy with Congress, are coming out with really strong statements. Before you wrote to me asking me to mobilise non-Congress opinion, it was already under way without any prompting from myself. Muthiah Chettiar came out with a very good statement the day after the Congress resolution was made public, and this was followed by Patro, Ramaswami Naicker, M. C. Rajah, Abdul Hamid Khan and many others. I have asked C. R. Reddy and K. V. Reddy to issue statements which they will willingly do.

4. As far as I can make out, there is genuine alarm among the local Congress leaders, outside the extremists, and I do not think that any disobedience movement would have very much support here, although in the Andhra country it would be stronger than in the Tamil.

5. Rajagopalachari's effort has not been successful, but there are a great [many] people in the Congress party who sympathise with his views but have not the courage or the financial stability to break away from Congress. Those people however would be most reluctant to take part in any wholesale action, and, although it is difficult to prophesy in these matters, my view is that we would not have much trouble here, although of course there would be in certain places. There are quite a large number of prominent people, prominent that is to say in their own districts, who have resigned from Congress, and I think that many more will do so.

6. One thing everybody is unanimous about is that if any mass movement does start, it must be squashed at the beginning. The theory of a long rope to hang themselves is not believed in, and certainly not by myself. I feel that a long rope is much more likely to entangle our legs than it will the Congress neck, and I know that this is your view as well. Another thing I would strongly urge, and I told Usman about it yesterday, is that all the leaders arrested in any Province should be imprisoned in another province. If the local leaders are imprisoned in local jails they corrupt the warders and jailers and have free access, whatever the regulations may be, to the outside public. I would suggest that the Madras leaders who may be imprisoned should be sent to the Punjab, and we would naturally be willing in return to take prisoners from the north. I think this is most important as if they have no access to their friends and relatives, they will be much less dangerous.

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7. I also think, although this may be more difficult, that those convicted should be treated as common criminals and not as political prisoners. During the individual *satyagraha* movement last year and the year before, those jailed were continually complaining about their conditions, food, &c., and I would prohibit any mention of the conditions in jail in the Press generally.

8. Likewise, as regards the villain of the piece, Gandhi, he still has great influence among the ignorant masses, and any mention of his name or state of health excites them. If the movement comes to anything, I would suggest arresting him at once and deporting him to Mauritius or Kenya, and prohibit any reference to him in the Press. If he fasts let it not be known; and if he dies announce it six months later.

9. One thing the bulk of the non-Congress people fear is that strong action will not be taken, and I feel quite confident that, after Congress have shown themselves in their true light, world opinion will agree that strong action must be taken now. There is a great change of opinion on this subject, but as long as the vast majority of the Press are allowed to put forward pro-Congress views and publish adulations of Gandhi, this must have an effect on the mass of the people. I hope His Majesty's Government do realise the change in the position and will not fall for any apparent weakening in Congress attitude in the next few weeks. They may well feel that they have gone too far, but as you know better than I do, they are an absolutely untrustworthy lot and it will cause immense resentment if we have any further truck with them.

10. I know that down here we may be in a happier position than in other Provinces, and naturally your Government must look at it as a whole, but I am giving you not only my own views but the views of very many people in this Presidency.

11. I do not want to bore you by referring again to non-official Advisers, but this question has again cropped up very acutely in the last few weeks. Many people thought that after the expansion of your Council, non-official Advisers were a logical conclusion in the Section 93 Provinces; and, since the Congress resolution, the demand has got much stronger. Many people whom I have seen are not people who could expect or want positions in the Government, but they say the same thing: mobilise non-Congress opinion, and the best way to do that is to have non-Congress Advisers. You know my views on this subject only too well,[1] but I am more emphatic than ever that here in Madras it could be done with complete success. Now that Congress are our avowed enemy, and we are treating them so in the National War Front, surely it would be wise to get the prominent non-Congress people into the Government which is going to fight Congress.

[1] e.g. No. 23.

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12. I would, as I think I have already told you, keep two officials and put in seven or eight non-officials. They would be Advisers, and I would of course maintain the final say. I do think it is of the utmost importance to give the loyalists a chance of governing their Province in these very difficult times.

13. As regards the Presidency as a whole, things have been very quiet. Rajagopalachari has gone to ground for the moment; food distribution and prices, although causing us a certain amount of anxiety, are no worse than they were; recruiting has gone on very rapidly and the number of men coming forward is too much for the authorities to deal with at the moment. I do not anticipate any serious trouble over prices, but we are very carefully watching the situation.

14. I was in Bangalore last week and saw the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Commander, and settled up a number of points which were not clear. Is there any chance of your coming down here on another flying visit? I do hope so as there are always things to talk over, and you would be very welcome.

Yours very sincerely,
ARTHUR HOPE

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Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/77

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE GOVERNOR'S REPORT NO. 14, DATED THE 23RD JULY 1942

Abdul Ghaffar Khan returned to Peshawar from Wardha on the evening of 18th July, and it was not until then that people began to take much interest in the recent Congress resolution. Since then he has been active in encouraging Congress workers to be ready to follow the Congress lead, whatever form it may take. Most people seem to anticipate that the methods employed here will be a campaign for the non-payment of land revenue, and the picketing of law courts, &c. Reports so far do not indicate that there is much public sympathy with Abdul Ghaffar Khan. But most of the people whom I have seen lately, both in Peshawar and elsewhere, seem nervous of what may happen, and Congress workers have been deliberately playing on this feeling of anxiety. The Khans all profess to be staunch on the side of Government, but I do not feel

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very confident about some of them. Apart from petty personal grievances, which in some cases may put them wrong, it is clear that the majority of them anticipate a future state of affairs in which Congress may be all-powerful again, and they fear they may jeopardise their own future by coming out too openly against them now. We are doing what we can to fortify opinion against Gandhi. Dr. Khan Sahib is quite friendly still; he came to dine and play Bridge with me last week.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *24 July 1942, 1.55 am*
PERSONAL *Received: 24 July, 2 am*

No. 2174-S. At meeting of my Council to consider position *vis-à-vis* of Congress on 22nd July, view was expressed that in many quarters there were apprehensions that with the collapse of the Cripps negotiations and the formal withdrawal[1] of the offer then made our policy was likely to be retrograde, and that it would be of value in removing such misunderstandings and in consolidating support of moderate and loyal elements behind us against Congress, if a statement could be made in Parliament making it clear either that the Cripps proposals stood or that His Majesty's Government would be ready to consider something at least equally liberal at the end of the war. Mody produced the draft repeated in my immediately following telegram (No. 2175-S) which shows how the minds of some of my Indian colleagues are working.

2. Point was then made, and carried weight, that there were strong objections to reaffirmation of the Cripps declaration which had gone down badly with Princes, alarmed Sikhs, and to some extent alarmed Muslims, and that reaffirmation of it by His Majesty's Government might aggravate rather than soothe things. I am sure this appreciation is sound.

3. General sense of meeting was in these circumstances that any statement from His Majesty's Government had best be in entirely[2] general terms.

4. I think point is worth considering. I have always felt that the proposals in the Cripps declaration having once been made, while they might formally have been withdrawn, could not but represent the basis of any future constitutional move in the setting in which they were originally put forward. At

[1] See the Commons debate on the Cripps Mission. *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 379, 28 April 1942, cols. 842 and 912–13.

[2] Deciphered as 'indistinct'.

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the same time I recognise the difficulty that His Majesty's Government must have in committing their successors, and undesirability of anything too precise.

5. If anything is to be said, something on the lines of the question and answer in my next but one following (No. 2176–S) telegram might meet the case. There was strong pressure in Council from Indian Members that any statement made should be made by the Prime Minister.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *24 July 1942, 9.30 am*
Received: 24 July, 10.45 am

No. 2175–S. Mody's draft is as follows:—
"The Working Committee of the Indian National Congress has passed a resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of the British from India, and threatening a mass movement if the demand is not conceded. The position of His Majesty's Government with regard to the constitutional position of India has very recently been defined in clear and precise terms in the Declaration which Sir Stafford Cripps was authorised to make on behalf of His Majesty's Government. That Declaration still stands, and on the conclusion of hostilities India will have it within her power to attain the status of a Dominion, with a right to secede from the Commonwealth, if she thought fit to do so. The present demand of the Congress completely ignores this far-reaching offer, and seeks to bring about a condition of things which can only be described as chaotic. There is no parallel in history to such a move towards the complete and abrupt dislocation of the vast and complicated machinery of Government. And all this at a time when in Russia, China, Libya and other theatres of war a situation of considerable gravity has developed calling for the undivided energies and concentration of resources of all the Allied Powers. No greater disservice to the cause for which the United Nations are fighting can be imagined, and men of goodwill everywhere, except in the countries which own allegiance to the Axis Powers, must hope for the avoidance of such a catastrophic development in one of the most vital theatres of War today.

His Majesty's Government, while reiterating their unflinching resolve to bring about the attainment by India of her most cherished desires, cannot but solemnly warn all those who stand behind the policy adumbrated by the Working Committee of the Congress that Government will not flinch from their duty to take every possible step to meet the situation. The United Nations

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have bent themselves to the task of fighting the menace which overhangs Civilisation, and of creating a new world order, in which India must inevitably play a great rôle, and it is the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that the Indian people will lend no countenance to a movement fraught with such disastrous consequences, but will on the contrary, setting aside their political differences for the moment, throw their all into the struggle against the common enemies of mankind."

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *24 July 1942, 9.30 am*
Received: 24 July, 10 pm

No. 2176-S. Question. What are the present intentions of His Majesty's Government as regards constitutional development in India?

Answer. The intentions of His Majesty's Government were defined in the declaration carried to India by Sir Stafford Cripps in the spring of this year. For reasons in some cases mutually destructive, it proved impossible to secure the support of the principal elements in India's national life for the proposals in that declaration, and they were accordingly withdrawn. It is impossible to proceed further with this matter in the middle of the war, and in circumstances so grave as those which confront us. At the conclusion of the war my Hon'ble Friend may rest assured that His Majesty's Government will be as concerned as they have been in the past to see a solution of the Indian problem on the same liberal basis as characterised the declaration carried to India by Sir Stafford Cripps, and with full regard for the legitimate claims of all elements in India's national life.

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Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 189

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *24 July 1942, 6.25 pm*
Received: 24 July, 6.30 pm

No. 5766. Continuation of our telegram 5529[1] of July 16th. We have now re-examined Congress Working Committee's Resolution of July 10th and

[1] No. 272.

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July 14th to see how far they provide legal basis for action against Congress organisation or individual members of Congress. We are advised that both Resolutions are prejudicial reports under Defence Rule 34[2] and that first Resolution would provide legal grounds for declaring Congress unlawful association under Criminal Law Amendment Act, inasmuch as it contains direct and authoritative instructions to the people to interfere with the administration of law in certain circumstances. Second or main resolution would not however provide grounds for similar action except against Working Committee (and even after approval by All-India Congress Committee would only justify proclamation of that body, and not Congress as a whole) until His Majesty's Government had rejected Congress demand. Congress as a whole would then be committed to implementation of threat to mass movement and could be declared unlawful.

2. Whatever legal position may be we are still convinced that it would be unwise to take action against Congress organisation before Bombay meeting or against individuals except for actual defiance of lawful orders or incitement thereto in pursuance of first resolution.

3. Our plan of action has however taken more definite shape as follows. Our general aim should be in following order (*a*) to avert (*b*) to abort and (*c*) to suppress mass movement.

Action will fall into 3 corresponding stages.

4. Stage One will last until Bombay meeting and will continue to be devoted mainly to propaganda. Press reactions both in India and abroad have so far been up our street and there appears to be almost universal hope, which is thinly concealed even in pro-Congress press, that mass movement may somehow be averted.

We have carefully considered issuing some preliminary statement of our reactions to the two Resolutions so as to give a lead and provide basis for our propaganda. We hope shortly to issue communiqué[3] replying to first Resolution and may address you separately[4] on much more difficult question of making any immediate announcement regarding the second. We do not think it would be wise to rattle the sabre, for example, by promulgating Emergency Powers Ordinance[5] during this stage.

5. Second stage will commence with ratification of Resolution by All-India Congress Committee. Immediately this occurs, provided as we expect, there is no substantial amendment, we propose:

(*a*) that all Provincial Governments should simultaneously proclaim All-India Congress Committee and Provincial Congress Committees but not Congress as a whole under Criminal Law Amendment Act. (*b*) that Gandhi and all members of Working Committee should be simultaneously arrested in

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Bombay if possible (*c*) that we should issue statement denouncing leadership of Congress in strong terms and stating action taken as in (*a*) and (*b*); and (*d*) that as soon as possible thereafter all Provincial Governments should seize[6] Congress Committee Offices and funds and arrest all Provincial leaders and organisers of real importance.

6. Banking on probability that Gandhi will expect an interval after ratification before launching movement and may not therefore have circulated his detailed instructions to his followers meanwhile, we have some hope that this action may prevent move from ever taking shape. To make it successful we shall require in advance His Majesty's Government's rejection of Congress demand; and if you will supply us with this in what you regard as suitable terms, we will fit it into our proposed denunciation draft of which we would send you later. We feel strongly that main object of our statement should be to discredit leadership of Congress rather than Congress as a whole. There are many Congressmen who disapprove of Gandhi's plan. We realise that action proposed may lead to widespread protest meetings and possibly some disorder but feel that to postpone action or spread out arrests would be useless and it is best to face worst at once. We propose that all arrests except Gandhi's should be under Defence Rule 26 or 129,[7] thereby relating them pointedly to war necessities and avoiding publicity and excitement of trials.

We propose that Gandhi should be made state prisoner (see correspondence ending with Home Department telegram No. 3646 dated September 21st 1940)[8] and should probably be sent to house reserved for him in Poona, but we are separately considering possibility and comparative effectiveness of interning him in his Ashram at Sevagram. Main object will be to segregate them all completely from outside contacts and in this connection we should like to know how you would regard proposal that say 6 or 8 of the more important members of the Working Committee should be deported to Uganda. We realise that such action might be regarded as extreme but it would have profound effect here and if you approve in principle we should be glad if you

[2] See No. 292, note 4.

[3] L/I/1/756: ff 245–6. It was timed to appear in the Press on 4 August.

[4] See No. 377. [5] See No. 247, note 4.

[6] Under the Criminal Law Amendment Act; see No. 329, para. 3.

[7] Rule 26 conferred powers on the Central or Provincial Governments to restrict the movements or activities of, or to detain, any particular person if it was necessary so to do 'with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order', relations with foreign or Indian States, 'or the efficient prosecution of the war'. Rule 129 enabled police or other officers to arrest without warrant persons suspected of actions (past, present or future) which included acting with intent to assist an enemy state 'or in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or to the efficient prosecution of war'. No person could be detained for longer than 15 days without order of the Provincial Government and no person could be detained for longer than two months.

[8] L/P&J/8/590.

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could warn Governor of Uganda and authorise us to arrange details with him direct. Legal preliminaries have already been examined in connection with Pir Pagaro's case (see correspondence ending with your telegram No. 9280 dated May 22nd 1942).[9]

7. Stage 3 will supervene if efforts to abort move fail. It is at this stage but not before that it may become necessary to proclaim whole Congress and promulgate Emergency Powers Ordinance. At present we have insufficient information regarding nature of proposed move to make detailed recommendations but it seems probable that Gandhi's idea is to leave wide discretion to individuals to select any line of action they may wish, whether by breaking the law or otherwise, to create maximum embarrassment and obstruction to administration.

8. We should be glad to receive your comments and advice at the earliest possible date since there is much spade work to be done. We are taking the utmost precautions to preserve secrecy here regarding these proposals.

[9] See No. 312, note 2.

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Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

24 July 1942

No. G.-231. I invite Your Excellency's attention to report submitted to D.I.B. by U.P., C.I.D. No. G.-C.-10.-A. of July 22nd.[1] This shows (*a*) campaign for organising mass movement is being vigorously carried on by means of meetings addressed by leaders, (*b*) at such meetings secret instructions regarding movement are given verbally; (*c*) efforts are being made to increase volunteer force and Quami Sewa Dal and activities of latter organisation are reported from Cawnpore by District Magistrate; (*d*) information from various sources including letter from correspondent *National Herald*, Allahabad, to *Hindustan Times* show that movement will include all known forms of civil disobedience including ever [even?] cutting telegraph wires.

2. This information appears reliable and no doubt you will have corroboration from other sources. It appears probable that A.-I.C.C. meeting will issue ultimatum terminating on September 15th, but ultimatum will obviously conceal and camouflage methods to be adopted. To wait till ultimatum expires before taking action or even for short time after Bombay meeting will be

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disastrous for delay will (*a*) give Congress more time for organisation, (*b*) mean that movement will start at more favourable season owing to (i) lull in cultivation activities, (ii) proximity of big religious festivals and (iii) possible intensification of war on Burma front. Delay between publication of resolution and Bombay meeting though giving Congress time to organise has had advantage of obtaining opinions from all sources hostile to Congress both in India, Britain and America. No further time needed for this purpose. In fact if we delay to take action after Bombay meeting, there will be usual spate of statements and discussions which will cloud the issue. *Daily Herald* articles and indeed all opinions against Congress policy have been intemperately criticised in Congress Press and clearly have not made them reconsider attitude. Delayed action will also dishearten our supporters in India, whose numbers will never be largely increased even by most efficient propaganda campaign but may be decreased if period of uncertainty is prolonged.

3. My Advisers incline to view that action should be taken before Bombay meeting but I think zero hour should be immediately after meeting when assuming resolution is confirmed His Majesty's Government should reiterate their policy and announcement should be made of our proposed action.

4. Have not yet had opinion of Inspector General regarding police morale,[2] but morale is at present good but may deteriorate if by delaying we convey impression of weakness. Morale of Jail Staff is more difficult, especially if we are faced with hunger-strikes and other attempts to upset Jail discipline.

5. Am meanwhile taking action to arrest some leading organisers and unless I hear to contrary, orders for arrest of Purushottam Das Tandon, Speaker,[3] will issue on 27th. His speeches have been most dangerous. Nehru seems to be at present less dangerous. At zero hour action should include proscription under Criminal Law Amendment Act of Congress Committees of all kinds, all volunteer organisations and seizure of all their offices and buildings. Action must also be taken against Congress Press.

6. This telegram may be treated also as official telegram to Home Department.

[1] Not printed. [2] See No. 303. [3] Of the United Provinces Legislative Assembly.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: ff 209–12

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *24 July 1942, 11.15 pm*
Received: 25 July

13166. Many thanks for your personal telegrams of the 17th July, 2111–S[1] and 20th July, 2136–S.[2] I am in general agreement. I accept your view that action need not be taken at the moment and am only anxious that preparations should be complete to strike effectively when the time comes.

2. Points in this and third paragraph are to clear my own mind and avoid any controversies at last moment. I understand that in regard to the Working Committee in general, you propose to take action for arrest and detention under Defence of India Rules. I am not quite clear why you contemplate taking action against Gandhi under Regulation III of 1818,[3] for Defence Rule 26 (1) (*b*)[4] seems to apply equally to him. There has been an indication already of criticism of the possible use of this century-old regulation and if action under the Defence Rules would be equally effective would it not be preferable not to single out Gandhi for special form of action which is open to criticism as being taken under an authority which is obsolete and which, by its very terms, suggests a lack of sufficient ground for more ordinary proceedings? We must face the fact that whatever may be possible as to keeping place of detention secret, fact of arrest cannot be kept dark and that notwithstanding general opinion of Congress responsibility for the breakdown of the Cripps mission and despite strong criticism of resolutions of Working Committee, there will be unfavourable reactions in America and elsewhere to the arrest of Congress leaders. Subject always to the condition of effective action it would seem preferable not to exacerbate these reactions by use of power open in itself to criticism.

3. I note that you contemplate the possibility that in the event of the All-India Committee endorsing the resolutions of 10th and 14th July, Congress should be declared an unlawful association. Am I correct in understanding that this would be supplemental measure following on, and not as a preliminary step for action against leaders which would be taken under other powers? I presume that in fact the necessity for action against Congress as a whole under the Criminal Law Amendment Act would not arise till the effect of the arrests of the leaders had been seen.

4. As regards disposal of leaders after arrest, I am, in principle, in favour of suggestion in your telegram of 19th July, 2130–S,[5] that they should be removed

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outside India, and am asking[6] Colonial Secretary at once to make necessary enquiries confidentially as to detention in Uganda and also Aden (see next paragraph). Legal aspect, including effect of proviso to Defence Rule 26 (1) (*a*) has already been considered in the case of the Pir Pagaro[7] and any legal difficulties have, I imagine, been surmounted.

5. Dramatic effect to which your Advisers attach value of sudden arrest and removal by air to distant inaccessible and temporarily at least secret destination would no doubt be to some extent weakened if Gandhi and possibly others had to be kept in India on medical grounds. But we must chance this. Gandhi and others unfit for air journey would at any rate be separated from the rest. Have you considered possibility of sending Gandhi by sea to Aden? This would not involve the risks to high blood pressure resulting from high altitude either during flight or at elevated destination such as Uganda. If Gandhi hunger-strikes in whatever place of destination we must, of course, see it through, though that is a very different matter from ourselves adopting method of removal which would be likely to cause his early demise.

6. I am glad to see that Firoz Khan Noon has already spoken out and that Ramaswami Ayyar has also been helpful.

[1] No. 278. [2] No. 292.

[3] Bengal Regulation III of 1818 provided for the arrest of individuals without trial when 'reasons of State', which included the preservation of 'the security of the British dominions from foreign hostility and from internal commotion', rendered it necessary. In cases connected with defence, external affairs or the Indian States, action was to be taken by the Central Government and in such cases the regulation extended to all Governors' and Chief Commissioners' provinces. *Bengal Code*, 5th edition, vol. i, 1939, pp. 157–61.

[4] For the general powers conferred by Rule 26, see No. 319, note 7. Sub-rule (1) (*b*) conferred the particular power of detention.

[5] No. 288. [6] See No. 312.

[7] The proviso of Rule 26 (1) (*a*) prohibited the making of any order under that rule directing a person to remove himself from British India 'in respect of any British Indian subject of His Majesty'. The powers under which it had been proposed to deport the Pir Pagaro were those conferred by the Government of India Act 1935, Seventh Schedule, List I, No. 17. See No. 312, note 2.

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Sir G. Laithwaite to Secretaries to Governors of Madras, Bombay, United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces and Berar, Assam, and North-West Frontier Province[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *24 July 1942*

My dear ———,

At His Excellency's request, I enclose a draft of an official telegram[2] dealing with the action to be taken in the event of the A.-I.C.C. ratifying the main resolution passed by the Working Committee. This draft will in due course be made official by a telegram which I will send you requesting that it should be made official, and be dealt with as a telegram from the Home Department to the Local Government. The present somewhat unusual procedure is adopted in view of His Excellency's great anxiety that the contents of the draft and the indications it gives of our intentions should be kept wholly secret until the time comes. But he would be grateful if His Excellency the Governor would, if he has no objection, show it to his Chief Secretary and the Advisers concerned, and he is most anxious that, so far as the question may arise actively in . . .[3] appropriate preliminary action should be set on foot in the manner least calculated to attract attention.

Yours sincerely,

J. G. LAITHWAITE

[1] A similar letter was sent to Secretaries to Governors of Ministerial Provinces (Bengal, Punjab, Orissa, and Sind) except that (*a*) it was marked 'Personal and Most Secret' and (*b*) its final sentence read as follows: 'But he would be glad if His Excellency the Governor, if he has no objection, would now take his Chief Secretary into confidence in the strictest secrecy, so that in the period before this telegram is made official the Chief Secretary can have given attention to the manner in which and the extent to which preparatory action is called for in the case of [e.g.] Orissa.' MSS. EUR. F. 125/110.

[2] Evidently this became the Home Department Express Letter of 2 August summarised in No. 393. It is called a 'draft express letter' in No. 333, para. 1.

[3] Gap for insertion of the province addressed.

323

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *24 July 1942*

Gandhi's antics have really been too much this time for the Press here and in America. I dare say I may have helped by some very frank talks to the Lobby

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Correspondents and the American Press, but I think in the main all the credit should be divided between Gandhi and Nehru! Even the *Daily Herald* and now the official Labour Party have turned against him.[1] Whether all this will have any influence on the old man or on the All-India Committee when it meets, no one can say, but it certainly has justified up to the present your policy of waiting and not taking drastic action prematurely. On the other hand, once you are convinced that he and his clique mean real mischief, the sooner you pounce on them the better.

2. I am glad that as regard the main body you have come round to my view about Uganda. There is not only the dramatic aspect of the act itself, but the fact that they are completely out of reach has something of the same effect as decease. People forget all about them. I am only too sorry that Gandhi's health does not allow of his joining U Saw out there. I am tentatively suggesting Aden,[2] which only means a sea voyage, but you may think that also impossible. I quite agree with you that we must not in any way be held directly responsible for his demise, even if we are not prepared to be blackmailed by a threat of fasting to death.

3. I was much interested in Villiers' account[3] of his talks with Nehru, which give very much the picture of the man which I have gradually formed myself: that of a man who has spun himself into a cocoon of his own perversion of history and diatribes against the British which blind him to all real facts. The type is not unfamiliar among nationalist intellectuals in other countries—de Valera for instance, though he evidently has some executive ability. I am not really surprised that Nehru, and Congress generally, and even Sapru, should be so bitter about myself. After all, though wholeheartedly in sympathy with Indian nationalist aspirations, I have been mainly responsible for confronting Congress with the hateful fact that it cannot step direct into the shoes of the British Government and run India through its party executive, but has got to begin at the beginning and conciliate the other elements by some form of new constitutional settlement which may very well preclude anything in the nature of Congress Party control.

[1] On 23 July the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party had adopted the following resolution: 'The British Labour Party, anxious to promote the well-being of the Indian peoples and their aspirations for self-government, reaffirms its call to them, made at its recent annual conference, to make a further effort to reach a rapid and satisfactory settlement in conjunction with the British Government. It therefore regards with grave apprehension the possibility of a civil disobedience movement in India and its effect on the efforts of the United Nations now engaged in a desperate struggle to preserve and extend world freedom. Such a movement, the very contemplation of which is a proof of political irresponsibility, might imperil the fate of all freedom-loving peoples and thereby destroy all hopes of Indian freedom.' *The Times*, 23 July 1942.

[2] No. 321. [3] MSS. EUR. F. 125/137.

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324

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: ff 193–7

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *25 July 1942, 8.30 pm*
Received: 26 July

13220. Your personal telegrams 24th July, 2174–S,[1] 2175–S[2] and 2176–S.[3] I think there would be considerable advantage in publishing denial of suggestion that H.M.G. are taking advantage of rejection of Cripps' offer to develop silently retrogressive policy.

2. I agree with opinion of your Council as to the objections to a plain re-affirmation of the draft Declaration and in that respect should much prefer something on the lines of your 2176–S. The effect of this could, without difficulty, be introduced into the first part of Mody's draft, but that draft takes much wider ground in that it goes on to attack Congress resolution and to combine a warning to Congress followers with a rallying cry to all others. There would be a compliment of some political value if, speaking for the British Government, I made substantial use of a draft statement evolved by member of your Council. But apart from this the last two-thirds of Mody's draft, subject to a few minor verbal amendments, strike me as a quite suitable statement in itself. The question arises, however, whether the moment has come for so plain a warning to Congress by H.M.G. Other things being equal, it would perhaps be better to defer that till the All-India Committee has shown its hand, but unfortunately Parliament rises for the recess on 6th August and statement in Parliament must therefore be made during present stage if at all.

3. Your Home Department telegram 24th July 5766,[4] received while this telegram was being drafted, is relevant. I think that answer in Parliament suggested below which deals primarily with second resolution by Working Committee, would fit into line of action described in paragraph 4 of Home Department telegram, and weighing one thing with another I am rather disposed to arrange a question for Thursday, 30th July, to ask whether H.M.G. have considered their attitude to the request in Congress resolution of 14th July, and to reply as in paras. 4 & 5 below. You will see that I have worked in much matter from your 2176–S but that I have not used sentence beginning "It is impossible". I do not think that sentence is necessary but have omitted it specifically because (*a*) if the war is prolonged statement might be falsified by events, and (*b*) it might provoke reactions in Parliament and elsewhere which it would be convenient to avoid at this juncture.

4. Proposed answer *begins*. The Working Committee of the Indian National Congress has adopted, subject to ratification by the All-India Committee, a

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resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of British rule from India and threatening a mass movement if the demand is not conceded.

The purpose of H.M.G. with regard to the constitutional future of India was made clear in the draft Declaration which Sir Stafford Cripps was authorised to offer on behalf of H.M.G. For reasons in some cases mutually destructive it proved impossible to secure the support of the principal elements of India's national life for the specific proposals in that Declaration, and the draft was accordingly withdrawn. Nevertheless H.M.G. stand firmly by the broad intention of their offer which is that on the conclusion of hostilities India shall have it within her power to attain to complete self-government through such method of arriving at a constitutional solution and under such form of government as the peoples of India may agree among themselves to adopt. *Ends.*

5. From this point I should propose to adopt Mody's draft from sentence beginning "The present demand of Congress completely ignores" but with some abbreviation and modification to make it read as follows:—

Begins. The present demand of Congress completely ignores this far-reaching offer and would, if conceded, bring about a complete and abrupt dislocation of the vast and complicated machinery of government in India. This at a time when in Russia, China, Libya and other theatres of war the situation calls for the undivided energy, co-operation and concentration of the resources of all the Allied powers. No greater disservice to the cause for which the United Nations are fighting can be imagined, and men of goodwill everywhere must refuse to envisage such a catastrophic development in one of the most vital theatres of war.

His Majesty's Government while reiterating their unflinching resolve to bring about the attainment by India of her most cherished desires cannot but solemnly warn all those who stand behind the policy adumbrated by the Working Committee of Congress that the Government of India will not flinch from their duty to take every possible step to meet the situation. The United Nations have bent themselves to the task of fighting the menace which overhangs civilisation and of creating a new World Order in which India must inevitably play a great part and it is the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that the Indian people will lend no countenance to a movement fraught with such disastrous consequences but will on the contrary, setting aside their political differences for the moment, throw their all into the struggle against the common enemies of mankind. *Ends.*

6. I should be grateful for your early comments. I think there is little chance of Prime Minister being available to make the answer and he might naturally not be fully prepared for supplementaries from various quarters that might follow.

[1] No. 316. [2] No. 317. [3] No. 318. [4] No. 319.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Gandhi

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *25 July 1942*

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I promised in my letter of 5th July[1] to make further enquiries on the point you had raised in your letter to me of 2nd July.[2] I have now done so and I have had the result. No one is keener than I am to prevent the slaughter of milch cattle or working bullocks. But though I think there is something in the complaint which you brought to my notice and though I do not suppose that perfection will be attained, I have now taken steps which will I hope result in reducing to quite insignificant proportions any future accident of this kind.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 221. [2] No. 215.

326

Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/P&J/8/609: f 398

CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NATHIAGALI, *25 July 1942*

D.-o. No. G.H.-315

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Will your Excellency please refer to your telegram, No. 2157-6,[1] dated the 22nd July, asking for an appreciation of the morale of our police Force?

2. I have discussed this question with my Inspector-General of Police, and his views coincide entirely with my own. We are both satisfied that the morale of the Police in this Province is excellent, and that there is no reason to fear that they will not be equal to any demand made upon them, if they have to take action against Congress.

3. There is, in our opinion, no general sympathy on the part of the public with the aims of Congress, who have been losing ground steadily in this Province for some time. There is particularly little sympathy with the attitude they have adopted with regard to the war. If this is true of the general public, it is true even more of the Police Force. Even at the worst time of the Red Shirt agitation the Police showed no sympathy with that body, and the Congress

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Ministry when it was in power did nothing particular to deserve the sympathy of the Police Force.

4. The standards, both of efficiency and honesty, maintained by the Police Force of this Province are so high that I shall be bitterly disappointed if they fail us.

Yours sincerely,
G. CUNNINGHAM

[1] This should read 2157-S, i.e. No. 303.

327

Sir A. Clow (Assam) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/P&J/8/609: f 404

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, SHILLONG, *25 July 1942*

No. 39
Dear Lord Linlithgow,
This is in reply to Your Excellency's telegram No. 2157-S[1] of the 22nd July regarding the morale of the police force and is based on the agreed conclusions of the Chief Secretary and the Inspector-General of Police.

In the non-co-operation movement of 1921–22 a certain number of men resigned. These were mostly from the U.P. and Bihar and recruiting from outside Assam has since been steadily reduced. It is unlikely that any Congress movement now would have the same force and enthusiasm as the 1921–22 campaign, and in subsequent efforts at civil disobedience there appear to have been no resignations. On the whole it seems likely, therefore, that the police would be staunch but there may be cases, as there probably have been in the past, of individuals who show a lack of enthusiasm for dealing with political offenders who may in the future have political power. If the police could feel that they had complete insurance against any subsequent victimisation, which I admit it is difficult to give, their morale would be considerably higher. Even as it is there are no grounds for fearing any marked deterioration.

This assumes that we shall not simultaneously have to deal with enemy action, the effects of which are uncertain. The Inspector-General has no doubt that if police find themselves within a bombed area a certain number will desert, but the presence of troops in Assam has already proved useful in stiffening police morale, despite occasional friction, and this should be an important factor in the event of air raids.

Yours sincerely,
A. G. CLOW

[1] No. 303.

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Sir H. Dow (Sind) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/P&J/8/609: f 405

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, KARACHI, *25 July 1942*

D.-o. No. 282/62
Dear Lord Linlithgow,
I am writing in reply to your telegram 2157-S[1] of the 22nd July asking for an appreciation of the state and moral[e] of my police force with particular regard to possible action against Congress. Because of the serious interruptions to communications which may be caused by the breaches in the river bunds, I have already sent you a brief telegram[2] as follows:—

> "Your telegram 2157-S of 22nd July. I am in agreement with my minister and my official advisers that there is no reason to believe that Sind police will in any way fail in its duty or prove inadequate to carry out any measures that may be decided on against Congress. Letter follows."

This letter is by way of amplification.

2. It is not possible to deny that the morale of the Sind Police is not all that could be desired. But it has been adversely affected largely by the constant abuse it has received from Congressmen in the Assembly and from a Congress-ridden press, and by the failure of a Government depending on Congress support to give them the public encouragement which they were entitled to expect. No part of the force, therefore, has any sympathy with Congress, and it may be trusted to deal without reluctance, even with enthusiasm, with any situation which Congress is likely to create. A reference to the Sind Administration Reports for the years covering the last civil disobedience campaign shows that the Sind Police did good work and that resignations were actually below normal.

3. It may also be expected that the prevalence of Martial Law[3] over a great part of Sind—after the 29th inst. this area will include almost all the important towns outside Karachi—will considerably cramp the style of Congressmen. Few of them, I fancy, have any desire to test out the more summary procedure and severer penalties that conflict with the martial law authorities may involve.

Yours sincerely,

H. DOW

[1] No. 303. [2] Dated 24 July. MSS. EUR. F. 125/98.
[3] Imposed in consequence of the Hur disturbances; see No. 312, note 2.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *26 July 1942, 3.45 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 26 July, 3.45 pm*

No. 2192–S. Your personal telegram of 24th July, No. 13166.[1] Most of the ground is I think covered by our official telegram No. 5766[2] of the same date which your telegram has crossed, but I comment as follows by way of supplement.

2. Your paragraph 2. Main reason for suggesting that action should be taken against Gandhi under the Regulation of 1818 was to give him the status of a State prisoner which he has I understand always possessed before, and which I am advised is generally accepted by public opinion in this country as being appropriate to his age and position (compare in this connection official correspondence ending with Home Department telegram No. 3646 of 21st September 1940 in which however final decision on point whether Gandhi should be arrested under the Defence of India Rules or the Regulation was postponed).[3] I am perfectly ready, if you think that use of the Regulation would have bad propaganda effect in America, to use the Defence Rules against Gandhi as against the other Members of the Working Committee. Only other advantage afforded by Regulation is that persons detailed [detained?] under the Defence Rules become security prisoners and under the Security Prisoners Rules are entitled to a certain number of interviews, letters, &c., whereas in the case of a "State prisoner" we can make *ad hoc* rules to suit each individual. My advisers consider, and I agree, that it would be necessary to prohibit all interviews and communications to and from Gandhi at any rate for a certain interval after he has been arrested.

3. Your paragraph 3. Our official telegram of 24th July will have made it clear that we do not propose to proclaim Congress as a whole to be unlawful immediately after the Bombay meeting. I ought to add that the main point of declaring the A.-I.C.C. and Provincial Congress Committees to be unlawful is not to enable us to make arrest[s] which will be made under the Defence Rules, but to give us powers of search and seizure, &c., which are provided by the Criminal Law Amendment Act.

4. I have this whole issue of deportation under active examination here. Essential thing is that we should be prepared to move at once if our final

[1] No. 321. [2] No. 319. [3] L/P&J/8/590.

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decision is in favour of deportation, and I am most grateful for help you have given with Colonial Office and with Uganda. I am testing opinion in various quarters as to what reactions would be likely to be having regard to fact that I have received certain representations to effect that deportation would be regarded as punitive almost more than preventive. In any event however I should be quite definitely against sending Gandhi overseas, even to Aden, and I am sure that the wise course is to make provision for him in this country either in the Aga Khan's house at Poona or elsewhere (again a point which I am examining in detail with the Bombay Government and with my advisers). Were Gandhi following on a fast to die overseas, effect would be even worse than if that regrettable consequence were to take place while he was a free[4] man in India. Once overseas he would certainly be regarded as our prisoner even if he were given technical freedom in the colony to which he was sent.

5. Please do not hesitate to telegraph if there are any points on which you feel any the least doubt or would like further information or comment from here. I fully agree as to importance of ground being cleared well in advance.

[4] Against the word 'free' Mr Gibson minuted: '? meaning that he will be released before the end'. L/P&J/8/597: f 188.

330

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *26 July 1942, 6.40 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 26 July, 6.15 pm*

No. 2199–S. Your personal telegram of 25th July, No. 13220.[1] I have carefully considered what you say, and, while I have not consulted my colleagues, I entirely agree in the result with your proposal. Only drafting alteration I would suggest is substitution in last sentence of paragraph 4 of your telegram for words "as peoples of India may agree among themselves to adopt" of words "as may be agreed among themselves by the principal elements in India's national life". We have to remember the Princes, and (a less important point) reference to "peoples" as distinct from "people" has always been very unpopular here. Will you let me know your decision urgently?

[1] No. 324.

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331

Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/P&J/8/597: ff 168–70

SECRET BARNES COURT, SIMLA, *26 July 1942*

D.-o. No. 404

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Will Your Excellency please refer to your telegram No. 2120-S[1] of July 7th, in which you asked to be kept in the closest touch with provincial reactions to the resolution of the Congress Working Committee?

2. It has never seemed likely that the Working Committee's demands would meet with any general support outside Congress circles in this province. Punjabi Muslims of almost all shades of opinion subscribe to the criticisms voiced by Jinnah, Firoz, Sikander and others. The Muslim press in Lahore is unanimously hostile, using such expressions as "blackmail", "hypocrisy" and "ludicrous demand". The Qadiani paper *Sunrise* takes the same line. Sikander said in a meeting at Lyallpur: "If the British quit India, chaos will follow and no ordered Government will be possible."

3. The Punjab Congress party is fortunately at a low ebb and its leaders are continually at loggerheads with each other. The two main groups led by Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava and Dr. Satyapal will both be inclined to follow Gandhi's lead, but the Satyapal group will hesitate to do anything that may increase the prestige of Gopi Chand. The Congress communists cannot well support a movement of the kind contemplated and may be forced out of their alignment with the Congress. The Congress Akalis will be in an awkward position in view of the recent Akali–Unionist rapprochement[2] and of their serious internal differences and, though individuals may join a civil disobedience movement, it is scarcely conceivable that there will be any unanimity on the subject.

4. It is significant that the Lahore Hindu press, which ordinarily supports the Congress, has shown no great enthusiasm for the resolution. The *Tribune* while resenting outside criticism has refused to advocate a mass movement. The *Daily Herald* has said that "it would be much better if the Congress instead of demanding the withdrawal of British rule had made some start with the facilities granted by the Government to prepare India to meet all eventualities". The *Hindu* asks "how the Congress when it has no scheme for maintaining independence can hope to ensure that India will enjoy *swaraj*".

5. The Sikhs generally are better disposed to Government than for some

[1] No. 285; the date should be 18 July. [2] See No. 287, note 2.

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time past as the result of the Sikander–Baldev pact and the appointment of Sir Jogendra Singh to the expanded Council. Sir Jogendra Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh made distinctly satisfactory speeches at a tea party last Tuesday which I attended. Baldev Singh's remarks included the following:—

> "Let me again make it clear that while I stand steadfastly to safeguard the interests of my community, I will be failing in my duty if I do it at the expense of any other community or do something which will embitter the communal situation. . . . Our country is threatened with evil forces of aggression and it should be the duty of every true Punjabi to get ready to make any sacrifice to meet internal disorder, and to defeat the forces of external aggression. My community has already played its part well and I have no doubt whatsoever that it will excel its tradition by answering the call of the hour and mustering in thousands to repel the evil forces that are threatening the democracies of the world."

The speech was reported in the press. In the *Tribune* of yesterday there is a statement by Sardar Naunihal Singh, Sardar Jogendar Singh Man, Sardar Bahadur Gurbachan Singh and Sardar Raghbir Singh Sandhanwalia. The first two are M.L.As, Naunihal Singh being also of course a member of the National Defence Council. Sardar Bahadur Gurbachan Singh is Deputy Speaker of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, while Sardar Raghbir Singh Sandhanwalia is President of the Khalsa Defence League of India.[3] This statement definitely criticises the Congress proposals, though it is not as outspoken as one would like: I append a copy for ready reference. As I anticipated, Sir Jogendra Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh have hesitated to come out into the open on the subject of the Congress Working Committee's resolution. Nevertheless there are gratifying signs that the Sikhs will be sensible and the Congress proposals have been criticised in Sikh newspapers of the Punjab. It is difficult to be sure that professional agitators among the Sikhs would not create a certain amount of disturbance if the movement really got going elsewhere. There are always a good many Sikhs who are temperamentally 'agin the Government', but the bond between the Akalis and the Congress is not so strong as it was, and Gandhi can certainly not rely on any general Sikh support in the early stages of a mass movement.

6. As we reported yesterday to the Home Department, there are signs that the Vernacular press is being used by the Congress to broadcast veiled instructions for a mass movement, and even the Indian News Agency yesterday published a long report from Bombay giving the comments of Mr. Mehrally, Mayor of Bombay, in support of the proposed movement. It seems most unsatisfactory that the Indian News Agency should be used for what amounts in effect to Congress propaganda. More stringent action to control the press and press agencies seems well worth considering.

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7. The Congress in the Punjab is, I think, lukewarm about launching a movement and ill-equipped to do so, but disturbances in other parts of India can hardly fail to give rise to some degree of trouble in this province.

Yours sincerely,

B. J. GLANCY

Enclosure to No. 331

Tribune dated 25th July 1942

SUICIDAL FOR CONGRESS TO START DIRECT ACTION

Sikh M.L.As' Statement

SIMLA, July 23rd

Sardar Naunihal Singh, M.L.A., Sardar Jogendar Singh Man, M.L.A., S. B. Gurbachan Singh, Deputy Speaker of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, and Sardar Raghbir Singh Sandhanwalia, President of the Khalsa Defence of India League, have issued the following statement to the Press:—

"We have noticed with great surprise and alarm the drift of Congress towards direct action in these critical days. We, who are fighting for the defence of India, are no less anxious that, when peace is gained, India may also gather the harvest of the great sacrifice she is making.

At this critical hour it would be almost suicidal on the part of the Congress to start any movement which may lead to the dissipation of our energies and the undermining of our War effort.

His Excellency the Viceroy's Cabinet has been Indianised, but it has not yet begun to function. It should be given an opportunity to work for a settlement such as the people of India desire. Whatever the Congress leaders may think, those who are fighting on our far-flung frontiers—men drawn from India, Empire countries and America—would not be grateful if Congress starts a campaign of disruption in these critical days. On the other hand, the new Cabinet should no more delay a declaration of its policy, its determination to maintain the integrity of India and its resolve to make the Government of India truly national."

[3] Formed in 1941 with the object of encouraging Sikh recruitment to the army.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

IMMEDIATE *27 July 1942*

No. 2203–S. You will have had Laithwaite's message[1] to Stephenson about paragraph 5 of your telegram No. G.–231[2] of 24th July. I should be most grateful if it is at all possible for you consistently with general security to hold your hand for the moment as regards this arrest. I do not want, if I can, to proceed piecemeal, and would much prefer in interest of my general plan to go slowly at this stage. Of course, if in your opinion it is essential that arrest should go through for security reasons, I should not be justified in dissuading you: but I trust that that may not be so.

[1] Not printed. [2] No. 336.

333

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir A. Hope (Madras), Sir R. Lumley (Bombay), Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar), Sir B. Glancy (Punjab), Sir T. Stewart (Bihar), and Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMMEDIATE *27 July 1942*

MOST SECRET

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2208–S. Would you refer to paragraph 4 of draft express letter[1] enclosed in my Private Secretary's letter to your Secretary of 24th July 1942.[2]

2. I have been considering this issue further. Main alternatives are—

(*a*) deportation of all or some of the Working Committee, *plus* possibly certain troublesome characters below Working Committee level;

(*b*) imprisonment in India of members of Working Committee—the party being divided between Yeravda Jail[3] and Attock Fort.[4]

3. Considerations are nicely balanced. Deportation would have deterrent effect, would provide plain warning that we mean business, and would prevent absolutely any clandestine participation by prisoners in the movement. Conversely, there may be suggestion of undue harshness with some risk of enduring bitterness amongst Indians. We must, I think, face the fact that if we do not

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deport immediately on arrest, it would be more difficult to justify our doing so later, given the fact that individuals concerned will have committed no further overt act.

4.[5] Incidentally, I think it most important to dispose of Patel, whatever we do with the rest of them, and would like your own opinion on specific question of case for deporting him (possibly with one or two other bad hats) even if everyone else was provided for in India.

5.[6] I would welcome your view in particular on case of deporting Nehru or merely keeping him in this country, and also as to case for picking up Purushottamdas Tandon and possibly one or two others whom you might like to see out of the way simultaneously with the Working Committee.

6. I am consulting certain other Governors and would welcome the earliest expression of your frank view.

[1] Not printed. [2] No. 322. [3] At Poona. [4] In the Punjab.
[5] Para. 4 was for Sir R. Lumley only. [6] Para. 5 was for Sir M. Hallett only.

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Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/609: f 396

27 July 1942, 8.35 pm
Received: 28 July, 2.15 pm

193–C. Your telegram No. 2157–S[1] of July 22nd regarding state and morale of police. Strength of [*sic*] figures are as follows. (*a*) District police: Officers pre-war 702, present 841; constabulary pre-war 17,647, present 23,753. (*b*) Bombay City Police: Officers pre-war 377, present 555; constabulary pre-war 5,375, present 8,096. Out of combined increase in constabulary of 8,827, 4,506 men have less than 4 months service while there were on the 15th July 864 vacancies. I anticipate no undue delay in filling these vacancies.

2. Morale is good and I am confident there will be no break. There has been no break on previous occasions and this time the pressure will, I feel, be less than before. One result of increase in numbers is of course that a considerable proportion of officers and men have less experience, but homogeneity of force has not be[en] affected.

[1] No. 303.

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Mr Lacey to Sir G. Laithwaite

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMMEDIATE *27 July 1942*

No. 37. Your personal and most secret letter,[1] dated July 24th. Plan of action against Congress. His Excellency the Governor suggests that Central Government might consider whether provincial branches of affiliated bodies such as Congress Socialist Party should not be proscribed along with Provincial Congress Committees. This, while not necessary, for purposes of arrest, would facilitate search and (group omitted) property.

2. As regards Press, His Excellency assumes that, once second stage of plan[2] has been put into effect, it will be open to Provincial Government to suppress, without prior reference to Government of India, individual newspapers which persist in advocacy of mass movement. Is this assumption correct?

[1] No. 322. [2] See No. 393.

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Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/609: f 397

27 July 1942
Received: 28 July

G.–232. This is in reply to your secret telegram No. 2157–S,[1] dated July 22, 1942, in which you ask for an appreciation of the morale of the police. The view of the Inspector-General, which is endorsed by such senior officers as he has had time to consult is briefly that in respect of ordinary police duties within their own local areas morale is good and there is little cause for anxiety in regard to their attitude to any move by Congress, provided first that they are sure of full support and that action against Congress will be whole-hearted, and second that Government show due regard for their material welfare and protect them adequately from difficulties arising from high prices and shortage of foodstuffs. The Inspector-General writes as follows: "If they can be assured that action is to be whole-hearted and as final as can reasonably be expected in human affairs, I am satisfied that they will be not only ready but pleased at the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves in their own estimation *vis à vis* the general public." In respect of what may be termed extraordinary police duties, for

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example, in case of air raids, semi-military duties and service far from their homes even within the province, the position is less satisfactory and there is cause for some anxiety. There has so far been no real trouble but certain incidents have shown that, leaving aside the special armed constabulary who have been enrolled for protection of railways and internment camps, it will be wise to retain police as near their homes as possible and that we must expect desertions in case of serious air raids.

2. I see no reason to differ from the Inspector-General's views on either point. In regard to material welfare of the force recent increases in the dearness allowance and also in the city allowances in Cawnpore will benefit all ranks up to head constable. Efforts are also being made to secure adequate stocks of grain for the force, as well as for other public servants, in case of emergency.

3. The rate of wastage in the first six months of the present year has been considerably above normal. In ordinary circumstances this might have been held to indicate deterioration in morale, but in existing circumstances may be mainly due to two causes, namely, (1) anxiety in regard to the military situation including threat of invasion and air raids, and (2) recruitment of unsuitable material in the course of the rapid expansion which has recently taken place. The number of men with less than two years' service discharged from the force has been unusually large.

4. The expansion referred to above has also involved accelerated promotion and the transfer of a considerable number of the most efficient non-gazetted officers and under-officers from the district executive force to the special armed constabulary and military police with consequent weakening of the district force. We hope that this will only be temporary, but it is a factor in the present situation which cannot be altogether overlooked.

[1] No. 303.

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Mr Gandhi to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

27 July 1942

Dear Lord Linlithgow,
How exceedingly nice of you to have listened to the cry of the dumb cow?[1]
May I say, God bless you for your kind act!

I am,
Yours sincerely,
M. K. GANDHI

[1] See No. 325.

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Sir H. Craik to Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar

L/P&S/12/998: ff 376–7

PERSONAL AND SECRET CAMP, ERNAKULUM, COCHIN, *27 July 1942*

Negotiations with political parties in British India

I am writing in reply to Your Highness's personal and secret letter to me of July the 10th[1] on the above subject, in which you informed me that the Standing Committee of Princes at its recent meeting recommended that a few leading Princes and Ministers should be asked individually to establish informal contacts with certain specified British Indian leaders and to report the results of these informal talks to yourself. You asked me to let you know privately if His Excellency had any reactions against the proposed approach to the question on this informal basis.

2. I have mentioned the matter to His Excellency, who explained that, while he felt some diffidence about offering advice to the Princes on a tactical move the expediency of which they are probably better qualified to appraise than himself, he could not help thinking that it might be better to defer for the moment any approach on their part to political leaders in British India. As Your Highness is aware, your official representation[2] regarding the position of the Princes in the negotiations conducted by Sir Stafford Cripps has recently been forwarded to the India Office. It is possible that after that representation has been considered, the Secretary of State may be able to give you a clearer picture than is now available of the position contemplated for the States in any future Indian polity. It would in His Excellency's view be advisable to await such clarification.

3. His Excellency also has in mind the point that Sir Stafford Cripps' advice that the Princes should make contacts with the major political parties referred only to the constitutional developments that seemed to be impending when the advice was given. These developments have for the present at any rate somewhat receded into the background and by far the most urgent question at the moment is, in His Excellency's view and he is confident also in that of the Princes, the successful prosecution of the war. His Excellency feels that the Princes, whose help in India's war effort has been so conspicuous and single-minded, will hardly desire to discuss their attitude in this regard with the leaders of parties which are either taking no part in India's war effort or are deliberately hampering it.

Yours sincerely,

H. D. CRAIK

[1] No. 242. [2] No. 115.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 318

L/PO/6/105: f 59

India as a Factor in Anglo-American Relations

NOTE BY THE LORD PRIVY SEAL

GWYDYR HOUSE, WHITEHALL, S.W.1, *27 July 1942*

The annexed report upon India as a Factor in Anglo-American relations was written by Mr. Graham Spry of my staff.

On my way back from India I sent Mr. Spry direct from Lagos to the United States of America so that he would be available to assist in propaganda, if necessary.

The attached report embodies his conclusions after the two months he spent in America and Canada. I circulate it as it may be of interest to my colleagues.

R. S. C.

Annex to No. 339

INDIA AS A FACTOR IN ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

It may be useful if I set down in summary form the conclusions formed on this subject during the tour of the United States which I was authorised to make, partly for official and partly for personal reasons. The tour occupied the ten weeks 22nd April–30th June, and Baltimore, New York, Washington, San Francisco, Denver, Kansas City, St. Louis and Chicago were visited. In Washington, appointments were made for me with the President[1] and with members of his staff and of the State Department. Through personal connections, but also through His Majesty's Consuls and the British Press Service, there were interviews or conversations with more than 100 groups of Americans.

1. The interest of the American public in India is enduring and widespread. It varies with the stimulus of events, but it is persistent; there is almost everywhere and almost at any period an audience for speakers or writers on India. That interest is not primarily founded in India as India, but in British relations with India. If the accidents of history had made India part of the Portuguese instead of the British Empire, there would be no comparable interest.

2. British relations with India appeal to and stir American nationalism. The interest in India arises from the seeming similarity between the relations of Britain to Indian independence and of Britain to the independence of the Thirteen Colonies. The superficial pattern of the relations of Britain to India neatly dovetails into the pattern of the American Revolution—of colonies

[1] See No. 61.

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struggling to unite into a nation, to free themselves from the commercial restrictions, political interference and control by Britain. The American readiness to adopt a critical attitude towards British relations with India derives not from India herself, but from the very pattern of American nationalism.

3. American nationalism embraces at once both a sense of community and a sense of rivalry with Britain and the British Empire. The sense of community springs from common language, similar laws, comparable institutions, &c., and sometimes identical necessities in foreign affairs. It is the manifest policy of the Administration to strengthen this sense. But the sense of rivalry derives from the history of revolutionary separation from Britain, and the monuments, memorials and symbols which from childhood shape the content and the concepts of so much of American political thinking. The sense of community and the sense of rivalry are both deep-seated. Both have their emotional content. British relations with India appeal to and nourish the sense of rivalry or, at its worst, of hostility towards Britain. The rôle of India in American opinion compares in character, though far less in degree, with the rôle of Ireland in American opinion three decades ago.

4. The trend of American opinion on British relations with India is towards sympathy for the more extreme and usually the Congress party points of view. The trend is almost always critical towards British policy. The American public largely holds the conviction that the Indians unitedly seek independence, entirely deserve it and that Britain, for her own commercial and other purposes, is withholding independence from them. Americans expect and American opinion through the press and wireless will almost certainly insist upon independence in the future. If there had been no Mission to India in 1942, there would have been some measure of such insistence.

5. The Mission to India widely and beneficially changed American opinion on British relations with India:—

(*a*) It demonstrated that the Indian problem was not simple and that it was more a problem within India than between Britain and India. These results will probably be lasting.

(*b*) The American public generally approved of the Draft Proposals and felt that the Indian political leaders should have accepted them. The intransigence of Congress, and particularly of Mr. Gandhi, adversely influenced the position of both in the United States. But to Americans Congress is the champion, the voice of the whole of India, and, to a large extent, Congress so remains. To this the very name Congress contributes. The Mission to India will remain as a promise of independence clearly given and to that extent the proposals will continue to command at least intelligent American opinion. But the secular pressure

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of American nationalist attitudes will weaken the friendly feeling so evoked and stimulate criticism of British policy.

(*c*) The policy of the various information departments of the American Government is being directed towards increasing friendship with Britain and knowledge of her imperial, including Indian, problems. But some suspicion was met in official circles that a settlement in India was made impossible in the final stages of the negotiations by new or revised instructions from the War Cabinet. A question on this point was raised in a friendly tone by the President in the interview with him, and in more emphatic terms by one of his executive assistants and by officers of the State Department. The interpretation was emphatically denied and the denial was accepted.

6. The rôle of India in Anglo-American relations is not of first significance, but at a moment of tension it could so become. It remains, however, a permanent factor in the complex of factors that determine American feelings, favourable or unfavourable, towards Britain. As such a factor, it is primarily a subject of Anglo-American relations; the views of Americans about India are essentially part of the views of Americans about Britain. Therefore, the responsibility for information and propaganda about British relations with India, though not necessarily about India, should be the responsibility of His Majesty's Government. There is so little knowledge of British relations with India, so many and such deep-rooted misconceptions of the Indian question in the United States, that I am led to state with emphasis that this responsibility seems not to have been adequately borne. It should be so borne.

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 96th Conclusions, Minute 8

L/P&J/8/597: f 178

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 27 July 1942 at 5.30 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Ernest Bevin

Also present during discussion of item 8 were: Mr S. M. Bruce, Mr W. Nash, Sir Kingsley Wood, Mr Herbert Morrison, Mr Amery, Viscount Cranborne, Mr A. V. Alexander, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Mr Brendan Bracken, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Sir Dudley Pound, Sir Charles Portal, Sir Alan Brooke

INDIA

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that the Viceroy desired[1] that a statement should be made on behalf of the Government which would be a

[1] See No. 330.

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warning to the Congress Working Committee before their meeting early next month. He would be glad if the War Cabinet would authorise him to make a statement on these lines in reply to a Question in the House of Commons on Thursday.[2]

The War Cabinet—

Invited the S/S for India to arrange for the text of the statement which he desired to make to be circulated forthwith to War Cabinet Ministers. If Ministers had any comments to offer on the terms of the statement, they should communicate them to the Secretary during the course of the following day, and the Prime Minister would then decide whether it was necessary for the proposed statement to be discussed at a meeting of the War Cabinet.

[2] 30 July.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 319

L/PO/6/102a: f 85

Proposed Statement in the House of Commons on Indian Policy

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

27 July 1942

By conclusion 8 of this evening's War Cabinet meeting W.M. (42/96)[1] I was invited to circulate for the information of my colleagues the statement which I propose, on the suggestion of the Viceroy, to make in the House of Commons on Thursday the 30th July in reply to a question on Indian policy. If Ministers have any comments to make on the terms of the statement will they let the Secretary of the War Cabinet have them by tomorrow, i.e. Tuesday.

L. S. A.

Annex to No. 341

PROPOSED QUESTION AND ANSWER FOR THURSDAY

Question:

What are the present intentions of His Majesty's Government as regards the political situation in India?

Answer.

[*There follows the draft statement in No. 324, paras. 4–5, except that (a) the opening sentence has 'The Congress Party Working Committee' instead of 'The*

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Working Committee of the Indian National Congress'; (b) the final sentence of para. 4 is amended as suggested by Lord Linlithgow in No. 330, with the substitution of 'Indian' for 'India's'; (c) in the first sentence of the last sub-para. of para. 5 'unflinching' is omitted.]

[1] No. 340.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *28 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2220–S. Reuters have telegraphed out a rumour, stated to emanate from responsible sources in London that Wendell Willkie is about to visit this country, China and Russia, charged by the President *inter alia* with mission of bringing about a *modus vivendi* between Britain and India, &c., which would prevent nationalist agitation interfering with war effort. I imagine that there is no foundation whatever for this, and am issuing immediate dementi; but would be grateful if you would confirm. But it is of course just the type of rumour which it is most important that Reuters should not put out in times like these, for it represents a very direct encouragement to Congress. Would it not be possible to get them to consult Joyce or the India Office over suggestions of this nature before they give them publicity?

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Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMMEDIATE *28 July 1942*

MOST SECRET

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 195–C. Your private and personal telegram No. 2208–S,[1] dated July 27th.

1. Although there are certain strong attractions in deportation, I do not hesitate, on consideration, to give my opinion against it. It would, I think, shock moderate opinion in India and alienate support from us. It would always remain a bitter focus of agitation.

[1] No. 333.

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2. To deport Patel alone would provide him with a halo of martyrdom above the others and I do not favour it. The important thing with him is to arrest him at once and sever his communications with the outside. Attock seems the best place for him.

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Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

MOST SECRET *28 July 1942 (by post)*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
No. G.–234. Your telegram No. 2208–S[1] of July 27th.

1. Following points occur to me:—

(*a*) Doubtful whether it will have deterrent effect. Deportation of large numbers which is obviously impossible might be deterrent but removal of selected few apart from eliciting sympathy of Liberals might provoke subordinate leaders to give more trouble in jails by hunger-strikes, breaches of discipline, &c., and outside jails to make greater efforts to extend movement.

(*b*) We can show we mean business equally effectively by other action which being on lines followed in previous movements will not provoke criticism or elicit sympathy. Action suggested in Express letter[2] is adequate except that paragraph 6 indicates somewhat half-hearted policy in regard to Press. Have written to Maxwell about this.

(*c*) Prevention of communication between prisoners and organizers outside jail presents difficulties but deportation of few leaders excluding Gandhi does little to lessen difficulties. Difficulties can be lessened if no visitors of any kind are allowed and if Press is controlled or suppressed. Secret communications with outside world often fall into hands of police which is useful. That happened when M. N. Roy was prisoner and Pilditch might be consulted.

(*d*) Difficulty arises as to where to draw line. If only Working Committee are deported, we should only get rid of Nehru and Pant and would be left with more dangerous organizers such as Kidwai and Paliwal (already detained), Tandon, Sampurnanand and many others of local importance, as well as Forward Bloc leaders now detained.

(*e*) If deportation included Gandhi, one great advantage would be that for duration of war we might escape agitation in England and India for releases.

2. In view of these considerations advantages seem to be counterbalanced by disadvantages, particularly if Gandhi is left out and only small number deported.

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3. In view of opinion above question of deportation of Nehru hardly arises. If Working Committee are deported, including harmless people like Dr. Mahmud, he should not be excluded. Also difficult to differentiate between him and Azad.

4. Reference to Tandon and others in paragraph 4[3] not understood. I propose to arrest him and many others apart from Working Committee and we have prepared lists accordingly. This appears in accordance with paragraph 3 of Express letter. It is supremely important to arrest all organizers and failure to do so in some districts in early stages of last movement was one reason for its prolongation. Such arrests will also show we mean business.

[1] No. 333. [2] See No. 322. [3] In fact, para. 5.

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Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/609: ff 407–8

28 July 1942, 2.30 pm
Received: 31 July, 9.45 pm

361–MS. Your Excellency's telegram No. 2157–S[1] dated July 22nd. I have consulted Chief Secretary and Inspector-General of Police and I agree with them that no uneasiness need be felt about the state and morale of our police force with particular regard to possible action against Congress. The Inspector-General records that the position of himself and his officers would be greatly strengthened if an assurance is given that provision will be made against future victimisation. There are difficulties in giving such assurance in view of possible independent status of India after the war but as possibility of such status appears to be receding to a period which may extend to some years I think assurance can be given to the extent that it may be declared that it will be the special concern of the Government of India and His Majesty's Government to see that adequate security is provided against victimisation. He also recommends the grant of a war allowance to subordinate officers and we are examining this question separately. Thirdly he asks for prompt and effective action at inception of movement.

2. In connection with third request all doubt has been removed by receipt of Laithwaite's express letter of July 24th[2] which I greatly (group omitted). There is point in paragraph 1(2)(*a*)[3] which needs clearing. I presume "Provincial

[1] No. 303. [2] See No. 322, note 2. [3] Cf. No. 393, para. 3 (*b*).

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Congress Committees" is used in non-technical sense to include local committees. We have three Provincial committees and there are local committees in every district and many tahsils. Many local committees will require to be declared unlawful but possibly not all as some of e.g. Berar committees are innocuous. Present information however indicates that many district and local committees are already preparing for fray and, following example of 1932, it will be essential to proceed against such as well as against Provincial Committees. I think this is probably the intention but would be glad of confirmation as we must begin appropriate preliminary action at once.

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Sir T. Stewart (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMMEDIATE *28 July 1942*
MOST SECRET
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 38. Your telegram No. 2208–S.[1] While I agree for reasons stated in Your Excellency's telegram that deportation should follow immediately on arrest, if at all, I am strongly of opinion imprisonment in India is preferable to deportation. Deportation would certainly be regarded as unduly harsh and if a mishap should occur to (say) Rajendra or Syed Mahmud, both ailing men, while in exile, there would be a serious revulsion of even moderate feeling in Bihar. We cannot ignore, moreover, the offence to religious sentiments of orthodox Hinduism.

[1] No. 333.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 165

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *28 July 1942, 2.30 pm*
PERSONAL

13311. Your personal telegram of the 26th July, 2199–S.[1] I accept your amendment and will arrange Parliamentary question for Thursday.[2]

2. Your personal telegram of the 26th July, 2192–S.[3] Many thanks. I am satisfied generally and am content to leave the manner of dealing with Gandhi to

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you if in fact you consider that the use of Regulation III is the only way effectively to cut him off from outside contacts. But having regard to that consideration, which in the case of those of the other leaders considered medically fit has suggested desirability of deportation, is there not something to be said in the case of those members of the Working Committee who cannot be deported for their internment also under Regulation III in order to avoid necessity of according facilities for interviews etc. to extent admissible under Security Prisoners' Rules? Are you satisfied that other leaders can be segregated completely from outside contacts in India if interned there under Defence of India Rules?

[1] No. 330. [2] 30 July. [3] No. 329.

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Secretary of State to Government of India, Home Department

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: ff 166–7

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *28 July 1942, 2.55 pm*

13312. Home Department. Your telegram of the 24th July, 5766.[1] Congress. I am in general agreement with your views and your proposed plan of action, and have only the following comments.

2. I note you are issuing communiqué dealing with first resolution of Working Committee, and you will doubtless ensure that the text is sent here by Reuter or otherwise. As regards second resolution I am proposing in agreement with you to deal with it this week by an arranged question in Parliament. My reply will make His Majesty's Government's attitude quite plain but in terms not sufficiently terse for the purpose of your proposed denunciation, for which I suggest the following. *Begins.* The Congress resolution (or, alternatively, the resolution adopted by the Committees which direct the policy of the Congress Party) calls for the withdrawal of British "power" from India. His Majesty's Government regard it as wholly incompatible with their responsibilities to the people of India and their obligations to the United Nations to discuss a demand the acceptance of which would plunge India into confusion and anarchy internally and would paralyse her effort in the common cause of human freedom. *Ends.* If it would suit better the tone of your proposed denunciation I should be willing to expand the foregoing by substituting early in the second sentence the word "duty" for the word "responsibilities" and (*c*) [*sic*] inserting after the word "discuss" the words "with leaders so devoid of all sense either of responsibility or of the realities of the situation".

[1] No. 319.

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3. Latter part of your paragraph 6. Your proposal for deportation in suitable cases has my support in principle and I have taken the matter up with the Colonial Office.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/Mil/7/18504: ff 188–9

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *28 July 1942, 8.30 pm*
PERSONAL

13361. Indian Officers Powers of Punishment.[1] Cabinet would like to know approximately (*a*) how many King's Commissioned Indian Officers possess this power; (*b*) how many I.C.O.s are now, or are likely in near future to be, in positions in which if they held King's Commissions they would ordinarily exercise powers of punishment.

I presume answer to (*b*) is "all" but should be glad to have present number of I.C.O.s & also to know how many are now or are likely shortly to be in positions where lack of powers of punishment is likely to cause embarrassment.

[1] On 26 April, Mr Amery received a telegram from the Government of India, Defence Department, proposing to remove the restriction placed on the powers of Indian Commissioned Officers to punish British personnel. Mr Amery and Lord Linlithgow, as well as General Wavell, supported the proposal, but because of the opposition of Sir J. Grigg, it was referred to the War Cabinet who asked for further information. (*War Cabinet W.M. (42) 96th Conclusions, Minute 7, dated 27 July 1942.*) The War Cabinet subsequently agreed to the proposal. (*War Cabinet W.M. (42) 119th Conclusions, Minute 10, dated 31 August 1942.*) See L/Mil/7/18504.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/4/24: f 935

IMPORTANT *28 July 1942*

24–U. My personal telegram 13310[1] dated 28th July. Winston at Cabinet last night supremely unreasonable. Says demand for power of punishment just sop to please your Executive and publicise further appeasement in India, last humiliation to poor British soldier, etc. He had no support except from Grigg but managed to stave off immediate decision by asking for details. No doubt you can make it clear in your official reply that this is primarily a matter of

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military discipline secondarily of the feelings of the loyal Indians on whose support we have to rely against Gandhi & Co.[2] It might be useful to get Wavell to send his own telegram to War Office.

[1] This should read 13361, i.e. No. 349.
[2] 'Gandhi & Co.' deciphered as '(gp. corrupt) crusade'.

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Viscount Cranborne to Officer Administering the Government of Nyasaland[1]

Telegram, L/P&J/8/599: f 98

IMMEDIATE *28 July 1942, 11 pm*
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL
Addressed O.A.G. Nyasaland. Repeated Chairman, East African Governors' Conference.

1. S. of S. for India has under consideration action which might become necessary if, following meeting of All-India Congress Committee on 7th August, authority of Government of India should be directly challenged by mass civil disobedience movement.

2. In that event Gandhi and other principal Congress leaders (probably 12 or 15 persons in all) may be arrested and it may be found desirable to remove them to detention outside India—

(*a*) in order to prevent them from communicating with their followers which, as shewn by experience in other cases, might not be effected by even most rigorous confinement within India, and
(*b*) as a deterrent to those who aspire to succeed the arrested men and as a means of giving confidence to waverers.

3. In these circumstances S. of S. for India has inquired whether, should the need arise, arrangements could be made for the safe custody in East Africa of these people (except Gandhi for whom accommodation elsewhere may be found) under conditions which should be reasonably comfortable but should secure every practicable precaution against communication with India.

4. In view of the size and nature of the Indian community in the maritime East African territories and Uganda I think it preferable that, if it is at all possible, Nyasaland should undertake to accept these people in the contingency contemplated by Mr. Amery. Please let me know as soon as you can whether you see any insuperable objection or difficulty and repeat your reply to Chairman, East

[1] Mr Juxon Barton.

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African Governors' Conference. You will realise need for absolute secrecy at this stage, as any leakage might imperil the whole scheme and greatly embarrass the Government of India.

5. As Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939 cannot be applied to India any Nyasaland Regulation based on draft[2] enclosed in my circular despatch of 27th September, 1940 would have to be amended by adding after the words "United Kingdom", in each place where they occur in paragraph 1 of that Regulation, the word "India" and a similar amendment would have to be made in paragraph 2(*e*). Orders for detention of these men could then be made under the amended Regulation.

[2] Namely, a draft regulation intended to serve as a model for regulations made by Colonial Governments to provide for the detention in their territory of persons lawfully detained in the United Kingdom or in any country to which the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939 extended. Though this Act did not extend to India, the Colonial Office were satisfied that persons lawfully detained in India could be detained in a Colonial territory; see No. 312, note 2.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/P&J/8/597: f 183

INDIA OFFICE, *28 July 1942*

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 43/42

Prime Minister

The gist of the proposed statement[1] is:

(*a*) the reaffirmation of our broad general purpose as to Indian self-government after the war. This is in essence the same as that contained in the declaration of August 1940.

(*b*) the warning to Congress.

The Viceroy is very anxious to combine the two in one statement. The actual text, approved by the Viceroy and indeed based on one[2] suggested by a member of his Executive, is a little verbose but is the sort of thing that should go down well in America as well as help in India.

L. S. AMERY

[1] See Annex to No. 341. [2] No. 317.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 321

L/PO/6/102a: f 90

PROPOSED STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON INDIAN POLICY

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *28 July 1942*

1. A number of amendments have been suggested to the answer which I propose to give in the House of Commons on Thursday, the text of which is in W.P. (42) 319.[1] I willingly accept the following changes:

(1) *Paragraph 4, line 7*[2]—omit "For reasons in some cases mutually destructive." (Lord Privy Seal)

(2) *Paragraph 5, line 19*—after "overhangs" insert "freedom and" (Prime Minister)

(3) *Paragraph 5, line 19*—omit "and of creating a new world order in which" and substitute "In all this". (Prime Minister)

2. Three different amendments have been suggested to the last sentence of paragraph 4. These are as follows:

(1) By the *Prime Minister*: Insert after "complete self-government" the words "within the British Commonwealth of Nations."

(2) By the *Lord President*: Redraft whole sentence as follows:—"Nevertheless His Majesty's Government stand firmly by the broad intention of their offer and on the conclusion of hostilities will address themselves afresh to finding a solution of the constitutional problem acceptable to the principal elements in Indian national life."

(3) By the *Lord Privy Seal*: Redraft whole sentence as follows:— "Nevertheless His Majesty's Government stand firmly by the broad intention of their offer that on the conclusion of hostilities India shall have it within her power to attain complete self-government."

Of these I am reluctant to accept the first as it would be taken in India as a deliberate exclusion of a major feature of the recent draft declaration and of its explanation by the Lord Privy Seal—namely the *de facto* right to leave the British Commonwealth. The Viceroy's object in suggesting that a statement be made is to make it clear that something not less liberal than the recent draft

[1] No. 341.

[2] The paragraph and line numbers in the original have been altered to correspond with the paragraphs and lines in No. 324.

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declaration will be open to India after the war. The second I am opposed to as it suggests that the onus of finding a solution after the war lies on His Majesty's Government and not primarily on Indians. I am ready to accept the third with the addition of the following words: "under constitutional arrangements devised by Indians for themselves." I feel that in the form proposed by the Lord Privy Seal it fails to lay emphasis on what has been the most important feature of His Majesty's Government's policy since the 1940 Declaration.

3. The Lord President has proposed that in *paragraph 5, line 14* the words:— "the attainment by India of her most cherished desires" should be omitted and the words "complete self-government" substituted. I feel that this is too restricted but am ready to substitute "attainment by India of her national aspirations" if this is thought preferable.

L. S. A.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/102a: f 92

INDIA OFFICE, *28 July 1942*

My dear Winston,

Many thanks for your amendments to the proposed statement on Thursday. I am, however, in some difficulty as to your suggested addition of "within the British Commonwealth of Nations" after "self-government" in the statement of our intention. You will remember that the draft Declaration not only included, in connection with the making of a treaty, a passage which definitely implied that an Indian Dominion could walk out of the Empire, but that Cripps in India said more than once in so many words that the Government's policy did include the right to secede from the Empire. I have always disliked emphasising what is not a right but a de facto possibility, and that is why I deliberately chose the words "complete self-government" instead of "independence". But to insert "British Commonwealth" at this moment will at once be interpreted by Indians to mean that we are in some way or other resolved to whittle down the Cripps Offer and would in any case, I think, be embarrassing to Cripps. I suggest you might consult him on the point, but I am pretty sure that he would prefer the suggested words to remain out.

If I am asked any Supplementary on the Question, I shall take care not to admit the right of secession but only its de facto possibility.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *28 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of 7th July[1] which came through very quickly, and which I was very glad to have. As I write I have almost completed my Council, for Ambedkar, Usman and Srivastava have all joined, and I now await only Jogendra Singh (who is taking over on the 29th) and Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar (who is taking over about the 5th). I should thus have a full team before the meeting of the A.-I.C.C. on 7th August, and there may well be some little value in the fact that the important discussions that are now going on about policy towards Congress, and possibly the decision to arrest Gandhi, &c., fall to be conducted with a Council entirely non-official save for the Chief and myself, and entirely Indian save for the Chief, myself and Benthall. Maxwell has been seedy and is likely to be out of action for the best part of a month, and Raisman is of course in London.

2. Broadly speaking, as I write, I do not think that things are going too badly for us. Congress continue to have a thoroughly bad Press in the United States and at home, and they are very conscious of it. They are coming in too for a good deal of rather sharp criticism here, and the latest utterances of their spokesmen seem to me to suggest a certain uneasiness of mind. Unfortunately that uneasiness of mind does not appear to exist (or does not manifest itself) in the one quarter in which it matters, viz. the Mahatma, and I am sure that we should make a great mistake if we were to underestimate the amount of trouble he can give us, or the amount of following which he may look for. His banner is bound to attract very substantial numbers of people, even if some of them are not too convinced of the merits of the case; and if things come to a show-down and his very clear indications that he proposes to consider using the device of a fast prove prophetic, we shall unquestionably have a strong reaction of sympathy for him here, and I have little doubt a reaction which may have to be reckoned with in the United States and possibly at home. And Congress have unfortunately got themselves into so tight a jam that I do not see much chance for them to get out without loss of face, though the suggestion, which has been made by the Congress chief whip, Mr. Satya Narayan Sinha, to the Press yesterday, that a decision might well await the assembly of the newly-elected A.-I.C.C. three months hence, gives them a method of escape, if they want to avail themselves of it.

[1] No. 233.

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3. I think I have mentioned in earlier letter[2] that I suspected that what the Mahatma was after was to work on the nerves of people at home and in the United States in the hope that he might get pressure brought to bear by the United Nations or the like, and the correctness of that view seems to be justified by Kalam Azad's appeal of yesterday.[3] I am told by the *Times* correspondent, who was present, that the Maulana showed slight signs of wishing to retain a free hand as regards even the United Nations, and was disposed to claim that the Congress addressed its observations to nobody, neither to Great Britain nor the United States, nor any one else, though it would be quite ready to *consider* anything that came from the United Nations. The suggestion was made to me by Holburn that Congress might feel that the Americans or the Chinese might be somewhat harder in their approach to the Indian problem than His Majesty's Government have been for very many years. I was interested to see that the Maulana, with much wisdom, took his stand on the resolution of the Working Committee and not on the interpretations of that resolution, or the comments on it, which Gandhi has let us have in such abundant measure!

4. I read what you say in paragraph 2 of your letter with a great deal of sympathy. As you know, I have felt in the past that there were great difficulties in "outlawing" Congress, or even in saying that we should not have dealings with them again in the present war: and, when in paragraph 3 of your personal telegram of 25th July, No. 13220,[4] about the proposed parliamentary question you took exception to a sentence in my draft about the impossibility of constitutional progress during war on the ground that, if the war was prolonged, the statement might be falsified by events, and secondly that it might provoke reactions in Parliament and elsewhere, which it would be convenient to avoid at this juncture, I felt that much the same considerations which have weighed with me in the past were in your mind now. Had Congress behaved at all prudently, I should still feel that we had better avoid a course that might eventuate in our having to eat humble pie. But now that the Mahatma has got himself and his friends into such a hopeless tangle, I am, I confess, tempted to wonder whether we should not be well advised to consider saying straight out that we will have nothing to do with Congress during the present war, and taking the chance of our having to eat our words.

5. I am particularly anxious to avoid in any statement that we may make now any suggestion that, e.g. we are reaffirming our constitutional policy merely in the interests of conciliating Congress, or that we are trying to appeal to Congress to think better. You are perfectly right in identifying[5] the Muslim reaction to any such tactics on our part, and you are perfectly right again, if I may say so, when you say that the complaint is always made that we woo the irreconcilables and do very little to conciliate those who are really out to help.

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6. I am most grateful for your reception of my Council's suggestion of an arranged Parliamentary question, and I think that, in the form in which it has now come back from you, it might be of value. I agree that the compliment to my Council (and to Mody) involved in taking the bulk of Mody's draft was worth something and, while the statement of our intentions about the constitutional position may not be as precise as might be desired in some quarters, I am quite sure that the dangers of alienating or alarming those who are upset by the Cripps declaration are considerable. The Sikhs were very present in our minds when we discussed that aspect in Council, and the moment the issue came up Firoz made it clear that the Muslims equally might be expected to jib at any reiteration of the original Cripps formulæ. I should not myself have too much minded had there been no Parliamentary question at all, for I regard the Congress as irreconcilable and I doubt the real importance of soothing misapprehensions among the moderates. But I felt that the matter was one in which I must defer to the views of my Council, who have after all their ears much closer to the ground than I can. I thought there was force in your point that it would have been better to have delayed any statement of the views of His Majesty's Government until after the meeting of the A.-I.C.C., but the difficulty arising out of the Parliamentary recess seemed decisive to me, and if the question goes through for 30th July, the week that elapses between then and the meeting of the A.-I.C.C. may give people, whose ears are open, time to ruminate on this explicit statement of the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the Congress threats.

[Para. 7, on airborne troops and unified command for all services; para. 8, on the non-arrival in India of plans for parachute production and for the folding bicycle; and para. 9, on Ranchi Clearing Station, omitted.]

10. Thank you so much for your telegram[6] about Cripps' broadcast. As it turned out it was, I think, a very good one, and it has been extremely unpalatable to the Congress here. But you will I know not have misunderstood my anxiety, given the extent to which Cripps' *obiter dicta* continue to crop up

[2] No. 307, para. 3.

[3] In the course of a statement to a Press Conference at New Delhi on 27 July, reported in *The Times of India*, 29 July, Azad said: 'I regard the Working Committee's resolution as an appeal to the United Nations to intervene on behalf of India. . . . The matter is no longer one between India and England but between India and the United Nations, as the latter want to make India their operational base.'

[4] No. 324. [5] See No. 233, para. 2.

[6] In his telegram 2198–S of 26 July, Lord Linlithgow had asked Mr Amery to satisfy himself that the broadcast which Sir S. Cripps was to make to the U.S. on 27 July (2 am, B.S.T.) contained nothing embarrassing, particularly regarding 'conventions', the Governor-General's veto, or other controversial issues. He added that the Princes, Muslims, and Sikhs would need most careful watching, and stated that he was quite ready to refer the matter to the Prime Minister if Mr Amery thought that wise. Mr Amery replied in telegram 910 of 26 July that he had seen the broadcast and Lord Linlithgow need have no anxiety. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 and L/PO/6/105e: f 95.

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at every point, to make sure that he was not going to say something about conventions, the building of Cabinets or the like, which would have added further fuel to the flames out here.

[Para. 11, on Colonel Yee; para. 12, on shortage of medical officers; and para. 13, on problem of sick and wounded evacuees from Burma, omitted.]

14. You will remember that on your recommendation I agreed to Mr. Symonds coming out here to do work on behalf of the Society of Friends. The understanding was that that work should be purely humanitarian, and I was of course very glad to give all facilities for it. Mr. Alexander without reference to me was subsequently added to the party; and on his return from his first visit to Gandhi immediately mentioned the possibility of acting as a mediator between Gandhi and the world in the same way as C. F. Andrews had done, that proposition having, he said, been put to him by Gandhi. He added that he had been given to understand by Cripps that any peace-making efforts that he could make would of course be welcome. Now had I known that there was to be any question of any political activity by these people I would not have agreed to their coming, and I am bound to say that I shall take very strong exception to it if Alexander develops on these lines. He has again been to Wardha in the last few days, and the Metropolitan has now written[7] to me that Alexander has picked up certain information there and would like to come and see me and place before me certain statements made to him by Gandhi. I shall not be able to see him, though I am of course quite ready that he should send me anything he thinks may help. But if you can arrange, as the original arrangements were made through the India Office, to give a hint to the Friends House that the basis on which these gentlemen were sent out here was purely one of help to evacuees and the like, it will I think save a certain amount of trouble in future. I have given instructions for special facilities to be given to Alexander and Symonds in the Orissa States. But that was on the assumption that they had nothing to do with politics. If as now appears to be the case they (or Alexander) are beginning to dabble in politics I may have to reconsider the matter. Will you think this over and see what you can do? I have no doubt that a hint from home is all that is needed.

[Para. 15, on a note by Sir R. Reddy on the quality of candidates for the I.C.S., omitted.]

16. You will remember that we had some correspondence[8] at the beginning of the year (arising out of a reference made to me by Twynam) as to the steps to be taken by way of paying honour to Gandhi's memory on his death. You left the decision to me, and I thought on the whole that the best thing would be to see how the situation developed. I therefore sent Twynam no reply at the time. I thought it well to revive the issue with him last month, and you will

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have had copies of my letter to him of 8th June[9] and of his reply of 19th June.[10] As you will see Twynam is still disposed in certain circumstances to half-mast the flag and to close offices. I have been through the whole of this business again in some detail. In the result I have reached the conclusion that the wise course would be in no circumstances to half-mast flags, but to leave Twynam discretion to close offices if Gandhi dies when he is not in custody or actively engaged in operations against us should a request be made to the Governor for offices to be closed. I send you copy of my letter[11] to him by this bag. I do not propose to issue any general instruction. The matter will be of acute interest primarily in the Central Provinces.

29 July 1942

17. We had a good discussion in Council this morning on action against the Congress, and I hope that they will stand pretty solid if it comes to the point. Ambedkar, Usman and Srivastava appeared for the first time and made quite useful contributions.

18. As I close this letter, I have just had your telegram No. 24-U[12] of 28th July about powers of punishment. You have my entire sympathy! I am asking the Chief to come and see me this evening and will discuss with him how best to handle this. But it is of interest, as it links up closely with a somewhat disturbing conversation which I had yesterday with Firoz Khan Noon. He told me that in his opinion there was great and growing bitterness, now of long standing, among King's Indian Commissioned Officers, who resented the suggestion (brought out by deferential [differential?] rates of pay) that they were in any way lower in status than their European colleagues, and were inclined to think that they had various other grievances, e.g. preferential treatment thought to be given to European officers, no better trained than they were, as regards acting rank, temporary command, and the like. According to Firoz, who has wide family and personal connection with the Indian Army, this feeling (which I have not had prominently brought to my notice before) was now of considerable standing, and our task, were we to try to find really contented King's Indian Commissioned Officers, would not be an easy one. I asked him what their general political reaction was at the moment and he said quite frankly that, while they might not favour the Congress policy, they, Muhammadans alike with Hindus, were very much for Gandhi as the one man who could make the British sit up: and that he was not free from doubt as to the extent to which, if it came to firing, they would be anxious to fire on Congress supporters. He went so far [as] to affirm his doubts as to whether these officers would prove staunch in the event of a Japanese or German invasion of India. I said that this was all to my mind a very disturbing picture and suggested that

[7] MSS. EUR. F. 125/124. [8] Not printed; but see No. 252, note 4.
[9] Not printed. [10] Not printed. [11] Not printed. [12] No. 350.

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he had better talk to the Chief (with whom I have myself had a word), and that in any case he should keep me in touch personally, so far as possible, with any impressions that he might himself derive of feeling in this very important class. I think you should know at once what Firoz told me (though I did not think it worth telegraphing). Of course, what we are witnessing is, to some extent, the inevitable consequence of the growth of India towards full stature as a nation, and I fear that the ferment which Firoz reports will become more active and more pronounced as time goes on. I will, of course, with Wavell, keep an eye very closely on this position now that it has been brought to my notice. Let me only add that you and I both know Firoz well, and that I might have been more disturbed (though I do not take this by any means lightly) had what he said to me been communicated by someone a little less inclined to over-emphasis.

All the best.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *29 July 1942, 8.5 pm*
Received: 29 July, 8.15 pm

No. 2225-S. Your telegram No. 13311,[1] 28th July. Many thanks. I will reply separately as regards use of Regulation III, &c. I have thought it well to sound selected Governors on the deportation *versus* detention in India issue, as I had some indications that deportation might alienate certain of our well-wishers, and this is not a matter to take any chances over. I am interested to find that both Lumley[2] and Stewart[3] (the only replies I have so far had) are very strongly against deportation and in favour of detention in India, and that they both confirm the suggestion that deportation would be ill-received and might develop into a real grievance likely to leave a very bitter and lasting memory. These views are shared by Tottenham and Pilditch. If further replies confirm this, the case for detention here (despite all the attractions of the other scheme) will of course be clear.

[1] No. 347. [2] No. 343. [3] No. 346.

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Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

MOST SECRET *29 July 1942*

No. 362-M.S. Your Excellency's private and personal telegram dated July 27th, No. 2208.[1] I view question in three aspects. First the effect at Home where one leftist paper has suggested we should laugh off movement as we did successfully in later stages of *satyagraha* movement. It will no doubt be procedure in proposed denunciation of Congress leaders that forthcoming movement is entirely distinct from *satyagraha* movement. The latter movement was symbolical in character and confined to a few. The proposed movement is to be a mass movement and "open rebellion".[2] The *satyagraha* movement was inaugurated when India was not directly threatened. The proposed movement is one which will give great encouragement to our enemies at a time when they are eager to take advantage of any internal disturbance to carry out an attack on India. Secondly, there is the deterrent effect in India, to which Your Excellency refers, counterbalanced by the risk of overdoing it with resulting swinging over to sympathy for Congress leaders and possibility of some risk of enduring bitterness. I doubt whether deportation as against imprisonment will do much to increase bitterness and consider the risk worth running. Experience during the terrorist movement was that the firmer our measures the more support we got. Now that we are committed to refusal to coerce Muslim Provinces, there is much to be said for bringing Congress back to reality by measures calculated to have a deterrent effect and indicating clearly the determination of His Majesty's Government and indeed so far as I understand all but the extreme leftists are not blackmailed into conceding all that Congress demands. Thirdly, there is the effect which will be produced on the Axis Powers, particularly Japan. I do not consider that any measure will be too severe which will have the effect of indicating to the Japanese that we will tolerate no revolutionary or subversive movement in India. Such effect will help to increase our own security which is an overriding consideration in these anxious days and will act as a tonic to our own officers—British and Indian.

On all the three grounds therefore, I favour deportation in the present circumstances of a limited few entirely on account of the moral effect which will be produced. The Working Committee has been playing with fire for so long that I doubt whether the moderate or our own supporters will be shocked at an uncompromising rejoinder to uncompromising treachery.

The latest information available to me indicates that the movement will

[1] No. 333. [2] Cf. No. 275, para. 1.

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be designed on the most subversive and dangerous lines and in war-time I consider that the more signal the counter-measures taken the better. Firmest possible measures at the start are essential to prevent the movement gaining ground and absorbing the whole time of the Police force.

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Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

29 July 1942 (by post)

No. 36-G. Your private and personal telegram No. 2208-S.[1] My personal inclination is in favour of deportation as likely to provide the more effective deterrent. But Punjab Government is not so intimately concerned as some other Provinces and few if any will qualify for deportee category from Punjab.

[1] No. 333.

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Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/609: f 406

29 July 1942 (by post)
Received: 31 July

37-G. Your Excellency's telegram No. 2157-S,[1] dated July 22nd about state and morale of police force. The sanctioned strength of the Punjab Police is now 9,000 more than the pre-war strength. The standard of recruits has naturally gone down somewhat owing to military recruiting but the number of unfilled vacancies in the regular police is very small. The Additional Police are however considerably below strength owing to the fact that the men taken are of the same type as those accepted for garrison duties in the army. The force as a whole is working under considerable strain and we are short of experienced officers but I think the morale is as good as ever and my Inspector-General is satisfied that provided no extra large scale internal security measures are required simultaneously the force will be able to tackle a mass movement by the Congress. I agree with his estimate.

[1] No. 303.

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Sir T. Stewart (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/609: f 403

IMMEDIATE

29 July 1942, 3 pm
Received: 29 July, 6 pm

39. Your telegram 2157-S.[1] State and morale of police force in Bihar.

2. Recent additions to strength of force have been considerable but so also have been extra duties arising out of war, increase in crime etc. In particular deputation of substantial number of experienced and capable sub-Inspectors and Inspectors has inevitably reduced the general level of efficiency in those ranks. It must be recognised therefore that if widespread and serious internal disorder develops strain imposed on police force will be a formidable one and it may be necessary for them temporarily to neglect certain routine and less important duties in order to concentrate on essentials.

3. *Morale* (*a*) Officers. If they are assured from the beginning that government intend to adopt firm and unequivocal policy (which is at the same time not unnecessarily vindictive) towards any subversive movement of Congress, I think we can rely on loyalty and staunchness of officers, including Indian officers. A very few may be rather half-hearted and inclined to sit on the fence. (*b*) Deputy Superintendents and Inspectors. Remarks about officers apply generally to them also. (*c*) Sub-Inspectors. Their position is more difficult. In the outlying areas the brunt of the battle will fall on them and force at their disposal will often be small. Their morale was undoubtedly shaken by Congress regime and to some extent their old unquestioned authority has been permanently undermined. If things went badly at the start there might be some defections in this class. But on the whole there has been marked improvement in their morale of late, given firm leading, they should for the most part hold fast.

(*d*) Constables. These include large numbers of temporary and incompletely trained men whose discipline and staunchness leave good deal to be desired. Even in the permanent ranks morale which deteriorated during the Congress regime has not recovered to the same extent as with sub-Inspectors. It will be important to deal very quickly and firmly with any attempts to "get at" the loyalty of police constables. For example, a movement to boycott families of police might be attended with serious results. But if such attempts are effectively met I believe vast majority of the men will respond to any call that is likely to be made on them.

[1] No. 303.

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Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet to First Sea Lord[1]

Telegram, L/P&J/8/599: f 99

HUSH MOST SECRET *29 July 1942, 8.54 am*
IMPORTANT AIDAC *Received: 29 July, 2.45 pm*

Addressed Admiralty 703. Most Secret and personal for 1st S.L. Viceroy has asked for a warship to be at Bombay by 8th August to convoy small number of political prisoners to Kilindini[2] for Uganda. Intend using H.M.S. *Manxman.*

[1] Copy sent to Mr Amery. [2] In Kenya.

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Viscount Cranborne to Mr Amery

L/P&J/8/599: f 97

COLONIAL OFFICE, DOWNING STREET, S.W.1, *29 July 1942*

MOST SECRET

My dear Leo,

After thinking carefully over the question, which you raised in your letter of the 23rd July,[1] of the reception and detention in some East African territory of any Congress leaders (other than Gandhi) who may be arrested in the eventuality which you contemplate, I decided that Nyasaland would be the best place to approach first, as this has the smallest Indian community. I have therefore now addressed to the Acting Governor the telegram[2] of which I enclose a copy.

I note that you have put to Linlithgow a suggestion that Gandhi might, should the need arise, be detained at Aden. I feel that I ought to let you know at once of certain objections which I see to that suggestion.

In the first place a substantial majority of the Indian population of the town of Aden are not unsympathetic to the aims and policy of the Congress party. Moreover, there is general sympathy with the underlying ideas of that movement amongst most of the Parsees who are the most influential section of the Indian community and have taken the lead, so far, in promoting the war effort of that community. A further, and important, consideration is that the problem of finding suitable accommodation (and possibly that of providing trustworthy guards) is likely to present real difficulty in that small Territory where all available resources are already taxed to the utmost. I hope therefore that you will feel able to drop this proposal.

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It seems to me undesirable that Gandhi should be sent to any Colonial territory where there is a substantial Indian community. Have you considered whether H.M.G. in the Commonwealth of Australia might not be asked to take him and thus to help towards the solution of what is, undoubtedly, a difficult and delicate political problem?

Yours ever,

CRANBORNE

[1] No. 312. [2] No. 351.

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War Cabinet Paper

Addenda to W.P. (42) 321[1]

L/PO/6/102a: f 84

29 July 1942

THE PRIME MINISTER has suggested the following alternative amendment of the last sentence of paragraph 2 of the draft Answer[2]:—

> "Nevertheless, His Majesty's Government stand firmly by the broad intention of their offer, which is, on the conclusion of hostilities, the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs."

THE LORD CHANCELLOR has suggested the following additional amendments:—

Paragraph 4, line 9:[3]

Delete "specific"

Paragraph 5, line 14:

For "bring about" substitute "give the fullest opportunity for"

[1] No. 353. [2] i.e. the last sentence of para. 4 of No. 324.

[3] The paragraph and line numbers in the original have been altered to correspond with the paragraphs and lines in No. 324.

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 99th Conclusions

R/30/1/2: f 26

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 29 July 1942 at 5.30 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton

Also present were: Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg

INDIA

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 96th Conclusions, Minute 8).[1]

The War Cabinet had before them—

(*a*) A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, containing the draft of a Statement which he proposed to make, on the suggestion of the Viceroy, in the House of Commons in reply to a Question on Indian Policy (W.P. (42) 319).[2]

(*b*) A Memorandum setting out certain proposed amendments to the statement (W.P. (42) 321).[3]

The War Cabinet approved the draft Reply, contained in W.P. (42) 319, subject to the following amendments:—

Paragraph 4, line 7.[4]—Delete the words "For reasons in many [some] cases mutually destructive."

Paragraph 4.—The last sentence should stop at the word "offer."

Paragraph 5.—The first sentence [of the last sub-para.] should start as follows:—

"His Majesty's Government, while reiterating their resolve to give the fullest opportunity for the attainment by India of complete self-government, cannot . . ."

Paragraph 5.—The last sentence should be rewritten as follows:—

"The United Nations have bent themselves to the task of fighting the menace which overhangs freedom and civilisation. In this crisis, and in the future after the war, India has a great part to play, and it is the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that the Indian people will lend no countenance to a movement fraught with such disastrous consequences, but will, on the contrary, throw their all into the struggle against the common enemies of mankind."

[1] No. 340. [2] No. 341. [3] No. 353; see also No. 363.

[4] The paragraph and line numbers in the original have been altered to correspond with the paragraphs and lines in No. 324.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 173

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *29 July 1942, 9 pm*
PERSONAL

13420. Your personal telegram 2199–S.[1] My next succeeding personal telegram contains revised text approved by Cabinet of answer which I shall give in House tomorrow in reply to Ammon.

[1] No. 330.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: ff 174–5

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *29 July 1942, 10.45 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 30 July*

13421. QUESTION:

What are the present intentions of His Majesty's Government as regards the political situation in India?

ANSWER: *Begins*

The Congress Party Working Committee has adopted, subject to ratification by the All-India Committee, a resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of British rule from India and threatening a mass movement if the demand is not conceded.

The purpose of His Majesty's Government with regard to the constitutional future of India was made clear in the Draft Declaration which Sir Stafford Cripps was authorised to offer on behalf of His Majesty's Government. It proved impossible to secure the support of the principal elements of India's national life for the specific proposals in that Declaration, and the draft was accordingly withdrawn. Nevertheless His Majesty's Government stand firmly by the broad intention of their offer.

The present demand of Congress completely ignores this far-reaching offer and would, if conceded, bring about a complete and abrupt dislocation of the vast and complicated machinery of government of India. This at a time when in Russia, China, Libya and other theatres of war the situation calls for the undivided energy, co-operation and concentration of the resources of all the

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Allied Powers. No greater disservice to the cause for which the United Nations are fighting can be imagined, and men of goodwill everywhere must refuse to envisage such a catastrophic development in one of the most vital theatres of war.

His Majesty's Government while reiterating their resolve to give the fullest opportunity for the attainment by India of complete self-government cannot but solemnly warn all those who stand behind the policy adumbrated by the Working Committee of Congress that the Government of India will not flinch from their duty to take every possible step to meet the situation. The United Nations have bent themselves to the task of fighting the menace which overhangs freedom and civilisation. In this crisis and in the future after the war India has a great part to play and it is the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that the Indian people will lend no countenance to a movement fraught with such disastrous consequences but will, on the contrary, throw their all into the struggle against the common enemies of mankind.[1]

[1] See also *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 382, cols. 674–6.

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Note by Mr Amery[1]

L/P&J/8/597: f 151

NOTE OF INTERVIEW WITH MR WINANT, 29TH JULY 1942

I explained to the Ambassador that the real underlying motive of Mr. Gandhi's movement was to create in connection with mass civil disobedience an emotional atmosphere which would cause Indian nationalists generally, and even sympathisers outside India, to forget their previous criticisms of the Congress blunder in rejecting the Cripps proposals and rally them to some demand that the British Government should give way to Congress. All the rest of the resolution, I pointed out, was eye-wash. No one could believe, least of all the framers of the resolution, that the disappearance of British rule would lead to a sudden healing of internal dissensions in India and to the formation of a provisional Government whose authority would be respected by India as a whole. On the contrary, if by going out we created such a gap, the only result would be that existing Governments such as e.g. the Governments of the States or of the Punjab, would regard themselves as free from any superior authority and act accordingly, with the most disastrous consequences to the general unity of India and above all to the war effort. As for the passages in the resolution referring to India's desire to help the United Nations, they were simply put in to salve Nehru's conscience while in fact he was following in the

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train of Gandhi, who was entirely indifferent either to what happened in India or what happened to the Allied cause.

As for the proposed movement itself, I was not without hopes that the volume of criticism directed against it from every quarter in India and outside might lead to the resolution not being passed or at any rate postponed when Congress met in August. It was from that point of view that the Government of India had wisely refrained from taking any drastic steps on the action of the Working Committee, steps which would certainly have been taken in this country. On the other hand, if the Congress leaders got their way and passed their resolution and it became clear that a really formidable movement was being organised, the Government would have to act promptly and firmly. I explained, however, that by "formidable" was meant something that might cause considerable embarrassment to the police, stoppage of traffic in some of the cities, etc., but certainly not anything that would directly interfere with the war effort. The classes that recruited for the army were entirely indifferent to Congress. Nor would such a movement enlist any serious support either among munition workers or railways or the docks, where to the best of my belief the more advanced section of workers were much more interested in fighting Fascism and Nazism than in playing the Congress game.

L. S. A.

[1] Mr Amery enclosed a copy of this note in a letter to Mr Eden dated 30 July. L/P&J/8/597: f 150.

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Sir H. Lewis (Orissa) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/84

GOVT. HOUSE, CUTTACK, *29 July 1942*

D.-o. No. 2013-G.O.

REPORT NO. 14

3. *The Congress Resolution.*—The new element in the situation arises of course from the threats and demands of the Wardha resolution. The estimate that comes to me from a variety of sources is that Congress would be unlikely to get from this Province anything like the response for which they would hope, but that local Congress leaders would certainly associate themselves without question in any campaign launched by the Mahatma and that on sentimental grounds others in not inconsiderable numbers would be ready to court imprisonment. We anticipate that we should be able without any real difficulty to meet such situation that may arise and that military help would (as far as can be foreseen) certainly not be needed. At the same time there is reason to

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think that Congress themselves may be hoping to give Orissa a rather prominent place in their campaign. Its situation in a potential war zone gives it for their purposes a special attraction; the Gandhi cult of non-violence has always had a marked appeal for the Oriya temperament; the absence of any considerable Muslim element in this almost exclusively Hindu Province gives the Congress hopes of an easier course here than elsewhere; but in addition to all this the Coalition Ministry which has been possible only because of the breakaway of former Congress supporters is anathema to the Congress High Command, and they have every desire if they can to restore the Congress position and influence in Orissa. It is necessary to recognise therefore that Congress may contemplate a special set at this small province and, though there need be no lack of confidence in meeting the situation, we would be well advised not to underestimate the possibilities of some embarrassment. An immediate question of relevant interest is how far the anti-Congress Ministry now in power has in fact succeeded with the general public in establishing a real anti-Congress front. On this aspect the situation is certainly not reassuring. So far as I can judge, the credit of the present Ministry has been progressively declining and stands now at low ebb.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *30 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2243–S. My private and personal telegram of 28th July, No. 2220–S.[1] Wendell Willkie. I see from Reuter of 29th July that Willkie is now talking of an unofficial trip to the Middle East, Russia and China. He does not mention India. But as you may imagine his visit here would not be welcome for the present, and while as a private individual he can go his own way, if opportunity offers you might be able tactfully to have that conveyed. Utmost prominence is being given to the unfortunate Reuter message referred to in my telegram of 28th July, and all sorts[2] of speculations continue to be built on it and on the fact that it has been denied.

[1] No. 342. [2] 'sorts' deciphered as 'representations'.

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Sir A. Hope (Madras) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMMEDIATE *30 July 1942*
MOST SECRET
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 117-M. Your telegram No. 2208-S,[1] July 27th. Advisers have seen the draft express letter accompanying Laithwaite's letter dated July 24th.[2] Draft will be handed over officially to Government on receipt of your telegram and full secrecy will be maintained meanwhile.

2. As regards 2 (*a*) and (*b*)[3] of draft letter, notification is being prepared, plans for seizure of offices and funds are being made and lists of those to be arrested are ready. These may undergo last minute alterations in case any local leaders declare themselves against Resolution in time.

3. Opinion here too is divided regarding the deportation of Working Committee members and possibly a few others. Boag and myself are in favour while other advisers oppose it as likely to create unnecessary sympathy with individuals. All are united in supporting that important Provincial leaders should be incarcerated outside their own Provinces as I suggested in my letter.[4] Our list has 43 names at present.

4. I would suggest that Emergency Powers Ordinance be promulgated at stage two, for there seems no advantage in holding it up, and it will then be known by the general public that we mean business, although we may not actually use it until stage three.

5. As regards Press I would not be too gentle with them. *Harijan*, in particular, should be suppressed now. The great bulk of vernacular are pro-Congress and if they are allowed to give accounts of protest meetings, allege sufferings in jail, &c., it will do a great deal to keep the movement alive; whilst if no reference is made to these matters a great deal of interest will die down. In particular no mention should be made of Gandhi, his views and state of health whether he is kept in India or deported.

6. In general I agree with proposals and feel that immediate strong action must be taken. I am fully prepared to take any further action you may suggest. I shall be replying almost immediately to you regarding police morale but have no reason at present to suppose that there is any question of their loyalty.

[1] No. 333. [2] No. 322. [3] Cf. No. 393, paras. 3 (*b*) and (*c*). [4] No. 314.

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7. Now that Rajagopalachari has resigned we have no member of Working Committee in this Province so that our action will be solely against Provincial leaders.

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Sir H. Lewis (Orissa) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/609: f 402

IMPORTANT *30 July 1942, 5 pm*
Received: 30 July, 7.15 pm

358–S.G.C. Your telegram 2157–S.[1] I am satisfied that Orissa police force will prove equal to demands that may be made upon it by a Congress campaign. Morale is as good as can be expected and there are no signs of deterioration.

[1] No. 303.

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Sir R. Campbell to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 192

MOST SECRET WASHINGTON, *30 July 1942, 10.50 pm*
Received: 31 July, 6.40 am

No. 3912. At the beginning of Pacific Council on July 29th President mentioned discussion with T. V. Soong over the Indian situation. The question was of course not simple and there was the fact that India belonged to the British Empire and was a British problem. However the other United Nations were closely concerned and he was in correspondence[1] with the Prime Minister. He told T. V. Soong that if he heard anything he would let him know.

2. I questioned T. V. Soong after the meeting. He said that he had been charged with a message from Chiang Kai-shek to the President on the subject. The Chinese were inclined to think that His Majesty's Government minimized representative character of Congress. Granted the existence of Moslems and others, the Chinese believed that Congress did in fact represent the general Indian aspiration just as (?grp. omitted. ?for) 15 years the Kuomintang was only an arm of the people but did represent the general Chinese aspirations. While admitting that he did not himself know India he said that as an Asiatic, he felt that what he was saying was accurate. Chiang Kai-shek wondered whether if the United Nations other than Great Britain were to under-write

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British promise to India, it would not be possible to get His Majesty's Government and Congress together for further discussion and for a compromise arrangement. He hastened to add that it was of course impossible during the war for a transfer of the Government to take place. He thought that the interval before the ending of the monsoon when Japanese attack might become possible, might be used to compose differences and avoid Indian non-co-operation which would have a serious effect on defence and might shake United Nations' hold on India. He said that he had discussed this matter with Viscount Halifax before his departure (Viscount Halifax's telegram No. 3523)[2] and in view of this and of the President's statement that he was in correspondence with the Prime Minister I did not pursue the matter.

[1] See No. 392. [2] No. 212.

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Sir J. Raisman to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/11/3: ff 279–80

IMMEDIATE *30 July 1942, 9.30 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 31 July*

924. Following from Raisman. My discussions with Treasury and Catto had been proceeding on the whole quite satisfactorily but Keynes who has now gone away has kept in background and not participated openly in discussions. He has however apparently said something to Prime Minister which has caused Chancellor to withdraw to original stand taken by Treasury and to insist that responsibility for accepting India's case as put forward by me must be taken by War Cabinet. I have indicated that whilst we are prepared to contemplate certain additions to India's defence expenditure within framework of existing financial settlement I have no authority to negotiate fresh settlement for which Treasury is pressing on ground that present arrangements are unduly favourable to India and will leave Britain with intractable problem at end of war. Treasury regard modifications offered by me in application of existing settlement as quite inadequate and are stating their view with uncompromising force in note for Cabinet. We are preparing vigorous counterblast traversing technical content of Treasury memorandum and emphasizing enormous political dangers involved if Cabinet were to accept Treasury view. Grigg has promised full support and regards it as impossible that case should finally go against India. Chancellor appears personally sympathetic to our difficulties but feels bound to present case as pressed by his expert advisers.

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Question is likely to come before special meeting of Cabinet next week, probably after Monday. You may consider it desirable to press for invitation to be extended to me to be present so that I may leave Cabinet in no doubt of the extremely serious political consequences of attempting to enforce a decision unfavourable to India. I have already made it clear to Chancellor that I saw no chance whatever of his view being accepted by Executive Council, and that I cannot conceive how I or any other Finance Member could even present it to the country in present political conditions.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/3: f 278

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *30 July 1942, 10 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 31 July*

925. Please see Raisman's telegram to you of to-day.
I propose to approach Prime Minister as to Raisman's attendance at Cabinet but am afraid he may be sticky. As Indian representation at War Cabinet has been offered it would however seem entirely appropriate and it would help me if, without referring to this telegram from me, you could send me an immediate private & personal telegram to the effect that you understand from Raisman's reports of his conversations that H.M.G. are reconsidering whole position regarding apportionment of war expenditure between India and H.M.G. and that you hope that, if this is so, Raisman will be given opportunity of being heard by Cabinet on this subject on behalf of Government of India. I should be grateful for very urgent reply.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 325

L/F/7/2861: ff 136–7

INDIAN STERLING BALANCES

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

TREASURY CHAMBERS, *30 July 1942*

1. President Roosevelt has recently set out the principle underlying "Reciprocal Aid", namely that each of the United Nations should contribute all it can from its own resources to the common war effort and that none of the United

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Nations should end up the war with a monetary war debt to any of its partners.[1] The Canadian gift of 1 billion dollars and our own lease-lend arrangements with Russia, China and our other Allies rest on the same principle.

2. The financial arrangements between the United Kingdom and India at present in force are totally inconsistent with this principle. We make no money charge for the aeroplanes, munitions and equipment which we send to India. India recovers from us in sterling a large proportion of the expenditure included in her Defence Budget. (This covers expenditure incurred as our agent as well as expenditure in which it is arguable that India has a considerable or even a predominant interest.) The estimated amount which India expects to recover from us in 1942/43 is some £260 millions, or about 60% of the expenditure to be met from the Defence Budget. (In the 1942/43 Budget, as originally presented, the proportion was 80%.)

3. The War Financial Settlement of April 1940 provides that India recovers from us all her defence expenditure except her normal pre-war budget (adjusted for rises in prices) measures taken in India for India's local defence, and a share of measures "taken jointly in the interests of Indian Defence and of H.M.G." The underlying assumption that the War is not India's affair except so far as the local defence of India is concerned, may have been a tenable point of view in 1939 and 1940. It is no longer so in 1942.

4. The result of this arrangement (in conjunction with India's favourable balance of visible trade) has been that we have paid India very large sums. Hitherto, India has been able to use these payments to extinguish her

[1] The Fifth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations for the period ended 11 June 1942, transmitted with a message from President Roosevelt, including the following passage in Chapter 3, pp. 22–3: 'Article VII of each of the basic agreements pledges that "the terms and conditions" of the final determination of the benefits to be provided the United States in return for aid furnished under the Act "shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations". By this provision we have affirmatively declared our intention to avoid the political and economic mistakes of international debt experience during the twenties.

A lend-lease settlement which fulfils this principle will be sound from the economic point of view. But it will have a greater merit. It will represent the only fair way to distribute the financial costs of war among the United Nations.

The real costs of the war cannot be measured, nor compared, nor paid for in money. They must and are being met in blood and toil. But the financial costs of the war can and should be met in a way which will serve the needs of lasting peace and mutual economic well-being.

All the United Nations are seeking maximum conversion to war production, in the light of their special resources. If each country devotes roughly the same fraction of its national production to the war, then the financial burden of war is distributed equally among the United Nations in accordance with their ability to pay. And although the nations richest in resources are able to make larger contributions, the claim of war against each is relatively the same. Such a distribution of the financial costs of war means that no nation will grow rich from the war effort of its allies. The money costs of the war will fall accordingly to the rule of equality in sacrifice, as in effort.' 77th Congress, 2nd Session, House Document No. 799, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1942.

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indebtedness to us in respect of pre-war sterling loans. These loans have now been entirely repatriated, except for Railway Debt to the amount of some £50 millions. From now onwards India is likely to increase her sterling balances, or, in other words, we are likely to become heavily indebted to India. By April 1943 India's sterling balances may amount to between £400 and £450 millions (of which some £250 millions represent backing for the note issue).

5. The arrangement of April, 1940, was not accepted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as necessarily final. The whole position has been completely changed by the Japanese entry into the war and the resulting threat to India, and by the adoption of the principle of Reciprocal Aid. I feel bound to submit to my colleagues that the existing arrangement should now be radically revised.

6. The acquisition of very large sterling balances by India would give rise to grave problems, both financial and political. Our greatest economic difficulty after the war will be to preserve equilibrium in our balance of payments with the rest of the world i.e. to pay for the imports needed to maintain a tolerable standard of living for our people. We cannot afford to start with a handicap of debt amounting to several hundred millions of pounds. It would be intolerable that this should be our reward for successfully defending India from being overrun by Japan or Germany.

7. India would certainly demand that these balances should be converted, wholly or partly, into gold or dollars. This would be impossible and political friction would result: we should be told that a rich country had repudiated a debt to a very poor country. There would be no satisfactory method of dealing with very large balances after the war. It is essential that they should not be allowed to accumulate.

8. The right principle to apply is that of Reciprocal Aid that we should supply without charge whatever costs sterling, and that India should supply without charge whatever costs rupees. We should not abandon that principle, even if it cannot be fully implemented at the present time.

9. As an immediate step, it should be recognised, even if we accept the view that India is primarily concerned with the defence of India, that this conception needs to be interpreted in a reasonably wide spirit. We plan to send to India this year aeroplanes costing over £100 millions. The value of these (so far as they are not lease-lent) should be set-off against the stores which India supplies to us for use in Libya etc. Again, the reconquest of Burma and the defence of Persia and Iraq should be regarded as an integral part of the defence of India. It is an untenable proposition that India should cease to regard troops as employed on her defence the moment they cross the frontier. In particular, India should bear the cost of all rupee expenditure incurred to aid China, for to aid China is to attack Japan and thus to defend India.

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10. I have stated our point of view to Sir Jeremy Raisman, the Finance Member, who has come to this country on a short visit to discuss this question. He is, as I gladly recognise, anxious to give any help he can within the limits of the existing financial arrangement. But the help which he can give within these limits is very little (not more than £40 millions non-recurrent and £7½ millions recurrent) and does not advance us towards a solution of the problem. He maintains that the existing War Financial Settlement cannot be altered. Any alteration would, he contends, be viewed by Congress and even moderate public opinion with intense and bitter suspicion, and would raise counter-demands that we should pay in dollars or gold, instead of in sterling. India cannot, he says, be coerced into a war effort free of charge, and sterling is, therefore, bound to accumulate so long as India remains in the war.

11. I think the War Cabinet will find it impossible to accept the argument that, because large sections of opinion in India are critical, we should have, not only to bear the burden of defending India, but also to pay an enormous monetary tribute to India for the cost of her defence. Undoubtedly we shall be criticised if we insist that the principle of Reciprocal Aid should be applied or that the concept of the defence of India should be given a reasonably wide interpretation. But we cannot hope to escape criticism with India in her present mood, and to criticism of the kind suggested by Sir Jeremy Raisman we have an answer convincing to our own public opinion and to that of the United States. If, however, we leave the present arrangements unaltered and are left after the war with a debt which we cannot pay in gold or dollars, and which gravely, and unjustly adds to our own post-war difficulties, we shall have far graver criticism to meet from India and no convincing reply, whether to India, to America, or to the people of this country by whose efforts the war will have been won.

12. On the financial side Sir Jeremy Raisman has argued that a Defence Budget of some £180 millions represents the utmost that India can finance by taxation and borrowing—the pre-war revenue of the total Central Budget of India having been only some £64 millions. In reply to this I have pointed out that the rupees spent in India have to be found by taxation or borrowing in India, whether or not a part of this rupee expenditure is covered by sterling payments. India is undoubtedly a poor country and the difficulty of internal financing is very real. But in this difficulty we cannot help. To pay sterling to India enriches India and impoverishes us after the war, but during the war it does not help India in the least degree.

13. I do not desire to under-estimate the financial or political difficulties with which the Government of India are faced. But the existing War Financial Settlement does not diminish their present financial difficulties and only avoids

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political difficulties today at the cost of involving graver political difficulties hereafter. My conclusion is that the Settlement must now be revised so that in future India's contribution will be increased to a level which is fair and reasonable on the facts of the case and which will prevent the accumulation of dangerously large sterling balances.

K. W.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *31 July 1942, 1.50 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 31 July, 12.30 pm*

No. 2244-S. Your personal telegram No. 13311[1] of 28th July. After further discussion with my Advisers, we have decided that if we have to arrest Gandhi we shall use the Defence of India Rules and not Regulation III, given extent to which use of latter might be misrepresented.

[1] No. 347.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *31 July 1942, 4.10 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 31 July, 6 pm*

No. 2252-S. Your official telegram to Home Department No. 13312[1] of 28th July. I am very glad that our minds continue to work so closely together and am most grateful for your useful drafting suggestions.

2. After discussion in Council, I do not now propose to issue any interim resolution commenting on main Congress resolution. I will, however, issue in the immediate future communiqué[2] dealing with grievances arising out of denial policy, &c., and will arrange to Reutbuck[3] text home. I propose, however (unless there is any change in the situation), to issue fairly short resolution in quite general terms once A.-I.C.C. ratifies main resolution (if it does), but as my Council will certainly expect to be in on this, and as I rather doubt the possibility of our adjusting its terms finally until almost the last moment, as there may be developments which would necessitate drafting alterations, I

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think that the best course would be, if you agree, that you and I should agree now the *general* line of any such communiqué which I would propose to recommend to my Council, and that the drafting should be left to me here.

3. Very provisional rough outline which I have in mind (and for comments on which I should be very grateful) is as follows:—

(*a*) Ratification of resolution by A.-I.C.C. confronts us with demand for withdrawal and a challenge, which however reluctant we may be to deal with these things in war time, we have no option but to resist.

(*b*) That His Majesty's Government or the Government of India have already made clear in Parliament that it is impossible for them[4] to contemplate demands of this nature, consistently with discharge of their responsibilities and duties to India.

(*c*) That demand of Congress, if accepted, would represent acceptance of nothing more or less than Fascist domination over country, great sections of which—Muslims, masses of Hindus, Sikhs, Depressed Classes, lesser minorities, States—do not in the least accept the Congress claim to speak on their behalf or support the Congress claim; touch on political offer (as described in your reply to Ammon)[5] and on hope that it holds out for future and on fact that it is an offer to all India and not merely to a single section; and touch again on risks to India and the allied cause inevitable in Congress plan and to futile unreal nature of that plan.

(*d*) Stern [Stress?] preventive rather than punitive character of action, but make it clear that we will deal with situation that now emerges without flinching and with determination to preserve intact the fabric of law and order, to retain unimpaired the degree of political evolution to which India has attained with all its promises for the future, and to interrupt as little as may be possible the everyday processes of political life in this country. Express hope that people of country will realise dangers and not be led astray, &c.

(*e*) I will also work in at some point one or other of the draft formulæ embodied in your telegram No. 13312.

4. Above, as you will at once see, is only the very roughest and most provisional possible outline, but I hope it will give you general idea of what I have in view, and any other points which you think worth stressing will be most welcome. I am sure that it would be a mistake from the Press point of view to put out a really long manifesto, and I want to make my communiqué as brief and telling as possible. On the other hand, there are some half a dozen points, such as those I have touched on above, which it seems essential to cover.

[1] No. 348. [2] See No. 319, note 3.
[3] Abbreviation signifying to send to London by Reuter.
Decipher has 'or Government of India' after 'them'. [5] See No. 365.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *31 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2254–S. Your private and personal telegram of July 30th, No. 925.[1] My immediately succeeding telegram contains message on the lines suggested by you. I thought it as well to add a warning as to possible political repercussions of adverse decision, in the hope that this also may strengthen your hands and Raisman's. But if you think it would be better tactics not to communicate it to the Cabinet, I leave that entirely to you.

[1] No. 374.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *31 July 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2255–S. I understand from Raisman's reports of his conversations that His Majesty's Government are reconsidering whole position regarding apportionment of war expenditure between India and His Majesty's Government, and I hope if this is so that Raisman, in the absence of[1] our representative at War Cabinet, will be given opportunity of being heard by Cabinet on this subject on behalf of the Government of India.

2. I do not propose to argue the merits of the financial case, but I must place on record for the Cabinet's information my sense of the very serious consequences of allowing our financial policy in this regard to get out of tune and focus with our constitutional policy in regard to India. Very gravest consequences would be quite certain to ensue, and these sections of the commercial and well-to-do public which are disposed to be sympathetic now will certainly be alienated were matters to[2] take such a turn.

[1] 'in the absence of' deciphered as '(? being)'.

[2] 'were matters to' deciphered as '(? if this) provocation'.

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Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMMEDIATE *31 July 1942*

SECRET

No. 542. In continuation of my telegram No. 538,[1] dated 21st July. Reactions to Congress agitation. It has become clear in the past week that, outside the Congress, no vocal support is being given to threat of Civil Disobedience, and there have been many outspoken statements in direct opposition to it. Even nationalist vernacular newspapers display no enthusiasm, but a desire to avoid a movement. Their general line is an appeal to the British Government to give way so as to avoid catastrophe.

2. Within the Congress Party there have been one or two resignations, and it is known that others disapprove of the policy though, out of loyalty to Gandhi, they will continue to follow his lead.

3. Depressed Classes talk of taking a procession of protest to the A.-I.C.C. meeting, which I hope will come off. Royists and Communists separately talk of protest meetings, though I am not yet convinced that Communists will not be an embarrassment.

4. Muslim Press has been consistently critical of Congress "Blackmail" tactics. Some anxiety among Muslims lest we should give way or not deal firmly with Congress, but Dehlavi tells me that Jinnah, a few days ago, expressed his belief that we would remain firm. Also an undercurrent of apprehension among Muslims that communal trouble will break out and this seems to me inevitable sooner or later.

5. In spite of this considerable opposition, I have little doubt that Congress will have a large volume of support in Gujarat and appreciable support in Bombay City, and that they count on this turning into serious trouble when Gandhi is arrested, and more so if he fasts. Patel has been in Gujarat organising. No clear line of action yet apparent, but probabilities are a *hartal* by cloth merchants and a student's strike. Labour in Ahmedabad may also be affected, as it is largely under Congress influence. Patel saw Kasturbhai Lallbhai. Mill-owners there will be in a dilemma if they are pressed to give up war contract. If gossip can be believed, Patel is said to have told hearers at private meetings that they should not be too squeamish about violence this time. In Bombay employers believe that labour will not be affected. The upper middle-classes

[1] See No. 308.

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may not openly join, but will probably assist covertly. For action Congress will rely most on lower middle-classes. These anticipations may be proved wrong if emotion is stirred up by the fast.

6. In general, opposition has developed quite well up to this stage, but Congress leaders have also had a little time to give orders to their followers. It is clear that the opposition in India and abroad has had no effect on Patel, except to make him more truculent. Whether it has affected the Nehru–Azad group sufficiently to make a split or postpone[ment?] a possibility, I do not know, but my anticipation is that Gandhi means to put maximum pressure on us by fasting. I remain convinced that, unless the Bombay meetings show that Congress does not intend to press its challenge, we must act at once, and make it plain, to all who are waiting to see what Government is going to do, that we shall deal firmly with the challenge.

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Sir J. Herbert (Bengal) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/609: f 400

IMMEDIATE *31 July 1942, 8.25 pm*
Received: 31 July, 10.30 pm

8–T. Your telegram No. 2157–S[1] of July 22nd. I am satisfied that state of Police force in Bengal is sufficient to deal with open movement by Congress, in spite of considerable number of vacancies both in Bengal Police and Calcutta Police. As previously pointed out it was essential to have reserve force of Eastern Frontier Rifles at our disposal and not dispersed on quasi-military duties.

2. Morale of police force is satisfactory and I have no doubt of their readiness to tackle Congress movement. The lower ranks are naturally affected by high cost of living, but that will not affect their response to a call for action against Congress. My Government are now considering further increase in dearness allowance, benefit of which would apply to all constables.

3. I consider it essential to morale that police force should know Government firmly supports any action legitimately taken in use of powers to suppress disorder. When instructions on Central Govt.'s policy towards Congress movement are officially received,[2] the determining factor will be attitude of Ministers which I anticipate will be one of tacit but not whole-hearted support.

[1] No. 303. [2] See No. 322, note 1.

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Sir A. Hope (Madras) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/609: f 401

IMMEDIATE *31 July 1942, 6.25 pm*
Received: 31 July, 8.30 pm

118–M. Your telegram No. 2157–S[1] of July 22nd. Results of my enquiries confirm that morale of Police is entirely sound and in case of action against Congress the force will be absolutely firm and loyal, and have no sympathy with movement. But recent further and steep rise in prices has made living conditions most difficult for low-paid men, and compensation by increase of pay or otherwise seems necessary if some existing discontent on this score is to be removed. My Inspector-General has already put forward proposals and these are being examined.

[1] No. 303.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/599: f 92

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *31 July 1942, 8.40 pm*
Received: 1 August

13551. Para. 3 of my telegram of the 28th July, 13312.[1] Colonial Office considered that Nyasaland having the smallest Indian community would be the most suitable territory and addressed[2] the acting Governor there whose reply is repeated in my immediately succeeding telegram. Of the points raised therein I should think that conditions mentioned in (*b*) and (*d*) would have to be accepted and faced, but I am unable to comment on (*a*) (except of course that the party would include no children) or on the question of liability for cost of construction of alternative accommodation raised in (*c*). Should you decide to pursue the question of deportation (vide your telegram of the 29th July, No. 2225–S)[3] it would facilitate matters if you reply on these points to Nyasaland direct repeating to me.

2. Reference last sentence of para. 6 of Home Dept. telegram of the 24th July No. 5766.[4] Could you kindly arrange to have telegraphed to me as soon

[1] No. 348. [2] See No. 351. [3] No. 356. [4] No. 319.

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as possible terms of draft Ordinance which you would propose to issue on lines of Malta[5] Ordinance to provide for deportation. Colonial Office are anxious to assure themselves of its adequacy.

[5] 'Malta' deciphered as 'defence'. The Colonial Office had advised that the deportation Ordinance should be modelled on a recent Ordinance passed in Malta for this purpose. L/P&J/7/4736: ff 329–30.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/599: ff 93–4

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *31 July 1942, 9.15 pm*
Received: 1 August

13552. Following (with one or two unimportant omissions) is repetition of most secret and personal telegram No. 229[1] dated 29th July from Officer administering the Govt., Nyasaland,[2] to Secy. of State for the Colonies.

Begins. There is no insuperable objection or difficulty to action contemplated. But following points need consideration:—

(*a*) If certain of party could not share quarters, or if party contains women and children, or had caste prohibitions against food cooked by Africans, I should wish to reconsider the proposal;

(*b*) Housing conditions for persons accustomed to luxury or to town life could not be provided;

(*c*) I have in mind finding accommodation in European houses in King's African Rifles Cantonment Area at Zomba which is in park-like surroundings and more easily guarded. (I do not think police guard working under depleted European staff sufficient.) This would mean vacating some quarters by military officers and may be objected to, but I assume I should be given authority if H.M.G. is making request, and be allowed to build alternative accommodation for military officers at cost of Government of India? (We have already lent the military various civil houses, including my own large house.)

(*d*) I suspect that apparently numerous Axis agents in Portuguese East Africa use British Indians as agents. These number some 4,000 and many cross the boundary for trading purposes. *Ends.*

[1] In reply to No. 351. [2] Mr Juxon Barton.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/11/3: f 277

INDIA OFFICE, *31 July 1942*

My dear Winston,

Kingsley Wood has circulated a memorandum to the Cabinet (W.P. (42) 325)[1] on India's sterling balances. This memorandum proposes that the financial settlement regarding war expenditure between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India should be radically altered. This suggestion raises issues on which there is a strong divergence of view between the Treasury and the Government of India and the proposal that the existing settlement should be altered has important political as well as financial implications. I am circulating a memorandum[2] which states India's side of the case in reply to the Treasury argument.

The Finance Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, Sir Jeremy Raisman, I.C.S., is over here on a short visit and has been engaged in discussions with the Treasury officials. He has also had a talk with Kingsley Wood, who has suggested to me that it would be valuable if Raisman could come to the Cabinet when this matter is considered. If you approve, I should myself welcome Raisman's presence, as I think it would probably shorten future official correspondence with the Government of India on this subject. I should however make it clear that Raisman was sent here by the Government of India to explain what they considered was the maximum they could do within the present financial settlement by way of shouldering an increased share of the financial burdens of the war. He is not empowered by the Government of India to negotiate a new settlement, as the Government of India are strongly opposed to any variation of the existing agreement.

It would not of course be necessary for Raisman to attend the whole of the Cabinet discussion, but it would I think be of great advantage if he could explain the Government of India's position orally.[3]

Yours ever,

[L. S. A.]

[1] No. 375. [2] No. 389.

[3] Mr Churchill's reply, contained in a letter of 2 August from his Private Secretary to Mr Turnbull, was that he saw no objection to Sir Jeremy Raisman attending the Cabinet when the question of India's Sterling Balances was considered, so long as it was understood that he came in to state his point of view and to be heard, and that it was, of course, open to the Cabinet, if they wished, to ask him to withdraw before the conclusion of the discussion on this item. L/PO/11/3: f 271.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *1 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2263–S. We discussed in Council last night question of releasing to Press documents seized from Congress offices in Allahabad on May 28th,[1] copies of which were sent to you in my letter of June 2nd. Those present in addition to the Chief and myself were Mudaliar, Mody, Sarker, Firoz, Benthall, Usman, Ambedkar and Srivastava. Council unanimously agreed that these documents should be released to Press. All except Mody (who originally favoured release *after* meeting of A.-I.C.C. but ultimately joined majority) favoured release at earliest possible moment, and we are arranging for publication in morning papers of August 5th. Mudaliar and Ambedkar expressed some doubt as to whether documents might not show Nehru in an unduly favourable light, but general sense of Council (accepted by Mudaliar and Ambedkar after discussion) was that telling use could be made for propaganda purposes of contrast between Nehru's attitude as shown in these intimate discussions and his subsequent public attitude and climb down to Gandhi. Benthall stressed damaging effect of evidence that majority of Working Committee were prepared to consider betrayal of India to the enemy. There are sentences in Gandhi's draft and references in Nehru's statement to fact that draft would be taken as evidence of Gandhi's readiness to surrender to Japan of which telling use could be made, as also damaging references to presence of Americans in India and use of foreign troops. Home Department will be telegraphing to you officially regarding release, but I do hope (and am fully confident) that you and your Information Department will be able to give us the same invaluable help on the propaganda side over these documents as you have hitherto. It is clearly of the utmost importance that we should bring out for benefit of the United States and China readiness of Congress under Gandhi to negotiate with Japan and (in case of America) their critical attitude towards use of foreign troops, &c.

[1] Enclosure to No. 113.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *1 August 1942, 11.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 2 August, 12.30 am*

No. 2264–S. My telegram of 29th July, No. 2225–S.[1] I have now had the views of all the Governors whom I consulted[2] regarding the deportation issue, and in the light of them I am clear that it will not be wise to proceed with this idea. Lumley[3] and Stewart[4] are definitely against. Hope[5] and his senior Adviser Boag favour deportation: but balance of his Advisers are against. Twynam[6] favours deportation. My Advisers are against. Arguments telling with those who are opposed are essentially grave misunderstanding to which it may give rise, risk of rousing hostility among moderates at present disposed to support us, &c.

2. My own strong inclination has been, and indeed still is to a large extent, towards deportation: and in certain circumstances we might have to resort to it even later. But I am pretty clear that it will be a grave mistake in a matter where the decision is nicely balanced to come down now in favour of deportation where one has against it considered views to which I must attach so much importance as those which I have just mentioned. I have therefore decided that individuals in whom we are interested shall be accommodated in India.

3. I have had in mind the forts at Dargai, Attock and Ahmednagar. But I want to ensure that they are completely cut off from the outside world but of course treated with the utmost consideration, &c., and with all possible reasonable comfort. It looks as though Ahmednagar might be the best unless Lumley sees strong objection. It has been used previously for State prisoners, is approachable only by a drawbridge and is surrounded by a moat. I am however consulting Lumley and will let you know the result.

[1] No. 356. [2] No. 333. [3] No. 343.
[4] No. 346. [5] No. 370. [6] No. 357.

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Viscount Cranborne to various Colonies[1]

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 139

IMMEDIATE COLONIAL OFFICE, *1 August 1942, 3.30 am*
MOST SECRET

Unnumbered Circular (1) [*sic*]

(To 4 only) Please pass copy to East African Governors' Conference with reference to my most secret and personal telegram of 28th July.[2]

Code

(To 8 only) My most secret and personal telegram of 28th July.[3]

(To 7 only) The following telegram, which is being addressed to Governors of Colonies with substantial Indian communities, is repeated to you for *Cypher* information only. *Begins.*

To all 1. The following brief appreciation of the political situation in India is for your secret information but is sent so that you may have time to consider any precautions to counter harmful local reactions to possible developments there.

2. You are doubtless aware that since the failure of the Cripps negotiations, which for the time caused a loss to the prestige of the Congress Party, Gandhi has been conducting a campaign of hostility to the British connexion. Setting aside the confusion and contradiction in his utterances his main theme has been that British power must be withdrawn immediately, and he made it known that he was contemplating a mass non-violent movement to achieve his object. In spite of known dissensions and misgivings about this policy among Congress leaders it appears that Gandhi has imposed his will on the Congress Working Committee, for it passed a resolution on 14th July calling for the immediate end of British rule in India and threatening if the appeal failed to use all the non-violent strength of Congress in a widespread struggle against Government under the leadership of Gandhi.

3. The resolution completely ignored the realities of the situation and all the difficulties which would attend a transfer of power with the enemy at the gates of India. It has had an unfavourable reception not only in England and America but also in India itself both outside and partly inside Congress circles. It remains to be seen whether this will affect Congress plans. The resolution is subject to approval by the

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All-India Congress Committee, which is due to meet in Bombay on 7th August, and if it is approved it is probable that Congress contemplate a pause to ascertain the reaction of Government before the mass movement is actually launched. In the absence of fresh developments no action is contemplated by the Government of India till the outcome of the A.-I.C.C. meeting is known but they will not hesitate to take up the challenge at the appropriate moment if Congress pursue their plans and this may involve the arrest of the leaders including Gandhi. It is to be emphasised that any action which the Government of India feel called upon to take will be taken wholly out of consideration for the security of India and the interests of the United Nations and will imply no change in H.M.G.'s settled policy for the realisation of full self-government in India after the war.

4. My immediately succeeding telegram[4] repeats text of a statement made by the Secretary of State for India in the House on 30th July.[5] There is of course no restriction on public use of that statement. A further appreciation will be sent to you as and when necessary.

(To 7 only) *Ends.*[6]

[1] Sent to the Governors etc. of (1) Ceylon, (2) Aden, (3) Zanzibar, (4) Kenya, (5) Uganda, (6) Tanganyika Territory, (7) Achimota, (8) Nyasaland, (9) Mauritius, (10) Trinidad, (11) Seychelles, (12) Fiji, (13) British Guiana, (14) Jamaica.

[2] No. 351. [3] *Ibid.* [4] Not printed. [5] No. 366.

[6] Dominions Office telegram G. No. 80 of 5 August to the four Dominion Governments, Newfoundland and Southern Rhodesia began 'Congress Working Committee' and continued, with a few unimportant variations, as in No. 388 from 'passed a resolution' in para. 2 to the end of para. 3. It concluded: 'A statement to this effect was made in the House of Commons on 30th July by the Secretary of State for India.' L/P&J/8/597: f 80.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 328

L/F/7/2861: ff 128–31

INDIAN STERLING BALANCES

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *1 August 1942*

1. The Chancellor of the Exchequer's Memorandum W.P. (42) 325[1] leads him to the conclusion that the existing Financial Settlement between India and

[1] No. 375.

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this country must be revised in such a way as to be substantially more favourable to the United Kingdom. I contend, in reply, first that there do not exist equitable grounds for such a revision, and secondly, that the realities of the Indian situation in any case make revision impracticable. *As my note is unavoidably lengthy, I have summarised the main points at the end (paragraph 18).*

2. The Chancellor has cited President Roosevelt in support of two propositions. The first is that each nation should contribute all it can from its own resources to the common war effort. On this I would say that the amount of contribution that can be expected from each nation must obviously, as President Roosevelt has clearly recognised in his recent message to Congress about Lend-Lease, be proportioned to its national income.[2] India is a poor country and I endeavour to show that she is already, under the existing Settlement, bearing very large defence expenditure, and that the existing financial arrangements between this country and India are by no means unduly generous to India, even apart from the fact—which in this connection must never be overlooked—that India, though technically one of the United Nations, is not a whole-hearted participant in the war in the same sense as, for example, Canada.

3. The second proposition is that none of the United Nations should end up the war with a monetary war debt to any of its partners. It is relevant to remember that the spokesmen of Indian opinion are already highly critical of the fact that in return for the services and materials that are being supplied India is merely accumulating a form of assets, namely sterling balances, which is not that which they would choose. They would reject without question any suggestion that India should dispense with even the future prospect of converting those balances into assets of a more acceptable kind. Nevertheless the Government of India are mindful of the need for doing anything that is possible towards relieving the kind of difficulties which the Chancellor forecasts. I shall indicate below that they offer to assume considerable further burdens of defence expenditure, are initiating proposals for the utilisation of sterling accumulations to compound for future recurrent sterling payments, and are anxious to discuss the means of securing the orderly liquidation of any amounts outstanding.

4. The description in the Chancellor's Memorandum of the present situation as one in which the United Kingdom has "not only to bear the burden of defending India but also to pay an enormous monetary tribute to India for the cost of her defence" is a complete travesty. The figures of the recoverable war expenditure do not represent in any sense a contribution towards relieving India of part of the cost of the defence of India: they represent such part of the cost of the general war effort (in the main supplying all the Imperial and Allied Forces in Egypt, Middle-East, Iraq, and other neighbouring areas) as happens

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to be incurred on behalf of the United Kingdom Government, and to be payable in rupees. Far the largest component in the total consists of munitions and other supplies, many of them having not the remotest connection with the defence of India as such, produced in India at the instance of the Ministry of Supply here; in fact, goods ordered by the United Kingdom Government from commercial suppliers in India. The only reason why the payment therefor falls to be made to the Government of India is because, for the convenience of the United Kingdom Government, the Government of India have lent the use of their financial and accounting facilities, have become a channel for orders and supplies, and have—on behalf of the United Kingdom Government—paid the contractors. Thus, any comparison between the amount of the recoverable expenditure and the amount of India's own defence budget can only be irrelevant and misleading.

5. It is true that a change has come over the situation by Japan's entry into the war, and by the approach of war to India's own frontier. These events have, however, also brought about automatically that India's own defence expenditure has very greatly increased. Thus, whereas according to the Budget Estimate this was expected to amount in 1942/43 to Rs. 131 crores, the estimated rate of expenditure is now about Rs. 245 crores per annum. These are enormous figures for India, and in the conditions of that country—where the expectation generally realised in more highly developed countries with a higher average level of income, that increased expenditure on war account can readily be gathered in again by taxation or borrowing, does not hold good—there is already doubt whether a resultant inflationary condition can be avoided. The Indian note issue is already more than twice as high as in August 1939, and by the end of 1942–43 is likely to be three times as high. If serious inflation occurs, it will mean a disastrous flight from currency into commodities, with consequential discontent and probably unrest. The risk is, however, being taken, and it is indeed probable that *under the existing Financial Settlement*, before 1942–43 is out, India's own rate of war expenditure will have risen to considerably more than even this figure of Rs. 245 crores (£184 million) per annum, and that the amount next year will be even higher.

6. As the Memorandum tends to belittle India's own defence efforts, and forecasts, for instance, the possibility of the United Kingdom "successfully defending India from being over-run", I should perhaps in fairness add, what is often overlooked, that in addition to serving as a producing and supply depot on the grand scale, India has expanded her armed forces to well over a million men

[2] See No. 375, note 1. President Roosevelt's message to Congress contained the following passage: 'And lend-lease is no longer one way. Those who have been receiving lend-lease aid in their hour of greatest need have taken the initiative in reciprocating. To the full extent of their ability, they are supplying us, on the same lend-lease basis, with many things we need now.'

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and continues to expand them at the rate of over 50,000 a month. Of these forces, over 300,000 are serving overseas, a figure which probably compares favourably with the overseas forces of the rest of the Empire. It is these services, and not merely India's pecuniary contribution (large though that is in the circumstances of the country), that represent India's contribution to the general war effort.

7. One of the underlying contentions of the Memorandum is that, irrespective of the merits in other respects, India must make a larger financial contribution to defence because otherwise she may experience some difficulty in utilising the proceeds of payments to her save in ways inconvenient or embarrassing (after the war) to the United Kingdom. I think that this has only to be stated to be seen to be untenable. It is clearly better, especially from the standpoint of a poor country like India, that she should receive payment—even if the payment be deferred—than that she should carry the entire cost (both in terms of money and of real things) herself. And it has already been made clear to the Treasury that the Government of India are prepared to meet the difficulties which the Chancellor's Memorandum foresees by the orderly liquidation of any amounts outstanding: for instance, by means of a development and reconstruction fund, which would in fact be tantamount to guaranteeing to United Kingdom manufacturers a long-term market for capital goods.

8. The principle which the Chancellor holds should be applied is that India should supply without charge whatever costs rupees. I can see no very obvious equity in an arrangement which allocates the burden of the war not according to capacity to pay, or power exercised, or benefits expected, but with relation to the more or less arbitrary and accidental circumstances of the origin of the forces employed or the sources of the materials expended. The Chancellor goes on to admit that it may not be possible to implement at the present time the principle in question. My case is that the circumstances of India are such that there is no advantage in purporting to adopt a principle which is not in fact capable of acceptance by Indian opinion.

9. It is a mistake to suppose that India's financial part in the war has been confined solely to that which takes place on the soil of India. The conquest of East Africa and Ethiopia, and the initial successes in Libya, were largely due to the presence of large forces of Indian troops, trained at India's expense, which were sent overseas in the early stages of the war. But I am bound to point out that, so far from Indian opinion being likely to accept, for example, the re-conquest of Burma—unless it meant that Burma was again to be subordinated to India—as an appropriate object of Indian defence expenditure, there is still in evidence much bitterness at the extent to which India was made to pay for the last conquest of Burma.

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10. A good deal of public attention in India is directed to these questions of the Financial Settlement and the growth of the sterling balances. Within the last few days I have received a copy of a communication from the Indian Chambers of Commerce, which refers to the Finance Member's visit to England, and says: "Trust no settlement will be arrived at without consultation Indian Legislature and commercial opinion, and without giving full publicity all relevant particulars . . .[3] Trust Government of India will fully safeguard Indian financial interests during pending negotiations and settlement with His Majesty's Government, and see that only expenditure strictly incurred for Indian defence is debited to Indian revenues and the scope of India's financial liabilities is not widened on ground India's strategic frontier extends to Middle East and other theatres of war." From the latest telegraphed summary of the Indian Press[4] I have noted also that all the principal newspapers express in various ways the fear that India is being saddled with a huge expenditure out of all proportion to her responsibility and interests in the war, without her consent and without her having any control over the expenditure.

11. It would, however, be a serious mistake to suppose, as is assumed in the Memorandum, that the argument based on the Indian attitude means no more than that "large sections of opinion in India are critical". Nor is it relevant to suggest that we can reply to Indian criticisms in a manner convincing to our own public opinion and to that of the United States. I am convinced that, even if the present Finance Member and the Viceroy were prepared (and I do not think that they would be) to recommend to their colleagues in the Government of India the acceptance of such a revision of the Financial Settlement as is being suggested, there is no hope that it would be accepted by the other Members of the Executive Council who constitute the Government of India. Nearly all these, it must be remembered, are Indians holding a leading position in the political life of the country, who have only recently consented to join the Council. The result of attempting to impose such a revision would almost certainly be that they would resign, and that it would be impossible to fill their places with other leading Indians. We should be driven back to an attempt to govern the country without the co-operation of Indian public men, and the consequences, especially in the present situation of India, could hardly fail to be disastrous.

12. There is another aspect of the matter. The whole body of Indian industrialists, financiers and commercial men are united in opposition to the idea that India's share of the financial burden of the war should be substantially increased. Any attempt to force upon India an unfavourable revision of the Financial Settlement would jeopardize their co-operation in the manufacture of munitions and other war supplies. Even if we were prepared to oust the

[3] The dots indicating an omission are in the War Cabinet Paper.

[4] L/F/7/2861: f 174.

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industrialists and take over their plant, we have no one to put in their place. At the best, there would be a calamitous reduction in India's practical participation in the war effort.

13. There is no indication in the Memorandum that the Service Departments and the Ministry of Supply have been consulted, and have concurred. They are vitally interested in the maximisation of India's material contribution to the waging of the war, and I doubt whether they would agree to its continuance being endangered for purely financial reasons—and moreover financial reasons of a purely post-war character. The memorandum argues that it is only a post-war detriment which India will suffer if she now forgoes payment in sterling. It is certainly the case that it is a purely post-war financial detriment to the United Kingdom which the Chancellor's proposal seeks to avert. Are we as a Government prepared to commit publicly, and on this scale, the very crime which is rightly so much stigmatised in the case of firms and individuals—that of sacrificing efficient prosecution of the war to post-war considerations of profit and loss?

14. I am not maintaining that India should not be asked to make any concessions. Indeed, the Finance Member has already intimated that he hopes, though with difficulty, to induce his colleagues in the Government of India to agree to make various additional concessions which can, by a little stretching, be brought within the framework of the existing Financial Settlement, and which will have the effect of increasing India's contribution in 1942–43 over and above the rate of £184 million referred to in paragraph 5 above by approximately £47½ million, of which £7½ million is recurrent. He feels, however, that he could not conscientiously, and certainly could not successfully, recommend to his colleagues the acceptance of any of these extensions of the content of the Settlement unless it was quite clear that all suggestion that the Settlement itself ought to be scrapped because of the rate of accumulation of sterling, or that India ought to be expected to provide gratuitously such goods or services payable in rupees as the United Nations may wish to acquire, had been definitely abandoned.

15. Admittedly, no such concessions which are within the bounds of practical politics would prevent the accumulation of large sterling resources on Indian account. (I would here remind my colleagues that these resources are not the property of the Indian Government. They are lodged in the Reserve Bank, which has liabilities against them; and they are only disposable by the Government insofar as it can replace them by rupee assets, i.e. usually by the proceeds of rupee borrowings.) The Government of India are prepared to do their utmost to co-operate in the disposal of such sterling accumulations in mutually satisfactory ways. In addition to further measures of debt repatriation the possibility

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is being explored, for example, of compounding for future sterling pensionary liabilities by a lump sum payment to the Treasury; this might absorb an amount of the order of £100 million.

16. The Chancellor's Memorandum assumes that the question involved is one for unilateral action by the United Kingdom. He asks the War Cabinet to approve a conclusion that the Settlement "*must* now be revised". I am sure, however, that the War Cabinet realise that, whatever the legal position, in fact the most that could be decided upon here would be to *demand* a bigger contribution from India, not to *secure* it. And I greatly fear that the only result of demanding it would be that we should have to choose between withdrawing the demand, which even so would undoubtedly have produced unpredictable and damaging results, and maintaining it, which—it can be said, probably without exaggeration—would for practical purposes have the effect of destroying India's effective participation in the war.

17. If, then, this country presses a demand for a revision, and as a result there is an end to Indian co-operation with us in the government of the country, we shall, for a purpose in which the world will find the motive of pecuniary gain, have brought about the very catastrophe which we are striving to prevent the Congress Party from precipitating—a dislocation of the vast and complicated machinery of government in a great country which is, and must remain, the heart of one of the most vital theatres of war. But with a difference. For where then should we stand in the estimation of the U.S.A. and of such world opinion as still exists? Where would the Government stand in the estimation of our own people? Meanwhile, so far from actually getting anything over and above the goods and services at present furnished by India for the war, it is probable that we should find that even these would have been disastrously diminished.

SUMMARY

18. (i) India is too poor a country to accept the principle that the cost of all goods and services provided from India or financed in rupees shall be finally borne by India. But even now, under the Settlement, India bears a heavy load of defence expenditure—and increase is inevitable. (Paragraphs 2 and 5.)

(ii) A large part of the sterling balances accrues through provision of goods and services not directly connected with the defence of India. (Paragraph 4.)

(iii) The process of accumulation of sterling balances could only be stopped either by ceasing to draw the goods and services or by ceasing to pay India for them. Either course would mean a disastrous collapse of India's participation in the war. (Paragraphs 11 and 12.)

(iv) Indian industrialists and business-men are so hostile to increase of India's financial war burden that if a revision of the existing Settlement were to be

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forced on India they would probably cease to co-operate, and munition production would fall away. (Paragraphs 10 and 12.)

(v) By the Treasury proposal the efficient use *now* of India's war potential would be treated as secondary to purely *post-war* financial considerations. (Paragraph 13.)

(vi) The Government of India offer to assume further burdens within the framework of the existing Financial Settlement, though they would find it impossible on political and other grounds to scrap it. They are anxious also to discuss the present or future application of any mutually satisfactory methods of mitigating any inconvenience to the United Kingdom through the accumulation of sterling balances. (Paragraphs 3, 7, 14 and 15.)

(vii) If the Treasury view were to be accepted by the Cabinet any attempt to implement it would involve deplorable political consequences, including the resignation of those Indian public men whom the Viceroy has succeeded in adding to his Council in the recent expansions, and an inability to find other suitable Indians to replace them. (Paragraphs 11 and 17.)

L. S. A.

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Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/63

SECRET CAMP, *1 August 1942*

No. R.-114-G.C.P.

While we are awaiting the outcome of the A.-I.C.C. meeting at Bombay, I will comment briefly on events up-to-date and at the same time acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter dated the 22nd July 1942.[1]

2. Provincial Congress Committees are getting busy passing resolutions to the effect that they will support Gandhi's threatened movement and Ruikar, our Labour leader and President of the Forward Bloc, together with his immediate supporters, have also announced the same intention.

As regards the Provincial Congress Committees, I doubt whether their arrangements have proceeded very far. There is still no indication that they have worked up the masses—indeed, all the evidence is to the contrary—or have thought out, or organised, any campaign.

Although, therefore, I cannot exaggerate the importance of beheading the movement before it starts, I still think that Gandhi's prospects of achieving a mass movement are particularly poor. We must however decapitate the

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movement the moment it starts. I still have vivid recollections of the success achieved against the second civil disobedience movement of 1932 when I was personally in charge of the counter-measures in Bengal. That movement was associated with the worst phase of the terrorist campaign and yet, by having all our plans ready at zero hour, declaring unlawful all Congress Executive Committees and seizing their premises, the movement was virtually brought under control in three weeks and in many cases it was not even necessary to arrest the personnel of local Congress Committees.

I have a draft Gazette Extraordinary ready for immediate publication at zero hour together with Code instructions to District Officers how to proceed.

As regards Ruikar's announcement of his intention to support Gandhi's movement, Scott, the Inspector-General of Police, and the Chief Secretary are both of opinion that Ruikar will resile from his undertaking the moment he sees which way the cat is going to jump.

The local Congress organ, *Nagpur Times*, although of no importance as a newspaper, is very often remarkably accurate as to what Wardha is thinking and saying. It states that Gandhi is reported to have told a prominent Congressman: "I find life impossible in this country. Our being inactive at this critical juncture might even mean an invitation to the Japanese. Now the world will see non-violence in full action."

It adds that Gandhi is very bitter and that there will be no restrictions on any one who wishes to join the movement and I think that the aim is to give *carte blanche* to all Provincial and local Congress associations to indulge in all possible methods of embarrassing Government—which, in practice, means the local authorities—without any control from Wardha. This, of course, is the most difficult form of movement to cope with and is what Congress aimed at in 1930–32.

3. Aney came to see me on the 28th July. He spoke at Tilak Jayanti and handsomely supported the Cripps scheme, earning for himself the caption in the *Nagpur Times*: "Aney Speaks in Amery's Voice." At his interview with me, he was concerned to impress me with the necessity of substituting some more popular form of Government for the Section 93 régime before October next. I gather that he has pursued the same line with Your Excellency. I was amused at his main argument, characteristically blunt and Maratha-like, as expressed to me, which was that, if the Section 93 administration went on much longer, the people might get to like it so much that democratic government, and especially by implication, Congress government, would be at a discount. He does not seem to have any clear ideas as to what should be substituted for Section 93 and does not seem to mind much. I pointed out the obvious difficulties as regards Minority Ministries, non-official Advisers and even reversion to diarchy

[1] Not printed.

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on the basis of the Act of 1919. He had no solution, and I enquired whether he would favour an amendment of the Act of 1935, so as to provide for nomination to the Assembly in order to give the Government a working majority; but I am not sure what his reactions were.

Aney had been seeing Dr. Khare and, I think, was concerned to put in a word for a Minority Ministry. It is reported that Dr. Khare is having difficulty with his supporters, some of whom, no doubt, are beginning to think that they had better join in with the threatened civil disobedience movement in order to better their election prospects and to lay up treasure for themselves in the eventual Congress Heaven.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir A. Hope (Madras)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMMEDIATE *2 August 1942*
MOST SECRET
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2271–S. Your private and personal telegram, dated July 30th, No. 117–M.[1] I am most grateful for your comments. There may be substantial amendments in draft instructions in the light of your views and those of other Governors, and revised version will be communicated as early as possible by Home Department.

2. *Your paragraph 3.*—In the light of the views of Governors whom I have consulted privately on deportation, I am clear (though my own inclination is strongly in favour of it) that there is still so substantial a balance of opinion against that it would not be wise to pursue the idea. I propose therefore to dispose of the individuals arrested in India. As regards the transfer of leaders, I personally feel great sympathy with this idea, but as you may remember we have had difficulties with certain Provinces. Suggestion (with our support) will be included in revised letter to Provincial Governments, but suggestion will be made also that they should arrange direct with one another, as you will appreciate difficulties of Central Government in organizing complicated series of transfers involved over the whole country.

3. *Your paragraph 4.*—I have discussed with my advisers, but we remain of opinion that it would be preferable not to promulgate the Emergency Powers Ordinance until we are ready to apply it. We cannot apply it until we know more definitely the nature of the movement which it is proposed to launch. There need however be little or no delay, and if our preventive arrests do not scotch the movement, we can promulgate the Ordinance at once.

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4. *Your paragraph* 5.—Please see my comment on paragraph 3 above. Whole subject of Press control is under urgent examination, and I agree that it will be well to consider ban on the mention of jail conditions, &c. Home Department on July 30th suggested to Provinces immediate action against any local or vernacular editors who may be carrying on advance propaganda in favour of civil disobedience. My advisers, with whom I agree, deprecate however suppression of *Harijan* at this stage. Much of what Gandhi says in it provides us and other commentators with admirable material for criticism, and is doing Congress more harm than good. Apart from that, it has probably only one or two issues to run in any case and suppression now would be a declaration of war before we are quite ready.

[1] No. 370.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 334

L/P&S/12/2315: ff 186–90

INDIA

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY

GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W.I, *2 August 1942*

By direction of the Prime Minister, the attached exchange of telegrams between President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister is circulated for the information of the War Cabinet.

E. E. BRIDGES
Secretary of the War Cabinet

Annex 1 to No. 392

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

No. 172 *30 July 1942*

I have today received a long and urgent message from Chiang Kai-shek. He asks me to regard this message as strictly confidential, but in view of its nature I naturally wish to inform you immediately of its contents.

The following is the text of this message:

"With both sides remaining adamant in their views, the Indian situation has reached an extremely tense and critical stage. Its development in fact constitutes the most important factor in determining the outcome of the United

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Nations war and especially the war in the East. The war aims which the anti-aggression nations have proclaimed to the world are two-fold, first to crush brute force and second to secure freedom for all mankind. If India should start a movement against Britain or against the United Nations, this will cause deterioration in the Indian situation from which the Axis powers will surely reap benefit. Such an eventuality will seriously affect the whole course of the war and at the same time the world might entertain doubts as to the sincerity of the lofty war aims of the United Nations. This will not only prove a great disadvantage to Britain but will also reflect discredit to the democratic front.

"At this juncture the United Nations should do their best, when there is yet time, to prevent the occurrence of such an unfortunate state of affairs. Your country is the leader in this war of right against might and your Excellency's views have always received serious attention in Britain. Furthermore, for a long time the Indian people have been expecting the United States to come out and take a stand on the side of justice and equality. I therefore venture to lay before you my personal views on this question.

"Inevitably Britain will regard the Indian National Congress' recent demand as an attempt to take advantage of her present predicament. The step contemplated by the resolution of the Congress Working Committee, however, still leaves sufficient time and opportunity for the reaching of an agreement. During my recent visit to India, I earnestly advised the Indian people to consider their primary duty to join the anti-aggression front in a common struggle for mankind.

"From the point of view of the Indian people, their consistent purpose is to secure national freedom. With this object in view the Indian National Congress, in seeking national independence, is dominated by sentiment rather than by reason. Consequently I believe attempts at repression in the form of either public censure or force, whether military or police with a view to compelling the Indian people to capitulate, will have the opposite result.

"From the psychological point of view of the Indian, he considers that India before attaining her National Freedom is not the master of her own vast territory and abundant resources. Just because he owns nothing, he has nothing to be afraid of. Moreover beyond National Independence and Freedom he demands nothing of the world. Likewise the Indian people as a whole only desire Freedom for their country and their only expectation is that the United Nations would sympathise with them in their aspirations.

"The Indian people are by nature of a passive disposition but are apt to go to extremes. I think that in launching its freedom movement today when Axis aggression is a pressing reality, the Indian Congress must have felt in their hearts a certain amount of anguish. If however the United Nations should show them no sympathy and pursue a *laissez faire* policy and thereby cause them to despair, I greatly fear that following the National Congress meeting in August

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there is danger of the situation getting out of control. In case an anti-British movement or some other unfortunate incident occurs in India, the United Nations war in the East will be adversely affected immediately. For the sake of our common victory the United Nations must seek to stabilise the Indian situation and to secure the Indian peoples participation in the joint war effort.

"The United Nations depend upon India for her to contribute to the war whereas the Indian people have little need to depend upon the outside world. From their own point of view their movement for independence and freedom is not something new that has come into existence after the outbreak of the war. Hence they do not stop to think whether their movement will have any harmful effect on the world situation. This being the case they have no hesitation in taking whatever steps they may think necessary in furtherance of their National Movement. Whether they are right or wrong is immaterial. The fact remains they have now already become irresponsive to even well considered public opinion or a realistic analysis of India's real interests. Once they abandon hope of an amicable settlement, they are liable to take any risk without hesitation even to the extent of sacrificing themselves and others.

"The only way to make them reconsider their course of action is for the United Nations, and especially the United States which they have always admired, to come forth as third parties and to offer them sympathy and consolation. This will help them to regain their sense of proportion and strengthen their faith that there is justice in this world. Once the situation is eased it can be stabilised and the Indian people, grateful to the United Nations for what they have done, will willingly participate in the war. Otherwise the Indian people in despair will have the same feeling towards other members of the United Nations as towards Britain and when this comes to pass it will be the world's greatest tragedy in which Britain is not the only loser.

"So far as Britain is concerned she is a great country and in recent years she has been pursuing an enlightened policy towards her Colonial possessions. She is one of the principals in this war against aggression. On the other hand India is a weak country. With this unprecedent[ed]ly extensive war in progress, naturally things cannot be handled in the ordinary manner. It is my opinion that in order to uphold the British Empire's prestige and safeguard her real interests, the British should unhesitatingly show extraordinary courage, forbearance, far-sightedness and resolution by removing the causes which tend to aggravate the situation. In this way the deceptive Axis propagandists will have no occasion to take advantage of these causes. Should however the situation be allowed to drift until an anti-British movement breaks out in India, any attempt on the part of the British to cope with the crisis by enforcing existing Colonial laws or by resorting to military and police force, will only help to spread disturbances and turmoil. The greater the oppression, the greater

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the reaction. Even if such measures should prove effective in curbing the non-violence movement, the spiritual loss and blow to the United Nations will far exceed that resulting from any reverse in the field. Such a situation will particularly be detrimental to British interests.

"There is no doubt a section of the Indian people which, having lost their sense of proportion, is asking if India will never obtain freedom, what choice does she have between Britain and Axis powers. This mistaken idea the United Nations should of course do everything possible to correct. On the other hand the wisest the most enlightened policy for Britain to pursue would be to restore to India her complete freedom and thus to prevent Axis troops from setting foot on Indian soil. If Britain would reorientate her present attitude and spirit, I firmly believe that not only will Indian sentiment towards Britain undergo radical change for the better but Britain's action will have an ameliorating effect on the whole situation. Therefore I earnestly hope that the United States would advise both Britain and India in the name of justice and righteousness to seek a reasonable and satisfactory solution for this affects vitally the welfare of mankind and has a direct bearing on the good faith and good name of the United Nations. The United States as the acknowledged leader of democracy has a natural and vital role to play in bringing about a successful solution of the problem. In saying so I have not the slightest intention to arouse attention by exaggerated statements. The war aims of the United Nations and our common interests at stake make it impossible for me to remain silent. An ancient Chinese proverb says: 'Good medicine, though bitter, cures one's illness: words of sincere advice, though unpleasant, should guide one's conduct.'

"I sincerely hope that Britain will magnanimously and resolutely accept my words of disinterested advice, however unpleasant they may be, and believe that they are voiced in the common interests of the United Nations.

"In view of the critical situation and in view of China's responsibilities as a member of the United Nations, I have ventured to offer you my views. This despatch is strictly confidential. It is only for your Excellency's personal reference. I hope your Excellency will give the minutest consideration to such practical measures as will break the existing deadlock and avert a crisis. I shall persevere in my efforts. My only feeling is that the United Nations should lose no time in adopting a correct policy towards the Indian situation and in striving for its realisation so that our entire war effort will not suffer a major set back. I ardently hope Your Excellency will favour me with your sound judgment."

I shall have to give a reply to Chiang Kai-shek in the near future and I shall be grateful if you will let me have as soon as possible your thoughts and any suggestions you may wish to offer with regard to the nature of the reply I should make to him.

ROOSEVELT

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Annex 2 to No. 392

PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT

PERSONAL AND SECRET *31 July 1942*

No. 125

Your 172.

1. We do not agree with Chiang Kai-shek's estimate of the Indian situation. The Congress Party in no way represents India and is strongly opposed by over 90 million Mohammedans, 40 million Untouchables, and the Indian States comprising some 90 millions, to whom we are bound by Treaty. Congress represents mainly the intelligentzia of non-fighting Hindu elements, and can neither defend India nor raise a revolt. The military classes on whom everything depends are thoroughly loyal, in fact over a million have volunteered for the Army and the numbers recently volunteering greatly exceed all previous records. Their loyalty would be gravely impaired by handing over the Government of India to Congress control. The reckless declarations of Congress have moreover given rise to widespread misgiving, even among its own rank and file.

2. The Government of India have no doubt of their ability to maintain order and carry on government with efficiency and secure India's maximum contribution to the war effort whatever Congress may say or even do, provided of course that their authority is not undermined. His Majesty's Government here have no intention of making any offer beyond the sweeping proposals which Sir Stafford Cripps carried to India and in fact could not do so without creating grave internal trouble in India. So far as I am concerned, I could not accept responsibility for making further proposals at this stage. We have however only today[1] in Parliament made clear that while the specific proposals suggested by Cripps failed to secure agreement we stand firmly by the broad intention of our offer which is that India should have the fullest opportunity at the earliest possible moment after the war to attain to complete self-government under constitutional arrangements of her own devising. I earnestly hope therefore, Mr. President, that you will do your best to dissuade Chiang Kai-shek from his completely misinformed activities, and will lend no countenance to putting pressure upon His Majesty's Government.

W. S. C.

[1] Mr Amery's statement (No. 366) was made on 30 July.

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Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: ff 118–19

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *3 August 1942, 10.50 pm*
Received: 3 August, 11.45 pm

6092. Following is fairly complete summary of letter to Provincial Governments issued August 2nd,[1] of which copy is being despatched to you by fast air mail.

Begins. Plan of campaign against Congress.

1. First stage now nearing completion has been usefully employed in propaganda and public opinion inside and outside India is now probably more prepared to support strong action than might have been the case a few weeks ago.

2. Ratification of Working Committee's resolution without substantial amendment (and no amendment will be regarded as substantial unless it unambiguously removes threat of mass movement) will mark commencement of second stage. As soon as this takes place Bombay Government will inform Government of India, all Provincial Governments, Chief Commissioners and Political Residents by telegram containing pre-arranged code word. No action will however be started until Government of India send all above addressees further telegram containing another pre-arranged codeword which will be the signal for action. (This will give opportunity for last minute consideration here and enable us to synchronise action suitably e.g. giving Bombay, if necessary, a short start over the others.)

3. On receipt of telegram from Government of India,

(*a*) Bombay Government will arrest Gandhi and all members of Working Committee who may be in Bombay under Defence Rule 26.[2]

(*b*) Each Provincial Government will proclaim under Criminal Law Amendment Act Congress Working Committee, All-India Congress Committee and each Provincial Congress Committee operating within its jurisdiction, but not Indian National Congress as a whole. Provincial Governments will also be given discretion to proclaim other Congress Committees or Committees affiliated to Congress, including those of Congress Socialist Party, against which they consider it essential to take action by way of seizing offices and funds, bearing in mind that all actual arrests will be made under Defence of India Rules and not under Criminal Law Amendment Act.

(*c*) Each Provincial Government will then seize relevant offices and funds and also arrest under Defence Rule 26 all individuals whom they consider competent and likely to attempt to organise and launch mass movement. No

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individual will be arrested merely as member of unlawful association general object being not to fill the jails but to limit the number of arrests to those regarded as essential for dislocation of the Congress organisation. Important that organisers from British India who may take refuge in Indian States will be arrested by the application from Provincial Governments to Political Officers concerned. Bombay Government will not arrest any individual who does not belong to Bombay Province except those mentioned in (*a*) above.

4. Simultaneously with issue of their telegram Government of India will publish statement containing H.M. Government's rejection of Congress proposal already implicit in answer to Parliamentary question of June 30th[3] and their own denunciation of Congress and its leaders.

5. If any member of Working Committee abstains from attending Bombay meeting on grounds which might reasonably be interpreted as indicating lack of sympathy with Congress resolution he will not be arrested immediately but his reactions to the other arrests will be awaited. Any member who is prevented from attending by unavoidable circumstances will be arrested in his province but if non-attendance is due to genuine illness restrictive orders will be passed against him under Defence Rule 26 (1) (*d*) and (*f*)[4] pending his recovery.

6. Gandhi will be arrested under Defence Rule 26 and not Regulation III and will be detained in Bombay Presidency and not Sevagram. Mahadev Desai, Mira Ben and Doctor Sushila Nair (lady doctor) will be permitted to accompany Gandhi if they voluntarily accept restrictions on communication which will be imposed on Gandhi himself. If first two refuse to accept these conditions they will also be arrested under Defence Rule 26. Lady doctor will not be arrested but will not of course be allowed to attend on Gandhi unless she accepts conditions.

7. Place or places in which members of Working Committee arrested in Bombay (except Mrs. Sarojini Naidu) will be confined has not yet been finally settled but will probably be in Bombay Presidency. Mrs. Naidu will accompany Gandhi. Any member of Working Committee arrested in province other than Bombay will be sent to join other members later if Provincial Government so desires. Whole party may have to be temporarily confined in Yeravda Jail immediately after arrest.

8. Gandhi and all arrested members Working Committee will be precluded absolutely from any form communication with outside world special care being taken to see that they are not allowed to make any public statements

[1] L/P&J/8/598: ff 305–8. [2] See No. 319, note 7.

[3] A mistake for 'July 30th'; see No. 366.

[4] Sub-rule (1) (*d*) conferred powers to specify place of residence. Sub-rule (1) (*f*) conferred powers to restrict activities in respect of employment, association or communication with other persons and dissemination of news or opinions.

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whatever or see any friends or relations after arrest necessary amendments being made to Security of Prisoners Rules if necessary to secure this object. All Provincial Governments are advised follow similar procedure with regard to important leaders and organisers arrested within their jurisdiction.

9. It is left to Provincial Governments by inter-provincial consultation to pursue if they so wish suggestion that important provincial leaders and organisers should be detained in some jail outside their own province.

10. If unfortunately Gandhi fasts, "cat and mouse" procedure will be followed as on previous occasions. He will be given every facility to take food and receive constant medical attention but will be released as soon as his life is in danger to avoid possibility of his death as a prisoner. Whether similar procedure should apply to members of Working Committee if they go on hunger strike is under consideration.

11. Dangers of widespread protests demonstrations and possible outbreak of disorder resulting from above action are realised and Provincial Governments will take all possible precautionary steps in consultation where necessary with military authorities who have already been warned by general headquarters. We are considering urgent amendment of Defence of India Rules to enable shops for sale of food and other essential commodities to be kept open by force if necessary if *hartals* are proclaimed.

12. Main object of action would be to render movement abortive by removing its leaders. Policy should therefore be to discredit and immobilise leaders, while doing as little as possible to antagonise rank and file, and to stress preventive character of action taken.

13. Third stage will supervene if attempts to abort movement fails. At this stage but not before it may be necessary to proclaim Indian National Congress and promulgate Emergency Powers Ordinance.[5] There will be no delay in taking latter step if movement is actually launched. Provincial Governments should send telegraphic reports as necessary during first week summarising reactions to arrests and other initial action and asking for promulgation of ordinance as soon as they consider situation demands it.

14. Indications as to character of movement are still indefinite but Gandhi's probable intention is to give wide discretion to individuals to embark on any line of action whether amounting to breach of law or not provided it creates maximum embarrassment and obstruction to administration. Obvious grievances mentioned in Working Committee's resolution of July 10th afford best grounds for successful movement so far as they are genuine but Provincial Governments must be prepared for all kinds of passive resistance before and after arrest and in jail.

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15. Separate instructions will issue as soon as possible regarding control of Press.

16. Every possible step should be taken to keep the plan secret. *Ends.*

[5] See No. 247, note 4.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *3 August 1942, 3.50 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 3 August, 4 pm*

No. 2273-S. After further consultation with my Advisers and with Lumley, I have now decided on Ahmednagar as the best place for the Working Committee. There is no insuperable local objection. There is definite advantage over Yeravda that these leaders[1] will be well away from other prisoners, and we also avoid the use of the word "jail" which may be desirable for propaganda reasons.

2. I am most grateful for the help you and Colonial Office have given me (your telegram of 31st July, No. 13551,[2] and connected correspondence), and while issue of deportation will not now immediately arise, I am having points raised by Colonial Office looked into, so that we might be prepared if the need for deportation should arise later on.

3. *Your paragraph 2.*—I will telegraph separately on this point. Urgency of this is now very much less.

[1] Deciphered as '(? huts)'. [2] No. 383.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *3 August 1942*
PERSONAL

No. 2274-S. You will I am sure agree with me as to importance of doing anything we can in provinces both to make clear to the public reasons for which we are going all out to deal with Congress menace, and to hearten the man

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in the street. If you have any specific suggestions, I shall of course be very glad to consider them. I imagine that it will be important to give District Officers in particular a line, and you may wish to consider possibility of fairly active propaganda in respect of our action in towns. In suitable localities District Officers or their subordinates might read a short message designed to steady and reassure the public. Expediency of posting notices on public buildings may also be considered. I pass this to you for what it is worth, but must of course leave methods to you.

2. I have considered using the National War Front still more extensively in this connection, but on the whole I feel that we have already probably gone as far as we can consistently with avoiding suggestion that we are making it political.[1] Here again however I should welcome any comment you may have.

3. I am telegraphing in similar terms to other Governors.

[1] Cf. No. 296, note 2.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/3: f 270

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *3 August 1942, 8 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 4 August*

937. Your private and personal telegram of 31st July, 2255–S.[1] Prime Minister has agreed to Raisman attending Cabinet in order to state Government of India's point of view in connection with a memorandum[2] put in by me in reply to Chancellor's[3] on this subject. I consider that it should not be publicly disclosed that he had done so as it is improbable that accredited Indian Representatives when they arrive will be admitted as of right when issue is not one of general war policy in which India with rest of Commonwealth is concerned but is matter primarily of domestic relations between His Majesty's Government and Government of India. It may be arguable into which category present case falls but I do not want to raise discussion at this stage on precise subjects for which they are entitled to attend.

[1] No. 379. [2] No. 389. [3] No. 375.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: ff 123–5

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *3 August 1942, 8 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 4 August*

938. Your private and personal telegram 2263–S[1] of 2nd August.
While we should of course be anxious to do everything possible to give publicity to substance of Congress documents, it is impracticable, especially at such short notice, to expect the Press to pay adequate attention to such voluminous material and I regard it as imperative, for purposes of publicity here and in U.S.A., that documents should be accompanied by carefully prepared summary. It is however impossible to produce latter here in the time available. Could you therefore, if documents are to be published in India, arrange to meet our purposes and those of Bajpai for suitable summary emphasising significant points to be carried by Reuter and for similar document or guidance based on it, to be made available to British and American correspondents in Delhi.

2. While, in view of unanimous decision of your Council, I should in the normal way be most reluctant to suggest any alternative course, I feel I must put to you what seem to me most important considerations pointing to desirability of postponement of publication unless and until action is taken against Gandhi and the Congress leaders. Very briefly considerations are as follows:—

(*a*) To publish now before opportunity is given to A.-I.C.C. to turn down Working Committee might seem provocative and raise in awkward form question why we held back this information up to last moment. On the other hand if A.-I.C.C. endorse Working Committee and you *then* (repeat then) publish that would both illustrate your forbearance up to date and afford extra justification for firm action. It might in fact provide a knock-out blow. I realise that your advisers have been influenced by prospect of publication having effect of creating confusion among number of A.-I.C.C. and so possibly averting their endorsement of Working Committee. As to this I should like you very seriously to consider weight of arguments I have put down above.

(*b*) If contrary to expectation on which we have been working A.-I.C.C. do not endorse Working Committee possibility arises that action may still have to be taken against Gandhi at any rate who may well decide

[1] No. 386; the date should be 1 August.

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to pursue his policy. In that event material will provide very strong justification for proceeding against him.

(*c*) Finally it must be realised that publication of the material at this stage means a final severance of relations with the Congress leaders implicated.

I shall be grateful if you will let me have your reactions by most immediate telegram.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/5/41: f 79

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *3 August 1942*,[1] *11.20 pm*

939. Your telegrams, 2220–S[2] and 2243–S.[3] Reuters were warned of probable untruth of Willkie story which reached them from India. They say they had intended to ascertain basis of report by service message which through office error was transformed into news message of which you complain and have expressed regret.

As regards Willkie's own statement I will if you think it essential ask Foreign Office to convey your view to Washington that visit to India even in private capacity might be inopportune. But if he were visiting China he would of course have to pass through India in which case it might not be a bad thing that in a purely private capacity he should have the opportunity of a talk with you and of forming his own impressions of the situation. Should he travel through London I would of course endeavour to see him.

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 gives the date as 4 August. [2] No. 342. [3] No. 369.

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Sir S. Cripps to Mr Amery

L/PO/3/3d: f 10

GWYDYR HOUSE, WHITEHALL, S.W.1, *3 August 1942*

My dear Amery,

I should very much like to make a broadcast to India on the enclosed lines[1] *before* the A.-I.C.C. come to their conclusion, partly as a justification of my position in face of a great deal of vilification in India and partly but principally with a view to rallying all moderate opinion in India to our side.

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I should be glad to know what your reactions are to my suggestion. I think it would help as regards public opinion here and in U.S.A. & China.

Could you let me know tomorrow Tuesday. I shall be in the House all day.

Yours,

STAFFORD CRIPPS

[1] Enclosure not printed.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/3/3d: ff 20–3

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *3 August 1942, 11 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 4 August*

940. Cripps has asked me whether I would agree to his broadcasting to India *before* A.-I.C.C. meeting reaches conclusions, and has sent me draft. This does not touch on such points as you referred to in your private and personal 2198–S,[1] but starting from position as regards future stated in my answer in House on 30th July[2] proceeds to give strong exposition of reasons why we cannot accept Congress demand, taking line that this is wholly unreasonable at this juncture. He points out that this involves certainty of breakdown of whole administration both central and provincial and would make it impossible for allied forces to continue to operate from India as a base so jeopardising whole allied position in East. He recalls that Gandhi said that once given certainty of Indian freedom he cared little how long period of transition lasted and since this certainty has now been announced appeals for reasonableness and patience during war period.

2. As means of rallying opinion in China and U.S.A. I consider after reading draft that it would be really useful contribution and even in India, if well put across, it might so impress moderate opinion as to undermine authority of Congress leaders and weaken if not avert development of civil disobedience. It might on other hand coming from Member of War Cabinet and particularly Cripps possibly be regarded as sign of weakening by Congress extremists and help to harden their hearts, though even so, if A.-I.C.C. passes resolution and firm action becomes necessary, it might strengthen our position with moderate elements.

Please let me have if possible by to-morrow evening your views as to this project. If you wish to consult your Council I have no objection.

[1] See No. 355, note 6. [2] See No. 366.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *3 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I am most grateful to you and to the India Office for the prompt replies which you have given to the somewhat numerous telegrams we have had to send you about tactics and strategy in dealing with the Congress. They have been of the greatest help, and it has, I need not say, been a great encouragement to me also to find that throughout our minds were working so much on the same lines. Most of the preliminary preparation is now disposed of. I have asked Home Department to let you have the gist[1] of the detailed instructions which have been sent officially to Provinces (after a preliminary run through the private channel which enabled us to get some useful suggestions from Governors which have been incorporated in the final official reference), and the full text of the instructions[2] goes to you by this mail. We have managed to settle this difficult business of the accommodation to be provided for the Working Committee, &c. Like you, I have felt considerable sympathy with the idea of deportation, but I did not, in the light of the views expressed by Governors of much experience and of quite different background such as Lumley and Stewart, feel that one was on a sufficiently strong wicket to justify carrying it further. I think that Ahmednagar looks like being a suitable and adequate place for the Working Committee, &c., and the facts that it has previously been used for State prisoners and that we have time to make such structural alterations as may be needed to bring it entirely up to date for the present purpose, are both relevant. For the Mahatma, we shall I think be able still to use the Aga Khan's Palace at Poona, though we shall have to take special steps to screen it off from new roads which have been driven near it, and on which there may now be a certain amount of traffic. I am sure that we shall be wise to avoid any accommodation which can be described as a jail: for we may be quite certain that we shall have some uphill propaganda battles to fight once the issue is joined (if better counsels do not prevail and it is joined) and we have to immure these various personalities.

2. I discussed in Council on Friday[3] the publication of what is now conveniently called the "Revelation", being the documents seized in Allahabad last May. The discussion was a good one. There was little anticipation that publication would produce any effect on the Congress or on the A.-I.C.C.: and as Sir Jogendra Singh wisely remarked, where there is no will to be converted, there is no hope of conversion. There was some debate as to whether the paper might not show Nehru in an unduly favourable light: but here again the general

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feeling was that the point on which to concentrate was the contrast between Nehru's attitude as revealed in these discussions, and the attitude subsequently adopted by him, which represented a complete runaway. Finally Mody was inclined to think that it would be better to publish after the A.-I.C.C. had made up their minds so as to prevent any possibility of a come-back: but the general feeling was against that, and I am sure rightly.

3. Meanwhile I have today had an appeal[4] from Rajagopalachari who on hearing (this too a breach of confidence by the editor of the *Hindu* to whom these papers had been sent in confidence for release on the 5th) what was afoot, has sent me a telegram which I repeat separately protesting vigorously against any use being made of them. As I had rather anticipated would be the case he does not suggest, though he was present at the discussions, that the papers are forgeries or that there is no foundation for their content. He concentrates entirely on the point that it is a sad abuse of the proprieties to publish confidential papers of this character. I cannot of course accept that view, any more than I can accept his attempted analogy with Cabinet papers. But the celerity of his reaction and of that of Srinivasan confirms me in my earlier feeling that while publication may have a hardening effect on certain sections of Congress opinion, it ought materially to shake the more responsible elements in that party.

4. I thought that Gwyer would like to have advance information of what was happening, and invited him to a *tête-à-tête* dinner here last night, after which I showed him the "Revelation". He was shocked beyond measure. I asked him whether he thought that those who participated on the basis revealed in a discussion of this nature were likely to be at all moved by any greater elasticity on the part of the Governor-General, or by the application of that magic called "imagination" in which you and I are alleged to be so utterly deficient. He was quite clear that the answer was in the negative! I went on to say (a point which I develop at greater length below) that once we had beaten the Congress, I was pretty sure that we should again find ourselves under fairly strong pressure for some further advance in the Centre, or some gesture to the moderate elements who are so consistently held up to us as worthy of being placated and whom it seems so impossible to placate on any terms in reason, and I asked him whether he had any constructive suggestions of his own. There was of course the possibility of dropping Maxwell and Raisman though they were due in any event to go in course of time, and I doubted their being a real make-weight. Did he think that any easing of the position as regards the special powers of the Governor-General would help? Gwyer, not for the first time, told me emphatically that he could see nothing that would in any way ease the situation or on which we could give way.

[1] No. 393. [2] L/P&J/8/598: ff 305–8. [3] 31 July; see No. 386. [4] No. 405.

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5. I have had the point I have just mentioned much in my mind of late. My new Council continue to be extraordinarily sore over Cripps and his mission, and they spare no opportunity of digging into me that he has prejudicially affected their prestige as a governing body, and that he has nullified all the endeavours which I had been making for many months previously to get the country to accept them as an effective and authoritative government in sympathy with the national ideal. Mody (who I suspect does not quite understand what some of this is about) is particularly persistent (and very anxious to be the spearhead of reform himself, and to secure the credit of ousting Parliament and the Secretary of State), and one gets representations also from people like Sarker in favour of the removal of the two remaining European officials and of some public indication that the Council will now be given those additional powers and responsibilities *vis-à-vis* of the Governor-General and of His Majesty's Government to which Cripps is so consistently alleged to have made reference in private conversation but which as you and I know so well fell completely outside the ambit of anything which he was authorised to concede or His Majesty's Government prepared to consider. I cannot of course disclose that Cripps went so far beyond his brief in a great deal of what he said, nor, since he did not normally conduct his discussions in the presence of witnesses, have any of us any means of checking what exactly he said. So one must make the best of it and try to protect his position and reputation, while at the same time avoiding the suggestion so far as one can that His Majesty's Government and I are hide-bound reactionaries, not prepared to go as far with a trustworthy and reasonable government such as I have at the moment, as we should have been with the left-wing stalwarts of Congress.

6. I think that Benthall may be of a good deal of assistance here. He is already beginning to serve as a bridge with the Indian elements in the Council. They like and trust him, I think. They know that he has a long record of political service and that his attitude has always been liberal. He is of course much in my confidence, and when he has found his feet I think that he may prove to be most valuable and that he will be able to assist one both in keeping the temperature low and in dispelling certain misconceptions.

7. I have let him know where we stand about conventions and that sort of thing. He realises the objections to going ahead on those lines. I have also discussed with him what I regard as a quite possible line of advance, and that is the development of the committee system. As you know we are working at the moment with a War Resources Committee, of which I am nominally the President, but over which I have not yet presided, and over which I do not intend to preside save in very special circumstances. The War Resources Committee has on it three or four Members of Council regularly, and others as they are needed. It has been a great success. It gets through its work quickly and

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efficiently, gives instructions to the departments, gets things done against a time-limit without referring to me save by way of a report to the full Council, and in general is an efficient and businesslike body. Again, it makes it possible for three or four Members and not merely for one, to be brought closely in on the detailed handling of an important group of subjects running into the policy field. Benthall has suggested that we might extend this principle and develop a Home Department sub-committee and a Finance sub-committee, since he tells me he is convinced that it is over those two portfolios, which have always been carefully guarded, which are of importance politically, and which are now the only two in the hands of official and European Members, that most suspicion hovers, and that it is about the line of policy in which the Home Member and the Finance Member are concerned that most interest is shown.

8. I am not in principle unsympathetic to the idea of Home and Finance sub-committees: but the issues involved in both cases are very delicate ones, and I do not propose to take this matter (on which I shall have to consult you if it comes to anything) further until Maxwell has recovered from his present bronchial attack, and Raisman is back in India—in other words not before the end of this month. But there are other areas of the field in which I think the principle of committees could be developed. I have already appointed Mudaliar to investigate with certain colleagues certain aspects of the precautionary measures to be taken in connection with Congress there. There is I suspect room for a committee on War Transport under the War Transport Member, who could have associated with him a couple of people like, say, Srivastava and Mody. There may well be a case for a committee on Information, and you and I can easily think of other possibilities of that nature. Political considerations apart, there is I think a good case, on merits; for a Council of fifteen or so is much too big to transact certain items of business and do the ordinary work falling to individual members as well. I propose to take some further soundings here and, if as I rather anticipate the reactions are good, then to go ahead.

9. The position is further eased by the fact that we have in Hutton an excellent Committee Secretary of high standing and much experience, not only of the General Staff, &c. here, but of the working of the Committee system at home in the C.I.D. Here, too, I think that the right line of development will be to keep Hutton as the Secretary of all Committees that may be set up (and probably as at home to keep the Governor-General as the Chairman or the only permanent member of all of them) letting him arrange for the secretarial functions to be discharged, where the matter is not of outstanding importance, by Deputy Secretaries working under him. In fact, I think that one can identify in Hutton, in a development such as I have been sketching very broadly above, the germ, not only of much more efficient working by Council

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as a whole, but of a Cabinet Secretariat such as was in view in 1935 when Miéville was appointed Council Secretary, and was again faintly in the air when Williams went to the Defence Co-ordination Department in 1938. Neither of the earlier experiments was a success, but we now have a man with the requisite experience. And I think that, moving cautiously from one rung of the ladder to the next, I might be able before I hand over in the spring to get the nucleus of an organisation going on lines which my successor could develop as occasion might justify.

* * *

12. Now a word on your letters of the 9th,[5] 13th[6] and 15th July,[7] for all of which I am most grateful. In your letter of the 9th July you touch on the ban on the Communists. I have no doubt that we were right to do what we did, and I think that our action has had a certain propaganda value. I greatly fear, however, on the material which the D.I.B. shows me, that we are to have little reward and a good deal of disappointment. But we shall see how things go.

* * *

14. My warmest thanks for the copy of your volume of speeches. It is most useful, and I am sure that its publication was very opportune. It does, as you say, bring out very clearly the continuity of our policy, and also the efforts that we have so consistently made to try to get people here to work to a manageable scheme.

* * *

18. Your letter of the 13th July deals, of course, with the general issue as between us and the Congress Working Committee, and there is little that I need say here for, as I mention elsewhere in this letter, our minds have been working very much on the same lines throughout. But you do raise a point of substance in paragraph 4 when you ask to what extent I have got to carry the whole of my Executive with me. Old or new, it is very important to ride them as gently as possible, and still more important to avoid leaving behind, in any decisions such as those which one has to take at the present time, any little centres of disaffection or disappointment. They are doing very well so far, but I do not want to give them a chance of running out on what must be a nasty and most unpopular job, as they might well be tempted to were I to try to ride on too tight a rein. It is all a business of taking them along with one; and I can assure you that while I always thought the Governor-General under Federation was going to find that task a substantial addition to his already almost unbearable labours, I have found the task descend on my shoulders with this team of 15 quite as heavily as it would have in any federal scheme! But I think the results are good, though my successor, with less familiarity, is likely to find the business a heavy one.

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19. Your letters of the 13th and 15th July mention the Cabinet attitude; and it is of course as great a relief to me as it must have been to you that they should have helped us so much and been so reasonable. I quite understand your feelings as regards the Congress "Grievances" resolution,[8] and of course I accept the view that they probably have in fact infringed the law by what they say. But in conducting the sort of campaign in which I am at present engaged one has to curb one's emotions and to wait for the right moment at which to strike; and I have little doubt that if the Congress could have tempted us into taking them up on the "Grievances" resolution (for which there is likely to be quite an important degree of support in certain of the operational parts of the country) and diverted us from the main issue (on which they must realise how weak their position is) nothing would have pleased them better.

* * *

21. I have thought again about the point mentioned in paragraph 6[9]—the possibility of asking Princes to sit with my expanded Council. I think that as time goes on there may be opportunities here and there for some closer contact between individual Members of Council and individual Rulers, or even, through the operation, as you say, of bodies such as the National Defence Council, between a British India body and a similar body of Rulers. But I do not believe that it would work so far as the Executive Council are concerned; and I suspect that the difference of approach and of interest is too great at any rate in present circumstances to make likely any very useful result of a Round Table approach in Council problems of common interest.

22. I of course sympathise greatly with the spirit of paragraph 7 of your letter of the 15th but, politically, I do not think it is practical politics in the present circumstances. I regret it the more, because the more I watch this Indian situation develop the more ground one sees for pessimism. There is little if any sign of personnel of the requisite quality; there is precious little indication of any desire to face unpopular decisions or to carry responsibility; and I have not the least doubt that progressive Indianisation is leading, whether in the educational world, in archæology, in the field of agriculture, in science, or in the services, to a substantial deterioration of quality, which acquires momentum every year. And there are many other elements in the situation to give one cause for deep and anxious thought so far as the future of India is concerned. I would not, as I said in a recent telegram,[10] exclude, either, the possibility that at the end of a successful war circumstances here may make it impossible for us to give effect to our anxiety to see India a Dominion. But I am equally clear (though of this you are a much better judge than I can be) that however deep and serious the cracks that are beginning to reveal themselves in the façade of a

[5] No. 241. [6] No. 259. [7] No. 269. [8] Of 10 July. [9] Of No. 269.
[10] No. 289.

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possible Indian Dominion, the signs of disintegration must become more manifest and the dangers more apparent, both at home and here, before we can well admit that the democratic experiment may have failed, and that we must retrace our steps.

* * *

24. The D.I.B. has sent me an interesting note,[11] on the basis of which the Home Department have telegraphed to you officially,[12] on Gandhi's fasts, and a copy of it goes to you from Home Department by this bag. But it seems pretty clear that, as the note says in its conclusion, "it is at least open to question whether it was not more than happy coincidence that turned these sacrifices so substantially to his political advantage".

* * *

5 August 1942

29. C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar took his seat in Council today and his swift and balanced intelligence and judgment seem likely to me to be a very substantial source of additional strength even to a Council as representative as the present body. He settled into business without a moment's delay, and made contributions of real value to what was going on. I had a long and very friendly talk with him afterwards.

30. Council had a further talk about arrangements in connection with the Congress position, and I found general agreement as to the line which we ought to adopt. We propose for the next three or four days to have a daily meeting to review developments. Mody, on whose attitude I have touched in greater detail before, again repeated that he thought it of real importance that we should get on with constructive constitutional advance. Jogendra Singh, who is quite as woolly as I had always anticipated, begged me across the table to make an immediate transfer of all power to the members of this really highly qualified Cabinet, an appeal to which I replied by thanking him and which appeared to be taken at its true value by his colleagues. I had in fact intended to develop today my ideas as regards the Sub-Committee procedure and a greater sharing between Members of Council of the responsibilities normally discharged by individual Members as a result of the adoption of such a procedure. But Jogendra Singh's intervention rendered the atmosphere unsuitable for that. I shall have to wait until I get a more suitable opportunity, which will I hope be in the near future. I had to remind Mody somewhat sharply that the Council was not constitutionally entitled to endeavour to control Governors in the Section 93 Provinces, or to interfere for that matter with governments in the ministerial provinces. There is of course the tendency to forget that Provincial Autonomy is a very real thing. It may not at the moment be a very real thing in the Section 93 Provinces but it unquestionably is where Ministers are concerned, and in neither set of circumstances would it be possible to contemplate

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this Council at the Centre assuming to itself rights to which it is not statutorily entitled. I dare say I shall have some more trouble about this, but I am quite clear that it is not a point on which I can make any concession.

31. The point that is going to cause me more trouble is of course the anxiety of Mody, &c. to turn out Parliament and the Secretary of State. You and I are too familiar with this issue to feel any doubt as to the impracticability of that sort of thing in present circumstances, but that does not of course render it any the easier to handle, since one has not the necessary margin to play with. Here again I shall have to do my best. But it is all relevant to a connected point, which is that we shall have to get accustomed to letting this Council have its way to a greater degree possibly than in the past where matters of vital importance are not concerned. A very good example is the issues that arose over the proposed publication of the Allahabad documents. There were decisive reasons of a different character against my holding up their publication which I explained to you by telegram.[13] But you may take it that it would have been quite out of the question for me to go to Council and suggest that publication was being held up, when they had agreed to publication, at the request of the Secretary of State. If I am to take these people with me (and I of course am anxious to do my very best to do so in the interest of sparing trouble for you and me, and also of developing the appropriate procedure for the future) I must ride them on a pretty light rein, and you must not therefore misunderstand me if on occasion in future (and I do not try to envisage any particular set of circumstances, nor would there be advantage in my doing so) I have to let you know that, given the attitude of my Council I cannot consider or support to you propositions that on merits, or so far as I personally am concerned, I would regard as entirely sound and reasonable. In such circumstances I will of course always be at pains to give you the background privately and to let you have the full story. But we may look for increasing reluctance to submit to control from home save where matters of great importance or matters that can only be handled through the Secretary of State are affected, and the business of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy must, I fear, in an increasing degree be to harmonise that sort of atmosphere here with the responsibilities which you and I have to the government of the day. I of course, and whoever succeeds me, will at all times be only too anxious to strike that balance with the utmost care. But the existence of the problem, as you with your immense experience of Parliamentary life and Ministerial government at home realise, is bound to present us from time to time with some rather knotty questions to resolve.

Best messages.

[11] L/P&J/8/600: ff 531–8. [12] L/P&J/8/597: f 164. [13] No. 403.

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402

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *3 August 1942*

I expect this may be the last letter I write to you before the A.-I.C.C. meeting on the 7th. So far it looks to me as if, in spite of universal criticism from every quarter, Gandhi and Nehru mean to go ahead, and if so I imagine they will carry the meeting with them. I have just sent off a telegram[1] to you expressing doubts as to the wisdom of publishing the impounded notes of the Congress discussion in May before the meeting instead of using them as an additional justification for strong action after the meeting endorses the resolution. Even if it does not it may be useful ammunition to you as against Gandhi himself. I realise the force of the argument that publishing it now may create dismay and confusion in Congress ranks and increase the prospects of the resolution being turned down. But we are dealing with queer people and my instinct is that they would only regard it as provocative, while the world at large would be inclined to say that we have produced it at this moment for purely tactical reasons when we might have produced it before. However, this is a matter on which you and your advisers must be the best judges of the situation.

2. Like you, I am a little sorry that your advisers are against deportation. However, if they can be shut up somewhere in safety in a place where there is no direct access to them and where crowds cannot easily be got together, I dare say it will be all right. What has disturbed me a little is a suggestion, in one of your telegrams[2] I think, that if Gandhi starts fasting unto death you will let him out. I should have said that this particular form of blackmail is one which we should deal with unhesitatingly. The idea that he should get out merely because we are afraid to have him die on our hands, and then promptly get well, or even die surrounded by awed and adoring crowds, does not appeal to me at all. There is, I suppose, the alternative of letting him out when very weak and promptly re-arresting him when he gets a little better, but I cannot say that that appeals to me very much, either. After all, he is not going to be detained in prison, but in a comfortable house of his own, the essence of the situation being not hardship but seclusion. If he insists on committing suicide, surely he might just as well do it in seclusion and India be informed of the fact afterwards? I would certainly not tolerate the kind of day-to-day bulletins which were issued about the wretched Lord Mayor of Cork[3] years ago.

3. Winston sent me over the other day a long telegram[4] from Chiang Kai-shek to Roosevelt, which the latter passed on without comment. It would

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be difficult to find a more misleading document or one which showed more clearly how little the Generalissimo really learnt while he was in India. Winston at once drafted a firm reply,[5] to which I made a few additions. I enclose herewith both, for your very confidential eye, as I think you ought to know what the Generalissimo is thinking, or what his lady is making him say.

4. Who on earth is the Bishop of Calcutta, and what makes him say the mischievous things he does say? It was some months ago, I remember, that, wishing to wound and yet afraid to strike, he made some very offensive insinuations against British behaviour in India generally.[6] Now he shakes his head sadly over my provocative and threatening attitude.[7]

Good!
L.

5. As a matter of fact, my answer in the House[8] the other day went down very well, and except for a curiously captious little note in the *Observer*, the Press generally have given us very good support. You will see I kept as much of Mody's wording as I could, and perhaps you might take an opportunity of congratulating him from me on his draftsmanship.

Put S/S. wise about the Editor.
L.

6. *A propos* of the general line which we should take with regard to the Cripps Mission as well as the present situation, I enclose an extract from a letter from Dr. Paton of the International Missionary Council, which puts the case very sensibly. The only point on which I should disagree with what he says is where he suggests that we should make it clear that we desire that there should be set up in India *now* some new form of National Government. As to this, I think we must clearly avoid anything which would weaken the position of your enlarged Executive such as suggesting that we are hankering after a new reconstitution on party lines. Apart from this point, the line taken by Paton is very much that suggested in your recent telegrams and is in fact the one which I myself have been following with private meetings of Members

[1] No. 397. [2] See No. 329, para. 4.

[3] Terence MacSwiney, whose hunger strike in 1920 in protest against the continued exercise of British rule in Ireland, attracted world-wide attention. MacSwiney died in Brixton Jail on 25 October after a fast lasting 74 days.

[4] Annex 1 to No. 392. [5] Annex 2 to No. 392.

[6] *The Times* of 20 April 1942 printed a letter addressed to the British community by the Most Reverend Foss Westcott, Bishop of Calcutta, criticising the 'calm assumption of superiority inherent in the British race'—an assumption resulting from 'lack of knowledge and appreciation of the culture and civilisation of the East accentuated by that insularity which is characteristic of many British people'.

[7] *The Times* of 3 August 1942 printed a statement by the Bishop of Calcutta beginning 'I read with profound regret the utterance of the Secretary of State regarding the political situation', and appealing for arbitration by Britain's allies to resolve this situation.

[8] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 382, 30 July 1942, cols. 674–6.

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of Parliament, Press correspondents, &c., i.e. coupling the frankest condemnation of Congress and the firmest assertion of our refusal to have any truck with the Congress demand, with the reaffirmation of the broad purpose underlying the Cripps Declaration. I feel that while we should take all possible credit for our expressed intention to give India full independence as soon after the war as a constitution can be framed by Indians and brought into operation, we should be chary either of formally committing ourselves to a renewal of the recent offer in the same form or, on the other hand, of saying that the Draft Declaration and Cripps' explanations in connection with it have been wiped out by the rejection of the offer. Naturally we are not bound in respect of details and, in that respect, there is everything to be said for keeping our hands as free as possible for the future.

7. I am glad to say Winston agreed to Raisman stating India's case to the War Cabinet, even before I got your telegram[9] which, however, I am circulating to the Cabinet to reinforce the argument on the constitutional side. The matter is to come up one day this week and I don't expect very great difficulty over it, though Winston is very curious and incalculable on questions of this kind.

Enclosures 1 and 2 to No. 402

EXCHANGE OF TELEGRAMS BETWEEN PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

[*There follows the text of Annexes 1 and 2 to No. 392.*]

Enclosure 3 to No. 402

EXTRACT FROM LETTER[10] FROM THE REVD WILLIAM PATON, D.D., SECRETARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL, TO MR AMERY, DATED 21ST JULY 1942

Obviously the whole situation has now become much more difficult for any kind of negotiation, and most of what was definitely proposed in that letter[11] is now out of the question. There is, however, it seems to me, one overmastering consideration to be borne in mind, namely, that it should be made abundantly plain in language which cannot be misunderstood that in spite of the follies of the Congress, and the ambiguities and moral imbecilities of Mr. Gandhi, the general purpose of the British Government as expressed in the Cripps' proposals remains unchanged. I mean by this that we intend that there shall be effective Indian independence, that we want the Indian nation enlisted now in full co-operation in the war, and that we desire that there should be

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set up now in India such a national government as would both lead to a truly constitutional Indian Government in terms of our proposals so soon as a constitution can be drafted, and also shall here and now enlist India as effectively as possible in the war effort.

I was in America during the whole of the period that Cripps was in India. The mission was front page news in all the major papers every day, and there was no doubt in my mind that the total result of the mission had been immensely to educate American opinion on the basic facts of the Indian situation. In particular the reality of the Muslim problem and of the tension between the Muslim and Congress groups was forced on the American mind in a way I think almost entirely new. The fact also that the Americans, who nearly always over-simplify British politics, viewed Cripps with very great favour made the failure of his mission, if it be a failure, a matter for criticism of the Congress rather than of the British Government.

While all this is important, I think one might also remember the persistent and deeply rooted suspicion not only in America but in many other countries of what is called our "Imperialism". Men such as Nehru and Gandhi have far greater publicity in America than any other Indians, and I have little expectation that the lessons taught by the Cripps Mission will be of permanent effect.

Broadly speaking it seems to me that Americans were full of admiration for the British and the British character but very suspicious, even in strongly pro-British quarters, of the British Empire.

From all this in both the Indian situation and the general status of British policy in the world I would draw the following inferences: (*a*) we cannot afford to allow it to be thought that we made an offer in a period of extreme war stringency from which we have receded. I know that both you and the Viceroy have made it plain that the offer stands, but in my judgment it cannot be made too plain, nor expressed in too simple and challenging language: (*b*) I would venture to urge that the statements made about the present situation should be couched in no apologetic language; whatever difference of judgment there may be about our policy in the past, it seems to me that what was offered by Cripps in the name of the British Government was sound, and that the alternative demands now put forward by the different Indian parties, above all by the Congress, are such as to be injurious to India and to the general cause of freedom in the world. It would seem to me therefore that there is everything to gain and nothing to lose by being both positive in our assertion of our fidelity to the general line laid down in the Cripps Mission, and positive and unapologetic in what we say about the Congress proposals, or the almost equally unacceptable Muslim proposals. The worst impression we can now create in the

[9] No. 379.

[10] The original of this letter is in L/P&J/8/510: ff 350–1.

[11] From the Union of Democratic Control, dated 2 July 1942. L/P&J/8/510: ff 385–6.

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world is that we are uncertain of what to do, are unwilling to give up power, but may under the stress of war be pushed. On the contrary, it seems to me that we have a policy, that it is a sound and right policy, which can be defended on its merits, and that we can claim the moral assent of the world for it.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *4 August 1942, 6.10 am*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2276–S. Your private and personal telegram No. 938.[1] Owing to distances here material has already been released to Press, and full text is by now in possession of twelve Reuter teleprinter centres, has been sent to local Governments and is due to reach editors throughout the country by 10 a.m. Indian time, on 4th August. It has already reached Madras and has (in breach of confidence) been communicated by editor of *Hindu* to Rajagopalachari, who has sent me message[2] urging most earnestly that such confidential matter should not be published and that publication will do harm and not good, but not questioning its authenticity.

2. It would be almost impossible at this stage to hold up publication and quite impossible to prevent leakage or a scoop.

3. All points taken in your paragraph 2 were fully present to my Council when they took their decision and I should be most strongly averse from asking them to reopen it.

4. I appreciate your difficulty about summary, but assume that you will in fact already have been working on one. We have prepared one for Washington[3] and I will have this repeated to you and hope it will meet the case. I will spare no pains here to see that correspondents European and American are fully briefed, and for your own information, Holburn and Crawley (Reuters) have been given advance copy of papers to study confidentially.

5. In view of considerations in paragraphs 2 and 3 above and additional undesirability of appearing to be climbing down to Rajagopalachari I am letting arrangements for publication already communicated to you stand.

[1] No. 397. [2] No. 405. [3] No. 455.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *4 August 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2279–S. Your private and personal telegram of 3rd August, No. 940.[1] I have consulted those of my colleagues immediately available. They unanimously advise against broadcast to India by Cripps. My own judgment coincides. His stock (for your own ear only) is so low in this country both with Congress and with other parties that nothing that he might say would carry any weight, while I am advised that there is grave risk that further appeal by him on these lines would be taken by non-Congress elements as a sign of wobbling on the part of Government, and that same interpretation would be placed on it by Congress which is of course the very last thing we want to happen at this moment. I have considered whether value on opinion in U.S.A. and China would outweigh objections discussed above. Here again those I have consulted think not. (We hope incidentally that publication of the Allahabad material will carry some weight in both places.) I would therefore drop the idea. Cripps may have some opportunity in a speech or the like of making the points, as described by you, which he would have made in a broadcast.

[1] No. 400.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *4 August 1942, 8.20 pm*
Received: 4 August, 9 pm

No. 2282–S. My telegram No. 2276–S[1] of today. Following is Rajagopalachari's message to me and reply which I have today sent to him:—

Following message from Mr. C. R. Rajagopalachariar to His Excellency the Viceroy:—

Begins. Editor of "*Hindu*" has shown me the Home Department Press note received through Reuters for release on the 5th. He consulted me as one who was in the Congress Working Committee the proceedings of which the documents purport to describe. I am surprised at the decision reached by

[1] No. 403.

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Government to publish such matter. Such publication would be severely condemned by all public opinion in India. Publication of Cabinet discussion may sometimes be proper if it will save a great peril. But in the present case no one will see any justification. I was present at the Working Committee meeting and know all the issues involved and the point of view at first hand from both sides—Government and Congress. I urge that publication will hurt the cause which Government have in view. Far from putting the Working Committee in the wrong it will enhance their moral position, and not only not serve any good purpose but expose Government to severe condemnation at a critical moment, namely, the ensuing week. The important point distinguishing the decision discussed in the Allahabad Working Committee meeting from the present proposal is that while the Allahabad proposal was that British and Allied forces should withdraw from India, that is no part of the present proposal. Nehru's remark therefore has no bearing on the present controversy, but will only give extra moral value among the Allied Nations to his present stand and add to the confusion. I earnestly request immediate reconsideration and withdrawal of the Press note, even if it is too late for complete suppression.

The publication of such confidential proceedings is to be condemned by all right-minded men and will increase the bitterness of feeling against Government and confuse the issue, and serve no useful purpose whatever. *Ends.*

His Excellency the Viceroy's reply to Mr. C. R. Rajagopalachariar.

Begins. Thank you for your message through His Excellency the Governor of Madras. I cannot I fear accept analogy you suggest with Cabinet papers, and while appreciating your reluctance to see publication of present material, greatly regret that it is not possible for me to meet your wishes. *Ends.*

2. *Hindustan Times* of this morning foreshadows publication of these documents, and I do not feel the least doubt that holding up publication would have been impracticable, while politically I think that the harder we hit at this moment the better. You are right in thinking (paragraph 2 (*a*) of your No. 938)[2] that what weighed with Council in deciding on immediate publication was hope of influencing waverers in A.-I.C.C., and anxiety to avoid suggestion that having this important material available we had deliberately held it up till it could no longer strengthen the hands of moderate opinion or influence waverers. I may tell you that I gave Council no lead as to when to publish and their decision was quite spontaneous.

[2] No. 397.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 98

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *4 August 1942, 11.30 pm*
Received: 5 August, 3.45 am

2284–S. Following telegram No. 119–M of July 31st from Governor of Madras is repeated for information. *Begins.* Secret. My immediately succeeding telegram contains condensed version of a circular from Andhra Provincial Congress Party to all district Congress Committee[s]. This circular was issued after a meeting at the house of Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya on July 28th attended by Prakasam and 29 other leading Andhra Congressmen (a number of whom are for arrest at stage 2). At meeting it was stated *inter alia* that all Congressmen would be expected to take part and others would be invited. Also that picking [picketing?] of troops would be left to members of Gandhi's Sevakhsangr only. This material was obtained from Provincial C.I.D. who have raised question of immediate arrest of Andhra one of[1] leaders. This is of course not possible under existing arrangements. In any case no similar meeting or issue of circular seems to have occurred in Tamil or Kerala areas—it might even be a trap. His Excellency is sure however that His Excellency the Viceroy will wish to see this note in case similar things are happening elsewhere. Provided first stage is not protracted he feels that preparation like this may not amount to serious danger before second stage begins.

[1] The words 'one of' appear to be either misplaced or redundant.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 99

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *4 August 1942, 11.30 pm*
Received: 5 August, 3.45 am

2285–S. Following is repetition of Governor of Madras' telegram No. 120–M of July 31st. *Begins*:— Following is condensed version of circular referred to in my immediately preceding telegram 119–M. *Begins.* Andhra Provincial Congress Committee. Confidential. Presidents and Secretaries of District Congress Committees should begin to organise for forthcoming movement at once and report weekly. The movement must go swiftly and this requires a

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succession of capable organisers, all acts must be non-violent and overt. Immediate lines of work include:—

1. Collection of information as regards items of programme—Porombokes with Toddy-yielding tree[s]—natural salt deposits—liquor shops—railway stations—telegraph and telephone lines—troop locations—recruitment centres etc.

2. Organisation of meetings and intensive propaganda in villages at once.

Disobedience may be individual, generalised individually or mass.

Items of programme: *Group 1.* First stage. (*a*) Breaking of prohibitory orders. (*b*) Picking of salt. (*c*) Continuing openly to be members of Unlawful Associations. *Group 2.* Second stage. (*a*) Items of N[on-] C[o-] O[peration]. Lawyers to leave practice, students to leave colleges, jurors and assessors not to respond to summons. (*b*) Government officers including village officers to resign their jobs. *Group 3.* Third stage. Arranging labour strikes. *Group 4.* Fourth stage. (*a*) Picketing of foreign cloth shops. (*b*) Liquor shops. (*c*) Foreign concerns in trade and industry. *Group 5.* Fifth stage. Following items are not prohibited but not encouraged and to be considered at this stage only. (*a*) Stopping trains by pulling chains. (*b*) Travelling without tickets. (*c*) Cutting Toddy-yielding trees only. (*d*) Cutting telegraph and telephone wires. (*N.B.* Rails should not be removed or permanent way obstructed.) No danger to life should be a great caution. *Group 6.* Practically last stage. (*a*) Non-taxes including municipal taxes. Especially Zamindari rent should not be paid if Zamindar will not join movement. (*b*) Picketing of troops.

Convictions. When people are sent to jail they need not keep quiet as usual. But they should continue disobedience here, also work and dock (sic) out strikes. Hunger-strikes also should be undertaken but voluntarily on personal risk of individual as it may lead to glory of self-immolation. *Ends.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *4 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2286–S. You will remember that at your request I gave facilities to Friends Mission under Symonds for humanitarian work in connexion with evacuation. Subsequently without any reference to me Horace Alexander was added to the party. I did not however object as I assumed from the correspondence[1] that he

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too would be strictly confined to humanitarian work. I would not have agreed to his coming out to this country on any other terms.

2. He is now busily engaged in endeavouring to act as intermediary to Mr. Gandhi and has been having conversations with him, Nehru, &c., and according to intercepted correspondence has found Nehru's point of view conclusive. In my letter of July 29th,[2] written before these latest developments, I suggested that the Friends House should be asked to give him hint that he must keep out of politics. In a letter he has just sent me he says that before he accepted his present post his Chairman and he "sought an interview with Mr. Amery, and he assured us that it would be entirely in order for me to undertake such work (conciliation work) provided I did not go around making political speeches, which of course I would not think of doing".

3. I shall be grateful for information. I cannot agree to these people carrying on politics under the guise of humanitarian work, and I feel entitled to complain that I should have been placed in this position. If Alexander is misrepresenting you, I should like to be in a position to tell him so, and to let him know that he must confine himself to his humanitarian work and keep out of politics.

[1] See L/P&J/7/5201. [2] No. 355; the date should be 28–9 July.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: ff 132–5

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *4 August 1942, 12.5 am*
PERSONAL

13667. Your personal telegram 2252–S[1] of 31st July. I note that your Government's communiqué on grievances in regard to denial policy will be issued before A.-I.C.C. meeting, and I am glad that use will be made of valuable material in Governors' replies demonstrating insubstantial grounds of Congress charges.

2. I am quite content to leave it to you and your Council to settle final draft of communiqué on main resolution should this be ratified by All-India Committee. In regard to your proposed outline which seems generally suitable following points occur to me.

3. In paragraph 3 (*c*) of your telegram, I suggest substitution of epithet "totalitarian" for "Fascist" and in reference to Allied cause inclusion of specific

[1] No. 377.

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reference to China. It might be worth while (see Azad as quoted by Gandhi in *Harijan* of 2nd August)[2] to make it clear that demand is in fact that power shall be transferred to Congress in first instance, leaving others to approach it afterwards.

4. While I appreciate force of political arguments on which action against Congress is justified in paragraph 3 (*d*), I presume emphasis will be laid in (*b*) or in (*d*) on intention to minimise interruption of measures for defence of India against aggression?

5. Please let me have text of resolution as finally determined in good time to ensure publication here simultaneously with any announcement of action against leaders.

[2] 'The Congress does not desire to take power for itself but for all. If real power is handed over to the Congress, surely it will approach other parties and will persuade them to join.' The Congress President added that he 'had no objection to Britain handing over power to the Muslim League or any other party provided it was real independence. That party will have to approach other parties as no single party can function properly without the co-operation of other parties.'

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/7/5412: ff 211–13

PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *4 August 1942, 3.15 am*

13670. It is to be expected that when the Jam Sahib and Mudaliar are here they will have considerable time on their hands after fulfilling their duties in connection with the War Cabinet. I am anxious not only to avoid the embarrassment this might cause but also to make use of their services while they are here and I have been turning over in my mind the possibility of arranging engagements for them.

2. I would propose to arrange full facilities for both delegates to pay visits (preferably independently for reasons of precedence) to factories, military demonstrations and other aspects of the war effort, including visits to Indian troops and to vessels building for the R.I.N. The Jam Sahib might also visit the Air Squadrons here raised by Indian States it having been ascertained that the Rulers in question would welcome this. I would arrange for a staff officer to accompany each delegate on his tour. It would seem appropriate for the Jam Sahib to make such visits in uniform.

3. Speaking engagements by both delegates, by wireless and on the platform would also be welcome, particularly for the purpose of making the Indian war

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effort better known. Such engagements ought to be made not long after their arrival, while their impressions are up-to-date. Both would, I imagine, do this very well and the Jam Sahib in particular might be posted by Army Headquarters with the latest information for the purpose before departure.

4. As you know it is intended that Mudaliar should go to America in November for the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference and no doubt some speaking engagements will be arranged for him there. It occurs to me that it would be useful, particularly from the point of view of publicising the contribution of the Indian States to the war, if the Jam Sahib were also to visit the U.S.A. say in October. He might be invited to pay a personal visit to Halifax and as an ex-Sandhurst cadet he could then visit and address certain military establishments such as West Point under Embassy auspices.

5. Work connected with his Commerce Department experience may take up some of Mudaliar's time. But occupation of this kind will not be available for Jam Sahib and as you know I am not at all anxious to encourage him in the discussion of States' problems generally while he is here. It may be of course that he would not himself wish to prolong his visit appreciably after returning from the U.S.A. if he goes there.

6. I should greatly value your views on these ideas and should welcome any other suggestions that you may care to make.

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Sir R. Campbell to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 380

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, *4 August 1942, 10.30 pm*
Received: 5 August, 6.30 am

3984. India Office telegram No. 13,676[1] of August 4th to me and preceding telegrams.

I should have welcomed being able to inform the President and Secretary of State beforehand of intention to publish. As you are no doubt aware the President has taken a keen interest in the Indian situation and the Prime Minister might still think it well to send a message to Roosevelt, making clear the double dealings of Gandhi and explaining forbearance of His Majesty's Government and Government of India as set out in paragraph 4 of New Delhi telegram to

[1] Confirming that publication of the Congress documents would take place on 5 August. L/I/1/756: f 259.

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me 6,054,[2] text of which is given in my immediately following telegram. You may think also that there would be advantage in the implications of Gandhi's original draft being brought officially to the attention of Hull, who has also shown interest in the Indian situation in conversation with Lord Halifax, as a United Nations interest. Perhaps you would discuss this with Lord Halifax and if you agree I would suggest démarche should be made by Agent-General, whose special position as representative of Government of India we have, as you know, encouraged the State Department to appreciate. Sir G. Bajpai has seen this telegram and concurs.

[2] Dated 1 August. Para. 4 explained that the main reason why the Congress documents were not released before was that their release must make it impossible to negotiate with the present Working Committee; and that the Government of India did not want to make a final break as long as there was a chance that the All-India Congress Committee might reject the Working Committee's resolution of 14 July. L/I/1/756: f 257.

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Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL CHUNGKING, *4 August 1942*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

When I had the opportunity of discussing the political and constitutional position in India with Your Excellency on the last occasion, you were good enough to intimate that I would be at liberty to submit to Your Excellency any observations that might occur to me on the situation and which in my opinion might be of help to Your Excellency. I am taking advantage of that permission to submit for such consideration as they may deserve a few odds and ends that have occurred to me in the form of a brief memorandum which I enclose.

I was very disappointed to observe from such Indian papers as are available to me here that the latest reconstruction of Your Excellency's Council has not met with the response that it deserved. I would venture to observe, if I may be permitted to do so without being guilty of impertinence, that under the very difficult conditions with which Your Excellency is faced Your Excellency has succeeded in getting together a very representative Council with a large number of extremely able and efficient public men on it. The appointment of Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar as the seniormost member of Your Excellency's Council to represent British India on the Imperial War Cabinet is also unexceptionable. In the absence of a settlement between the principal political parties, I do not know how Your Excellency could have improved upon the present personnel of your Council. Individual opinions may differ with regard to one or two

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members, but those who may be inclined to criticise these appointments are often not aware of the number and complexity of the considerations which must be given due weight to by Your Excellency in making your choice.

I note that there are now eleven Indian Members on Your Excellency's Council (in one of my letters to Caroe I had said the number was ten but at that time I was not aware that Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar would retain his rank as Member of Council while discharging his duties in London). Out of these eleven, only three are Muslims. This proportion may be somewhat disappointing to the Muslims. In the past, Muslims have always held one out of three Indian memberships and last year when Your Excellency expanded your Council you were pleased to appoint three Muslims as against five non-Muslim Indians. Now that the total number of Indian members has risen to eleven, as against eight, the number of Muslims remains the same. I am aware that Your Excellency is not committed to any particular proportion and that these arrangements are only transitional, nevertheless, I venture to submit that if it could be avoided certain element among the Muslims should not be afforded the opportunity of hinting that Your Excellency had not been sympathetic towards the Muslims. I would, therefore, suggest that when an opportunity offers itself, Your Excellency might take advantage of it to appoint one more Muslim to your Council.

In this connection, the following suggestions are submitted for Your Excellency's consideration but, of course, Your Excellency would know how best to make up the deficiency. All that I am concerned about is that the Muslims should not feel that their interests have been neglected. I have complete confidence that Your Excellency would yourself devise the best method of reassuring them on that score. My suggestions are—

(*a*) that when Sir Reginald Maxwell completes his term the resulting vacancy might be filled by the appointment of Mr. M. S. A. Hydari, who has proved his ability and merit in various appointments which he held in the Government of India. I do not imply that he should necessarily take over Sir Reginald Maxwell's portfolio though I have no doubt that if he was trusted with it he would discharge his duties to Your Excellency's complete satisfaction;

(*b*) failing (*a*) Your Excellency might consider the desirability of including Sir Mirza M. Ismail in your Council at a suitable opportunity offering itself. I am not aware of the nature of the prejudice that might exist against Sir Mirza Ismail in the Political Department or any other quarter, but I have known Sir Mirza Ismail for a number of years and have the highest opinion of his ability and merit. I also think he is one of the most upright Indians that I have come across and I venture to submit that it would be a great accession of strength to your Council if Your Excellency could bring yourself to consider him favourably for appointment;

(*c*) failing (*a*) and (*b*) Your Excellency might consider Mr. Ghulam Mohammed, till lately Additional Secretary in the Supply Department and now

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Finance Member of H.E.H. the Nizam's Government. Mr. Ghulam Mohammed is a comparatively young man but possesses great ability and drive and, I think, would in practice fully justify his choice. Perhaps his comparative lack of years might even be regarded as a merit as a large number of the present Members of Council are not open to that accusation. Being a member of one of the services, Mr. Ghulam Mohammed would also fulfil the statutory condition of ten years' service under the Crown in India.

Yours sincerely,

ZAFRULLA KHAN

P.S.V.—

Some interesting and helpful stuff.

L.,—15.8.

Enclosure to No. 412

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

The world is moving very fast, but in some respects it is likely to move even faster after the cessation of hostilities. Constitutional and political changes in India are likely to come with a rush after the war, and one of the gravest problems that India will be faced with will be whether the administrative machinery that has served her so admirably hitherto is able to withstand the drastic changes that are bound to be introduced so as to go on functioning with reasonable efficiency. India's right to the framing of her own constitution after the war has been conceded, and it is possible that some understanding between the different political parties may be arrived at by virtue of which they may be able to take advantage of this offer. It would be a very bold speculation to attempt to forecast even the bare outlines of the future constitution of India, but what is reasonably certain is that as soon as the major parties are able to arrive at an understanding they are bound to insist upon the complete elimination of the British element from the Services. Let us hope that if this demand is formulated it will be accompanied by a fair offer of compensation and pensions, &c., but that would not secure the administrative machine against the very violent disturbances to which it is bound to be subjected as the result of any such wholesale withdrawal. Is it possible to do anything now to minimise the effect of the shock when it comes? It may be that the wholesale withdrawal of British personnel may be postponed for a few years, but even assuming that, the period from now onwards till the change takes place will be so short that anything that is likely to operate to reduce the intensity of the shock must be put in hand immediately. This is the aspect of the question that I am anxious should be studied systematically and with care so that a complete scheme may be evolved and put into operation at an early date.

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I am not in position to be able to put forward a scheme and indeed it is a task which would require the co-operation and interplay of many minds and the pooling together of a great deal of experience, but it is a task which can no longer be shirked and I venture to submit respectfully it should be undertaken at once.

I have a few tentative suggestions to offer in this connection which to my mind are so obvious that they could be adopted forthwith while the main problem is being studied and a complete solution is being devised. Some of these suggestions may appear in the eyes of those who have a greater experience of these matters than I can claim to possess as foolish and impracticable, but I venture to put them forward for what they are worth.

If it is realised that the change that I have indicated above is bound to come, and is bound to come at an early date (and I submit that is the only honest assumption that can be made, having regard to conditions with which we are faced today), then it must be recognized that till some firm understanding is arrived at and a clear-cut policy is evolved with regard to these matters which is acceptable to the British as well as the Indian sides, it would be most unfair both to India and to Britain as well as to the individual officers concerned to go on with British recruitment into the higher Services except where it is absolutely unavoidable. To touch upon only one aspect of the matter, the larger the number of British officers at the date when complete Indianisation has to be put into effect the greater the administrative chaos and confusion that is bound to result therefrom. It could perhaps be argued that, realising that, those who are at the helm of affairs in India will act reasonably and will be willing to adopt some scheme of gradual substitution of Indian for British personnel. I think we may assume that for a long time to come the Indian National Congress or some other body with similar political doctrines will continue to be the principal political party in India and that when the effective transfer of power in the Centre takes place it will be that party that will come into power. Knowing their doctrines and sentiments in this behalf I have no hope whatsoever that they will be willing to stay their hand and to put in effect some scheme of gradual substitution. I cannot therefore get rid of the conviction that pending a solution acceptable to all sides regular British recruitment into the services should be suspended forthwith, to be resumed only, if it is to be resumed at all, after a settlement of this question has been arrived at between the British and Indian sides. If this is decided upon an announcement to the effect that such recruitment is for the present suspended would, I think, have very good effect both in India and outside. It goes without saying that this will

P.S.V.—
Worth putting into the hat as one of many little things that might help Council when they come to think out their gesture?

L.

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affect only the juniormost rungs in the services concerned, and nobody will contend that suitable Indian young men are not available in large numbers today to fill adequately all the vacancies that may occur at those stages in the various services. Indeed, after the war the number of young men, particularly those with high academic qualifications who have also served on the military side, will be so large as to constitute a distinct problem for India itself. That problem may to some slight extent be easier to deal with then if all vacancies in the services are henceforth to be filled by suitable Indians.

India will for a long time to come still need the services of technical, scientific and industrial experts, and there is no reason why a large number of these should not be British even in a completely autonomous or even independent India. These will no doubt be recruited under the new conditions on a contract basis, and I submit that even during the interval they should be recruited only on that basis so that if any question of the termination of the services of any of these experts should arise, the termination can take place under the terms of their contracts and no difficulty need arise.

This assumption that the British will be found ready to put up with such conditions is touching.

L.

There is one direction in which progress with regard to Indianisation can be made fairly rapidly even under existing circumstances without any loss of efficiency and without occasioning any dislocation. I have in mind the higher judicial appointment in the Provinces, that is to say, appointments to the High Courts, Chief Courts and Judicial Commissioners' Courts. Eleven years ago, the Services Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference made an unanimous recommendation that no further recruitment into the Indian Civil Service should be made for the purpose of supplying Judicial Officers. Unfortunately no notice was taken of this recommendation to which the Committee attached considerable importance. Today, the appointment of Indian Civil Service Officers as District and Sessions Judges and High Court Judges has, except in a very few exceptional cases, come to be an anomaly. It has been freely admitted that in the earlier history of the High Courts of India, judges drawn from the Indian Civil Service achieved meritorious distinction in the discharge of their duties. Even today there are notable exceptions, but they have come to be only exceptions. The general run of Indian Civil Service judicial officers no longer inspire the same confidence that they used to in the past, and they certainly do not compare as favourably with their Indian colleagues as they used to. That is a field in which the Indian has proved his superiority to his average British colleague, and there is no reason why the natural consequences should not follow. There is quite a large British element in the various High Courts, &c. today, and if it is not added to any further it should last for quite a number of years and the change in that sphere need not occasion any violent break with

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the past. Nobody denies that Great Britain itself could supply direct the highest forensic and judicial talent for employment in India which would do more than hold its own against the Indian talent available. Unfortunately, however, though such talent undoubtedly exists in abundance in Great Britain recent appointments to the High Courts in India from Great Britain indicate that these appointments offer no attraction to people who actually do possess such talent, and that it is only mediocre people who can be persuaded to come to India to take up these appointments. Some of these appointments have indeed been extremely disappointing. The only conclusion to be drawn from this state of affairs is that this field must now definitely be surrendered to Indians who have in every respect established their claim to it.

Same and similar considerations though not with the same force, apply to appointments to the posts of District and Sessions Judges. Indian members of the Bar and senior officers of Provincial Judicial Services have proved themselves at least as competent in these appointments as members of the Indian Civil Service, and there is no reason why appointments to these posts should not be confined to practising members of the Bar and senior members of the Provincial Judicial Services selected on the basis of efficiency.

If these suggestions with regard to judicial appointments are given effect to they would make an appreciably larger number of Indian Civil Service Officers available for service on the general administration side which would in itself be a great advantage having regard to the condition with which India is bound to be faced on the termination of hostilities.

Arrangements for India's defence under the new conditions will give rise to problems of great magnitude and complexity. I am not at all competent to offer any views on this group of questions, but I am extremely anxious that advantage should be taken of the conditions to which the present war has given rise to provide training and experience for Indian officers on as large a scale as possible in various activities which are carried on more or less only during a period of war; and also that distinctions and anomalies which obtain in the present system on the basis of racial discrimination should be eliminated altogether. I am sure this is a matter which would require expert handling, but given the will and determination necessary a great deal can be achieved which should prove of immense advantage to India in making its own arrangements for defence later on.

One or two suggestions that I have to offer in this connection are offered with even greater diffidence than those that I have ventured to submit in connection with civil administration as I have very little experience of conditions obtaining on the defence side.

I think we might give him the no *on this.*

L.

One has not been able to help noticing that Indian officers are very

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inadequately represented on the staff side. Now that commissions are being given to Indians on such a large scale it ought to be possible to train much larger numbers of them to hold staff appointments. I would suggest that as a preliminary step at least half the vacancies in the Staff Colleges at Quetta should be reserved for Indian officers.

Again, the very few Indians who have been given staff appointments have been almost wholly employed on the Quartermaster side. There have been extremely few appointments and those relating to purely routine jobs on the Adjutant and General sides.

There are very few Indian Staff Officers at Headquarters particularly at Delhi as against an enormous number of comparatively junior and inexperienced British officers. Surely advantage should be taken of war conditions to train a large number of Indians in these jobs? I believe similar conditions prevail overseas. This is a matter to which His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's personal attention might be drawn.

Important to keep Sir Z. K. right on all this.

L.

Where Indian commissioned officers have to serve in mixed formations as junior staff officers, e.g. Staff Captains, Liaison Officers, Brigade Supply Officer, &c., they have no power of command over European troops. Surely no officer could be expected to maintain discipline under those conditions and, apart from the stigma of racial discrimination, the awkwardness resulting from this discrimination is bound to result in an inefficient discharge of duties for which the Indian officers could not fairly be held responsible. The whole arrangement is unfair, and it is submitted that whenever Indian officers are called upon to serve in mixed units or formations they must be given equal powers of command over all ranks.

After the war a very large number of Indian officers with adequate training will be available for service on the military as well as on the civil side. The arguments that used to be employed to demonstrate the impracticability of Indianisation on the military side on a very large scale will have ceased to possess any validity. It should be possible after the war to man all Indian units with Indian officers up to the seniority which Indian officers may by then have attained in adequate numbers. It would be extremely unfair to recruit British officers to replace trained Indian officers who must be demobilised and cast adrift. I believe it would have an extremely good effect if an announcement could be made that on the termination of hostilities the Indian units of the Army will be so reorganized as to be officered completely by Indians up to the seniority in which Indian officers are then available.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 101

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *5 August 1942, 4.20 pm*
Received: 5 August, 6.30 pm

2289–S. Following telegram No. 546 August 4th from Governor of Bombay is repeated for information.

Begins. Most Secret. I have now received reports of effect of Patel's visit to Ahmedabad and Gujarat. Before visit Congress followers were said to be depressed and had little confidence of a successful move. Patel appears to have whipped up a good deal of enthusiasm.

2. It is believed that first move will be made in Ahmedabad and possibly elsewhere on August 6th when an Anti-Government Servants Day is to be staged by what are termed Communists but who have all along been Congress supporters. Processions in which students will take prominent part are to be organised and demonstrations made outside Government offices with attempts to bring Government servants out.

3. This is no doubt intended to provoke repressive action just before A.-I.C.C. meeting but I regard it as out of the question to ignore it. With Gujarat's previous history some Government servants might be brought out if Government took no action. I have therefore authorised District Magistrate of Ahmedabad to issue an order on August 5th (? provided) he has reason to believe such demonstrations will be attempted to ban meetings and processions and to disperse them if necessary. Similar steps will be taken in other Districts of Gujarat if required.

4. Another step which would have a healthy effect in Gujarat would be immediate arrest of Patel. This would indicate clearly Government intentions and encourage any wavering Government servants. On the other hand it would no doubt destroy any possible chances of Congress backing out. I do not so far press it as essential though I would like to do it for benefit of local situation. While I strongly suspect that Patel is behind this "Anti-Government Servants Day", I have no material to prove this.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT — NEW DELHI, *5 August 1942, 5.15 pm*
PERSONAL — *Received: 5 August, 5.30 pm*

No. 2291–S. My personal telegram of 1st August, No. 2264–S.[1] We are now clear about accommodation—Ahmednagar Fort, as already intimated to you, for the Working Committee, while Lumley has been able to make arrangements at Poona which will admit of Aga Khan's Palace being used for Gandhi (and possibly also Mrs. Naidu).

[1] No. 387.

415

Sir A. Hope (Madras) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMMEDIATE — *5 August 1942*
PERSONAL

No. 123–M. Your telegram No. 2274–S[1] of August 3rd. I entirely agree on the importance of giving District Officers a line but I feel that until All-India Congress Committee have committed themselves to a definite plan and Government of India have communicated their decision on consequent course of action it will hardly be possible to frame instructions. We shall of course do so immediately we know the position. Posting of notices on public buildings has already been considered but we decided to wait till the future is a bit clearer.

2. As regards National War Front I agree with you that we have gone as far as we can without making it too political.

[1] No. 395.

416

Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMMEDIATE — *5 August 1942*

No. G.–237. Your telegram No. 2274–S[1] of August 3rd. Points raised seem to be covered by paragraph 2 of draft letter forwarded with Laithwaite's letter,

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dated July 24th.[2] If we get statement of His Majesty's Government's rejection of Congress case and Home Department's denunciation of Congress leaders, that should make our reason for attack on Congress plain and we can give wide publicity to it. But we should be grateful to have draft in advance of publication. I may have opportunity of public speech shortly after the probable zero hour, when apart from showing effect of movement on war effort, I should make it clear that though we meant business, we intended to go for Congress organisation and leaders (group omitted and not?) rank and file misled by them. I would also refer to action proposed to prevent no-rent campaign by exercise of powers under United Provinces Special Powers Act which would encourage landholders. I doubt whether mass reading of message by District Officers and others is likely to be very effective. Most people are rather tired of statements and will be impressed favourably or otherwise by efficacy of action taken.

2. Publications of National War Front, e.g. questions appearing in Press advertisements, cannot fail to be interpreted as anti-Congress, though they avoid mention of a direct attack on Congress. I agree that it cannot go much further under present conditions, but there is less objection to using any organisation we have to combat rebellion and to rally all parties to our support. Front will be political but in conditions anticipated it will be fighting rebellion.

[1] No. 395. [2] No. 322.

417

Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

PERSONAL *5 August 1942*

No. 40-G. Your telegram No. 2274-S,[1] August 3rd. We are instructing Deputy Commissioners to explain to District War Committees which are of course quite distinct from the War Front the way in which Congress have taken action designed to betray the country. This would seem to be an effective way of rallying the opinion of those who are well disposed. District Officers will no doubt take other opportunities of putting across the Government's point of view and this can be done with good effect in interviews.

2. It has been suggested that a special effort might be made to induce the Russian radio to give out useful propaganda at the critical time. I hand on this suggestion to Your Excellency for consideration.

[1] No. 395.

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Sir A. Clow (Assam) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

SECRET AND PERSONAL *5 August 1942*

No. 1061-G.S. Your Excellency's telegram No. 2274-S[1] of August 3rd.

I agree that District Officers should be given a line but feel that this can hardly be detailed until we know the form which central denunciation of Congress takes. I would use National War Front here as we lack other machinery and no one doubts that it is directed against all who like Congress are out to weaken the war effort.

[1] No. 395.

419

Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMMEDIATE *5 August 1942*

No. 65-T. Your Excellency's telegram No. 2274-S.[1] I held conference of District Officers in Peshawar, August 3rd. All agreed that propaganda for general public can best be done by District Officers exerting right kind of influence personally and verbally on Indian officials and selected non-officials and letting it percolate through to masses. We have been doing this for some time. If picketing begins we have arranged for selected non-officials to stand about near entrances to courts, &c. and encourage waverers.

[1] No. 395.

420

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/3/3d: f 11

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *5 August 1942, 2.45 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

947. Your telegram 2279-S.[1] Cripps has agreed to give up idea of broadcasting to India, but is making statement to *The Times*[2] in accordance with suggestion in last sentence of your telegram. It will, I understand, appear tomorrow morning.

[1] No. 404. [2] See *The Times*, 6 August, p. 5.

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Sir R. Campbell to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 185

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, *5 August 1942, 2.49 am*
MOST SECRET *Received: 5 August, 11.35 am*

3986. My telegram No. 3984[1] and your telegrams Nos. 4580 and 4588.[2]
PERSONAL
President summoned me after lunch at Hyde Park on August 2nd and referring to your telegrams under reference and saying that he had no right to ask my view nor I to give it, continued that he nevertheless intended to read out draft reply to your telegram, which he had just received from the State Department. He hit on two points which he did not like, chiefly from the point of view expressed by the Prime Minister in which apparently he concurred. These he said he would modify. On the whole the reply was, as far as I could judge from his hurried reading, satisfactory in the light of your telegram No. 4588. The President said however that he did not feel able to go quite so far as the Prime Minister had advocated in riding Chiang Kai-shek off any future practical (1 grp. undec. ? intervention) in Indian situation but thought, after saying the British Government must deal with the situation themselves, he would say something to the effect that it would always be open to himself and Chiang Kai-shek, if the situation should later make it appear desirable and opportune, to offer their good offices. This was in reply to the suggestion from me that the State Department draft did not seem to go so far as the Prime Minister had requested in choking Chiang Kai-shek off and was a slight improvement in that draft. The answer as a whole seemed to accept and make the Prime Minister's statement of his position the basis of the President's reply. Conversation was entirely private.

2. It is in view of the passage about good offices and because the President has tended to advocate keeping the door open that I think that a message from the Prime Minister, if possible, would be useful.

[1] No. 411.
[2] These two telegrams repeated to Washington telegrams exchanged between President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill (Annexes 1 and 2 to No. 392). See L/P&S/12/2315: f 184.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 340

L/P&J/8/597: ff 102–3

Action to be Taken, if Necessary, Against Indian National Congress

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *5 August 1942*

On the 13th July (War Cabinet Conclusions 91 (42) No. 8)[1] the Cabinet had before them the question of the action against the Congress Working Committee, more particularly in the light of the resolution adopted by it on the 10th July, which amounted to instructions to the people concerned in India to resist requisitions of land, vehicles, boats and so forth required by Government for the defence of India. It was noted in the course of discussion that the Viceroy had not yet put forward any specific proposals as to the action which should be taken with regard to that resolution or the general menace of civil disobedience: but the Cabinet approved the suggestion that the Viceroy should at once be given an assurance that if the Government of India found it necessary to take strong measures they would receive full support; and a telegram[2] to that effect was accordingly despatched the same day.

On the 14th July the Working Committee adopted a further resolution[3] demanding the immediate withdrawal of British power from India and threatening, in the event of refusal, the launching of a campaign of non-violent resistance to Government. This resolution was adopted, subject to confirmation by the All-India Congress Committee.

The All-India Committee meets at Bombay on the 7th August, and the Government of India's information indicates that it is practically certain that, whether very quickly or after protracted discussion, it will endorse the resolution recommended by the Working Committee.

Since the middle of July a very considerable and rapid exchange of telegrams with the Government of India has taken place dealing with the legal aspects of the situation created by the two resolutions of the Working Committee, with the forms of action appropriate in the event of endorsement by the All-India Committee and with details as to various methods of applying the sanctions available. I attach for information a copy of a telegram[4] which, after approval by the Prime Minister was despatched on 24th July, and which illustrates the nature of the questions then being investigated. These various questions, it will be seen, included a suggestion put forward, on the initiative of the Indian members of the Governor-General's Council, that if drastic action against members of the Working Committee were called for it would be particularly

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effective to deport those persons who were physically capable to some suitable place in East Africa; after considerable ventilation of this possibility the plan has been dropped for the moment, though not entirely abandoned. Simultaneously, and intermingled with consideration of such matters as the foregoing, there has been active discussion of certain collateral questions such as the reaffirmation of H.M.G.'s policy towards India, which culminated in the Parliamentary question and answer of 30th July (after approval of its precise terms by the Cabinet W.M. (42) 99)[5] and, during the past weekend, the decision of the Government of India,[6] again on the initiative of the Indian members of the Governor-General's Council, to publish information in their possession as to the real significance of the Congress attitude towards aggression by Japan.

The present position, therefore, of which the Cabinet should be informed, is that within a few days the All-India Committee will in all probability endorse both the resolution of the 10th July, which is quite clearly in itself a prejudicial act,[7] and the resolution of 14th July which, with its threat [of] a civil disobedience campaign or something of the sort, will become a prejudicial act when endorsed by the All-India Committee. In the meantime the Government of India have completed their arrangements for the action to be taken for the purpose, I should emphasise, not of punishing those responsible but of nipping in the bud a movement which, if allowed to develop, would undoubtedly be a cause of the gravest embarrassment to the conduct of the war in India.

I attach a telegram[8] from the Home Department of the Government of India which summarises fully the instructions sent to the Provincial Governments, on whom it will fall to take action.

L. S. A.

[1] No. 257. [2] No. 258. [3] No. 265. [4] No. 321. [5] No. 364.
[6] See No. 386. [7] See No. 270, note 6. [8] No. 393.

423

Mr Wellington Koo to Viscount Halifax

L/P&S/12/2315: f 178

CHINESE EMBASSY, 49 PORTLAND PLACE, W.I, *5 August 1942*

Dear Lord Halifax,

Mr. T. V. Soong has sent me a telegram the contents of which he asks me to convey to you personally. But as I understand from your office here that you are not expected back this week, I hasten to enclose a gist of it by letter, as I presume he wishes you to be acquainted with it as early as possible.

Yours sincerely,

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO

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Enclosure to No. 423

GIST OF MR T. V. SOONG'S TELEGRAM

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has sent a message[1] to President Roosevelt about the present situation in India and the possibility of untoward developments arising, if allowed to take its course. In the Generalissimo's view, the crisis has become largely psychological, as he realises the new fundamentally enlightened policy of Great Britain in regard to India. He feels that since the Indian Congress in its basic purpose represents the real aspiration of the Indian people, it will be difficult, especially in the changed circumstances of the war, to succeed with any effort of a repressional character. The President informed the Pacific Council at a recent meeting that he is consulting the Generalissimo by wire. Let me add that I myself and a number of our mutual American friends earnestly hope that something may be done in time to find a satisfactory solution in the interest of the United Nations' common cause.

[1] Annex 1 to No. 392.

424

Sir R. Campbell to Sir A. Cadogan

L/P&J/8/510: f 242

BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C., *5 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Cadogan,

After the President had read me out the State Department draft reply for him to send to Chiang Kai-shek's message (see my Personal telegram to the Secretary of State No. 3986[1] of August 4th), he went on to say that he thought we had made mistakes in connexion with the offer to India carried by Sir Stafford Cripps. As he had told the latter before he started, we should not offer parts of India a right to secede which, after the Civil War, "sounded terrible" to an American mind. Nor should we have held out the idea that after the war a constituent body should be summoned with the right to produce a final constitution (including a right of secession) which His Majesty's Government forthwith undertook to accept. It would have been better to follow the example of the American Colonies, which first produced an interim system and then after experience of a few years trial and error settled a final constitution which has remained ever since. We should have proposed this system of trial and error, saying that after it had been in effect we would accept the constitution established in the light of it. In this way we could have kept the situation in play.

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Speaking later on general world organisation after the war the President spoke of India separately from the Far East (Malaya, N.E.I. etc.) and said we and the United States should try to think of some arrangement by which India found its place in the European and American, i.e. Western orbit rather than the Asiatic. I told him of Soong's remarks reported in my telegram No. 3912,[2] paragraph 2, which seemed to show that Soong at any rate regarded India as Asiatic, in order to get his opinion on this conflicting view. The President said that after all, racially the mass of the Indians were really the cousins of us Westerners (Aryans, Iranians!)

Yours ever,

R. I. CAMPBELL

[1] No. 421; the date should be 5 August. [2] No. 372.

425

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *6 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2296–S. Paragraph 4 of your private letter of 15th May.[1] Moore. I think that Catto should know that in the difficult situation we are handling in which it is so important that we should have all the support we can, Moore has made no editorial comment on the political situation save for (*a*) a leader which suggested that Congress and the Government were one as bad as another (30th July); (*b*) a leader today (5th August) suggesting that we are all at fault and that the British public may not be fully informed, deploring the "obstinate attitude" of the British Government and "the corresponding crime of Congress". He has made no comment on your important answer in the House of 30th July.[2]

2. He has declined I understand to print certain articles (admittedly propaganda) prepared by Hodson which were sent to certain of the leading papers, and the important "grievances" communiqué[3] prepared by the Government of India, gist of which has been telegraphed to you, has not so far appeared in the Delhi additions [editions] of the *Statesman*.

3. Catto knows me too well to think that I am anxious to bring any pressure to bear on him or that I have not the utmost possible confidence in his judgment. He has given me all the help that he possibly can in dealing with the problem

[1] No. 60. [2] See No. 366. [3] L/I/1/756: ff 245–6.

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presented by the attitude of the *Statesman*, and I think that I have his confidence so far as the general handling of the Indian situation is concerned. I do not wish to overemphasize or attach undue importance to Moore's attitude, though its entire unhelpfulness when criticism of, or non-co-operation with, Government by the *Statesman* still carries so much weight and the *Statesman* is still regarded to such a large extent as an organ of official opinion will be obvious to you and to Catto. What I am more apprehensive of is the risk of a clash between the *Statesman* and my Government which might lead to action against the *Statesman*. Catto knows me well enough to believe that no one will be less anxious than I am to interfere in the least degree with the proper liberty of the Press. But I am quite sure that some fresh stimulus to Moore and some instruction to co-operate, whatever his own views may be, is desirable. His contract (Catto's action in relation to which I so much appreciate)[4] does not, according to your letter of 15th May, expire till next November and great harm may well be done before then unless Moore's present non-co-operative attitude changes.

[4] 'so much appreciate' deciphered as 'have telegraphed appreciation'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *6 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2300-S. My private and personal telegram of 6th August, No. 2296-S.[1] Moore. Today's *Statesman* contains a leader[2] which I am having repeated to you Reutbuck. It calls for no comment from me except to say that no more active support of Congress attitude or more damaging comment on position of His Majesty's Government and Government of India could be asked for. I hope you will let Catto see it. As you know *Statesman* (save for *Times of India*) is the only really important English morning paper with a wide circulation. You realise to the full the necessity for keeping up morale of the European community here, and also of the European element in the armed forces. All these are very largely dependent on *Statesman* for views or comment, and effect of Moore's stuff is the more deplorable and potentially dangerous for that. I do hope Catto can help us.

[1] No. 425. [2] A copy of this leader is on L/I/1/348: ff 117–18.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *6 August 1942, 6.30 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2301–S. I have received very strong protest from my Council against statement made by B.B.C.[1] in their Indian broadcast last night as to the indications given by authoritative circles in England of action that would be taken against A.-I.C.C., &c. Council have at the moment almost an obsession about their position and extent to which Cripps negotiations have put them in the background, and they are morbidly sensitive of any suggestion that they are being run by His Majesty's Government. Their complaint was that B.B.C. statement will have given the impression throughout India that they are not free agents. Nothing of course is more desirable from our point of view than to keep them full behind us in our present policy and wholly responsible for arrest of Gandhi, &c., if necessary. And while I think that they are unduly touchy, I do hope you will be able to give me something consoling to say to them on this point, and that you will do all you can to shut down any comment of the kind from the B.B.C. I made what play I could with the difficulty of keeping B.B.C. wholly under official control. Position is too delicate here for us to take any chances.

[1] A copy of the B.B.C. statement, made on 5 August at 6 pm, is at L/PO/3/3d: f 9. The opening sentence reads: 'Here in London authoritative quarters have stated afresh the British Government's attitude to the forthcoming meeting of the A.-I.C.C.'

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *6 August 1942, 6.30 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2302–S. Your personal telegram of 4th August, No. 13667.[1] Many thanks for your help. I repeat in my immediately following telegram text of draft which I am putting before my Council tomorrow morning. It is longer than I could wish,[2] but my colleagues seem to favour that. I cannot of course guarantee to what extent they will accept it, but will telegraph any amendments with a view to simultaneous publication, if and when the time comes. As you will

[1] No. 409. [2] 'wish' omitted in decipher.

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see, I have embodied your various suggestions (though I think it may prove safer to drop the Azad reference quoted in your paragraph 3 as this issue has since been rather fogged by Congress offers to let the Muslims form a Government). If there is anything which seems to you right off the mark do not hesitate to telegraph. But my Council is in a most touchy mood at the moment as a result of the Cripps business, to which they never cease reverting, about any interference from home in matters submitted to them, and I have to ride them very lightly.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *6 August 1942, 6.30 pm*
Received: 6 August, 8.30 pm

No. 2303–S. Following is text of draft communiqué:—

Begins. The All-India Congress Committee have ratified the resolution passed by the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress on August 5th, 1942.[1] That resolution demands the immediate withdrawal of British power from India. Failing acceptance of that demand, the Congress propose "the starting of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale". "Such a struggle must inevitably be under the leadership of Gandhiji." Mr. Gandhi, the leader so designated, has made it clear that there is no room for negotiations "either they recognise independence or they don't". In reply to the question how free India will function, he has said "Leave India to God or anarchy". The Governor-General in Council has been aware, too, for some days past of dangerous preparations being pushed forward by Congress in the Provinces for immediate action, for the cutting of telegraph wires, interference with railway services, the organising of strikes, the tampering with the loyalty of Government servants, the picketing of troops and a wide variety of similar unlawful and nefarious activities.

The Government of India have waited patiently in the hope that wiser counsels might prevail. They have been disappointed in that hope. To a challenge such as the present there can be only one answer. The Government of India would regard it as wholly incompatible with their responsibilities to the people of India, and their obligations to the United Nations, to discuss a demand the acceptance of which would plunge India into confusion and anarchy internally, and would paralyse her effort in the common cause of human freedom. Now that the challenge has been thrown down, it must be taken up, and that at once.

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There is no sanction behind the demand of the Congress leaders. On the face of [it] it is the work of leaders devoid of all sense either of responsibility or of the realities of the situation. The Congress Working Committee admit that "there may be risks involved". They are right. Acceptance of the resolution means the exposure of a defenceless India to Axis attack from without. Internally it means civil war, the collapse of law and order, the outbreak of communal feud. For the Congress does not, and cannot, speak for India. It does not speak for the Muslims, for the Scheduled Castes, for the lesser Minorities, for great masses of solid opinion in Hinduism, for the Indian States. It represents an arrogant minority, concerned to seize the moment when the United Nations are in peril, to secure acceptance of a totalitarian domination over all other interests and elements in India. Its demand, in the words of the Congress President, is that power shall be transferred to Congress in the first instance, leaving others to approach it afterwards. How unreal is the Congress claim to speak for India the world can judge from the protests that many great communities and interests, so many leaders of Indian public life and Indian thought, have made and continue to make against their present demand.

Nor can the Congress leaders claim that only thus can India's future be assured. The Congress is not India's mouthpiece, yet, in the interests of securing their own dominance, its leaders have consistently impeded the efforts made to bring India to full nationhood. British policy for India's future stands clear. It is that once hostilities cease, India shall devise for herself with full freedom of decision, and on a basis embracing all, and not only a single party, the form of government most suited to her conditions: and that in the meantime Indian leaders shall fully participate in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. It is on that basis that when the day of victory comes, the final structure of India's constitution will be erected by Indians themselves.

The Congress leaders claim that the withdrawal of British Rule "with goodwill" will "result in establishing a stable provisional government in India, and co-operation between this Government and the United Nations in resisting aggression and helping China". There is no foundation for those claims. The interval between withdrawal and the establishment of a stable provisional government would be a welter of anarchy. And acceptance of the Congress demand would be the betrayal of the United Nations and their forces in and outside India, the betrayal of the ideals to which the true heart and mind of India have given and are giving such support, the betrayal of Russia and of China, which at this moment face such odds; the betrayal of India's fighting men who are earning such glory in so many theatres of war.

There can be no question in circumstances such as these of yielding to

[1] The resolution which the All-India Congress Committee was to adopt on 8 August (No. 470) corresponded, with minor alterations, to the Working Committee's resolution of 5 August.

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chicanery and treachery. To such an appeal to abandon India to external aggression and internal chaos, to such an invitation to betray India and the Allied cause, there can be only one answer. India has today a government stronger and more representative than ever in the past, a government predominantly Indian and non-official. There is nothing they regret more than this challenge at so critical a juncture. But on the Governor-General in Council, with the full support of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, lies the task of defending India, of safeguarding India's interests, of securing the maintenance and the development of the degree of political evolution which she has attained, with all its promise for the future, of securing so small an interruption as may be possible of the everyday processes of political life in this country. That task the Governor-General in Council will discharge, in face of the Congress challenge, with clear determination, but with an anxiety that action shall be preventive rather than punitive, and with a full consciousness of responsibility to India and to the cause of the United Nations and of civilization. The Council call on the people of India, and on all who wish her well, to unite with them in resistance to the present challenge of a political caucus, to lay aside political differences, and for the period of the war to place before all other considerations the defence of their country, and the achievement of those common aims and of that victory to which the Congress demand is so sinister a threat. *Ends.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *6 August 1942*[1]
Received: 7 August, 4.15 am

No. 2305–S. Your personal telegram of 4th August, No. 13670.[2] I think these, if I may say so, admirable suggestions. I will take early opportunity of talking to Mudaliar and of sounding the Jam Saheb, and will then telegraph again.

[1] L/P&J/7/5412: f 199 gives the date and time of despatch as 7 August, 1 am.
[2] No. 410.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *6 August 1942*[1]

PERSONAL

No. 2307–S. Your telegrams of July 31st Nos. 13551[2] and 13552.[3] I am, I need not say, most grateful to you, to Colonial Secretary and to Governor of Nyasaland for all this assistance. Issue no longer arises in present circumstances since as you know we propose not to deport. But circumstances might arise in which it would revive at short notice, and I am accordingly trying to clear the ground here.

2. I am arranging preparation of a draft ordinance so that we can refer it to you for consideration if necessary. I think it would be well to know the approximate cost and time required to prepare as suggested (paragraph (*c*) of your No. 13552), and would be grateful if you could obtain this information. As regards paragraph (*a*) of that telegram, party would not contain women or children, but would contain several members who had caste prohibitions against food cooked and served by Africans. We would however propose to meet this difficulty by sending an appropriate number of cooks and servants with the party (we could not arrest these servants here and thus there would be no legal ground for their detention in custody in the Colony concerned; we should have to obtain their voluntary agreement to submit to all restrictions on communications which might be imposed on their masters).

3. Your paragraph (*b*). Persons concerned are no doubt accustomed to a certain amount of luxury and to town life, but I imagine that quarters which were suitable for European officers in the King's African Rifles would be suitable for them.

4. I note the information in your paragraph (*d*). If it is indeed a fact that Axis agents would be likely to approach our party and Governor could not guarantee that this would be prevented, this would I fear constitute a grave objection to proposal. If you can throw any further light on this aspect of the[4] matter, I shall be most grateful.

[1] L/P&J/8/599 gives the date as 7 August. [2] No. 383. [3] No. 384.
[4] 'aspect of the' deciphered as 'woeful'.

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Sir T. Stewart (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

PERSONAL RANCHI, *6 August 1942*

No. 41. I have given my fullest consideration to the problem set out in Your Excellency's telegram No. 2274–S.[1] I am in complete agreement as to the importance of getting across Government's case but I doubt whether actual official propaganda, which even in normal times is suspect, will have any good effect. In particular I anticipate that posting of notices on public buildings or reading of messages by officers in public would only provide focal points for demonstrations and disturbances. I am myself holding two divisional durbars in the course of this month and shall be able to put the case to reasonable audiences but otherwise I should prefer to enlist unofficial support. It is impossible now to foresee to what extent such support will be forthcoming: most people are at present sitting on the fence.

2. I agree that we should not utilise the War Front for public propaganda but I have hopes based on an assurance from provincial leaders that when the campaign has opened the Front will take active part among the people in opposing the Congress plan.

[1] No. 395.

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Viscount Cranborne to Officer Administering the Government of Nyasaland

Telegram, L/P&J/8/599: f 83

COLONIAL OFFICE, *6 August 1942, 2.30 pm*

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

Unnumbered. Addressed O.A.G. Nyasaland. Repeated to East African Governors Conference.

Your telegram No. 299[1] has been repeated in substance to the Government of India who will examine the points you have raised and will, if necessary, communicate directly with you about them. I am informed however that it is not (repeat not) now proposed to proceed with the suggestion that certain Congress leaders should be deported from India, at all events in the immediate future.

[1] This should read '229': see No. 384.

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Mr Amery to Mr Eden

L/P&J/8/598: f 357

INDIA OFFICE, *6 August 1942*

My dear Anthony,

Butler sent to Turnbull yesterday evening a copy of Campbell's telegram No. 3984[1] in which he suggested that it would be desirable for the Prime Minister to send a message to the President with reference to the recent revelations about the proceedings of the Congress Working Committee and also that Campbell should be put in a position to bring the implications of Gandhi's original draft resolution to Hull's attention. It seems to me very essential, if this is to be done, to act quickly, and I have therefore had prepared the enclosed drafts, the first of which might, I suggest, be sent either by Attlee or yourself as you may think most suitable, and the second of which provides material for Campbell's proposed conversation with Hull. Perhaps you would consider these and let me know whether you think them suitable?

Campbell suggests that you should consult Halifax, but I understand he is up in Yorkshire and in the circumstances I should think we had better proceed without troubling him.

I feel myself that it would probably be better for Campbell to speak to Hull on this subject than for Bajpai to do so, though I think Bajpai should see both telegrams.

I am not very clear whether Campbell's further reference to a message from the Prime Minister in paragraph 2 of his No. 3986[2] of 5th August is intended to mean that the private conversation reported makes a message of the kind asked for in his 3984 the more desirable, or that it should be enlarged by some reference to the importance of discouraging Chiang Kai-shek from attempting to intervene. As the conversation is referred to as private I have presumed that the former is his intention.[3]

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] No. 411. [2] No. 421.

[3] The draft message to President Roosevelt enclosed with this letter is substantially the same as paras. 1 and 5 of Mr Eden's telegram 4728 of 7 August to Sir R. Campbell (No. 454). Paras. 2–4 were later added to implement the 3rd Conclusion on Minute 1 of the War Cabinet meeting of 6 August (No. 435).

The draft providing material for Sir R. Campbell's conversation with Mr Hull was despatched, after some inconsiderable amendments, as Mr Eden's telegram 4729 of 7 August (No. 455).

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 105th Conclusions, Minutes 1 and 2

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 6 August 1942 at 5 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Ernest Bevin

Also present were: Sir Kingsley Wood, Viscount Simon, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair, and (for part of item 2) Sir Jeremy Raisman

INDIA

Minute 1

R/30/1/2: ff 28–30

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 99th Conclusions.)[1]

The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, on the action to be taken, if necessary, against the Indian National Congress (W.P. (42) 340).[2] The War Cabinet also had before them copies of three further telegrams (Nos. 2284–S,[3] 2285–S[4] and 2289–S[5]) containing:—

(i) A summary of a circular from the Andhra Provincial Congress Party; and

(ii) A report from the Governor of Bombay of the effect of Patel's visit to Ahmedabad and Gujarat.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that the Viceroy, who had throughout acted in full accord with his Council, had adopted an extremely patient attitude, in the hope that Congress might think better of the course of action they proposed. His whole Council, however, had decided that if Congress forced the issue, stern and swift action must be taken. Evidence was now accumulating that Gandhi and those associated with him meant real mischief. He asked the War Cabinet to authorise him to telegraph to the Viceroy to the effect that the course of action proposed in telegram 6092[6] (a copy of which was annexed to W.P. (42) 340) was approved, and should be adopted if Congress passed a resolution which called for mass disobedience all over India.

The All-India Congress Committee was to meet on the 7th August. It was therefore likely that the resolution recommended by the Working Committee would be endorsed in two or, more probably, three days' time.

The following were the main points dealt with in discussion:—

(i) The suggestion in paragraph 10 of telegram 6092 that, if Gandhi fasted, a "cat and mouse" procedure was to be followed, was strongly criticised.

Doubts were expressed as to whether the machine at the disposal of the Government of India would stand the strain which would be

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involved if Gandhi hunger-struck while detained in India. From this point of view it was essential that Gandhi should be got out of the country.

(ii) The War Cabinet were informed that the Viceroy had given careful consideration to the proposal that Gandhi should be deported, and had consulted the Provincial Governors. The Viceroy had reported[7] that, while two of the Governors favoured deportation, most of them, and his own (the Viceroy's) advisers, were against this course.

The view taken by the War Cabinet was that this was a matter in which His Majesty's Government must be responsible for the decision taken.

(iii) Discussion ensued as to the places to which Gandhi could be deported. For a man of his physique and age, a sea voyage would be preferable to a journey by air. It was also agreed that it was very important that he should be taken out of India the moment he was detained.

The War Cabinet concluded that the right course was that he should be taken at once to Aden. This would allow time for further consideration to be given to his ultimate destination.

(iv) The question then arose whether other leaders who were detained should also be taken out of India. On this, the view taken was that one issue of prime importance was to avoid a situation in which Gandhi was on hunger-strike in India. No doubt other Congress leaders detained would be less likely to hunger-strike if Gandhi was not in India. The determining factor was, however, that the importance of Gandhi's position should not be emphasised by deporting him and him only from India. It would therefore be desirable that half a dozen or a dozen of the other leaders should be deported. East Africa seemed to be the best place.

(v) Comment was made on some of the terms used in telegram 6092, e.g. the words "arrest" and "detention in jails". It was important to avoid any words suggesting criminal imprisonment and to make it clear that the persons in question were being interned and treated as *détenus*.

The Conclusions of the War Cabinet were as follows:—

(1) Approval was given, subject to the modifications set out below, to the action which the Government of India proposed to take against Congress (as outlined in telegram No. 6092 from the Government of India Home Department dated the 3rd August) in the event of the resolution of the 14th July being endorsed by the All-India Congress Committee or some similar resolution being passed which included a Civil Disobedience Campaign, or overt action being initiated on similar lines.

[1] No. 364. [2] No. 422. [3] No. 406. [4] No. 407. [5] No. 413. [6] No. 393.
[7] No. 387.

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The modifications in question were as follows:—

(*a*) The War Cabinet could not agree that the "cat and mouse" procedure should be adopted if Gandhi should hunger-strike while under detention. It should be clearly understood that, once he had been taken under restraint, he must be kept in detention, even though he went on hunger-strike. In view of the difficulties to which his detention in India, while hunger-striking, was likely to give rise, the War Cabinet were strongly of opinion that, as soon as he had been taken under restraint, he should be removed forthwith by sea to some place outside India.

(*b*) Aden was suggested as the first destination. Subsequently, he might be transferred to some more suitable place for continued detention—possibly the Sudan.

(*c*) Arrangements should be made for him to be accompanied, not only by medical attendants, but also by a responsible officer who could take decisions on behalf of the Government of India in an emergency.

(*d*) To avoid giving the impression that Gandhi was being selected for special treatment, some dozen or half-dozen of the other leaders who were to be detained should be taken to East Africa by air.

(*e*) In announcing the decision to detain these leaders, and generally in regard to the action taken, care should be taken to avoid the use of words suggesting criminal imprisonment. It should be made clear that the leaders were being treated as *détenus*.

(2) In announcing the action taken against the Congress leaders prominence should be given to the following points:—

(*a*) This action had the full support of the members of the Viceroy's Executive Council.

(*b*) The resolution of the Congress Working Committee was only the beginning of a far-reaching scheme designed wholly to undermine India's co-operation in the war effort. The documentary evidence in support of this should be made public (e.g. telegram 2285 from the Viceroy dated the 4th August).

(*c*) Our action was taken in the interests of the United Nations as a whole, not merely for the protection of British interests in India.

(3) The Foreign Secretary should communicate to the President of the United States, in advance, full particulars of the course of action which it was proposed to take against the Congress leaders. The Secretary of State for the Dominions should also inform the Dominion Prime Ministers of the course proposed. His Majesty's Ambassador in China should also be informed of the plan, but should be instructed not to disclose it to General Chiang Kai-shek until after Gandhi and the other Congress leaders had been detained.

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Minute 2

L/PO/2/16: ff 126–7

War Financial Settlement of 1940 and
Indian Sterling Balances

The War Cabinet had before them Memoranda by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (42) 325)[8] and the S/S for India (W.P. (42) 328).[9]

The Settlement of 1940 provided that India should recover from Great Britain all her defence expenditure except her normal pre-war budget (adjusted for rises in prices), the cost of measures taken in India for India's local defence, and a share of the cost of measures "taken jointly in the interests of Indian defence and of His Majesty's Government". If the Settlement remained unaltered India would have accumulated, by the end of the war, sterling balances amounting to several hundreds of millions of pounds which, while they would be of no benefit to India during the war, would present a grave handicap to Britain after the war.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER urged that, in the light of the principle of "Reciprocal Aid" enunciated by President Roosevelt and of the changed situation resulting from the spread of the war to India's frontiers, the Financial Settlement of April 1940 ought to be revised and that, in future, the United Kingdom should supply without charge whatever cost sterling, and that India should supply without charge whatever cost rupees.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA contested the Chancellor's case for revision of the Settlement. The amount of contribution to be expected from each of the United Nations in accordance with the principle of "Reciprocal Aid" clearly had to be in proportion to its National income, and India was a poor country with a rapidly increasing defence budget of her own. Further, a large proportion of the rupee war expenditure recoverable by India under the 1940 Settlement was incurred by the Government of India acting as agent for the U.K. Government and bore no direct relation to the defence of India. The Govt. of India were ready to assume further limited financial burdens within the framework of the 1940 Settlement and to discuss with the U.K. Govt. mutually satisfactory methods of mitigating any inconvenience through the accumulation of sterling balances, provided it was made clear that there was no intention radically to revise the 1940 Settlement.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said that the Prime Minister took a great interest in this subject; he would therefore prefer that the matter should be dealt with at a meeting at which the Prime Minister could be present.[10] He

[8] No. 375. [9] No. 389.

[10] From 3 to 24 August, Mr Churchill was away visiting the Middle East (Cairo) and Moscow (12–16 August).

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had felt, however, that the War Cabinet ought to take the opportunity of hearing the views of Sir Jeremy Raisman, the Finance Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, who was shortly returning to India.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer indicated that a decision might have to be reached between two views: The first was that the situation had been so changed by the course of the war that the Settlement of 1940 should now be revised. The second was that, while the existing Settlement should be continued, some measures should be taken within the limits of that Settlement to mitigate the difficult, and perhaps dangerous, position which would arise after the war. He cited, as examples, that it did not seem right that the incidence of expenditure of troops should vary according to which side of the Indian and Burma Frontier they were on. Again, India should be pressed to pay for the aircraft sent to her.

(Sir Jeremy Raisman then entered the meeting.)

SIR JEREMY RAISMAN said that India's war effort included the provision of men and materials not only for the defence of India, but for the war generally. Under the existing Settlement India's defence expenditure was already four or five times greater than before the war. But as a result of the payments which India was receiving in sterling for goods and materials used outside India, she was accumulating large sterling balances. The Treasury took the view that these large sterling balances would give rise to a serious post-war situation, and that the 1940 Settlement ought, therefore, to be revised. India's reply was that no feasible alteration in the 1940 Settlement could prevent these sterling balances from being built up, and that other measures must be considered for mitigating the post-war situation. These measures must, moreover, take a form which would not alienate the commercial classes, which had hitherto co-operated well in the war effort. If India neither received payment nor was entitled to claim compensation in respect of goods and services used outside India, the co-operation of the commercial classes would cease.

It was also clear that those who held moderate views in India could not be got to accept the point of view put forward by the Treasury, and that no good could come of attempting to get this view accepted.

Sir Jeremy said that he had had discussions with the Treasury on defence expenditure and had gone so far as he properly could, within the limits of the existing Settlement, in accepting liabilities on India's defence budget. It should be recognised, however, that India's increased war expenditure had created a very difficult problem, which would have to be met by taxation and borrowing on a scale hitherto unknown in India. Moreover, if anything was done to alienate the commercial classes, it would be impossible to raise the sums required by borrowing, and an inflationary position would result. There would be the danger of a flight from currency into goods, which would result in hoarding. This in turn might give rise to famines and riots.

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Sir Jeremy said that he hoped to be able to justify the large increase in defence expenditure under the existing Settlement because the people of India had seen the large increase in the fighting services in the country and also the flow of munitions, etc., sent to defend the country.

Sir Jeremy Raisman then dealt with the measures which he thought could be taken to mitigate the consequences of India's growing sterling balances at the end of the war.

First, it was contemplated to set aside a reconstruction fund which would be used, under control, for the importation into India of capital and consumer goods, in accordance with a recognised programme.

In the second place, he was prepared to discuss the capitalisation of India's sterling pension liabilities, India handing over to the Treasury a capital sum in sterling in exchange for annual sums, calculated to meet India's pension payments as they accrued. There was also still some £50 or £60 millions of debt to be repatriated.

Thirdly, it would be necessary to keep a large sum of sterling as a backing for the currency.

These measures taken together should suffice to dispose of our embarrassment at the sterling balances at present in view.

Another measure which the Indian Government were prepared to consider was an alteration in the law which would enable the Reserve Bank to hold sterling investments of a maturity exceeding five years.

Sir Jeremy was asked whether India could not pay for the aircraft now being sent to India. He said that the present arrangement was that, in regard to defence expenditure undertaken in the joint interests of India and the United Nations, India paid for items provided by India from local resources, while the United Kingdom and the United States paid for what they themselves had provided. This arrangement was so well and so widely understood in India that a change would be regarded as a fundamental departure from the existing settlement. There would also be grave administrative inconvenience in departing from this system, since it would involve a costing of services received and rendered. In Sir Jeremy's view, any possibility that might have existed of asking India to accept a larger defence liability had been finally dispelled by Japan's entry into the war, which had already caused a heavy increase in India's own expenditure.

The War Cabinet thanked Sir Jeremy Raisman for his statement, and he then withdrew.

The War Cabinet decided to take note of the views expressed, but to record no decision, further discussion being adjourned to a meeting when the Prime Minister could be present.

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Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

I RACE COURSE ROAD, NEW DELHI, *6 August 1942*

Your Excellency,

Having had the advantage of listening to the discussions in Council and having also perused the proceedings and resolutions of the Congress Working Committee, I have been considering all the likely political developments and their possible repercussions.

I have very little hesitation in asserting that a large number, if not the majority, of the members of the All-India Congress Committee would be, *in reality*, opposed to a programme such as is now envisaged. The latest resolution,[1] although in its operative part it does not differ from its predecessor, yet displays intrinsic signs of nervousness and is really a kind of "apologia" calculated to repel the suggestion that the Congress was against the United Nations as such or against the defence of India and the resistance to aggression "with all the armed as well as the non-violent forces at its command together with its allied powers". Another proposition which has not been very much noticed is extremely important as this part of the resolution in question outlines the Federal Government for the whole of India with the "maximum autonomy for the provinces, residuary powers vesting in the provinces". This is a definite concession to a certain powerful section of Muslim opinion and runs counter to the line taken by almost every representative at the Round Table Conference at which stress was laid on the importance of residual control being vested in the Centre as a unifying factor. I read this resolution, therefore, as a sign of weakening of confidence. Nevertheless, the probability is that the All-India Congress Committee will be dragooned into ratifying the resolution. I foresee, however, that it would be sought to fix a time-limit for the carrying out of the resolution. I am clearly of opinion that a destructive programme like the one projected by the Congress must be unequivocally dealt with. What I have seen in the country does not induce me to believe that the response to the Congress programme will be as widespread or as intense as in 1921. The leading merchants of Bombay, Ahmedabad and Calcutta may pay moneys secretly or even openly and may offer lip-sympathy and stage or connive at *hartals*; but they are making too much money now to participate fully in a campaign which is bound to affect them most prejudicially.

Neither Government servants nor labourers in the great industrial establishments will respond to the call of the Congress except perhaps as a momentary gesture; and even the no-tax campaign will not be as pervasive or as effective

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as on previous occasions. But a great deal of embarrassment to Government and resultant suffering seem, in any case, to be inevitable.

Holding these views, my opinion is that the dangers of the projected movement would be minimised, if not nullified and the neutrality (if not the adherence) even of the less extreme Congress-minded elements secured if it were possible for Government, in England and in India, not only to declare with Mr. Amery that the basic principles of Sir Stafford Cripps' proposals still hold the field but that it is the definite intention of the British Government, given the suitable environment, to Indianise the Government of India in spirit and in personnel, such Indianisation not being dependent as to its pace upon that preliminary consultation with all interests in India and the resultant concord which are outlined in various declarations. As a weapon against disruptive and weakening influences at this juncture, I hold that such a statement would be of inestimable value and I have thought it my duty to place my views before Your Excellency.

I am,

Your Excellency's sincerely,

C. P. RAMASWAMI AIYAR

P.S.—My suggestion has been made with a view to meet the doubts and hesitations felt by persons who have been incredulous of the possibility, within a reasonable period, of any approach to unanimity amongst the various communal and political groups with reference to the future constitution of India (having regard to the apparently irreconcilable points of view and demands on the part of the Congress, the Muslim League and other parties).

[1] This refers to the 'Quit India' resolution (No. 470) passed by the Congress Working Committee on 5 August, which was to be confirmed by the All-India Congress Committee on 8 August.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *7 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2306-S. Your private and personal telegram of August 4th, No. 939.[1] Wendell Willkie. Many thanks. I am most grateful.

2. I am quite prepared in the light of what you say to leave things as they stand. So much attention has now been drawn to the possibility of his acting as an intermediary, &c., that I think myself that he might find a visit to India, even

[1] No. 398; the date should be 3 August.

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in a wholly private capacity, a little embarrassing. But I do not press my point and agree that we can see how things develop; and if he does come to London it would of course be a most excellent thing if you were to have a talk with him.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *7 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

2308–S. I have had individual representations from Mudaliar, Sarker, S. Ahmed, Mody in the last few days that their position and that of the Council would be greatly strengthened by replacement of Maxwell and Raisman by Indians: that this having been offered by Cripps to the irreconcilables is a concession that cannot legitimately be refused to a co-operating council such as the present, and that the change would be a real earnest of the sincerity of H.M.G. I have stonewalled, though fact that I cannot disclose that any offer by Cripps had no authority behind it puts me at some disadvantage.

2. Tonight I have however received letter[1] from C. P. Ramaswami Iyer, who suggests that dangers of Congress "movement would be . . . minimised if not nullified, and the neutrality (if not the adherence) even of the less extreme Congress minded elements secured if it were possible for Govt. in England and in India not only to declare with Mr. Amery that the basic principles of Sir S. Cripps' proposals still hold the field, but that it is the definite intention of the British Government, given the suitable environment, to Indianise the Government of India in spirit and personnel, such Indianisation not being dependent as to its pace upon that preliminary consultation with all interests in India and the resultant concord which are outlined in various declarations".

3. (Take Cypher U:— 28/U) I suspect that the nervous strain of having to handle Congress firmly is telling on my Hindu colleagues (plus Sultan Ahmed and Mody) and that they want something to show the public that if they can be firm with Congress equally they can get something out of H.M.G. I think it possible that some of my more nervous colleagues may be looking for an opportunity to shelter behind the alleged obduracy of H.M.G., and to hand the Congress baby to me. In C. P.'s case I suspect that he sees a good opportunity to establish his footing as a "progressive" among colleagues whom his personality is likely to dominate.

4. Cripps' comments while here are an embarrassment. I should myself be most reluctant to drop Maxwell and Raisman. Nor do I believe for a moment

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that it would have the helpful results anticipated. But we may be in for a good deal of trouble over this. I propose to continue to stonewall and to make play with technical difficulties of legislation, unlikelihood of Congress being placated by this or any similar move, etc. But I think you should know position at once, and any ammunition you can supply from your end may be of value in helping me to hold a position which I am anxious to maintain if possible. If C. P. has Indianisation of Secretaryships as well as these two memberships in view I gravely doubt whether the I.C.S. could produce at this stage Indians of requisite quality, and I am far from impressed by general effect on efficiency of Indianisation to extent that it has already gone.

5. (revert to XX telm. No. 2308) I should welcome very early reply. I see no reason myself to reiterate your statement of 30th July[2] about further constitutional advance, though so long as we do not go beyond that statement there could no doubt be found an opportunity here for referring to and underlining it.

[1] No. 436. [2] See No. 366.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *7 August 1942*

No. 2313-S. My telegram No. 2302-S[1] of 6th August 1942. Draft resolution was discussed in Council at great length this morning. It has in the result been so much cut about that I doubt if it is worth your while paying any attention to the draft I sent you. We are having a further drafting meeting this afternoon, and I will telegraph revise as soon as possible.

[1] No. 428.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 82

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *7 August 1942, 12.5 am*

MOST SECRET

PERSONAL

13855. To be decyphered by Superintendent.

War Cabinet have considered[1] Government of India's 6092[2] and approve proposed course of action generally. They are however very strongly opposed

[1] No. 435. [2] No. 393.

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to suggested cat and mouse procedure in the event of Gandhi's hungerstriking and feel that once he is arrested we must see it right through and let him know that we mean to do so. In view of this and of the continued state of passionate emotion which would be aroused by inevitable knowledge of hungerstrike which would spread if he were in India and clamour for his release Cabinet were strongly of opinion that you should immediately on arrest put him on board ship for Aden. Eventual destination, possibly Sudan, can be arranged later. Naturally every care would have to be taken as to medical attention. Cabinet considered that he should be accompanied on board ship and after arrival not only by medical attendants but by responsible officer who could take decisions on behalf of Government of India in an emergency. Personally I believe dramatic effect of such a clear[3] exercise of our authority might be very effective in breaking legend of Gandhi's power to defy Government and also that with distance interest in him will inevitably be less.

2. Cabinet also wish to avoid impression that Gandhi was specially selected for invidious treatment and definitely recommend dozen or so ring-leaders being flown to East Africa as originally contemplated. As you know from my telegram 31st July 13551,[4] Colonial Office consider Nyasaland best area. In their case too it will be important to send with them responsible persons who can see that they are properly looked after.

[3] 'clear' deciphered as 'development of'. [4] No. 383.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *7 August 1942, 3.45 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 7 August, 3.45 pm*

No. 2314-S. Your most immediate telegram of 7th August, No. 13855.[1] I am grateful for this indication of Cabinet's wishes. You know my own feeling on the matter of deportation. I fully sympathise with Cabinet's attitude. But I must carry these people here with me and I must also pay some attention to views of experienced Governors such as Lumley, &c.

2. I thought best course would be to take issue in Council this morning. I did so, Council were unanimously and without exception most strongly opposed to deportation. Grounds given were bad reaction here, fact that Gandhi will almost certainly stage a fast and that that would be easier to deal with if he were in this country than if he were abroad or on the high seas

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since there would be less room for speculation as to what was happening, risk that if he went abroad, engineered rumours of victimization, maltreatment, lack of appropriate food, &c. would be spread about and developed by Congress. I am quite clear that it would be almost impossible to get my Council to concur in deportation, and as I have an extremely difficult task in taking them with me over this business in their present excited and nervous frame of mind, I would not propose to press matter further. I am sure that Cabinet will accept my view on that.

3. I thought it wiser not at this stage to raise the question of cat and mouse treatment, and will keep that till later. But in the course of discussion C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar said in terms (and without provoking any comeback) that in his judgment if Gandhi did fast, he should be left to face consequences and that it should be made clear that that was not our fault (he added that he thought we should be in a stronger position to carry that policy through if he and the other leaders were interned in India).

[1] No. 440.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 83

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *7 August 1942, 12.5 am*
MOST SECRET
PERSONAL
13856. To be decyphered by Superintendent.

My personal telegram 13855.[1] As regards publicity Cabinet attach importance to it being emphasized throughout that Congress leaders are not ordinary prisoners but detained as preventive measure. They also consider that once you decide to arrest you should give prominence in publicity to following points—

(1) that action taken had full support of Members of your Council;
(2) that resolution of Congress Working Committee was only the beginning of far-reaching plan wholly to undermine India's co-operation in war effort. Documentary evidence such as Andhra Committee's circular given in your official telegram 2285[2] of 4th August should be made public and any other material showing the seriousness of the mischief intended;
(3) that our action was taken in the interests of the United Nations as a whole, not merely for the protection of British interests in India.

[1] No. 440. [2] No. 407.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE PERSONAL — NEW DELHI, *7 August 1942, 3.45 pm*
Received: 7 August, 1.30 pm

No. 2315–S. Your personal telegram No.13856.[1] I am fully alive to importance of these matters. It is of course most necessary that I should as far as possible be able to point to full support of Members of my Council, and that is one of the reasons that make it necessary for me to play this hand much more cautiously than I could wish. I think however[2] there is a possibility that my colleagues may wobble under the strain and insist upon delay using as an excuse advertised intention of Gandhi to send me a letter to be followed by a meeting "if my response is favourable[3]". In that event I should have to decide between political disadvantages of acting contrary to the advice of my Council and practical danger[4] of postponing action in face of seriously increasing tension in Bombay and United Provinces. Congress President has announced intention to endeavour to end meeting of A.-I.C.C. tonight and not in any event to sit after Saturday. Your points (2) and (3) are both good ones, and I will see that they are followed up and do my utmost to keep Council with me.

[1] No. 442. [2] 'think however' deciphered as 'am (sic) understand'.
[3] Deciphered as 'favoured'. [4] Deciphered as 'propositions'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/599: f 80

MOST IMMEDIATE PERSONAL — INDIA OFFICE, *7 August 1942, 12.10 am*

13859. My tel. No. 13855.[1] In regard to Nyasaland please telegraph urgently direct to Governor repeating to me your views on points of detail raised in my tel. No. 13551[2] July 31.

[1] No. 440.
[2] No. 383. Lord Linlithgow had already replied to Mr Amery's telegram 13551 (see No. 431). The substance of this reply was transmitted by Lord Linlithgow to the Governor of Nyasaland in telegram 2328–S of 8 August. MSS. EUR. F. 125/130. For further discussion of details see MSS. EUR. F. 125/130 and L/P&J/8/599.

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Viscount Cranborne to Officer Administering the Government of Nyasaland

Telegram, L/P&J/8/599: f 86

IMMEDIATE COLONIAL OFFICE, *7 August 1942, 12.15 am*
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

Addressed Governor Nyasaland. Repeated East African Governors' Conference. My most secret and personal telegram of 6th August.[1]

Plans have again changed and Congress leaders may be deported by air from India at short notice. Government of India are being asked for very early comments on points raised in your telegram 229[2] and I trust that you will make all plans which can be made in advance without disclosing their purpose to arrange reception and accommodation of Congress leaders. You will of course be given longest possible notice of definite intention to remove them to Nyasaland but that may be a matter of only a few days before their arrival.

[1] No. 433. [2] See No. 384.

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Viscount Cranborne to Governor of Aden[1]

Telegram, L/P&J/8/599: f 85

IMMEDIATE COLONIAL OFFICE, *7 August 1942, 3.30 am*
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

1. If, following meeting of All-India Congress Committee on 7th August, authority of Government of India should be directly challenged by mass civil disobedience movement, it may be decided to detain Gandhi and other principal Congress leaders and to remove them, under restraint, outside India—

(*a*) in order to prevent them from communicating with their followers which, as shewn by experience in other cases, might not be effected by even most rigorous confinement within India; and

(*b*) as a deterrent to those who aspire to succeed the arrested men and as means of giving confidence to waverers.

2. Accommodation elsewhere would be found for other leaders who would travel by air but in case of Gandhi (who, on account of very high blood pressure, must be removed from India by sea and be accommodated at an altitude approximating sea level) it is important to select for his enforced residence a

[1] Sir J. Hathorn Hall.

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territory also reasonably near to India and Cabinet have decided that you should be asked to accept him in Aden, at all events as a first destination. He would be accompanied by medical attendants and by a responsible officer from India who could take decisions on behalf of Government of India in an emergency.

3. I realise the many objections that could be raised to accommodation of Gandhi in Aden and the practical difficulties and inconvenience that this must cause. But you will, I know, appreciate that decision of H.M.G. has been taken only after fullest consideration of all other choices open to them, and I am sure that I can rely upon you to arrange for his restraint, should the need arise, under conditions which, while reasonably comfortable, will secure every practicable precaution against communication with India.

4. It is not desired, at this stage, that you should take any action beyond planning, so far as it may be possible to make plans without disclosing their purpose, the arrangements for Gandhi's reception and accommodation. You will, of course, be given the longest possible notice of definite intention to remove him to Aden but that may be a matter of only 3 or 4 days before his arrival.

5. As Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, cannot be applied to India any Aden Defence Regulation based on draft[2] enclosed in my circular despatch of 27th September 1940, would have to be amended by adding after the words "United Kingdom" in each place where they occur in paragraph 1 of that Regulation, the word "India" and a similar amendment would have to be made in paragraph 2 (*e*). Order for Gandhi's detention could then be made under the amended Regulation.

[2] See No. 351, note 2.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *7 August 1942, 9.45 pm*
Received: 7 August, 11.50 pm

No. 2319–S. The A.-I.C.C. have ratified the resolution passed by the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress on 5th August.[1] That Resolution demands the immediate withdrawal of British power from India, and sanctions "the starting of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale". The Governor-General in Council has been aware, too, for some days past of dangerous preparations by the Congress Party for unlawful, and in some

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cases violent, activities, directed among other things to the interruption of communications and public utility services, the organisation of strikes, tampering with the loyalty of Government servants, and interference with defence measures, including recruitment.

2. The Government of India have waited patiently in the hope that wiser counsels might prevail. They have been disappointed in that hope. To a challenge such as the present there can only be one answer. The Government of India would regard it as wholly incompatible with their responsibilities to the people of India, and their obligations to the Allies, that a demand should be discussed the acceptance of which would plunge India into confusion and anarchy internally, and would paralyse her effort in the common cause of human freedom.

3. For the demand of the Congress leaders there is no warrant. In the view of the Government of India that demand is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with a full sense of responsibility on the part of the leaders of the Congress Party, or a full appreciation by them of the realities of the present situation. The Congress Working Committee admit that "there may be risks involved".[2] They are right. Acceptance of the resolution must mean the exposure of India to Axis attack from without. Internally the withdrawal of British rule invites civil war, the collapse of law and order, the outbreak of communal feud, the dislocation of economic life with its inevitable hardships. Nor can the Government of India accept the claim of the Congress Party to speak for India as a whole. The Congress Party has for long occupied a position of great prominence and great importance in Indian political life. At this day its importance is substantial. But it is the duty of the Government of India to take a balanced view of the interests of all sections of Indian thought and Indian opinion. And looking as they must to the repeated protests even in these last few days by the leaders of great communities and solidly established interests, by so many leaders of liberal thought, by those great sections of the population which are giving unstinted and invaluable support to war against Axis aggression, they are confirmed in their view that that claim has no solid foundation, and that acceptance of the proposals now put forward by the Congress Party must mean the abandonment of all those large and powerful elements in the population which have condemned the course of action proposed by the Congress Party and which resent and resist the widespread dislocation which its acceptance would involve of India's war effort and of the general life of the community.

4. Nor can the Congress leaders claim that only thus can India's future be assured. The Congress Party is not India's mouthpiece, yet, in the interests of

[1] No. 470. [2] Working Committee resolution of 14 July (No. 265).

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securing their own dominance, and in pursuit of their totalitarian policy its leaders have consistently impeded the efforts made to bring India to full nationhood. But for the resistance of the Congress Party to constructive endeavours, India might even now be enjoying self-government. British policy for India's future stands clear. It is that once hostilities cease, India shall devise for herself with full freedom of decision, and on a basis embracing all, and not only a single party, the form of government which she regards as most suited to her conditions: and that in the meantime Indian leaders shall fully participate in the government of their country, and in the counsels of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. The fullest opportunity for the attainment of self-government by the people of India has been guaranteed by His Majesty's Government. It is on the basis, fully accepted by His Majesty's Government and by the people of Great Britain, that the fullest opportunity shall be given for the attainment of self-government by the Indian people, that when the day of victory comes the final structure of India's constitution will be erected by Indians themselves. That those guarantees given by the British Parliament and the British people are accepted by the people of India we firmly believe. The suggestion put forward by the Congress Party that the millions of India uncertain as to the future are ready, despite the sad lessons of so many martyr countries, to throw themselves into the arms of the invader is one that the Government of India cannot accept as a true representation of the feeling of the people of this great country.

5. The leaders of the Congress Party have claimed that the withdrawal of British rule "with goodwill" will "result in establishing a stable provisional government in India, and co-operation between this Government and the United Nations in resisting aggression and helping China".[3] There is no justification for those claims. Nor can the Government of India accept the suggestion that a stable provisional Government could be formed in a moment of time within a day of two of the withdrawal of British power. Past experience has shown to their profound regret the existence of deep differences in this country, the harmonising of which must be the object of all on whom responsibility falls, the removal of which is the ambition and the hope of the present Government of India. But to deny that those problems confront India today would be to ignore the facts: and the Government of India are satisfied that the interval between the withdrawal of British rule and the establishment of a stable provisional Government would provide an open opportunity for the enemies of order and for all dissident elements in the population. In the view of the Government of India it is not too much to say that acceptance of the demand now put forward by the Congress Party must mean the betrayal of the Allies, whether in or outside India, the betrayal in particular of Russia and China, the betrayal of those ideals to which so much support has been given and is given today from the true heart and mind of India, the betrayal of India's fighting

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men, whose glory is so great, and the betrayal of all those loyal and co-operating elements in India which do not support the Congress Party, but which have played so active and so valuable a part in the prosecution of the war.[4]

6. India has today a government stronger and more representative than ever in the past, a government predominantly Indian and non-official, a government determined to prosecute the war and no less determined to lead India on to her political goal. There is nothing that the Government of India regret more than this challenge at so critical a juncture. But on them there lies the task of defending India, of maintaining India's capacity to wage war, of safeguarding India's interests, of holding the balance between the different sections of her people without fear or favour. That task the Government of India will discharge in face of the challenge now thrown down by the Congress Party with clear determination, but with an anxiety that action shall be preventive of the interruption of war effort and the other dangers to which they have referred rather than punitive, and with a full consciousness of responsibility to India and to the cause of the Allies and of civilisation. Their duty is plain, and they have to discharge it, profoundly as they must deplore the situation which they have been called upon to face. They urge the people of India to unite with them in resistance to the present challenge of a party. They appeal to them to lay aside all political differences, and for the period of the war to place before all other considerations the defence of their country, and the achievement of those common aims on which depends the future not only of India but of all the freedom-loving peoples of the world.

[3] Working Committee resolution of 14 July (No. 265).

[4] Lord Linlithgow's telegram 2330-S of 8 August made the following amendments in this sentence: after 'elements' delete 'in India' and after 'a part' insert 'in British India and in the Indian States'. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *7 August 1942, 11.30 pm*
Received: 7 August, 10 pm

No. 2321-S. My Council has approved resolution telegraphed in my telegram No. 2319-S[1] of 7th August.

[1] No. 447.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/599: f 79

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *7 August 1942, 11.30 am*
PERSONAL

13870. Superintendent Series. My telegram 13859.[1] Colonial Office have informed Nyasaland and Aden of Cabinet decision communicated to you in my personal telegram 13855.[2]

[1] No. 444. [2] No. 440.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 89

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *7 August 1942, 12.45 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

956. You may think it useful to point out to your advisers that if Gandhi is out of Government of India's jurisdiction the very difficult decisions arising out of hunger-strike, public clamour for release, &c. will be no longer their responsibility.

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 107th Conclusions, Minute 5

R/30/1/2: ff 35–7

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 7 August 1942 at 5 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Ernest Bevin

Also present during discussion of item 5 were: Mr Amery, Viscount Cranborne, Mr A. V. Alexander, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Sir Orme Sargent

INDIA

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 105th Conclusions, Minute 1)[1]

The War Cabinet considered a suggestion that the Government of India should make a public statement welcoming the attempt of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru to

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bring about a meeting of the leaders of the various elements of Indian opinion as a wise alternative to the launching of Gandhi's threatened campaign of civil disobedience.[2] The statement might indicate that, if such a representative meeting were held, the Government of India would give careful consideration to any suggestions submitted by it which expressed conclusions agreed upon by all the major sections of Indian opinion.

A statement on these lines might help to divorce moderate Indian opinion from Gandhi, and might correct the tendency for world opinion to concentrate attention on Gandhi and the activities of Congress.

The general view of the War Cabinet was that the issue of such a statement was likely to be interpreted in India as a sign of weakness on the part of the Government; and it was agreed that it would be inexpedient to issue such a statement at this stage.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA read to the War Cabinet the Viceroy's reply to the telegram[3] which had been sent to him in pursuance of the conclusions reached by the War Cabinet at their meeting the previous evening (W. M. (42) 105th Conclusions, Minute 1). In this telegram (No. 2314-S,[4] dated the 7th August) the Viceroy said that, in the light of the recommendations made by the War Cabinet, he had taken the view of his Executive Council on the question whether Gandhi should be removed outside India. The Council were strongly opposed to this course. Assuming that Gandhi intended to fast, they thought it would be easier to deal with him if he were detained in India than if he were abroad or on the high seas. The Viceroy thought it would be impossible to persuade the Council to agree to Gandhi's deportation; and, in view of his anxiety to carry them with him, he did not propose to press the matter further. He had not thought it wise to raise with the Council at this stage the question of applying the "cat-and-mouse" procedure if Gandhi fasted while under detention in India. One member of the Council had, however, said already that, if Gandhi did fast, he should be left to face the consequences.

The general feeling of the War Cabinet was that, while they regretted the Viceroy's decision, it would be inexpedient to attempt to overrule the judgment formed on this point by those on the spot. It was, however, essential to secure a firm assurance from the Government of India that they would not in any

[1] No. 435.

[2] In a statement dated 25 July (reported in *The Times of India* of 27 July) Sir T. B. Sapru called on 'the leaders of different parties and communities' to 'meet at a Round Table to discuss how best to remove the present tension and to arrive at some settlement for the period of the war, leaving the larger question of a permanent constitution for times of peace, immediately after the war'. In a further statement on 4 August (reported in the London *Times* of 5 August) he renewed his appeal, suggesting that, if Mr Gandhi or the other party leaders failed to call a conference, the Viceroy or Indian Executive Councillors should take up the responsibility.

[3] No. 440. [4] No. 441.

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circumstances apply the "cat-and-mouse" procedure, and that they were determined, if Gandhi fasted while under detention in India, to continue his detention whatever the consequences.

The question was also raised whether the Viceroy was not attaching too great importance to carrying his Executive Council with him in all decisions which would have to be taken in this crisis. The vital need was for the Government of India to show firmness and determination in dealing with this situation, and the Viceroy must, above all, be in a position to take prompt and decisive action. This must come first, and it must not be prejudiced by the desire to obtain the full support of the Executive Council. In the last resort, the responsibility lay with the Viceroy, and not with the Council. The views of the War Cabinet on this point should be made clear to the Viceroy, and he should at the same time be assured that, in taking a strong and vigorous line, he could count on the full support of His Majesty's Government.

The War Cabinet also had before them a telegram from the Viceroy (No. 2308–S,[5] dated the 7th August) regarding a suggestion that the position of the Executive Council would be strengthened if Sir Reginald Maxwell and Sir Jeremy Raisman were replaced by Indians.

The view of the War Cabinet was that there could be no question of considering such changes in the composition of the Council at this time.

The War Cabinet's Conclusions were as follows:—

(1) The Government of India should not be asked at this stage to make any public statement welcoming the attempt of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru to bring about a meeting of the leaders of the various elements of Indian opinion.

(2) The Secretary of State for India should reply to the Viceroy's telegram No. 2314–S in the following sense:—

(*a*) The War Cabinet were strongly impressed by the need for prompt and decisive action. In their view, it was of the very greatest importance that the Government of India should show firmness and determination in dealing with this crisis.

(*b*) The War Cabinet had thought that the position of the Government of India would have been easier if Gandhi had been removed outside India. Having regard, however, to the terms of the Viceroy's telegram, they did not desire to press that view. The Government of India should, however, take a firm decision at the outset that, if Gandhi fasted while under detention, the "cat-and-mouse" procedure would not in any circumstances be applied, and that Gandhi must continue in detention whatever the consequences.

(*c*) In all these matters the Viceroy should, if possible, carry his Executive Council with him; but his desire to do so should not be

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allowed to prejudice the vital objectives set out in (*a*) and (*b*) above.

(*d*) The Viceroy could rely on the fullest and strongest support of His Majesty's Government in carrying through the course of action which the War Cabinet had approved.

(3) The Secretary of State for India should also inform the Viceroy, in a separate telegram, that, if Gandhi fasted while under detention in India, it would, in the view of the War Cabinet, be most inexpedient that announcements should be made from day to day regarding his condition.

(4) In reply to the suggestions that Indians should be appointed to the Executive Council in place of Sir Reginald Maxwell and Sir Jeremy Raisman, the Viceroy should make it clear that there could be no question of considering such changes in the composition of the Council at this time.

[5] No. 438.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 62

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *7 August 1942, 11.35 pm*
MOST SECRET *Received: 8 August*
PERSONAL

13931. Superintendent series. Your 2314-S.[1] Cabinet fully appreciate your difficulties and in view of your representations do not press for deportation. They do however attach highest importance to absolute promptitude and decisiveness of action, and to display of firmness and determination by Government of India. They have no doubt that by exercise of your personal authority and in view of their own obvious interest in defeating the Congress manœuvre you will be able to carry your Indian colleagues with you but desire to achieve this should not be allowed to prejudice main objective. They likewise regard it as essential and similarly, if necessary, involving your personal responsibility, that if Gandhi starts hunger-strike there should be no question of release. (I am glad to note Ayyar's view on this.) In both connections you and your Council can feel assured of the unwavering support of Government here.

[1] No. 441.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 58

IMPORTANT PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *7 August 1942, 11.30 pm*

13932. Superintendent Series. My immediately preceding telegram personal No. 13931. War Cabinet wished me also to convey to you their view that if Gandhi fasts while under detention it would be most inexpedient for announcement to be made from day to day regarding his condition.

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Mr Eden to Sir R. Campbell[1]

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 49

MOST IMMEDIATE AND SECRET FOREIGN OFFICE, *7 August 1942, 6 pm*

4728. Your telegram of the 4th August, No. 3984.[2] Please communicate following most secret message to President from Mr. Attlee.

Begins.

My colleagues and I would have wished that you should have known in advance of the Government of India's decision, only communicated to us at the last moment,[3] to publish on 5th August the documents relating to the Congress Party Working Committee's discussions on the Congress Party's resolution of 1st May. These papers with their damaging revelations of the defeatist outlook of the Congress Party leaders and particularly of Gandhi had been in the Government of India's hands for some time but they forbore from disclosing them or from placing any restraint upon the Congress leaders in the hope that counsels of moderation and especially the opinions expressed in the United States of America might avert any extreme decision. Unfortunately this hope has gradually diminished and after much searching of heart the Government of India decided almost at the last moment on publication which they felt might help to check waverers in the Party by showing up its leaders in their true light.

2. In considering now how best to deal with the situation created by the Congress Party's threat of a mass movement to enforce their demand for a British withdrawal, the Government of India have been guided by the available indications of the extent to which the movement may interfere or be intended

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to interfere with the conduct of the war on Indian soil. The indications are unfortunately grave. More than one leader has threatened that the movement would be short and swift, and the declared intention of Congress is to throw into it all the non-violent strength accumulated in the past 20 years. Detailed information has been derived from a circular issued locally by the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee in Madras[4] indicating that the programme is designed to effect pressure on Government officers to resign, organisation of labour strikes, interference with railway transport (though without danger to life) and with telegraphs and telephones, and picketing of troops. The crippling effect on the war effort of such activities carried out on a widespread scale is manifest.

3. For these reasons the Government of India, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, have decided that the most vigorous steps must be taken to suppress the movement at the outset. It is noteworthy that this is the decision of the Governor-General in Council and that this Council is now comprised of eleven prominent non-official Indians and, counting the Viceroy himself and the Commander-in-Chief, only five Europeans one of whom is at present out of India.

4. It is the intention of the Government of India, as soon as the All-India Congress Committee pass or endorse a resolution containing the threat of mass civil disobedience, promptly to order the detention of the leaders, that is of Gandhi and the members of the Working Committee, under the Defence of India Rules, and it is possible that the more prominent of them will be deported from India. The Working Committee, the All-India Congress Committee and each Provincial Committee, but not the Indian National Congress Party as a whole, will be declared to be unlawful associations, their offices and funds seized, and all individuals arrested who are considered competent and likely to attempt to organise and launch a mass movement. The main object of this action will be to render the movement abortive by removing and detaining its leaders. All possible precautionary measures will be taken in consultation where necessary with the military authorities to deal with the danger of widespread demonstrations and disorders. If the hope of paralysing the movement at the outset by the above methods should not succeed it will be necessary to introduce stronger measures against the Congress Party as a whole. These intentions are of course strictly secret for the time being.

5. His Majesty's Government feel confident that you will share their view that no other choice is open to them than to restrain with whatever means may

[1] Paras. 2–4 of this telegram were repeated almost verbatim in Dominions Office telegram Z No. 96 of 7 August to the British High Commissioners in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, which requested that this statement should be communicated to the Dominion Prime Ministers for their most secret information. L/P&J/8/597: ff 42–3.

[2] No. 411. [3] No. 386. [4] No. 407.

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be necessary the activities of politicians who are bent on pursuing a course which His Majesty's Government sincerely believe would not only hamper and frustrate the war effort of the United Nations but would shatter indefinitely all hope of peace and orderly political advancement in India itself. *Ends.*

6. My immediately following telegram contains explanation for Mr. Hull suggested in your telegram No. 3984. It is recommended that, unless you see objection, you, rather than Agent-General, should make this communication, which is from the Secretary of State for India. In doing so you should also speak to Mr. Hull in the sense of this telegram.

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Mr Eden to Sir R. Campbell

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 50

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE, *7 August 1942, 6.30 pm*
SECRET

4729. Your telegram of the 4th August, 3984.[1] Secretary of State for India asks me to send you the following explanation of the Government of India's action which you may be able to use for the purpose of a communication to Cordell Hull, in addition to speaking to him on lines of my telegram No. 4728.[2] Please show this present telegram to Agent-General for India and my telegram No. 4728 also. Latter should of course be handled by yourself, and though I would have no objection to statement that follows being communicated by Agent-General if you see clear advantage in that course, I should regard it as more correct that it should be communicated by you seeing that it is message from His Majesty's Government and not from Government of India from whom Agent-General takes his instructions.

2. In April last the Congress Party suffered a certain loss of prestige as the result of public disappointment over the failure of the Cripps Mission and subsequent activities of the Party reflected their endeavour to recover lost ground and to close their ranks in which dissension was apparent. The Working Committee at the end of April passed three resolutions[3] criticising recent actions of Government and particularly of the military authorities in India and Burma. They were based on gross misrepresentations and unverified rumours and were calculated to undermine public confidence in the Government and the armed Forces. The Government of India in the circumstances would have been justified in banning the publication of all three but contented themselves with suppressing one resolution and a portion of another.[4] On 1st May the All-India

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Congress Committee passed the resolution[5] to which the recently published papers relate and which contained the demand for the withdrawal of British power from India.

3. In a subsequent police search of the Offices of the All-India Congress Committee at Allahabad which we [was?] carried out to enforce the banning of the Working Committee's resolutions above referred to certain documents were seized containing a summary of the discussions on the resolution of 1st May. This made it clear that the resolution was originally drafted by Gandhi himself and in terms which revealed his defeatist and Quisling tendencies. It further showed that the majority of the Working Committee were prepared to support Gandhi's draft and although it was replaced by Nehru's draft which was finally adopted the latter represented a difference only in tactical approach and not in substance.

4. The publication of the resolution of May 1st did not meet with a favourable reception outside India, and the Government of India did not choose to take any action against the authors in the hope that dissensions within and criticism from outside the Party might influence its counsels in the direction of moderation. They persisted in this attitude even when the seized documents revealed the inner workings of the mind of Gandhi and the Congress leaders and when later it became apparent from Gandhi's utterances that he was meditating a mass movement against Governmental authority. They even refrained from action against Congress when the Working Committee passed its resolution of 14th July formally threatening mass civil disobedience if the Congress demands were not met; since it was apparent that the ratification of the All-India Congress Committee would be awaited before the threat was put into effect, and there was still hope that the volume of adverse criticism in India as well as overseas would modify Congress policy. All this time the Government of India carefully refrained from disclosing the information in their possession though well aware of the damaging effect it would have on popular estimation of the Congress leaders. Finally however after much anxious thought they felt that publication of the information before the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee on August 7th might well have a decisive effect in preventing extreme decisions by its revelation of the true mind of the leaders which they hoped would restrain the wavering members of the Committee. The documents were therefore released for publication on 5th August and the press guidance sent by the Government of India to Bajpai adequately brings out their implications.

[1] No. 411. [2] No. 454. [3] See No. 4. [4] See No. 5.
[5] Enclosure to No. 43, col. 3.

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Mr Eden to Sir H. Seymour

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 51

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE, *7 August 1942, 10.15 pm*
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

1056. For your own information you should know that Government of India, with approval of His Majesty's Government, have decided, as soon as All-India Congress Committee pass or endorse a resolution containing the threat of mass civil disobedience, promptly to order detention of the leaders, that is of Gandhi and the members of the Working Committee, under the Defence of India Rules. The Working Committee, the All-India Congress Committee and each Provincial Committee, but not the Indian National Congress Party as a whole, will be declared to be unlawful associations, their offices and funds seized and all individuals arrested who are considered competent and likely to attempt to organise and launch a mass movement. The main object of this action will be to render the movement abortive by removing and detaining its leaders. All possible precautionary measures will be taken in consultation where necessary with the military authorities to deal with the danger of widespread demonstrations and disorders. If the hope of paralysing the movement at the outset by the above methods should not succeed it will be necessary to introduce stronger measures against the Congress Party as a whole.

2. These intentions are of course strictly secret for the time being; and you should not (repeat not) disclose them to General Chiang Kai-shek until after Gandhi and the other Congress leaders have been detained.

3. As soon as you hear that this has been done, you should ask to see General Chiang Kai-shek and explain to him that the action of the Government of India had the full support of the members of the Viceroy's Executive Council which consists of 11 Indians and 4 Europeans (including Viceroy); that the resolution of the Congress Working Committee was only the beginning of a far-reaching scheme designed wholly to undermine India's co-operation in the war effort (documentary evidence in support of this will be made public); and that our action was taken in the interests of the United Nations as a whole, not merely for the protection of British interests in India.

4. See also Intel. No. 141 and my telegram No. 1055.[1]

[1] Neither printed.

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457

Mr Amery to Sir Kingsley Wood

L/PO/11/3: f 268

INDIA OFFICE, *7 August 1942*

My dear Kingsley,

I think you were quite right to postpone[1] an actual formal decision of the Cabinet until you have had an opportunity of talking to Winston. But I think you will have realised what the general attitude of the Cabinet is, and that there is really no possibility of tearing up the present agreement.

About that agreement itself, I think we must remember that in our Empire we have never asked for more help than in the particular circumstances of each part it was prepared to give. We take nothing from the colonies to-day, directly subject to us though they are, beyond such voluntary gifts as they may make. India in this war is doing far more than she did in the last and her position is really parallel to that of South Africa in the last war. We thought it wonderful that Botha and Smuts did in the last war what they did do. In fact, while they supplied a good many troops in East Africa and in France, we paid for them, and all that South Africa ever paid for was the six weeks campaign in South-West Africa, which the Union duly annexed. We also paid cash for everything that we bought from the Union. It is difficult to expect India to do more in principle than South Africa did then.

As a matter of fact, the situation is still extremely hypothetical. If the Japanese should really seriously invade India, or if the war came to India from the North-West through Persia, the burden of India's defence would be increased enormously, possibly beyond anything that India could conceivably pay for. Even to-day the agreement has worked out much more unfavourably to India than was ever contemplated at the beginning of the war, when the most we ever thought of as falling upon India itself was the possibility of Afghan trouble.

Apart from that, it also seems to me that the panic about accumulated sterling balances is equally in the realm of hypothesis. Raisman has suggested various ways of dealing with these balances after the war and no doubt they will for some time continue to be controlled. But surely in any case it is a mistaken assumption to think that because we may have to send goods to India in payment of sterling already in India's possession, therefore we shall not get imports from India which we need. The Indian merchant in jute or hides isn't going to stop selling to us until the sterling balances are exhausted. He will sell because it pays and therefore it is only a balance that we may have to provide without securing immediate return in much needed goods. When we have had large

[1] See No. 435, Minute 2.

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credits in foreign countries we have never assumed that our invisible exports were to the detriment of our other export trade. Nor is there any reason to suppose that India will want to off-load her accumulated sterling at once instead of using it up by degrees or even putting it into long-term securities and living off the interest.

There is indeed a good deal to be said from the point of view of the immediate post-war situation in having a lot of sterling in other peoples' hands, which they can then use for the immediate purchase of those capital goods which our industries will be most easily able to supply because they are most akin to the goods being made for war purposes. Dorman-Smith will be putting up his case for a substantial loan to help the reconstruction of Burma. Even larger sums will be required to start off the reconstruction of the Colonial Empire. All of this means the putting of sterling at the disposal of the countries concerned. In fact, the more I think of it, the more it seems to me that the Indian accumulated sterling balance, whatever it is, is more likely to prove a blessing than a danger.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/3/3d: f 5

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *8 August 1942, 5.30 am*
Received: 9 August

960. Your private and personal telegram 2301-S[1] dated 6th August. I am sorry that the statement of the B.B.C. on the 5th August should have caused any embarrassment to your Council at this difficult time. I recognise that phrase "authoritative quarters" in opening words may have struck unfortunate note but they were of course introduced only to safeguard B.B.C. from any accusation of speaking without due authority: I am afraid they do not always see difference of significance of "British Government" from that of "Government". But I am sure you and they will appreciate statement was intended to be helpful. We are receiving the utmost co-operation from the B.B.C. at this juncture and they themselves today have indicated spontaneously that they intend, between now and the time that the A.-I.C.C. reaches a decision, to take a purely objective line. A note of guidance is being circulated to all departments of the B.B.C. emphasising the necessity for caution in the direction indicated by you.

[1] No. 427.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 52

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *8 August 1942, 1.15 am*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

962. Your 2306-S.[1] Cabinet consider that it should be made clear that there can be no question of considering such changes in composition of your Council at this juncture. As a means of putting this across I suggest that answer to these suggestions is quite simply that Cripps offer was made in order to secure a specific purpose namely the agreement of all principal parties to come together and help wholeheartedly in the war effort. For such a result it might have been necessary and justifiable in the public interest to take risk involved by sacrifice of existing members, European and Indian, and so secure a broad based and homogeneous political executive. You might I think point out that present Executive has been based on expansion and continuity, retaining the essential feature of selection for efficiency, and not on displacement in order to secure a different type of executive. I think you might very well suggest how glad you are personally to have obtained an executive based on personal quality and not on politics. On the basis hitherto followed no one, European or Indian, has been turned out to give way to newcomers, and there is no reason why two of your most experienced advisers should be turned out now because of the colour of their skins.

Anyhow a recasting of your Executive now would not appease Congress or really carry great weight with Jinnah or even Sapru and Co.

2. The above line of argument no doubt may imply that when Raisman and Maxwell come to the end of their time their successors should be Indians. I should not personally rule that out, but everything will depend on circumstances and you will no doubt give no pledge on that.

As to Aiyyar's suggestion I don't for the reason at the end of para. 1 see how a public declaration of this sort would really help. You can point out to him what we have in fact done in the Executive and are doing in other fields e.g. overseas representation and that the proof of the pudding is not in the promise but in the eating.

[1] This should read 2308-S, i.e. No. 438.

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Governor of Aden to Viscount Cranborne

Telegram, L/P&J/8/599: f 77

IMMEDIATE *8 August 1942*
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL *Received: 8 August, 12.9 pm*

Your most secret and personal telegram of 7th August.[1]

In view of acute shortage of suitable accommodation in Aden, I should be grateful for some indication of the total number of the party and racial composition.[2]

[1] No. 446.

[2] On this telegram Sir D. Monteath minuted on 8 August to Mr Gibson: 'I suppose Hall [Sir J. Hathorn Hall, Governor of Aden] has been put out of his suspense by now? We told Thornley.'

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *8 August 1942, 2.35 pm*
Received: 8 August, 1.45 pm

No. 2323-S. We now await outcome of the adjourned meeting of Congress which is to be resumed this afternoon, but I see nothing in anything that took place yesterday to suggest any probability of their climbing down. You will have had text of my revised draft resolution[1] which I am glad to say my colleagues have accepted, and Puckle will let Joyce know arrangements for release when time comes. If any amendment should be necessitated by any fresh development I will of course telegraph at once. Gandhi has apparently intimated in Bombay that he proposes to send me a letter. This I would anticipate would be on lines of forwarding the resolution and expressing his readiness to discuss and the like. I do not propose to delay arrest[2] until I receive any such letter and feel that it would be a profound mistake to allow the Working Committee to disperse over India while I did so. I shall have to carry my Council along with me, but will aim at getting them to regard the substantive resolution as one on the basis of which we cannot parley and on which, once it has been formally passed and leadership entrusted to Gandhi, immediate action must be taken.

2. Herbert is not very certain of the attitude of Huq who under Shyama Prasad Mookerji's influence shows signs of wobbling with the result that Bengal

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Government may be reluctant to take necessary action. I have told him that we must be prepared to face consequences in that event, adding that desirability of avoiding a break with his Ministry over this business (so long, that is, as they take whatever action we regard as necessary) will be present to him and propaganda advantage which could be taken of it.

3. No trouble is apparently anticipated with Ministers in the Punjab, Orissa or Sind.

[1] No. 447. [2] 'arrest' deciphered as 'the party'.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill (via Air Ministry and Commander-in-Chief, Middle East)

Telegram, L/PO/6/102a: ff 65–6

IMPORTANT *8 August 1942, 5.45 pm*
MOST SECRET
TULIP 65. Following for Prime Minister from Secretary of State for India.

INDIAN SITUATION

1. On morning of 5th August in order to anticipate meeting of All-India Congress Committee Government of India released text of Gandhi's original draft resolution[1] and of discussion in Working Committee thereon[2] at end of April last. This had valuable effect in Press here and in U.S.A. by revealing defeatist tendencies of Congress leaders, but it is doubtful if it has had much effect in discrediting them in India.

2. Congress Working Committee met in Bombay on 5th and have drafted revised resolution for presentation to All-India Congress Committee. This modifies presentation of their case in resolution of 14th July and particularly seeks to present Congress as determined if freedom is granted to aid United Nations. But it maintains essential demand for withdrawal of British power prior to formation of provisional Government under threat of civil disobedience.

3. All-India Congress Committee are now in session and are generally expected to ratify revised resolution probably to-day. It is rumoured that Gandhi will then address formal letter to Viceroy asking for statement of Government's attitude.

4. War Cabinet considered position on Thursday evening[3] and approved

[1] Enclosure to No. 43, col. 1. [2] Enclosure to No. 113. [3] See No. 435, Minute 1.

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generally Government of India's proposed plan of action against Congress which comprises:—

(i) Arrest of Congress leaders including Gandhi immediately on ratification of resolution
(ii) Provincial and All-India Committees to be declared unlawful; offices and funds seized and all potential organisers arrested;
(iii) If these measures fail to stultify civil disobedience Congress as a whole will be declared unlawful association and emergency powers ordinance promulgated, giving fullest powers for dealing with all forms of Congress activity.

5. Government of India had proposed to confine leaders in India, Linlithgow having abandoned deportation[4] idea after consulting Governors, more important of whom were opposed to it and also high police adviser.[5] Cabinet strongly favoured deportation of Gandhi and other principal leaders and urged this[6] on Linlithgow but he replied[7] that he had put it to his Council who were unanimously against. Cabinet considered this again last night[8] and agreed in view of importance of carrying Council with us not to insist on deportation but have informed Linlithgow[9] that they attach highest importance to prompt and decisive action and display of firmness and determination by Government of India and that in last resort support of Indian Members of Council must be forgone in order to obtain this. They have also informed him that if Gandhi starts hunger-strike there should be no question of release and that Linlithgow and his Council can be assured of unwavering support of H.M.G. on both these matters.

[4] See No. 387. [5] Namely Mr Pilditch, Director of the Intelligence Bureau; see No. 356.
[6] No. 440. [7] No. 441. [8] See No. 451. [9] No. 452.

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Viscount Cranborne to Governor of Aden

Telegram, L/P&J/8/599: f 75

IMMEDIATE COLONIAL OFFICE, *8 August 1942, 7.30 pm*
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

My most secret and personal telegram of the 7th August[1] and your reply.[2] Proposal to deport Gandhi is again in abeyance. If it should be revived I will inform you at once and give you estimate of party.

[1] No. 446. [2] No. 460.

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Viscount Cranborne to Officer Administering the Government of Nyasaland

Telegram, L/P&J/8/599: f 76

IMMEDIATE COLONIAL OFFICE, *8 August 1942, 7.40 pm*

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

My most secret and personal telegram of the 7th August.[1]

Proposal to deport Congress leaders is again in abeyance for time being. If it is revived I will at once inform you and it would be likely to be short notice. It is desired therefore that arrangements for reception should be carried as far as practicable.

[1] No. 445.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 33

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *8 August 1942, 8.30 pm*

PERSONAL *Received: 8 August, 9.30 pm*

2327-S. Your personal telegram 13856[1] of Aug 7th. I have discussed with D.I.B. and Home Dept proposal to publish the Andhra circular[2] etc. They very strongly urge that, while it is of course essential to bring out in any Govt. of India resolution that we possess material of a damaging character showing Congress intentions, we should not publish detailed instructions, as publication in this country must spread all sorts of ideas as to possible action against ourselves which may not have occurred to individuals, but will, in addition, give wide currency not only to the forms of activity themselves but also to the organisation required to put them into force.

2. I think myself that there is great force in this. What I propose therefore is—(A) that we should *not* publish this material in detail in this country but should confine ourselves to general statements on the lines of revised para No 1 of my Council's resolution:[3] (B) that we should, however, publish them in full (or with suitable extracts if you think that preferable) in England and the U.S.A. That will secure the effect we desire on audience to which it is most important to bring home the actively dangerous character of Congress preparations, without running the risk of any embarrassment to law and order authorities in this country.

Do you agree?

[1] No. 442. [2] See No. 407. [3] No. 447.

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Government of India, Home Department, to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 29

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *8 August 1942, 10.20 pm*
EN CLAIR *Received: 8 August, 9 pm*

All-India Congress Committee has ratified[1] Resolution and action is being taken as in paragraphs 3 and 4 of our telegram No. 6092[2] August 3rd.

[1] See No. 470. [2] No. 393.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *8 August 1942, 10.45 pm*
Received: 8 August, 9.15 pm

No. 2331-S. After anxious discussion have secured unanimous support of my Council to immediate action. Chief, Raisman and Maxwell absent and Benthall only other European present. They have expressed themselves most strongly against any move towards Congress by His Majesty's Government and I will telegraph separately about this.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *8 August 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2332-S. On further consideration I suggest you avoid reference to fact that decision has been taken by a Council entirely Indian save for Benthall. This has been a very hard decision for my colleagues, and I think it would not be fair to them to emphasise either its Indian character or even its unanimity. Better keep quiet and let facts speak for themselves.

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Mr Churchill to Mr Amery (via Commander-in-Chief, Middle East and Air Ministry)

Telegram, L/PO/6/102a: f 64

MOST IMMEDIATE *8 August 1942*
MOST SECRET *Received: 9 August, 2.23 am*

REFLEX 46. Following most secret and personal from Prime Minister to Secretary of State for India.

I cordially endorse War Cabinet policy set forth in your TULIP 65.[1] Press on.

[1] No. 462.

470

The "Quit India" Resolution

Cmd. 6430

TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ALL-INDIA CONGRESS COMMITTEE ON 8 AUGUST 1942

The All-India Congress Committee has given the most careful consideration to the reference made to it by the Working Committee in their resolution dated July 14, 1942,[1] and to subsequent events, including the development of the war situation, the utterances of responsible spokesmen of the British Government, and the comments and criticisms made in India and abroad. The Committee approves of and endorses that resolution, and is of opinion that events subsequent to it have given it further justification, and have made it clear that the immediate ending of British rule in India is an urgent necessity, both for the sake of India and for the success of the cause of the United Nations. The continuation of that rule is degrading and enfeebling India and making her progressively less capable of defending herself and of contributing to the cause of world freedom.

The Committee has viewed with dismay the deterioration of the situation on the Russian and Chinese [fronts and conveys to the Russian and Chinese][2] peoples its high appreciation of their heroism in defence of their freedom. This increasing peril makes it incumbent on all those who strive for freedom and who sympathise with the victims of aggression, to examine the foundations of the policy so far pursued by the Allied Nations, which have led to repeated

[1] No. 265.

[2] The words in square brackets are from the text in the Government of India's secret print: *Quarterly Survey of the Political and Constitutional Position in British India*, No. 21. L/P&J/7/1816: f 69v.

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and disastrous failure. It is not by adhering to such aims and policies and methods that failure can be converted into success, for past experience has shown that failure is inherent in them. These policies have been based not on freedom so much as on the domination of subject and Colonial countries, and the continuation of the Imperialist tradition and method. The possession of Empire, instead of adding to the strength of the ruling power, has become a burden and a curse. India, the classic land of modern Imperialism, has become the crux of the question, for by the freedom of India will Britain and the United Nations be judged, and the peoples of Asia and Africa be filled with hope and enthusiasm.

The ending of British rule in this country is thus a vital and immediate issue on which depend the future of the war and the success of freedom and democracy. A free India will assure this success by throwing all her great resources in the struggle for freedom and against the aggression of Nazism, Fascism and Imperialism. This will not only affect materially the fortunes of the war, but will bring all subject and oppressed humanity on the side of the United Nations, and give these nations, whose ally India would be the moral and spiritual leadership of the world. India in bondage will continue to be the symbol of British Imperialism and the taint of that imperialism will affect the fortunes of all the United Nations.

The peril of to-day, therefore, necessitates the independence of India and the ending of British domination. No future promises or guarantees can affect the present situation or meet that peril. They cannot produce the needed psychological effect on the mind of the masses. Only the glow of freedom now can release that energy and enthusiasm of millions of people which will immediately transform the nature of the war.

The A.-I.C.C., therefore, repeats with all emphasis the demand for the withdrawal of the British power from India. On the declaration of India's independence, a provisional Government will be formed and free India will become an ally of the United Nations, sharing with them in the trials and tribulations of the joint enterprise of the struggle for freedom. The provisional Government can only be formed by the co-operation of the principal parties and groups in the country. It will thus be a composite Government, representative of all important sections of the people of India. Its primary functions must be to defend India and resist aggression with all the armed as well as the non-violent forces at its command, together with its Allied Powers, and to promote the well-being and progress of the workers in the fields and factories and elsewhere to whom essentially all power and authority must belong. The provisional Government will evolve a scheme for a constituent assembly which will prepare a constitution for the Government of India acceptable to all sections of the people. This constitution, according to the Congress view, should be a federal one.[3] With the largest measure of autonomy for the federating units, and with the residuary powers vesting in these units. The future relations between India and the Allied Nations

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will be adjusted by representatives of all these free countries conferring together for their mutual advantage and for their co-operation in the common task of resisting aggression. Freedom will enable India to resist aggression effectively with the people's united will and strength behind it.

The freedom of India must be the symbol of and prelude to this freedom of all other Asiatic nations under foreign domination. Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, the Dutch Indies, Iran and Iraq must also attain their complete freedom. It must be clearly understood that such of these countries as are under Japanese control now must not subsequently be placed under the rule or control of any other Colonial Power.

While the A.-I.C.C. must primarily be concerned with the independence and defence of India in this hour of danger, the Committee is of opinion that the future peace, security and ordered progress of the world demand a world federation of free nations, and on no other basis can the problems of the modern world be solved. Such a world federation would ensure the freedom of its constituent nations, the prevention of aggression and exploitation by one nation over another, the protection of national minorities, the advancement of all backward areas and peoples, and the pooling of the world's resources for the common good of all. On the establishment of such a world federation, disarmament would be practicable in all countries, national armies, navies and air forces would no longer be necessary, and a world federal defence force would keep the world peace and prevent aggression.

An independent India would gladly join such a world federation and co-operate on an equal basis with other countries in the solution of international problems.

Such a federation should be open to all nations who agree with its fundamental principles. In view of the war, however, the federation must inevitably, to begin with, be confined to the United Nations, such a step taken now will have a most powerful effect on the war, on the peoples of the Axis countries, and on the peace to come.

The Committee regretfully realizes, however, that despite the tragic and overwhelming lessons of the war and the perils that overhang the world, the Governments of few countries are yet prepared to take this inevitable step towards world federation. The reactions of the British Government and the misguided criticism of the foreign Press also make it clear that even the obvious demand for India's independence is resisted, though this has been made essentially to meet the present peril and to enable India to defend herself and help China and Russia in their hour of need. The Committee is anxious not to embarrass in any way the defence of China or Russia, whose freedom is precious and must be preserved, or to jeopardise the defensive capacity of the United Nations. But the peril grows both to India and these nations, and inaction and submission

[3] The *Quarterly Survey* has a comma here and continues the same sentence.

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to a foreign administration at this stage is not only degrading India and reducing her capacity to defend herself and resist aggression but is no answer to that growing peril and is no service to the peoples of the United Nations. The earnest appeal of the Working Committee to Great Britain and the United Nations has so far met with no response and the criticisms made in many foreign quarters have shown an ignorance of India's and the world's need, and sometimes even hostility to India's freedom, which is significant of a mentality of domination and racial superiority which cannot be tolerated by a proud people conscious of their strength and of the justice of their cause.

The A.-I.C.C. would yet again, at this last moment, in the interest of world freedom, renew this appeal to Britain and the United Nations. But the Committee feels that it is no longer justified in holding the nation back from endeavouring to assert its will against an imperialist and authoritarian Government which dominates over it and prevents it from functioning in its own interest and in the interest of humanity. The Committee resolves, therefore, to sanction, for the vindication of India's inalienable right to freedom and independence, the starting of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale, so that the country might utilize all the non-violent strength it has gathered during the last 22 years[4] of peaceful struggle. Such a struggle must inevitably be under the leadership of Gandhiji and the Committee requests him to take the lead and guide the nation in the steps to be taken.

The Committee appeals to the people of India to face the dangers and hardships that will fall to their lot with courage and endurance, and to hold together under the leadership of Gandhiji and carry out his instructions as disciplined soldiers of Indian freedom. They must remember that non-violence is the basis of this movement. A time may come when it may not be possible to issue instructions or for instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress Committees can function. When this happens every man and woman who is participating in this movement must function for himself or herself within the four corners of the general instructions issued. Every Indian who desires freedom and strives for it must be his own guide urging him on along the hard road where there is no resting place and which leads ultimately to the independence of India.

Lastly, whilst the A.-I.C.C. has stated its own view of the future governance under free India, the A.-I.C.C. wishes to make it quite clear to all concerned that by embarking on a mass struggle, it has no intention of gaining power for the Congress. The power, when it comes, will belong to the whole people of India.

[4] See No. 265, note 1.

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Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/77

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE GOVERNOR'S REPORT NO. 15, DATED THE 8TH AUGUST 1942

Congress workers in this Province have been very reticent as to their intentions, and nobody seems to like to give an opinion on the subject. The answer to any questions I ask is generally that Abdul Ghaffar Khan is waiting for final orders before he divulges his plans. Abdul Ghaffar himself has been making such a parade of secrecy that I think the explanation may be that he is still not quite certain what methods to adopt when Gandhi gives him the word. I would say that on the whole opinion has strengthened against Congress during this last fortnight. The Khaksars, the Ahrars, and the Muslim League have all proclaimed their neutrality in the coming struggle. The Mohmands and Afridis have issued manifestos—both of them more or less spontaneous—objecting to any visit to their country by Congress agents. Several Maulvis, who have been working for us for a long time now, have come out with strong anti-Congress speeches in mosques, mostly on the theme of the anti-Islamic marriage of Dr. Khan Sahib's daughter. Government officials, according to all my reports, are staunch.

2. The Red Shirt camp started by Abdul Ghaffar Khan about a fortnight ago has attracted few people apart from his regular rather meagre following. Meetings held during the last two or three weeks have been poorly attended. But this period of quiescence does not necessarily mean that as soon as the lead is given by Gandhi there will not be immediate activity. I think there is no doubt of this and the only question is what form it will take. The anticipation is still that, in this Province, it will be mainly picketing of law courts, appeals to Government Servants to give up their Government duties and a campaign for the non-payment of land revenue.

3. On August 5th, a small party of Red Shirts, at Abdul Ghaffar Khan's instructions, entered the Malakand Agency. I see that a speaker at a Congress meeting has said that I gave them permission to do so. This was not so. Abdul Ghaffar Khan wrote to me about three weeks ago, asking whether he might send his workers to tribal territory in order to preach friendship between tribesmen and inhabitants of the Settled Districts, and to induce the tribes not to commit offences in British territory. He was obviously trying to put me in a dilemma. So I sent no answer. On the evening of 3rd August he sent me a polite

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reminder, which I felt I had to answer. I replied that the only answer I could give to his first letter was that every one was allowed to do what was lawful, but not what was unlawful. The Red Shirt party to the Malakand was not a success. The local Maliks staunchly opposed them, and they had to come back without achieving anything. I have been expecting to hear of violent protests against Government's attitude in this matter, but they have not yet started. The impression here is that this visit to tribal territory was intended largely to test out the feeling of the people at large. If so the results so far are very satisfactory. Badshah Gul, the anti-Government leader in Mohmand country (who is, however, more or less our man for the time being) has protested strongly against Abdul Ghaffar Khan's suggestion that tribesmen could ever commit offences in British territory! The Pathan certainly has a sense of humour.

[Para. 4, on the people of Kurram Valley, and para. 5, on the good effect on the tribes of a military column sent to Datta Khel, omitted.]

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: f 158

IMMEDIATE[1] *8[2] August 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 10 August*

968. Please, if you think suitable, express to your colleagues my appreciation of their courageous[3] and wise decision to grasp the nettle firmly. You have done splendidly yourself in carrying your team with you.

[1] Priority mark taken from MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.
[2] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 gives the date as 9 August.
[3] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'courage'.

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Sir S. Radhakrishnan to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

BENARES, *8 August 1942*

My dear Lord Linlithgow,
My only excuse for troubling you at the present moment is the extreme gravity of the situation so far as the Indo-British relations are concerned. I am writing when I have not before me the decisions of the All-India Congress

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Committee. I assume that the resolution put before them by the Working Committee will be accepted with slight amendments here and there, if any. It is born of sheer despair and indignation at the way in which India is being treated.

On account of high prices and scarcity of foodstuffs there is an increasing and widely felt poverty in the land. Apart from a very small percentage of people who are able to live in comfort in spite of all these hard conditions, the very large majority are suffering from acute difficulties and hunger is a great revolutionary force.

If the movement is actually launched it will spread like wild-fire in spite of the attempts of the Government and will give rise to riots, lootings and bloodshed, &c. If in the meantime anything happens to endanger the life of Gandhi the movement will acquire greater momentum. It is even possible that such a movement might be utilised by the enemy in the East to cross over. The steady deterioration of the situation on the Russian Front is fraught with extreme danger to the North-West of India. That is the position in which we are.

On the other hand, the British Government is pledged to the grant of complete self-government to India after the war. Their objection to do anything now, is that it would dislocate considerably the existing order, and hamper the War Effort. It is said that it is unwise to change horses in midstream. The British Government recognise today that their policy in Malaya and Burma, in Egypt and Ireland has failed. And unless there is an organic relationship between the State and the people, no war can be fought wholeheartedly. The example of South Africa points the moral. And if India has to throw in her lot completely and devotedly with the Allied Cause, the thrill of freedom must be felt and the people must feel that they are fighting for their independence against aggressors. The Congress is now pledged to resistance against the aggressors and on behalf of the Allies, if India is made a self-governing country.

I do not know whether the fears that there would be a disturbance in the present order are justified. It is not necessary to upset the Civil Administration in any manner. If the present Viceroy's Council is displaced by a coalition cabinet consisting of the representatives of the Congress and the Muslim League, the present administration can be carried on with such a Government. It will enthusiastically support the War Effort, as the resolution of the Congress proclaims it. The Commander-in-Chief will be in sole command of the military movements and this provisional Government will assist him so far as the War Effort is concerned. Only the assurance will have to be given that in the day-to-day administration of the country, except in regard to military matters where the Commander-in-Chief will be supreme and Native States where the Viceroy's advice will be sought, there will be no interference or veto by either the Viceroy or the Secretary of State. A settlement on these lines will lead to the setting up of national governments in the country both in the centre

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and in the Provinces. It will be for the duration of the war and when the hostilities terminate, steps may be taken for the drafting of a future constitution for India.

It is unwise to exaggerate the difficulties of communal cleavages. The facts are that coalition governments are operating in three Provinces and the North-West Frontier which is essentially a Muslim province was under Congress control. It will be a terrible disclosure of the artificiality of these cleavages, when we find that a large number of Muslims are willing to participate in the struggle when it starts. The launching of the movement and danger to the life of Gandhi will accentuate the antagonism of the Indian people to the British Government and will certainly worsen the present situation. What has happened recently about the seizure of some pamphlets in the A.-I.C.C. office, to say the least, has not added to the prestige of the British Government. I am terribly anxious that the present deadlock should be overcome and the situation eased. And I feel that the setting up of a provisional Government in place of the present Viceroy's Council, with the leaders of the two principal political parties, who must be of all communities, subject to the two limitations of the Military affairs and Native States where the Commander-in-Chief and the Viceroy will exercise control will bring about a settlement. I know that you must be thinking a great deal about the painful crisis by which our countries are faced. You may be greatly upset that India must be kicking up such a row at a time when the Allied Nations are fighting with their backs to the wall, against formidable and ruthless enemies. But Gandhi is feeling that after three years of war, no serious attempt is made to transfer power to the representatives of the people. The situation is acute and it is not for us to discuss the rights and wrongs, but work for a resolution of the problem. With that idea I am writing to you this note.

With the kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

Out dated!

L.,—10.8.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *8 August 1942*

We have had two Cabinets[1] on India in the last two days. Winston has been away—by the time you get this you will know that he has been in the Middle

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East and in Moscow—but that has not prevented the rest of the Cabinet being perfectly sound on the main issue of dealing with Congress. On Thursday there was, as you learnt from my telegram,[2] a very strong feeling in favour of deportation of all the leaders including Gandhi, both as a demonstration of our control and on the principle of "out of sight, out of mind". Above all, there was a unanimous feeling against "cat and mouse" in the case of Gandhi, and in favour of letting him hunger-strike, if he wants to, on the clear intimation that he would be allowed to see it through. I shared the Cabinet view on both points, but was equally clear at the further Cabinet on Friday that it would not do to force a break with your Executive on the relatively secondary issue of deportation. In the end, at yesterday's meeting, they came to the conclusion that the one thing essential was promptitude of action and that to ensure this you might even have to take the responsibility on your own shoulders, though they felt confidently that you would carry your Executive with you by the exercise of your personality in Council, however wobbly individuals might be behind the scenes. They also felt that it would help to have a clear intimation of the unwavering support which you would get from the Government at home, both on the main issue and on a hunger-strike. Yesterday Cripps, apparently influenced by a leader in the *News Chronicle*, suddenly suggested[3] that you should issue a last moment declaration welcoming the idea of a meeting between Congress and the other parties, as suggested by Sapru, and offering to give serious consideration "to any conclusions that emerged from such a meeting". As a matter of fact, he only put it up rather half-heartedly and I had no difficulty in securing unanimous support of my view that coming at this moment such a declaration would only have weakened the hands of all loyal elements and done nothing to appease Congress. As a matter of fact, the Cabinet are all perfectly sound, none sounder than Bevin who hitherto, next to Cripps, has been most inclined to favour Congress. My difficulty indeed has been rather with those who, like Grigg, and to some extent Anderson, underrate the gravity of anything in the nature of a break with your colleagues. On this sort of issue I hope I have managed to give you all the help you need.

2. The great thing now is that your Executive should really feel, as they say in the admirable statement[4] now agreed on, which I have just read, that they are a stronger and more representative Government than any that India has had hitherto, if they really believe that and act accordingly, all India would be quick enough to realise the fact, and your Executive may in a very short while really command the respect and loyalty of the public at large and the whole challenge of Congress may be not only defeated but made to look ridiculous.

3. The really interesting thing, as it may prove in historical retrospect, is the extent to which in fact the Government of India has been expanded and

[1] See Nos. 435 and 451. [2] No. 440. [3] See No. 451. [4] No. 447.

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modified within the last two years. If these Congress folk had any real intention of sharing responsibility they would have known quite well the extent to which the unwritten convention of your working with your Executive on all ordinary issues has grown and is inevitably growing. The present crisis may very well help to put that across to the public, not only in India but in the world outside.

4. I trust those of your colleagues who have been talking of pushing out Raisman and Maxwell[5] in order to conciliate moderate opinion by complete Indianisation will have been persuaded by you to realise that this is not consistent with the whole conception of expansion with continuity and on the basis of efficiency and ability and not of party representation. I know Cripps has landed you in a good many difficulties over all this, but I think you can stick to the point that this was an extreme offer made to secure a very big prize, namely the consent of all the main parties to work together in support of the war—a prize which was not secured. If it had been there was no doubt a case for a homogeneously political Executive, but there is no particular case for a homogeneously Indian Executive on the present basis. When Raisman and Maxwell come to an end the question of their successors will no doubt be an open one, but I should hesitate in giving any absolute pledge now as to their necessarily being Indians. I doubt myself whether, unless the general situation is improved greatly, or Jinnah comes more into line, you could find men to fill the gaps who would really commend themselves to Indian opinion generally.

5. Meanwhile, I am at this moment waiting for the news from your end. I imagine the Congress resolution will be passed within a very few hours and I hope your Council will have agreed to action being taken immediately after the meeting, if not the same evening at any rate during the night. We shall see.

10 August 1942

6. My sincerest congratulations to you on the way in which you have handled your Executive, and indeed to them also for the courage which they have shown in a difficult situation. I quite realise your anxiety not to bend the bow too far and in this connection I may have some difficulty with the Cabinet this evening when I bring before them the various telegrams[6] from Governors deprecating letting Gandhi starve to death while under detention. In spite of the strength of their opinions I confess I am not wholly convinced. If he is let out and gets well he has a certain success: if, on the other hand, he dies at his *ashram*, surrounded by friends and with daily bulletins issuing and crowds coming to wait on his last moments, the effect may be fully as bad as if he had died in confinement. Possibly the only solution may be to let him out to Sevagram, but definitely to put a cordon round the place, allowing no one to come near, and of course also preventing all publicity. He may of course

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take that as a provocation to further fast, but that cannot be helped. However, I won't prosecute these hypothetical considerations further for the moment.

7. You may imagine that I have been busy during these last few days both with Cabinet meetings, and with three broadcasts[7] last night. Naturally I hadn't time to communicate with you about them, but I hope they have been useful elsewhere and have not done harm in India. Certainly, the first Press reactions in America have been good and so, I understand, have been those of the White House and State Department whom we apprised of our intentions beforehand. The Press here have been excellent as a whole, except for the *Herald*, *News Chronicle*, *Manchester Guardian*, and, under its new Editor,[8] *The Observer*, which had a fulsome article about Gandhi yesterday.

8. So far the news that has reached us here has only been of clashes in Bombay, Poona and Ahmedabad, with some firing by troops as well as police and apparently ten killed or died of wounds. I have expressed the hope generally that we should get through in the main with police action and with only occasional bringing in of security troops and that the movement would not extend to the point at which it would affect our general military dispositions. I only trust I have not been too optimistic. What I am certain of is that if the thing had been allowed to gather momentum our whole military dispositions might easily have been disorganised.

9. The more I think of the whole business, the more clear it is to me that what we are confronted with and have been confronted with all along is a direct conflict between two different conceptions of the Indian problem. The one is the constructive democratic conception that India can only live in freedom under a constitution arrived at by agreement and acceptable to the various elements which make up India: the other that a single highly-organised and highly-centralised party is entitled, in the name of Indian nationalism, to take over the whole country. One or other of these conceptions has got to win. From its point of view Congress naturally regarded both the August declaration and the Cripps offer as a direct challenge and has proceeded to answer it by the strategy which it thinks most effective, namely that of a mass movement generating emotional excitement and disturbance in the course of which Indian sentiment rallies behind Congress, and the Congress leaders can pose as the champions of India against British oppression. The interesting question now is whether that strategy applied in the present case is going to succeed, regardless of whether the immediate trouble is suppressed or not, by making the Congress leaders national heroes when they emerge at the end of

[5] See No. 438.

[6] Nos. 479, 480, 481, 486, and 487 would probably have been received by the time Mr Amery wrote.

[7] For the B.B.C. Empire Programme, the Columbia Broadcasting System, and the B.B.C. Home Service. For the texts see L/PO/6/102a: ff 16–24.

[8] Mr Ivor Brown.

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the war. The alternative possibility is that their failure may so discredit them this time that the various moderate elements which are more and more realising the need for compromise and Indian agreement may get the upper hand, and the Congress leaders emerge from confinement with lowered status in Indian eyes. That is what we must hope for, but we can only hope. Meanwhile, the military situation has left us no choice any way.

10. Talking of this raises the question of how long it will be necessary to confine the leaders. Given their whole temper I do not see very well how they can be released while the war is on. That raises in my mind another question, whether, if they are to be kept strictly isolated and not allowed to send out letters, &c., that might not afford an opportunity for the revival of Provincial Government. For if they cannot write, or only write purely private letters, they cannot be in a position to resign their seats in order to provide for by-elections. Consequently it may be possible to form majorities without them in certain Provinces. The point is at any rate worth considering.

11. In this connection I hope they will be kept really isolated, i.e. not only [not?] allowed to communicate with the outside world or their doings discussed outside, but also that no information of the happenings of the outside world should reach them. More particularly, it seems to me essential that if Gandhi decides to hunger-strike no news of this should reach the other prisoners.

12. I was interested to read Dow's account[9] of the difficulty created by the American white troops' attitude towards their own coloured troops, coupled with their intense friendliness for Indians. Here, while as you know we have been working hard to make our own people free from colour prejudice, we have had complaints from the Americans that our people are too friendly to their coloured troops! In this connection I was told a rather good story yesterday. A certain lady, wishing to be hospitable, wrote to the Colonel of an American battalion in the neighbourhood asking him to send two or three of his officers to stay with her on their next leave. In a postscript she added that she would sooner not have Jews. When the leave time came three coal-black young men turned up. When she suggested there might have been some mistake, the senior one of them replied: "No M'am! I don't think there was no mistake. Colonel Cohen he don't make no mistakes!"

No time for more. All my very best wishes go to you in the difficult time ahead.

P.S.—Cabinet are deferring to your views as to having G. die on your hands,[10] but clear that he mustn't defeat you. Our best idea so far is to send him to Sevagram as soon as he starts and then draw a cordon round the *ashram* and let no one in or out. Anyhow we await your considered recommendations.

[9] In his letter of 17 July 1942. MSS. EUR. F. 125/98. [10] See No. 488.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 35

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *9 August 1942, 12.5 am*
PERSONAL

13991. Your 2319–S.[1] Statement[2] is altogether admirable both in substance and in tone. If your colleagues are confident that they are a "Government stronger and more representative than ever before" and act accordingly all India will feel it too and the victory over disorder and defeatism will have been won at the outset.

[1] No. 447. [2] The Government of India's statement (No. 447) was issued on 8 August.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram L/PO/11/3: f 266

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *9 August 1942, 8 am*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 10 August*

966. Your private and personal telegram 2255–S[1] dated 31st July. Cabinet considered Indian Financial question on 6th[2] and Raisman made useful statement to them. The general consensus of opinion was that we must retain existing agreement and not substitute new basis proposed by Treasury. But as Prime Minister was unable to be present at that meeting decision was deferred. Chancellor will speak to Prime Minister privately first and I hope that further meeting may be only for formal decision. I will inform you when this has taken place.

Naturally Chancellor will now press for widest possible interpretation of existing agreement but I see no reason why reasonable settlement should not be reached.

[1] No. 379. [2] No. 435.

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Mr Churchill to his Private Office (via Commander-in-Chief, Middle East and Air Ministry)

Telegram, L/P&J/8/558: f 85

IMMEDIATE *9 August 1942, 1.35 pm*
MOST SECRET *Received: 9 August, 7.10 pm*

REFLEX No. 51. Following Most Secret and Personal for Private Office from Prime Minister.

Begins. Please arrange transmission of following message through U.S. Embassy.

Begins.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.

I hope you will let me see beforehand the text of any message[1] you are thinking of sending me upon the anniversary of the Atlantic Charter on August 14. We considered the wording of that famous document line by line together and I should not be able, without mature consideration, to give it a wider interpretation than was agreed between us at the time. Its proposed application to Asia and Africa requires much thought. Grave embarrassment would be caused to the defence of India at the present time by such a statement as the Office of War Information has been forecasting. Here in the Middle East the Arabs might claim by majority they could expel the Jews from Palestine, or at any rate forbid all further immigration. I am strongly wedded to the Zionist policy, of which I was one of the authors. This is only one of the many unforeseen cases which will arise from new and further declarations.

2. Would it not be sufficient to dwell on the progress made in this memorable year, to the growth of the United Nations, to the continued magnificent resistance of Russia to aggression, to the success of the arms of the United States in the Pacific and to the growth of our combined air power? Finally we could re-affirm our principles and point to the hope of a happier world

[1] In telegram 4025 of 7 August to the Foreign Office, Sir R. Campbell reported that the United States Office of War Information were proposing that on 14 August, the anniversary of the signing of the Atlantic Charter, telegrams should be exchanged between the President and the Prime Minister, the President's telegram stating that the Charter applied to Asia and Africa as well as to Europe; and that meanwhile the O.W.I. had circulated to all radio stations a statement to the same effect. The Foreign Office replied in telegram 4770 of 8 August that in existing circumstances the proposed exchange of telegrams would be very difficult to arrange and that they would strongly deprecate a message from the President involving such important issues without full consultation and agreement. Their telegram 4801 of 9 August to Washington transmitted a message from Mr Churchill emphatically agreeing with this view. In telegram 4061 of 10 August Sir R. Campbell informed the Foreign Office that he had written to Mr Hull urging the necessity of full prior consultation on the proposed exchange of messages; and that the President's advisers were discussing a revised draft of his message. L/P&J/8/558: ff 87–9 and 97.

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after some preliminary intervening unpleasantness has been satisfactorily got over. I am sure you will consider my difficulties with the kindness you always show to me.

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President Roosevelt to Mr Churchill (via Joint Staffs Mission, Washington and Commander-in-Chief, Middle East)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 180

IMMEDIATE *9 August 1942, 4.29 pm*
MOST SECRET *Received: 9 August, 10 pm*

No. 176. Your Message No. 125.[1] From the President for the Former Naval Person Personal and Most Secret.

In view of the message you have sent me, I have replied to Chiang Kai-shek that it does not seem to me to be wise or expedient for the time (?) being to consider taking any of the steps which he suggested in his message to me. I have emphasised the fact that we would of course not wish to pursue any course which would undermine the authority of the Indian Government at this critical time. I have, however, told him that I would be glad to have him keep in close touch with me with regard to this and any other questions which affect the vital interests of the United Nations because of my belief that it is wiser to have him feel that his suggestions sent to me receive friendly consideration. I fear that if I did not do so he would be more inclined to take action on his own initiative, which I know you will agree might be very dangerous at this moment. I have, therefore, left the door open for him to make any further suggestions which he may have in mind later on, and should he think the need therefore [therefor?] exists.

Repeated War Cabinet Offices.

[1] Annex 2 to No. 392.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 566

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *9 August 1942, 5.40 pm*
Received: 9 August, 7.5 pm

No. 2334-S. Your personal telegram of August 7th 13931.[1] Fast by Gandhi. I note and fully appreciate views of Cabinet, but issue is so important and I am

[1] No. 452.

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conscious of such strong feeling on matter here that I thought I had better consult Governors, making clear to them attitude of His Majesty's Government. I repeat in my immediately following telegram my reference to Governors dated August 8th 2325–S and replies which I have so far had.

2. I have also consulted Hartley in Wavell's absence. His estimate of army reactions to allowing Gandhi to fast to death under arrest is as follows: "(*a*) No effect on Moslem rank and file. (*b*) Possibly some effect on Hindu rank and file; in particular on Jats recruited from Rohtak district, who are in a more receptive condition than any other Hindu class in army. (*c*) The broadening of basis of recruitment of officers has increased chance of definite reactions. I feel little doubt but that the whole of officer class (K.C.I.O., I.C.O. and Emergency Commission) would give vent to very violent criticism."

3. I will telegraph views of remaining Governors as soon as received. I am clear however from views so far expressed, and I am sure that Cabinet will agree with me, that we cannot disregard this unanimity of opinion. I refrain from final recommendations until I have seen views of other Governors, but feel little doubt that they will accord with those now repeated. I attach particular importance to Lumley's view, and you will I know appreciate most unfortunate effect of our adopting a decision to let Gandhi fast to death in confinement and then being forced off it by irresistible public pressure here.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 565

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *9 August 1942, 5.40 pm*
Received: 9 August, 6.15 pm

No. 2335–S. Following is text of my telegram to Governors and their replies referred to in my immediately preceding telegram 2334–S. *Begins:*—My telegram to Governors No. 2325–S dated 8th August. *Begins:*—Question arises of action to be taken if Gandhi after arrest conducts a fast. It is quite clear (for your most secret information) that H.M. Government feel very strongly that in that event he ought not to be released but be allowed to go his own way whatever the consequences. He might of course decide to continue to fast despite release. I would welcome earliest possible your estimate of local reactions if decision is to allow him to fast to death under arrest.

Could you let me have earliest possible reply? *Ends.*

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2. From Governor of the Punjab dated 9th August No. 41-G. *Begins:*—Though reactions in Punjab are likely to be less unfavourable than elsewhere in the event of Gandhi being allowed to fast to death under arrest I am personally in favour of release if and when his condition should become dangerous provided that he is kept [under] close surveillance and is re-arrested when his condition improves. I think this would expose less surface for misrepresentation and agitation. *Ends.*

3. From Governor of Bihar dated 9th August No. 42. *Begins:*—I appreciate force of position taken up by H.M. Government and would in normal circumstances support it but my considered view is that while Gandhi's death from fasting would be bound in any case to give rise to intense feeling, popular sentiment in Bihar would on the whole be less embittered if he died out of jail rather than inside.

4. From Governor of Bombay No. 548 dated August 9th. *Begins:*—If Gandhi fasts I am certain that it would be gravest political (? blunder) to allow him to die under detention. It is quite possible that he will insist on fasting to death even if we release him: judging from his Rajkot stage, the hysteria which would then arise would be quite formidable, but I have little doubt that it would be insignificant compared to explosion of hatred which will get right down to villages, which would follow if he died in detention. In this Province I would expect that we would have few friends left in any community, and none, certainly, who would openly approve. Civil disobedience can be quite easily dealt with and we shall retain a very considerable body of support if we deal with it firmly, but it is my considered opinion (? that) to continue to hold Gandhi under detention till he dies would transform the whole situation in this Province, and gravely affect attitude to the war. We shall no doubt have difficulties of various kinds if we let him out, when he starts to fast. We can deal with them, but consequences of his death in our hands are not calculable by ordinary standards.

As Governor on the spot in this eventuality I would request that my views may be placed before His Majesty's Government. *Ends.*

From Governor of the Central Provinces No. 363-M (? S). *Begins:*—Your Excellency's private and personal telegram 2325-S of August 8th. Most secret. I felt it necessary to consult my Advisers Sir C. Burton and Mr. Greenfield under warning of secrecy on the question raised in your Excellency's telegram. They have been in the Province 33 and 32 years respectively. They are both emphatically of the opinion that local reactions would be most unfavourable if decision is to allow Gandhi to fast to death under arrest. With that opinion I concur. I fear we should be left with no friends in India and even some of the Indian members of Superior as well as Inferior Services will turn against us. I recognise alternative decision to release him (? omission) he embarks on a fast

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practically rules out the possibility of jail custody because cat and mouse policy would obviously be (?impracticable) in his case. Nevertheless I feel some alternative must be found. Although this is question of policy nothing more I venture to express my views with diffidence. I feel Gandhi should be released and restricted to Sevagram if he embarks on a fast. If he died in his own Ashram reaction will be much less unfavourable than those which will follow if he dies under arrest in a jail or substitute jail. *Ends.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 564

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *9 August 1942, 9.30 pm*
Received: 9 August, 8.20 pm

No. 2335-S. (sic). Following is Government [Governor ?] of Sind's reply. *Begins:*—Your most secret private and personal telegram No. 2325-S August 8th. So far as Sind is concerned I do not consider local reactions would materially differ whether Gandhi's death should take place in jail custody or after his release. A possible danger of latter course is that even though continuation of fast were deliberate this fast [fact?] might be concealed and it would then be represented that release took place only when Government were satisfied that recovery was impossible. In that event the odium attaching to Government might well be greater than if he were permitted to fast to death in jail where it is presumed he would be permitted if he so desired to have attentions under whatever degree of supervision might be considered necessary of his staff of medical advisers.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/597: f 32

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *9 August 1942, 12.45 pm*
PERSONAL

14012. Your personal tel[egra]m 8th Aug. 2327-S.[1] Point in para: 1 is clearly sound and is accepted. But adoption of course B in para: 2 would defeat purpose A unless you can be sure of effectively stopping all incoming messages carrying

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substance of Andhra circular or so commenting as to convey substance. Pending assurance on this I am suspending action on course B. Please reply urgently.

[1] No. 465.

483

Note by Sir A. R. Mudaliar[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/157

MOST SECRET *9 August 1942*

The accompanying Memorandum is the result of discussions among some Members of Council during the last three months. It is believed that it embodies the general view of Members, and it is proposed to submit the signed Memorandum to H.E. the Viceroy for his consideration.

Honourable Members, if they are in general agreement with the Memorandum, are requested to sign it and send it to the Member next mentioned in the list. The last to sign will please return it to Sir Homi Mody.

A. R. MUDALIAR

Annex to No. 483

It is becoming increasingly clear that negotiations with the Indian National Congress for a satisfactory settlement of outstanding constitutional issues will not be fruitful of any result and that for the rest of the period of the War, Congress will not undertake any responsibility for the governance of the country. It seems also likely that the Muslim League as such, will not allow its representatives to join the Government either at the Centre or in the Provinces. In this position, fairly clear and definite now, we have necessarily to consider how the administration of Government can be so carried on as to procure the maximum amount of support for the war effort and so that political discontent in the country may be kept at a minimum.

The events that are likely to happen within the next few days and the steps that Government are likely to be called upon to take on the occurrence of such events will lead to a serious situation in the country. Public uneasiness not unoften culminating in public disorder, a sense of general grievance and a

[1] The note and memorandum were circulated to Sir Homi Mody, Sir Sultan Ahmad, Sir Firoz Khan Noon, Sir Edward Benthall, Sir Muhammad Usman, Dr B. R. Ambedkar, Sir J. P. Srivastava, Sir Jogendra Singh, and Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar. Sir Firoz Khan Noon noted: 'This is the first time I see it, and should like to think over it.'

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feeling of insecurity will all combine to make the task of Government a very difficult one. Neither the Government of India nor the Provincial Administrations can flinch from their duty in putting down disorder and lawlessness, in trying their best to promote the war effort and in dealing with those who intentionally obstruct such war effort. While, however, Governments must be firm and determined in dealing with such situations, there is another aspect of the question which cannot be ignored and which we wish to present to Your Excellency for your serious consideration.

We are convinced that the Congress in its latest resolution[2] which will in all probability be accepted by the A.-I.C.C. does not reflect the opinion of the vast masses in this country or even the great bulk of the intelligentsia. But the strength of the Congress will lie in the fact that the bulk of the people though quite opposed to the Congress are not entirely satisfied with the present situation. What may be considered moderate or non-Congress opinion in the country has, while criticising Congress policy and programme as defined by the Working Committee, emphasised the need for advance in certain directions, so far as the constitution of Governments, Central and Provincial, are concerned. There has hardly been a time in the recent political history of this country when the Congress decisions have been more widely and by so many organisations and individuals criticised. At the same time, there is also a large measure of agreement in the constructive suggestions put forward by most of them regarding the constitution of the Central and Provincial Governments. These constructive suggestions are pointedly summarised in the statement of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru[3] which Your Excellency will no doubt have perused. We feel that it is not only desirable but also practicable to mobilise this large body of opinion on the side of Government.

It is with a view to promote this idea and with a view to ensure that the broad intentions of the Cripps proposals which the Secretary of State has reaffirmed, are carried out in the immediate present as they certainly will be in the future, that we would press very earnestly on Your Excellency's attention the proposals that follow:—

I. Sir Stafford Cripps in his ill-fated proposals[4] stated on behalf of His Majesty's Government that "immediately upon cessation of hostilities steps shall be taken to set up in India an elected Body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India—the object of the new constitution being the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion associated with the United Kingdom and other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown but equal to them in every respect in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs." Sir Stafford Cripps at the end of his mission withdrew the proposals but we pointed out at the time that a proposal like this once put forward not to any particular political party but to the

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country cannot be withdrawn. We are glad that the Secretary of State has stated that "the British Government stands firmly by the broad intention of their offer".[5]

II. The Cripps proposals also envisaged in the last paragraph of H.M.G.'s Declaration that "the task of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the co-operation of the peoples of India and for this purpose His Majesty's Government invited the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people to participate in the counsels of their country". The only exception that was made was that "His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain the control and direction of the defence of India as part of the world war effort". It seems to us that when the Secretary of State stated that His Majesty's Government adhered to the broad intention of the offer, it included not merely the ultimate offer at the conclusion of the hostilities but also the offer for the interim period. We would press very earnestly that these intentions should be carried out and our specific suggestions for the purpose are as follows:—

(i) The portfolios still in the hands of official Members, Home and Finance, may now be transferred to non-official Indians. We would like to state quite explicitly that the strongest criticism against the expanded Council was and is that the main and important portfolios which were so far in the hands of European official Members have not been transferred to Indian hands. Whether at the stage of the first expansion or at the present stage, much of this criticism still remains true. Departments in charge of Indian Members have been divided and sub-divided but a Department like Finance stands completely intact in charge of an official European Member. Similarly the Home Department, except for the excrescences that had grown immediately after the War broke out and were attached to the Home Department, such as Information or Man-power, remains strictly intact in the hands of an official European Member. The Communications Department has now been transferred to [a] non-official, but the most important part of that Department, Railways, is in the hands of a non-official European Member. We do not raise any objection at this stage to the War Transport Department being in the hands of a non-official European Member, but we feel that both in accordance with the spirit of the Cripps Proposals and to meet what we consider to be the legitimate criticism of influential sections of moderate opinion the remaining Departments, Home and Finance, should immediately be transferred to the charge of non-official Indians.

[2] Namely the 'Quit India' resolution passed by the Congress Working Committee on 5 August and confirmed by the All-India Congress Committee on 8 August (No. 470).

[3] See No. 451, note 2. [4] See Vol. I, No. 456. [5] See No. 366.

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(ii) Provincial Governments in seven Provinces are now administered by Governors with the help of official Advisers almost entirely Europeans. Even the Government of India Act in Section 93 contemplates a maximum period of three years for such administration. While this form of Government was welcomed by non-Congress opinion at the initial stages, the long period during which it has been functioning and the fact that gradually the Advisers have got out of touch with public opinion has changed the aspect of affairs and it is not an exaggeration to state that today in most Provinces these administrations are becoming extremely unpopular. What is far more important is that at a critical period in the affairs of this country, the Governors are left with Advisers who are generally unapproachable to the general public and are therefore not in a position to give correct advice to the Governors. Our suggestion is that a bold step must be taken and the system of Executive Councils should be revived in these Provinces and Indians appointed as Members of the Executive Council. It is true that this change would require Parliamentary amendment of the Act but in the light of Section 93 even the continuance of the system of Advisers would require similar Parliamentary legislation. In case it is felt by H.M.G. that Parliamentary legislation on the lines suggested by us will not be possible in the present Parliament, and only in that case, we suggest that immediate steps may be taken to appoint non-official Advisers of status in the various Provinces to replace official Advisers.

(iii) We would also urge that all important questions of policy pertaining to any Department should be brought before Council for discussion and decision.

We are satisfied from such contacts as we have had with non-Congress opinion in this country that if these proposals are immediately given effect to, Government will be in a position to commandeer the goodwill of large sections of the people and the threat of civil strife and disorganisation from Congress will be greatly mitigated. We trust Your Excellency will accept our suggestions in the spirit in which they have been offered and would do your best to support our views and get them accepted by His Majesty's Government.

A. R. MUDALIAR
H. P. MODY
S. SULTAN AHMED
NALINI RANJAN SARKER

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484

Mr Churchill to President Roosevelt (via Commander-in-Chief, Middle East and Joint Staffs Mission, Washington)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 179

IMMEDIATE *10 August 1942, 8.45 am*
MOST SECRET *Received: 10 August, 1.25 pm*

REFLEX No. 62. Following Most Secret and Personal for President Roosevelt from Former Naval Person.

Your 176.[1] Thank you very much.

Repeated Air Ministry.

[1] No. 478.

485

Mr Churchill to Mr Amery (via Commander-in-Chief, Middle East and Air Ministry)

Telegram, L/PO/6/102a: f 15

MOST IMMEDIATE *10 August 1942, 11.25 am*
MOST SECRET *Received: 10 August, 4.22 pm*

REFLEX No. 66. Following Most Secret and Personal from Prime Minister to Mr. Amery.

Report of B.B.C. news Monday morning states that in your broadcast[1] you referred to "The Government's pledge to give India her independence after the war". Surely this goes beyond the declaration approved by the War Cabinet for Cripps.

[1] See No. 474, note 7.

486

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 561

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *10 August 1942, 10.40 am*
Received: 10 August, 9.15 am

2340–S. Following is telegram from Govr. of Bengal number 181 *Begins.* Most secret. Your telegram number 2325–S[1] August 8th: In my view Hindu

[1] See No. 480, para. 1.

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sentiment would resent and be alienated by Gandhi's death in jail as a result of fasting. His death in jail might also give rise to wild rumours and even to suspicion against the Government. If he continued to fast after release and then died, popular opinion would be greatly stirred but might appreciate clemency shown by releasing him. You will of course have considered what publicity should be given to hunger strike by him.

487

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 563

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *10 August 1942, 12.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 10 August, 12.20 pm*

2342-S. Following private and personal telegram No. G/238 of August 9th from Governor of the United Provinces repeated. *Begins.* Most Secret. Your telegram 2325-S[1] of August 8th. It is of course possible that Gandhi does not intend to die as a result of fast but if he died while under detention, it would have far more serious reactions in India than if he died while continuing fast after release. Further (as their, corrupt) legal authorities hold that there is obligation on jail authorities to keep prisoners alive and if Gandhi died in jail, jail officers would be put in a most difficult position and might have to face legal proceedings which would be extremely embarrassing to Government. He should therefore be released when fast seriously affects health, point to be decided by best possible medical opinion. If released there appears greater possibility of abandonment of fast, especially if all publicity is prevented.

Deportation would have very considerable advantage in Gandhi's case and is far preferable to action suggested by His Majesty's Government. *Ends.*

[1] See No. 480, para. 1.

488

War Cabinet W.M. (42) 109th Conclusions, Minute 7

R/30/1/2: ff 39–40

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 10 August 1942 at 5.30 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Ernest Bevin, Viscount Halifax

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Also present during discussion of item 7 were: Mr S. M. Bruce, Mr W. Nash, Sir Kingsley Wood, Mr Amery, Viscount Cranborne, Mr A. V. Alexander, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Mr Brendan Bracken

INDIA

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 107th Conclusions, Minute 5)[1]

The War Cabinet were given the latest information about the state of public order in India following the action taken against Congress. Reference was made to the sensational character of some of the reports which were being sent by newspaper correspondents to this country and to the United States. It was suggested that the Government of India might ask Press representatives in India to exercise discretion, not only in what was published in India, but also in messages sent abroad.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that the Viceroy had thought it advisable to ascertain the views of the Provincial Governors regarding the attitude to be adopted if Gandhi fasted while under detention.[2] With one exception, all the Governors had expressed the view that, whatever the disadvantages of releasing Gandhi, they would be outweighed by those of allowing him to die under detention.[3] His death while under detention would, in their view, have a deplorable effect on all shades of Indian opinion. The Viceroy's final views on this question had not yet been received.

In the course of a preliminary discussion, it was pointed out that this question ought not to be considered on the basis of the obligations which a Government has for safeguarding the life and health of a person undergoing a sentence of imprisonment. Gandhi was being treated as a *détenu*, and the conditions of his detention were not comparable with those of imprisonment. The object in placing him under restraint was to prevent him from carrying on the campaign which he and Congress had initiated, and he need not be subjected to any greater degree of detention than was necessary for the purpose of securing that object. It should be possible to devise some method of detaining him which, while preventing him from carrying on his campaign, would leave the Government of India free of responsibility for safeguarding his life and health.

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Secretary of State for India to put these considerations to the Viceroy and to ask him what arrangements he proposed to make with a view to meeting them.

[1] No. 451. [2] See No. 479. [3] See Nos. 480, 481, 486, and 487.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 542

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *10 August 1942, 12.55 pm*
Received: 10 August, 12 midnight

2343–S. Following telegram No. 1064–G.S. dated August 9th from Governor of Assam is repeated for information *Begins.* Most secret and personal. Your telegram No. 2325–S[1] of August 8th. Gandhi's death (? in, omitted) custody would have extremely bad effect on nearly all Hindus whether Congress or not. This effect would be permanent and incident[al]ly would serve as rallying point for bitter hostility so long as British remained. Death in liberty would still create deep feelings but intensity would be greatly reduced. After first shock realisation of his sole responsibility would come and would grow as time went on. *Ends.*

[1] See No. 480, para. 1.

490

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 557

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *10 August 1942, 9 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2344–S. My private and personal August 9th 2334–S.[1] Possible fast by Gandhi. I presume by now (omission) have had replies received from Assam and United Provinces. Hope promises his reply today.

2. Matter was discussed in Council this morning. I gave them no lead and did not disclose your views. I found them almost unanimously in favour of releasing Gandhi from restraint at point at which his fast might become dangerous to life. C.P. was inclined to keep him under restraint even then though Mody on the other hand was in favour of letting him out altogether the moment he started to fast. There are no signs yet I understand from Bombay of any intention on his part to fast, but C.P.'s information is specific that he does intend to do so and to carry things to the end.

3. I do not feel any doubt in the light of views of Governors and of reactions of my own Council (whom I deliberately did not ask to take a final decision) that we must be prepared in the event of a fast to set Gandhi at liberty (leaving

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it to himself to decide where he wants to go to or whether he prefers to remain in Agha Khan's house at Poona) once fast begins to endanger his life and I trust that in the circumstances Cabinet will agree.

[1] No. 479.

491

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *10 August 1942, 9 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 10 August, 8.15 pm*

No. 2345-S. I have discussed in Council this morning question of speeches &c. by its Members during next few days. They came to conclusion that wise course on the whole would be to avoid public speeches at any rate for a week or ten days, and my colleagues suggested that it would be as well if a similar self-denying ordinance could be considered at home. Immediate reactions to action by us are as you will see unexpectedly satisfactory—there is no sign of any disturbance save in the Bombay Presidency, and even there on a relatively very limited scale. Already I discern a tendency of non-Congress Hindus to say "If this is all you had to fear why did you act so precipitately?" But it is arguable that the decisiveness of our action has had a somewhat stunning effect and that once first shock is over we shall have greater difficulties to contend with.

492

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *10 August 1942, 9 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2346-S. My private and personal telegram No. 2331-S[1] of 8th August. I can hardly exaggerate strength of view expressed in Council at possibility that (*a*) there should be any repetition of the Cripps Mission; (*b*) His Majesty's Government under pressure from the Allies and from public opinion at home should endeavour to reverse policy as regards internment of Gandhi, &c. over heads of Government of India; (*c*) His Majesty's Government should yield to

[1] No. 467.

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pressure from the United States or China. Members in fact almost unanimously made it clear that in the event of their being overruled by His Majesty's Government or action being taken save through the Governor-General and/or themselves on any of these matters, they would resign.

2. You have no conception of how deep the Cripps business has bitten. Position is made worse by fact that certain of the Members of Council are in a position to quote at first hand statements which I have hitherto been able to brush aside on the ground that they had not been made to me or publicly. They have done so well over this business that we must do our utmost to keep them sweet and together, and I trust that you will be able to let me have something suitably soothing in reply to the protest which they unanimously (including Benthall) desire to send to you and which is contained in my immediately following telegram. I think my colleagues recognise that His Majesty's Government cannot be expected to promise never again to negotiate with the Congress Party. Truth is that they are deeply exercised about their own position collectively and individually and greatly alarmed lest they may be let down. I sympathise with them very sincerely.

493

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *10 August 1942, 9 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 10 August, 9.45 pm*

No. 2347-S. I have separately reported[1] decision of my Council to deal with situation created by ratification by A.-I.C.C. of Working Committee resolution on lines of which you are aware. That decision was unanimous. Its gravity I need not emphasize. Nor can I overstate its immense importance to the Members of my Council individually. They are all of them prominent in public life, with long and distinguished records of service to India and to the public. But a decision such as the present must inevitably mean their being pilloried as traitors and reactionaries, and that process has already begun.

2. Those reasons did not deter my colleagues, who saw their duty clear, and once they were satisfied on that they discharged it without hesitation. They unanimously desire me however to make it clear in the most definite terms possible to His Majesty's Government that (*a*) they would bitterly resent any early resumption of these negotiations by His Majesty's Government with present leaders of Congress or with any other political parties in this country

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save after full consultation with my Council: (*b*) that equally they rely on His Majesty's Government to resist any pressure that might be brought upon them by China, the United States or any other of the Allied Nations for a relaxation of the present decision. If circumstances should appear later to call for any revision of policy, that will be a matter on which Government of India will expect to be given an opportunity to express their view to His Majesty's Government.

3. I have told my colleagues that I would forward their representation to you and that I felt certain that the Cabinet would treat it with a full appreciation of its significance and with full sympathy for the motives prompting it.

[1] See No. 467.

494

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 332

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *10 August 1942, 9 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 10 August, 8 pm*

2350–S. Your personal telegram August 9th 14012.[1] We can certainly control all incoming messages: but this is more difficult in the case of the B.B.C. and the position is to some extent being complicated by the fact that they have repeated references in your broadcast. But I think we can carry on all right and suggest adoption of course (B).

[1] No. 482.

495

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *10[1] August 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2352–S. My private and personal telegram No. 2300–S[2] of 6th August. Moore. I repeat in my immediately following telegram text of leader in today's *Statesman*, which speaks for itself. Point is, I fear, approaching at which we may

[1] L/PO/10/17: f 159 gives the date as 11 August. [2] No. 426.

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be driven to intervene. I do not know if Catto would feel able to consider instructing Moore confidentially to avoid all editorial reference, whether direct or indirect, to the civil disobedience and Congress situation, since he appears incapable on his own of keeping within the bounds of reasonable comment. Damaging effect on morale and confidence of leaders such as these of which you have now the text—one coming shortly after the other—will be only too obvious to you.

496

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *10[1] August 1942*

No. 2353-S. Following is text of Moore's leader:—

Begins. The finger of fate moves on and new lines in the Indo-British chapter are being rapidly written. The Congress has adhered to its resolution after proving to its own satisfaction that Britain is in the wrong. The Government of India has replied by arresting the leaders and issuing stern orders for the suppression of the threatened civil disobedience if it starts.

This is a military question. The Allies can and must now think only in military terms. Common salvation is essential. The B.B.C. announcing on Saturday night[2] the passing of the Congress resolution, called it the "Quit India" resolution, thereby refusing to distinguish between it and the Allahabad resolution[3] of more than three months ago, or to accept the explanations of the July resolution[4] given in much detail at Bombay. The Government of India's resolution[5] issued on Saturday, immediately after the All-India Congress Committee had endorsed the July resolution, also rejects the face value of this resolution with its offer of co-operation in the war. It pins the Congress to its Allahabad resolution and it interprets the whole as an invitation to anarchy. The future alone will reveal whether the B.B.C. and the Government of India are speaking for the Allied War Council. If they are, if this is the considered view of the supreme military direction, it will of course stand. In that case the announcements in the form they have taken are for the information both of the Allied countries and of the enemy countries, and we must assume that it is considered good propaganda to emphasise, elaborate and insist, in front of an enemy which has forced us to quit Malaya and Burma, that the Congress has asked us in the literal sense to quit India. On the other hand, if what must prove one of the most critical military decisions of the Allies has been taken without reference to the War Council by the Home Department of the

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Government of India and the bureaucracy of the India Office, and if the Government resolution and the B.B.C. announcement are arguments addressed to the Allies and the Supreme War Council for the retention of their powers, they may be subject to revision in the light of the stern necessities of war. *Ends.*

[1] L/PO/10/17: f 159 gives the date as 11 August. [2] 8 August. [3] No. 43, col. 3.
[4] No. 265. [5] No. 447.

497

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *10[1] August 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2355–S. Your private and personal telegram of 9th August, No. 968.[2] Thank you so much. I am most grateful and I am sure that my colleagues will greatly appreciate what you have been kind enough to say.

[1] L/PO/10/17: f 160 gives the date as 11 August. [2] No. 472; the date should be 8 August.

498

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/7/5201: ff 295–6

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *10 August 1942, 7.15 pm*
Received: 11 August

970. Your private and personal telegram 4th August 2286–S.[1] I am so sorry that difficulty should have arisen. Basis on which passages for Unit were procured was of course that the sole object was strictly humanitarian. Alexander (who was persuaded by Unit Headquarters to accept leadership of party as they felt it essential to have as leader man with knowledge of India) put it to me that obviously he could not escape contact with his old friends including Gandhi, and that if he did find there was any work of conciliation to be done behind the scenes he hoped it would not be taken amiss if he attempted it. I told him that I saw no objection to his visiting his personal friends provided he took no *overt* part in politics. This assurance seemed at the time to cover the case but I regret that I did not at once inform you of what had passed.

[1] No. 408.

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2. I am sure you share my recognition of Alexander's sincerity and good intentions. But I have myself concluded from his telegrams to Conciliation Group here that situation we have reached in India since he left has led him, with best intentions, to get involved with Gandhi more deeply than he can have anticipated and I recently asked Miss Harrison to convey to him that I thought he might be exceeding our understanding with him. I should have no objection to your letting him have substance of this telegram and putting it to him that as situation has developed it would be consistent with the spirit of my understanding with him that he should confine his attention strictly to the Unit's affairs or, if it is satisfactorily launched and his work done, return home.

3. I understand that Unit is finding ample opportunity for service with both unofficial and official organisations and I trust that its activities will not be hampered as a result of this regrettable excess of zeal on the part of its leader outside the Unit's own business.

499

Mr Amery to Mr Eden

L/PO/5/41: f 77

INDIA OFFICE, *10 August 1942*

My dear Anthony,

At the end of July there were sundry rumours in the Press that Wendell Willkie was going to visit India on a personal mission from the President with the object of finding some solution of the Indian problem. These caused a certain amount of anxiety to Linlithgow,[1] who issued a denial of them. They were exaggerations of what appears to be a true report that Wendell Willkie is thinking of visiting Russia and China. Were he to do so it seems inevitable that he would pass through India and Linlithgow is rather anxious in case, in view of these rumours, his arrival there should give rise to misunderstandings.

I have told Linlithgow[2] that we do not feel we could object to a visit to India in a private capacity, especially if it were merely for the purpose of going on to China. I see, however, that it has again been reported that Willkie has been to see the President about the arrangements for this journey and I wonder if it might be opportune to send instructions to Campbell that if the subject of transit through India should come up he should take occasion to warn the U.S. authorities that the visit may be an embarrassment unless Willkie makes it perfectly clear that he is proceeding to China as a private individual and is only passing through India for that purpose.

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I am of course entirely prepared to be guided by you as to what you think would be tactful in this connection; but I am anxious to help Linlithgow in every possible way at the present time.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] See Nos. 342 and 369. [2] See No. 398.

500

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: ff 558–60

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *11 August 1942, 1.45 am*

PERSONAL

14074. Your personal telegrams 2334–S to 2343–S.[1] Possible fast by Gandhi. Cabinet have considered[2] Governors' views and await your definite proposals. They fully appreciate your difficulties and possible reactions of having Gandhi die on your hands, but wish to be assured that you are not in danger of letting him defeat you. If it is a question of letting him out what exactly does that mean? If it means freedom to communicate with political sympathisers and make capital out of his release he will clearly have scored. Or is all that you contemplate sending him back to Sevagram (where responsibility for looking after him will be that of his personal friends), but first isolating his ashram effectively from outside world? Could that be effectively done? If he then starved he may have starved as a protest but not under your charge. If that is your policy then there would seem to be much to be said for shifting him to Sevagram as soon as he starts repeat starts fasting so that there could be no question of his health having been affected in detention and the whole responsibility would remain his own and that of his domestic circle.

2. May we take it that both at Poona now and at Sevagram (under above plan) means are effective not only to prevent him and retinue from sending messages out but also from receiving news from outside particularly of progress of civil disobedience?

3. Similarly are those detained in Ahmednagar fort kept without outside news as well as from sending messages? Are they prevented from communication among themselves?

[1] Nos. 479–81, 486–7, and 489. [2] No. 488.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: ff 553

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *11 August 1942, 2.55 pm*
Received: 11 August, 7.15 pm

2358–S. Following telegram from Governor of Orissa 367–S.G.C. of August 10th is repeated for information.

Begins. Private and personal. Your telegram No. 2325–S[1] August 8th. There can be no doubt if Gandhi were to fast to death under arrest, feeling in this almost exclusively Hindu Province would be deeply stirred among large sections of the population both urban and rural by whom he is regarded with veneration. It would seem inevitable that as critical stages were reached and Gandhi's life were thought to be in danger there would be emotional outbursts with displays of anti-British feeling.

2. On the other hand there are on this occasion very many who in view of vital interests that are involved are relying on Government not to yield to pressure. After first shock of Gandhi's fast had passed I would expect their influence to be helpful in steadying and reassuring local opinion and leading it to a more reasoned view.

3. Prime Minister[2] saw me yesterday after news came through of Bombay arrests. One of the first points he took was to express the hope that there would be no surrender to hunger strike whether by Gandhi or by other leaders. Prime Minister was of course not aware of this secret and personal reference from Your Excellency to myself.

[1] See No. 480, para. 1. [2] The Maharaja of Parlakimedi.

502

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 556

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *11 August 1942, 2.55 pm*
Received: 11 August, 2.15 pm

2359–S. Following telegram from Governor of the North-West Frontier Province 76–T August 10th is repeated for information. *Begins.* Your Excellency's telegram 2325–S[1] August 8th.

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If Gandhi dies from hunger strike Hindu opinion may be expected to be unanimous against the Government and bitterness will remain for some time. But in this Province this is not important.

Muslim opinion apart from that of Congress Leaders will I think be that Gandhi has asked for it, and though some sympathy may be expressed (? temporarily) effect will not be very lasting.

[1] See No. 480, para. 1.

503

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *11 August 1942*

No. 2362-S. Your private and personal telegram of 8th August, No. 960.[1] Many thanks. I am most grateful for your help, and you can rely on me to try to keep the position straight. I am very glad that B.B.C. are playing up. I am sure they realise how thin some of the ice is in this country.

[1] No. 458.

504

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *11 August 1942, 11.55 pm*

Received: 11 August, 11.30 am [11.30 pm?]

No. 2373-S. Following telegram from the Governor of Madras of the 10th August is repeated for information:—

Begins. Most Secret. Arrests of both Congress Working Committee and of local leaders who were not in Bombay has been so far taken quietly on the whole. At present four small printing presses, two small vernacular newspapers, two small factories and four of large colleges in Madras City are on strike but there has been no rioting or *hartal* generally. There is no news of any disturbance in one (our?) Province as yet except one minor affair in Ramnad district in which only three injured. As regards your question about situation if Gandhi fasts my Advisers and myself all agree that it would be mistake to let him die in jail and that he should be released if he gets very bad. Unfortunately he is in a class by himself and his death in jail would make him a martyr to many Congress and non-Congress alike. I feel from a purely expediency point of view no one

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should be allowed to die in jail. As regards exchange of prisoners we are in communication with the Central Provinces Government and it is too early to see what general reaction to arrests will be but so far they are mild and at a Press conference this morning local Press seemed to acquiesce in Press regulation except Srinivasan who was querulous and annoyed. *Ends.*

505

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill (via Air Ministry and 30 Military Mission, Moscow)

Telegram, L/PO/6/102a: ff 9–10

IMPORTANT *11 August 1942, 3 pm*

MOST SECRET

TULIP No. 91. Following Most Secret and Personal from Mr. Amery for Prime Minister.

REFLEX 66.[1] Following are verbatim only passages in my three broadcasts on Sunday[2] dealing with post-war pledge to India.

1. *Empire Programme.*

Begins. When the hour of world victory comes, as assuredly it will, then it will be for Indian statesmanship to make the fullest use of the opportunity to which we have pledged ourselves and to which we remain pledged, to devise for India a constitutional framework within which she can live at peace and in unity of spirit within her own borders and take her rightful place among the free nations of the British Commonwealth and of the world. *Ends.*

2. *American Broadcast.*

Begins. The misguided action of the Congress leaders will not affect one way or another the broad purpose alike of the British Government and of the Government of India that when victory is won India shall without delay have the fullest opportunity to attain to the complete control of her own destiny among the free nations of the British Commonwealth and of the world within a constitutional framework of her own devising. That is our pledge to India and to the world. By that pledge we stand. *Ends.*

3. *Home Service.*

Begins. In broad outline what we offered was that Indians should have full opportunity immediately after the war of attaining under a constitution to be freely devised among themselves to the same independence, the same complete freedom from all outside control, as is enjoyed by the Dominions, or for that matter by this country. By that offer we still stand. *Ends.*

[1] No. 485. [2] 9 August.

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Sir R. Campbell to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/PO/6/102a: f 7

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, *11 August 1942, 7.40 pm*
SECRET *Received: 12 August, 3 am*

No. 4068. A report has just appeared in the press of a resolution relating to India passed by the Annual Convention of an extremely important union, United Automobile Workers now being held in Chicago. The resolution affirms "claim of Indian people to their independence is a just and democratic one, fully in accord with liberating and democratic aim of this war", states "it is the wisest course to come to a mutual satisfactory agreement with Indian Congress", and urges President Roosevelt to "request British Government that it will take steps necessary to bring support of the Indian people to avert civil strife in India". This resolution will receive wide publicity. It must be expected that it will be followed by similar resolutions from other labour organisations.

2. I agree with Tawnay [Tawney] in thinking it highly important that British labour should let its views on the present Indian crisis be known clearly and at once.

I would suggest you urge on National Council of Labour the desirability of its issuing a public statement on the subject as soon as possible and of ensuring that it reaches the hands of the American pressmen for circulation to American press. This course is preferable to communicating the statement direct to the American Unions, but we will see when it is issued it is brought to their notice, for which purpose we should be grateful if full text could be cabled to the Embassy. I would emphasise that in Tawnay's [Tawney's] opinion (? grp. omitted ? unless) such a declaration by British labour appears soon, present situation in India will (? grp. omitted ? have) serious effects on Labour opinion here and may have grave consequences for American war effort.

3. Butler concurs. Please repeat to Ministry of Information.

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507

Mr Amery to Mr Attlee

L/PO/11/3: f 307

11 August 1942

My dear Clem,
I enclose a couple of telegrams[1] from the Viceroy which I hope the Cabinet may be able to take on Thursday.[2] I certainly think that the Viceroy's Council, after the way they have behaved, and really in any case, are entitled to be consulted before any fresh move were made in India on the constitutional question or on the release of the internees. Not that there is, I trust, any question of negotiations being reopened with Congress in any near future or even at any time during the war, or that we should be foolish enough to give either the Americans or the Chinese a pretext for meddling in Indian affairs; but it would certainly be a good thing if we could give every possible reassurance to the one body of men who can see us through the rest of the war without grave consequences.

I hear Dorman-Smith is off on Friday. I do hope, even if it were only out of personal consideration to an old member of the Cabinet who has gone through a terrible time with wonderful courage, and who has got a heavy job in prospect, the Cabinet will not think it a waste of time to hear him for a few minutes.

Yours ever,
L. S. AMERY

[1] Nos. 490 and 492. [2] 13 August.

508

Sir T. Stewart (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/49

SECRET *11 August 1942*

No. 540–G.B.
My dear Lord Linlithgow,
I enclose my Chief Secretary's report[1] for the first half of July 1942.

2. Notwithstanding its very disquieting developments in the past few weeks, the war has hardly been news. Interest has been focussed almost exclusively on the political situation. Until a very few days ago the average Congressman, while paying lip-service to Gandhi, was in his heart of hearts

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hopeful that conflict could be averted; but in a recent meeting of the Provincial Congress Committee Rajendra Prasad made it clear that he had no hopes of a settlement and, whether he was sincere or not, he stiffened up the waverers by his assertion that Gandhi had entered upon his last fight and that he would never see him again. I can understand the report that Rajendra was speaking under great emotional strain: his affection and reverence for Gandhi is accepted as his ruling characteristic. Up to that time I do not think that there had been any very serious consideration of the Congress plan of campaign but in the Committee various suggestions for action were put forward some of which, while professing to be non-violent, carry in them the seed of nasty trouble. In particular Rajendra admitted the permissibility of non-violent obstruction of military vehicles. I do not find this activity included in the list of "points" upon which it is intended to concentrate. (These "points" have been included in today's telegraphic situation report.)[2] Of the other leaders, the late Prime Minister[3] has been the most mischievous in inciting students to take an active and vigorous share in the campaign. Non-Congress elements in the Province were not particularly helpful in the waiting period. Sitting on the fence was their general attitude and while there was general deprecation of the launching of a mass movement there was equally emphatic criticism of Government's refusal to take any step forward in the direction of setting up a truly National Government at the Centre. I was very conscious of this non-committal attitude when, some ten days ago, I spoke to two Divisional Darbars convened for the distribution of War Sanads and to a gathering of the District Leaders of the National War Front. At Patna, it was very noticeable that many upon whom one might well have looked for support were absent. My main theme was naturally the absolute necessity for resisting the Congress move but I confess that I did not arouse enthusiasm amongst my audiences. The National War Front was a particularly hard nut to crack. Chandreshwar as I expected was not anxious to cross swords with Congress and he had—I can only suspect—already set on foot a publicity campaign to keep the War Front on a non-political basis. I got hold of him at 7-30 a.m. on the morning of the meeting and pressed him to include in his speech something less colourless than the preliminary draft which he had given me in advance. In the event he produced

Mark it up.

L.

[1] Not printed.

[2] Sir T. Stewart's telegram 44 states that common features of the reports received from District Magistrates were:

(*a*) Meetings and processions to protest against action taken by the Government;
(*b*) Noisy demonstrations outside courts and Government offices;
(*c*) *Hartals* (generally partial and confined to Hindu shops);
(*d*) Strikes of college and school students usually combined with picketing. L/P&J/8/605: f 418.

[3] Mr Shri Krishna Sinha.

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a certain amount of "ginger"—which was omitted in the reported version of the speech. I am now fairly certain that it will not be possible to drive him out into the open. Russell had a somewhat similar experience in the Executive Committee of the Provincial War Committee. There was a considerable section which wished to keep the War Committee on a non-political basis to the extent of ignoring the Congress movement. Russell succeeded in getting a majority in favour of fighting it.

3. These are early days to attempt a forecast of how the fight will go but it may be of interest to assess what appears to be the setting at its commencement. We have had the advantage of a surprise attack. Our local Congressmen certainly were taken unawares and the only significant reaction as yet has been on the part of students whom we know were already looking for trouble. We carry with us so far the sympathy of the moderates though it is unlikely to be vocal. I am inclined to discount its value: it may so easily turn to criticism or condemnation if a good "atrocity" slogan should arise or if the conflict is prolonged. On the Left Swami Sahajanand has already "ratted" on us to the extent of denouncing our repression but I have information that his lieutenant Jamuna Karjee, a person of more real influence amongst the Kisans, will oppose the Congress move even if it takes the form of a no-rent campaign. A no-rent campaign will take some time to work up and meantime a good monsoon is making for a prosperous harvest and less agricultural discontent. Labour too appears to be fairly contented and Jamshedpur and the coal fields should not give us much trouble. On the other hand the supply and price control situation continues to be troublesome and may prove to be a focus of agitation. I fear too that we shall not have a very sympathetic Press; serious offence has been taken at the restrictions which have been imposed. In my own view the restrictions are necessary and I am not particularly apprehensive of their results. The Muslim League and the Mahasabha are for the time being neutral though the latter may swing against us. The League waits for the word of Jinnah though I do not think the Muslims as a whole will do so if the Hindus try to impose a *hartal* upon them.

Which ones?
L.

[Para. 4, on the food situation, dacoities, and relations between Chinese troops under American command and local inhabitants, and para. 5, on the Rice Conference, omitted.]

Yours sincerely,

T. A. STEWART

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509

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *11 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of 24th July[1] and for the interesting comment in it. I have, as you may imagine, had a very heavy time during these last few days, but I think that so far we can congratulate ourselves on the way things have gone, certainly so far as my Council are concerned, though as I write there is a good deal of nasty stuff in the situation throughout the country consequent on the break with Congress which I shall be glad to see removed.

2. I think my Council deserve full marks for the way in which they stood up to a most unpopular decision. I had been endeavouring over many days past in individual conversation and also in our regular meetings of Council to lead them in the right direction, though I have scrupulously refrained from taking any decision, even contingent, and have been at pains throughout to emphasise that my mind and theirs must remain open until the crisis came. I was not by any means certain right up to the last that I was going to get a unanimous vote, for certain of my friends were very far from anxious to stand up to this problem. I was quite ready to take the decision myself if it had to be taken, but realising how great would be the value to Council as an education in responsibility, and equally how great would be the propaganda value outside of a unanimous vote by them, I strained every nerve to secure that result. Mody was extremely miserable. There were in one or two other colleagues signs of doubt. But finally Council without any dissentient agreed that there was nothing for it in face of the challenge thrown down but to take immediate and drastic action against Gandhi and the Working Committee on the lines with which you are familiar.

3. There was some discussion as to whether it would not be a good thing to wait for the receipt of the letter which Gandhi was alleged in the Press to be sending to me. I pointed out to my colleagues that there was nothing in fact to show that I might expect such a letter beyond rumours in the Press, and C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar was of great assistance here by giving an amusing account of his own epistolary correspondence with the Mahatma at an earlier stage, and the delays, uncertainties and final disappointment which it had involved. As I write there is still no sign of any letter, and we should indeed have been unwise to have waited for one. I do not exclude the possibility that Gandhi

[1] No. 323.

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may send me something from his place of restraint, and I shall have to consider how to deal with it if he does. But that is a different business, and it will be much easier to handle, now that the decisive step has been taken, than it would have been had we delayed at the end of last week.

4. I am sorry to have bothered you so much with the text of our resolution. My heart sank when my first draft, after a couple of hours of round-table discussion, emerged in rags and I was required to produce a modified version at the shortest of notice. But the modified version went down very well, and I think that my colleagues were probably pleased to have had a chance of shooting a few arrows at a target such as this, and of making themselves felt. The real question of course was whether we wanted a pugnacious draft or one bound in leather, and I think that the instinct of Council was right in preferring the latter, though I had originally assumed from one's conversations that the former would be more acceptable to them.

5. The situation is not too bad. Bombay is clearly the main storm centre, and Lumley gives me rather a gloomy account of the situation in the city as I dictate today. But throughout the rest of the country, as the telegrams[2] so far received (I have asked Governors to repeat direct to you) show, though there is a great deal of sporadic disorder of varying degrees of seriousness and though the strain on the police and the executive authorities in the Provinces must be considerable, there is nothing of great importance. We are having in Delhi today a certain amount of trouble, but I hope that that will quieten down. Taken over the country as a whole, the total casualties hardly exceed, indeed hardly approach, those that result from a severe communal riot in a place like Bombay or Ahmedabad. It would be a mistake at the same time to imagine that we are at all yet round this corner. I think there is a good deal in the suggestion made in Twynam's telegram of 10th August that the effect of our sudden, decisive, and well thought out action has been somewhat stunning, and, if that is correct, there may well be a reaction in a few days' time. But I am still not without hope that by, say, the middle of September I shall have this movement under control, and at the moment I am not ill-pleased with the results of the preparatory action which we have taken.

6. I would like again to thank you for all your help and advice, and for your assistance with the Cabinet. I was particularly relieved that we should have got them off the deportation idea, much as my own instinct leant to deportation: and I hope equally that, in the light of the reports that I have sent you from Governors and from Hartley, we shall be able to get them off the idea of leaving Gandhi to die in prison if he dies on his fast to death (and I fear that the indications are rather that he will try that method of pressure). And I would like to say a word of very warm thanks to you and to the India Office, and Joyce, for

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your invaluable help over propaganda. I think my own machine here has (almost for the first time) worked very well, and the combined effect of the arrangements made at home to cover the United Kingdom and the States and of those made from here has been very striking, and has produced for once a very definite position of advantage for us as compared with that of our political adversaries.

7. Before I leave these past discussions I would only like to add one word about the attitude of Council towards any intervention by His Majesty's Government of a nature which could be represented as a surrender to Congress or as the over-riding of the Government of India. You will have gathered from various of my telegrams the curiously intense bitterness which they appear to feel without exception (I have in mind particularly people like Firoz) at the way in which they were handled by Cripps: and while only the older members of my Council can speak of that with experience, they appear thoroughly to have indoctrinated the new recruits with their views. This was the background to their reluctance to see Cripps broadcast,[3] and I was frankly astonished by the reiteration (and the bitterness of the reiteration) of their attitude towards Cripps, and I fear towards the Cabinet to the extent that they were responsible for him, during the discussion on the draft resolution. Thus the line was taken that it was impossible to disregard the representative character of Congress since that had been fully accepted by His Majesty's Government through the mouth of their emissary, despite the protests that had been made to him by all other parties. Srivastava spoke of Cripps' attitude towards the Mahasabha: Ambedkar was aware of his attitude towards the Depressed Classes: C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar recounted at first hand the remarks of Cripps to Their Highnesses of Bhopal, Jamnagar, and Bikaner, made in his presence and those of Gopalaswami Iyengar of Kashmir and Krishnamachari: and I found myself from time to time in a most difficult position when matter was quoted from Cripps by first-hand witnesses which, as I knew well, went right outside anything that the Cabinet had authorised him to say, or which represented statements against which I had myself protested to you at the time and my protest in regard to which you had upheld. However, we got round the corner, but the existence of this feeling is of material importance: and while my Council in saying all that they asked me to convey to you by way of protest went a good deal over their own boundaries, I did not feel any hesitation in thinking that the wise course was to pass it on in the hope that you and the Cabinet would realise the atmosphere here and would be able to let me have a reasonably sympathetic reply.[4]

8. For it is quite essential, now that we have a body of this quality and size, to take it with one. The longer they hold together the less risk, I should

[2] Not printed. [3] See No. 404. [4] See Nos. 492 and 493.

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think, there was of resignations and the more chance of building up a tradition which may be of very considerable value to my successor, and of real assistance to India, if, as seems only too likely, we have to continue with the present form of Council Government for some considerable time. They are of course touchy; they do not quite realise (or will not quite realise) where they stand constitutionally; and they are naturally very anxious to have something to wave before the public as proof of their independence of attitude and the regard in which they are held by His Majesty's Government. I revert to this further below in connection with the suggestions which certain of my colleagues have been thinking over. But, with patience, I hope that it will be possible to get things going smoothly though I may occasionally not only have to exercise a great deal of patience myself but to ask for your forbearance and that of the Cabinet!

9. Now for a word about the anxiety of some of my colleagues to push ahead without delay. I telegraphed[5] to you on the question of the possible replacement of Raisman and Maxwell, and am most grateful to you both for your prompt reply[6] and for its authoritative character. It has been of real use to me, and has very greatly strengthened my hand in dealing with this particular proposition, to which I should be most averse from assenting in the present situation unless it appeared after consultation with you that it was quite vital to do so. I think I mentioned at an earlier stage[7] that shortly after Cripps left for home, some of my colleagues got together with a view to presenting me with agreed demands for the conferment on this Council of those benefits in the constitutional field which they might have looked for at the Centre had Cripps' negotiations succeeded. That attempt came to nothing, for it proved impossible to secure unanimity, and the communal bogey emerged, I understand, at a very early stage. I am now informed that there is in draft a further representation to me designed to be signed by the Indian Members of the Council *plus* Benthall, and to ask for (*a*) the removal of Maxwell and Raisman: (*b*) Executive Councils in the Provinces: (*c*) a guarantee that the Council will be consulted on all important matters at the Centre.[8] I suspect that this will have the fate of its predecessor, for at least two of my colleagues have made it clear to me that they would have nothing to do with such a document, and I should not be surprised if they had at least two more companions. It may well therefore be that it will all come to nothing, and I have not failed to indicate discreetly when the matter was touched on in confidential conversation with me by the dissentients that while the Council has behaved admirably and in the manner that one would have hoped, given its composition, over this question of the arrest of Gandhi, &c., that that is the course that it ought properly to have taken given its own self-respect, and that any suggestion, such as might easily arise were we immediately thereafter to give publicity

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to moves in the constitutional field, that these represented the *quid pro quo* with which His Majesty's Government had bought the support of the Council for an unpopular decision, would be damaging to them in the highest degree.

10. I have little doubt that we shall be able to dispose of the proposed removal of Maxwell and Raisman. I had a long talk with C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar this morning, and in the result he fully accepted the arguments against. Usman is most violent in his opposition to anything on these lines: Benthall and Firoz I would expect to take the same line: and they might very well be supported by Ambedkar and J. P. Srivastava. I do not propose to argue it further here.

11. The second point, which can more fairly be described as an anxiety on the part of Council to see the representation of the non-official element in Section 93 Provinces in the Government of those Provinces, stands on a different footing. It is not my Council's business but it is certainly a matter which I should be prepared to discuss with them, though I should make it clear, if I did so, that the matter was not one within their sphere of control; that it was one on which the views of Governors would carry preponderating weight with His Majesty's Government; and that the provincial field also was in whatever respect a very dangerous one for trespassers from the Governor-General's Executive Council, since any suggestion that they were endeavouring to re-enter an autonomous area (even where, as at present, that area was temporarily unfortunately under the control of Governors and not of legislatures and Ministers as well as Governors) would be bound to lead to serious misunderstanding and possibly to cause some alarm in Ministerial Provinces such as Bengal and the Punjab. You and I are only too familiar with the various possible solutions, and we have canvassed at frequent intervals over the past two years the arguments for and against non-official advisers, or a mixture of non-official advisers and official advisers. I propose to analyse these various objections and put them before my Council. But the idea which certain of my colleagues apparently have in mind goes of course much further than the appointment of advisers, whether official or non-official, or both, who would *assist* the Governor but whose existence would not in any way detract from the exclusive responsibility vested in the Governor under your control and mine for the management of the affairs of the Province. Reversion to Executive Council Government and the revival of that once much maligned entity, the Governor-in-Council (even on the assumption that the Executive Councillors were non-officials and not officials) raises very fundamental issues. It could not take effect without an amendment of the law, and though I myself begin to entertain very grave doubts as to the adequacy or practicability in present

[5] No. 438. [6] No. 459. [7] See Nos. 8, para. 3; 22, para. 6; and 401, para. 5.
[8] See No. 483.

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political conditions here of the form of Provincial Government embodied in the Act of 1935 over large parts of India, and though we may have to admit that the experiment has failed, I still suspect myself that were one to go back today to Parliament, admit that that failure was complete over two-thirds of British India, and ask the House of Commons to agree to a system which for practical purposes put the legislatures and the electorate out of court for many years, we might have a somewhat unexpected result if the whips were taken off. We may have to face it, I do not for a moment dispute that. But I should be rather surprised if the case for doing so had sufficiently begun to sink into people's minds in Parliament as yet, and if that is so, that is a case for caution. That again of course I shall be perfectly prepared to talk over with my colleagues, and I shall be interested to see how their minds react to the impact of the various considerations which you and I have found impediments in the past.

12. Now for the third point which I mentioned in paragraph 9 above. Here frankly I do not quite know what my colleagues are after. We cannot have them invading the field of the Governor-General's discretions, or the field of Provincial Autonomy. Benthall, when I sounded him, thought that it was likely that they were anxious to be in more on the business of the Home Department (they cannot complain that they have not been in on every item of any importance of its business over our decision to take action against Congress) and of the Finance Department. If that is so, the sub-committee idea which I mentioned in my letter of the 3rd August,[9] but which I cannot of course take further even in my own mind until I am able to discuss with Maxwell and with Raisman, might go a long way towards meeting any difficulties. As so often in the Indian political field, the real trouble is not so much that a matter is kept from Council, for that is not the case, as that they have been bred in an atmosphere of suspicion and are inclined to think that a good deal is done without their knowledge on which they could properly claim to be brought in. I have spared no effort to rid them of the idea that secrets are being kept from them, and I think I have had a considerable degree of success, though one sometimes gets tired of having to fight the same battle again and again. The point is one which my successor will find of very real importance and which you may think it worth mentioning to him when the time comes. This team will work very well indeed so long as it has confidence in the Governor-General, and so long as he is prepared to devote a great deal of energy to watching it and satisfying it and disabusing it of the idea that it is not trusted. But that exhausting process is I fear an essential condition of smooth running, and it is not likely to become less so as time goes on.

* * *

15. One suggestion[10] that Cripps made when out here was apparently that it would be a good thing for the Princes to make contact with the major

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political parties in British India, though I fear that as with many of the somewhat unguarded statements which he made he added that it was not a matter for him but for me, thereby leaving me with the responsibility for rejecting suggestions which I would never have made and wholly disapproved of! In the present case there has been correspondence in the result with the Chamber of Princes, and I send you with this bag copies of the Chancellor's letter of the 12th July[11] and Craik's reply.[12] You may also receive them through the official channel. I am quite certain that the line taken in Craik's answer is the only possible one. C.P. has, I may say, already had some fun with me in Council over this business, but he is wise enough to enjoy himself without going an inch further than he should.

16. I am very grateful to the Colonial Office and the Government of Nyasaland for the help they have given us over the possible use of Nyasaland for deportation. I have just had a telegram[13] from the Governor and am replying on certain of the points which he raises.

* * *

23. Thank you very much for your private and personal telegram of the 10th August No. 970,[14] about Alexander and his activities. I am very grateful to you and sorry that his unwise zeal (the motives behind which I am quite ready to recognise) should have caused him to be a nuisance to either of us. I will, as you suggest, let him have the general sense of what you have been kind enough to tell me, and I hope that that will keep things quiet. In any event, the Congress position has now of course taken a turn at which most of Alexander's friends are out of reach. I am, I need not add, most anxious to continue to give the humanitarian work of the unit all the help I can.

Best luck.

[9] No. 401, paras. 7–9.
[10] See Vol. I, No. 498, from which it appears that the suggestion was made by the Chamber of Princes' Delegation.
[11] No. 242; the date should be 10 July.
[12] No. 338.
[13] Of 9 August. MSS. EUR. F. 125/130.
[14] No. 498.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *12 August 1942, 9.25 pm*
SECRET
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2385-S. Much to my surprise, C. P. came to see me this morning and suggested that on reflection he thought it would be a good thing, given the gravity of the situation, if he were to fly to Poona, see Gandhi, and beg him to call off his civil disobedience movement. I said that I must of course consider anything one of my colleagues put to me, and would turn it over in my mind, but that I could not hold out any hope of my being able to regard the suggestion as a sound one.

2. I cannot quite think what C. P. is after, or what is in his mind, unless it is that he too is beginning to suffer from the strain which this business is putting on the nerves of my Hindu colleagues. Hitherto, he has taken exactly the opposite line and been anxious to be stiff.

3. I have confidentially consulted Mudaliar and Srivastava. Both are most firmly opposed to any compromise with Gandhi, which, as Mudaliar remarked, would represent an abdication. Srivastava would let him fast to death. I am sure that that would be the attitude of my Muslim colleagues, and almost certainly of Ambedkar; and, while I shall treat C. P.'s request with care and respect, I have no intention of acceding to it.

4. Nor have I the least intention of budging myself on this issue, and I [am] proceeding on the basis, which I do not think I need ask you to confirm, that Cabinet will be wholly with me in resisting anything that could be even remotely represented as a climb-down or compromise. We shall no doubt get more of these feelers as time goes on and the strain becomes greater. But I am quite prepared in the last resort to see the business through on my own responsibility, if necessary, all the more so as there is nothing in the situation in the country to justify any uneasiness (see my telegram of today).[1]

[1] No. 511.

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511

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *12 August 1942, 9.25 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 12 August, 9 pm*

No. 2386-S. Congress situation. Governors are repeating their provincial situation reports direct. Home Department will keep you in touch with developments in Chief Commissioners' provinces. You will like to know my general appreciation. It is briefly that we are doing very well. There is a good deal of quite subordinate damage to property, rioting, occasional molestation, &c. But that has got to be seen in its true perspective. Only area in which there has been any trouble that matters is Bombay Presidency, and even there what has taken place in Ahmedabad, Poona, and Bombay City bears no relation at all to the seriousness in casualties and damage of bad communal rioting. In Delhi there has been a good deal of trouble. Casualties may be heavy and some damage has been done to property. Here again I attach no importance to it. It is not political in character, but is largely due to millhands on strike, and the Chief Commissioner is quite confident that he can handle the situation, which is indeed much quieter today. Throughout the rest of the country, as you will see from the reports, there is nothing on a broad view of any importance whatever. We may get more trouble in the next few days, but I am not in the least degree worried by the prospect, and am entirely satisfied with the preparations we have made to deal with it and with the way in which they are being carried out.[1]

2. Inevitably a very false view is given by the kind of stuff telegraphed home by the news agencies, &c. I discussed in Council this morning possibility of stopping this down to a substantial degree. But the general feeling was that so far as India was concerned, it was not a bad thing to let sober-minded people see how immediately an allegedly non-violent movement can be generated into acute violence; risk of handing the country over, not to Congress politicians but to hooligans, &c. I am not quite convinced by that but do not judge it politic to press the point further at the moment. I have now, however, in the light of your private and personal telegram No. 980[2] of 11th August

[1] Mr Amery transmitted the substance of para. 1 to Mr Churchill (via Air Ministry and 30 Military Mission, Moscow) in telegram Tulip 111 of 13 August. L/PO/6/102a: f 58.

[2] Expressing the view that 'too much detail about disturbances is coming through and by its sheer volume giving impression of something like a major war in India'; and suggesting that if Reuters could not be persuaded to shorten material 'and bring it into better perspective', censorship might 'deal with long-winded stuff by refusing priority or by direct instructions to reduce'. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

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received after the Council meeting, told C. P. that we must consider tightening up and have asked him to reconsider the position. But I must repeat that I see nothing in this situation to cause me any worry or disturbance and I hope it will be possible to keep it in its proper perspective at the London end so far as the Press is concerned.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *12 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2387–S. Your private and personal telegram of 11th August, No. 979.[1] Moore. I am most grateful and hope you will thank Catto very warmly for me. I of course fully realise Catto's difficulties . . .[2]

2. I am letting Herbert know position confidentially and asking him to get hold of Richardson and ginger him up to action. It is the more important that something should be done as the *Statesman* leader of the 10th August was raised in my Council today when very strong disposition to take immediate action against Moore and the *Statesman* was manifested. I headed them off that, but much emphasis was laid by various Members on fact that our gentleness towards Moore was regarded widely as racial discrimination while Benthall indicated that many Europeans would greatly welcome a stronger line with *Statesman* which was a source of much embarrassment to the extent that it was so widely regarded as representing European opinion when in fact it did not do so.

[1] See No. 513. [2] Personal comment omitted.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir J. Herbert (Bengal)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/42

SECRET *12 August 1942, by secraphone*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2387–A.S. I have felt bound to inform His Majesty's Government of tone of recent editorials in *Statesman*, and have sent full text of editorials of 10th

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August,[1] and 6th August.[2] These have been seen by Catto to whom also I have asked Secretary of State to make representations. I have now had from Secretary of State following telegram:—

Begins. Your telegram No. 2352-S.[3] I have seen Catto who has asked me to let you have following summary of his efforts in respect of Moore:—

"In addition to previous efforts Catto cabled Moore very strongly on May 19th and on June 18th to Richardson that unless Moore implicitly obeyed cable of May 19th then they must part company forthwith and after receipt of Richardson's reply in which he said Moore indicated that (there?) might be publicity if forced out, Catto again cabled to Richardson that unless Moore will work in team and accept guidance he must be dropped and indicated this could be done by giving leave of absence on full pay till expiration of contract and regarding publicity that he does not quarrel with his associates but if they choose to quarrel with him by encouraging publicity the threat of which is unworthy of Moore this does not worry Catto and would recoil on Moore besides forfeiting Catto's esteem and friendship. In separate cable Catto told Richardson not to cable further about this matter as he had given all guidance possible and that Richardson who is Chairman of *Statesman* Company and Directors must now deal with the matter in regard to which they have Catto's full support and authority."

In addition however and in view of your message Catto has today cabled Richardson in the following terms:—

"I am sure I need not impress upon you and Moore that you must see the *Statesman* gives Viceroy and his Government fullest support in present emergency. Authority of government has been challenged and whatever may have been previous expression of political views the present situation is no longer question of politics but of law and order which it is our duty to support to fullest extent. I rely on you both. Leader of 10th very opposite of this spirit."

. . .[4] Obvious solution is immediate leave of absence to end of his contract. *Ends.*

2. Between you and me I am quite clear that it is Richardson's weakness that is responsible for a good deal of the trouble, but I cannot see him myself as he is in Calcutta. Could you send for him and confidentially give him gist of Secretary of State's telegram? I personally agree with suggestion at the end of that telegram. We cannot go on like this, for I am under very strong pressure over our forbearance in regard to Moore already. I know I can rely on your tact and discretion in this delicate matter, but Richardson must be gingered up to point, and I am sure that you will be able to do it. I realise that he is no match for Moore, but he obviously has plenary authority and he must nerve himself to the effort.

[1] No. 496. [2] See No. 426, note 2. [3] No. 495. [4] Personal comment omitted.

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Mr Martin to Mr Rowan (via Air Ministry and 30 Military Mission, Moscow)

Telegram, L/PO/6/105f: ff 77–8

IMMEDIATE *12 August 1942*
MOST SECRET
TULIP No. 101 (NOCOP). For Rowan from Martin. The following has been received from the President for the Former Naval Person. Personal and Most Secret. *Begins.* No. 177. 11.8.1942.

I have just received following from the Generalissimo in Chungking.

"I feel certain that you [are] concerned as I am at the news of the arrest of the Working Committee of the Indian Congress including Gandhi and Nehru. In my last telegram[1] I expressed my dread that such a development would prove to be a great setback to the Allied cause in the Far East and would certainly have a disastrous effect on the entire war situation. I fear also that if matters are allowed to deteriorate further the influence of the Axis Powers would be considerably strengthened and the avowed object of the Allies in waging this war would no longer be taken seriously by the world and the professed principles of the United Nations would lose much of their spiritual significance. At all costs the United Nations should demonstrate to the world by their action the sincerity of their professed principle of ensuring freedom and justice for men of all races. I earnestly appeal to you as the inspired author of the Atlantic Charter to take (effective (query)) measures which undoubtedly have already occurred to you to solve the pressing problem now facing India and the world so that normalcy will return and unimpeded war effort may continue to hasten our common victory. Your policy will serve as a guide to all of us who have resisted for so long and so bitterly the brute force of the aggressors. Trusting you will favour me with an early reply."

What do you think?

ROOSEVELT. *Ends*

[1] Annex 1 to No. 392.

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Mr Irwin to Sir G. Laithwaite

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

12 August 1942, by secraphone

Poona.—His Excellency the Governor has received a letter from Gandhi complaining that he and Mrs. Naidu, Mirabai and Mahadev were taken in a

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car, while their co-prisoners were taken to jail in lorries. He feels deeply humiliated and in the altered conditions and altered state of his mind he can no longer accept special privileges which he has hitherto accepted, and will accept no privileges and comforts which his comrades do not receive, except special food. Rough handling of co-prisoners who resisted the police non-violently comes in for criticism.

He wants Vallabhbhai Patel and his daughter to be accommodated with him at the Palace. The daughter is Vallabhbhai's nurse and cook and Gandhi has been personally regulating his diet. Other co-prisoners should also be accommodated at the Aga Khan's Palace.

He wants newspapers as he wants to correct totally incorrect statement of the Government of India resolution, and wants to know what is going on outside the jail.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/606: f 26

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *12 August 1942, 1.15 pm*

14159. Home Dept. telegram 11th August 6335.[1]

I am most grateful for daily reports from provinces, but brief daily appreciation from yourself of situation as a whole on lines requested in Joyce's telegram to Puckle 14061[2] of 10th August is also urgently needed not only for press guidance but also for Cabinet. I suggest that it be repeated to Chungking and possibly Kuibyshev as well as Washington.

[1] This telegram noted that Mr Amery was receiving situation reports direct from the Provinces, and reported on the situation in Delhi on 9th, 10th, and 11th. L/P&J/8/606: f 27.

[2] This telegram pointed out the need for Reuters to send a brief general appreciation twice a day to counteract the impression of serious disturbances given by sensational news flashes. Mr Joyce also requested Sir F. Puckle to telegraph daily, repeating to Messrs Hennessy and Butler, a 'brief general picture of situation as seen from Delhi, which could be used unofficially for guidance purposes'. L/I/1/756: f 193. By 15 August, it was agreed that the Viceroy's daily reports would meet the latter need. *Ibid.*, ff 181–2.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill (via Air Ministry and 30 Military Mission, Moscow)

Telegram, L/PO/6/105f: f 74

IMMEDIATE *12 August 1942, 8.15 pm*
MOST SECRET

TULIP No. 105. Reference TULIP 101.[1] 12/8/42. Following personal for Prime Minister from Secretary of State for India.

Most earnestly hope you will dissuade President in strongest terms from paying any attention to Generalissimo's mischievous and ignorant intervention. He might possibly remind Generalissimo that Gandhi was prepared if we quitted India to negotiate with Japan and has repeated this view of his in last few days and is anyhow wedded to non-violence which will not open Burma Road. All the talk of Congress leaders wishing freedom for sake of helping Allies is insincere eyewash. They are concerned with one thing only, namely Congress supremacy in India. It might be worth pointing out to President that decision to intern was taken by Executive at which only one European present to eleven Indians, that these Indians are as good Indian patriots and as able men as any of the Congress leaders, and that they have shown great courage and that it is essential not to weaken their authority.

[1] No. 514.

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Sir R. Campbell to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 174

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, *12 August 1942, 11.34 pm*
SECRET *Received: 13 August, 5.55 am*

No. 4101. Hopkins told me this morning that Soong had been talking to him about India and suggesting some joint Chinese American attempts at mediation. Hopkins said that he had spoken doubtfully to him about the danger of outside interference and its futility. Soong also told him that Chinese Ambassador to Panama[1] on his way through India had borne a letter from Chiang Kai-shek to Nehru. Nehru had professed moderate intentions and that he would accept dominion status on condition of Chinese American guarantee. Hopkins had replied that whatever Nehru might say was useless since it would be Gandhi who would decide, and we all knew what Gandhi was. Hopkins however said

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that the President was anxious about the situation but as I gathered could not see what could be done.

2. At Pacific Council Meeting this morning, the President referred to the Indian situation and said that all the United Nations must watch it with anxiety. Aiming his remarks at Soong, he continued that he and Chiang Kai-shek had been corresponding on the subject and that he felt sure that they saw eye to eye on *ultimate* Government of India. But he had explained to Chiang Kai-shek the hesitations he felt on the point of timing. Frankly he did not think India was ready today for complete independence. If he could talk to Chiang Kai-shek at a table he was sure that he would bring him to his point of view. He did not feel that China and United States when they had a great friend like Great Britain could tell the British Empire what it must or must not do nor could they say to it "we will arbitrate in this thing for you". The matter was nevertheless of general concern to the United Nations.

[1] Mr Tu Yun-tan.

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Note by Mr Hollington Tong[1]

L/P&S/12/2315: ff 104–8

undated

Sir Horace Seymour, British Ambassador, called on the Generalissimo at 4.30 p.m. on August 11th, 1942, at Hwangshan. Madame Chiang was present. Following is a gist of their conversation:—

Sir Horace: I talked about the Indian affairs when I called on you the last time. This time I am calling on you also in connection with the Indian affairs. It was the wish of the Government of India that necessity of taking measures such as now being taken could be avoided. This unfortunately proved impossible and the Government of India with the approval of the British Government had been obliged to detain a number of the Congress leaders. There are three points which I should like to make clear; firstly, that this action was taken with the full support of the Viceroy's Executive Council, the membership of which consists of eleven Indians and four British; secondly, that the movement was the beginning of a scheme which would lead to a total collapse of Indian war efforts—I understand that further documents on this aspect of the question are to be issued; and thirdly, that these measures have been taken in the interests of the United Nations as a whole, and by no means for the protection of the

[1] Enclosed in despatch 107 of 12 August 1942 from H.M. Ambassador, Chungking to the Secretary to the Government of India, External Affairs Department.

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British interests alone. There was no change in the British policy of letting the Indian people decide the kind of government which is to rule them after the war. I would like to draw attention that Sir Stafford Cripps had pointed out in a statement, which the Generalissimo no doubt had seen, the chaotic conditions which must necessarily follow if the present basis of government is suddenly withdrawn.

Generalissimo: What has been done has been done, and I do not wish to make any comment on that. What we are now principally concerned [with] is to find a modus vivendi whereby a peaceful settlement of the Indian problem can be effected. However, I did not expect that the development of the situation should have been so swift. I thought that following the launching of the non-co-operation movement there would be a lapse of say one week or ten days during which mediation might be offered. The fact that arrests immediately followed the passing of the resolution of the Congress has made this impossible. Despite this, we still must seek a peaceful solution of the Indian problem.

First of all, I would like to make clear my position and my attitude towards the Indian problem. Essentially it is a domestic problem which concerns Britain and India only. As a third party I have no desire to interfere and have been scrupulous to keep myself away from it, although I did my best to persuade both parties to see the need of a peaceful solution of their problem. This position and this attitude of mine has not changed. However the importance of the problem to the cause of the United Nations cannot be over-emphasized. A successful solution of the question or failure in reaching a solution would mean victory or defeat for the United Nations. That was the reason why I went to India last winter to exploit the possibility of obtaining a peaceful settlement of the Indian problem. India is a danger spot in the Far East, and a pivot point on which our joint war is to turn. I have no other object than to make both sides understand each other and to seek a peaceful solution of their problem.

Let me further explain my attitude. 1. Since the commencement of the Pacific War, the interests of Britain and China have become identical. The British understand that their interests are ours and our interests are theirs. In view of this attitude of mine, I am not afraid of British suspicion of my motive or their misunderstanding it. I have in my mind the best interests of Britain and other United Nations and are [am] truly unselfish in the view which I held. Sooner or later the fact will speak for itself. 2. From the viewpoint of principles, I wish frankly to admit that I am in sympathy with the aspiration of the people of India for freedom.

Sir Horace: There can be no difference of opinion on this point because we all are in sympathy with the aspiration of the people of India for independence.

Generalissimo: I do not indulge in personal feelings towards the Indians, nor have I been bound by any kind of close relationship to them. In the past China was oppressed, and naturally I automatically feel sympathetic with the aspira-

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tion of the Indians for freedom. Having had a good deal of administrative experience, I cannot support the Indian demand for an immediate British withdrawal, which is impractical. What I can fully support is the reaching of an understanding between the British and the Indians and the effecting of a peaceful settlement of the problem that has been outstanding. Such being my attitude, the British have suspected that I have been helping the Indians in their struggle for freedom while the Indians have suspected that I have been helping the British. My position becomes difficult, and in the present circumstances I do not wish to offer any explanation. As I have said elsewhere, it will be clear when the time comes. Meanwhile I do not mind British suspicion of me. However, I must admit that I have been showing greater sympathy for the people of India. That is because I desire to win their confidence in me so that I may have greater chances for the attainment of the object which I have had in mind, namely, a peaceful settlement of the Indian problem in the interest of the allied cause.

Sir Horace: The British have never suspected your motive in your interest in the Indian problem. However there is a feeling prevailing that you have thought too much of the Congress, and have not paid sufficient attention to other aspects of the Indian problem.

Generalissimo: Different persons may hold different viewpoints. As for myself, I hold that the pivot of the Indian problem is the Congress. If the problem of the Congress is solved, other aspects of the Indian question can be settled without much difficulty. My sympathy with the Congress desire for freedom is sincere; aside from the ground of principles I believe it is a good thing not only for Britain and India but also for the other United Nations to have an amicable solution of the Indian problem. I am telling you as a friend of mine and in my personal capacity that if Britain and India should go to extremity resulting in the existence of ill-feelings between them, and what is worse, if there should exist ill-feelings between China and India at the same time, India would be driven to Japan's arms. There would ensue a permanent occupation of India by Japan, and such a development would be bad for Britain as well as for China. I have been much worried over such a possibility. I strongly urge that the United Nations generally and China particularly must not pursue a policy which will estrange their relationship with the people of India. There is a need for the pursuing of a different policy between say Britain and China in dealing with the Indian problem. If the policy of these two nations should be identical, this would be detrimental to the British interests, because the people of India find that there is no hope for them and that the best thing for them to do is to turn to Japan for support. If the people of India can count upon sympathy from some members of the United Nations, they feel that there is still some hope left for them to cling to. Any experienced statesman will see the validity of the reason for some members of the United Nations to be in sympathy with the people of India. Things being what they are now,

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it is not in the interest of our common cause to take a parallel attitude towards the Indian problem. In other words, we must do everything within our power to prevent Japan's use of India as her tool.

Sir Horace: Consciously or unconsciously the Congress leaders are being used by the Japanese as their tools.

Generalissimo: I do not believe that they would permit themselves to be used by the Japanese. Take Mr. Nehru for instance. The Japanese certainly cannot influence him.

Sir Horace: That is so, but the strikes which the Congress leaders have instituted are causing disorder and interfering with the regular functioning of the Government which will have a disastrous result if not arrested.

Generalissimo: The present development is a natural reaction from the arrest of some of the leaders of the Congress. It is true that it impedes the war progress, but thus far I believe that the movement is still nationalistic and not under Japanese influence if the psychology of the Indian people is carefully studied.

Sir Horace: I do not suggest that the present movement has been caused by Japanese influence. However, I do maintain that what the Congress is doing is playing into the Japanese hands.

Generalissimo: I still hold the view that one satisfactory and immediate solution of the problem which is now impeding our war efforts is some form of peaceful settlement of the Indian question. I believe that the only way is that of mediation by America. Up to the present the American Government has not yet taken an open stand. The Indians may not object to Americans playing the role of a mediator if America can be influenced to do so. The United Nations should ask America to come out and serve as the mediator. Prior to the arrests of some leaders of the Congress, I think I could have persuaded them to accept America as mediator, but I do not know now how the Congress leaders would react towards such a proposal at present. However, Britain should initiate the move of getting the other United Nations to ask America to mediate in the dispute. If America should be willing to act as mediator, it may be proposed to the Congress party that she is acting for other United Nations and guarantees the carrying out of the arrangement as Sir Stafford Cripps had offered during the war, and the British granting of freedom after the war. Prior to the arrest of the Congress leaders, I believe such an arrangement had a good chance for Indian acceptance.

At this critical hour, it behoves the British to take a realistic attitude of the situation. A further bone of contention is that Britain is willing to give a dominion status whereas the Congress wanted full independence. There is not much difference between such dominion status as enjoyed by Australia and Canada, and independence. If freedom is graciously given, the good feelings of the Indians can be preserved. Even if the Indians get their freedom, in

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30 years or even in 100 years, British influence in that country would remain. It is impossible for a physical British withdrawal of her political, economic and industrial interests from India. Therefore I hold the view that you can be generous thereby winning the Indians' goodwill rather than force them to a revolution.

Let me assure you that in the interests of the United Nations I do not wish to see the development of any feeling of antagonism between China and India. The existence of a cordial feeling between them would help the allied cause. Consequently I have sent a telegram to Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Nehru, and Mr. Azad, in which I expressed my concern over their arrests and expressed the hope that they will take good care of themselves. Madame Chiang sent a letter in similar terms to Mrs. Naidu and Mrs. Pandit. I hope you will wire to the Viceroy informing him of the same and asking him to facilitate our Resident Commissioner Sheng Shoh-hua to deliver the telegram to these Congress members in person, and to see Mr. Nehru individually in order to ascertain his true reaction to the present situation. This is not a request from me but a suggestion. On the other hand, if the Viceroy wishes to have someone present when the telegram is delivered, it will be alright with me. I might give some help if my suggestion for Mr. Sheng to see Mr. Nehru in person and alone is accepted. What I am doing in this connection is a gesture of personal friendship, and may be helpful in the ultimate settlement of the Indian problem. Mr. Tong, give Sir Horace a copy of my telegram.

On parting, the Generalissimo: What I have just said represents not the official attitude of the Chinese Government but my personal view.

Sir Horace: At a crisis like this, views from more experienced statesmen like yourself would contribute to an early solution of the Indian problem. The more the better.

Generalissimo: When you wire the gist of my views to Mr. Churchill, please give my regards to him and to Mr. Eden. I hold him in high esteem. What I have suggested is my personal view, and a decision naturally rests with him.

Sir Horace: Thanks for your views on the Indian problem, which I will convey to my government. As regards mediation, there are three parties involved, and I cannot say that the proposal will necessarily be acceptable to any of them.

Generalissimo: If my telegram is to serve any useful purpose it must be quickly delivered.

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Mr Amery to Mr Attlee

L/PO/6/102a: f 6

INDIA OFFICE, *12 August 1942*

My dear Clem,

I have just seen Washington telegram 4068[1] of yesterday in to-day's War Cabinet distribution.

I resent very much the idea that our policy in India shall be governed by the ignorant views of the United Automobile Workers of America and I think Tawny [Tawney] and Butler are somewhat panicky in their clamour for an immediate counter-resolution or statement by the National Council of Labour here. However, I daresay such a public statement by our National Council of Labour might be a very good thing if the statement were a really effective and helpful one. You can judge best whether such a statement is likely to be forthcoming and if you think it a good idea would you be good enough to make the suggestion through whatever channel you may consider appropriate?

My Office understand from the Foreign Office that it would not meet the case if the statement were to be made by the T.U.C. which has given some offence to certain sections of American Labour opinion, and that the National Council would therefore be the most appropriate body to make it.

I am sending copies of this letter to Eden and Brendan Bracken.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] No. 506.

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 111th Conclusions, Minute 4

R/30/1/2: ff 42–3

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 12 August 1942 at 5 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Ernest Bevin, Viscount Halifax

Also present during discussion of item 4 were: Mr S. M. Bruce, Mr W. Nash, Sir Kingsley Wood, Mr Amery, Mr A. V. Alexander, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Sir Orme Sargent

INDIA

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 109th Conclusions, Minute 7)[1]

Further reference was made to the sensational character of the news reports regarding the state of public order in India. Though the extent of the disorder

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was relatively small, it was being reported in such a way as to give the impression that there was widespread rioting throughout the whole of India.

Particular reference was made to the prominence given to a report suggesting that in Bombay whipping was to be widely used as a punishment for arson, rioting or personal violence.[2]

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Secretary of State for India—

(i) To ascertain to what extent it was proposed to resort to whipping as a punishment for offences against public order.

(ii) To make further strong representations to the Government of India regarding the need for securing that Press representatives in India would exercise greater discretion in the messages sent abroad, and to ascertain what further action the Government of India proposed to take in this matter.

(iii) To make arrangements, in consultation with the Lord Privy Seal and the Minister of Information, for a meeting to be held with the editors of newspapers in this country with a view to impressing on them the need for greater discretion in publishing reports of disorders in India.

[1] No. 488.

[2] The effect of Section 3 of the Bombay (Emergency Powers) Whipping Act (XI of 1941) was to add these offences to those which might be punished by whipping. On 11 August the Government of Bombay announced that it had brought this Section into force.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *13 August 1942*

MOST SECRET

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2397–S. I saw Lauchlin Currie, Roosevelt's personal representative on his way through a few days ago, and at his request I am endeavouring to arrange for him to meet Wavell in Baghdad. He had nothing to say of any great importance and did not mention Indian politics. Our conversation was chiefly about China. D.I.B. now informs me, however, that he had a long talk on the 11th August in very confidential terms with Shiva Rao, as a result of which Shiva Rao prepared "Draft Memoranda" which he later handed over to Currie. We have no indication of the nature of the memoranda.

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2. I cannot resist the conclusion, taking Colonel Johnson's activities with incidents like this, that the Americans are not running entirely straight with us over India. Every one of them of any political eminence who comes through here flirts with Congress. I do not suppose there is much we can do, but I think you should know all the facts and my feeling, and that it should also be communicated to Foreign Office and to Halifax.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *13 August 1942, 5.55 pm*
Received: 13 August, 5.15 pm

No. 2398–S. Your No. 14159[1] of 12th August. I will readily send very brief daily personal appreciation as from myself and repeat it to Chungking, Kuibyshev, and Washington. Position will then be that you will be receiving (*a*) direct from Governors their daily situation reports; (*b*) my very brief daily appreciation; (*c*) official telegram from Home Department, as may be necessary from time to time, designed to cover Chief Commissioners' Provinces; (*d*) periodic fuller official appreciation of position by Home Department probably every couple of days.

2. I hope this will meet the case. If you have any suggestion we shall of course be most ready to consider it here.

[1] No. 516.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *13 August 1942, 7.30 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 13 August, 7.15 pm*

No. 2399–S. Following is my appreciation of position midday, 13th August. Reports received from Governors suggest further improvement in position. Bombay situation easier; Delhi situation is also in hand; no incident of any seriousness reported from provinces save attack by mob on station at Tenali in Madras which cut communications, looted goods-sheds and burnt two trains. Otherwise Madras Presidency is quiet, and though students continue to give

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trouble in various places, and there are still evidences of strain in industrial areas such as Lucknow, Cawnpore, Bombay, Nagpur, Ahmedabad, due partly to local hooligans and partly to presence of large numbers of mill-hands, &c. on strike, situation is throughout the country well in hand. No signs as yet of any developments of importance in rural areas. There are indications that troubles to date have been spontaneous reactions to arrest of Gandhi & Co. and that Congress may be planning a more formal opening of the civil disobedience movement throughout the country. We have dealt satisfactorily with immediate reactions to arrests, and I doubt if anything that has happened in the process will have helped Congress in securing their wider objectives. It remains to be seen how situation will develop, but present outlook may be taken on the whole as encouraging.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

IMMEDIATE *13 August 1942, by secraphone*

No. 2405-S. Your secraphone message of 12th August.[1] My present view is that there should be a mild but very definite change in our attitude towards Gandhi and his complaints, and that he should be made to feel that he has damaged his reputation and reduced his status by what he has done. I think further privileges should be refused firmly but very politely, and that he should be given to understand that there is no intention of changing the conditions of his detention for the present. It would in my judgment be most undesirable that you should send him any message or enter into any direct communication with him, and I suggest that the Collector of Poona should inform him personally and orally that his requests for the presence of Vallabhbhai Patel and his daughter, and of the Working Committee, cannot be acceded to, and that it is not at present proposed to let him have newspapers. The Collector should be on his dignity, refuse to allow himself to be won over by Gandhi's charm, and carefully avoid any undue geniality.

2. Nor can I agree to Rajagopalachari's telegram being delivered. The request if granted provides a start. At the next stage, Gandhi desires to send R. a reply. Next R. *must* see Gandhi personally to make the appeal effective, and so on indefinitely.

[1] See No. 543, also No. 515.

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3. For your own information I have three or four weeks in mind as the period during which no news from outside shall reach Gandhi or the Working Committee. I am, naturally, anxious to avoid provoking him to fast, but I feel little doubt that full information as to what is going on outside might well help him to decide on the best date to choose for one, as it would certainly help the Ahmednagar prisoners to discuss and concert future action.

Repeated to Secretary of State.

526

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *13 August 1942, 9.20 pm*
Received: 13 August, 8 pm

No. 2411-S. Following telegram No. 127-M, from Governor Madras, is repeated for information:—

Begins. I have received today a letter from Rajagopalachari. He enquires whether I could ask Lumley to send information in case Gandhi attempts to undertake a fast and obtain permission for him to visit Gandhi that he might attempt to dissuade him. He promises to maintain complete secrecy. Rajagopalachari concludes "I fully share with you all deep regret at course events have taken".

2. I personally do not support this request. It would be impossible to prevent leakage of news of this, and undesirable despite Rajagopalachari's privileged position *vis-à-vis* Gandhi to discriminate in his favour for an interview.

3. Will you kindly let me know how you would like me to reply to him. *Ends.*

527

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir A. Hope (Madras)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/70

IMMEDIATE *13 August 1942*

No. 2406-S. Your secret telegram dated 11th August, No. 127-M.[1] I quite agree, and am not prepared to allow communication with Gandhi or with Working Committee. Once that starts, there would be no end to it. I have so

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informed Lumley. You will no doubt let Rajagopalachari know decision in quite firm, but very polite, terms.

Repeated to Governor of Bombay (by secraphone) and Secretary of State.

[1] See No. 526.

528

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/608: f 68

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *13 August 1942, 8.45 am*
Received: 14 August

983. Understand Labour Party while generally sound are very much exercised in mind about reintroduction of so-called Whipping Ordinance in Bombay.[1] Cabinet also fear it may have adverse effect in America. Can you let me know exactly how this stands and on whom and to what extent corporal punishment is applied. Press has made it headline matter here. Generally flood of Reuter and other Press tripe today unabated and Cabinet seriously concerned at what they feel inadequate control.

[1] See No. 521, note 2.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/3: ff 296–7

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *13 August 1942, 8 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 14 August*

988. Your private and personal telegram No. 2346–S[1] and personal telegram No. 2347–S.[2] I had hoped to send you required assurance at once but it is necessary to put it before Cabinet and this unfortunately cannot be done until Monday. Draft which I propose to submit to them is as follows: *Begins.* Your personal telegram 2347–S. You can assure your colleagues that there is no question[3] of H.M.G. weakening under pressure from any Allied country or from any quarters in this country in their support of the Government of India in the execution of its primary responsibility for dealing with the situation created by the Congress resolution, or of their entering into negotiations with

[1] No. 492. [2] No. 493. [3] 'question' deciphered as 'position'.

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the present leaders of Congress or with other political parties with regard to any scheme designed to resolve the existing political deadlock, without consulting the Government of India fully. Their courageous and patriotic attitude has been sincerely appreciated here, and we rely on them to continue to play their part with the same[4] high sense of responsibility both for India's present peace and security and for her future destiny. *Ends.*

Could you let me know by Saturday evening whether you agree that this will meet the case?

[4] 'the same' deciphered as 'some'.

530

Mr Attlee to Mr Churchill (via Air Ministry and 30 Military Mission, Moscow)

Telegram, L/PO/6/102a: f 2

IMMEDIATE *13 August 1942, 9.20 pm*

MOST SECRET

TULIP No. 118. Following from Deputy Prime Minister for Prime Minister.

Following are salient points of statement issued by Labour Party and Trade Union Committee [Congress] last night.

Stresses that Indian freedom depends on victory. Indian effort important. Urges Indian communities to realise this.

The Labour movement is compelled to regard the present attempt to organize a civil disobedience movement in India as certain to injure seriously the hope of Indian freedom, for such a movement must add heavily to the present burdens and anxieties of the leaders of the United Nations, and give encouragement and comfort to the common enemy. The Labour movement therefore considers that the action of the Government of India in detaining leaders of Congress was a timely and unavoidable precaution.

Urges Government to make clear that on abandonment of civil disobedience, discussion can be resumed on principles duly[1] proclaimed by Government and endorsed by Parliament.

[1] Telegram Tulip 123 of 14 August, 3.25 am amended 'duly' to 'already'. L/PO/6/102a: f 3.

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Mr Churchill to Mr Amery (via 30 Military Mission, Moscow and Air Ministry)

Telegram, L/PO/6/102a: f 8

MOST SECRET *13 August 1942*
Received: 13 August, 1.27 am

REFLEX 80. Reference TULIP 91.[1] From Prime Minister to Secretary of State for India.

Report I read in Cairo was evidently misleading. Extracts you now send me seem unobjectionable except that no. 3 does not embody point of:—"Among free men and free Nations of the British Commonwealth".

We have also departed more precisely and emphatically than is necessary from the Lord Privy Seal's wise utterance that the offer had been rejected and from our own subsequent decision that in broad principle it remained open.[2]

Have wired President as you will see.[3]

[1] No. 505. [2] See e.g. Mr Amery's statement of 30 July on H.M.G.'s Indian policy (No. 366).
[3] No. 532.

532

Mr Churchill to his Private Office (via 30 Military Mission, Moscow and Air Ministry)

Telegram, L/PO/6/105f: ff 72–3

MOST SECRET *13 August 1942*
Received: 14 August, 4 pm

REFLEX No. 83. From Prime Minister to Private Office.

Please arrange transmission of following message through U.S. Embassy from Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

Begins. Secret and Personal. Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Your 177.[1] I take it amiss Chiang should seek to make difficulties between us and should interfere in matters about which he has proved himself most ill-informed which affect our sovereign rights. Decision to intern Gandhi was taken by Executive of twelve, at which only one European was present. These Indians are as good Indian patriots and as able men as any of the Congress leaders. They have shown great courage and it is essential not to weaken their authority. All Chiang's talk of Congress leaders wishing us to quit in order that they may help the Allies is eye-wash. They are concerned with one thing only, namely, Congress supremacy. It occurred to me you could remind Chiang that Gandhi was prepared to negotiate with Japan on the basis of a free

[1] See No. 514.

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passage for Japanese troops through India[2] in (corrupt group) of their joining hands with Hitler. Personally I have no doubt that in addition there would have been an understanding that the Congress would have the use of sufficient Japanese troops to keep down the composite majority of 90 million Moslems, 40 million untouchables and 90 million in the Princes' states. The style of his message prompts me to say *Cherchez la femme.*

2. It may well be that the ensuing weeks will show how very little real influence the Hindu Congress has over the masses of India.

3. Averell and I are sending you full accounts of our conversation with Stalin, and upshot of which is so far satisfactory. *Ends.*

Please also pass to Secretary of State for India and Cabinet.

[2] Mr Churchill was perhaps referring to Mr Gandhi's first draft for the A.-I.C.C. resolution passed on 1 May (Enclosure to No. 43, col. 1, seen by Mr Churchill in Appendix II to No. 150) and to Mr. Nehru's remarks on this draft in the first para. of Appendix II to No. 196.

533

War Cabinet W.M. (42) 112th Conclusions, Minute 5

R/30/1/2: f 45

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 13 August 1942 at 12.15 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Ernest Bevin, Viscount Halifax

Also present were: Mr A. V. Alexander, Sir Orme Sargent, Sir Dudley Pound

INDIA

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 111th Conclusions, Minute 4)[1]

THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER said that the Secretary of State for India had suggested that, as the Editors in this country were now dealing with news of the Indian position in a more satisfactory way, it was hardly necessary to arrange for a meeting at which they could be addressed by Ministers. Furthermore, there was reason to believe that most of the trouble had arisen as the result of messages from India by Reuter's.

In these circumstances, the War Cabinet—

(1) Agreed that it was unnecessary for a meeting to be held with the Editors.

(2) Invited the Secretary of State for India to consult with the Minister of Information, and to see representatives of Reuter's (who were now subject to a measure of Government control) and give them directions as to the form of their messages from India, in order to avoid further misrepresentation of the position.

[1] No. 521.

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Mr Amery to Mr Attlee

L/PO/11/3: f 299

INDIA OFFICE, *13 August 1942*

My dear Clem,

I enclose the draft telegram[1] of reassurance to the Government of India which Linlithgow is so anxious to secure. The only thing in it which commits the Cabinet, apart from general assurances of support, is the undertaking not to start new negotiations with Indian parties without full consultation with the Government of India. In view of the present composition of that Government and of the high sense of responsibility which it has shown, I don't see how we could do anything else. So far as I am concerned, I am quite willing to send the telegram off, subject to your approval. But you may prefer to bring it up before the Cabinet.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] i.e. the draft incorporated in No. 529.

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Mr Attlee to Mr Amery

L/PO/6/102a: f 1

DOMINIONS OFFICE, DOWNING STREET, S.W.1, *13 August 1942*

My dear Leo,

I see no suggestion here[1] that our action should be influenced by the American Trade Unions, but only that a statement by the National Council of Labour would be useful in steadying opinion.

The National Council of Labour are not meeting, but a satisfactory statement on behalf of the Labour Party has been made.[2]

Yours ever,

CLEM

[1] See Nos. 506 and 520. [2] See No. 530.

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Note by Mr Amery

L/PO/6/105f: f 83

NOTE OF A TALK WITH SIR E. VILLIERS ON 13TH AUGUST 1942[1]

Sir E. Villiers, talking very frankly, thought that the Viceroy's personality had something to do with present difficulties. Nehru had told him, or at any rate implied, that with a more accessible person with whom the Congress leaders could have talked round the table and discussed actually how the Executive worked, they might possibly have accepted. A member of the Executive seems to have told him that things there were very much cut and dried and the Executive expected to sign on the dotted line. Europeans and Indians generally complained that the Viceroy kept to himself, Laithwaite and a very small inner circle.

I took all this with a grain of salt, but think I ought to record it. Villiers also spoke of the harm done by the rudeness of some officers of the British Army to young Indian Officers and is seeing the War Office about it.

L. S. A.

[1] At Sir D. Monteath's suggestion, this note was later sent to Sir Stafford Cripps.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 358

L/I/1/808: f 164

INDIA AS A FACTOR IN ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *13 August 1942*

I have read with great interest the note by Mr. Graham Spry, circulated by the Lord Privy Seal No. W.P. (42) 318.[1] I am, of course, broadly in agreement with Mr. Spry's conclusions in paragraph 6 of his note that information and propaganda in the United States about British relations with India are the responsibility of His Majesty's Government. While I agree, also, that there is undoubtedly need for improving and developing our publicity on this subject, I am satisfied that whatever deficiencies exist are in no way due to inadequate effort by the British Information Services or the Indian Agency-General (which latter was only established a few months ago), but rather to the fact that the two organisations, as such, had not until recently been as closely associated with

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one another in this task as is desirable for the purpose of securing the best results. I am glad to say, however, that the closest consultation and collaboration has been established with Sir G. S. Bajpai since the arrival of Mr. Harold Butler.

I have felt for some time that it was desirable to try and establish some broad working conception of the respective functions of the British Information Service in the United States and those of the Agency-General in relation to publicity on Indian developments, and I have already been in consultation with the Minister of Information, with Mr. Harold Butler, and with the Viceroy on the question. While the view of Mr. Butler is that, for the present, our propaganda in the United States should concentrate on India's war effort and the military consequences of the Congress Party's attitude, yet the constitutional question is always in the background and may at any moment come again to the front. Although there is a consensus of opinion that whatever distinction may be made as a matter of theory no hard and fast division between, or separation of, the spheres of the British Information Service and of the Agent-General is possible in practice and that in the last resort any dividing line for working purposes must rest on expediency and good understanding between the two Offices, there is, I think, a broad measure of agreement with my view that, although publicity about and on behalf of India and the Government of India, e.g. about the country, its peoples and economic and social welfare and India's war effort, would largely, or wholly, fall naturally to the Agent-General, the British Information Service must bear responsibility for seeing that there is adequate guidance available to the United States Press, &c. on the constitutional policy and intentions of His Majesty's Government towards India. Nevertheless, Sir G. S. Bajpai also will be expected by the American Press to deal with this aspect, and it is right and proper that he should do so, though as the representative of the Government of India and not of His Majesty's Government. It is natural that in relation to Indian questions the Agent-General of India should occupy the public stage, but it is in the important function of prompting and inspiration behind the scenes that I conceive that the British Information Service would mainly play its part. The provision to the Office of the Agent-General and to the British Information Service of a full supply of information and of guidance on policy is, of course, the responsibility of the Government of India and of the India Office in co-operation with the Ministry of Information.

I am now engaged on working out with those concerned the practical implications of the principle outlined above. The first step, of which the Viceroy is in favour, is the setting up of such publicity machinery under the immediate control of the Agent-General as will enable him to carry out adequately what are naturally and peculiarly his own responsibilities in that sphere. The second is that the Ministry of Information should consider, in consultation with Mr. Harold Butler, whether measures may be necessary to enable the British

[1] No. 339.

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Information Service to function with the maximum effectiveness in the direction I have indicated. I am taking up this aspect of the matter with the Minister for Information.

L. S. A.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *13 August 1942*

It certainly looks now, on the third day of the troubles, that they might have been much worse. Incidentally they show how dangerous a non-violent movement can be. However, we must wait, for it is always possible that the real organised civil disobedience movement, though upset by the loss of leaders, may yet get to work in a few weeks, and next month may be, for all we know, more serious than this.

2. I have just been having a talk with Cripps, who lays great stress on what the outside world will say if the Congress leaders are detained indefinitely, cut off from all the world, and not given an opportunity to withdraw their resolution and call off civil disobedience. I pointed out that they could always communicate that intention to you, but he thought that was not enough, but that you ought, a little later on, discreetly to give an opportunity to a wise friend like Rajagopalachari to see them, tell them that the movement was collapsing, or had collapsed, and that they had better formally and unconditionally call it off. That of course they won't do anything of the sort did not seem to deter him from his point of view of the importance of being able to tell America and the world that we had given them this opportunity. I said I would pass the suggestion on to you, but frankly I don't see much in it.

3. On the other hand, I do think there is a good deal to be said for making much of Rajagopalachari now, when the Indian public generally may be beginning to realise that he was right and the Congress leaders wrong. It is too early days to think of getting him into the Executive and indeed his proper place is not there, but in Madras. But would it, do you think, be a good thing for one of your Executive who knows him well, say C. P., to get into personal touch with him and discuss the possibility of getting together a working coalition in Madras with whatever help Hope or the Government of India can give him without embarrassing him?

4. I am all against any suggestions of negotiations or discussions which could imply the supersession of your Council. They have proved themselves

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men of courage and with a high sense of responsibility and the fact that they have done so is, I believe, a landmark in Indian constitutional development and has given to them an authority and standing *vis-à-vis* the Cabinet here which is no mean thing. I hope, by the way, to let you have in the next few days the kind of reassurance from the Cabinet in respect of their position and of their being consulted on any political moves, that you asked for.[1] Given the strengthening of their position on present lines it seems to me the next thing is to develop the situation in the Provinces if we can. I gather that Assam was on the verge of the restoration of Ministerial Government when the trouble started, and it may be that Khare might now really pull off something in the Central Provinces. By "now", I mean as soon as the first dust of the arrests has subsided. If that does happen it may well prove a real turning point in the whole constitutional position and mark a definite victory for the policy of constructive constitutional progress with an agreed solution in view, over the Congress conception of an India to be handed over to them regardless of consequences.

I hear a mail is just off, so I send this unfinished letter as it is.

[1] No. 492.

539

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *14 August 1942, 5.50 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 14 August, 4.30 pm*

No. 2420-S. I repeat in my immediately following telegrams Chungking telegram No. 502 to Foreign of 12th August and my reply to Seymour.

2. You will agree with me that quite intolerable situation will arise if Chiang Kai-shek is to endeavour to butt in on domestic politics of India. I have made my position clear to him in I hope suitably temperate and appropriate terms. But I suggest that it might help Seymour if he had from Cabinet, or from Foreign Secretary after consultation with yourself, definite instructions as to the line to be taken on this business. As you know there is deep Muslim suspicion of the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek and Madame on Indian politics. They are both (I do not think rightly in the case of the General) identified in popular opinion here with the Congress. Apart from that there are indications which I recently reported to you of the strong opposition and resentment which might be expected in my Council at any endeavour by China or the United States or the like to endeavour to influence the playing of this hand.

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3. I have separately telegraphed[1] officially to you about the proposed Tsiang visit. I am all for developing cultural relations with China, but things have reached a point at which we must run no risk of cultural missions playing with politics and unless we can get satisfactory guarantees on that point, I shall, though with the greatest possible regret, have to desist from the efforts we have been making to develop this liaison.

[1] Telegram 2415-S of 14 August from Government of India, External Affairs Department, to Secretary of State, referred to a message on the Indian situation attributed by Reuter to Mr Tsiang, who was to be head of a Chinese Educational Mission shortly to visit India; and asked that the Chinese Government should be warned that statements of this nature suggesting Chinese intervention in Indian affairs were intolerable and that it might be necessary to cancel the invitation to the Mission. L/P&S/12/2318: f 162.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *14 August 1942, 5.40 pm*
Received: 14 August, 4 pm

2422-S. Following is Chungking telegram No. 502 dated 12th August:—

Begins. My immediately preceding telegram.[1] Chiang Kai-shek informed me that he had sent a personal telegram to Gandhi, Nehru and Azad while Madame Chiang Kai-shek had sent messages to Mrs. Naidu and Mrs. Pandit. His Secretary has since given me text which is[2] as follows:—

"I am deeply concerned over your arrest. Please take good care of yourself for your country's sake."

2. Chiang Kai-shek asked me to inform Viceroy of this and to say that he suggests that Chinese Commissioner[3] should be allowed to deliver the telegram to three men in person and to see Mr. Nehru personally in order to ascertain his reactions to present situation. If possible he would like Commissioner to see Nehru alone. He thought such interview with Nehru might be helpful towards ultimate settlement and attached importance to his messages being delivered at the earliest possible moment.

3. I promised to pass on this request but made no suggestion that you would be able to accept it. *Ends.*

[1] Not printed. [2] 'which is' deciphered as 'and might be'. [3] Mr Sheng Shoh-hua.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir H. Seymour

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *14 August 1942*

PERSONAL

No. 2421-S. Your official telegram of 12th August to Foreign, No. 502.[1] I have not yet had immediately preceding telegram referred to in it, but I am perfectly clear that it will be out of the question to convey any messages of this type to any of the addressees and that it would be an intolerable situation and deeply resented in this country by very important elements were there to be any evidence whatever of interference by China or any other outside power in our internal politics. There are already signs of soreness in non-Congress quarters at Chinese attitude. And I need not comment on probable reaction of Chinese Government were I or His Majesty's Government to try to operate in the Chinese political field. I am of course reporting to Secretary of State to whom I am repeating this telegram.

2. Would you give following personal message to Generalissimo from me:—

Begins. Ambassador has sent me your message about your communications to Mr. Gandhi and others. As you know no one is more anxious than I am to see a happy ending to the difficulties and troubles in India, and I have at all times done my very utmost to bring that about. But recent action of Congress has left my Government and me with no alternative but to enforce the machinery of the law, and I fear that I could not agree to allow any communication to any of the leaders whom you have mentioned who are under restraint for illegal activities. You will not I am sure misunderstand my feeling in this matter, and I know you will believe how anxious I should have been to meet your wishes had I thought that at all possible. Letter follows by next bag. *Ends.*

3. I have given instructions that these messages are to be held up. It is just possible of course that if they have been sent on beam we shall be unable to prevent their receiving Axis publicity which would be very embarrassing. But I assume (perhaps you will confirm if you can discreetly obtain the information) that they have been in code to the Chinese Commissioner, and hope it may be possible to guard against any other beam messages being sent.

Repeated to Secretary of State.

[1] See No. 540.

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Sir H. Seymour to Sir G. Laithwaite

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

14 August 1942

No. 505. Following from Seymour for Laithwaite. Chiang Kai-shek sent me message yesterday evening expressing hope for very early reply to proposal described in my telegram No. 502[1] about messages for Gandhi, &c.

Whatever decision may be—and he is most anxious for favourable one—I suggest most suitable way of answering would be in form of personal message from Viceroy.

[1] No. 540.

543

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *14 August 1942, 5.40 pm*
Received: 14 August, 4 pm

No. 2423-S. Following is Governor of Bombay's secraphone message of 12th August referred to in first line of Viceroy's telegram No. 2405-S[1] of 13th August to Governor of Bombay repeated to Secretary of State:—

Begins. Following from Secretary to Governor of Bombay. His Excellency at Bombay has got a letter, dated 9th August, from Mr. Rajagopalachari. Letter reads: "I request that the enclosed copy of a telegram may be sent to Mahatma Gandhi wherever he may be in custody. The original has been despatched this morning. But I fear it may not be transmitted or delivered unless you permit it."

2. That telegram reads: "Gandhiji, c/o Superintendent, Yeravda Prison, Poona. (Text begins): Love. Earnestly plead no fast when your move is interpreted on background of war situation. Rajagopalachari."

3. His Excellency the Governor's comments are these. "My view is that it can do no harm to let this telegram be delivered. I doubt if it will influence Mr. G. but it cannot do any harm and might conceivably help to deter him." *Ends.*

[1] No. 525.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *14 August 1942, 8 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 14 August, 9.15 pm*

No. 2424-S. Following is my appreciation at noon, 14th August:—

Bombay situation very much easier and 59 mills working wholly or partially. No fresh serious incidents throughout the country though in Allahabad there has been rioting necessitating firing. In Calcutta there have been more minor disturbances than there had been, and there has been fairly serious rioting in Nagpur, while a goods train was derailed without casualties by sabotage at Cawnpore. Position is now quiet in Madras but it appears that wrecking of Tenali station (which was accompanied by wrecking of four small stations adjoining) was organized sabotage.

2. General impression left on me is that main elements now concerned in causing difficulty (probably more now under Congress direction than was the case earlier) are: (*a*) students; (*b*) hooligans. Mill element is dropping out. In Nagpur for instance Governor reports that organized ruffians are the main trouble and not mill-hands.

3. There is a certain amount of cutting of telegraph and telephone wires throughout the country, and indications are that Congress is definitely interested in interruption of communications.

4. On the whole, however, and on a broad view, situation remains generally satisfactory. It is of particular importance that the Bombay situation should have eased as much as it has. Delhi is now quiet, and while I repeat the warning contained in my appreciation of yesterday that it may deteriorate again, I am not dissatisfied with the present position which is well in hand.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Chungking and Washington (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *14[1] August 1942*

No. 2426–S. My telegram of 12th August, No. 2387–S.[2] Moore. Following telegram just received from Herbert:—

Begins. Following Secraphone message. Have discussed with Richardson. Meeting of Directors of the *Statesman* on August 10th agreed that Moore should be allowed to leave preparatory to retirement on full emoluments, such leave to take effect as soon as conveniently might be able to be arranged and that Stephens carry on as Editor.

2. Delay was caused by defamation case of *Hindustan Standard* versus Arthur Moore as it appeared undesirable to prejudice his position before findings. As judgment is on Monday 17th he leaves *Statesman* that day. . . .[3]

Am inclined to suggest that if Stephens not entirely satisfactory someone should be sent from England for permanent appointment. *Ends.*

As you will see, action had been taken by the Board of the *Statesman* itself following Catto's instructions before I communicated with Herbert. This is very satisfactory. I would like again to say how grateful I am to Catto (and to you) for support over a matter which I am satisfied is of great importance as affecting European morale. . . .[4]

2. I make no comment as regards editorship. Joyce knows Stephens well and can form better judgment than anyone as to his adequacy. Matter is of course one for the paper itself to settle though *Statesman* is so potentially important that really good man would not be wasted out here. Can you take whatever steps are necessary about *Times* cancelling Moore's appointment as Special Correspondent?

[1] L/PO/10/17: f 164 gives the date as 15 August. [2] No. 512.
[3] and [4] Personal comments omitted.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir J. Herbert (Bengal)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/42

IMPORTANT *14 August 1942*

No. 2425–S. Your telegram of 13th August, No. 188.[1] Moore. This is most satisfactory, and I am very grateful to you for your help. I have passed on what

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you say in full to Secretary of State. I am glad to see that action in fact had been taken by Richardson before receipt of my message to you.

[1] No. 545.

547

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *14 August 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2427-S. Your private and personal telegram of 13th August, No. 988.[1] I am most grateful. I think this would do admirably.

[1] No. 529.

548

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *14 August 1942, 11.45 pm*
Received: 14 August, 11.15 pm

No. 2430-S. Following secraphone message, dated 14th August, from Secretary to Governor of Bombay, is repeated for information:—

Begins. His Excellency Sir Roger Lumley reports that he has been in touch with the local *Telegraph* correspondent. The correspondent and others have been in touch with Jinnah and report that he is in a completely uncompromising frame of mind. He prefers the British to remain in this country rather than see a Hindu raj. He is entirely against any compromise. He would be willing to join a provisional Government but only on condition—

(*a*) that he was given 50 per cent. of the seats in such Government for the Muslim League;
(*b*) that the British Government conceded Pakistan.

2. All this as the Governor understands, has been sent home by correspondents including the correspondent of the *Daily Herald. Ends.*

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Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

IMMEDIATE *14 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 550. Whipping: Government of India Act IV of 1909 authorises whipping for certain offences. Bombay Act X of 1933 sanctioned whipping for rioting offences. As its scope was found inadequate, Bombay Act XI of 1941 was enacted during last year's communal riots, and it is this latter Act which has now been applied.

2. Acts of 1933 and 1941 have been found exceedingly useful, and their application has been well received during communal riots by large sections of the communities. There has been no adverse comment here on the present occasion. It has been accepted as an essential penalty during serious disorder. The Congress Ministry kept the 1933 Act, and on one occasion considered that it might have to be used.

3. When enforced the Acts have been sparingly used. In 1941, when rioting lasted for eight weeks, only 39 persons were whipped. Usual sentence by Magistrates is 10 to 12 stripes against a maximum of 30, and penalty is inflicted under medical supervision and on the tough, sturdy, bullying type of offender.

4. If it is apprehended that the peaceful, non-violent political demonstrator may be whipped, it may be stated that whipping can only be applied under the Act for such offences as rioting, grievous hurt and mischief by fire or explosives, i.e. on violent hooligans. I am however considering amending it so as to include assaults on public servants and criminal intimidation.

5. Some 33 persons have been killed and several hundred including many policemen, injured in four days in Bombay alone. Introduction of whipping, which might be better termed corporal punishment, is a minor detail in a serious situation. It is the only enhancement of penalty so far introduced in this Province. At least three other Provinces have put into operation the enhancement of penalties ordinance[1] which validates death for an even wider range of penalties (offences?).

6. Finally, in the present riots no sentence of whipping has so far been inflicted in this Province.

Repeated to Secretary of State.

[1] The Penalties (Enhancement) Ordinance 1942. See *Gazette of India Extraordinary*, 2 January 1942, p. 62, also 29 January and 10 June.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 326

IMPORTANT
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
SECRET

INDIA OFFICE, *14 August 1942, 8.45 pm*
Received: 15 August

994. Your private and personal telegram 2385-S.[1] Many thanks for letting me know about this. I fully agree with the line you are proposing to take.

[1] No. 510.

551

Mr Eden to Mr Amery

L/PO/5/41: f 69

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1, *14 August 1942*

My dear Leo,

I have had your letter of 10th August[1] and we have discussed it today with Halifax. It seems to us improbable that President Roosevelt would send Willkie as his personal representative, and still less probable that Willkie would prejudice his not very secure reputation with the Republican Party by accepting a job as President Roosevelt's personal emissary. We have had nothing from the Embassy to confirm these rumours in question though Campbell met Willkie recently and had a longish confidential talk with him.

I trust therefore that the difficulty will not arise. Halifax confirmed what was our own view, namely that it would be very difficult to seem to wish to prevent an important American personality, especially if he were on some sort of official mission, from passing through India, and that any such attempt on our part would be liable to misconstruction. He thought that the best that we could do would be, if there seemed any foundation for the report, to ask that Willkie or any prominent American passing through India en route for China or Russia should be warned before starting by the American authorities to exercise at all stages the greatest discretion as regards India. I am therefore proposing to instruct Campbell to act in this sense.

Yours,

ANTHONY EDEN

[1] No. 499.

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Mr Amery to Mr Eden

L/PO/5/41: f 71

14 August 1942

My dear Anthony,
I send you a copy of a private and personal telegram[1] from Linlithgow which speaks for itself. I don't suppose there is much to be done, but perhaps you and Halifax would bear what Linlithgow says in mind in case any suitable opportunity arises of dropping a hint in Washington.

Many thanks for your letter of the 14th[2] about Wendell Willkie. I will let Linlithgow know your view and what you are doing.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Halifax.

Yours ever,
L. S. AMERY

[1] No. 522. [2] No. 551.

553

Mr Gandhi to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

AGA KHAN'S PALACE, *14 August 1942*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,
The Government of India were wrong in precipitating the crisis. The Government resolution[1] justifying this step is full of distortions and misrepresentations. That you have the approval of your Indian "colleagues" can have no significance, except this, that in India you can always command such services. That co-operation is an additional justification for the demand of withdrawal irrespective of what people and parties may say.

The Government of India should have waited at least till the time I inaugurated mass action. I had publicly stated that I fully contemplated sending you a letter before taking concrete action. It was to be an appeal to you for an impartial examination of the Congress case. As you know, the Congress has readily filled in every omission that has been discovered in the conception of its demand. So could I have dealt with every difficulty if you had given me the opportunity. The precipitate action of the Government leads one to think that they were afraid that the extreme caution and gradualness with which the Congress was moving towards direct action might make world opinion veer round to the Congress, as it had already begun doing, and expose the hollowness of

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the grounds for the Government's rejection of the Congress demand. They should surely have waited for an authentic report of my speeches on Friday and on Saturday night after the passing of the resolution by the A.-I.C.C. You would have found in them that I would not hastily begin action. You should have taken advantage of the interval foreshadowed in them, and explored every possibility of satisfying the Congress demand.

The resolution says "The Government of India have waited patiently in the hope that wiser counsels might prevail. They have been disappointed in that hope." I suppose wiser counsels here means abandonment of its demand by the Congress. Why should the abandonment of the demand legitimate at all times be hoped for by a government pledged to guarantee independence to India? Is it a challenge that could only be met by immediate repression instead of patient reasoning with the demanding party? I venture to suggest that it is a long draft upon the credulity of mankind to say that the acceptance of the demand "would plunge India into confusion". Anyway the summary rejection of the demand *has* plunged the nation and the Government into confusion. The Congress was making every effort to identify India with the Allied cause.

The Government resolution says "The Governor-General in Council has been aware too for some days past of dangerous preparations by the Congress Party for unlawful and in some cases violent activities directed among other things to interruption of communications and public utility services, the organisation of strikes, tampering with the loyalty of Government servants, and interference with defence measures including recruitment." This is a gross distortion of the reality. Violence was never contemplated at any stage. A definition of what could be included in non-violent action has been interpreted in a sinister and subtle manner, as if the Congress was preparing for violent action. Everything was openly discussed among Congress circles, for nothing was to be done secretly. And why is it tampering with your loyalty if I ask you to give up a job which is harming the British people?

Instead of publishing behind the backs of principal Congressmen the misleading paragraph the Government immediately they came to know of the "preparations" should have brought to book the parties concerned with the preparations. That would have been the appropriate course. By their unsupported allegations in the resolution they have laid themselves open to the charge of unfair dealing.

The Congress movement was intended to evoke in the people the measure of sacrifice sufficient to compel attention. It was intended to demonstrate what measure of popular support it had. Was it wise at this time of the day to seek to suppress a popular movement avowedly non-violent?

The Government resolution further says "The Congress is not India's mouthpiece. Yet in the interests of securing their own dominance and in

[1] See No. 447.

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pursuit of their totalitarian policy its leaders have consistently impeded the efforts made to bring India to full nationhood." It is a gross libel thus to accuse the oldest national organisation of India. This language lies ill in the mouth of a government which has, as can be proved from published records, consistently thwarted every national effort for attaining freedom, and sought to suppress the Congress by hook or by crook.

The Government of India have not condescended to consider the Congress offer that if simultaneously with the declaration of the independence of India they could not trust the Congress to form a stable provisional government, they should ask the Muslim League to do so, and that any national government formed by the League would be loyally accepted by the Congress. Such an offer is hardly consistent with the charge of totalitarianism against the Congress.

Let me examine the Government offer. "It is that as soon as hostilities cease, India shall devise for herself, with full freedom of decision and on a basis embracing all and not only a single party, the form of government which she regards as most suited to her conditions." Has this offer any reality about it? All parties have not agreed now. Will it be any more possible after the war? And if the parties have to act before independence is in their hands? Parties grow up like mushrooms, for without proving their representative character, the government will welcome them as they have done in the past, and if they the parties oppose the Congress and its activities, though they may do lip homage to independence, frustration is inherent in the Government offer. Hence the logical cry of withdrawal first. Only after the end of British power and a fundamental change in the political status of India from bondage to freedom, will the formation of a truly representative government, whether provisional or permanent, be possible. The living burial of the author of the demand has not resolved the deadlock, it has aggravated it.

Then the resolution proceeds "The suggestion put forward by the Congress Party that the millions of India uncertain as to the future are ready, despite the sad lessons of so many martyr countries, to throw themselves into the arms of the invaders is one that the Government of India cannot accept as a true representation of the feeling of the people of this great country." I do not know about the millions, but I can give my own evidence in support of the Congress statement. It is open to the Government not to believe the Congress evidence. No imperial power likes to be told that it is in peril. It is because the Congress is anxious for Great Britain to avoid the fate that has overtaken other imperial powers that it asks her to shed imperialism voluntarily by declaring India independent. The Congress has not approached the movement with any but the friendliest motives. Congress seeks to kill imperialism as much for the sake of the British people and humanity as for India. Notwithstanding assertions to the contrary, I maintain that the Congress has no interests of its own, apart from that of the whole of India and the world.

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The following passage from the peroration in the resolution is interesting "But on them lies the task of defending India, of maintaining India's capacity to wage war, of safeguarding India's interests, of holding the balance between the different sections of her people without fear or favour." All I can say is that it is a mockery of truth after the experience of Malaya, Singapore and Burma. It is sad to find the Government of India claiming to hold the "balance" between the parties for which it is itself demonstrably responsible.

One thing more. The declared cause is common between the Government of India and us. To put it in the most concrete terms it is the protection of the freedom of China and Russia. The Government of India think that the freedom of India is not necessary for winning the cause. I think exactly the opposite. I have taken Jawaharlal Nehru as my measuring rod. His personal contacts make him feel much more the misery of the impending ruin of China and Russia than I can—and may I say than even you can. In that misery he tried to forget his old quarrel with imperialism. He dreads much more than I do the success of Fascism and Nazism. I have argued with him for days together. He fought against my position with a passion which I have no words to describe. But the logic of facts overwhelmed him. He yielded when he saw clearly that without the freedom of India that of the other two was in great jeopardy. Surely you are wrong in having imprisoned such a powerful friend and ally. If notwithstanding the common cause the Government's answer to the Congress demand is hasty repression, they will not wonder if I draw the inference that it was not so much the Allied cause that weighed with the British Government, as the unexpressed determination to cling to the possession of India as an indispensable part of the imperial policy. This determination led to the rejection of the Congress demand and precipitated repression. The present mutual slaughter on a scale never before known to history is suffocating enough. But the slaughter of truth accompanying the butchery and enforced by the falsity of which the resolution is reeking adds strength to the Congress position.

It causes me deep pain to have to send you this long letter. But however much I dislike your action I remain the same friend you have known me. I would still plead for reconsideration of the Government of India's whole policy. Do not disregard the pleading of one who claims to be a sincere friend of the British people. Heaven guide you!

I am,
Yours sincerely,
M. K. GANDHI

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554

Notes by the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/137[1]

undated

SKETCH NOTES—OPENING OF DISCUSSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS IN COUNCIL[2]

Request to Cabinet for assurances in regard to further dealings with Congress.

Indications good that we may expect a thoroughly satisfactory reply.

Propose to say a word or two about certain constitutional questions.

In past, it has not been ordinarily the practice to discuss in Council the initial stages of constitutional cases. Such matters have lain in the region between S.S. and the G.G.—and no decision falls to be taken by Council upon them.

But we are moving forward. True, no changes involving changes in the law as this affects Council have been made. But the *practical* effects of the two expansions of Council recently accomplished are already being felt. That process is destined to develop.

No better example than an undertaking by His Majesty's Government to consult this Council about negotiations with parties, if that undertaking is forthcoming.

I do not think any of us feel that anything we could compass would ease the present position between Congress and my Government. But the time is opportune for considering what steps whether at the Centre, or in the Provinces, are within reach, this side of those major constitutional moves that will come after the war.

CENTRE

Reconstitution of this Council, to include representatives of parties apart from *Congress*.

The principal part would be played by Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha. Such an adjustment would of course involve resignation of all or a large part of the present Council. But no one here would reject it on that ground.

What would be the M.L. terms.

If those prove inacceptable, can we conceive a Government in which the Mahasabha, a frankly communal body, would play the leading part.

Effect of participation of M.L. on its prospects at the next and very critical election, the precursor of the setting up of the constituent body which is to draft the constitution.

Short of the organized parties (apart from Congress) coming in, it is not easy to see why any general reconstruction should provide added public support for the Government.

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Power of G.G. Section 41 of old Act—nothing doing. Internally, wider use of the Committee system. Better interaction and more collective responsibility.

Question of Discretionary Field. (Secy., G.G., Public.)

Extreme case—giving a decision domestic to the Public on a matter that had come up to me *via* the Government, and might or might not go from me to S.S.

I [am] having an analysis made and propose to revert to the matter again.

PROVINCIAL FIELD

Almost impossible task on speaker. Last experience not hopeful.	1. Minority Ministry 2. Council Government 3. Non-official advisers.	Legislature in session normal periods of year. (?) legislature sitting.

Non-official advisers.

Question of Muslim representatives and Mr. Jinnah's attitude.

Would be target general attack by Congress.

Much to be said, at moment of extreme stress, for retaining at any rate some of present advisers to work with the new non-official advisers, on equal terms.

[1] Enclosed in the letter of 15 September from the Assistant Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State, which stated that the note was by His Excellency the Viceroy.

[2] Probably prepared for the meeting held on 15 August: see No. 577, paras. 12–13.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *15 August 1942, 1.40 am*
PERSONAL AND SECRET *Received: 15 August, 1.45 am*

No. 2433–S. Since issuing my appreciation today,[1] serious reports have come in of major interference with railway lines around Patna. These have been delayed owing to interruption of communications by sabotage. It is clear from them that organised attempt is being made on a large scale to take up railway lines on both sides of Patna and to arrange a really major interruption of communications. Evil reputation of this part of the country for train wrecking even in peace time is of course well known to you.

2. Floods and interruption of communications have made it impossible to get troops to the affected area in time, and after consulting with Hartley

[1] i.e. of 14 August: No. 544.

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I have authorised machine-gunning from air of saboteurs. We shall, I fear, almost certainly have to resort to this weapon in other areas also, if attack on communications develops on a serious scale, as now begins to seem possible. But I have given instructions that any reference to this, if at all practicable, must be kept out of statements to Press.

3. In the ordinary way, I should of course have been anxious to consult you before authorising action of this character, but situation on the reports received, is one that calls for immediate handling, and I have had no hesitation in taking my decision. I am quite clear that, while we may regret any deterioration in the situation, such as that reported above (a deterioration which may of course well go further), there is nothing to be gained by any withholding[2] of the means at our disposal to protect essential property and to re-establish order.

[2] 'withholding' deciphered as '(? overlooking)'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *15 August 1942, 4.40 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 15 August, 6.15 pm*

No. 2436–S. Following is my appreciation of position midday, 15th August. Bombay and Delhi are both now quiet. Nagpur City also quiet, though there has been a serious riot in Ramtek a town outside. Slight deterioration in the United Provinces, where Allahabad situation has passed beyond student stage and become a hooligan case, and also in Calcutta and Dacca, where there have been disturbances necessitating firing. Only new and serious feature is a large scale attempt to interrupt communication on railway on either side of Patna (a district notorious for its train-wrecking history even in peacetime) by large scale removal of rails burning of rail sleepers on bridges, &c. and cutting of telegraph wires. Full details are still awaited.

2. As previously reported the main elements in these disturbances seem to be students and riff-raff, and while minor incidents (and the one or two more serious incidents referred to above) are reported from widely scattered points throughout the country: and while the strain on police and security organisations remains very heavy, I am not disturbed by the situation. Most embarrassing developments are signs of extension of endeavours to interrupt railway, telegraph and telephonic communication. This may develop still further and is of course very difficult to dispose of effectively in a country of the size of India.

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3. Still no active signs of any major deterioration or of development of Congress attempt to launch civil disobedience on a large scale. But I remain of opinion that we should be most unwise to under-rate the possibility of this happening, and it is most essential that we should keep fully on the alert and relax none of our precautions. Rajagopalachari has issued strong condemnation of hooliganism.

4. I much regret sudden death today from heart failure of Mahadev Desai, Gandhi's Secretary, who was confined with him at Poona. News will be released once details are known.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington & Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *15 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2440–S. Your private and personal telegram of 13th August, No. 983.[1] I am of course most anxious to keep the Labour Party sweet. I have asked Bombay to report[2] direct to you repeating to me position as regards Whipping Ordinance. I gather that no action has been taken under it so far, that in practice very little action is ever taken, but that its deterrent effect is very great. But I fully recognise misapprehension to it [which?] the name might give rise.

2. I am doing my best about press control, and I hope that some impression is now being produced.

[1] No. 528. [2] See No. 549.

558

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir S. Radhakrishnan

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *15 August 1942*

Dear Sir S. Radhakrishnan,

I am greatly obliged to you for your letter of 8th August,[1] and appreciate the spirit by which it was actuated. Since it was written matters have of course,

[1] No. 473.

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as you will have seen, consequent on the discussions in the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay taken a different turn, and we are faced with a new situation. But I much appreciate your anxiety to see a satisfactory outcome, though I think it fair to say that the difficulties are in my judgment more substantial than your letter would altogether suggest.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/603: f 41

IMPORTANT
PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *15 August 1942, 7 pm*
Received: 16 August

14416. Your personal and secret telegram of the 15th August, No. 2433-S.[1] I am repeating paragraphs one and two to Butler and Bajpai for their confidential information in order that they may be forewarned against a possible deterioration in the situation generally.

2. I note with approval the measures you have authorised against saboteurs and need hardly assure you of my full support and my confidence in your discretion.

[1] No. 555.

560

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 362

L/PO/11/3: f 292

Proposed Assurance to Viceroy's Executive Council

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *15 August 1942*

I circulate for consideration by the War Cabinet the draft of a reply (Appendix I) which I propose should be sent to the Viceroy's personal telegram No. 2347-S of 10th August (Appendix II), paragraph 2 of which contains a request for certain assurances from His Majesty's Government in regard to consultation with the Viceroy's Executive Council before any change in existing policy is undertaken. The Viceroy has informed me separately[1] that this request is put forward unanimously by all members of the Council including Sir E. Benthall,

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and that he attaches the greatest importance to a satisfying answer being given. I have communicated the text of the proposed reply privately to the Viceroy who considers it entirely suitable.[2]

L. S. A.

Appendix I to No. 560

DRAFT TELEGRAM

From Secretary of State
To Viceroy
IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

[*There follows text of draft contained in No. 529.*]

Appendix II to No. 560

[*There follows the text of No. 493.*]

[1] See No. 492. [2] No. 547.

561

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/13/998: ff 401–12

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *16[1] August 1942, 8.30 am*

14395. Your Secretary's letter of 25th June D 494–P (C) 42.[2] I confess that Chancellor's letter[3] seems to me to consist largely of debating points, but I of course accept your judgment as to feeling of Princes generally. I note that you leave nature of reply to His Majesty's Government but before they are asked to take final decision I should like to let you know line I have provisionally in mind on which I shall be grateful for your comments. I will of course have to have informal talk with Jam Sahib here, as regards which see paragraph 9 below, but reply to Chancellor will no doubt be made formally by your Political Adviser[4] to whom letter is addressed.

2. Point I. As regards (*a*) to (*f*) answer to the Chancellor is contained in Prime Minister's statement on March 11th,[5] (to which he himself refers) and in his own letter[6] of 10th April to Sir S. Cripps. These appear in White Paper presented to Parliament in April and make it quite clear that (1) fulfilment of[7] treaty obligations to Princes is an integral part of His Majesty's Government's

[1] Transmission began on 15 August. [2] No. 187. [3] No. 115.
[4] MSS. EUR. F. 125/29 has 'Secretary'. [5] Vol. I, Nos. 308–9. [6] Vol. I, No. 591.
[7] MSS. EUR. F. 125/29 has 'full treaty' instead of 'fulfilment'.

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policy, (2) this was recognised and welcomed by the States representatives themselves. No public declaration at present stage could add anything to what has already been said, and absence of specific mention in draft declaration has no significance. As regards private assurances, the Chancellor has apparently overlooked the answer by Sir S. Cripps to question 5 of States Delegation on 2nd April, see summary sent by Turnbull to your Private Secretary and to Chancellor's Secretary on the 5th April.[8] Presumably important Princes will have been informed privately of this discussion, and nothing can be clearer than statement that "we will provide for everything necessary to implement our treaty obligations with non-adhering States". Cripps' answers 3 and 4 indicate that in the absence of any provision or reservation a Ruler's adherence to Union would, under the terms of the declaration, automatically dissolve the existing mutual obligations of the Crown and the State, and that any subsequent relations between the Crown and the Ruler would be through the Union. I do not understand that this was accepted by the Princes in all its implications, but while transference to the Union of the major part of the mutual obligations would result from adhesion, the Princes might, of course, propose as a condition of adhesion that certain specific matters (e.g. in connection with succession) remain reserved to the Crown Representative. See also my comment on point III (*d*). As regards (*g*), word *negotiate* which was used in draft declaration shows that no unilateral denunciation is intended. Moreover, Cripps himself in answer to question 9 made it clear that treaties of non-adhering States will not be revised without their consent. (*h*) is of course covered generally by King-Emperor's message broadcast by Duke of Gloucester on 12th June.[9] Moreover there has been no suggestion that any State would be under compulsion to adhere to Union.

3. Conclusion, with reference to (*i*) and (*j*), is that formal pronouncement at this stage on lines suggested would not only be superfluous, in view of assurances already given publicly and privately to Princes, but would confuse situation and immediately raise question why it was being made, what it added to previous statements, whether it heralded some new move by His Majesty's Government etc. His Majesty's Government can hardly believe that the participation by the Princes and their subjects in the defence of their country could be in any way affected.

4. Point II. I think Chancellor reads too much into Lord Privy Seal's remarks. He takes "representative institutions" as necessarily synonymous with "democratic system of government". Sir S. Cripps did not disguise his own personal view that ideally representatives of States in constituent body should be "popular representatives". But he also made it clear that H.M.G. recognise that they must deal with matters as they are, and that what is hoped for is the development of a system of representative institutions that is *suitable*. Sir S.

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Cripps' remarks are therefore not inconsistent with what we have consistently urged upon Princes in their own interest in regard to internal reforms. For instance in your speech to an informal meeting of Princes on 13th March, 1939,[10] when referring to the establishment of methods and institutions by which the subject may express his wants you added "and the more closely these arrangements approximate to[11] *representative institutions*, the more effective". The phrase need not therefore alarm the Chancellor. It remains His Majesty's Government's policy, not in their own interests so much as in those of the Princes themselves, to urge strongly upon rulers the establishment and effective maintenance of machinery "whereby the legitimate wants and grievances of subjects can be brought to notice so that they may [be] freely and promptly set right" (I quote from your speech at Jaipur on 28th February, 1939.)[12] Whatever the ultimate outcome may be there is nothing in Lord Privy Seal's words to indicate a change of policy by H.M.G. in regard to abstention from the imposition on States of *constitutional* reform.

5. Point III. (*a*) So long as the fundamental responsibility for the control of the Armed Forces remained in the hands of the C.-in-C., the interests of the States were not affected. As there was no intention of departing from this position Sir Stafford Cripps did not consider it necessary to consult the States Delegation in regard to the Defence formula.

(*b*) is of course covered by His Majesty's message broadcast on June 12th.

(*c*) the British Indian in question was not received as a representative of the States: Sir S. Cripps saw many people e.g. M. N. Roy, opposed to[13] the existing order of things in British India and was ready to see informally as many people as possible who expressed a sectional point of view.

(*d*) In the absence of any provision to the contrary in the body of the Union's constitution or in the terms of adhesion of any particular unit, this is no doubt the case. The possibility is one which the States must take into account when considering the desirability of their adhering but there would be nothing to prevent Rulers making as the price of their adhesion to the Union a stipulation either as regards the constitution as a whole (e.g. that it declares for irrevocable union with the Crown or that it can only sever that union subject to specific provisions such as a 2/3rds vote of 2/3rds of the Provinces and States) or as regards their own right to secede from a Union which severed its connection

[8] Vol. I, No. 527.

[9] In the course of this message to 'the Princes and people of India', the King-Emperor noted that 'The Princes, true to their traditions of loyalty and attachment to my Throne, have been unstinting in their offer of men and money and personal services'. *The Times of India*, 13 June 1942.

[10] L/P&S/13/888: ff 229–34.

[11] MSS. EUR. F. 125/29 has 'for approximation of' instead of 'approximate to'.

[12] The Marquess of Linlithgow, *Speeches and Statements* (New Delhi, Bureau of Public Information, Government of India, 1945), p. 175.

[13] MSS. EUR. F. 125/29 has 'proposed' instead of 'opposed to'.

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from the Crown. (It is, of course, for careful consideration how far it is judicious to put these points into the minds of Princes at this stage.)

(*e*) It is difficult to see how the constitution-making body can be debarred from discussion of internal affairs of States so far as concerns the machinery whereby the Union Government would function. In any case it would hardly be possible to lay down in advance the procedure which the body would adopt. But the function of the body would be to frame a constitution and it would be open to the States' representatives to refuse to take part in any discussions outside that limit.

(*f*) has of course been answered by the Jam Sahib's mission.

6. Point IV. Formation of a separate States Union would of course raise much more difficult and complicated problems than formation of Unions based on geographically compact British Indian areas. Point has not been considered by His Majesty's Government but should not be regarded as ruled out.[14] Indeed if a plan on the lines of draft declaration again comes under consideration His Majesty's Government would have no option but to discuss question of separate Union with Princes, if they had a practicable proposal of that nature to put forward, and there is of course no reason why in meantime they should not try to work out among themselves some scheme as basis of discussion.

7. Subject to any comments from you I would propose that your Political Adviser's reply to the Jam Sahib should follow above lines. Two major points of policy arise. First, as reply hints, I feel it is essential in interests of States themselves that introduction of administrative reforms generally, including of course representative institutions for reporting wants and grievances to Durbars, and particularly effective arrangements for the grouping of smaller States should be pressed forward and that impetus created by yourself and Wylie should be maintained. To slacken our efforts on the ground that we should not upset the Princes at this juncture would be a dis-service to them and a dereliction of our duty. Whether they come into a Union or stay out, or even if no Union is created, they will inevitably depend for their continued existence on the efficiency and liberality of their administration. Whatever our interest in their survival, it can hardly be as great as their own. Secondly, the question of a separate States Union or in the light of geographical considerations of several such Unions seems to be one that, however reluctantly, we must face. Clearly we cannot be expected to produce a ready-made scheme or even to say off-hand whether the thing is possible. But on the assumption that it should be a cardinal feature of our policy to assist the States in standing up to the stresses and strains of political developments in British India (see my letters of 16th May, 1941, and 27th May, 1942[15]) the Princes' own suggestions to Cripps for facilitating this deserve sympathetic consideration. I would be very grateful for the benefit of your views and those of your expert advisers, who indeed might

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be able in due course to consider the possibilities on broad lines in conjunction with the Standing Committee of this Chamber. This seems to me to be the most honest and profitable way in which we can endeavour to salve any wounded feelings of the Princes.

8. As time is short before Jam Sahib arrives here I have thought it well to telegraph. You will of course understand that any apparent curtness is due to desire for brevity; reply sent on your behalf to Chancellor would of course need to be more elaborate.

9. As you are aware, necessity for amendment of Section 93 will mean a general Indian debate in Parliament in October, and if circumstances so demand I would endeavour to say something to reassure the States. This will largely depend no doubt on attitude of Jam Sahib to whom, if he raises the matter, I will of course give a sympathetic hearing. But any talk I have with him would be quite informal and without prejudice. I would not be drawn into any general exposition of the policy of His Majesty's Government towards States nor treat Jam Sahib as having come here as the accredited representative of Rulers' views on this subject. I should say that of course he will get reply to his letter through Political Adviser[16] and subject to your comments that I expect it will be on above lines. Needless to say I would decline to be drawn into a discussion of the precise means by which His Majesty's Government would discharge their treaty obligations to non-adhering States in the various hypothetical possibilities that the future may hold.

10. In order that I may be in a position to deal with Jam Sahib on his arrival I shall be glad of your very early comments.

[14] MSS. EUR. F. 125/29 has 'rule' instead of 'ruled out'. [15] No. 94.
[16] MSS. EUR. F. 125/29 has 'Secretary'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: ff 338–40, 345–8

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *16 August 1942, 10.20 am*
PERSONAL

14433. Washington telegram 188[1] of 4th August to External Affairs Department regarding disclosures of Gandhi's double dealing. On Campbell's suggestion[2]

[1] Expressing the opinion that publication of the Congress documents should damage the position of Congress in the estimation of the American public; and suggesting that it should be explained to American correspondents in Delhi that seizure of these documents by the police was a justifiable precaution of war against an organisation legitimately suspected of leanings of appeasement towards Japan and no different from the dealings of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States with disloyal organisations. L/P&J/8/598: f 382. [2] No. 411.

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explanation of your Government's decision to publish document in question was telegraphed to President Roosevelt by Attlee[3] and fuller explanation was sent to Campbell for communication to State Dept.[4]

2. My immediately succeeding telegram repeats Campbell's report of subsequent conversation with Secretary of State. Hull's broadcast address on 23rd July of which full text may be available with American correspondents at Delhi contains passages relevant to points (1), (2) and (3) in paragraph 3 of Campbell's telegram.

Begins. This latest assault on human freedom is, in a profound sense, a searching test for nations and for individuals. There is no surer way for men and for nations to show themselves unworthy of liberty than, by supine submission and refusal to fight, to render more difficult the task of those who are fighting for the preservation of human freedom—unless it be to align themselves freely and voluntarily with the destroyers of liberty. There is no surer way for men and for nations to show themselves worthy of liberty than to fight for its preservation, in any way that is open to them, against those who would destroy it for all.

There is no chance for liberty for any people anywhere save through the victory of the free peoples. Never did a plainer duty to fight against its foes devolve upon all peoples who prize liberty and all who aspire to it. Never was there such an opportunity for every people, as have the people of the Philippines, to demonstrate its fitness both for the rights and the responsibilities of freedom and, through proof given of its fitness, to create an overwhelming sentiment in every country of the world in support of its striving for liberty.

We have always believed—and we believe today—that all peoples, without distinction of race, colour or religion, who are prepared and willing to accept the responsibilities of liberty, are entitled to its enjoyment. We have always sought—and we seek today—to encourage and aid all who aspire to freedom to establish their right to it by preparing themselves to assume its obligations. We have striven to meet squarely our own responsibility in this respect—in Cuba, in the Philippines and wherever else it devolved upon us. It has been our purpose in the past—and will remain our purpose in the future—to use the full measure of our influence to support attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy of it and ready for it.

The pledge of the Atlantic Charter is of a system which will give every nation, large or small, a greater assurance of stable peace, greater opportunity for the realisation of its aspirations to freedom, and greater facilities for material advancement. But that pledge implies an obligation for each nation to demonstrate its capacity for stable and progressive government, to fulfil scrupulously its established duties to other nations, to settle its international differences and disputes by none but peaceful methods, and to make its full contribution to the maintenance of enduring peace. *Ends.*

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3. Expression of President's views foreshadowed in paragraph 5 of Campbell's telegram has not yet been received. Subject to your views I propose to ask Foreign Office to instruct Campbell to following effect,[5] asking him to inform Butler and Bajpai.

4. Point (1) is, of course, the corner-stone of all British propaganda to India. Points (2) and (3) cannot be pursued by us in terms used by Hull even though their sense is implicit in our propaganda on constitution issue because either they could not fail to be regarded as whittling down Cripps' declaration (self-government for Philippines is not contemplated by U.S.A. earlier than 1946 whereas we have tied ourselves to "immediately upon cessation of hostilities"[6]) or would be interpreted as committing us to principle of fixed date for Indian self-government which hitherto has not been regarded as practicable. But we welcome sympathetic reaction of State Department to my statement in Parliament on 30th July[7] and much hope that U.S. Government will find it possible to instruct their publicity agents in India, Chungking and elsewhere, to emphasise points in question as American viewpoints. It might be possible for All-India Radio to assist in India in enabling Americans there to follow up lines of American Secretary of State's broadcast or any similar future pronouncements by the President or members of U.S. Executive.

5. Please let me know your views as soon as possible. You will no doubt agree that in light of latest move by Chiang Kai-shek it is important to make the most of line taken at Washington.

[3] No. 454. [4] No. 455.
[5] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'as Foreign Office to instruct Campbell in' instead of 'to ask Foreign Office to instruct Campbell to following effect'.
[6] Para. (*a*) of the draft Declaration published 30 March 1942 (Vol. I, No. 456). [7] No. 366.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 350

IMPORTANT[1] INDIA OFFICE, *16 August 1942, 3.45 am*

14434. Following is repetition of telegram from Washington to Foreign Office No. 4048, 9th August.

Begins. Your telegram No. 4729.[2] I communicated to Mr. Hull early on August 8th the substance of your telegram under reference and of Mr. Attlee's message to the President,[3] of which I think he was already aware. Mr. Hull

[1] Priority mark taken from MSS. EUR. F. 125/23. [2] No. 455. [3] No. 454.

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expressed gratitude and much interest in the messages. He said that he would prefer not to be quoted as making any comment, but that any views of the United States Government should be put forward through the President for whom he was working on the matter.

2. I am grateful for your response to the suggestion in my telegram No. 3984.[4] I think that the Secretary of State was gratified, and I was satisfied over what seems to be his general outlook. I gathered the impression that he is thoroughly disposed to adopt a helpful attitude and to look at the matter in a realistic way. He seems to have no illusions over Gandhi, or over the possibility of transfer of the Government during the war.

3. Subject to local Indian requirements I think that after my brief conversation, that as far as Mr. Hull is concerned it might be useful if H.M.G. in any action taken and in explaining to Indians and Chinese their attitude and intentions, could make reference to, and go along the lines of, passages in Mr. Hull's speech of July 23rd in which he refers to necessity in case of peoples seeking independence that (1) Axis should be beaten (2) they should prove by their contributions to this end that they deserved independence (3) show that they are ready for it (not only from the point of view of unity but also from that of capacity). Mention might also be made to the case of the Philippines, with its set date for independence.

4. It is realised that after offer through Sir S. Cripps such a line[5] must appear to be step backward, but I have (group undec: ? best) reason to believe that in spite of this and within the limits of His Majesty's Government's statement in Parliament on July 31st[6] Secretary of State himself would view sympathetically, and mentally endorse such lines. It is also I think realised that His Majesty's Government have for years been leading India towards self-government and that Cripps offer may be taken as indicating their view that, given unity, Indians had reached stage where His Majesty's Government considered them capable of managing their own affairs. Line suggested would therefore obviously need most careful handling not least in respect of its effects on *public opinion* here. To meet this, references to points in Mr. Hull's speech and to Philippines, should be profitable to some degree.

5. You will however doubtless await any expression of views from the President before taking any decision on suggestion to Government of India.

6. Bajpai and Mr. Butler have seen this telegram. *Ends.*

[4] No. 411. [5] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'antagonism' instead of 'a line'.
[6] No. 366; the date should be 30 July.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 551

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *16 August 1942, 1.35 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 16 August, 3.15 pm*

2443-S. Your personal telegram August 11th.[1]

(*a*) We had already considered very carefully possibility of keeping Gandhi at Sevagram under any kind of restriction and decided that difficulties were too great. It contains a large number of individuals against whom there would be no ground for action: it is regarded with considerable reverence and reaction to imposition of wire fencing etc. would I am advised be resented, while straggling lay-out is such that arrangements for effective guarding would be most difficult. If therefore he goes there after starting a fast in our custody, position would, as we see it, be that he must go as a completely free man. If we were to impose any restrictions e.g. on his communication with the press, he might either defy them or make them a ground for continuing his fast. He would still be our prisoner in the eyes of the world, and his death while under our control is what we wish to avoid. There would in that event be no question of our moving him to Sevagram. I doubt very much his being able to make much capital out of his release if he is not released until he is in imminent danger of death as a result of fasting.

(*b*) As stated in my private and personal telegram of August 10th No. 2344-S[2] idea would be when the point came for a decision that Gandhi should be set at liberty leaving it to himself to decide where he wants to go to or whether he prefers to remain in the Aga Khan's house at Poona once his fast begins to endanger his life.

(*c*) Your para. No. 2. Answer as regards Poona is in the affirmative. As stated above we shall find it extremely difficult in conditions of Sevagram to cut him off from sending messages and receiving news.

(*d*) Your para. No. 3. Answer to your first sentence is in the affirmative. Answer to second is in the negative, local circumstances making it impossible to isolate these individuals, unless they are all placed in solitary confinement or planted out individually in jails. I recognise that fact they are together facilitates concerting of future action, and that there is the risk that if one of them had to be let out e.g. for an urgent operation, he might be able to pass instructions on. On the other hand fact that they are in Ahmednagar, completely isolated and cut off from news must hamper effectiveness of any plan-making, and it would be very difficult to ensure equal isolation from giving or receiving news or instructions if they were scattered over a number of centres.

[1] No. 500. [2] No. 490.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE — NEW DELHI, *16 August 1942, 3.50 pm*
SECRET — *Received: 16 August, 3.45 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2448–S. Your private and personal telegram of 14th August, No. 994.[1] I am most grateful. Situation has not improved. C. P. again tackled me yesterday and I am seeing him this morning. He explains that it is now an almost religious conviction like that which led him to decide on the opening of the Travancore temples to Harijans, and that he feels that he has no option in the matter, but that he is of course most anxious not to embarrass, &c.

2. I cannot quite make out what is moving C. P. unless it is the general Hindu sensitiveness to this sort of business. But I am astonished that anyone of his political experience, &c. should want to make this formal approach to Gandhi and (*a*) seriously expect to convert Gandhi save on the latter's terms, (*b*) think that he could make any approach such as the present without most seriously encouraging Congress and damaging the position of the Government in this country, while (*c*) this development on the part of a man whom we should all of us have regarded as completely dependable and solid is a lamentable commentary on the strain with which we will be faced were we to agree to an Indian Home Member.

2. [*sic*] I will telegraph further as early as possible. Meanwhile I am doing my best to steady C. P. but as I telegraph am extremely pessimistic.

[1] No. 550.

566

Note by the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/P&J/8/537: ff 198–206

NOTE OF AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN H.E. THE VICEROY AND SIR C. P. RAMASWAMI AIYER, ON SUNDAY, THE 16TH AUGUST, 1942

I had had from Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer two letters which I attach as an appendix to this memorandum. The second of these letters I received immediately before he came to see me. I have also been in correspondence on the subject of his first letter with the Secretary of State through the private channel.[1]

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2. On seeing Sir C.P., I thanked him for his further letter and said that I had considered very carefully and with great detachment the views he had put to me; and that I had been at pains to separate and consider independently the public aspect and that personal aspect which I could see was so material from his point of view and the sincerity of his approach to which I so fully respected.

3. I said I would like to touch first on the soundness as I saw it of his grounds for thinking that his intervention with Mr. Gandhi on the basis that he had proposed was likely to be effective. We were both of us agreed that everything turned on whether Mr. Gandhi did or did not sincerely and in his own heart abhor violence, and that any appeal of that nature which Sir C. P. had had in view as admitting of being made could only be on that basis. Sir C. P. agreed that this was the case, and also that his belief was that Mr. Gandhi was in fact in his heart of hearts opposed to violence. I said that I full[y] accepted his own judgment on this matter, though it was not one which I could myself agree with. I had naturally kept the closest possible watch on every development in this position that might help us to assess the trend of events and the working of the mind of those on the side of the Congress who were concerned with its organisation; and it was fair that I should let him know that I was getting together what was in my judgment a considerable body of evidence to the effect that Gandhi realised that he could not get what he wanted without violence, and that he was ready in these circumstances to face extreme measures. I could not, and I must make this quite plain, agree, that in my opinion, any representation that Sir C. P. could make, based on the details of violence which had followed the arrest of the Congress leaders or on any exposition of the undesirable activities of Mr. Gandhi's followers, would move him in the slightest degree.

4. That was my first point. I turned now to the point of view of the public and the public interest. Sir C. P. would agree with me that he had joined my Government at a time when it was well known that a collision with the Congress was more or less inescapable. Because of his status, his great experience, and his high position, all of which were recognised abroad as well as in this country and in Great Britain, his acceptance of my invitation and his adherence to my Government had been regarded on all sides as a great accession of strength. I had received congratulations on it from the most diverse quarters, and I had some reason to think that even moderate elements in the Congress had been gratified by his accepting office though that was not a compliment to him. For it was only common knowledge that of all the new names which had been included in my Council as a result of the two last expansions, his joining was by far the most distinguished addition. Sir C. P. gave no reaction to this statement.

[1] See Nos. 510, 550, and 565.

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5. I went on to say that I had indeed been accused of searching for a giant-killer to kill Gandhi, but that had been the only criticism levelled at me over his appointment. Could anyone suppose, however the pill was sugared or the fact wrapped up in skilful wording, that Sir C. P. could at this stage leave my Government without deeply damaging the Government here and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and without producing most misleading and unhappy impressions in Great Britain, China and the United States? Public opinion interested in India must inevitably be seriously disturbed not only in Great Britain and here, but all over the world. I saw no escape from this. The draft press announcement which Sir C. P. had handed to me on entering my room (and which is reproduced as Appendix 2) would be front page news with heavy headlines wherever any interest in India was taken. But it would be front page news in the sense that the headlines would say:— "Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer resigns from Viceroy's Council", and the detailed reasons for which he had done so would achieve far less prominence. I could not believe that any statement on these lines was really going to carry conviction or alter the position materially.

6. Thus, I hoped I had made clear to him in the first place that I could not feel that Sir C. P. himself was likely to succeed in this venture. Secondly, I was pretty certain that it was impossible to conceal, whatever cover might be devised for his leaving Council, that his departure from that body at this moment, in these circumstances, and when he had belonged to it for so short a time, would not deeply damage that Government. Thirdly, that my Council having decided on a very definite line and having deliberately accepted the Congress challenge, it was now for us to call off non-violence: not for us to ask Gandhi to do so. Fourthly, could Sir C. P. hope to approach Gandhi without the world deciding that the Civil Disobedience Movement had brought the Government to negotiate, and the Congress to agree to negotiate on a fair assumption that something more might be hoped for than could have been got had a Civil Disobedience Movement never been launched? Finally, and a very real difficulty which I wished to put in the most friendly way—were Sir C. P. to withdraw from my Council would that not almost certainly mean an early collision with his present colleagues? For their policy had been very clearly and deliberately that we should not approach Gandhi or let anyone else do so.

7. This final argument seemed to carry some weight with Sir C. P., who behaved as though it was news to him. He then asked whether I would regard his leaving my Council as an unfriendly act. I said that no question of friendship arose: this was a matter of business. But that having considered the issue in all its bearings I was deeply convinced that I must regard any such decision on his part as unwise and inexpedient in the extreme.

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8. Sir C. P. said that the remarks which I had just made to him gave him cause very carefully to reconsider the position. He would like to take time, and to come back when he had been able to reflect on the considerations I had advanced. But if he could not go to see Mr. Gandhi, could not Rajagopalachari do so? It was in his opinion essential to bring pressure upon Gandhi without delay, as the death of Mahadev Desai would increase the risk of a fast. Rajagopalachari was a relation, and it would seem quite natural to the public that he should pay a visit to Mr. Gandhi on the occasion of Mahadev Desai's death. Was it not possible, therefore, for Mr. Rajagopalachari to be allowed to go and see him? Even if the answer to that request was in the negative, could we not raise the ban on newspapers so that Mr. Gandhi could see the damage that had been done. His own instinct was that Gandhi hated violence.

9. I replied that I feared that I must disagree on that point; but that, without committing myself in the least degree, I would of course turn over in my mind what Sir C. P. had said.

10. We then touched on the question of a fast, and I gave my reasons for seeing advantage in holding Mr. Gandhi until his weakness consequent on the fast had reached a point directly threatening his health, and then releasing him to go where he wished, and for regarding it as on the whole the least dangerous of the three alternatives of (*a*) allowing him to fast to death; (*b*) releasing him the moment he began to fast; and (*c*) releasing him as soon as the fast began to imperil his health.

11. Sir C. P. commented that things had turned out very much worse than he had expected. I said that that might be so, but that they had not turned out worse than I had expected or warned other people to expect.

12. In conclusion Sir C. P. gave me an interesting piece of news. He had, he said, been coming through Bombay on his way to see Sir Stafford Cripps on behalf of the Princes last spring, when he had met Vallabhbhai Patel, who said that the whole Cripps Mission was neither more nor less than a carefully organised stunt on the part of Nehru designed to get himself into the front of the platform and become Prime Minister of India; that the moment he had realised that this was the case he had vowed that he would torpedo the whole scheme; and that there was reason to believe, in C. P.'s opinion, that Mr. Patel more than anyone else was responsible for the obstinacy of Mr. Gandhi's antagonism and fixed determination to destroy it.[2]

L.,—16.8.42.

[2] Lord Linlithgow conveyed a summary of this note to Mr Amery in telegram 2452-S of 16 August. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

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Appendix 1 to No. 566

I RACE COURSE ROAD, NEW DELHI, *14–15 August 1942*

PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

Your Excellency,

This morning's newspapers contain some items of special importance. One of them is a most valuable utterance by Mr. C. Rajagopalachariar who is practically the only important public man in India that has denounced the hooliganism which, if not prevented at its inception, might well enthrone mob-rule in India. The second is the telegram despatched by Mr. P. C. Joshi, the Secretary of the Communist party in India, to Mr. Pollitt practically lining up the Communists with the Congress.

2. As I told Your Excellency in person, I believe that the acts of sabotage that have occurred so far are of a sporadic character and can be put down by the use of force as they should be; but the family likeness that exists between the various manifestations of mob-violence so largely participated in by the students who will be the citizens of the future, demonstrates a definite and pre-concerted plan directed towards the destruction of public buildings including railway stations and warehouses, attacks on all means of communication including post and telegraph offices, railway lines and telephone and telegraph wires and a contemplated assault on and abuse of European citizens. The Grand Trunk Express, the Calcutta Mail (in which my colleague, the Honourable Mr. Aney, is travelling) and various other railway trains are finding it impossible to carry out their normal functions. The Honourable Mr. Sarker told me how his saloon was stoned by a large mob near Etawah.

3. This kind of activity may flare up and die down; but unless the mental processes underlying these demonstrations are comprehended and combated and the suicidal character of today's happenings fully exposed all over the country by persons who cannot be suspected of any axe to grind or any personal advantage to be obtained, even the course of the war—especially in the East—may soon be affected. However much our own newspapers and broadcasts may help to preserve proper perspectives, the enemy radios are picturing and will strive to picture the situation as tantamount to a civil war and there is the undoubted possibility of enemies taking advantage of what they may regard as a rebellion.

4. On previous occasions when I have had to fight the Congress and Mr. Gandhi in particular, popular manifestations and students' strikes were not organised with so much subtlety and thoroughness as at present and I have little hesitation in coming to the conclusion that some leading spirits in the Congress Movement have been the inspirers of this programme. From widely separated localities in India I have received news that identical bits of paper are distributed

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among students and workmen referring to the need for sabotaging public communications and suggesting that the British must be driven out. This campaign, in the interests of India, must be checked at the outset.

5. I have suggested to Your Excellency the advisability, or rather, from my point of view, the necessity of placing these aspects before Mr. Gandhi and insisting that, as a man of peace and honour, he should call off the subversive movement and work for the elimination of sabotage and the orgy of destructive hatred. He is certainly one of the few persons in the country who is likely to respond to such a call; and if he does respond, *his voice is probably the only one that will be effectual.* If he does not respond to the call, it will be up to those who think as I do, to place *the facts and his attitude* before the public and to fight this evil in the open. I have had several conflicts with Mr. Gandhi and on a very few occasions, though not in all, I have succeeded in making him realise and proclaim his mistake. Hence arises my present hope which may, of course, be vain.

6. I realise to the full the weight of the considerations which may weigh with Your Excellency in regard to my suggestion. Such a suggestion may embarrass some of my colleagues. It may mean that if Gandhi calls off the civil disobedience movement, the resumption of negotiations with the Congress may have to follow, though not necessarily. These are matters of serious import but I feel that the danger to India arising out of the birth of this evil spirit is nearly as great as the risk of a Japanese invasion. The Japanese invasion is bound to be successfully resisted and the evils that such an attempt may bring in its train and the damage that may be wrought by it are bound to be temporary; but those views and programmes which lead to assaults on Europeans and the attack on communications and other means of civilised existence will evoke feelings and nurture a spirit that will result in permanent harm to the country at large and may well nullify the efforts of all parties, including the Congress, who are seeking to attain Self-Government on constitutional lines and not on the South American model or on the basis of a *coup d'état.*

7. For these reasons, I regard it as my paramount personal duty to do all I can to resist the emergence of this phenomenon. I may fail with Mr. Gandhi in which case I shall not be ashamed to make my failure public and indicate it as one more reason for the banding together of men of goodwill and high faith to fight this new battle. If I succeed, I shall have done what, I consider, will be some service to India. I have no desire to advertise myself as a kind of minor *deus ex machina* nor do I have the slightest desire to embarrass those of my colleagues who may feel differently and who may favour a different line of action. But as Information Member my belief is that it is not inconsistent with my official position and duties to meet Mr. Gandhi and point out the grievousness of the mistake made in coupling a political resolution, however

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far-reaching, with the threat of mass action and emphasise the terrible results that have followed from the implementing of a catastrophic campaign by students and labourers (in mills) which bears on the face of it signs of premeditation. I am, therefore, asking for permission to do so in my official capacity.

8. Let me make it clear that I have been wholly in favour of the policy and the action that have been adopted by Government in the matter of the timely arrest of the leaders. My definite opinion, however, is that the Government have not been fully informed of the programme of subterranean inspiration and propaganda that must have been carried on for many months and that has now to be nullified. If after balancing the considerations, pro and con, Your Excellency is not in favour of my taking the above step in my official capacity, I am prepared to ask Your Excellency to release me from office as I am anxious that the work that I consider to be a most necessary task should not be productive of any awkwardness or embarrassment to this Government or the British Cabinet. It may be an advantage that I should be so released in order to make myself absolutely free to carry on the work that can be effectively done, if at all *only during the next few weeks or days*. Success in such a task is, of necessary [necessity?], problematical but it is impossible if initiated after Mr. Gandhi starts a fast. The urgency of the matter is therefore pressing. The manner in which such a release can take place without weakening Government, I leave to Your Excellency. One method is to announce publicly that while I am party to and fully in favour of the policy that has, so far, been pursued by Government, it is my desire and resolve, in the face of this peril, to make myself perfectly free to speak and act without advertence to official conventions and procedure in order to fight at its very start the danger facing the country.

9. My decision to address this letter to Your Excellency was arrived at only after much searching of heart and certainly not without a profoundly grateful consciousness of the confidence reposed in me by Your Excellency and the gracious kindnesses of which I have been the recipient on more than one occasion. Such a decision, moreover, would not have been taken but for the feeling that only thus shall I best repay that confidence and those kindnesses and do my bit towards advancing the ultimate interests of my country and Your Excellency's and of the war which the Allies are waging and which is now entering on a critical phase.

10. I wrote this letter yesterday but laid it aside so as to take more time for consideration and to reflect upon the whole matter at leisure. The extension of the trouble to Calcutta where there is already in existence a definite revolutionary movement has helped to enforce my views as well as the news I have had from Bombay that Mr. Gandhi told his associates that his fast will probably

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begin a fortnight after his arrest and will be unlike his previous fasts in that he proposes to deny himself even water so that the crisis may be precipitated within two or three days from the commencement of the fast.

With my best regards,

I am,

Your Excellency's sincerely,

C. P. RAMASWAMI AIYAR

P.S.

I am bound to add that, of course, this letter has no reference to constitutional problems which cannot be discussed either with Mr. Gandhi or with the representatives of any organisation so long as it defies Government and is on the war-path. I hold strongly that such discussions should only be conducted if and when they become necessary or desirable between Your Excellency as the Viceroy and as the head of the Government of India on the one hand and representatives of political parties or groups on the other. Any other course is fraught with the same risks as were encountered by Sir Stafford Cripps.

C. P. R.

1 RACE COURSE ROAD, NEW DELHI, *16 August 1942*

Your Excellency,

Sir Gilbert Laithwaite informed me last evening that Your Excellency would see me at 11 a.m. today. I shall accordingly be at the Viceroy's House at the hour named.

2. I have, however, thought it as well to put down the results of my further reflections on paper in order to let Your Excellency have a fairly complete picture, taken in conjunction with my previous letter, of events as I see them and my duty at this juncture.

3. There are times in the history of a human soul when a definite call comes to it which cannot be ignored or put aside lightly. I felt that such a call came to me when, in spite of formidable obstacles and the opposition of the serried ranks of orthodoxy, I resolved to advise His Highness of Travancore to throw open 1800 temples within His Highness' State to Hindus of all classes including the so-called backward and depressed communities. The odds were against me but I utilised all my energies and exerted myself to the utmost after having prayed for guidance. Mr Gandhi wrote in his newspaper that mine was a political stratagem designed as a manœuvre to strengthen my personal position and the results were described as an eye-wash. I challenged him to visit Travancore and see things for himself. He did so accompanied by Mr Mahadev Desai, his Secretary, whose death has come so suddenly. The result was a remarkable book by Mr Mahadev Desai entitled *The Epic of Travancore* in which Mr Gandhi, after visiting over 250 temples, and seeing things for himself, assigned a place

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to His Highness of Travancore side by side with Asoka and Akbar and openly confessed his error.

4. I feel that the present crisis in the history of India is another such moment when, under other conditions and in a different environment, I have to convey both an appeal and a challenge to Mr Gandhi. If I thought that anyone else could or would charge himself with this particular duty with any chance of success, I should not have volunteered to perform a most difficult and, in some ways, a disagreeable task. The only two persons who could have done something in this direction are Mr C. Rajagopalachariar and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. The latter's personal relations with Mr Gandhi are not good and he has concentrated entirely on the political aspect of the matter which, to my mind, is far less important than the moral or spiritual. Over the former I have no influence and he has been perhaps too much of a disciple effectually to oppose and to expostulate with Mr Gandhi.

5. On the last occasion I did not expect success but Providence ordained otherwise. I do not anticipate success on this occasion; but if I did not make the attempt, I shall feel unhappy and frustrated throughout my life and shall be haunted by the thought that I missed a supreme occasion fateful alike to me personally and to the country at large. As I have already indicated, the emergence of a new and malign spirit has to be combated unless India is to be a prey to marauders and hooligans. This is not a time for purely administrative actions and formulae. It is a testing time for the spirit, and success in overcoming the obstacles that are now looming large is a condition precedent to ordered progress.

6. I am not much interested in political discussions nor am I a believer in the system of Responsible Government on the Parliamentary model as a panacea for all the ills of India. In the peculiar conditions of this country a different system more akin to the American model seems to be called for. But I am profoundly interested in the student population and in their mental balance and spiritual well-being. I am equally interested, as an administrator of some experience, in the maintenance of peace and order and in the strenuous fight against the forces that are exemplified in Nazidom and in the cult of Japan.

7. I feel that, at this moment, the only man whose efforts can with some chance of success neutralise the forces of disorder is Mr Gandhi. To say this is not to admit that he is a safe guide in all matters or that he is a leader whom I could or would follow. I am opposed to his particular system of religious beliefs. I am wholly opposed to his political outlook; but this is not the time for criticism of this type or for standing on prestige or even for resting on grounds of expediency.

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8. Feeling like that, I have reached the same conclusion as was contained in my last letter, after further thought. Everything that is necessary to make it clear that I have not resigned in a huff or in a funk or that I differed from the policy of Your Excellency in any matter may and should be done. My motor car was stoned in Travancore and a scheme was afoot to injure me physically but I declined even to have a police guard during the troublous times of the non-co-operation movement in Travancore and those who have known me will not facilely accuse me of cowardice or nervousness in the face of physical or political danger.

9. I did not come closely in contact with Your Excellency until quite recently; but, will you believe me when I say, in all sincerity, that I regard Your Excellency as one of the greatest gentlemen and most high-souled administrators in recent Indian history? I know and realise that Your Excellency is determined to do the best you can for the good of India and of England. I assure Your Excellency that nothing that I shall do will be guided by any considerations save to be of the utmost assistance to Your Excellency in your great effort. If I thought I could best help Your Excellency by being within your Government, I should have had no hesitation in so deciding. But, at present, I feel that the best service that I can do both to deserve a friendship and confidence that I greatly value and to aid the cause that Your Excellency has at heart is to be outside the Government and do my bit.

10. The urgency of the situation has been intensified by the unfortunate death of Mr Mahadev Desai, the life-long disciple and Secretray of Mr Gandhi. This event is likely to accelerate Mr Gandhi's own programme of fasting.

With my best regards,

I am,

Your Excellency's sincerely,

C. P. RAMASWAMI AIYAR

Appendix 2 to No. 566

Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, Member for Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, has asked for permission to resign his office in order to enable him, with complete freedom of speech and action and in a non-official capacity, to organise opinion and take the steps that he considers necessary to counteract the campaign of mass action and concerted hooliganism that have flared up in widely separated localities and are bound to handicap war effort and impede progress in every direction. He intends, in the first instance, to meet Mahatma Gandhi and appeal to him to set his face against and denounce a campaign which has assumed a form that is the very reverse of non-violent programme adopted by him as a cardinal article of faith. Sir Ramaswami Aiyar desires to make it clear that he is in entire concurrence with the policy adopted

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hitherto by the Government of India to combat the subversive methods that have been resorted to by so many misguided persons following upon the detention of the Congress leaders.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *16 August 1942, 11.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 16 August, 11.45 pm*

No. 2453-S. Situation report. Following is my appreciation midday, 16th August. Storm centre appears to be Bihar where a serious situation has developed around Patna owing to widespread sabotage of Railway lines and cuttings of communications. Troop dispositions have been made, and communication by wireless has been re-established with the Governor. Everything is being done to re-establish the position, but it may take some little time to do so, in view of the widespread damage that has been caused. There are signs of reactions to the Bihar position in the Eastern Districts of the United Provinces, Benares and Allahabad, which border on it. Basis of organisation of Bihar disturbance not yet quite clear. Students, particularly basing themselves on Benares Hindu University, with hooligans, appear to be responsible in the Eastern United Provinces, the rest of which Province is at present reported in good order.

Nothing of significance from States.

2. Students and hooligans remain responsible for some difficulty in Calcutta. In Madras where it will be remembered that there was serious interruption of Railways in the Guntur area and some burning of stations, the Governor comments that were it not for the deliberate attacks on Railway property and communications, he could feel that his Province has been reasonably lightly touched by this trouble. As it is, safety of Railway communications is a cause of anxiety: but all possible preventive measures are being taken. Scattered trouble in Central Provinces in which students prominent. Delhi is quite quiet. Bombay City has now been normal for almost three days and the Bombay Presidency, apart from sporadic incidents, generally satisfactory. Lumley, a very experienced Governor, comments that hitherto similarity of incidents suggests some previous instructions, but no formidable strike; that he has little doubt that our action disrupted Congress plans for the moment; that attempts may soon be made to revive the movement, but that he is inclined to doubt whether they will meet with much success. The violence shown has in his judgment shocked many people.

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3. Bihar situation is the most serious with which we have at the moment to deal. Taking the country as a whole the disturbances, though evidently planned by a common source, do not appear now to be co-ordinated by any single centre and are sporadic in incidence. I have not much doubt that desire of students to imitate subversive or destructive activities of students in other Provinces of which they become aware, and anxiety of hooligan element to turn so good an opportunity to profit, are responsible for a good deal, helped no doubt in certain areas by plans being worked out, or already in existence and implemented, by Congress support. Interruption of communications whether by rail, telegraph or telephone, is serious, and there has been a good deal of scattered destruction of property. But it remains to be seen whether Congress have in fact any further active and better organised subversive plan up their sleeve. We ought to know this in the next couple of days.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Chungking, Washington (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE[1] NEW DELHI, *16 August 1942, 8.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 16 August, 9.45 pm*

No. 2455-S. I thought it well to consult (*a*) Clow: (*b*) Cunningham, as to probability in present circumstances of their being able to form Government since propaganda value if that were possible might obviously be considerable. Following is Clow's reply:—

Begins. Your telegram No. 2401-S[2] of August 13th. Saadulla has reached agreement with Whittaker[3] main understanding being that schemes or (for?) supply will be administered by competent commercial firm and that Europeans will not join Ministry until October when Saadulla intends to reconstruct cabinet. I am awaiting confirmation on certain points from Saadulla and hope to apply for concurrence[4] in revocation tomorrow. *Ends.*

This looks hopeful, but we must of course wait for confirmation.[5] I have not yet heard from Cunningham.

[1] Priority mark taken from L/P&J/8/646. [2] Not printed.
[3] Details of Sir M. Saadulla's negotiations with the European group to gain their support for a new Ministry can be found in L/P&J/8/646.
[4] i.e. the Governor-General's concurrence.
[5] The Section 93 Proclamation was revoked on 25 August and Sir M. Saadulla's new ministry took office the same day.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *16 August 1942, 8.55 pm*
Received: 16 August, 8.30 pm

No. 2457–S. You will have seen paragraph 5 of Lumley's No. 551[1] of 15th August. I know that Cabinet and you are completely satisfied as to attitude we should adopt towards any re-opening of negotiations with Congress. I am certain however that great harm has been done of nature suggested by Lumley by recent leader in *Times*[2] and suggestions in various quarters in home press of home anxiety to go ahead in the constitutional field and try to satisfy Congress there. I realise that there is little if anything that you can do with any of the papers who take this line, but think it only fair that you should be aware, formally from me, of extremely damaging and depressing effect of these speculations at a critical moment in this country, and (not that that is necessary) that I remain entirely satisfied that no business, save on the basis of complete surrender by us, can possibly be done with Congress in present circumstances.

[1] The reference is to the final sentence of para. 5 which remarks that '. . . continued reference to negotiations with Congress, particularly in the home press, makes many reluctant to help government for fear of Congress revenge on their release'. MSS. EUR. F. 125/56.

[2] Of 12 August.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 163

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *16 August 1942, 11.50 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 18 August*

996. Whole-heartedly approve your firm handling of Chiang Kai-shek's impertinent interference.[1]

[1] See No. 541.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: f 263

PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *16 August 1942, 4.45 pm*
Received: 17 August

14442. Your personal telegram 14th August 2430–S.[1] Jinnah's statement was published prominently by *Daily Telegraph* and sent to U.S.A.

[1] No. 548.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *17 August 1942, 8 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 17 August 8.20 pm*

No. 2477–S. Following is my appreciation at midday, 17th August. Bihar situation remains serious and disturbing but is coming under control. Contact maintained with Governor and appropriate troop dispositions made. Some recrudescence of trouble in Bengal at Calcutta and Dacca. Students prominent. Some organised sabotage indicating technical knowledge of electric distributors in Calcutta. Central Provinces situation very much better. Governor comments that we have won first round but other rounds are expected, possibly with progressively diminishing Congress punch. Nagpur City now almost as usual. Rural areas still unaffected. Further disturbances may well be localised and small. Prompt action taken wherever outrages are reported is having good effect. United Provinces situation satisfactory except for Benares area where Benares Hindu University is stated to be focus of sabotage and railway dacoity organisation. Buildings, &c. of university will be taken over by military in the next couple of days. Bombay and Delhi quiet. Otherwise nothing of significance throughout the country though a variety of widely scattered minor incidents of varying importance.

2. No news of anything of importance from Indian States. Attack on communications continues prominent. I am pretty clear, now that we have had over a week to observe, that had we not moved as swiftly and decisively as we did we should have had most serious difficulty in handling what is neither more nor less than a revolutionary movement. Revolutionary character of that

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movement is more apparent in some areas, e.g. Bihar and Benares, than in others. Of its seriousness and its total disregard for non-violence there can be no question.

3. No sign yet of any emergence of further major Congress civil disobedience onslaught. Reports as regards morale and attitude throughout the country, of civil services, which have been under very great strain, generally good, save that in Madras some suggestion that subordinate railway personnel may have been connected with railway sabotage already reported there, and now stated to have been the work of gangs of youths.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Chungking and Washington (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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Mr Russell to Mr Turnbull

L/PO/11/3: f 291

GWYDYR HOUSE, WHITEHALL, S.W.I, *17 August 1942*

Dear Turnbull,

The Lord Privy Seal has asked me to send over, for the Secretary of State's information, the attached draft of an alternative to the proposed telegram to be sent to the Viceroy in accordance with W.P. (42) 362.[1]

> "You may assure your colleagues that His Majesty's Government sincerely appreciate the courageous and patriotic attitude which they have adopted and which is widely and generally supported in this country.
>
> His Majesty's Government will not take any steps as regards the execution of the Government of India's primary responsibility for safeguarding internal order, nor will they enter into any direct negotiations with the leaders of political opinion in India without previous consultation with you and your executive."

Sir Stafford also wishes Mr. Amery to know that he intends to mention the question of whipping at the Cabinet this evening.

Yours sincerely,

M. G. RUSSELL

[1] No. 560.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 363

R/30/1/2: f 2

INDIA

TREATMENT OF GANDHI IN THE EVENT OF A FAST
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *17 August 1942*

I circulate a copy of a telegram sent to the Viceroy on the 11th August[1] enquiring more precisely than was clear on that date what was contemplated in regard to the disposal of Gandhi should he start a "fast unto death" while in detention in the Aga Khan's bungalow at Poona. I enquired whether, if it were contemplated to release him to the care of his personal friends in his ashram at Sevagram, he could still be kept effectively isolated from the outside world.

The Viceroy's reply appended, No. 2443-S[2] of 16th August, shows that it would be impossible effectively to isolate Sevagram and that therefore the alternatives are either to keep him in detention after he starts to fast and see the thing through to the end—a course against which all Governors, with one exception, and also the military authorities advise strongly—or to release him unconditionally to the care of his friends when the fast has reached a stage dangerous to his survival.

It is to be borne in mind that the medical authorities responsible for the medical care of persons in jail, or in any other form of detention, have a duty to preserve the health of the persons in their care; and if a prisoner or détenu starts to "fast unto death" a point is reached sooner or later at which these medical authorities must either impose their will on the person fasting in order to keep him alive, or must be relieved of their responsibility.

Paragraph (*d*) of the Viceroy's telegram explains the conditions of the other Congress leaders detained in Ahmednagar Fort. Though precluded from contact with the outside world, they are not isolated from one another, and it is not possible so to isolate them without treating them on the lines of convicts rather than persons detained for State reasons.

L. S. A.

[1] No. 500. [2] No. 564.

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 113th Conclusions, Minutes 6–9

R/30/1/2: ff 49–51

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 17 August 1942 at 5.30 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Ernest Bevin, Viscount Halifax

Also present during discussion of items 6–9 were: Mr S. M. Bruce, Mr W. Nash, Sir Kingsley Wood, Mr Herbert Morrison, Mr Amery, Viscount Cranborne, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Mr Brendan Bracken, and during item 6 Sir Dudley Pound, Sir Charles Portal, Lt.-Gen. A. E. Nye, Sir Orme Sargent

INDIA

General Situation

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 112th Conclusions, Minute 5)[1]

6. The War Cabinet were given the latest information about the state of public order in India. Over the country as a whole the situation was easier, but there was some cause for anxiety about the position in Bihar. The widespread interference with communications indicated a premeditated purpose, but the results suggested that Congress had not had time to perfect their organisation. So far, there had been no serious communal trouble in any part of India.

Reference was made to the suggestion made in a telegram from a Provincial Governor that the publication in the Indian press of reports of incidents in certain areas was leading to the spread of disorder to other parts of the country.[2] THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that the Viceroy was watching this position, and suggested that he might be left to take such steps as he thought wise to restrict publication of these reports in the Indian press.

As regards press reports in this country, it was suggested that, after the excessive publicity during the first few days, there might now be some tendency to mislead the public into thinking that all danger in India was now over. THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION undertook to give some guidance to the Press on this point.

Proposed Assurance to Viceroy's Executive Council

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 107th Conclusions, Minute 5)[3]

7. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (42) 362)[4] suggesting that an assurance should be given to the Viceroy's Executive Council that His Majesty's Government would neither renew negotiations with Congress, or any other Indian political party,

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except after full consultation with the Government of India, nor modify its present policy as a result of pressure from the United States, China, or any other of the United Nations. Annexed to the Memorandum was a draft telegram to the Viceroy giving an assurance on these points.

The Secretary of State for India handed round copies of an amended draft telegram which had been prepared to meet the suggestion that the assurance should not include a reference to pressure from Allied countries.

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Secretary of State for India to telegraph to the Viceroy in the terms of the amended draft.[5]

Detention of Gandhi

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 109th Conclusions, Minute 7)[6]

8. The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (42) 363)[7] covering an exchange of telegrams with the Viceroy. These telegrams gave the Viceroy's answer to the suggestion that, if Gandhi fasted, he should be sent back to Sevagram, where the responsibility for looking after him would be that of his friends. The Viceroy replied that detention at Sevagram had been considered and was not regarded as practicable. It appeared that the Viceroy's advisers still held the view that, if Gandhi fasted, it would be necessary to release him unconditionally as soon as it was thought that his life was in danger.

In discussion, it was suggested that, if Gandhi was not to be held in detention, whatever the consequences, there was much to be said for releasing him as soon as he began to fast. The responsibility for deciding when the point had been reached at which further fasting would endanger his life must be left to the Medical Officer; in practice, no instruction could be given to him by the Government of India which would limit his professional discretion. Left with this responsibility, he would certainly take no risks.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL said that the Viceroy's attitude on this point confirmed his view that the War Cabinet had been right in recommending at the outset that Gandhi should be deported rather than detained in India. He feared that the course which the Viceroy now favoured would be interpreted as a sign of weakness on the part of the Government of India. He therefore suggested that it would be wise to put more specifically to the Viceroy the suggestion made in the discussion at the War Cabinet on the 10th August (W.M. (42) 109th Conclusions, Minute 7), that Gandhi should be

[1] No. 533.

[2] The suggestion seems in fact to have been made in Home Department telegram 6434, para. 4 of 15 August. L/P&J/8/604: f 38.

[3] No. 451. [4] No. 560. [5] No. 576. [6] No. 488. [7] No. 574.

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detained under such conditions as would leave the Government of India free of responsibility for safeguarding his life and health. What he had in mind was something like the system of "house domicile", which was well known in India. Gandhi would be placed in a suitable house, where some of his friends could, if he wished, be interned with him, and a close guard would be maintained round it in order to restrict his freedom of movement, visits and communications. It would, however, be made clear that the Government assumed no responsibility for his food or living conditions or for his health and welfare. He could have his own medical advisers and, if he was attended by a Medical Officer in the employ of the Government of India, this would be only at his own request. Having thus made it clear that they were concerned only to prevent him from carrying on his revolutionary campaign and that they assumed no responsibility for his life and health, the Government of India could then, if Gandhi chose to fast, leave him to take the consequences. The responsibility would rest with Gandhi himself and his friends and medical advisers.

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Secretary of State for India to inform the Viceroy that the War Cabinet felt considerable anxiety about the policy envisaged in his telegram No. 2443-S of the 16th August. It was, in their view, important to avoid a situation in which Gandhi or his followers could interpret his release from detention as a victory in his struggle against the Government of India. In these circumstances, they wished the Viceroy to give further consideration to the possibility of modifying the conditions of Gandhi's detention, on the lines indicated by the Lord President in the course of the discussion, so as to leave the Government of India free of responsibility for safeguarding his life and health, and thus able, if he chose to fast, to leave him to take the consequences.

Whipping in Bombay

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 111th Conclusions, Minute 4)[8]

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA read to the War Cabinet a telegram[9] received from the Governor of Bombay in reply to the enquiry about the extent to which it was proposed to resort to whipping as a punishment for offences against public order. This indicated that this punishment was only intended for offences involving violence, and that it would be sparingly used.

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Secretary of State for India—

(i) To inform the Viceroy that the War Cabinet, while they did not suggest the withdrawal of the statement already made regarding the availability of corporal punishment for certain offences of violence,[10] would strongly deprecate any extensive use of this penalty, and hoped

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that steps would be taken to ensure that it would be used most sparingly by the courts.

(ii) To ascertain what instrument was used for carrying out sentences of corporal punishment in India.

(iii) To consider whether some statement could not be issued for the guidance of the Press in this country and the United States, indicating the limited extent to which the courts would, in fact, impose sentences of corporal punishment in these cases.

[8] No. 521. [9] No. 549.

[10] Presumably a reference to the Bombay Government's announcement of 11 August: see No. 521, note 2.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 312

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *17 August 1942, 9 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 18 August*

14510. Your personal telegram 2347-S.[1] You can assure your colleagues that His Majesty's Government will continue to give their unflinching support to the Government of India in the execution of its primary responsibility[2] for dealing with the situation created by the Congress resolution. There is no question of His Majesty's Government entering into negotiations with the present leaders of Congress or with other political parties with regard to any scheme designed to resolve the existing political deadlock, without consulting you and the Government of India fully. The courageous and patriotic attitude of your colleagues has been sincerely appreciated here, and we rely on them to continue to play their part with the same high sense of responsibility both for India's present peace and security and for her future destiny.

[1] No. 493.

[2] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'share of the responsibilities' instead of 'primary responsibility'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *17 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I have no letter from you to answer and we have been in very close touch by telegram, so I do not propose to say very much today. I am now sending

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you the daily personal appreciation for which you asked of the development of the Congress campaign, and I hope that it may be of some use to you.

2. What does emerge pretty clearly, as I said in my appreciation of today,[1] is that had we not struck as swiftly and as decisively as we did we might have found ourselves faced with an extremely awkward situation, wholly revolutionary in character, well organised by people working underground and deterred by no considerations of non-violence or the like. I think that we are fortunate to have tidied up the Bombay position as well as we have, and I am relieved also that things should now be quiet in Delhi, for serious and prolonged rioting in the capital city of a country is not a very good advertisement, whatever the reasons may be for it. I am not a great deal bothered about the position in Bengal, though I may have cause to revise that view in the next day or two, for the trouble is confined so far as one can judge essentially to Calcutta and Dacca, both of them important university towns, and the excitable and emotional character of the Bengali student may well make him, if he once gets at all worked up, most dangerous material for agitators of a more sinister character. But so far even in Bengal things seem not too bad, though I do not like the reference to the sabotaging of electric distributors by people clearly possessed of technical skill. Madras has not gone too badly, apart from that very bad patch of interference with communications near Guntur, where, again, as you will see, Hope is inclined to think that some other agency may have been at work. Twynam has handled his troubles well, and I was much encouraged by his telegram of today which I have repeated to you; though Nagpur must have had a very unpleasant couple of days, and there is always the danger in that rather jungly country of communications admitting of being very easily cut but repaired only with great difficulty. The Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province have gone well, and so have Assam and Sind. We are left with what in my judgment is much the most serious outbreak of any of those with which we have had to deal, viz. Bihar. Even allowing for the bad reputation of Bihar as a train wrecking area, I have been surprised at the scale and the nature of the preparations and of the interference with railway traffic, &c. there, while this murder of two Air Force Officers, about which we have as yet had no details, is, if confirmed, a shocking business.[2] I cannot but ask myself whether the local authorities in Bihar ought not to have had their ears a little closer to the ground—or alternatively, to the extent that this business may be spontaneous, whether it ought not to be possible to get some clearer impression than I at any rate have at the moment of the underlying causes of this agitation which bubbles up at regular intervals in the district round Patna, Arrah, and Dinapore, &c. I am glad to say that we have re-established communication with Stewart, and that the latest reports show signs that the situation is coming under control. There were fortunately plenty

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of troops available, and the military authorities have here as elsewhere been most co-operative and have wasted no time.

3. From my survey I have so far only omitted the United Provinces. The United Provinces have been a most agreeable surprise, for I had quite expected bad trouble, particularly at Cawnpore and Lucknow. In actual fact the only serious business has been in the eastern part of the Province, Allahabad (no doubt its associations with Nehru count for something), and Benares, where the Hindu University, though Hallett's telegrams may have painted a slightly more lurid picture than after all may prove to have been justified when he has been able to investigate things more closely, seems clearly to have been a hotbed of seditious activity. It seems to me quite clear that there is nothing for it, from what Hallett says, but to authorise the military to take it over whatever may be the repercussions to their doing so.

4. The States seem, apart from three or four incidents not of great importance, to have emerged pretty well, and I am greatly relieved that that should be so too.[3]

5. Service morale, so far as I can judge, seems to be good throughout the services, whether the I.C.S., Police, Railways, &c.

6. I am most grateful for your support over the use of air power against saboteurs, &c.[4] I am certain that one ought not to shrink from using any of the means at our disposal in dealing with a movement so dangerous and so revolutionary as the present one. And I am discussing with Hartley, in Wavell's absence, the possibility of defining more precisely the courses of action to be adopted from the air in differing circumstances.

7. As I write I still see no particular sign of the development of a second wave of the Congress attack. I continue however, and I have made it clear to all those concerned that I expect them also to continue, to watch with the closest attention every straw in the wind. It may yet prove that our swift action at the beginning and the care with which our preparations had been worked out have sufficiently disorganised the Congress movement to eliminate the possibility of a further serious attack upon us; though I think we should be *very* optimistic were we as yet to take that view. But we can, as Twynam says, feel that we have won the first round, and that is something. I am particularly anxious to

[1] No. 572. The Governors' situation reports to which Lord Linlithgow refers in this and the following paragraphs are on L/P&J/8/605.

[2] On 13 August, a train was stopped at Fatwah in Bihar and two R.A.F. officers travelling on leave were taken from it and killed. Their bodies were afterwards paraded through the town and thrown into a river.

[3] Situation reports from the States are on L/P&S/13/967 (Summary at ff 287–8; see also L/P&S/13/966: f 71).

[4] See No. 559, para. 2.

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consolidate our position, more especially in really troublesome places like Bihar, and to re-establish our supremacy in all of the disturbed areas before the date on which the Mahatma might want to start a fast: for once he does start a fast and the news gets about (and we shall not be able to keep it dark for more than a day or so), there will of course be a further violent wave of emotional feeling throughout Hinduism which may result in a revival of these lamentable incidents with which we have been grappling.

8. The significant feature of the whole business has been the prominence of the part played by the student community. Discipline in Indian universities is not of the best—indeed, as someone remarked to me the other day, one of the most damaging things done by Gandhi and his friends in 1921 was to destroy discipline in schools and colleges. Taking the absence of any tradition of discipline, with the highly strung and excitable character of so many of these young men, and the amusement which it is so easy to get from smashing things or setting something on fire, and you have all the material for bad trouble.

9. As I have said, I think we may congratulate ourselves upon our having struck at Congress before their preparations were completed. But in my judgment, we have this different and far more important reason to be thankful: that we have brought on this business at a time when the war position is not such as to offer any immediate threat to India, whether from the West or from the East. I have not the least doubt that Gandhi's plan was to wait for bad war news before raising the standard of revolt, and had we faced this revolutionary challenge towards the end of September, with evil tidings upon us from the Nile or the Caucasus, with the fighting season beginning in the East, with Congress plans perfected, and with my Council shaken by six weeks intensive intimidation, we should have been in a position far worse than that which now confronts us.

10. The Press has been a great nuisance, and I have been continually conscious that we were not doing enough to curb the flood of news. One has of course had to watch one's political corner a little here, but I personally am in complete agreement with your criticisms, and am most grateful for the help you have been able to give us from the other end in keeping the matter straight. I think, as I write, that the position is now a good deal tidier, and we have learnt a great deal by the experiences of the last week or ten days. I have just heard that 14 of the Calcutta newspapers have ceased publication (thus leaving Calcutta only with the *Statesman* and the *Star of India*) indefinitely as a protest against the restrictions placed upon them. That means either that they are altruistic in a high degree, or that they have received financial assistance in some subterranean way, for the loss to a paper like the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* with a circulation of 45 to 50 thousand must be very substantial. I am trying to investigate that

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aspect of the matter. I fear, though there has as yet been no move, that this may result in pressure on me to reconsider our Press control on the ground that if the newspapers cease publication, rumour will be driven underground. We shall see how that goes, but I do not much like calling off restrictions in face of a threat.

11. I have had no easy time in handling this team of mine. But the most surprising development of any has, as I think you will agree, been this difficulty with C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar. I have given a full account by telegram[5] of my talk with him, and I send you by this bag a copy of my interview note[6] and of his two letters to me, with the draft statement which he wanted to release to the Press. I am still frankly entirely at a loss to fathom what can have been working on him. I thought it was well to take Gwyer into my intimate confidence, partly because I like to keep him in touch, and partly, too, because I thought that circumstances might arise in which if he shared my view, he might be able to act to some extent as a restraining influence on C.P. I think his capacity for wonder at possible developments in this country is beginning to show some slight signs of exhaustion. But he was shocked and amazed to hear of C. P.'s *volte-face*! and readily assured me that, being as he was in entire agreement with me as to the danger to my Council and to our position as a whole, which any move of the nature advocated by C. P. must represent, he would give any help he could, should the occasion arise. It may be necessary for me by way of conceding something to C. P. to ease up a little on the question of supplies of newspapers to Gandhi or the like. I shall regret it if I have to, but obviously it will be well worth while. Sarker (under, I am certain, very strong Congress pressure, and though clearly very far from happy) has been staunch so far. Mody is unhappy in a high degree, but remains fairly firm. Sultan Ahmed, who sometimes in the past wobbled a little, is better than he was.

12. I thought that I would take a preliminary run over the matters which I knew to be exercising the minds of certain of my Council in the constitutional field, and which I discussed in paragraphs 7 to 12 of my letter of 11th August,[7] and I did so at a Council meeting on Saturday last, the 15th. I avoided the question of Indianisation of Council. I touched on the difficulties of any further extension of its powers such as would leave it independent alike of the Legislature here and of Parliament at home in the field in which it at present operates, and I said that I did not see that there could be any question of intrusion by Council into either (*a*) the Governor-General's discretionary field, or (*b*) the autonomous field of the Provinces. I hinted finally (this did not go with a swing in all quarters) that the only major stroke, so far as the Centre was concerned, was the formation of a Government based on solid political parties, who would invite my friends to make their places available; that Congress were clearly

[5] See No. 566, note 2. [6] No. 566. [7] No. 509.

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out of the question in the present circumstances; that Jinnah was very likely to make formal acceptance of Pakistan as well as 50 per cent. of seats the *sine qua non* of his adherence; that the Mahasabha by itself could hardly claim to represent the country; and that the present Council was about as representative probably as we could get. In the Provincial field I asked them to turn over in their minds a possible solution, so far as the Section 93 Provinces were concerned, and dealt briefly with the advantages and disadvantages of minority Ministries; reversion to Council Government; non-official Advisers, and a mixture of non-official and official Advisers. I then tried to deal with the suspicion, entirely unfounded, which I thought certain of them entertained about the operations of my Public Secretariat, and promised to revert to the whole subject in the near future.

13. An interesting discussion followed. Mudaliar, with his usual clarity of mind, suggested that the first thing we wanted to settle was whether any advance or change was needed, leaving the question of what that advance or change should be to be decided subsequently. As I rather anticipated, Mody, Sultan Ahmed, and Sarker had no hesitation in replying at once that some change was needed, and Benthall steered a careful course. Firoz and Usman were cautious and rather hostile. Ambedkar took the somewhat unexpected, but solid, point that if we wanted peace in this country it meant giving the Congress its own terms. We had better make up our minds whether we proposed to give Congress its terms or not. If we did not, it was no use wasting time in minor alterations or concessions, if the reason for those minor alterations or concessions was that we hoped to buy off Congress. Aney and Jogendra Singh were both absent. C. P.'s remarks were general and oracular, and it was agreed to leave things till our next discussion. I think the talk has done good, and I rather hope that it has torpedoed the representation which certain of the Members had been anxious to make to me. I shall be much interested to see what emerges from their reflections on the points suggested to them.

[Para. 14, on the structure of Indian war planning staff, omitted.]

15. I mentioned in paragraph 18 of my letter of 28th/29th July[8] the reports I had had from Firoz Khan Noon of feeling among Indian King's Commissioned Officers. He has just sent me copy of a letter from one of them, and I send a copy by this bag.[9] I think you will agree that it is a distinctly disturbing business, and if this frame of mind is once spread in the Army, as suggested, there may be cause for some uneasiness. I will discuss further with Wavell and Hartley.

[Para. 16, on a honorarium for Waris Ameer Ali; para. 17, on Ramaswami Aiyar's suggestion that the order of the Crown of India should be conferred on the Junior Maharani of Travancore; and para. 18, on the departure of Mr Hodson, omitted.]

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19. As I close this letter I receive a long letter from Gandhi, dated 14th August.[10] There seems nothing in it to justify any reconsideration of our policy. But neither at this stage is there any threat of a fast. I shall have to consider how best to deal with it, bearing in mind that if I send a reply and that reply is, as it would have to be, negative, that may be the signal for the old man to say that he had now lost all hope, and that he must take refuge in a fast. If he is going to fast, I should like to have got the first wave of the civil disobedience movement well disposed of and communications through Bihar to the coal-fields, &c. reopened, before he does so. But I must depend upon the telegraph to give you the result of my reflection and consultations.

Good luck to you.

[8] No. 355.

[9] Not printed; it was enclosed in the Private Secretary to the Viceroy's letter of 18 August to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State. MSS. EUR. F. 125/137.

[10] No. 553.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *18 August 1942, 4.35 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 18 August, 5.45 pm*

No. 2484–S. As you will see, my daily personal appreciations contain a great deal of material which you also receive direct from Governors, &c. I am including it because it seems to me valuable background for Washington, Chungking and Kuibyshev which do not get the detailed reports, and also because it occurs to me that something quite short of this nature may be convenient for circulation to Cabinet in substitution for large number of individual telegrams from Provinces. But if you think it unnecessary I will of course gladly shorten my telegrams and confine them to mere appreciation.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *18 August 1942, 11 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 19 August, 12.45 am*

No. 2493–S. Following is my appreciation midday, August 18th. Situation in Sind is reported to be completely restored to normal. Situation in Central

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Provinces (apart from murder of two Indian officers) rapidly returning to normal. Governor comments that he hopes Congress will not get away with it both ways, i.e. by successfully staging all-out sabotage movement and at the same time succeeding in creating impression that they are not responsible. Movement in Provincial Government's view is by no means wholly spontaneous, and Congress is largely responsible for outrages. Bengal situation better. Hindu nationalist papers in Bengal have decided to suspend publication from August 21st as protest against Press restrictions. It has still to be seen whether Congress sympathisers are subsidising serious financial loss which must be involved. Madras situation still causing difficulty, and things not improving in the country districts where a number of interferences with communications and a serious riot in one place. Little further trouble in Madras City except for misbehaviour of students. Bihar. Improvement in Patna town and neighbourhood has been maintained. Situation still serious in surrounding districts and extensive damage reported to communications, post offices, railway stations and occasionally police stations and Governor anxious about safety of Europeans in outlying districts, while staunchness of Constabulary stated to be questionable in Saran District to which troops being sent from Patna 17th. Elsewhere in India situation quiet.

2. While Bihar situation is still a difficult one, and Governor of Madras is obviously concerned at these scattered attacks on communication in his province, there are increasing signs of return to normality. Still no signs of further major Congress attack. Central Provinces reports that there are signs that better class Congressmen have had enough, but that Hindustan Red Army are still out for trouble.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/105f: f 62

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *18 August 1942, 3 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 19 August*

1003. Following Most Secret and Personal Message received from Prime Minister for transmission to you. Text of telegrams referred to in paragraph 1 are repeated in my next succeeding private and personal telegram.[1]

2. *Message begins.* I must congratulate you upon the resolute and skilful manner in which you are grappling with the disorders fomented by Congress.

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I hope you will have seen my telegram to President Roosevelt in reply to his request for my observations on Chiang Kai-shek's telegram to him. If not Secretary of State will repeat it to you. My own conviction is that if this situation is handled with the poise and strength which the Government of India is showing under your guidance it will soon demonstrate the very slender hold which the Congress have both upon the Indian masses and upon the dominant forces in India life and society.

General Wavell who will return to you shortly will give you a full account of my visit to Moscow and will also tell you about several other secret operational plans which are being concerted. These are for your information alone.

I have every reason to believe that it will be possible to avoid moving the Second Indian Division out of India at the present time towards the Caspian Front. C.I.G.S. will accept instead the other Indian Armoured Brigade. It seems to me that you need as much British strength as possible in these difficult times.

Every personal good wish. *Message ends.*

[1] Telegram 1004 of 18 August transmitted the texts of Nos. 514 and 533.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/608: f 61

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *18 August 1942, 8 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 19 August*

14573. Bombay telm. 14 Aug. 550.[1] War Cabinet while grateful for information I gave them on basis of this telegram and not suggesting withdrawal of statement already made about availability of corporal punishment for certain violent offences, strongly deprecate any extensive use of penalty and hope steps can be taken to ensure that it would be used most sparingly by Courts.[2]

[1] No. 549. [2] Cf. No. 575, Minute 9.

582

Sir D. Monteath to Sir J. Anderson

L/P&J/8/600: ff 541–3, 545

SECRET *18 August 1942*

I am sending on behalf of Mr. Amery, who has left the Office, a copy of the draft telegram to India to carry out the Cabinet Conclusion taken last night in

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regard to the disposal of Mr. Gandhi.[1] Mr. Amery has approved the draft so far as he himself is concerned, but understanding that Bridges, to whom it was referred earlier in the day to make sure that it coincided with the Cabinet intention, had some doubt whether this was so, he would be glad if you would consider it, as the Cabinet Conclusion emerged, I understand, largely from your own suggestion.

I think that Bridges' doubts centre principally on paragraph 2 of the draft and in particular on the phrase in the fourth sentence that Gandhi might have a choice of place in which to fast. This, of course, is a reflection of the Government of India's idea that if Gandhi does decide to fast he should be released to fast where he pleases.

I understand that, broadly, the intention of the Cabinet Conclusion was to find a middle way between the Government of India's proposal to release Gandhi unconditionally, and the other extreme of keeping him in such detention as is now applied at Poona until he dies. The draft that I enclose was certainly intended to suggest a middle course, but if you do not feel able to accept it as carrying out fully the Cabinet's intention, would it help if I came over at your convenience to see how it could be amended?

D. T. MONTEATH

Enclosure to No. 582

DRAFT TELEGRAM

From Secretary of State to Governor-General

IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL

Your personal telegram 16th August, 2443–S.[2] War Cabinet are most grateful for full explanation of your views but are compelled to revert to subject since they feel considerable anxiety about consequences of policy envisaged. In their view it is most important to avoid situation in which Gandhi or his followers could interpret his release from detention as victory in his struggle against Government of India, or which others might regard as a sign of weakness on the Government of India's part. They urge that you should give further consideration to the possibility of establishing conditions of detention on lines of "home domicile" viz. detention in suitable house (together with such friends as he wished who would also be interned) under close guard in order to restrict détenus' movements and communication with, or visits by, persons from outside, but on the clear understanding, which should be made public at appropriate moment, that Government assume no responsibility for his or other detained persons' health or welfare or diet beyond provision of food desired and suitable living conditions. Gandhi could have his own medical advisers

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and any attendance by a medical officer in the service of the Government of India would only be at his own request. Responsibility for the consequences, if he chose to fast, would then rest with himself, his friends and his own medical advisers, and Government of India would be relieved of responsibility.

2. I should be grateful for your reactions to this suggestion which explains in rather more detail general idea contained in my telegram of 11th August, 14074.[3] I imagine that conditions suggested above correspond very closely, if not entirely, with those already obtaining in respect of detention at Poona. Main purpose of Government's suggestion is, of course, to maintain maximum practicable seclusion from the outside world for so long as any danger remains from his having contact with it. I think it follows that if this purpose is to be achieved compatibly with relief of Government from responsibility for his death if he decides to fast, his choice of place in which to fast other than his present quarters must be limited to places over which restrictions can be more or less effectively maintained. I note that the layout at Sevagram is such as to make the application of the suggested arrangements very difficult, though I am not sure that if Gandhi expressed a desire to go to Sevagram in order to carry out a fast it would not be justifiable, after pointing out to him the consequences of his choice to the innocent members of the community, to picket the whole place if he persisted in that choice.

3. Have you any idea yet of his intention to fast and if so on what alleged motive? Much depends on that.

[1] See No. 575, Minute 8. [2] No. 564. [3] No. 500.

583

Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/P&J/8/537: ff 194–5

1 RACE COURSE ROAD, *19 August 1942*

Your Excellency,

The more I reflect on the events that are happening and are likely to take place, the clearer I am in my own mind that the step advocated by me in my two letters[1] to Your Excellency is the only right and possible line to take. *The Muslim League has developed cold feet and desires to negotiate with Gandhi:*[2] With my opinion of

[1] See Appendix 1 to No. 566.

[2] It was reported in *The Times of India* of 19 August that the draft resolution considered by the Muslim League Working Committee on 18 August included a proposal for negotiations with Gandhi. In a statement issued on 19 August (appearing in *The Times of India* of 20 August) Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan denied that the draft resolution had yet been drawn up or that the Working Committee had considered any such resolution on 18 August.

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Jinnah I feel that Government should forestall him. I go further and venture to assert that to speak, as one Governor has spoken, of *crushing* the organisation is to follow the wrong method. What is needed is to arouse the people to realise the futility and terrible danger not only to the present Government but to all future Governments of the Sabotage that is threatening to assume the dimensions of a civil war.

At this stage and with the existing background, the only person that can, if he attempts the task honestly and genuinely, check the movement is Mr. Gandhi. If he does not and will not do so, this fact should be prominently published and others should take up the job whenever they can work successfully in that direction. As I have told Your Excellency more than once, Mr. Gandhi, if the facts are brought home to him, will be under a moral duty and responsibility in view to his professed doctrines to denounce the present campaign. If he does, I expect immediately effective results. If not, we shall know where we are and the hands of other persons working for peace will be strengthened.

One of the best means for conducting a fight against terrorism and sabotage is the Press and I am wholly against any policy which will either put the Press wholly against us or will suppress it.

Last morning I discussed the articles and notes that appeared in the *Hindustan Times* with Your Excellency. I was as I informed Sir F. Puckle and stated in a note against the policy of suppressing the paper by Executive order and if, as stated, the paper had contravened the directions of the Chief Commissioner, my view was that it should be prosecuted in a Court of Law.

I also discussed with Your Excellency the possibility of a frank talk and negotiation with the Calcutta papers. Late in the evening I heard *for the first time* that the office of the *Hindustan Times* had been raided by the Police and that all copies of the newspaper despatched outside Delhi were seized in the Railway Stations. Later, I heard that all the chief *Madras* papers owned by Indians except the *Hindu* and the allied vernacular paper had ceased publication. There is therefore very little point in my proceeding to Calcutta, in the events that have happened.

Without the help and in the absence of the newspapers, not only does my portfolio become even more of a sinecure than I have found it to be, but Govt. will find it difficult to function especially as the *Statesman's* editorial policy is, according to me even more mischievous than that of papers like the *Hindustan Times* and *Bombay Chronicle* and the *Madras Mail's* attitude is purely opportunist and undependable. Moreover, to proceed against the *Hindustan Times* and tolerate the leading articles in the *Statesman* is, to me, indefensible.

Half measures or complacency will not meet the situation and I renew my appeal to Your Excellency to allow me to meet Mr. Gandhi in an official capacity and *if that be not possible* as a non-official.

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I have explained my desire to be of the greatest possible help to Your Excellency and my deep indebtedness and loyalty to you personally. If I did not feel that I shall serve the cause of the war and of this country and indeed serve Your Excellency best by pressing such a course I should not have done so.

Every step may and must be taken to emphasise my entire concurrence with the policy pursued in relation to the Resolution of the A.-I.C.C. and the Civil Disobedience Campaign though I honestly feel that the big stick has been too freely used by local authorities against the press instead of expostulation and friendly persuasion which I believe would have been successful.

But, that having been done my duty seems to be clear and although it may be that my opinion of Gandhi and his reactions may be erroneous as suggested by Your Excellency, it is derived from a long acquaintance with and in consequence and also in spite of my many fights with him.

Your Excellency is entitled to get complete information as to my definite attitude on this subject and I have therefore sought to be fully explanatory.

With my sincerest regards.

I am,

Your Excellency's sincerely,

C. P. RAMASWAMI AIYAR

P.S. If possible, I should like permission to meet Mr. Gandhi *in some capacity* within the next two or three days before the *Muslim League moves in the matter* as it *now must after its Resolution.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *19 August 1942, 9.50 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

SECRET

2504–S. My private and personal telegram 2448–S[1] of August 16th. C.P. is still pressing his point and I am continuing to stonewall. I had discussed position confidentially with Gwyer who is entirely sound on this, and have now suggested to C. P. that he might talk position over with Gwyer which he has agreed to do. I hope this may ease matters a little, and will report as early as possible. Meanwhile we discussed in Council this morning the case for letting Gandhi see newspapers. There was unanimous support for it and for letting him see back numbers, point being taken that if he really believed in non-violence

[1] No. 565.

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revelation of what had taken place since his incarceration might have some effect upon him. I do not myself entertain any hopes of that being the case and did not fail to warn my Council that it might also, if he was thinking of fasting, give him a date on which to begin. But as it is most important if we can to keep whole of my team, and in particular to keep C. P. if one can do so cheaply, I accepted their view and am so informing Lumley. Lumley had independently suggested that time had now come to allow the Ahmednagar détenus to correspond purely on family matters with their family. That also was accepted by Council[2] and as they have been cut off for at least ten days and it will be a few days more before working arrangements can be made I am not unduly disturbed by it.

2. I have already had informal discussions with my Council as to possible expansion of their work at the Centre. I clearly indicated difficulties, and facts that H.M.G. could not leave this Council responsible neither to the Secretary of State nor to the Indian Legislature; that neither could they contemplate its intrusion into field of autonomous provinces or into the field of the Governor-General's discretion. I kept off Indianization problem, but events of the last few days have confirmed me in my view of intolerable burden that would fall on Governor-General in present circumstances without a European element in the Council.

3. So far as provinces are concerned I told them that I had of course always been anxious to get a non-official element in in the Section 93 Provinces if that was practicable, and went through arguments for and against with which you are familiar from our correspondence,[3] and told them to turn position over in their minds on assumption that alternatives were minority ministries, reversion to complete executive council government, official advisers, and a mixture of official and non-official advisers.

4. While I have not been back to Governors I think that wise course will now be to move in the direction, and that without delay, of a combination of official and non-official advisers and I hope to be able to get a good deal of support from Governors for that.

(Take Cypher U:— 31-U) A more revolutionary proposal to which I should like to give effect would be that I should send Sultan Ahmed to Stewart to act as his principal non-official Adviser. Sultan Ahmed is far from a strength in my Council and as leaky as a sieve. There is no one in Bihar excepting Darbhanga and himself and just possibly Sachidananda Sinha who could be considered as non-official advisers, and I think that I might serve a double purpose if we adopt the idea of non-official advisers, by disposing even temporarily in this way of Sultan Ahmed. If I did, I would propose provisionally to make Ambedkar, who is qualified, Law Member, and to put in M. S. A.

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Hydari from the Eastern Group Supply Council to act as Labour Member. Hydari has been Secretary of that Department and knows the work. His present status as representative of India on the Eastern Group Supply Council is a high one, much above that of Secretaries to the Government of India, and while I would not regard him as in any sense a decisive candidate for my Council in ordinary circumstances he is I think quite good enough and is a Muslim, who might be used later for Home Department if Maxwell's health failed or we decided that the wise course when his vacancy occurred would be to replace him by an Indian *official*.

5. (cypher U) I have breathed no word of my intentions to anyone save that I am warning Stewart confidentially about Ahmed. I would welcome earliest possible reaction. There would of course be criticism of fresh appointment of an official, but you know at once how empty the Muslim cupboard is and how important it is to have a good working team which can carry its burdens here.

[2] 'Council' deciphered as 'many'. [3] See L/P&J/8/591.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *19 August 1942, 6.40 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 19 August, 7.30 pm*

No. 2505–S. I have had through Lumley from Gandhi a long letter, dated 14th August,[1] received here by telephone on night of 17th.[2] It devotes itself to analysis and attempted rebuttal of Government of India resolution: shows no sign whatever of the least disposition to climb down; harps on non-violence and ends by urging that Government of India should reconsider their policy.

2. I read it to my Council today and told them that it did not represent any advance and that I proposed to reply[3] in polite but concise terms to the effect that I could not accept Gandhi's criticisms or suggestion of reconsideration, but that I had of course given most careful attention to what he had said. This was not disputed. I propose to keep existence of letter confidential so far as possible. There is of course the risk that he might treat receipt of my reply as an excuse for starting a fast on ground that he has now no longer any hope, but we must take the chance of that, and I am sure that it would be as unwise not to send an answer as it would be to give him the least hope of any reconsideration. Copy of letter went to you by bag of 18th August.

[1] No. 553. [2] Deciphered as '(?August 16th)'. [3] See No. 611.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

PERSONAL NEW DELHI, *19 August 1942, 11.40 pm*
Received: 20 August, 8.15 am

No. 2509–S. Following is my appreciation midday, 19th August. Situation in Bihar is still serious. Some improvement at Patna. Bhagalpur reported out of hand and situation north of the Ganges still grave. Police in small outlying police stations in that area are being concentrated in central places. Arrangements have been made for flights over worst districts to reassure our own supporters and deter rioters, &c. At Gaya 80 per cent. of population reported against Congress but very apathetic. Contact maintained with Governor. United Provinces: Benares Hindu University has been occupied without trouble. Governor comments that with students scattered over the Province one can never be certain when trouble will occur, but situation appears quiet save in eastern area where there have been serious attacks on outlying police stations apparently with brutal murder at Ghazipur of local Indian police staff. As in Bihar police in this area have been called in from outlying stations. No publicity is being given to these attacks on police stations. Governor reports that continued interference with railway between Allahabad and Benares is a serious feature, and that sabotage has been preconcerted and cleverly planned. Central Provinces: two cases of attacks on outlying stations held by small bodies of Indian policemen who have been murdered and their bodies burned.[1] Details still lacking in one case victims stated to have been offered their lives if they promised to join Congress and resign Government Service. Both incidents are in intensive Congress propaganda area which contains Gandhi's home town and is scene of the activities of his disciple a Binova [Vinova?] Bhave. Other parts of the Province quiet. Nagpur returning to normal. Bengal: Calcutta comparatively quiet. Unrest continues at Dacca. Bombay: some disorder and uneasiness in districts. Bombay city normal. Some tension Ahmedabad. Madras: city quiet, mofussil situation not improved and a large number of scattered incidents, some of them serious. Governor reports that acts of violence and sabotage at Madura on 14th–15th August were most determined and well-organised. Otherwise country seems generally quiet, though minor incidents are reported as usual from widely scattered places. States quiet though a serious riot in Mysore, which is now quiet and no further trouble expected on 17th.

2. Congress attention continues to be concentrated on interruption of communications, and evidence of organised sabotage and of careful thinking out ahead of plans is impressive. While situation is in hand there are signs of

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disturbances spreading into the districts, and Governor of the United Provinces comments on difficulty of preventing this owing to dispersal of students. These murders of subordinate Indian policemen accompanied by destruction of police posts in Central Provinces and United Provinces are a significant and most unpleasant feature of situation, and emphasize complete impracticability of maintaining non-violent character of movement such as this when Congress has advised its followers to think for themselves in the absence of leaders.

3. Morale generally speaking throughout the country of Civil Services seems good, though strain on them, particularly on police and on railway staffs, is obviously very great. *Hindustan Times* of Delhi and many Madras nationalist papers have ceased publication as protest against Press restrictions.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

[1] Deciphered as 'buried'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *19 August 1942*

No. 2512–S. Your private and personal telegram No. 1003.[1] Following most secret and personal for Prime Minister:—

Begins. I am much encouraged by your kind message. We are confronted by an awkward situation and I am by no means confident that we have yet seen the worst. But I have good hope we may clear up the position before either Jap or German is well placed to put direct pressure upon us. We shall then[2] be able to offer you India as a sound platform for future operations in any direction. Best messages. *Ends.*

[1] No. 580.

[2] 'then' deciphered as '(?not at present)', but Mr Amery surmised that the word 'soon' had been intended.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: ff 541–3

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *19 August 1942, 7.20 pm*

PERSONAL

14649. Your personal telegram 16th August, 2443–S.[1] War Cabinet are most grateful for full explanation of your views but are compelled to revert to subject

[1] No. 564.

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since they feel considerable anxiety about consequences of policy envisaged.[2] In their view it is most important to avoid situation in which Gandhi or his followers could interpret his release from detention as victory in his struggle against Government of India, or which others might regard as a sign of weakness on the Government of India's part. They urge that you should give further consideration to the possibility of modifying conditions of detention on the lines of "home domicile" viz. detention in suitable house (together with such friends as he wished who would also be interned) under close guard in order to restrict détenus' movements and communication with, or visits by, persons from outside, but on the clear understanding, which should be made public at appropriate moment, that Government assume no responsibility for his or other detained persons' health or welfare or diet beyond provision of food desired and suitable living conditions. Gandhi could have his own medical advisers and any attendance by a medical officer in the service of the Government of India would only be at his own request. Responsibility for the consequences, if he chose to fast, would then rest with himself, his friends and his own medical advisers, and Government of India would be relieved of responsibility.

2. I should be grateful for your reactions to this suggestion, which explains in rather more detail general idea contained in my telegram of 11th August, 14074.[3] Main purpose of Government's suggestion is, of course, to maintain maximum practicable seclusion from the outside world for so long as any danger remains of his still trying to carry on his revolutionary campaign. If the suggestion were adopted there might be advantages in settling place of detention if it is not to be his present quarters and installing him there at once before any fast begins. It would of course have to be a place over which restrictions could be effectively maintained.[4] I note that the layout at Sevagram is such as to make the application of the suggested arrangements very difficult, though I am not sure that if Gandhi expressed a strong desire to go to Sevagram in order to carry out a fast it would not be justifiable, after pointing out to him the consequences of his choice to the innocent members of the community, to picket the whole place if he persisted in that choice.

3. Have you any idea yet of his intention to fast and if so on what alleged motive? Much depends on that.

[2] See No. 575, Minute 8. [3] No. 500.

[4] The passage from 'Main purpose' to 'maintained' was substituted for the corresponding passage in the draft on the suggestion of Sir J. Anderson (see No. 582), who also indicated that para. 2 might end at this point. L/P&J/8/600: f 544.

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Secretary of State to Government of India, External Affairs Department

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 144

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *19 August 1942, 11 pm*

14641. Following is repetition of F.O. telm. 1102 of 18th August to Chungking repeated to Washington.

Begins. Your telegram No. 1134.[1]

Views of General Chiang Kai-shek will be given careful consideration and reasoned reply will be sent to you for communication to him. Meanwhile, however, we must deal separately with questions raised by the Viceroy's telegrams Nos. 2421-S[2] to you and 2415-S[3] both of 14th August.

2. His Majesty's Government fully support the line taken by the Viceroy regarding General Chiang Kai-shek's messages to Indian politicians and regarding Dr. Tsiang Ting Fu's statement. Please therefore besides communicating the Viceroy's personal message to General Chiang Kai-shek speak to him on behalf of His Majesty's Government on the following lines.

3. His Majesty's Government fully understand that the Chinese Government are actuated solely by a desire to further the joint war effort. But they must strongly represent that attempts by the Chinese Government to communicate directly with the Congress leaders or public statements in China displaying sympathy with the Congress party, made at the present juncture when civil disobedience movement initiated by the Congress party is in full swing, must seriously handicap the effort of the Government of India to maintain law and order which is so essential in the interests of the joint war effort. It had indeed been understood that the Chinese Government accepted the undesirability of intervention in Indian domestic politics (vide their action regarding Colonel Yee).[4]

4. In this connexion General Chiang Kai-shek will bear in mind that as emphasised in my telegram No. 1056[5] decision to arrest Congress leaders and

[1] Summarizing Sir H. Seymour's conversation of 11 August with Chiang Kai-shek (see No. 519). L/P&S/12/2315: f 166.

[2] No. 541. [3] See No. 539, note 1.

[4] Colonel S. K. Yee, an official connected with the organisation advising Chiang Kai-shek on Indian questions, visited India during July 'to enquire unofficially into possibility of bringing Indian political parties together' (Linlithgow to Amery, tel. 1924-S of 26 June. L/P&S/12/2315: f 220. See also f 199). H.M. Ambassador at Chungking was instructed to represent that such intervention by China in Indian affairs was not likely to assist the common war effort (*ibid.*, f 206); and H.M. Ambassador at Washington was instructed to speak to his Chinese colleague (T. V. Soong) in a similar sense (*ibid.*, f 201). In tel. 3747 of 18 July to the Foreign Office, Sir R. Campbell reported that Mr Soong had told him that Chiang Kai-shek had recalled Yee to report (*ibid.*, f 196).

[5] No. 456.

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other measures were taken by the Viceroy in Council and that on the Council there are eleven Indian leaders, as opposed to only five British including the Viceroy himself (not four as stated in my telegram No. 1056). Two only of the British members were present when the decisions were taken. Thus if the Chinese Government publicly support Congress party the effect can only be to fill with misgivings regarding Chinese intentions these Indian statesmen who have taken a courageous and a patriotic stand against an attempt to weaken the Indian war effort. Acquiescence on the part of His Majesty's Government in such intervention would lead them to fear that His Majesty's Government might be willing to let them down.

5. His Majesty's Government must also bear in mind the reactions of the Muslims to these approaches to Congress and avoid the risk of communal disorder adding to our difficulties. This is relevant to misconception underlying points 5 and 6[6] in your telegram No. 1134 that so-called Indian National Congress is representative of all-India national feeling. This is of course far from the truth.

6. Present Chinese action is in marked contrast with attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government last year at the time when Communist–Kuomintang differences were most acute.

7. As regards Dr. Tsiang's mission to India you should say that the Government of India would still be glad to receive it but that they would welcome an assurance that its leader and members will while in India refrain from any activities which might give a handle to those elements opposed to the cause for which both our countries are now fighting. *Ends.*

[6] Points (5) and (6) reported Chiang Kai-shek's views as follows:
'(5) Congress was the key point of the problem, and if the question at issue with Congress could be settled other aspects of the Indian question could be settled without much difficulty.
(6) It was very important that the Indians should feel that one member at least of the United Nations was in sympathy with them. China should not assume a policy which would estrange Indian feeling. If the Indians felt they could count upon no sympathy from any side among the United Nations, they would be driven into the arms of Japan.'

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Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/P&J/8/537: ff 192–3

PERSONAL 1 RACE COURSE ROAD, *20 August 1942*

Your Excellency,

I have met Sir Maurice Gwyer and placed my point of view and programme before him. I am glad to feel that he comprehends my attitude towards the

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grave problems that face us and also towards Your Excellency: my interview with him has helped me to clarify my ideas. It has strengthened my resolve.

One matter came up during our discussions which has only been hinted at in my last letter to Your Excellency: It is this. The Working Committee of the Muslim League is about to pass a Resolution empowering Jinnah to make "contacts" with Gandhi. If he asks for permission, such permission cannot well be refused as public opinion in India and elsewhere will misconstrue the refusal as due to a desire to prevent the reconciliation of the two most powerful organisations in the country—the Congress and the League. Deliberately I did not ask for Sir Maurice's own views but I feel that he agrees. Last evening's *National Call* has published (in addition to a vitriolic leading article mainly directed against me) *a letter from Gandhi to one of Jinnah's followers* handing over not only *British* but *Indian India* (namely the States) to Jinnah. Who is to govern the whole of India. A very astute and menacing move!

This sinister move has finally determined me to take my gloves off and definitely and publicly to arouse the States to a sense of impending danger. As Your Excellency knows, I have laboured hard in Travancore to produce a sense of loyalty (born out of material well-being and the rule of law) and flatter myself that I have largely succeeded. I made it clear to Your Excellency that my ambition is to complete my work there *after discharging my duties at this emergency* to *India as a whole* and to Your Excellency:

I hold that it will be a great misfortune if the States were to become the plaything of the two men Jinnah and Gandhi in combination and to forfeit that security and those contacts with the Paramount Power which they are entitled to under their engagements with the Crown and which are both their safety and their guide. Consistently as I have objected to interference with the internal affairs of well-governed States either on the part of British Indian politicians or even of the Residents, I still feel that a supreme *central authority in which they must play their part* under any new Constitution is essential not only for their welfare but their very existence. Pakistan and the Congress Resolution are both inimical to this ideal and I regard it as my foremost duty to fight for it.

Furthermore, the progress that has been achieved by India and the sense of unity that, more or less (less rather than more) pervades the country today and that must be *enlarged* and not diminished are, in my opinion, entirely due to the unity of law and administration and uniformity of legislative and public health and educational endeavours brought about by British association. I cannot see it all jettisoned in order to placate ambitious politicians ignorant of world-forces and of the impossibility at this juncture of World History of creating any "independent India" except in a loose and mischievously inaccurate sense. Why—even England is hardly independent in the ultimate sense

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and post-war arrangements are bound to restrict the ambit of national "independence" in favour of international Control.

Your Excellency has only a few more months of office. I am anxious that the settlement of the Indian question should take place before you leave us. It will be my anxiety to help you to succeed where Cripps failed. I believe that the above political and constitutional ideals are shared by us. I am specially anxious that the States should not be pawns in the game, to be shifted about at the pleasure of bargaining politicians who may dragoon either Chinese or American or even English opinion.

I am now convinced that this work cannot be done from within the Executive Council. I am equally convinced that even before Jinnah and Gandhi meet, not only must the civil disobedience programme be dealt with as I have proposed (i.e. by meeting Gandhi and persuading Gandhi to call it off or denounce it or by a campaign of exposure of Gandhi in the last alternative) but the dangers of the possible Jinnah–Gandhi pact should be made clear to the States and later to the Indian and British public. I have certain advantages in this respect because I have been an adviser of practically every big state in India. I honestly and deliberately feel that this moment calls for the exertion of all my energies in the directions indicated. I cannot fairly and constitutionally operate in the Indian States as a member of the Executive Council.

Need I repeat that I feel the innate conviction that thus alone shall I faithfully serve India and the two persons that have a right to claim my co-operation and loyalty namely Your Excellency and His Highness of Travancore.

My decision to resign my present office is thus final as I explained to Sir Maurice and I hope and trust that Your Excellency will help me to fulfil my trust and my duties as I see them.

I do not propose to inflict more of these tiresome letters on this subject on Your Excellency but shall ever be at Your Excellency's disposal for such advice and assistance in British India or the Indian States as you may require from me and this work I shall regard as my paramount duty.

I am enclosing a formal letter of resignation[1] but, of course, the draft communiqué that I handed to Your Excellency,[2] modified in any manner that appears suitable and appropriate to Your Excellency, should be published so as to clarify the position and prevent the slightest misunderstanding.

The thought has oppressed me that my action may be taken to be a histrionic display but there are occasions when one's faith must be vindicated. The only thing I am anxious about is to preserve the friendship that Your Excellency has honoured me with and to make clear my loyal adherence to you and my ideals as outlined above.

Finally, I wish to repeat that such constitutional discussions as have taken place in Council and are scheduled to take place regarding "Indianisation" do *not* interest me as Indianisation is irrelevant and immaterial so long as Parliamentary

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control exists (as it must exist unless & until complete responsibility is transferred to India).

With my sincerest regards and my best wishes.

I am Your Excellency's Sincerely,

C. P. RAMASWAMI AIYAR

[1] See Enclosure to No. 593. [2] Appendix 2 to No. 566.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *20 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2522–S. My private and personal telegram No. 2504–S[1] of 19th August. C.P. He has seen Gwyer who however failed to make any impression on him, and is clear that he has made up his mind to go, and he has now tendered a formal letter of resignation.[2] C. P. has however shifted his ground. Whereas originally he was anxious to resign so that he could deal direct with Gandhi and while he reiterates that point in a letter[3] accompanying his letter of resignation he also now takes the line that given certain statements that have appeared in the Press purporting to register concurrence of Gandhi to transfer to the Muslim League of all powers of the British Government which it today exercises over India, including the "so-called Indian India", he regards the danger to Indian States as so real and so likely that he feels that he must have full liberty of speech and action at this juncture, and has informed me quite spontaneously that he is prepared to base his resignation on the threat which he sees developing to the Indian States and the vital necessity of countering that by every[4] means in his power in a manner which he could not adopt were he in Council.

2. I fear we must accept that there is no hope of holding C. P. What the true reasons acting [actuating?] him are I am completely unable to fathom. But we must accept the fact. So far as published reasons for resignation go it is much better from our point of view if he does resign on the Indian States issue, though even so the shock of his disappearance after so very short a period will be great.

3. I hope to telegraph further this afternoon.

[1] No. 584. [2] See Enclosure to No. 593. [3] No. 590. [4] L/PO/10/17: f 169 has 'sole'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *20 August 1942, 10.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 20 August, 11.45 pm*

No. 2526–S. Following is my appreciation of situation midday, 20th August. Bombay: city calm, districts generally quiet save for minor incidents. Two or three minor incidents in Orissa. Madras: city normal. Some bad patches in mofussil concentrated in two or three areas, viz. (*a*) Ramnad, Madura and Tanjore districts; (*b*) Guntur, Kistna and Godavari districts, in which Governor describes attacks that have been made, interference with communications, &c. as having been really violent revolutionary outbreaks. Central Provinces: stated by Governor to have "returned to sanity". It now appears that in murders of policemen at Ashti reported yesterday two of the murdered constables were burnt alive in kerosene, and that police station staff defended the station gallantly to the end. Governor remarks that these diabolical murders are a comment on non-violence as understood by the proletariat. United Provinces: position appears better but districts still calling for very close attention. Governor states that in Ghazipur incident reported yesterday police station was burnt and the staff murdered. Bihar: situation still a serious one and reported to have deteriorated in Bhagalpur and Santal Parganas, while at Mokameh rioters are in possession of arms and ammunition suspected to have been obtained from a looted train. Saboteurs in certain areas are reported to have taken trains and driven them. Considerable damage at Kodarna, station raided by mob of 500 with Congress flag. Bengal: situation much as before. Students' strike continues in Dacca but position there somewhat improved. Assam: no news. Rest of British India: quiet. In Indian States Maharaja of Indore has received ultimatum expiring August 19th to sever relations with His Majesty's Government and establish responsible government failing which lawlessness will take place. He has sent a suitable reply. Similar ultimatum sent on 17th August to Ruler of Kotah. A little trouble in Mysore where situation appears to be in hand.

2. I have asked Governors to report whether activities of students which have been so very prominent and destructive are normally of Hindu or of Muslim students. Sind replies entirely Hindu. Bombay broadly speaking entirely Hindu. In United Provinces Muslims except possibly Communists have taken no part and appear anxious to continue studies. I shall be surprised if remaining reports when received do not establish entirely communal and Hindu basis of Congress agitation and of these students' activities. Ultimata to Holkar and Kotah are first moves of this nature reported in States.

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3. Attacks on communications continue. Real storm centre is still Bihar where situation clearly remains a grave one. But all possible action is being taken by troops and local forces to re-establish it. Hope clearly takes a serious view of incidents in Madras in areas referred to in paragraph 1 of this telegram. He comments that there is no[1] reason to believe that Congress were anxious to make a particularly good show in Madras so as to offset the effect of Rajagopalachari's defection from them. In Bengal reports indicate strong suspicion that Marwaris backed by G. D. Birla are financing movement and may endeavour to finance strikes in mills and factories coinciding with spread of alarmist rumours when nationalist Press closes down. No pains are being spared to track down murderers of police at Ashti, Chimnur and Ghazipur (mentioned in paragraph 1 above and in my telegram of yesterday) but we are not giving publicity to incidents as yet.

4. As a contrast to position in the disturbed areas Governor of Assam anticipates immediate return to normal Parliamentary government and has formed a Ministry. This should be treated as confidential pending further announcement, but it is a significant portent at this moment.[2]

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

[1] *Sic.* 'no' is omitted in decipher. [2] See No. 568.

593

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar

L/P&J/8/537: ff 187–90

PERSONAL *20 August 1942*

My dear Sir C. P.,

Very many thanks for your letter of the 20th August[1] and for your subsequent telephone message for my Private Secretary. I have also seen your letter[2] to him of this morning, and you will by now have received the reply[3] to that letter which he sent you on my instructions.

2. I realise fully as the result of our correspondence, and of the long conversations which we have had,[4] that in present circumstances you do not feel that you can render best service to this country and to those interests which you have at heart while remaining a Member of my Council; and, though with the very greatest reluctance, I am driven to accept that view. I need not emphasise how great my reluctance is, for you know well from our conversations at

[1] No. 590. [2] Not printed. [3] Not printed. [4] See Nos. 566, 583, and 590.

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various times how much I had relied on your wise guidance and your assistance in the very difficult task which falls to me here, and how great a loss your counsel and your experience will be to me. But as I say, since you are satisfied in your own mind that the course you desire to take is the right one, I cannot press you further to reconsider; and I am telegraphing[5] to the Secretary of State to let him know that you have tendered your resignation to me and that I propose to accept it, and to make an announcement in the immediate future.

3. As my Private Secretary mentioned in his letter to you of today, I do feel very strongly indeed that from the point of view of the public interest it would be much preferable that, as you suggest, any statement regarding your resignation should base your action on your anxiety, in face of the latest developments, to take active steps in connection with the protection of the position of the States such as could not properly be taken by you while a Member of the Government of India. I think, too, to be quite frank with you, that it would be very undesirable, for reasons that I have made clear to you in our conversations, that there should be any reference in any such statement to your desire which you have mentioned to me to be allowed to see Mr. Gandhi as a matter in the least degree associated with your present decision. And I felt bound, too, using the same frankness as I have always used with you and with the full knowledge that it will not be misunderstood by you, to instruct Laithwaite in his letter to add, since I could see myself no hope of permission being granted for a visit to Mr. Gandhi, that it would be undesirable that even after you ceased to be a Member there should be an early request of that nature from you: since its refusal could not but lead to the conclusion in the public mind that it was that and not any matters connected with the States that was at the root of your decision to resign.

4. We must carefully consider the time table. I have of course to let the Secretary of State and the Cabinet know, and you will probably yourself care to mention your decision to your colleagues before it is made public. What I would suggest would be that it should be mentioned at the conclusion of our meeting in Council on Saturday evening, on the basis of the statement thereafter proposed to be issued, and that we should publish on, say, Monday morning, our colleagues being asked to treat the matter as confidential in the meantime. Would that be convenient for you? As for the terms of any announcement, I enclose a very rough draft on which I would welcome your views, but which would I should say be in accordance with what you have been kind enough to say to me in the letters which we have exchanged today. (I have as you will see omitted the reference to British India in the quotation from your letter to me.)

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

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Enclosure to No. 593

DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Honourable Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, who recently took up the portfolio of Information and Broadcasting in the Government of India, has intimated to the Governor-General that he takes so serious a view of the suggestions which have now been made in the public press as to the attitude of the Indian National Congress towards the Indian States, and regards with so much concern the suggestion attributed to Mr. Gandhi that India "including Indian India" should be made over to the Muslim League, that he does not feel that he can, consistently with his obligations to the Indian States with which his association has been so long and so close, and his anxiety to be free to organize against any threat to their integrity and their position, continue to hold his present portfolio; and he has asked the Governor-General to set him free so that he may be at liberty to take up this matter which he regards as of the first importance.

Sir C.P., in his letter of resignation, adds: "I wish to make it clear beyond all possibility of doubt that I am in full agreement with the action taken and the policy pursued by the Government of India, of which I have been a Member, in respect of the civil disobedience campaign contemplated in the resolution of the All-India Congress Committee, of which we see the calamitous results today, and that my resignation is solely due to my desire at this critical period of Indian history to express my views and take the necessary action with complete freedom of speech and movement with reference to the mass action that has been unfortunately initiated and the constitutional changes that may be proposed in so far as they affect[6] the Indian States in whose well-being and fortunes I am vitally interested."

The Governor-General has accepted Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar's resignation with very great regret. An announcement as regards the succession to him will be made shortly.

[5] No. 594.

[6] The original (L/P&J/8/537: f 191) has 'not only British India but' after the word 'affect'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *20 August 1942, 11.40 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 20 August, 11 pm*

No. 2532–S. My private and personal telegram No. 2522–S[1] of today. C. P. I have had further correspondence[2] and discussion with him. I am clear that he

[1] No. 591. [2] See No. 593.

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is not to be moved from his intention to resign. I am not clear (nor is Gwyer) as to true motive underlying this. But so far as we are concerned resignation on issue of Congress attitude towards States is a far easier wicket than resignation over question of seeing Gandhi. I have therefore told C. P. that I accept his resignation, on that basis, with very great regret, and am discussing with him terms of announcement. Text will be telegraphed to you in advance. I have suggested to him that he should let Council know on Saturday evening and that we should publish probably on Monday morning.

2. He has expressed deep appreciation of being allowed to go and has added orally that he will in all circumstances base his action solely on his anxiety over the States position. Statement regarding his resignation will make it clear in terms that he is in fullest accord with policy of the Government of India towards Congress, &c.

3. I need not tell you how profoundly I regret this business, which is unfortunate in the highest degree, though less unfortunate than if he had gone over Gandhi. As it has happened we can but make the best of it. But from that point of view you will I am sure agree with me as to vital importance writing up resignation at home as another direct result of Congress attack on all stable elements in Indian life and reassertion in another form of their right to dispose of everything inside this country. Play might be made with C. P.'s long and close association with so many different States and utmost emphasis should of course be laid on his categorical statement of support for policy of Government so far as its dealing with Congress is concerned.

4. I am considering difficult question of succession.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/3: ff 260–4

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *20 August 1942, 9.25 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 21 August*

1022. Your private and personal telegram 2255-S[1] dated 31st July. If it is necessary for Raisman to reveal, whether to your Council or in private conversation with colleagues, that he attended Cabinet when question of Indian Sterling Balances and War Expenditure was under consideration, I think it is most desirable that he should make it clear that he did not attend as accredited representative of Government of India but was invited to come in and make statement in extension of *my* repeat my memorandum as a person with expert knowledge of the subject matter who happened to be in this country and on

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basis that he would be required to leave meeting before discussion and taking of final decision.

2. My reason for this suggestion is that as you will have gathered from our correspondence ending with your telegram 1956-S[2] dated 30th June, position regarding exact occasions on which Indian representatives will attend Cabinet when they arrive is delicate. Official invitation is to attend in same circumstances as Dominion representatives who in fact attend when general issues regarding conduct of war are under consideration but in case of Dominion representatives substantially only issues affecting Dominions which come before Cabinet are questions relating to conduct of war in widest sense. In regard to India, questions which come before Cabinet include of course instructions to be sent to yourself and your Government regarding major policy in internal affairs. Such cases can hardly arise in relation to Dominion but if a matter of relations e.g. handling[3] of negotiations in process with Dominion did it is hardly conceivable that discussion of it would be in presence of representative of Dominion. It is possible, though by no means certain, that Prime Minister will wish to invite Indian representatives on some occasions when Indian domestic matters are under consideration, for example, it might be valuable to have them present when such matters as policy in regard to treatment of Gandhi and Working Committee are under consideration. On the other hand, there are clearly matters of Indian policy in respect of which their presence would be impossible, such as constitutional policy and attitude to be adopted towards your Council as a whole. Occasion on which Raisman attended would, I think, be very much a border-line case, since while broad aspects affect India's war effort, decision to be taken was actually one regarding relations of H.M.G. with your Government in respect of which it would not be proper for representatives of one side of the negotiation to be present at the deliberations of the other. I think it is impossible to define rights of Indian members in regard to these matters and that we should carefully preserve position that they are invited to attend for discussions of general war policy. If as we go along it is found possible to invite them *ad hoc* to meetings where some Indian issues are under discussion, that will be all to the good, but it is essential we should be uncommitted and I am apprehensive lest statement by Raisman that he attended discussion on financial matters will lead to demands from Mudaliar for similar treatment as of right when he arrives.

3. I have no objection to Raisman's revealing the fact of his attendance at Cabinet provided he makes it clear that he was not invited as accredited representative of the Government of India but simply asked to come in and make statement without taking part in discussion leading up to decisions.

I hope you will feel able to instruct Raisman accordingly on his arrival.

[1] No. 379. [2] No. 204. [3] Deciphered as 'expiring'.

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Note by Mr Amery[1]

L/P&S/12/2315: ff 113–14

NOTE OF AN INTERVIEW WITH THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR[2] ON 20TH AUGUST 1942

The Chinese Ambassador came to see me this morning and, saying that he had come entirely on his own initiative and in a personal capacity, in view of the fact that I had talked informally and personally to him about India a little while ago,[3] he then proceeded, looking in a variety of directions and rather avoiding catching my eye, more or less to recapitulate what the Generalissimo said to Seymour a little while ago.[4] He said he quite realised that our first duty was to restore order and that we could not negotiate with Congress at this moment, but suggested somewhat vaguely that it was desirable to have some fundamental solution which would enable India's whole effort to be in the war. He said that China, in her isolation, naturally was anxious to know how far she could rely upon India's help. He also referred in a somewhat deprecatory fashion to the attitude of the Chinese press.

I said that as this was a purely personal talk I would be perfectly frank in my personal capacity. As regards the general Indian situation it was essential that the Chinese Government should understand that Congress, whatever Nehru might say in conversation, were not interested in China or in anything except their own predominance in India. They were in fact China's worst enemies. To have yielded altogether to them would have put an end to any hope of China ever getting help from that quarter. Even to appease them in any measure now could only be done at the expense of weakening India's war effort. In any case, however, there was only one principle on which the Allies could work and that was non-interference in each other's internal affairs. When Russia came into the war we declared our wholehearted alliance with her and asked no further questions of ourselves or of anyone else as to her internal form of government. Referring to the Generalissimo's messages to Gandhi and Nehru,[5] I said that the Viceroy had taken the only possible action in refusing to transmit them and that I had at once expressed my approval of his action. We were not contemplating sending messages of sympathy either to any communists who might be making trouble in China or to Wang Ching Wei who, like Gandhi, was an appeaser of the Japanese. As regards the press, we were entitled to look to the Chinese Government to keep it on the right lines.

The Ambassador took all this in very good part and expressed the hope that he might come and see me again or that if I had anything that I could

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say for his guidance I would let him know and he would come round at once.

L. S. A.
20.8.42

[1] Enclosed in a letter of 20 August from Mr Amery to Mr Eden. Foreign Office telegram 1232 of 16 September transmitted a summary to H.M. Ambassador, Chungking (repeated to Viceroy and Governor of Burma, and to Washington by bag No. 377 Saving). L/P&S/12/2315: f 88.
[2] Dr V. K. Wellington Koo. [3] See No. 306. [4] See No. 519. [5] See No. 540.

597

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *20 August 1942*

You certainly are having a time of it, what with the disturbances breaking out now here and now there, and with your colleagues doing the same in their own fashion! I have just received your last telegram[1] telling me that you are still hopeful of getting Gwyer to pacify C. P., and that you feel you must take a step forward with mixed official and unofficial advisers. As you know, my leaning has been that way, but I have always felt that it was for you to judge when the right moment should come. It will come all the more effectively, I think, if the Bengal Government somehow holds together and Assam is added to the list of self-governing Provinces. It will all throw additional strain on the Provincial Governors, but that has got to be faced.

2. I am a little sorry that the needs of the case, which I quite agree dominate everything, are making you do a small reshuffle within your Executive. However, Hydari will no doubt prove a more effective member than Sultan Ahmed, who I hope is not the only prop Stewart has in Bihar. I quite share your view as to further Indianisation of your Executive at this moment. I see no reason why we should not stand firm on the principle of expansion for efficiency as against displacement for political reasons. We can see what will be the best thing to do when the end of Raisman's and Maxwell's terms is nearer.

3. We have sent you a lot of telegrams about Gandhi; indeed, I have sent you rather more than I should have otherwise, only the Cabinet all have such definite, and not always identical, views on the subject. The great thing is that, fast or no fast, he should not be in a position to organise mischief or give vent to his comments on the situation. I see no very great harm in his receiving the newspapers and knowing the kind of non-violence that has resulted from

[1] No. 584.

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his efforts. Indeed, the more he feels that he is definitely only detained and responsible for his own life and not a prisoner in the ordinary sense, the better. But by hook or crook we mustn't let him defeat us, even if it involved somehow enclosing and picketing Sevagram, the difficulties of which I fully appreciate.

4. The Chinese Ambassador came to see me this morning, and saying that he spoke purely personally and on his own initiative reproduced the substance of Chiang Kai-shek's remarks to Seymour the other day. This gave me an opportunity of also saying that I would speak purely personally and quite frankly and I enclose a note[2] of my conversation.

[Para. 5, on a recommendation by the American War Production Board; para. 6, on General Auchinleck's future employment; para. 7, on the need for a victory in Libya; and para. 8, on plans for a folding bicycle, omitted.]

9. In paragraph 10 of your letter of the 25th May[3] you referred to the encouragement to separation which the Sikhs may have derived from the Cripps Mission or from references in my own speeches. Undoubtedly there is nothing that, with any justification, they can point to as a pledge: though that is not to say that they will not try. Clearly however the more Pakistan is pressed the more the Sikhs are likely in their turn to press for a degree of autonomy sufficient to protect them from Muslim domination. Advocacy of an independent "Sikhdom" is I imagine bound sooner or later to give us trouble, and if time and opportunity permit I conceive that it would serve a useful purpose to clear our minds on the facts and to have explored the various possibilities they suggest in advance of any further constitutional discussions. At a superficial glance the propounding of any practicable scheme seems to me to bristle with difficulties. I should judge that a separate Sikhdom is really unworkable without extensive transfers of population in order to mitigate the fresh minority problems that it would raise. We have on record here the views of the Government of India on certain schemes adumbrated at the Round Table Conference (see Reforms Department telegram No. 2610–S of 27th October 1931). But we have not the means of investigating the question fully. I do not know if you would care to consider the desirability of entrusting the task to your Reforms Department in consultation with the *Punjab Government*. *Complete secrecy* would of course be essential, not only to avoid raising false expectations among the Sikhs themselves but also to prevent encouragement to separatist tendencies in other Provinces like Madras and Bombay. I shall be glad to learn the results of any enquiry that may be undertaken.

Shades of Baldev Singh! My hat, what an idea!

L.

None will be!

L.

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10. I do hope you are keeping fit under the tremendous strain imposed on you. If ever a man deserved a breather it will be you when the next eight months are over. Meanwhile, I can only wish you fitness and a cheerful temper in your immediate troubles and quieter waters before long.

Thanks. I was never fitter (though damn'd angry at times!)

L.

P.S. 1.—With reference to the first paragraph of this letter, I remember of course that in June you reported[4] that almost all the Governors were adverse to taking in non-official advisers and that Lumley[5] and Hallett, who had originally favoured the idea, had gone back on it. I rather doubt the wisdom of pressing any of them beyond what they are reasonably ready to do, and I rather come back to my earlier suggestion[6] that in this matter, and particularly at this moment, uniformity is not essential.

[Second Postscript, personal comment omitted.]

[2] See No. 596. [3] No. 86. [4] No. 122. [5] See No. 181, postscript.
[6] See Nos. 54, para. 7, and 125.

598

Resolution of the Muslim League Working Committee

L/P&J/7/1816: ff 70v–1

BOMBAY, *20 August 1942*

The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, having given their deep and anxious consideration to the present political development in the country, deplore the decision arrived at by the All-India Congress Committee on August 8th, 1942,[1] to launch an "open rebellion" by resorting to the mass civil disobedience movement in pursuance of their objective of establishing Congress Hindu domination in India which has resulted in lawlessness and considerable destruction of life and property.

It is the considered opinion of the Working Committee that this movement is directed not only to coerce the British Government into handing over power to a Hindu oligarchy and thus disabling them from carrying out their moral obligations and pledges given to the Musalmans and other sections of the peoples of India from time to time but also to force the Musalmans to submit and surrender to Congress terms and dictation. Ever since the beginning of the war and even prior to that the sole objective of Congress policy has been either to cajole or to coerce the British Government into surrendering power

[1] See No. 470.

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to the Congress—a Hindu body with a microscopic following of other communities—in utter suppression of one hundred millions of Musalmans, besides millions of other peoples of this vast sub-continent of India. While claiming the right of self-determination for "India" which is a mere Congress euphemism for a Hindu majority it has persistently opposed the right of self-determination for the Muslim nation to decide and determine their own destiny.

On May 1st, 1942,[2] the All-India Congress Committee by their resolution emphatically repudiated the Muslim League demand for the right of self-determination for Muslims and thus closed the door for the settlement of the communal problem, which is a condition precedent to the attainment of the freedom and independence of India. The Congress had also recognised this as an indispensable condition and had therefore made it a prominent plank in the Congress programme for over 20 years, but by their recent decisions have suddenly thrown it overboard and substituted the fantastic theory that the solution of the Hindu–Muslim problem can only follow the withdrawal of British power from India.

The negotiations of Sir Stafford Cripps with the Congress broke down not on the issue of independence but because of the refusal of the British Government to hand over the Muslims and the minorities to the tender mercies of the Congress. Any acquiescence in this on the part of the British would have been strenuously resisted by the minorities and particularly by the Muslim nation, with memories of tyranny in the Congress-governed provinces still fresh and vivid in their mind.

Baulked in their effort to cajole Sir Stafford Cripps to agree to the transfer of power to the Congress caucus, they decided upon a slogan—"Quit India"—accompanied by the threat of mass civil disobedience. This slogan is mere camouflage and what is really aimed at is supreme control of the government of the country by the Congress.

The Muslims are not a whit less insistent on freedom for the country and the achievement of independence of the people of India, which is the creed of the All-India Muslim League. They are, however, firmly convinced that the present Congress movement is not directed for securing the independence of all the constituent elements in the life of the country but for the establishment of Hindu raj and to deal a death blow to the Muslim goal of Pakistan.

The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League note with dissatisfaction the attitude and policy of the British Government towards the national aspirations of 100 millions of Muslims of India. While the Congress aims at ignoring and suppressing the Muslim demand, the Working Committee regret that the British Government have been unresponsive to the Muslim League offer of co-operation. The appeasement of the Congress has been the central pivot of the Government's policy with barren and sterile results and has now culminated in open defiance of law and order.

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Since the commencement of hostilities the Muslim League has been ready and willing, either singly or in co-operation with other parties, to shoulder the responsibility for running the administration and mobilising the resources of the country for the war effort for the defence of India if a real share in the power and authority of the Government at the Centre and in the provinces is conceded within the framework of the present constitution, and in pursuance of this policy the Muslim League accepted the underlying principles of the August offer of 1940[3] of the British Government.

But the Government, in implementing the offer, nullified the essential principles of it and so made it impossible for the Muslim League to co-operate with the Government on honourable terms. In spite of the fact that the British Government had spurned the offer of co-operation of the Muslim League, under the imminent shadow of the Japanese menace the Muslim League once again reiterated their offer by their resolution of December 27th, 1941,[4] in the following words:—

"In view of the fact that the entry of Japan in the war on the side of the Axis Powers has brought the danger much closer to India and has forced into greater prominence the question of the defence of India, the Working Committee consider it necessary to reiterate that the Muslim League from the very beginning has expressed its willingness to share the responsibility of defence of the country as is evident from the stand taken by the President of the All-India Muslim League as far back as November 1939. . . ."

"The Working Committee once more declare that they are ready and willing as before to shoulder the burden of defence of the country, singly or in co-operation with other parties, on the basis that a real share and responsibility is given in the authority of the Government at the Centre and the provinces within the framework of the present constitution, but without prejudice to the major political issues involved in the framing of the future constitution."

The British Government completely ignored the offer of the Muslim League.

While the proposals of Sir Stafford Cripps virtually conceded the Congress demands of the right of secession from the British Commonwealth of Nations and forming of a constituent Assembly with a preponderantly Hindu majority for the framing of the post-war constitution, they merely recognised the possibility of establishing Pakistan supposed to be implicit in the non-accession scheme.

The Working Committee are definitely of the opinion that if the Muslim masses are to be roused to intensify the war effort with all the sacrifices that are involved it is only possible provided they are assured that it would lead to the

[2] See No. 16, note 5. (The date should be 2 May 1942.)
[3] Cmd. 6219; Vol. I, Appendix I.
[4] L/P&J/7/1816: f 176v.

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realisation of the goal of Pakistan. The Muslim League therefore calls upon the British Government to come forward without further delay with an unequivocal declaration guaranteeing to the Muslims the right of self-determination and to pledge themselves that they will abide by the verdict of a plebiscite of Musalmans and give effect to the Pakistan scheme in consonance with the basic principles laid down by the Lahore resolution of the All-India Muslim League passed in March 1940.[5]

Having regard to the oft-repeated declaration of the United Nations to secure and guarantee the freedom and independence of the smaller nations of the world, the Working Committee invite the immediate attention of the United Nations to the demand of 100 millions of Muslims of India to establish sovereign States in the zones which are their homelands and where they are in a majority.

The Working Committee are fully convinced that Pakistan is the only solution of India's constitutional problem and is in complete consonance with justice and fair play to the two great nations—Muslims and Hindus—inhabiting this vast sub-continent whereas if the Congress demand is accepted it would bring the 100 millions of Muslims under the yoke of a Hindu Raj which must inevitably result either in anarchy and chaos or complete strangulation and annihilation of Muslim India and all that Islam stands for. The Muslim League, as it has been repeatedly made clear, stands not only for Pakistan and the freedom of Muslims but also for the freedom and independence of Hindustan and the Hindus.

The Muslim League has been and is ready and willing to consider any proposals and negotiate with any party on a footing of equality for the setting up of a provisional Government of India in order to mobilise the resources of the country for the purpose of the defence of India and successful prosecution of the war provided the demands of Muslim India, as indicated above, are conceded unequivocally.

In these circumstances the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, after anxious and careful consideration, call upon the Muslims to abstain from any participation in the movement initiated by the Congress and to continue to pursue their normal peaceful life. The Working Committee hope that no attempt shall be made from any quarter to intimidate, coerce, molest or interfere in any manner with the normal life of the Muslims, otherwise the Muslims will be compelled to offer resistance and adopt all such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their life, honour and property.

[5] L/P&J/7/1815: f 54.

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599

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *21 August 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2535-S. My private and personal telegram of 20th August.[1] C.P. I have discussed further with him. He is now anxious for fear of leakage and in interest of avoiding embarrassing cross-examination by Press to resign immediately and leave Delhi tomorrow morning, and has pressed that communiqué[2] (text of which as agreed with C. P. is in my immediately following telegram) should appear in tomorrow morning's papers. After discussion with Maxwell I am agreeing. If he is going to go the less risk we run of further *volte-face* which would take him off the States excuse the better, and rumours are already beginning to spread that certain Members of the Executive Council are in favour of seeing Gandhi. Only thing I greatly regret is shortness of notice which this will give you. But I hope that necessary arrangements can for all that be made at your end. I am certain that the dominant notes for publicity should be: (*a*) his complete support for policy of Government of India *vis-à-vis* of Congress, (*b*) threat to States, who are our loyal Allies, &c., represented by present policy of Congress and seriousness with which this is viewed by so experienced an ex-Dewan as C. P., (*c*) further evidence of Congress policy of claiming, though without the least foundation, to be exclusive voice of India whether British India or Indian States.

2. Categorical repudiation by Muslim League in their resolution of yesterday[3] of Congress claim to speak on behalf of Muslims might usefully be associated with this argument in publicity.

[1] No. 594. [2] See Enclosure to No. 593. [3] No. 598.

600

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *21 August 1942, 9.45 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 22 August, 12.15 am*

No. 2544-S. Following is my personal appreciation midday, 21st August.

2. Provincial reports generally, with exceptions in following paragraph, indicate improvement.

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3. *North-West Frontier Province.*—No incidents. Feeling reported to be hardening against Congress.

Central Provinces.—All quiet.

Sind.—Situation entirely normal and may be expected to remain so. Governor proposes to discontinue daily telegrams.

Bombay.—Generally quiet. Trouble in the towns looks to have subsided after firm action, though it is possible that Congress efforts will now be diverted to villages.

Madras.—Nothing of importance in the city. Slight improvement in districts, though Ramnad and Trichinopoly still very disturbed.

Bengal.—Calcutta quiet. Strikes and demonstrations continue in many localities in districts.

United Provinces.—Situation in eastern area easier. No further detailed report as yet from *Bihar* where G.O.C., Eastern Army, states energetic military action being taken by Governor and local Commanders; but I regret to say that Tata's Works at Jamshedpur have gone on complete strike. This is of course of serious importance from the point of view of war effort.

No further incident of importance reported from States.

4. Attacks on communications and sporadic incidents still reported from various quarters: but in this respect, too, situation appears to be rather easier.

5. I am discussing United Provinces situation with Sloan, Adviser to Governor, today. No effort being spared to bring Bihar position under control and to re-establish communications across Bihar and running of coal trains westward across that province. Morale generally in various Services appears to continue good. Police have obviously done exceedingly well in most difficult conditions. Central Provinces have today given publicity to brutal murders of policemen at Chimnur and Ashti already mentioned in my daily telegrams.[1] United Provinces propose to give similar publicity tomorrow to similar murder at Ghazipur mentioned in yesterday's telegram.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

[1] See Nos. 586, para. 1, and 592, para. 1.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/603: f 31

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *21 August 1942, 9.45 pm*
Received: 21 August, 9 pm

2548–S. Addressed S. of State for India. Repeated Ambassador Washington for Agent-General, Chungking for Agent-General: S. of State please pass to Kuibyshev. My personal appreciation of the Congress situation of 21st August.[1] We are doing our best to keep secret news of strike at Tata's.

[1] No. 600.

602

Government of India, Supply Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/604: f 25

CALCUTTA, *21 August 1942, 3.55 pm*
Received: 21 August, 5.45 pm

10058 C.S. Have received information from Tata's this morning that complete steel plant at Jamshedpur closed down during the night. Practically all the subordinate supervisory staff with labour have not come to work. The few hundred men who are now in plant are being utilised for taking safety measures so that plant can be started up again at short notice. The men have given no official intimation to company nor have they put forward any demands or grievances but have openly stated they will not resume work until a national Government has been formed. The action taken synchronises with final payments of 3 months profit sharing bonus. So far there have been no signs whatsoever of attempts to sabotage the plant. Steel Corporation Bengal and Indian Iron and Steel so far unaffected.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/537: f 143

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
SECRET

INDIA OFFICE, *21 August 1942, 1 pm*
Received: 22 August

1026. Your private and personal telegram 2504-S,[1] 19th August. I note that in view of the unanimous view of your Council you have now agreed to let Gandhi see newspapers, including back numbers. I hope, with you, that your Council may be right in their estimate that the knowledge of what he has done may bring about a change of heart, though, with you, I have no expectation of this and some fear of the contrary. I see less reason to object to the concession to the Ahmednagar détenus to correspond with their families on family matters, and assume that this correspondence will be subject to censorship.

2. I entirely concur in the line which you report in paragraph 2 having taken in regard to expansion of Council's functions and consequent whittling down of your discretionary authority or responsibility to H.M.G., as well as in heading off the suggestion of further Indianization. You have all my sympathy and encouragement in playing what at the moment is practically a lone hand.

3. As regards non-official advisers in the Provinces, it is little more than 2 months since you told me in your telegram of 5th June, 1652-S[2] that, with the exception of Clow, who now has a Ministry,[3] and Hope and Lumley, the latter of whom came round to the opposite view within a few days,[4] all Governors were opposed to appointment of non-official advisers. I recognise that great deal of water has flowed under the bridges since then, but I hope that consultation of Governors will leave them entirely free to express their views frankly from the point of view of handling affairs in their Provinces and will not give them ground for inferring that their duty may be to subordinate effective administration of their charges to political considerations at the Centre. I should be glad if possible to have Governors' reactions by Monday when matter is coming up before Cabinet.

4. Pending a final decision on this question, and until you let me have your ideas for filling the vacancy created by Ayyar's resignation I need not go into the suggestion in paragraph 4 about Sultan Ahmed.

[1] No. 584. [2] No. 122. [3] See No. 568, note 5. [4] See No. 181, postscript.

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604

Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/P&J/8/537: ff 185–6

1 RACE COURSE ROAD, NEW DELHI, *21 August 1942*

Your Excellency,

Your Excellency's letter of the 20th instant[1] has afforded another instance of generous comprehension and active kindliness for which I am once more indebted to Your Excellency. No one can be more sorry than I am that my tenure of office as a Member of Your Excellency's Council should have been so brief; but in the circumstances that I have sought to explain, I feel that I can be of more service to the country and especially to the Indian States as well as to Your Excellency by working outside the Government of India rather than inside it.

Your Excellency's references to me have deeply moved me and I pray that I may continue to deserve the consideration so consistently shown.

With regard to the statement and the omission of all references to my desire to meet Mr. Gandhi and the abandonment of my intention to ask for permission to interview him, I bow to Your Excellency's decision.

Referring to the time-table regarding publication, I venture to suggest that my request for permission to resign, its acceptance by Your Excellency and the draft communiqué, may be communicated to my Honourable colleagues during the course of the day in a secret note. The Communiqué may be handed over to the Associated Press late this evening for publication in tomorrow morning's papers. My belief is that, on the whole, it would be inexpedient to start what may easily become a discussion in the Council; and, in any case, there is no special advantage to be derived from mentioning the matter in Council.

Further, having regard to my views on the subject of constitutional changes at this juncture and my firm conviction that what is needed in the interests of India is not the mere addition of a Member or two or the elimination of A. or B. but the transfer of plenary authority to the Viceroy and Governor-General acting (subject to certain residual powers) with his colleagues, the constitutional discussion in Council tomorrow which, I know, will be concentrated on the Indianisation of the present Executive Council, does not appear to necessitate my presence. In saying so, I am not denying that the portfolios of Home and Finance, for instance, may well have been transferred to Indians many years ago. But my point is that the much criticised "great Moghul" is less likely to go wrong than the far-off Secretary of State functioning on the basis of a somewhat theoretical Parliamentary supervision. This view may be unfashionable but I have cherished it for a long while.

[1] No. 593.

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I fully accept the draft Communiqué and I am suggesting only a small change, namely, that after the words "mass action that" the following words may be substituted: "if unchecked is bound to hamper India's progress and war efforts" in place of the words "has been unfortunately initiated".

Will Your Excellency be pleased to glance at the *enclosed statement*[2] that I propose to make to the Press which, I venture to hope, will meet with Your Excellency's approval?

With Your Excellency's permission, I propose, if my suggestions meet with your approval, to leave tomorrow (Saturday) morning for Madras via Bombay as the other route via Nagpur seems to be still liable to interruptions and delays. I am specially anxious to avoid the numerous interviews and the excited cross-questioning that the several enterprising and sensation-loving foreign and local correspondents in Delhi are certain to initiate.

May I also request Your Excellency, as a great favour, to instruct Sir Gilbert Laithwaite to send a message *enclair and in Code* to the Resident, Madras States, asking him to inform His Highness the Maharajah of Travancore of the decision and the Communiqué? I am naturally anxious that the first intimation of these events should not reach him through the newspapers and I know he can keep a secret.

His Highness of Mysore has asked me to deliver the Convocation Address to his University next month and I shall then start my campaign with reference to the States if I do not get any suitable opportunity to do so even earlier in Travancore.

With kindest regards and reiterating my sincere hope and desire always to be of service to Your Excellency,

I am,

Your Excellency's very sincerely,

C. P. RAMASWAMI AIYAR

[2] Enclosure to No. 605.

605

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar

L/P&J/8/537: ff 183–4

21 August 1942

Dear Sir C. P.,

Many thanks for your letter of the 21st August,[1] for which I am very grateful.

2. I quite agree as regards the time-table, and I propose to arrange for Mr. Natarajan to have the communiqué[2] at 8 p.m. this evening, and to send the

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letter,[3] of which my Private Secretary has already sent you a draft, so as to reach Members of Council by about 6-30 this evening. As you will see, I propose to mark it "Secret and Personal".

3. I see no objection whatever to the statement that you propose to make to the press, which I return herewith, and greatly appreciate the friendly references which you have been kind enough to make in it to myself.

4. I agree also as to your suggestion to leave tomorrow morning for Madras via Bombay, and I understand that Laithwaite is in touch with you as regards the detailed arrangements.

5. I have had a message sent as desired by you to the Resident, Madras States.

6. I have made one small alteration of a technical character in the communiqué by substituting for the words "continue to retain[4] his present portfolio" the more correct statement "continue to remain a Member of the Government of India". Otherwise it will issue in the terms with which you have already agreed.

7. In thanking you again for your kind words, I repeat my own sense of the loss which your experience and mature judgment will be to me in my very difficult task, and send you my best good wishes for the future.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

Enclosure to No. 605

On the occasion of my resignation of Membership of the Governor-General's Executive Council, I cannot but publicly acknowledge the great debt that I owe to His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General for the personal friendliness and the uniform and cordial co-operation as well as the friendly candour of which I have been the recipient before and during my brief tenure of office as His Excellency's colleague. I can now, without any risk of misconstruction state that in him we have a high-souled and most sympathetic administrator. It is my hope and trust that during the remaining months of his Viceroyalty the conditions in this country will return to normalcy so that he can play the effective part that he should and can fulfil in furthering India's ideals in order that, after the victorious termination of the war, this country, as a united and powerful political entity, may achieve all the rights of full nationhood.

C. P. RAMASWAMI AIYAR

[1] No. 604. [2] See Enclosure to No. 593. [3] Not printed.
[4] Enclosure to No. 593 has 'hold'.

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Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/P&J/8/537: f 182

PERSONAL 1 RACE COURSE ROAD, NEW DELHI, *21 August 1942*

Your Excellency,

Words fail me to express my obligation to Your Excellency for all that your letters have meant and implied.

I am a profound believer in prayer and, in bidding Your Excellency good-bye or rather au revoir (when victory is won) my best wishes and prayers will be directed towards you in your great task. May God bless you and prosper all your works.

I am,

Your Excellency's sincerely,

C. P. RAMASWAMI AIYAR

607

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *22 August 1942, 7.10 pm*

PERSONAL *Received: 22 August, 8.15 pm*

No. 2556–S. Following is my personal appreciation midday, 22nd August.

2. Broadly speaking situation continues to show signs of improvement, though it would be very unwise to think that we are yet out of the wood.

3. Bihar remains very much the worst point, but some improvement over a considerable area in that Province is reported, though in certain districts it remains grave and is even deteriorating in Bhagalpur, Purnea and Santal Parganas, while Gaya gives some cause for anxiety. Restoration of communications going well though slowly.

Punjab quiet and one serious incident only of derailment of train.

United Provinces situation clearing up generally, but Governor warns against any premature optimism, and stresses fact that owing to bad communications there are certain areas which are still not yet safe.

Madras. City remains quiet. In the districts there are still several cases of interference with telegraph or telephone wires or with railway tracks. Governor suggests that refugees from Burma may be taking prominent part in disturbances.

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Bengal. Calcutta generally quiet yesterday. Situation tending towards normality in Dacca; a number of minor incidents in the districts of which most important is attack on Beldanga railway station in Murshidabad.

Central Provinces. Situation described as quiet but uneasy.

Country otherwise quiet and nothing of significance from States.

4. General impression left by provincial reports is that while Bihar will still take a great deal of clearing up, and while Madras and Bengal have both of them a number of minor trouble spots, things are settling down, though it would be very unwise to take an optimistic line in public as yet.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *22 August 1942, 8.55 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2558–S. Your private and personal telegram of 21st August, No. 1026.[1] Many thanks for comments in your first two paragraphs.

2. As regards non-official Advisers, I think there may be some slight misunderstanding. I have been discussing this in a general way with my Council and propose to have further discussion with them this evening on the basis of course that this is not their responsibility but that I am interested to know their minds. I have no intention whatever of making any recommendation to you or the Cabinet until I have again consulted Governors. I know that Twynam and Hope would now welcome non-official Advisers (*plus* official Advisers), but I should of course have to consult all other Governors affected again, and that I would propose in due course to do. I do not think there is any need to trouble Cabinet with this as an *immediate* issue; and I of course fully realise that when matter does come up for decision, views of Governors on whom immediate burden of holding situation falls will carry a great deal of weight in a matter of this nature rather than any theoretical considerations that may be urged from the Centre.

3. I might add that while these discussions are a great nuisance and an additional burden to me at a time of great pressure, I have no doubt that I am wise in trying so far as possible to carry my Council along: and I have done

[1] No. 603.

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pretty well so far, and if one can keep them reasonably contented at the risk occasionally of being involved in a discussion more embarrassing than one could have wished or even of having to defer more than one could wish to their view[2] on a particular point, I think on balance that you will agree with me that is worth while.

[2] Deciphered as 'circumstances'.

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Sir D. Monteath to Sir G. Laithwaite

Telegram, L/P&J/8/537: ff 139–42

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *22 August 1942, 4 pm*
Received: 23 August

1031. Laithwaite from Monteath. What follows is result of speculation as to possible implications of certain phrases in paragraphs 2 and 3 of H.E.'s private and personal telegram 19th August, 2504-S,[1] viz. (*a*) "possible extension of their work at Centre" (*b*) "intrusion into the field of autonomous Provinces or into the field of Governor-General's discretion" and (*c*) "reversion to complete Executive Council Government." Secretary of State regarded suggestions below as more speculative than he would care to subscribe to himself and therefore did not include them in his reply 1026[2] but has no objection to their being passed on to you as contingency against which it would be well to be forewarned.

2. If these phrases indicate what is in minds of Indian members relevance should not be overlooked of their being seized of necessity shortly to amend Section 93 in order to get rid of time limitation factor.[3] If they are in principle in favour of appointment now by Governors of Section 93 Provinces of non-officials as Advisers, might they not urge that it would be convenient to turn the legislative[4] opportunity to advantage by investing present extra-statutory Advisers with the powers of Executive Councillors? If this were done might not their next move be to put forward the plausible claim already advanced by Sapru[5] that Provincial Executive Councils should be controlled by Governor-General in Council to the same extent as in pre-1935 or even pre-1919 Constitution? It might be argued that as things stand with Provinces under Section 93 both now and when time factor is amended out, Governor-General's Council is side-tracked in regard to six out of eleven Provinces by the Governor in his discretion working in co-operation with Governor-General in his discretion, that creation of[6] Executive Councils would not only be of assistance to Governors in administering their charges but also get rid of this reproach and

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enable an almost wholly Indianised Council at the Centre to claim, if these Executive Councils were subordinated to the same extent as their predecessors, that it is really governing India where not already governed by Indians either ministerially or Princes.[7]

3. If there were signs that such progressive argument were in contemplation in any quarter, it would be well to be prepared with the counter-argument to the effect that Section 93 whether in present or in proposed amended form, is clearly an emergency provision designed only to cover interval, short or long, while Ministerial Government is lacking, whereas an Executive Council with statutory powers and of a semi-permanent nature would obviously be a retrograde and undemocratic creation. This might be condoned (though it would be difficult to persuade Parliament to do so) on the score of greater efficiency compared with that of Governor assisted by Advisers without any legal status, but the further suggestion of subordination to the Central Government would be even more retrograde since it conflicts with the fundamental features both of the 1935 Act and of the Cripps proposals which is that Provincial units should have the fullest possible autonomy compatible with the requirements of Central Government for Federal or Union purposes.

[1] No. 584. [2] No. 603.
[3] Sub-section (3) of Section 93 of the Government of India Act 1935 provided that no proclamation under that section might remain in force for more than three years.
[4] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has '1935' instead of 'legislative'.
[5] See e.g. Vol. I, No. 2, sub-para. (2).
[6] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'authorised' instead of 'creation of'.
[7] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'completely' instead of 'Princes'.

610

Mr Eden to Mr Amery

L/P&S/12/2633: ff 189–90

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.I, *22 August 1942*

My dear Leo,
Thank you for your letter of the 14th August[1] enclosing a copy of Linlithgow's telegram[2] of the previous day about Laughlin Currie. It seems a pity that Linlithgow did not open up to Currie on the Indian situation, because I am afraid we must regard it as a certainty that more or less eminent Americans will go on flirting with Congress Party leaders and others unless and until we take them more into our confidence. It is their nature to expect to be given inside information on current subjects and if they are not given it the effects

[1] No. 552. [2] No. 522.

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are to make them go after it elsewhere, think that we have something to hide, or feel that they are not regarded as worthy of confidence.[3] Halifax agrees with this diagnosis. Would you feel like giving the Viceroy a hint in this sense?

I understand from Halifax that he suggested to you the other day that the Viceroy should invite President Roosevelt to send a mission of three Americans of high calibre to report back to him. I gather, however, that the idea did not appeal to you. I can certainly understand your reluctance to agree, in view of the risk that the people the President selected might not be just what we wanted, nor do we want to encourage American participation in Indian affairs. It occurs to me, however, that the risk would be considerably less and the same object achieved if the Viceroy had residing in Delhi close to him a really high calibre American in whom we would have confidence and who would equally enjoy the confidence of the President and be a sufficiently well-known figure to command the confidence of the American people too. I do not think it would be impossible to arrange for something of this sort and to ensure that a really suitable man from all points of view was selected. If you agree perhaps the best plan would be for Halifax to get in touch with the President about it on his return.

I know you realise how vitally important it is that American ideas, and the President's too, should be guided in the proper channel on this question of India, and human nature being what it is, I am very doubtful whether we can expect to get the results we want unless the tale is told to the President and to America by an American. I hope very much that you will consider the possibility of agreeing to something on the lines I have suggested.

Yours,

ANTHONY EDEN

[3] In the margin, Sir L. Wakely minuted: 'It is not so much a matter of their receiving confidential information as of their taking a reasonable view of facts known to everyone.'

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Gandhi

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *22 August 1942*

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

Thank you very much for your letter, dated the 14th August,[1] which reached me only a day or two ago.

2. I have read, I need not say, what you have been good enough to say in your letter with very close attention, and I have given full weight to your

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views. But I fear in the result that it would not be possible for me either to accept the criticisms which you advance of the resolution of the Governor-General in Council, or your request that the whole policy of the Government of India should be reconsidered.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 553.

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Sir T. Stewart (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/49

SECRET *22 August 1942*

No. 575-G.B.

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

I have endeavoured to keep Your Excellency informed of the Bihar situation from day to day but I realise that, owing to the very indifferent means of communication which demanded the greatest economy in messages, the picture may not be complete or very distinct. In this letter I shall endeavour to show the wood without making the trees too obtrusive.

2. I arrived in Patna on the morning of 8th August bringing with me Lacey, Russell, the Chief Secretary and the Inspector-General of Police. We all camped out in Government House which has been operational headquarters throughout. The earlier demonstrations took very much the course which we expected; processions and picketing of Courts without any indication of the violence which was to follow. The attack on the Secretariat on the 11th however showed the crowd in an uglier temper and it was only after a very trying afternoon and when it was evident that non-violence was no longer the rule that resort was had to firing. Though the firing checked the attack the crowd went back in an ugly mood in the evening and through the night engaged in widespread sabotage and road obstruction, the thoroughness of which had to be seen to be believed. Telegraph poles complete with their full equipment of wires were pulled over and branches of trees a foot and over in diameter were chopped down. This was not the work of five minutes or an hour but nevertheless no information came into headquarters that this wholesale destruction was going on. The ordinary police in the city as well as the civic sense of the citizen appears to have been paralysed by fright. So far the attackers had been students with an increasing following of *goondas* and we had dealt with them by our police forces alone. In view of the obvious deterioration in the situation we called out the troops from Dinapore and after discussion

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with Major-General Wakely, General Officer Commanding, Lines of Communication Area, I asked him to call upon Eastern Army for a Brigade to come from Ranchi. We were promised a battalion with more to follow if required. The troops at Dinapore consisted of little more than two companies but they served the purpose of warding off further attack on the New Capital and the power station. Pending reinforcement we could not take the offensive, the more so that on the evening of 11th one company of troops was detached for duty at Arrah from which a very urgent call for assistance had been received. With the arrival of another battalion on the 11th–12th we were in a position to commence offensive action. Patrol trains with troops moved both East and West and strong patrols pushed through the Patna bazar (the character of which Your Excellency will remember) removing road blocks, breaking up opposition and extricating Europeans with the result that Patna and the road to the East for about 27 miles was reasonably secured. With the arrival of a further battalion on the 17th we have carried the process further and have opened up the road communications surrounding the inflamed tracts in Patna and Gaya districts with a railway connection through the middle from Patna to Gaya. These peripheral communications are essential as a base for punitive patrols into the village areas which have already been undertaken with some success and which will be continued and pressed home.

3. With rail, telegraph and telephone communications out of order we lost immediate touch with other districts except Gaya with which we at an early stage established a daily shuttle service by "Tiger Moth" planes belonging to the Bihar Flying Club. Belated reports which came in by hand all told the same story. In North Bihar particularly there had been extensive sabotage on the railways and though even before zero hour we had asked for a company of British troops to be sent to Muzaffarpur its arrival was badly held up by traffic interruptions. Fortunately Muzaffarpur had a windfall in the form of a troop train carrying three hundred British troops and three hundred Indian troops. This force was immediately, and energetically, used and brought relief to the officials and railway employees of the Sonepur–Hajipur locality who were being hardly pressed. The same process is being carried on from Muzaffarpur as from Patna, namely, the securing of the main lines of communication which in the case of North Bihar at this time of year are mainly the railways. The lines from Muzaffarpur to Sonepur, to Samastipur (and beyond) and to Motihari are open and operations to open the line west from Sonepur to Chapra parallel to the Ganges are in progress. We are in daily contact with Muzaffarpur by "Tiger Moth". It must be admitted however that conditions in the interior are still pretty bad. The Commissioner of the Tirhut has ordered the abandonment of less important police stations and posts and the concentration of their garrisons at more important and more strategic points. The situation of the

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European planting community has given rise to some anxiety. So far there has been no sign of concerted and murderous attack on Europeans though individuals have on occasion been hustled and roughly treated. Nevertheless, the evacuation process has been begun and meantime I have asked the military authorities to arrange for extensive air reconnaissance over the danger area. Muzaffarpur has not been able to help Chapra and we have sent two companies of B.I. to operate there. We have no recent news of their operations, not even the details of the incident in which one officer and four B.O.Rs. were killed and a "tommy" gun and four rifles lost. Air reconnaissance yesterday showed a crowd in Chapra, and apparently, a troop train in the station. Saran District, of which Chapra is the headquarters, will require a good deal of clearing up. It is notoriously a criminal district where it is difficult to distinguish between a dacoit and the next man. At this time of year too it is to a great extent under water.

4. The districts in the East of the Province have caused us even greater anxiety because of the lack of news as to how they are faring. A personal discussion with an officer who came to Patna by river gave me the impression that Monghyr-cum-Jamalpur was in pretty good shape. The I.A.O.C. personnel and the A.F. (I)[1] at Jamalpur provide stiffening to the police and our information is that a detachment of the South Staffs which was working up the E.I.R. line from Asansol has turned East through Monghyr. The South Staffs have had a hard job overcoming the work of saboteurs who did their best to stop them. They found a good deal of looting at Mokamah and did quite a lot of firing. The looters had got hold of wagons containing Besa guns and S.A.A. Quite an amount of this loot was recovered but we shall yet have to carry out extensive house searches. The advance guard of the Staffs is now in Patna.

5. Of Bhagalpur, Purnea and the Santal Parganas I can tell you little except that three days ago we sent a Company of B.I. to Bhagalpur and that Eastern Army is trying to send help into the Santal Parganas. So far as Purnea is concerned I can only trust that a battalion of Indian Infantry which was working up the B.N.W.R. North of the Ganges (of the progress of which we have not heard) has provided help. The battalion must have passed through the South of the District. The situation in Chota Nagpur, the coal-fields and Jamshedpur is at the moment satisfactory.

6. Having only a short time ago attempted an appreciation of the situation which was entirely wrong[2] I am loth to embark on another. Nevertheless it is strongly suggested that the revolt and the form which it took was a carefully

[1] The Auxiliary Force (India) was a volunteer body set up in 1920 to assist in home defence. Membership, which was confined to European British subjects, involved liability only for local service. In 1940 the Viceroy acquired powers of conscription to the force.

[2] Sir T. Stewart may be referring to No. 508.

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planned one and that our intelligence system was badly at fault. It has still to be discovered whether the plan was the plan of Congress or whether it was the plan of a wing of Congress (the C.S.P.). It may be that it was a plan that was intended to be put into operation on another and more sinister occasion. It seems clear however that the student class were the moving spirits though leading Congressmen like Jagat Narain Lal, an ex-Parliamentary Secretary, fostered the spirit of violence. When checked in Patna the students at once spread out into the villages and there they found very willing allies in the widespread criminal population of the Bihar villages to whom loot and destruction are great attractions. Sabotage has been by no means haphazard and whether on the railways or on the roads it showed no little intelligence and planning. It is a confirmation of this theory that incidents, at least in South Bihar, spread progressively outwards from Patna as a centre in correspondence with the outward movement of the instigators.

7. There are now signs that at least some sections of the public are protesting against the movement but I cannot say that we have had any significant measure of public support. The Press has been unhelpful. The *Searchlight* had to be suppressed at a fairly early stage and its editor is now in jail. The *Nation* . . .[3] has refused to publish our Press Notes or to commit itself to Editorial opinions on the ground that a precensorship order is an insult to the journalistic profession. *Moderate* opinion climbed the fence as soon as there was firing. The Elder Statesmen had no doubt that the firing, if not entirely justified, was yet done in good faith but they would have been failing in their duty if they did not tell us that the younger generation believed that the firing was deliberate murder; the District Magistrate asked one of his subordinates to beckon the crowd forward so that they might provide a better target. A similar excuse has been invented for the Chapra tragedy. The soldiers are said to have concealed themselves in a sugar-cane field and to have shot a woman from that cover. The surrounding villagers naturally took their revenge. There is, too, a certain amount of resentment amongst the intelligentsia in that they have had to undergo certain inconveniences in these days of stress and say that a B.O.R. on picket duty sometimes fails to distinguish between an advocate of the High Court and a possible saboteur. The Bar have been tricky and have tried to jockey the Chief Justice into closing the Courts. The Chief Justice has seen through their manœuvres and is keeping the High Court as a going concern.

8. It is too early to pass a general judgment on the way that the services have stood up to this strain. Some individuals have been very good and some not so good. I regret to say however that I have had very poor reports of the ordinary constabulary and in some places of the armed police: their hearts are not in the job. In pleasing contrast has been the staunchness of the Gurkhas and the Military Mounted Police (P.Ms.) and I must record that junior police

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officers such as Sub-Inspectors have in many cases put up a pretty good show against odds. I would also say how valuable and cordial has been the co-operation of Major-General Wakely and those under his command. We are in constant touch and generally twice a day go "into Committee".

9. This letter is written in haste and may not present the complete picture which I had hoped it might. We have rather lost count of time and days and dates and I am trying to catch an Air Mail leaving Gaya tomorrow morning. I should be very grateful if Your Excellency would regard this as my periodical report. I am sending copies to the usual recipients. As usual I enclose my Chief Secretary's report.[4] I do not comment on such ancient history. I enclose too the C.I.D. report[5] for the week ending 21st August. It makes dismal reading but I trust that what I have said will show that there is another side to the cloud. We are in good heart and confident that we can win through.

10. Again let me say how grateful we all are for Your Excellency's message of encouragement. You too, I can conceive, are not living in Arcadia!

Yours sincerely,

T. A. STEWART

[3] Personal comment omitted. [4 and 5] Not printed.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *23 August 1942, 5.30 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 23 August, 7.5 pm*

No. 2567–S. Following is my appreciation midday, 23rd August. Situation generally continues to improve.[1] In Bihar, the only trouble centre of first-class importance at the moment, Governor reports that Patna town is almost returned to normal, Gaya improving, and that Bhagalpur and Saran districts are the areas which are now causing most anxiety. Some public reaction against mob frenzy is now in evidence. A predominant part in sabotage is now being played by the type of villager who ordinarily indulges in mischief and loot rather than by the students who had been very prominent in earlier incidents. Two murders of officials have been reported, one of a Sub-Inspector of Police, one of a constable. The former after defending his police station with singular

[1] The decipher has no full stop here and does not begin the next sentence until the words 'Governor reports'.

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courage and determination was eventually overwhelmed by the mob which proceeded to make a bonfire of furniture, &c. and burned him on it alive. Publicity is being given to this. Bengal. Calcutta normal except for leaflets. Strikes and demonstrations continue in many districts with a good many attacks on communications. Madras city normal except for unsettled conditions in principal mills. Reports from Mofussil suggest slight improvement. United Provinces. Campaign said to be on the wane even in the east of the Province, and police definitely on top in areas. I would repeat, however, Governor's caution mentioned in my telegram of yesterday that it would be unwise to be optimistic as yet about the United Provinces situation. Otherwise British India is quiet save for a derailment in the Punjab.

2. Mysore.—There has been trouble at Bangalore where the police have had to fire, and Hindustan Aircraft factory and other mills are still on strike. Considerable interference with communications in the State, and one station burnt. Minor incident in Nilgiri in Eastern States. Baroda where there has been some trouble and military had to fire is now quieter.

3. I now have reports from all Governors on student activities which have been of such importance in fomenting disorder. In every Province save North-West Frontier Province, where there has been no student trouble, Hindu students have been responsible, Muslims either completely abstaining or participating only in so far as communists or the like. This well brings out the essentially communal and Hindu character of the Congress agitation.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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Sir S. Radhakrishnan to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

BENARES, *23 August 1942*

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

Since writing to you yesterday,[1] I have posted this letter (enclosed) to Gandhiji at Yeravda Jail. I hope it will reach him.

With the kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

[1] Protesting against police taking control of Benares Hindu University on 19 August. MSS. EUR. F. 125/124.

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Enclosure to No. 614

BENARES HINDU UNIVERSITY, BENARES, *23 August 1942*

My dear Mahatmaji,
Today is the 23rd of August. It is 14 days since the first arrests were made. I do not know whether you are aware of the developments.

You have all your life insisted on the adoption of strictly non-violent methods for the achievement of India's freedom. But within 12 hours after you were taken in, violent developments had started. Here in Benares, I have been hearing of disturbances in villages, looting of granaries, burning of stations and derailing of trains, &c. I know you have insisted on the inexorable condition of non-violence and by no stretch of imagination can these things be regarded as non-violent.

Your demand for independence is perfectly just. Your appeal to Britain to implement her professions so far as India is concerned is quite right, and I am deeply concerned that the British Government have not come to a settlement with India when you are leading the nation. It is true that every country in the world is making sacrifices of life and security for the sake of noble ideals, and it is too much to expect that India can attain her goal without much loss of life and suffering. But you have always advised that suffering should be cheerfully borne by oneself and not inflicted on others. The mass struggle has assumed a character quite different from what you anticipated. Short cuts to the goal, attempts to reach our end quickly, or by force, or through actions intrinsically evil are doomed to frustration and disaster. If people grow habituated to these activities, as they are likely to, there will be a deterioration in national character which will unfit us either to deserve self-government or maintain it, when once we achieve it.

I know all these events will cause you pain, and make you feel that the people of the country from whom you expected great things, have failed you, but if there is one person who will even now be able to check these things, and regulate the movement, it is you. The British Government has done the greatest disservice to itself and to India, by arresting you. I am writing this letter to you with two ideas:—

(1) That you should direct the movement in proper channels, and see to it that it is carried on in a clean non-violent manner. You must cry a halt to the present form of the struggle. So many schemes are alleged to have your sanction and are obtaining wide circulation.
(2) Your disappointment with the people of India must not make you adopt drastic measures of a fast because I know it is your duty to try your very best to raise this country to a higher plane. You have faith and you will succeed in that attempt but you can do it only if you are alive.

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Your work is not finished and any act of fast unto death will mean a sanguinary upheaval in the country and a violent revolution which will discredit the movement which you have started.

The will to freedom is there, and it is unbreakable and you alone can use it to a higher purpose. I am voicing the deepest ideas of our people and am speaking to you in the name of the conscience of this great country.

May I say how deeply pained I was to hear of the death of Mahadev Desai? The country has lost an ardent worker and you a loyal follower of your ideals. My deepest sympathy.

Yours sincerely,

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *24 August 1942, 5.15 pm*
Received: 24 August, 2.45 pm

No. 2574-S. Your telegram No. 13670[1] of August 4th. Jam Saheb and Mudaliar have agreed to all your suggestions. In particular, Jam Saheb considers his visits to institutions, &c. should be separate from Mudaliar's and agrees to wearing uniform and visit to America.

[1] No. 410.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *24 August 1942, 12.15 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 24 August, 6.15 pm*

No. 2578-S. Following is my personal appreciation of situation midday, August 24th. Improvement over British India as a whole is definitely marked. *Nil* reports from Sind, Punjab, Orissa, Central Provinces and North-West Frontier Province. In United Provinces still some strain in eastern districts and serious riot at Cawnpore. Otherwise quiet.

Bengal.—Calcutta quiet: Students' strikes and demonstrations, but apparently on a rather reduced scale, continue in districts. Situation in Dacca district and city much improved.

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Madras.—City quiet: in districts renewed interference with communications and Police have had to fire at Coimbatore where stay-in-strike resulted in violence.

Bombay.—Province generally peaceful except for reports of minor incidents from various districts. Police morale stated to be excellent.

Bihar.—Restoration of order reported to be gaining momentum and distinct improvement evident in many important areas, though Gaya and Purnea still disturbed and reports from other districts of Bhagalpur Division awaited. Officer and four men of the Yorks and Lancs Regiment killed at Marhowrah near Chapra were apparently overcome after some 40 people had been killed by their fire. Mob atrocities stated to be rousing bitterness among Police officers.

2. No fresh reports from States save that Nilgiri is now quiet.

3. It seems pretty clear that situation is settling down, and I hope that some reaction against gross violence which in so many areas has been significant feature of this movement may begin to make itself felt.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *24 August 1942, 7 pm*
Received: 24 August, 9 pm

No. 2579-S. Lumley's telegram of 23rd August, No. 556[1] paragraph 2. Central Provinces, and I think United Provinces have already made clear that they do not intend to make enquiries. Sind may have agreed to a local enquiry. Ministerial pressure for an enquiry (for political reasons) in Bengal may well be strong and might prove irresistible. I have telegraphed to all Governors urging them to resist demands for enquiries and adding that while I quite accept that there may have been incidents difficult to justify here and there, I am equally conscious of the immense strain which has been carried by Police and of our indebtedness to them, and that I think it essential to maintain Police morale.

2. I have had in mind the whole matter of the case for a judicial enquiry into the origin and course of the present disturbances possibly conducted by a Judge

[1] Para. 2 reads: 'I have seen District Officers of 3 districts. Police morale appears excellent and likely to remain so as long as they are supported and not let down (? by) enquiries (Sic ? Political Officers).' L/P&J/8/605: f 951.

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from home. Congress tactics are clearly going to be, now that they have been beaten in this battle, that they are not responsible for anything that has happened; that hooligan and irresponsible students were the cause, and that undue violence, &c. had been used by us in dealing with harmless manifestations. I am doing what I can to establish direct complicity of Congress and Gandhi: but there may of course be gaps in the evidence which will not leave us with a completely cast-iron case that could be published. But we must be on the look out for Congress tactics such as I have just mentioned, and it may well be, though I have constantly before me the lessons of the Hunter enquiry,[2] that something of the sort I have mentioned might in certain circumstances be worth considering. I am averse to any public commitment for the present but would value your own views.

[2] The Committee, presided over by Lord Hunter (1865–1957), appointed by the Government of India to investigate the disturbances in the Punjab in 1919; see Cmd. 681 (1920) and Cmd. 705 (1920).

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

24 August 1942
Received: 25 August

No. 14874. Following from Foreign Office to Chungking, telegram No. 1134, August 23rd, repeated to Washington, No. 5107 and Viceroy. My telegram No. 1102.[1] Following is reasoned reply to paragraphs 2 and 3 of your telegram No. 1134[2] which you may use at your discretion.

2. Rapid action by the Government of India was essential since they were aware from secret sources that elaborate plans were being made by Congress to paralyse communications and machinery of commerce and government through acts of sabotage committed by followers comparatively small in number but strategically disposed. Course of events at recent meeting of All-India Congress Committee showed clearly those not prepared to sabotage war effort (the followers for instance of Rajagopalachari) were overborne by those who were prepared for anything, in effect, to establish supremacy of Congress as against all other elements in India and eviction of the British. Arrests of leaders have disorganised those plans but even limited campaign since waged by students and hooligans (see Viceroy's daily reports, repeated to you) has shown what might have happened if Congress had been given week or two to perfect plans.

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3. Peaceful solution and successful settlement is only possible on basis that army, munitions workers and men in the street are satisfied. Does Generalissimo realise how small a fraction of these adheres to Congress and how unfounded is Congress claim to speak for India as a whole? The soldiers regard Congress as contemptible politicians (Army has been untouched by these events). The man in the street is anxious to avoid trouble and is very ready to obey orders of present Government provided it governs. Bulk of munitions production is in Bengal where population is almost equally divided between Muslims and Hindus. Any parleying between Government and Congress now that battle is on would without question be regarded as surrender by Government and surrender by Government to Congress Hindus would inevitably before long cause civil war between Muslims and Hindus in Bengal and elsewhere. In fact only possible bases of settlement are: (*a*) firm government by existing authorities; (*b*) agreement between communities themselves on readjustments in government. (*b*) depends above all on Congress Hindus securing the co-operation of Jinnah and Muslims which with the exception of Rajagopalachari they have made no serious attempt to do.

4. It is therefore not true at present time that an agreement between Government and Congress would make other problems easy, quite the reverse. It *was* true in a sense at the time of the Cripps Mission, since proposal he made for solution would probably have been acceptable to other communities if only Congress had accepted them. But His Majesty's Government are now in effect asked to throw over other communities and to let British troops be used as mercenaries of Hindu Raj. If supported by His Majesty's Government and not let down by others the Government of India are quite capable of suppressing civil disobedience and preserving impartial government: they have done so before. But they are not so confident of dealing with communal civil war nor are they prepared to try to coerce martial races of India into acceptance of Congress rule. Chiang Kai-shek knows what civil war means and His Majesty's Government could not contemplate any course which would leave the Government of India to face such a war with Japan at the gates. His Majesty's Government cannot therefore themselves open negotiations with Congress at the moment nor require Government of India to do so nor can they do or countenance anything which would give Congress the impression that their methods are proving successful. It is here that difficulty over paragraphs 2 (2) and 3[3] of your telegram arises. Chiang Kai-shek wishes to show sympathy with United

[1] No. 589.

[2] Paras. 2 and 3 of telegram 1134 of 12 August summarised Sir H. Seymour's conversation of 11 August with Chiang Kai-shek (see No. 519). L/P&S/12/2315: f 166.

[3] Point (2) of para. 2 noted that Chiang Kai-shek felt that a peaceful solution to the Indian problem should still be sought, and para. 3 enlarged on his proposal for U.S. mediation which he believed was the only method to achieve this object.

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Nations and with Indians: Indian fighting men and munitions workers know they have this sympathy; they have evidence of American troops and aeroplanes to defend their country and of Chinese bravery in Burma. But it is really to Congress not to Indians as a whole that he proposes to show sympathy; similarly it is between Congress and Government that he wishes President to arbitrate. Congress at present time is in the hands of Gandhi's clique who profess that they would rather have chaos than British or Americans. There is not the slightest prospect that these men would co-operate actively in the war effort even assuming their political demands could be met. By temperament unwarlike they are utterly defeatist so far as external affairs are concerned and are only concerned with their own political supremacy at home. They have lost much face and are steadily losing more. British Government has also no doubt lost much face by its military defeats and no doubt Government of India have shared in this loss but by its firm handling of internal situation Government of India is now gaining face with the people of India. Admitting any kind of intervention by a foreign country as mediator would mean that Government's face would be utterly lost. Government servants would lose their authority and Congress would be triumphant. Moreover it is not in fact mediation between British and Congress but an agreement between Indian communities themselves that is needed. The Cripps offer invited this and His Majesty's Government stand by that invitation. Unfortunately they can detect no signs that conditions for this agreement at present exist. In the meantime His Majesty's Government must concentrate on supporting Government of India in restoration of order throughout India and while they deeply appreciate Chiang Kai-shek's friendly motives must decline to avail themselves of his suggestion.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 191

SECRET WASHINGTON, *24 August 1942, 12.48 am*
Received: 24 August, 7.35 am

No. 4259. Bajpai informs me J. J. Singh, head of All-India League of America, came to see him on August 18th. The conversation showed what publicity line would be taken by League and their sympathizers headed by the broadcast commentator Louis Fischer. This was that

(*a*) if preventive measures were successful in India, movement would only be driven underground and fifth column thus be prepared.

(*b*) If unsuccessful, British forces would be caught between two fires, Japanese invasion and general uprising.

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(*c*) In latter case they might well lose India, and for the sake of United Nations' cause American troops would have to take part in its reconquest, involving loss by American mothers, wives and sisters of men who might have lived if British had made concessions to Congress. Possibility must thus be faced that American public opinion (as distinct from Administration) might, under impact of such a campaign, swing away from present general favourable attitude, and that this in turn might affect later the attitude of Administration. It appears Singh has sought interviews with Vice-President[1] who has hitherto avoided seeing him. Bajpai received on same day a visit from Dr. Grady. After speaking of his report, Grady spoke of political situation. He said it was of concern to America because American troops were in India, and then said that failing quick restoration of order certain American military circles might use conditions as argument against proceeding with implementation of report. He added he thought Mr. Welles shared this fear but intended so far as State Department was concerned to advise going ahead with report. Grady then expressed regret over absence of an American representative who could furnish objective reports. He deplored activities of Louis Johnson, and said other persons of type of William Phillips were being canvassed for vacant post. A point however which needed consideration was whether despatch of new representative in present conditions might be misunderstood as move towards American intervention. This morning Dr. Berle told Sir G. Bajpai that all aspects of this question were being very carefully considered. This attitude seems satisfactory since, if a suitable person were suggested for post, it would be tactically unwise for us to object on last grounds mentioned by Dr. Grady. In our opinion it would be preferable not to say anything of this to United States Ambassador. This telegram has been drafted in consultation with Sir G. Bajpai.

[1] Mr Henry A. Wallace.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/P&S/12/2315: f 111

24 August 1942

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 45/42

Prime Minister

I am indeed grateful to you for your straight telegram[1] to Chiang Kai-shek. I had already spoken pretty frankly to Wellington Koo, who asked to see me the other day, and you may care to see the note[2] of the talk I had with him.

L. S. AMERY

[1] See No. 637. [2] No. 596.

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 117th Conclusions, Minute 1

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 24 August 1942 at 5.30 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Ernest Bevin

Also present during discussion of item 1 were: Sir Kingsley Wood, Mr Amery, Viscount Cranborne, Sir Archibald Sinclair

INDIA

L/E/8/2527: f 358

General Situation[1]

The War Cabinet were given the latest information regarding the state of public order in India. The general situation had continued to improve; and in Bihar, which was now the only area giving cause for serious anxiety, order had been restored in most parts of the Province.

Reference was made to a recent telegram from the Government of India, Home Department (No. 6664[2] of 23rd August) suggesting that the disorders had not been organised by Congress alone, and that to some extent they might be attributable to agencies working directly for the Japanese. If this could be established, the facts should be made known.

In this connection it was suggested that urgent attention should be given to the development of a more progressive social and industrial policy in India. Under present conditions discontent with social and industrial conditions was being exploited for political purposes; and this type of exploitation could best be countered by a positive policy for improving those conditions. By way of illustration, reference was made to the low level of wages paid to Lascar seamen.

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Secretary of State for India—

(i) To obtain, and report to the War Cabinet, the considered view of the Government of India on the extent to which the recent disorders might have been provoked by agencies working directly on behalf of the enemy.

(ii) To submit to the War Cabinet a report on the consultations now proceeding regarding the pay and conditions of Lascar seamen, and the possibility of providing the Government of India with further expert assistance in the formulation of social and industrial policy.

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L/P&J/8/537: f 135

Viceroy's Executive Council and Unofficial Advisers to Provincial Governors[3]

The War Cabinet had before them an exchange of telegrams between the Viceroy and the S/S for India (telegrams 2504–S[4] of 19th August and 1026[5] of 21st August) regarding the functions of the Viceroy's Executive Council and proposals for appointing unofficial advisers in Provinces administered under Section 93 of the Government of India Act.

THE S/STATE FOR INDIA drew attention to a later telegram from the Viceroy (2558–S[6] dated 22nd August) from which it appeared that the question of unofficial advisers in the Provinces could not with advantage be discussed until certain further consultations had been held in India.

The War Cabinet—

(iii) Deferred consideration of these questions.

L/P&J/8/600: f 540

Detention of Gandhi[7]

Attention was drawn to a telegram (No. 2385–S[8] dated 12th August) in which the Viceroy stated that Srivastava was of opinion that if Gandhi started a "fast unto death" he should be held in detention whatever the consequences. The Viceroy added that he felt sure that all the Moslem members of his Executive Council would take the same view.

It was pointed out that the Viceroy's telegrams had left the War Cabinet under the impression that his advisers, almost without exception, were strongly of the opinion that in no circumstances should Gandhi be allowed to die while under detention.[9] It now appeared that among the members of the Executive Council opinion on this important question was more divided than the War Cabinet had been led to suppose. It was unfortunate that the Viceroy should not have made this clear at the material time.

[1] Previous reference: No. 575, Minute 6.

[2] Para. 4 of this telegram read: 'An alternative theory [to those of either purely local and uncoordinated direction of disorders or their organisation by Congress] is that what we have been witnessing is (whether with or without knowledge of Congress High Command) the results of premature ignition by Government's action of a mine laid under direct enemy influence, the explosion of which was originally timed to coincide with the end of the rains and the moment most favourable for a Japanese attack on India. There is no direct evidence to support this theory; but that does not necessarily prove that it is not true; and the fact remains that most concentrated attacks on communications have, designedly or not, taken place in those areas in which complete success would have isolated the parts of India most likely to be invaded, while simultaneously immobilising transport and industry elsewhere by cutting off coal supplies.' L/P&J/8/604: f 21.

[3] Previous reference: No. 451, Minute 5. [4] No. 584. [5] No. 603. [6] No. 608.

[7] Previous reference: No. 575, Minute 8. [8] No. 510. [9] See Nos. 451 and 488.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that he had not yet received the Viceroy's reply to the further enquiry[10] which had been put to him regarding the conditions of Gandhi's detention, in pursuance of the decision reached by the War Cabinet on the 17th August.

The War Cabinet—

(iv) Took note of this statement.

[10] No. 588.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek

MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *24 August 1942*

My dear Generalissimo,

I hope that you duly received my telegraphic message[1] in reply to the message[2] which Sir Horace Seymour conveyed to me from you. I would not have thought it necessary to trouble you with a letter were it not for my anxiety, of which you are so well aware, that there should at no time be any error or the least misunderstanding in Your Excellency's mind as to my feeling on any question about which you may be kind enough to approach me. Our personal friendship, and the profound regard that, as you know, I have always had for Your Excellency, are an additional factor that is always present to me, influencing me in troubling you with anything further.

I have deliberately postponed sending my letter until I could see how matters were moving in this country. I am glad to say that the subversive movement is now coming swiftly under control, though immense damage has been done by its organisers: there has been much loss of life and serious interruption to communications. It is a matter of profound regret to me, since I have so consistently endeavoured to reach with the leaders of Congress a settlement which would be in the interests of India as a whole and fair to the other important elements in India's national life—the Muslims and the States, the lesser minorities, &c., that I should have had no better success, and that, at a time when the one anxiety of all of us must be to win the war, and to give all the assistance we can to Your Excellency and to China in the heroic struggle that you are waging, we should have to face difficulties of this nature in this country. And it is again a source of deep regret to me that I should be left with no option but to conclude that the responsibility for these disturbances rests with the Indian National Congress. Your Excellency, who has yourself to carry such heavy and immediate burdens, will I know realise the decisive character of the considerations that moved me in sending you my telegraphic

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reply, and I do not think that I need do more in concluding this letter than to repeat how great my regret has been that matters should have taken the turn that they have, and that that should have made it impossible for me to gratify Your Excellency's wishes to which, as you know both on personal and general grounds, I always attach such very great weight.

Pray convey my best regards to Her Excellency Madame Chiang, and accept my very good wishes for Your Excellencies' health and success.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 541, para. 2. [2] See No. 540.

623

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *24 August 1942*

My dear Jam Saheb,

I have already been in communication with Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar about the position of the representatives of India at the War Cabinet and on the Pacific Council,[1] and I write now to let Your Highness have the same information as I conveyed to him on this subject.

2. The position is entirely different from the position of 1917, and Your Highness and Sir Ramaswami, at all meetings of the War Cabinet at which you are present, will be present as one of the two accredited representatives of India, and not in virtue of any appointment by the Secretary of State, with, of course, the logical sequence that Your Highness will be entirely free to express your views independently of (though one would of course hope not in conflict with) those of the Secretary of State. In the same connection the Secretary of State has telegraphed to me the text of certain questions and answers in Parliament defining the position of the Dominion representatives (which will be the same as the position of the representatives of India), and I do not think that I can do better than let you have copies of those questions and answers which I now enclose. As you will see, the position of the representatives of India will be the same as that of the Dominions representatives. The actual term "Member" is apparently one which has difficult implications of its own, since membership would connote responsibility to Parliament at home, which the representatives of the Dominions and India clearly could not have. The questions and answers also make it clear that there is no intention

[1] See Nos. 186, para. 2; 191, para. 2; 193, para. 1; and 204, para. 2.

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to trouble the accredited representatives of the Dominions and India to attend the War Cabinet for meetings dealing with purely domestic matters, but to concentrate on those meetings at which there is a general review of the war situation. The Secretary of State tells me that he is himself invited to attend meetings of the latter character, and that being so he also will be present, though, as I have made clear above, no question will arise of Your Highness and Sir Ramaswami attending the War Cabinet as his Advisers, and Your Highness will be at complete liberty to express your own independent point of view. I hope that this makes the position clear.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

Enclosure 1 to No. 623

Extract from a telegram from the Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Viceroy, No. 169, dated the 9th February 1942

[*There follows the text of Vol. I, No. 86, para. (2) which reproduced a Question and Answer in the House of Commons of 5 February 1942.* Parl. Debs., *5th ser., H. of C., vol. 377, cols. 1275–6.*]

Enclosure 2 to No. 623

[*There follows the text of Mr Amery's telegram 11469 of 27 June 1942 to Lord Linlithgow described in No. 191, note 5.*]

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Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *24–7 August 1942*

REPORT NO. 110

My dear Linlithgow,
This report covers the last four or five weeks, and it will, I think, be best to confine it to the Civil Disobedience Movement, which has been the main preoccupation throughout this period.

1. *Preparations.*—The period intervening between the passing of the Congress Resolution at Wardha and the meeting of the A.-I.C.C. in Bombay was a period of preparation; both by Congress and those opposed to the projected movement. The Provincial Government itself did little direct propaganda, as it appeared best to allow spontaneous criticism of the Congress decision to

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develop: and as this development went on in an unexpectedly satisfactory degree, the main feature of the propaganda against Congress can be described as unofficial and spontaneous. Prominent citizens, like Sir Chimanlal Setalvad and Sir Cowasji Jehangir, came out almost at once, after the Wardha meeting, with their own highly critical statements of the Congress Resolution. Dr. Ambedkar responded to your suggestion[1] by a very downright denunciation of Congress on behalf of the Depressed Classes.[2] The National War Front, with commendable courage, issued its own statement. With regard to the Press, the *Times of India* had some excellent leaders, and published a number of good letters critical of Congress. A good part of the Marathi press disapproved of the Congress move, and the same is true of the Urdu Press. The Nationalist newspapers were by no means enthusiastic over the prospect of the Civil Disobedience Movement, and generally took the line that it was essential for the British Government to accept the Congress demands in order to avoid such a movement. The *Bombay Chronicle*, which is perhaps the leading exponent of Congress views in the Province, persistently opposed the idea of Civil Disobedience, which it regarded as disastrous, especially in the absence of Hindu–Muslim unity. On the whole, the opposition to Congress, which developed of its own accord during this period, was greater than I had expected, and was eminently satisfactory.

The publication[3] by the Government of India of the minutes of the Working Committee's discussions at Allahabad,[4] and of the resolution which Gandhi proposed,[5] caused a sensation. I have no doubt whatever that it was worth doing, for although a large body of opinion endeavoured to comfort itself with the suggestion that it was unfair tactics, there could be little doubt that it caused a good deal of dismay. The reception which was given to it in the British and American Press must also, I think, have had a considerable effect. On the other hand, the publication of Puckle's circular[6] provided a counterweight which was sufficient to make Congress-minded people feel reassured.

Although the opposition to Congress that developed was most satisfactory, Congress itself used this interval for whipping-up enthusiasm for Civil Disobedience, and achieved a considerable measure of success. This was particularly the case in Gujarat and Bombay City. Vallabhbhai Patel spent some time in Gujarat. Before his arrival, Congress followers were depressed at the prospect of a movement for which they could see little hope of success, but Patel was entirely successful in inspiring them with enthusiasm. He paid particular attention to students. He held enormous public meetings and a large number of private meetings, at which preparations must have been discussed and instructions given. It was common talk, both in Ahmedabad and Bombay, amongst Congressmen, that Patel, in these private meetings, told them that on

[1] See No. 273. [2] See No. 310. [3] On 5 August. [4] Enclosure to No. 113.
[5] Enclosure to No. 43, column 1. [6] Not printed.

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this occasion they would go all out, and were not to be too squeamish about non-violence. It is impossible to produce documentary or direct proof about this, but it was so much the common talk of both cities that I have not the slightest doubt that it is true. Patel was equally successful amongst Congress followers in Bombay. Here, again, there was little enthusiasm for the movement, but after his first enormous meeting in Bombay, which was attended possibly by a lakh of people, the atmosphere completely changed and became definitely revolutionary in outlook. Other leaders who were prominent in whipping-up enthusiasm were Shankarrao Deo and Yusuf Meherally, the Mayor of Bombay, who spent much time inciting students. The general effect of this propaganda by Congress was to create a feeling of tension and excitement, so that, by the time the A.-I.C.C. met, an atmosphere favourable for a Civil Disobedience Movement had been prepared, at any rate in Bombay and Gujarat. I do not think that they had sufficient time to perfect their plans, but I am quite convinced that if they had been allowed a further two or three weeks, as no doubt Gandhi and the Working Committee intended, they would have been in a position to paralyse communications over most of the country, at any rate for some time. Moreover, doubt would have been created, in the minds of Government officers, as to Government's intentions, which might easily have led, in certain areas, to a lack of resolution in coping with the movement when eventually it had to be done. Indeed, I felt that, with all the concentration of Congress activity on this Province, the position was beginning to deteriorate, and I have little doubt that, from the local point of view, it would have been better to have arrested the leaders soon after the Wardha meeting and to have prevented the A.-I.C.C. meeting. I recognise, however, that it was important, from the point of view of world opinion, not to take precipitate action, but I do not think action could have been delayed longer than it was without grave risk. A few days before the A.-I.C.C. meeting, I felt it necessary to do something to reassure Government officers, and sent a message to all Collectors telling them that Government would go all out to defeat the movement, once the A.-I.C.C. ratified the resolution, and instructing them to make this quite clear to their subordinates. This, together with the declarations made by His Majesty's Government and by the Government of India, and a general feeling that the Congress move at this moment in the war was definitely wrong, helped to preserve the morale of Government servants in an explosive situation.

2. *The Round-up.*—Our plans for the arrest of Gandhi and the Working Committee, and some fifty of our own Congress leaders and organisers in Bombay, went well. They entailed some sixty separate visits, in the early hours of the morning of August the 9th, carried out by about sixty police parties. I confess that I thought it was hardly likely that this could be kept

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secret, or that the Congress leaders would not anticipate arrest and have crowds outside their residences, which might have produced a difficult situation. In fact, not a word of these preparations leaked out, which I think is a very high tribute to the loyalty and reliability of the Bombay City Police. It is noteworthy that the officer of the Special Branch, most intimately concerned with these preparations, was a Gujarati officer, Rao Bahadur Desai. He has taken a prominent part against previous civil disobedience movements, and on this occasion his experience was invaluable.

Zero hour was fixed at 5-00 a.m. The Commissioner of Police and Rao Bahadur Desai effected Gandhi's arrest. He displayed his usual courtesy and gave no trouble at all. The only piece of trouble was occasioned by Pant, who appears to have been angry at being woke up so early and gave some trouble, with the result that he did not get to the station in time to catch the special train. Everything else went according to plan, and at 7-15 a.m. the special train, with Gandhi and the Working Committee, and about forty of our own Congress leaders, was on its way. The D.I.G. in charge of the train has written an interesting report, which will no doubt come to your notice. With the exception of a scene created by Yusuf Meherally, who is decidedly unbalanced, all went well up to Chinchwad, a small station short of Poona, at which Gandhi and those destined for Yeravda Jail alighted. After that, there was an unfortunate incident when the train, which now contained only the Working Committee, passed through Poona. It was not intended to stop at Poona Station, but the signal was against the train. This matter is under enquiry. A small crowd of students were waiting on the platform. Nehru and Shankarrao Deo climbed through the corridor window but were stopped by the D.I.G. and an unpleasant scene, with Nehru and Deo beside themselves with rage, followed. Apart from this incident, the Working Committee reached Ahmednagar safely.

I think there is no doubt that the Congress leaders were taken by surprise and did not expect to be arrested so soon. This appears to have been the general trend of conversation on the train journey.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *24 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of the 3rd August[1] which reached me a day or two ago. I have indeed had my hands very full these last two or three weeks, which

[1] No. 402.

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have been a period of extreme pressure. Not only has one had to deal with the problem of countering the Congress civil disobedience movement at its most active stage, but one has had to spend a disproportionate amount of time in argument—alas in the outcome fruitless—with C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, and in listening to discussion by my Council on matters falling outside their own sphere and on which individual speakers have occasionally shown some lack of appreciation of what is practicable as well as of the proper constitutional boundaries of the Council's functions.

2. However things are not going too badly. To take first the Congress position—the Governors' telegrams and my daily appreciation will have kept you in close touch with the way things have been going. As I write, while Bihar still needs a certain amount of cleaning up, and there are still these little spots of disorder widely scattered over the country, I think that we can feel that we have probably dealt pretty effectively with the first attack, and that, partly by the promptness with which we took action against the Working Committee, partly by the extent to which counter-measures had been worked out in detail in advance, we have hit the movement pretty hard. But it is perfectly clear (as I think I have said in one of my appreciations) first that Hallett is entirely right in describing[2] this movement, in certain parts of the country at any rate, as a rebellion; secondly that had we not moved when we did, and had we given the Congress another fortnight or three weeks while metaphysical discussion took place with Gandhi as to the precise meaning of words or phrases, we should have had a most serious situation to handle, and one that could have been set right only at the cost of heavy loss of life and great damage to property. Under both those heads our losses are heavy enough as it is, but I cannot with much ease of mind contemplate what the amount might have been.

3. I have set Thorne on to examining the material that has come in with a view to his building up a case, if the facts justify that, establishing the complicity of Congress and the personal interest of the Mahatma in the development of the campaign on the lines that it followed. No one taking the country as a whole can possibly resist the conclusion that there has been a very considerable degree of organisation, and I send you by this bag two very interesting documents[3] which I have had from Pilditch, being instructions to Provincial Congress Committees, and instructions to students, which have clearly directed in a material degree the activities of large sections of the supporters of the Congress movement in important areas of India. I send you also a letter[4] from Hallett containing an extremely vivid and interesting discussion of the stand made by a Deputy Commissioner in the United Provinces in the Azamgarh district against organised attacks on a police station in which he found himself, and you will not fail to note the complete conformity of the technique employed in that

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attack with the instructions contained in the instructions to Provincial Congress Committees.

4. Some of these murders have been brutal in the highest degree, and I have mentioned two or three of them in my daily telegrams. We may, I fear, have others still to hear of. I am on the whole more than satisfied with the way in which the police stood up to a situation which has imposed an immense strain on them. The only area in which one has seen any suggestion of any weakening or failure on their part has been Bihar, on which you will see Stewart's comments in the very lucid account of developments in the Province contained in his letter of 22nd August, No. 575–G.B.[5] of which I send you a copy by this bag.

5. I continue to be rather puzzled that our Intelligence should not have been able to give us rather more warning than it has of the way things were likely to go: and as you will see, Stewart himself in Bihar (where I gather that the Inspector-General of Police is not an outstanding personality and where I have never been too well satisfied with the general quality of the Services, whether I.C.S. or Police) frankly admits the extent to which he and his Government were taken by surprise. I propose to pursue that matter at greater leisure. I am pretty confident that when the picture clears, we shall find that it is the quality of our C.I.D. work that has fallen short, and that we must pay a good deal more for inside information than has, in most Provinces, been the practice hitherto. For the moment there is nothing to be gained by conducting post-mortems.

6. Meanwhile all continues quiet at the Aga Khan's palace. I sent you by the last bag copy of Gandhi's letter to me,[6] and this bag carries my reply,[7] which is polite but short, and negative. I shall be telegraphing to you on the general question of a fast. I still think myself that Gandhi has probably made up his mind to indulge in one, and is merely waiting for the right moment, for the events of the last fortnight cannot have been such as to encourage him. To the extent that Congress wanted to take us on in the open field it has done so and it has been beaten. To the extent that non-violence was supposed to be the basis of the movement, it has been proved abundantly (if indeed proof had ever been necessary) that non-violence is the very last thing that in fact characterises developments such as these. (In that connection you will see the emphasis laid in the instructions to Congress committees which I have mentioned above on disarming by "non-violent means" policemen, soldiers, &c. How can anyone in their senses imagine that policemen or soldiers are going to allow

[2] In the first sentence of his report of 18 August 1942. In the margin, Lord Linlithgow commented 'That's the word!' MSS. EUR. F. 125/105.
[3] L/P&J/8/617: ff 341–6. [4] Of 21 August 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/105. [5] No. 612.
[6] No. 553. [7] No. 611.

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themselves to be disarmed non-violently?) But what I am relieved at is that if the Mahatma is going to fast, he should have postponed his fast until we have got control of the first main Congress attack. I do not mean by that that I do not anticipate very serious repercussions to a fast to death on his part—I am sure that we shall have great trouble throughout the country if it comes to that, and that the unsubstantial character of Gandhi's pretext for a fast will carry no weight whatever. But a fast say a week ago, when Bihar was still very largely out of control, and when we were only beginning to put down effectively outbreaks in many other parts of the country, would have added immensely to the problems then on our hands. We shall be better prepared by the time the next outbreak comes, if it does, and the mere fact that we have been successful in dealing with the first wave will at once encourage our own supporters and, I trust, go some way to demoralize our opponents.

7. Meanwhile, so far as the other parties are concerned, the latest resolution of the Muslim League again brings out in the most emphatic way that the Muslims and the Muslim League[8] have not the slightest intention of accepting Gandhi's position. Somebody put the general position in Indian politics at the moment rather well to me the other day by saying that the Congress were blackmailing His Majesty's Government, and the Muslim League were blackmailing Congress! Not too far from the truth, either. Jinnah has taken advantage of the latest turn in events to raise his terms against us (not that that matters much), and also to raise them against Congress. Great hopes were entertained in the nationalist Press for a couple of days before the final Muslim League resolution appeared because of a rumour that the League were considering a resolution which should empower Jinnah to establish contact with Gandhi with a view to ascertaining from him: (*a*) if Congress was prepared to agree to Pakistan when the time for constitution making came, if a national plebiscite of Muslims then voted for it; and (*b*) if Congress was prepared to join the Muslim League in forming a national government for the purpose of carrying on war effort and conducting the war against the Axis, the character and powers of the national government to be settled by negotiation. The Working Committee of the Muslim League promptly contradicted this rumour.[9] But until the contradiction was made, I had derived some little amusement at the thought that this was a new and highly ingenious move in Jinnah's game of Poker: for it seemed to me inconceivable that Gandhi could accept the principle of Pakistan by whomsoever it was backed, and in whatever circumstances, and I thought it extremely unlikely, too, that he would be prepared to commit himself to accepting the principle of collaborating in any violent opposition to the Axis Powers. Jinnah, on the other hand, had everything to gain if Gandhi were to have been so unwise as to accept Pakistan, and nothing to lose if his answer to an overture such as that I have just described was a flat negative: and

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he could hope in either case to emerge with slightly enhanced prestige. It remains pretty clear that there is going to be nothing doing with either the Congress or the Muslim League while the war lasts, and I am more than doubtful as to whether we shall be able with any confidence to hope for progress, with the backing of either of the great political parties, when the war comes to an end, and the business of trying to get Indians to formulate a constitution for this country comes to be undertaken.

8. So much for the general Congress campaign. I have had much trouble during the last week with C.P. I sent you the earlier part of the correspondence by last week's bag, and I have kept you in touch by telegram. The balance of the correspondence I send you now. I am still at a loss to know quite what is in his mind. But the suggestion has been made to me, and I would not be a bit surprised if it was correct, that he had never been anxious to join the Council; that in Travancore he is a complete autocrat enjoying absolute power, patronage, an interesting State with substantial revenue, and the like; and that the far more confined existence of one of fifteen Members of Council with colleagues, who, I am given to understand, he regarded with considerable intellectual contempt, and the limited scope of a single portfolio without any of the trappings of the Diwan of Travancore, was more than he could endure! I have had the suggestion, too, that the Ayyangar and Aiyer Brahmins in Madras have risen to prominence so much on the support of the Congress that pressure may have been brought upon him through his caste once it became clear that we meant business with the Congress and with Gandhi, though how much there is in that one cannot judge. We have parted on the best of terms: but I must say that I wish he had started to clear his mind a little earlier. Gwyer tells me that his colleagues were highly indignant at the fact that he said not a word to them and kept his intentions entirely secret. We may at any rate be thankful that if he was going to go, he should have chosen a pretext which we could regard as not embarrassing to us, and that he should have been ready to state in terms his complete acceptance of the general policy of the Government of India.

9. I am now faced with the task of finding a successor. It is not going to be too easy since, hard as that fact may seem, we have practically exhausted the political talent of any quality in this country. I do not want Mirza Ismail, whom I do not trust: nor am I anxious to put in Shanmukham Chetty. One suggestion which has been made to me, and which may prove to be the answer, is that I should at any rate temporarily combine the portfolios of Information & Broadcasting and Civil Defence, and let Srivastava run them both. He is very anxious to take over the National War Front, the importance of which is growing, and arrangements in connection with which are at the moment handled by the Information Department; and as Srivastava has considerable

[8] See No. 598. [9] See No. 583, note 2.

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experience as a Minister and the owner of a newspaper, and is a good business-man, I may end by making a recommendation in this sense to you. Another suggestion which has been put to me has been that I should replace C.P. by a Muslim, move Jogendra Singh from Education to Information, and select A. F. Rahman, late of the Public Service Commission to succeed him in the Education portfolio. Sir A. F. Rahman has been pressed on me for a long time past with great insistence from various quarters. From what I hear he is an agreeable and intelligent person, but I should have thought that he was rather a good club man than an important political figure: and I should have liked something a little more substantial. Incidentally Stewart has replied to my enquiry about Sultan Ahmed that he would welcome Sultan Ahmed as an Adviser, balanced of course by a Hindu, and I may therefore have to consider the possible shuffle which I mentioned to you in our U correspondence.[10]

10. I mentioned in my letter of the 11th August[11] the line on which discussions have been going in my Council on these various forbidden topics of Indianisation, non-official Advisers in the Provinces, &c. We had a further round on Saturday the 22nd, but did not get very far. Mudaliar, Mody, Sultan Ahmed and Sarker (who tend to form a homogeneous group) and Aney gave their views. Broadly speaking they were all in favour of complete Indianisation of the Council, this involving of course the elimination of Benthall though I think Mudaliar was prepared to keep Benthall. They admitted that Indianisation would not in the least degree help to bring in either Congress or the Muslim League, but they trotted out the old argument, which I confess begins to nauseate me rather, that Cripps had done so much harm to the position of the Council that nothing short of some substantial concession of this order, which would catch the public eye, could really give them back their self-respect. So far as the Provinces were concerned, they were very strongly against a combination of non-official and official Advisers (which is in fact likely to be the solution); they were wholly opposed to official Advisers; they recognised on the whole the force of the argument against minority Ministries (on this Aney made the interesting point that there was really no strong objection to minority Ministries since we knew that Congress who were *ex hypothesi* the majority in the Section 93 legislature would not take office if called upon to do so: that being so, there should be a convention (or else a rule) under which a minority Ministry in office could ignore divisions in which they were defeated and carry on as though the legislature was not there).

11. The majority of those who spoke on Saturday frankly favoured reversion to Executive Councils, though they recognised that it would involve an amendment of the Act. I put it to them that they could hardly reasonably hope for the feelings of the very large electorate created under the Lothian franchise,[12] and the very large number of members of Provincial Legislatures which had

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resulted from the Act of 1935, to remain wholly content if their views were repeatedly disregarded by an irremovable executive: but I doubt if they really grasped the point—at any rate they showed no signs of being much moved by it. Finally there was (what I am also becoming rather familiar with) a root and branch attack on the Secretary of State and his powers—an anachronism which should be removed at the earliest possible moment! And what do you think was the answer to my suggestion that this Council must be responsible either to Parliament or to the Indian Legislature, and that they could not be left in the air to do as they pleased with no control from anywhere? The answer was that all these powers should be vested in the Viceroy. It does not seem to have occurred to them that you and I as Secretary of State and Viceroy are no more than the channels through which Parliamentary control is exercised, and that a completely absurd situation would arise, and one much more difficult to defend than anything that confronts us at present, were the Viceroy with completely autocratic powers to sit here in charge of the whole administration of India; that it goes without saying that it would be out of the question for any Viceroy to control or hold such a position; and that the burden put on him of adjudicating between the communities, of reconciling the attitudes of British India and the Indian States where they conflicted, and of trying to keep the peace between the new Government of India and His Majesty's Government would be a quite impossible one. However, that point may come out in a little more detail as our discussions proceed.

12. I shall probably resume these conversations on the 29th August, and get the remaining Members to speak. Benthall, I think, will refuse to say anything on the matter of Indianisation, and will express some sympathy for the limitation of the Secretary of State's control. I cannot be sure what line Firoz will take, but I would expect him to be conservative. Usman will unquestionably be very conservative: and so, I suspect, will be Ambedkar. Srivastava I would judge to be likely to side with the earlier Hindu speakers, and Jogendra Singh to do the same. In other words there is not likely to be anything like a united Council for any of these propositions, and I shall probably take the line that I am quite ready to let you know what their views are about Indianisation, that I cannot support those views for reasons which I need not detail here; that as regards the Provinces I am greatly obliged to my colleagues for letting me know their minds on this important matter, which is one on which I am in discussion with Governors: that I cannot see the House of Commons contemplating a reversion to Executive Council Government, and that I am extremely doubtful as to the practicability of eliminating official Advisers in times such as these; and that as to the powers of the Secretary of

[10] No. 584, paras. 4 and 5. [11] No. 509, paras. 9–12.

[12] Namely the franchise laid down by the Government of India Act 1935 based on the recommendations of the Indian Franchise Committee chaired by Lord Lothian.

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State, apart from the fact that their elimination would represent a major constitutional change such as His Majesty's Government had made it clear they were not prepared to contemplate in war time, there is no practicable alternative to their retention until we can get a government here responsible to a legislature, and that it would be out of the question to have a Viceroy in supreme control. There has been a hint in the Press that some of my colleagues might carry their dissatisfaction with not being given the full Cripps offer (which of course was intended to purchase the support of the major political parties) to the point of resignation. That is a bluff which I think will have to be called if it is tried on. But if any of them really are so foolish as to throw their hands in over a relatively limited issue such as Indianisation, all I can say is that it would display a sad lack of sense of proportion.

13. It has occurred to me that you might care to avail yourself of the Jam Saheb's arrival in England to make on some public occasion an acknowledgment of the very valuable contribution made by the States to the prosecution of the war and to emphasise how greatly this has been appreciated both by His Majesty's Government and by my own Government. As material for any such pronouncement I would refer you to the observations in my speech in the Chamber of Princes on the 16th of March last[13] and to the facts summarised in a memorandum by Craik,[14] copies of both of which I am sending you by this bag.

14. Apart from facts and statistics, I would be very grateful if you could stress the willing alacrity with which in practically all States our numerous and varied demands have been met. There has hardly ever been the slightest reluctance in this matter, even when the demands made entailed a sacrifice of the personal convenience of Rulers or the assumption by State Governments of the odium of enforcing unpopular measures. To give a single example of this, I am informed that in the immediate neighbourhood of Bangalore not only has practically every available State building (including several of the Maharaja's own Guest Houses) been handed over to the military authorities, but between 30 and 40 plots of land, several of them of very large size, have been acquired for such purposes as Field Firing exercises, bombing practice by aeroplanes, &c., &c. In many cases this acquisition means the temporary or permanent evacuation of the inhabitants at very short notice, which is never an easy or popular measure. But in every case the State authorities have been prompt, helpful and conspicuously unfettered by red-tape procedure.

15. In short, the spirit displayed by the larger States in their war effort has practically without exception been astoundingly helpful and reassuring. I am not sure whether this point has been properly appreciated at home. The Jam Saheb himself has given a conspicuous example of eager co-operation.

[Para. 16, on a letter from a K.C.I.O., omitted.]

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17. Now for a word on points arising out of your letter of the 3rd August. I have not much to say on paragraphs 1 and 2 because they are covered by subsequent events, but I shall be telegraphing to you about the arrangements for Gandhi. Much as I should like to conceal the fact of his death until after it has happened, I doubt its being wise to do so, and in reaching that conclusion I found myself on the advice I have had from those conversant here with general Indian opinion. But he is still hovering on the brink, and I suppose it is just conceivable, though not in my judgment at all likely, that he might think better of it and decide that it was worth accepting defeat and carrying on in the hope that matters might improve later. But I repeat that I am not by any means optimistic as to that, and that my own judgment has always been that he would fast, and try to go out in a cloud of glory. However, some of my Indian colleagues tell me that love of life will win the day with one who, despite much talk to the contrary, is essentially a worldling! We shall see.

18. I cannot tell you how grateful I am to you and Winston for all your help about Chiang Kai-shek. Nothing could have been better than Winston's correspondence with Roosevelt, and of course it clears the air entirely so far as we here are concerned.[15] I did not feel myself that there was any room for temporising over this business, and once I got the Generalissimo's quite extraordinary proposal that he should be allowed to send a series of messages to these Congress leaders in prison,[16] I thought that the only thing to do was to act at once.[17] I fear that Seymour, admirable as he is in so many ways, is just a little inclined to the normal Foreign Office tendency to go easy with the people to whom he is accredited, and there has of course always been the tendency in these posts bordering on India to regard the Government of India and the India Office as nuisances representing an unpopular point of view, difficult to get across, and in no degree inspired by pure reason or by any appreciation of the difficulties of His Majesty's representatives on the spot! But it is not so simple as all that and I am quite clear myself that we must resist these endeavours by the well meaning but the uninformed outside India to try to run our situation for us.

19. My best thanks for your help about Willkie. I have been much relieved to hear from you today[18] that he is not coming to India after all. Of course I fully realise that one has to handle these important American personages with great care. But I should have been somewhat badly stuck if he had, for instance,

[13] The Marquess of Linlithgow, *Speeches and Statements* (New Delhi, Bureau of Public Information, Government of India, 1945), p. 322.

[14] Printed as an Annex to this document. [15] See Nos. 392, 478, 484, 514, 517, and 532.

[16] See No. 540. [17] See No. 541.

[18] Mr Amery's telegram 1034 of 24 August (L/PO/446: f 59) said that apparently Mr Willkie's visit to India was now off. There were, however, later reports that he might pass through India *en route* for China. See No. 662, note 2.

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asked to see Gandhi or other of the prisoners; and so much discussion has centred round a possible visit to India by Willkie that I think he would himself have found it rather awkward had he come here.

20. In paragraph 4 of your letter of the 3rd August, you mention the Bishop of Calcutta. I hope I am not going too far in describing him as an extremely well-meaning nuisance. He continues to suggest to me, I have no doubt with the best of intentions but without the least appreciation of what the situation is, that I should see Gandhi, &c.; and his outlook is characterised by the type of exaggerated humility which makes him anxious to tell the whole world that we are all of us servants unprofitable in the highest degree, that all the blame is on our side and all the merits on the other. I do not pay any attention to his views, but I need not say that I should be much better pleased had I someone who was content to concentrate on his own business and leave us to mind ours.

21. As for paragraph 5 of your letter, I think the explanation of the slight point of captiousness in the *Observer's* comment is probably due to the fact that Lionel Fielden, once Director of Broadcasting out here with whose record, &c. you are familiar, is, I think, now the Editor.[19] I am wondering how long the arrangement will endure!

22. I have no time to comment at any length on the point taken in paragraph 6, but will mention it next week.

23. Many congratulations on persuading Winston to agree to Raisman putting our financial case to the War Cabinet. I have just had your telegram[20] on that subject. Mudaliar and Raisman will have crossed one another in the air today, but I will of course warn Raisman as soon as he arrives that he must watch his step carefully in anything that he says.

[Para. 24, on airborne troops; para. 25, on Ranchi Clearing Station; and para. 26, on General Auchinleck, omitted.]

27. Mudaliar and the Jam Saheb are due off in a day or two, and I have no doubt that we will get very useful service out of both of them. I am grateful to you for all your suggestions for employing them in their spare time. It took some time to get an answer from the Jam Saheb, but as you will have seen, he is completely in line so far as all you suggest is concerned, and I am sure there is a good deal to be said for getting him off to America in advance of Mudaliar and the Pacific Relations party; while his attractive combination of an interest in politics and a capacity to play a very good game of tennis ought to go down well on the other side. By the way, it would be valuable to us here if the Jam Saheb and Mudaliar were photographed with Winston. I would prefer that you should not be in the group, if you'll forgive me for saying so,

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because of the naughty suggestion by our political critics in India that both our emissaries are to be in your pocket and leashed to the India Office!

Best luck.

[19] The Editor was in fact Mr Ivor Brown; Mr Fielden was a member of the editorial staff.
[20] No. 595.

Annex to No. 625[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/137

MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR EFFORTS BY THE STATES

Military aid by the States.—Since the outbreak of the war the strength of the Indian States Forces has been raised approximately from 46,600 to 79,000 men. This is exclusive of the Civilian Labour Corps raised in the States aggregating about 30,000 men; 53 units of the I.S.F. are now serving with His Majesty's Forces and of these 18 units are serving overseas, including five Infantry Battalions captured in the fall of the Malaya Peninsula.

In addition to the I.S.F. proper, 28 additional units of the Indian Army have been raised in the States and seven of these are at present serving overseas. This means, the enlistment in the Indian Army of approximately 100,000 State subjects.

No complete figures are available at the moment of the increased expenditure by States on their military forces, but Hyderabad's military budget has increased from 55 to 95 lakhs and that of Kashmir from 35 to about 76 lakhs.

2. *Contributions to War Purposes Funds and Defence Loans.*—Up to the end of July donations from the States for War Purposes amounted approximately to Rs. 3,12,80,000 non-recurring; and Rs. 36,64,000 recurring; contributions to Defence Loans amounted approximately to Rs. 3,62,54,000.

3. *Miscellaneous efforts.*—51 Technical Training Centres have been opened in Indian States in addition to several Royal Air Force training establishments and several schools for A.R.P. Instruction. Two States (Bhopal and Mysore) have provided sites for large Prisoners of War Camps, and Bikaner has offered to provide a third such Camp. No less than 28 sites for new aerodromes have been selected in Indian States and on most of these construction is already in progress.

An Aircraft Factory has been opened in Mysore; a Bren-Gun Factory at Hyderabad, a Torpedo Training School and a new Naval base in Nawanagar and a hospital for war casualties in Bikaner.

In addition States have made generous response to demands for the loan of port facilities, aeroplanes, railway rolling stock, motor launches and road construction plant.

[1] This note was sent separately by bag (see No. 625, para. 13) enclosed in the letter of 25 August from the Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State.

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4. *Loans of Houses.*—Numerous Princes have given houses for use as convalescent homes for war casualties and other purposes. Nearly all the Rulers' Palaces in Delhi are being used as offices or for the accommodation of officers, and a large number of such houses have been made available for similar purposes or for the accommodation of evacuees in Bombay, Calcutta and elsewhere.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *24 August 1942*

Your letters of August 3rd[1] and August 11th[2] have just come in, but a mail is going out immediately and I can only briefly acknowledge them.

2. The most interesting part to me of your letter of August 3rd is paragraph 7, in which you testify to the success of the War Resources Committee with Hutton as Secretary and outline the possibility of further development on the same lines. That seems to me excellent and would in fact be reproducing the organisation which Hankey built up with myself and others as his assistants in the last war. In your case it should work not only for administrative efficiency but for wider experience and more practical outlook on the part of your colleagues. In the present outfit here the Secretarial business is divided between Ismay, under the Minister of Defence, acting as Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff, and Bridges covering the whole field of Cabinet and Ministerial activities. But I don't think that division is likely to be appropriate to your conditions. I suppose it hasn't occurred to you that Hodson might possibly make a good assistant to Hutton, and, under him, act as Secretary to some of the committees on the more civil and administrative side? It may be that you would doubt whether his personality is suitable to that sort of work; but I should like you at any rate to turn the idea over in your mind, more particularly if nothing really suitable offers itself here.

3. I am sure you are right in making it clear to your colleagues that it would not do for them, on the nominal plea of more Indian control, to encroach upon the sphere of Provincial Autonomy. On the contrary, looking to the future, and to the possibility of using the Provinces as the basis of any future constitution, a basis to some extent at any rate cutting across communalism, we want to do everything that we can to maintain provincial rights. Even Congress, to my inward amusement, has now pledged itself to giving the Provinces and States residual powers.

4. It might be worth while in that connection, as well as in connection with

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the question of how far States would surrender their ties with the Crown on entering a Federation, to keep in mind that, in Australia for instance, the several States not only retain residual sovereignty, but emphasise that sovereignty by continuing direct correspondence through their Governors, on State affairs, with the Dominions Office, as well as making the selection of Governors a matter directly with the Crown through that Office. It may well be that it would help the Muslim Provinces, as going some way towards Pakistan, if in any Federation their relations in respect of certain matters were still with the Crown, and I imagine it would greatly help the States if it was clear to them (as it was not to Cripps?)[3] that on such matters as succession, &c. they would still be entitled to deal with the Crown Representative. What would happen if an Indian Federation wished to walk out of the Empire is one of those hypothetical questions which Australia didn't trouble about and which we need not trouble about in the Indian case, for I am convinced that, one way or another, it will not happen.

P.S.V.—
No one could have heard recent talks in Council without noticing how strongly the Indian mind veers towards a strong centre, and how small the confidence in the capacity of the Province to run its own show well.
L.

I am not *quite so confident.*
L.

5. I am sorry you have lost C. P. He has gone at any rate on a plea which, if somewhat thin in India, looks not unreasonable to the public here. I imagine he really looks forward to a time when from a more independent position he can play a part as a conciliator.

6. More than one of your recent letters has referred to the bad effect of some of Cripps' doings and sayings on your Executive. I hope his recent tribute to them in his article to the *New York Times* and his complete breach, in that connection, with Gandhi and Congress, may have had some corrective effect. Naturally when present troubles come to be debated in the House next month I shall take an opportunity of saying something that should help your colleagues feel that they are understood and appreciated.

They seem to be more rabid against Cripps now than when he left. Ask Mudaliar!
L.

[Para. 7, on the interpretation of Government of India Act 1935, Ninth Schedule, Sec. 85 (2) (*b*) regarding the drawing of pensions or emoluments during tenure of office, omitted.]

[1] No. 401. [2] No. 509.
[3] See e.g. Vol. I, No. 439, para. 11, and Enclosure to No. 527, Answers to Questions 3 and 4.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir A. Hope (Madras), Sir R. Lumley (Bombay), Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces), Sir T. Stewart (Bihar), Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar), and Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province)

Telegram, MSS. EUR.F.125/110

IMPORTANT *25 August 1942, by post*
PERSONAL

No. 2582–S. My Council (though matter is one which is off their beat) have indicated that they are much concerned about position in Section 93 Provinces to the extent that present arrangements make no provision for association of non-officials with control. They recognise that possibilities are—

(*a*) Minority ministries:
(*b*) Non-official Advisers:
(*c*) Non-official *plus* official Advisers:
(*d*) (a suggestion to which some of them seemed particularly inclined) a reversion to Executive Council Government with Executive Councillors, all non-officials, this irremovable executive existing side by side with present legislature which could criticise but not control. They recognise that this would mean amendment of the Act.

2. For political reasons I have thought it well to let my Council air their views while making it clear that decision in this matter is not for them, and that to the extent that any reconsideration may be necessary it will be views of Governors that will count. You and I have thoroughly canvassed in the past arguments for and against Advisers. We have never discussed Executive Councillors, but I should say myself that House of Commons would not look at such a change meaning as it would at the present time final acceptance of fact that there was no longer any hope of democratic government on basis of present Act over very large area of India. Our experience of 1937 has satisfied me that minority ministries are not the answer; and my own view, though I have no doubt my Council would be strongly opposed to mixture of official and non-official Advisers, would be that that was in fact the right solution to the extent that any change was called for at the present time.

3. Twynam in present conditions has (You have of course)[1] strongly urged[2] the case for addition of non-official Advisers to his official team, and I think that there may be one or two other Governors who feel the same. While conditions naturally vary from province to province, I would see advantage in our working to some general principle throughout, and I would therefore welcome your view as to—

(*a*) the alternatives discussed in paragraph 1; and

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(*b*) whether, if you agree with my comment on these alternatives, you would see advantage in adding some non-official Advisers at the present time.

4. My own judgment is that, with Congress out of the way for some time to come, there may be advantage in some closer association of non-officials with Government in the Provinces, though preferably non-officials, whose selection, where Muslims are concerned, would not involve a direct clash with Jinnah. I would be grateful for very early comment so that I can discuss further with Secretary of State. I am consulting other Section 93 Governors in the same terms.

5.[3] I am grateful for your telegram No. 63[4] of 23rd August, and quite appreciate arguments for and against Darbhanga and Sinha. As regards latter I agree with you that if we are going to have any non-official Advisers now, we must be prepared to let them take their own chance about their political future if they are willing to serve, and therefore that there would be no objection to taking on Sinha if decision should be in favour of adding some non-official Advisers and he was prepared to act in that capacity.

[1] The words in brackets were sent to Sir H. Twynam.
[2] In his letter 115-G.C.P. of 12 August. MSS. EUR. F. 125/63.
[3] Para. 5 was for Sir T. Stewart only. [4] MSS. EUR. F. 125/49.

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Sir G. Laithwaite to Sir D. Monteath

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *25 August 1942*

No. 2583-S. Monteath from Laithwaite. Very many thanks for your private and personal telegram of 22nd August, No. 1031.[1] His Excellency is most grateful. He will comment on general position in this week's private and personal letter. The fact is that Council is moved not so much by over-acquisitive tendency or desire to control Section 93 Governors as by (as Mudaliar has openly admitted in discussion) a growing understanding of the improbability of the parties being able *post bellum* to build an agreed constitution, and a secret conviction that Parliamentary Government with political unity in India is beyond the capacity of a self-governing India, and likely to remain so for many years to come. Argument on the general issues mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 of His Excellency's private and personal telegram of 19th August, No. 2504-S,[2] continued on Saturday[3] and will be

[1] No. 609. [2] No. 584. [3] See No. 625, paras. 10–12.

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resumed in next few days. You will be interested to know speakers so far (Mudaliar, Mody, Ahmed, Sarker, Aney) want complete Indianisation (even Benthall to go) and tend to favour executive councils in provinces. But it is quite likely that some of the remainder will take a completely different attitude on the whole business. His Excellency is in no hurry and will continue to play for time. Nor has he any intention of committing himself. But he is pretty clear as to the psychological advantage[4] of taking the risks involved in a certain amount of talking round matters that are not really technically the Councillors' business.

[4] Deciphered as 'disadvantage'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *25 August 1942, 9.30 pm*
Received: 26 August, 12.45 am

No. 2591-P. Am grateful for your telegram No. 14395[1] of 15th August and material supplied therein to enable me to meet misgivings entertained by Princes who in my judgment had no desire to raise debating points but were genuinely disturbed by extent to which in draft declaration and throughout negotiations centre of stage was reserved for British Indian elements whilst rights and merits of States received little if any open acknowledgment. In particular only reference to Treaties in Draft Declaration announced necessity for their comprehensive revision.

2. Admittedly position was further elucidated in discussions with Sir S. Cripps but his assurances remain unknown to elements hostile to States and were in some important respects not regarded as satisfactory by Princes themselves. For instance his reply to question 5[2] which you say was apparently overlooked was in fact specially brought to notice of Maharaja of Bikaner in personal discussion with Political Adviser. His Highness then observed that he found difficulty in placing confidence in such an assurance since Sir S. Cripps' replies to supplementary questions on same point showed that he had no practical ideas as to where necessary force would come from. This lack of faith will probably persist in minds of Princes generally until it is dispelled by detailed exposition of actual intentions.

3. In same connection Princes are probably anxious as to who is to provide funds for supply of such force as also for financing Political Department maintenance of which will be necessary for non-adhering States. No new

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Indian Union could be expected to do so. Have His Majesty's Government considered assumption by themselves of these liabilities?

4. Subject to your approval my Political Secretary will now send to Maharaja of Bikaner as Pro-Chancellor reply on following lines to Chancellor's letter (with copies by air mail for yourself and Jam Saheb) making it clear that its contents have been authorised by His Majesty's Government.

5. Point I (*a*) to (*f*). Princes should be sufficiently reassured by clear statement that fulfilment of Treaty obligations to States remains integral part of His Majesty's Government's policy and that absence of specific mention thereof in draft declaration has no significance. Reference would also be made to Prime Minister's statement of March 11th.[3] Points (*g*) and (*h*) will be dealt with on lines suggested by you. As regards (*i*) and (*j*) I presume that objections stated in paragraph 3 of your telegram to "pronouncement" at this stage would not be applicable to assurances which we are now in position to give in reply to major apprehensions of States as expressed by Chancellor. Such reply must be sent and though not amounting to public pronouncement will certainly be widely circulated to Princes and publicized outside Princely circles by Chamber organisation on whom we could hardly enjoin secrecy in such a matter.

6. Point II. Relevant speeches by me have been carefully phrased to advocate responsive[4] rather than democratic government and I need not stress difference between remarks made to strictly private and informal gathering of Princes the proceedings of which were never circulated and views expressed in Parliamentary debate by Leader of House. Also we have hitherto scrupulously refrained from any language calculated to affect or question the full discretion of Princes in regard to selection of representatives of States at constitution-making or similar bodies. However I think reply as in last sentence of paragraph 4 of your telegram should allay misgivings.

7. There need now be no difficulty over points III (*a*), (*b*), (*e*) and (*f*). I propose to ignore III (*c*) as I doubt if explanation suggested by you would carry conviction.

8. Points III (*d*) and IV may be taken jointly together with relevant observations in paragraph 2 of your telegram. I propose replying that adherence to Union would be for their discretion but that it would of course be open to States to endeavour to negotiate terms which would set at rest the apprehensions which seem to have prompted III (*d*) of Chancellor's letter. I would point out with reference to point IV that it is open to them during such time as may be available before the future political structure of India again comes under active discussion to consider the comparative advantages from their

[1] No. 561. [2] See Vol. I, No. 527. [3] Vol. I, Nos. 308–9.
[4] Deciphered as 'responsible'.

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point of view of (*a*) separate Union of their own and (*b*) securing by negotiation terms of adherence to Indian Union which would meet such apprehensions as they may entertain in regard to such matters as possible severance of their relations with Crown and future regulation of their personal and dynastic affairs, and I should like to add that neither of these alternatives need be regarded as necessarily inadmissible though as regards the former nothing more than the tentative formulation of a scheme which could serve as basis for discussion is at present suggested.

9. For His Majesty's Government's information I have following further observations to offer. Of the two alternatives set forth in preceding paragraph I regard the second as definitely preferable because any attempt to set up separate union of States side by side with one or more unions of Provinces quite apart from obvious and probably insuperable difficulties presented by geography, &c. must inevitably lead to trial of strength as between popular and monarchical forms of Government and that too in a form which would embroil the Crown in its capacity as guarantor of Princely India despite its more modern function as champion of democracy. In such circumstances prospects of continued existence of States in anything like present form must soon become more precarious than if they entered all-India fold on terms designed to protect minimum essentials. I suggest therefore that our line should be to encourage Princes to use the idea of separate States Union not so much as end in itself but as powerful bargaining factor for negotiating reasonable terms on which they could adhere to new Union with some or all of the Provinces.[5]

10. If you agree I trust you will take this line in discussions with Jam Saheb. I suggest also your impressing upon him vital necessity that all influential elements in Princely India should in their own interests do utmost to secure that schemes for co-operative administration are taken seriously and carried into early effect. This is important because His Highness in his capacity of Chancellor has shown tendency to associate himself with selfish and short-sighted objections raised by Rulers in Eastern States and elsewhere to such schemes. Obviously purging and strengthening of weaker elements and some form of regional combination affecting all States except the very largest would be essential preliminary if States as a whole are to attempt formation of central Union *inter se* or to pull their weight inside any Union with other elements. For this reason I cordially endorse view expressed in paragraph 7 of your telegram that our efforts in that direction should not be slackened subject always to the proviso that it would be most unwise in the present emergency to do anything likely seriously to antagonise the more important Rulers, whose goodwill and co-operation are at the moment an asset of special value to us. I suggest however that strong and authoritative advice in favour of combination would carry more weight if combined with some sort of equally authoritative pronouncement

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reaffirming sanctity of Treaties subject to its being understood that our liabilities will not be interpreted as applicable to the protection of anything unworthy of survival in modern conditions.

11. Subject to your approval my Advisers will take first opportunity of expounding these doctrines to Standing Committee. Meanwhile you will no doubt consider possibility of propagating them in your private or public utterances.

[5] 'Provinces' deciphered as 'Princes'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *25 August 1942, 9.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 25 August, 10.30 pm*

No. 2594-S. Following is my personal appreciation, midday 25th. General improvement maintained. Nothing to report from N.-W.F.P., Sind, Punjab, Central Provinces.

Bengal.—Calcutta quiet yesterday. Some students activity in districts.

Bihar.—Situation in Jamshedpur a little better, about 1,000 men back at work (I continue to give no publicity to Jamshedpur position). Elsewhere in industrial areas situation believed to be quiet. Situation improving in districts, though acts of sabotage and looting reported from Tirhut Division up to 22nd August, and situation there still far from quiet. Monghyr district in hand. Reinforcements have arrived Bhagalpur, and Commissioner and Collector have gone north of the Ganges where very extensive damage has been done to B. & N.-W.R. No detail yet about position in the difficult area of Chapra. Light Railways in Patna district have resumed service.

Orissa.—Firing necessary as a violent mob intent on burning police station in Koraput.[1] Parts of Cuttack district still disturbed.

United Provinces.—Province generally quiet, and Cawnpore labour working today after incident mentioned in my telegram of yesterday. Save[2] in eastern area province otherwise generally quiet. Police party reported murdered on Fyzabad-Pratabgarh road. Our forces have reached Balia, a remote district where very bad report given of conduct of local police and of Congress progress. Railway situation reported better.

[1] For the first sentence of the report on Orissa the decipher has 'Situation stationary in Karaput'.
[2] Deciphered as 'Same'.

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Madras.—Over half the Presidency practically quiet on yesterday's reports. Strike[3] at Binny's mills in Madras city understood to be on industrial rather than on political grounds. Minor demonstrations in a good many places. Difficulties still experienced in catching railway and communications saboteurs.

Central Provinces.—Governor quite satisfied with local situation.

Mysore.—All quiet in Civil and Military Station, and Bangalore. Some interruptions still with railway communications.

2. I would judge process of settling down to be continuing though there is still much interference with communications and sporadic incidents persist. We must continue constantly on the alert and consolidate improvement achieved. With the exception of incidents mentioned above, country appears to be quiet.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

[3] The decipher has 'Firing necessary on a violent mob intent on burning' instead of 'Strike'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/537: f 136

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *26 August 1942, 7.45 am*

1043. Your private and personal telegram of 22nd August, 2558-S.[1] Cabinet understand position and have deferred consideration.[2]

[1] No. 608. [2] See No. 621.

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Secretary of State to Government of India, Home Department

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 299

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *26 August 1942, 8 pm*

15057. Your telegram 23rd August, 6664.[1] H.M.G. are interested by suggestion that to some extent disturbances might be attributable to agencies working directly for Japanese and would be glad of considered view of Government of India of extent to which this may have been the case.

[1] See No. 621, note 2.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *26 August 1942, 10.20 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 26 August, 11.5 pm*

No. 2608–S. Following is my appreciation, midday August 26th. Improvement continues. Nothing to report from Sind, Central Provinces, United Provinces (where some signs of villagers assisting authorities), Punjab, North-West Frontier Province and Assam. Some slight uneasiness still in Orissa. No news from Bombay. Madras mofussil situation is improving with *Nil* reports from 14 districts and minor reports from 4: still some interference with communications. Bihar. Signs of strong public resentment at the widespread outbreak of violence which has gone on for nearly a fortnight. South [of] Ganges steady improvement being maintained. 4,000 men back at Jamshedpur today and except for some stone-throwing situation there quiet. Situation almost normal Patna city. Public reported from Sasaram and Silcut in Muzaffarpur district to be organising opposition to riotous mobs. Communications with Muzaffarpur and adjacent districts being re-established and very few fresh incidents reported from these districts. In Purnea district where situation reported particularly bad, fresh damage to railway and reinforcements being despatched. Main difficulty now in North Monghyr and Bhagalpur and Purnea is repair of extensively damaged B. & N.-W. track state of which impedes movement of forces. Bengal, some recrudescence of hooliganism in Calcutta yesterday. In districts a number of minor incidents but not of great importance. *States.* Most serious fresh incident is destruction by fire suspected sabotage of Kashmir Government silk weaving factory where parachute silk was being made, which followed a warning received too late that damage to certain buildings including silk factory was contemplated in connection with Congress agitation.

2. Broadly speaking situation continues to settle. We are concentrating on moving coal trains from east to west so as to keep factories in Cawnpore, &c. supplied and men at work.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Chungking, Washington (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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Sir G. Laithwaite to Sir D. Monteath

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *27 August 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2609–S. Monteath from Laithwaite. My personal telegram of 24th August, No. 2583–S.[1] You may care to know that Firoz Khan Noon made his contribution on 26th August. He favoured non-official Advisers for Provinces and was opposed to any change whatsoever of any nature at the Centre unless it had the consent of Congress and the Muslim League, on the ground that it could only be made to the disadvantage of the minorities; that applied equally to: (*a*) elimination of European members and (*b*) any reduction of Secretary of State's powers of control, which he said were regarded as of substantial value as a protection of the minorities in this country.

2. He is likely to find support from Usman and probably Ambedkar, and now that the communal issue has come out so prominently I would judge that there is no prospect of Council as a whole agreeing to the type of proposition that has been under discussion.

[1] No. 628; the date should be 25 August.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *27 August 1942, 2.10 pm*

PERSONAL *Received: 27 August, 12.35 pm*

No. 2610–S. I have been considering possible methods of filling C. P.'s vacancy as Information Member. With Congress and Muslim League not co-operating we have more or less exhausted political talent in this country in the existing Council. I would not be prepared to take on Mirza Ismail and would not regard Shanmukham Chetty as a possible. In the circumstances I am disposed temporarily at any rate to combine Information with Civil Defence and to put Srivastava in charge of both. He has had a good deal of general experience and his association with the *Pioneer* has given him an insight into and familiarity with newspaper problems. I think he would do it well and he is, I have reason to believe, anxious to push the National War Front, publicity, &c. in

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connection with which is dealt with by Information Department. This would mean reducing by one the Indian membership of my Council, but I am not much concerned about that, and such reduction being of a Hindu would go some little way to meet the Muslim complaint that the last reduction [expansion?] reduced their proportionate share in representation.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *27 August 1942, 9.15 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 27 August, 8.30 pm*

No. 2616–S. Following is my personal appreciation, midday 27th August. Process of return to normal conditions continues.

Punjab, Sind, Central Provinces and North-West Frontier Province. Nothing to report. Abdul Ghaffar Khan returned to Peshawar, 25th August, after very unsuccessful tour in southern districts. Orissa nothing fresh. Assam nothing of importance.

Bombay. Generally quiet.

Madras. *Nil* reports from 18 districts, but situation in affected areas still anxious; there have been continued tamperings with communications.

Bihar. Improvement continues, though still reports of tamperings with railway-lines and communications. No fresh report from Purnea. Sub-Divisional Officer and Police Inspector in Sitamarhi reported from Muzaffarpur to have been murdered by mob on 24th August. Fire said to have been opened in disturbance at Batia on 23rd August, nine killed.

[1](Every endeavour being made to bring Jamshedpur strike to an end. Reported that its continuance is favoured by foremen and supervisors rather than by workers. Latest news is that supervisory staff remain very stiff, and threaten if Tatas continue as at present to supply full requirements of power to Indian Cable Coy. and A.F.V. shops, and to supply about 1000 K.V.S. [?Kilovolts] to Indian Steel Wire products, to close down No. 2 Power House which will stop all maintenance services.)

United Provinces. Two or three incidents necessitating firing reported between 23rd and 25th: but situation appears to be continuing to settle. Governor complains bitterly of unfortunate effect on morale of suggestions in

[1] The paragraph in brackets was sent in a more secure cipher, as telegram 2619–S of 27 August (despatched 9.15 pm, received 8 pm).

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British Press and by India League and Dean of Canterbury that reopening of negotiations with Congress is contemplated.[2]

No report from Bengal, and no fresh news from States.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Chungking, Washington (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

[2] See No. 641, note 2.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: ff 124–5

IMMEDIATE *27 August 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 28 August*
MOST SECRET

1047. Superintendent. Following is repetition of Foreign Office telegram to Chungking 1146 of August 26. *Begins.* Please deliver following message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from Prime Minister.

Begins. 1. I have received from Sir H. Seymour an account of the conversation Your Excellency was so good as to hold with him on August 11th about India.[1] As you asked that this conversation should be conveyed to me and as these views were stated to be Your Excellency's personal views I take this opportunity of replying directly and giving my own similar personal views in an earnest, sincere and friendly spirit.

2.[2] I do not consider that Congress in any way represents India, which is a Continent like Europe inhabited by many different races, nations and religions. There are, for instance, 95 million Moslems, 45 million Untouchables and 90 million subjects of the Principalities, none of whom are represented by the Congress, which is almost entirely a Hindu organisation. If these large minorities are added together they comprise a substantial majority of all the people of India. Moreover, the Congress has nothing in common with the fighting races of India of whom well over a million have volunteered for the army during the present war, there being no compulsory service in India. These brave Indian soldiers belong mainly to the Northern races among whom Moslems predominate. If at any time in the future as a result of the constitutional process to which we are committed the British withdraw their troops from India the Hindu Parliamentarians would be rapidly dominated by the Moslem warriors. If Mr. Gandhi could get a compact and adequate Japanese army placed at the disposal of the Congress for the purposes of holding down the Moslems, other non-Hindu elements and the States, furnished to him in

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return for assistance to the Japanese in making a free passage through India to try to join hands with the Germans, then and then only would he be able to set up Hindu ascendancy all over India. It has been shown that he was ready to negotiate with the Japanese[3] but this would not by itself be enough for him. The Japanese would also have to lend him an army or he and his friends would speedily be overthrown by the martial races. It has occurred to me that Your Excellency might be willing to reflect a little on some of these points.

3. I think the best rule for Allies to follow is not to interfere in each other's internal affairs. We are resolved in every way to respect the sovereign rights of China and we have abstained even from the slightest comment when Communist–Kuomintang differences were most acute. I should therefore greatly regret if Your Excellency were to be drawn into political correspondence with the Congress, or with individuals who are endeavouring to paralyse the war effort of the Government of India and to unsettle the internal peace and order of these vast regions. I am afraid that such an incident would lead to the estrangement from Your Excellency of powerful sections of British opinion, who would naturally feel that our war burden against Germany, Italy and Japan had been increased by one whom we have long regarded as a hero and a friend.

4. With regard to the suggestion which Your Excellency has made that His Majesty's Government should accept the mediation of the President of the United States regarding their relations with the Indian Congress and generally with India, I should like to place on record the fact that no British Government

[1] See No. 519.

[2] Para. 2 of Mr Churchill's message (transmitted in telegram Reflex 194 of 23 August to his Private Office) had been amended by Mr Amery before transmission to Sir H. Seymour. Originally it read: 'I do not consider that Congress in any way represents India, which is a Continent like Europe inhabited by many different races, nations and religions. There are, for instance, 90(?) million Moslems, 40 million Untouchables and 90 million subjects of the Principalities, none of whom are represented by the Congress, which is almost entirely a Hindu organization. If these large minorities are added together they comprise a substantial majority of all the people of India. Moreover, the Congress has nothing in common with the fighting races of India of whom a million have volunteered for the army during the present war, there being no compulsory service in India. These brave Indian soldiers belong almost entirely to the Northern races and are in the main Moslem by faith. If at any time in the future as a result of the constitutional process to which we are committed the British withdraw their troops from India the Hindu Parliamentarians would be rapidly dominated by the Moslem warriors. If Mr Gandhi could get a compact and adequate Japanese army placed at the disposal of the Congress for the purposes of holding down the Moslems and other non-Hindu races, furnished to him in return for assistance to the Japanese in making a free passage through India to try to join hands with the Germans, then and then only would he be able to set up Hindu ascendancy all over India. It has been shown that he was ready to negotiate with the Japanese on the basis of their having such a free passage but this would not by itself be enough for him. The Japanese would also have to lend him an army or he and his friends would speedily be overthrown by the martial races. It has occurred to me that Your Excellency might be willing to reflect a little on some of these points.' L/P&S/12/2315: f 126.

[3] See No. 532, note 2.

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of which I am the head, or a member, will ever be prepared to accept such mediation on a matter affecting the sovereign rights of His Majesty the King-Emperor. I have, as Your Excellency knows, the warmest feelings of friendship and admiration for the President and we are working together over the whole field of the war in the closest comradeship. I am sure he would not be willing to make any such proposal to me because he is very well acquainted with the conviction I have about my duty to Crown and Parliament.

5. I was very glad to find when I visited Moscow that Premier Stalin was in such good heart and had so confident an outlook on the future of the war which he and the Russian people are waging with inflexible resolution. I am not unduly impressed by the gains which the Germans have made in Russia this summer. They have so far shown far less strength than they manifested when they first made their murderous onslaught in 1941. It now looks as if the Japanese are unwilling to attack Russia until they know the conditions under which the German and Russian fronts will reach the now-approaching winter. From the Russian point of view I am glad of this but of course it may throw more burden on Your Excellency and on the Chinese people as well as making the defence of India a more[4] immediate and prominent task. However, I am persevering with the plans of which I spoke to Dr. Wellington Koo for an offensive upon the Japanese lines of communication along the Burma Road and other roads between Siam, Malaya and China. I asked General Wavell to meet me here in Cairo for the purpose of concerting these plans which have to be fitted in with other enterprises we have in mind. It is my earnest hope that we may be able to do something to relieve the pressure upon the Chinese people under Your Excellency's inspiring leadership before many months have passed.

[4] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'acute'.

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Mr Gandhi to the Secretary to the Bombay Government, Home Department

MSS. EUR. F. 125/137

27 August 1942

Dear Sir,

With reference to the Government orders about the writing of letters by security prisoners, it seems that the Government do not know that for over 35 years I have ceased to live family life and have been living what has been called Ashram life in association with persons who have more or less shared my views. Of these Mahadev Desai whom I have just lost was an associate beyond compare. His wife and only son have lived with me for years sharing the

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Ashram life. If I cannot write to the widow and her son or the other members of the deceased's family living in the Ashram I can have no interest in writing to any one else. Nor can I be confined to writing about personal and domestic matters. If I am permitted to write at all, I must give instructions about many matters that I had entrusted to the deceased. These have no connection with politics which are the least part of my activities. I am directing the affairs of the All-India Spinners' association and kindred associations. Sevagram Ashram itself has many activities of a social, educational and humanitarian character. I should be able to receive letters about these activities and write about them. There is the Andrews Memorial Fund. There is a large sum lying at my disposal. I should be able to give instructions about its disposal. To this end I must be in correspondence with the people at Santiniketan. Pyarelal Nayyar, who was co-Secretary with Mahadev Desai, and whose company as also that of my wife I was offered at the time of my arrest, has not yet been sent. I have asked the I.G.P. about his whereabouts. I can get no information about him, nor about Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel who was under my care for the control of his intestinal trouble. If I may not even correspond with them about their health and welfare, again the permission granted can have no meaning for me.

I hope that even if the Government cannot extend the facilities for correspondence in terms of this letter, they will appreciate my difficulty.

I am,

Yours, &c.,

M. K. GANDHI

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan

MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

PERSONAL THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *27 August 1942*

My dear Sir Zafrulla Khan,

Very many thanks for your personal and confidential letter of the 4th August,[1] and for the interesting note enclosed in it. It is always a help to me to know your mind, and your personal letter has been very stimulating in many ways.

2. As you say in the second paragraph of your letter, we have not had quite the response to the latest expansion that we might have expected. But I will confess to being a little hardened to disappointment in these regards! Not only is the present Council a very able and representative body but (to say nothing of the position of the major communities) for the first time it gives representation to the Depressed Classes and to the Sikhs, and that by itself, leaving all other

[1] No. 412.

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features of the expansion outside, is a very significant landmark. Equally, as you rightly point out, there is the selection of Sir R. Mudaliar to be one of our representatives at the War Cabinet. I am sorry that we should have lost Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar; but his feeling as he expressed it to me was very strong on this matter of the threat which Congress represented to the Indian States; and as it was perfectly clear that he could not carry on the sort of active campaign which he tells me that he would like to be able to carry on, from within the Executive Council, there was nothing for it but to let him go. But I greatly regret his departure, for his experience, standing, and personality would all have been very valuable assets to us.

3. I appreciate your point about Muslim proportions, and it is one which I keep in my mind; and I am interested in the specific point which you raise in that connection.

4. I have been paying a great deal of attention to one point in particular taken in the memorandum you have been kind enough to let me have with your letter, and that is the position of Indian officers on the defence side. I think that it will help you if I let you see the note[2] which I enclose with this letter and which I recently got General Hartley to prepare for me.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

[2] By Mr E. T. Coates; enclosed in a letter of 14 August from General Hartley to Lord Linlithgow. MSS. EUR. F. 125/124.

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Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL BARNES COURT, SIMLA, *27 August 1942*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

In Your Excellency's letter of July 20th[1] on the subject of Pakistan and Sikander's suggestions for a future constitution you said that you felt pretty clear that His Majesty's Government would be most unlikely to consider any further move during the war unless there was some marked change in circumstances, having regard to the fate of the Cripps Declaration.

2. Two of my Ministers, Sir Chhotu Ram and Sardar Baldev Singh, in conversation have particularly asked me to urge that no declaration on the subject of Pakistan should be made by His Majesty's Government as a result of the recent resolution of the Muslim League.[2] They feel that the one thing that

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L.,—28.8.

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would certainly cause extensive trouble in the Punjab would be any such declaration, and I agree with them. I realise that in view of what Your Excellency has said it is extremely improbable that any such declaration will be considered, but I think I should pass on to Your Excellency what these two Ministers have said. Sikander, who is still in Egypt, would, I am sure, agree and has been doing his best to stop down all propaganda whether pro or anti-Pakistan.

Yours sincerely,
B. J. GLANCY

[1] No. 294. [2] See No. 598.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *27 August 1942*

It really does look as if we were going to be well on top of the situation at the end of the first three weeks. I fully realise that it is early days for any undue optimism and we may have to face a continuance of trouble and even its serious recrudescence possibly for months, and more particularly if the Japanese begin invading India, which now seems not altogether unlikely. It looks to me very much as if the more bitter elements in Congress were fusing with sheer revolutionary and fifth-column elements into something really dangerous unless tackled with the utmost firmness.

2. In this connection I fully appreciate the difficulty created for your Governors by the tremendously strong sentimental feeling on the part of the Socialist Members of the Cabinet, shared in this instance by Anderson, against whipping. I have had to send you a telegram[1] about Hope's rather crude announcement that he wants to apply it to the utmost extent, and now this morning I see Hallett's earnest appeal on that subject.[2] It is very difficult to know what to advise except that in so far as it is inflicted as a punishment—and it may have to be so increasingly if things get really critical—care should be taken to avoid publicity. There is no doubt that the Left here and our opponents in America are making the most of it.

[1] No. 643.

[2] In telegram G-262 of 26 August to Lord Linlithgow (repeated to Mr Amery), Sir M. Hallett complained of Reuter's telegrams giving opinions of, for example, the India League and the Dean of Canterbury urging negotiations with Congress, and added that 'another resolution reported by Reuter condemns whipping and collective fine but these are two main weapons in fighting the rebellion'. He felt that 'if such messages cannot be held up in England surely they can be stopped in India'. MSS. EUR. F. 125/105.

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3. Apart from this point of detail I am sure you will have public opinion here and everywhere behind you in continuing to show strength. So far as Winston and I myself are concerned, and I think the rest of the Cabinet will be all right, there is not going to be any truck with foolish talk of resuming negotiations with Congress, or on the other hand trying to create a patch-work Government from parties outside Congress and the League. After all, when you eliminate those two factors the present Executive is as representative as any you are likely to get, and no doubt you are keeping your mind open for the possibility, if any vacancies occur, of strengthening the representative aspect. I don't suppose bringing in Sapru or Jayakar would strengthen your hands very much, while, as for Rajagopalachari, I doubt if he will turn the corner far enough to join you just yet, and anyhow he may be better employed in Madras.

I agree. I am hunting hard!
L.

I agree.
L.

4. I have just read in *The Times* Firoz Khan's admirable speech to Aligarh.[3] The pity is that the newspapers have all fastened on the detailed suggestion of a confederation of five Dominions and only *The Times* has given his most interesting tribute to the way in which you have handled your Executive, and his condemnation of Congress methods as methods of violence.

[Para. 5, on the Kolhapur succession, omitted.]

[3] i.e. Aligarh Muslim University.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/PO/8/6: f 51

PRIVATE *27 August 1942*

My dear Linlithgow,

Your letter[1] urging an early decision on the question of your succession reached me just after Winston had left, but I took the matter up with him yesterday and we have had at any rate a preliminary talk. We both agree that it would be asking too much of flesh and blood to suggest any further prolongation of your own tenure of office, and we both appreciate deeply what a strain these last months have been on you and how admirably you have stood up to it.

2. We discussed a good many names yesterday, though without feeling at all confident that any one of them offered the ideal solution. Of people in public

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life the best undoubtedly would be Cranborne. But his health is anything but good and his father is very old and none too strong. Also he makes an excellent leader in the Lords. Then there is John Anderson, with Indian experience and much solid administrative capacity. He has brightened up a lot since he married again and she is a clever, interesting woman, though not altogether the type of a Vicereine. On the other hand he is an almost indispensable maid-of-all-work in the Cabinet. Another possible in the Government field is Archie Sinclair. He has a good presence, speaks well, has I think reasonable courage . . .[2] On the other hand, there is always the danger with a Liberal that he will think that a complex situation can be solved by a formula. Then there is Harlech, now in South Africa. He has ability, eloquence, a wide range of interests including both scientific development in connection with agriculture, and architecture. My one doubt is whether he has the power of sticking to his course in a difficult situation, or whether he would appeal personally to Indians.

3. Entirely outside the political field two names were discussed. One was Wilfred Greene, Master of the Rolls, who has a supreme grasp of constitutional problems as well as a very good keen insight into strategy, added to great personal charm and some knowledge of India. . . .[3] Lastly, Winston suggested Cis Asquith, who is now a judge. He has got ability and character and a very nice wife, but he is most decidedly a dark horse, with no political experience and unknown to the public. On the other hand, he comes from a stable where both political knowledge and intellectual ability have characterised all turned out by it.

4. The matter has been left with Winston promising to turn the whole question over in his mind during the next week or so and then having a further talk with me. I daresay nothing will have been settled by the time you get this and if you have any very strong views as to any of them you might possibly send a U telegram referring to them by their initials. I may say that Sam Hoare was discussed but that Winston feels that would be equally unpopular here and in India, and anyhow, much as I like Sam and recognise his good qualities, I am not sure that he would stand the strain physically of another five years of the kind of work you have been facing. Lumley too was mentioned. He has done well and has the advantage of up-to-date experience, though not a striking personality.

5. As regards Lumley and Dill,[4] Winston hopes to make up his mind in the next week or two whether he means to keep Dill in Washington for the

[1] This letter has not been traced. [2] and [3] Personal comments omitted.

[4] Field-Marshal Sir John Dill had been appointed Governor-designate of Bombay. He had accompanied Mr Churchill to Washington in December 1941 in place of General Sir Alan Brooke, who had relieved him as Chief of the Imperial General Staff on 1 December.

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duration, in which case we shall obviously have to find a successor to Lumley at once. Winston's favourite in this connection would be Birkenhead, who has got ability without any of his father's aggressiveness or flamboyance. On the other hand, Winston may decide to bring back Dill either before the end of the year, in which case the present arrangements could stand, or in the spring, in which latter event Lumley could no doubt be persuaded to stay on yet another six months.

Yours ever,
L. S. AMERY

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/608: f 45

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *28 August 1942, 4 am*

1052. Madras telegram 24th August, 154–M,[1] paragraph 4. Flogging. You will no doubt have conveyed to Governors Cabinet's views contained in my telegram 18th August, 1457–S.[2]

[1] Para. 4 of Sir A. Hope's telegram to Lord Linlithgow (repeated to Mr Amery) read as follows: 'Although military patrols and armed guard system on railways are now at work it seems most difficult to catch railway and communication saboteurs, severe punishment of whom might be of good effect. I have ordered that flogging must be used wherever possible in such cases and I am insisting that Districts shall make punishment follow on violent acts as quickly as possible for the sake of effect.' Mr Amery underlined the words from 'I have ordered' to 'in such cases'. L/P&J/8/608: f 44.

[2] This should read '14573', i.e. No. 581.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/609: f 379

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *28 August 1942, 9.15 am*
Received: 29 August

1051. I think that when Parliament reassembles early in September it is almost inevitable that there will be a discussion of the Indian situation. It occurs to me that that would afford an opportunity, if you thought it desirable, for a tribute to be paid, either by the Prime Minister or myself, to the staunchness of the Police. If you agree in general perhaps you could let me have an indication of the line the tribute should take and what allowance, if any, should be made for any unfortunate incidents which may have been brought to notice.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/537: f 172

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *28 August 1942, 8.30 pm*
Received: 29 August

15207. Your personal telegram of 27th August, 2610–S.[1] If you have no one suitable in view whose appointment would strengthen your Council there seems nothing for it but to couple up two portfolios at any rate for the time being though absence among your Indian colleagues of direct experience of States is perhaps to be regretted. I should have thought that in present circumstances Information (with Broadcasting) and Civil Defence would each of them provide enough scope for the energies of one man. But you are best able to judge and if you are satisfied that the work—and expansion of the work—of either Department will not suffer by the amalgamation of the portfolios I have nothing more to say.

You have no doubt considered alternative of joining Information with Defence portfolio (Firoz) rather than with Civil Defence.

[1] No. 635.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/707: f 16

MOST SECRET

WASHINGTON, *28 August 1942*
Received: 4 September, 12.30 pm

No. 456 SAVING. We are reliably informed that the United States Consul-General at New Delhi has sent a report to the State Department alleging that the Moslem League gets most of its financial support from "the Indian princes, Hindu as well as Mohammedan, the great Mohammedan landlords and the English business community, particularly that of Calcutta". The report goes on to say, if our information is correct, that the Indian princes and the British business community support the Moslem League for the same reason that the Government does namely, to prevent the "representatives of India" from obtaining power. These groups, says Mr. Merrell, try to play the Moslem League off against Congress in order to avoid a definite settlement of India's problems and to prolong the present deadlock; and a secondary reason why the Mohammedan landlords are interested in supporting the Moslem League is that they are scared of the Congress Party's belief in the national ownership of all natural resources.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 383

L/P&J/8/537: f 134

INDIA

THE VICEROY'S EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *28 August 1942*

I think my colleagues may be interested to see the attached two extracts from the last personal letter which I have received from the Viceroy, dated 11th August, as to his relations with his Executive Council.

The suggestions in the mind of his colleagues, referred to in the second extract, are in relation to complete Indianization of the Council and the desirability or otherwise of appointing non-official advisers to the Governors in the Provinces at present administered under Section 93 of the Act. Neither of these suggestions has yet been developed beyond a very tentative stage.

L. S. A.

[*There follows the text of No. 509, paras. 2 and 8.*]

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Aney

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

PERSONAL THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *28 August 1942*

My dear Mr. Aney,

You will remember that you asked me to turn over in my mind the case for a talk with Mr. Rajagopalachari, and I have done so with the care that I always give to any suggestion that you make to me. But in the result I am clear that it will not be wise to take any action of this nature. It would certainly be taken to mean that we are willing to discuss, and would be regarded as a sign of approaching compromise, possibly even of weakness, by the many substantial interests in this country which are not in agreement with the point of view represented by him. I think that our first and immediate duty at the moment is to concentrate on the disposal of the rebellion.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir B. Glancy (Punjab)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

CONFIDENTIAL THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *28 August 1942*

My dear Glancy,

Many thanks for your private and personal letter of the 27th August[1] about Pakistan. I quite appreciate the force of what you say, and I am letting Amery have a copy of your letter. I am sure that the wise course is to avoid committing ourselves in either direction in this touchy business.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 640.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *28 August 1942, 9.10 pm*

PERSONAL *Received: 28 August, 9.30 pm*

No. 2635-S. Following is my personal appreciation, midday 28th. Improvement continues. Nothing to report from Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind, United Provinces and Central Provinces. General situation in Eastern United Provinces reported much improved.

2. Slight deterioration in Assam, but nothing apparently of any importance, and probably due to imitation of action elsewhere.

Calcutta.—Two attempts to fire trams and trolly ropes and overhead tram wire cut. Situation otherwise quiet. In districts students' strikes and demonstrations continue number of interferences with communications.

Bihar.—Quiet day in Patna[1] division. [2](Jamshedpur situation: strikers still peaceful. Management advise that "we watch situation for three or four days in hope that some of foremen and supervisors may actively work and thus help in terminating strike. In absence of supervisory staff little or no work can be done". *Rest of Chhota Nagpur and industrial areas quiet.*[3]) Situation under

[1] Deciphered as 'Jors'.

[2] The passage in brackets was sent in a more secure cipher as telegram 2636-S of 28 August (despatched 9.30 pm received 7.50 pm).

[3] The words in italics were omitted in decipher.

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control south of Ganges in Bhagalpur division. Some reinforcements have reached Purnea and work of reopening communications and establishing order in northern portion of Bhagalpur division proceeding. No change in situation in Tirhut division. Report of murder of Sub-Divisional Officer and Inspector of Police with one Head-Constable and two orderlies at Sitamarhi has been confirmed.

Madras.—Nil reports from 17 districts. In Coimbatore district thatched sheds at an aerodrome under construction set on fire: 22 lorries destroyed: three persons burnt to death. What seems to have been a pitched battle in Ramnad district between rioters armed with guns and bombs and armed police. Details awaited: but police seem to have dealt with situation effectively. Madras City quiet.

Bombay.—Nothing of importance.

Orissa.—Still some trouble, but not of very great importance. Serious disturbances reported from Dhenkanal in Eastern States, where treasury looted in one Sub-Division.

3. I would judge that situation generally is settling pretty well. On the other hand we may expect for some [time?] to come minor ebullitions of trouble here and there throughout the country. Remedying of interruption of communications is well in hand. But here again we must expect a certain amount of further trouble with students, &c.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *29 August 1942, 5.35 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2646–S. Your private and personal telegram of 27th August, No. 1047.[1] I am most grateful to Prime Minister. All this is first-class stuff.

2. I would much like, if you and he see no objection, Seymour to be authorised to show paragraphs 1 to 4 privately to Zafrullah. I have no doubt either that they would have an extremely heartening effect on Bajpai if he could be allowed to see them.

[1] No. 637.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 528

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *29 August 1942, 10.5 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 30 August, 2.10 am*

2648–S. Your personal telegram 14649[1] of August 19th. Before commenting further I would premise that there is no sign yet of a fast though Gandhi has by now had my reply[2] rejecting requests in his letter of August 14th.[3] Moreover he has by now seen the newspapers and if he had intended to fast as a demonstration against Congress violence that has been displayed by so many quarters or by way of embarrassing Government in putting down the situation which he must have seen is coming very swiftly under control, one might have expected him to do so. Prior to his arrest he is alleged in *Harijan* to have said to Birla that he did not intend to fast unless and until impulse came.

2. I now turn to Cabinet's specific proposals. If by "home domicile" you mean restriction of residence under Defence Rule 26 (1) (*d*)[4] combined with restrictions on communication with other persons under Rule 26 (1) (*f*)[5] instead of (as at present) detention under Rule 26 (*b*)[6] it would I am advised be legally possible to secure desired objects in this way. But in practice there would be no difference between restriction of residence and full detention since Gandhi would not in our judgment voluntar[il]y comply with any restriction order imposed on him and it would therefore be necessary wherever he was kept to enforce orders by force or display of force under Rule 132.[7] In these circumstances Gandhi would in either case be physically a prisoner and the public would see no difference in the two methods of treatment. It is true that use of Rule 26 (1) (*d*) and (*f*) would make it easier to prescribe the Sevagram Ashram as his domicile because it would not be necessary to take physical possession of premises. Access of public to precincts to Ashram could it appears legally be regulated under Defence of India Rule 9 (1) (*c*).[8] But this course would involve either eviction or corresponding restriction of innocent inmates of Ashram including women and children and either action would be exploited against us.

[1] No. 588. [2] No. 611. [3] No. 553. [4] See No. 393, note 4. [5] *Ibid.*
[6] See No. 321, note 4.
[7] Rule 132 provided for the use of such force as might 'be reasonably necessary' to give effect to rules and orders made under the Defence of India Act or Rules.
[8] Rule 9 (1) (*c*) conferred powers on the Central or Provincial Governments to control 'the admission of persons to, and the conduct of persons in, and in the vicinity of', any place or area in relation to which it appeared necessary 'to take special precautions in the interests of the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order, the efficient prosecution of war' or the maintenance of essential supplies and services.

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Moreover the Ashram which is a straggling collection of buildings not properly fenced would be more difficult to guard than Aga Khan's Palace in Poona. I doubt in these circumstances whether it is worth while re-opening Sevagram question. In other respects Aga Khan's Palace can be regarded as "home domicile" since it is not a jail and other conditions desired by Cabinet can be and indeed have been applied to Gandhi's detention there. As I have already made clear substitution of restriction for physical detention would in this case have no advantage from our point of view.

3. I have examined position in detail so that Cabinet may see how matters stand. But in the last few days I have been considering whole issue further and I have provisionally reached following conclusions. I have put these to Council who did not react too badly but I made it clear that I was not asking them to take a decision and that I did not propose to take decisions until closer to the time.

4. What I think probably wise solution is that on Gandhi starting a fast and making it clear that it is a fast to death we should on the assumption that such fast is for the achievement of his inadmissible demands (*a*) warn him in the name of H.M.G. that we do not propose to interfere that all facilities for medical treatment etc. will be provided but that decision in matter is one which he must take himself: (*b*) Immediately send Devadas Gandhi, his eldest son,[9] to join him at Aga Khan's Palace: (*c*) Tell Devadas that we would provide all possible facilities, doctors, medical or spiritual assistance, food etc. and that he has only to ask for anything he wants; and that we will also put Devadas in charge of arrangements inside Aga Khan's Palace and of Gandhi's health: (*d*) That there will be no objection to Gandhi seeing a reasonable number of visitors or friends from outside, that we leave selection of names to Devadas but that we expect him to operate that permission in a reasonable sense and to avoid any substantial number of people being let in, and wholly to exclude press: (*e*) That we shall continue to keep Gandhi under treatment in these conditions until he either abandons his fast or it has a fatal outcome.

5. I am quite clear on further reflection that our earlier suggestion under which we should have set Gandhi at liberty to fast to death either at Sevagram or in the Aga Khan's Palace though no longer our prisoner, would not work for reason that the moment that he was known to have started a fast there would be an immense concourse of people anxious to dissuade him, to visit him or merely to be spectators and travelling an extensive pilgrimage from all over India; also it would be most difficult to control the press, which would write up most exciting stories which would have an extremely bad effect on opinion here as well as abroad; while serious problems of public order might arise out of assembling and control of crowds. My revised scheme as I see it meets these points. We retain our control (assuming Devadas Gandhi's readiness

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to co-operate) of entry to Gandhi's precincts; we retain control of press; and no one can complain either that Gandhi has been forcibly fed or that he lacks any comfort, medical or other attention for which he or his relations on his behalf may care to ask [for?] him.

6. I shall welcome your reactions as soon as possible.

[9] In fact his fourth son (1900–57).

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Government of India, Home Department to Government of Bombay

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 529

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *29 August 1942, 11.15 pm*
Received: 29 August, 11 pm

6885. Addressed Bombay Special Bombay repeated to Secretary of State for India, London. Continuation of our telegram 6693[1] dated August 24th. There has been some pressure for publication of a regular bulletin regarding the health of Gandhi and members of the Working Committee together with some information regarding the conditions of their detention. Our decision is that no regular bulletins should be issued but that it would be advisable for Bombay Government to issue a brief (?communiqué) in the following terms:

Communiqué Begins.

The following information is published regarding Mr. Gandhi and members of Congress Working Committee who were recently detained under Defence of India Rules. Mr. Gandhi is in a private house where he is supplied with everything necessary to secure his comfort and kind of food he requires. His wife is with him and also certain companions, including his own medical adviser. The members of the Working Committee are also accommodated in suitable quarters and are supplied with all necessary conveniences. They are in charge of an officer of the Indian Medical Service. All these persons are permitted to correspond with members of their families on personal matters, and are provided with newspapers. The health of them all is good. *Ends.*

Please issue as soon as possible after, of course, checking correctness of facts stated.

[1] Note on original states 'not rec[eive]d'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *29 August 1942, 11.40 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 30 August, 1.45 am*

No. 2649–S. Following is my personal appreciation, midday 29th August. General improvement continues. Nothing to report from Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind. Nothing of any importance from Bombay. Nothing from Central Provinces, which states: "no untoward incident in any part of the Province", and adds "welcome return sanity reported from disturbed areas and no signs recrudescence mob mentality apparent". Minor demonstrations still continue there in various towns, but little inclination to defy authority.

2. Bengal. Calcutta quiet. Students' strikes and demonstrations continue in many areas in districts.

United Provinces. In eastern districts all reported superficially quiet, though restoration of normal conditions will take time and continued incidents are to be expected.

Madras. Nothing serious to report in Madras City. Burning of aerodrome lorries &c. near Coimbatore reported yesterday, now reported due to roaming gang of mill strikers in that area who are being followed up by armed police. Nothing of importance otherwise.

Bihar. No development in Jamshedpur position. Rest of Chota Nagpur quiet. Situation in Patna division gradually improving and returning to normal. Situation in Bhagalpur believed to be improving generally, though still much lawlessness in Purnea and no news from northern tracts of Bhagalpur district. Northern portion of Muzaffarpur district still in disturbed state, and cleaning up of that area and Saran district in progress. Communication with Nepal extremely precarious.

Orissa. Sporadic mob activity in Cuttack district. Position in Koraput understood to be well under control.

States. Agitation in Dhenkanal understood to be mainly work of one agitator.

3. As will be seen, situation settling down pretty steadily, though we shall continue to get widely scattered minor incidents and interferences with communications, &c.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/77

IMPORTANT *29 August 1942 (by post)*

No. G.H.–361. Your Excellency's telegram No. 2638–S,[1] August 28th. I have had possibility of forming Ministry constantly in mind, and have sounded several people. General opinion is clearly that at present such a Ministry would not be effective. Difficulty is that Muslim Members of Assembly are divided by personal jealousies and are not men who command much following at present. Most of our anti-Congress campaign has been done by well-wishers outside the Council. In a session, Muslim Ministry would still have a very precarious majority. I do not therefore consider that at present there is any hope on these lines.

[1] Repeating the enquiry already made in telegram 2402–S of 13 August about the possibility of forming a Muslim ministry. MSS. EUR. F. 125/77.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMPORTANT *30 August 1942*

No. 2651–S. Cabinet continues to be very sensitive on question of use of whipping[1] and have told me that they would strongly deprecate any extensive use of this penalty and hope that steps can be taken to ensure that it would be used most sparingly by courts.

2. What has weighed with the Cabinet is of course Press reactions at home and abroad, but I fully realise on the other hand deterrent effect of knowledge that these penalties exist, and fact also that on occasion they may be of great value. I suggest however that it would be well, given Cabinet feeling, to close down publicity or public references to whipping as much as possible. Could you meanwhile let me know how many, if any, whippings have in fact actually taken place in your Province?

[1] See Nos. 581 and 643.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *30 August 1942, 9.5 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 30 August, 8.30 pm*

No. 2654-S. Following is my personal appreciation, midday 30th August. Improvement continues. *Nil* reports from Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (though Governor states that Congress are reported to intend picketing of Courts to start on 4th September and occupation of tahsils and police posts on 10th September); Sind (though a little student hooliganism); Madras (save for minor incidents); Bombay (save for instances of minor sabotage); Central Provinces (except for quite minor incidents which in Governor's view show that all disorderly elements not yet subdued). No report from Orissa.

2. Bengal. Calcutta normal yesterday. Students' strikes and demonstrations continue in districts though apparently on somewhat reduced scale. Minor interruptions of communications. United Provinces: roads now clear in eastern United Provinces and railways in running order, so far as track is concerned. Problem is now hunting down organisers of outrages. Main rebellion in Governor's opinion hindered but isolated sabotage will continue and province is far from restored to normal conditions. Campaign of alarmist rumours is part of Congress technique and aggravated by increasing attention to Axis wireless. Bihar. Consolidation of position continuing. No further developments at Jamshedpur. Every effort is being made to tidy up north Bihar, but Governor comments province still has some way to go before it can say that it is back to normal and can dispense with troops.

3. There are evident slight signs that lesser Congress leaders still at large are preparing a revival of the civil disobedience movement for early September. Hooligan element, upon which Congress depends for execution of many of their schemes, have had a baddish time in many areas and it will be interesting to see if they will stand up to another round.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Amery (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/PO/5/41: f 43

WASHINGTON, *30 August 1942, 3.25 am*
Received: 30 August, 11.40 am

No. 4367. Following for Secretary of State for India.

Louis Fiscier [Fischer] came to see me yesterday and gave me his views forcibly and at length on the Indian situation.

After stating that the National Congress[1] is drifting to disaster he argued that Cripps had promised the Indians a National Indian Government with the abolition of the Viceroy's veto, and had subsequently gone back on this offer. He supported this by letters between Congress leaders and Cripps while in Delhi.

I contested his argument and told him that quite apart from what might or might not have been the exact course followed throughout the very difficult negotiations, nothing could justify the action of Congress that was evidently quite deliberate attempt to paralyse the Government in the face of the enemy.

I made little impression on him, and he will I have no doubt continue to give us all the trouble he can. It would be helpful if I could have Cripps' answer to what was Fiscier's [Fischer's] main point, in so far as this is not covered by the Ministry of Information's telegram No. 625 EMPAX.[2]

2. Sherwood Eddy, of quite different calibre, and very sympathetic to our difficulties, came to see me today. He has it in mind to go to India in the hope at some stage of being able to give some help by way of mediation.

I told him that the first duty of the Government of India must be the restoration of order, and that to follow any other course would be disastrous. He appreciated this, and if he does go, will I hope, as he promised, exercise prudence and restraint.

He will let me know what he decides. He intimates that he had discussed his provisional ideas with Hull.

Repeated to Viceroy New Delhi.

[1] 'National Congress' was received corrupt in New Delhi. [2] Not printed.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/609: ff 386–8

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *30 August 1942, 2 am*

15278. Your telegram 24th August 2579-S.[1] Our first consideration must clearly be to ensure that Police and other services retain their confidence in support and encouragement of Government, and I entirely agree with your advice to Governors. I hope that pressure for enquiry may be resisted successfully even in ministerial Provinces where political motives would be most evident and would be most likely to have some effect on any enquiry and its findings. *Per contra* very unfortunate inferences would be drawn if it were only in ministerially governed Provinces that any enquiries were held. It will be remembered that in July 1919 there were suggestions supported by C.-in-C. & Home member that certain local enquiries into the origin of particular incidents and conduct of authorities should be set on foot in anticipation of general enquiry already promised by Montagu in House of Commons on 22nd May. Suggestions were overruled on score that they would prejudice general enquiry and that purpose in view would be adequately met by departmental investigations. This is relevant to the extent that in present case the general enquiry may ultimately be necessary.

2. As regards the case for general enquiry, I agree with view in your paragraph 2 that pros and cons will have to be carefully weighed more particularly as something of the kind may be urged in the debate which is to be anticipated when Parliament re-assembles, or in the impending session of the Indian Legislature, or both. I should not wish to express a final view until you have been able to consider the matter further in the light of later developments and I will await any further views you may wish to express later but my preliminary reaction is altogether against our taking the initiative in favour of enquiry. Apart from the considerations mentioned in my preceding paragraph and apart from practical difficulties such as that of getting a judge from this country, I should anticipate that a general enquiry is more likely to be an embarrassment than a help. The Committee's terms of reference could hardly be so drawn as to exclude enquiry into action to suppress disturbances and to authorise only investigation of their origin and its report would inevitably have to be published, however inconvenient its findings might be. There is also this fundamental difference between present case and conditions of Hunter Committee that in the latter case the world war had been victoriously concluded several months previously.

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3. In any case I should feel doubtful whether a judicial enquiry would achieve the object you have in mind or do so more effectively than publication of the evidence you already have or may hereafter obtain, e.g. the Andhra circular reported in your telegram of the 4th August, 2285–S,[2] which I notice from Madras telegram to *Times* dated 28th August has been released to Press. An important consideration would be possible prejudicial effect of enquiry on morale of troops engaged in support of civil power (I have heard reports that British troops new to India[3] are disposed to question whether in view of their behaviour its inhabitants are worth fighting for) and I should hope to ride off any Parliamentary pressure on that ground amongst others.

[1] No. 617. [2] No. 407.
[3] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has '(group corrupt) new scheme' instead of 'British troops new to India'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: ff 68–71

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *30 August 1942, 8.10 am*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

1061. Indian representatives at War Cabinet. I have been considering details of arrangements which I should suggest to War Cabinet for circulation of memoranda to them and their summons to meetings. Even though only the most secret operational matters and such domestic issues (constituting a considerable proportion of Cabinet business) as are not suitable for them to take part in are excluded, it will naturally not be possible to provide them with a very full day's work by letting them see in circulation memoranda on and attend Cabinet for discussion of what remains. I hope therefore that I may be able to get my colleagues to agree that they may see also in circulation for educative purposes some papers on such domestic issues as broadly have Indian counterpart[1] e.g. labour, fuel, food etc. which are dealt with initially in a Cabinet Committee and possibly be invited to attend discussion on occasion. I presume you will see no objection.

2. In relation to questions of *foreign policy* some discrimination may be necessary. What are your views, with reference to practice in bringing such matters before your Council, about Representatives being in on questions relating to Afghanistan, China and U.S.A., the latter two with particular reference to those countries' interest in Indian internal developments? *Prima facie* I should think it best to arrange for their *not* repeat not being in on those matters but much depends on what is your practice. On the other hand I would propose that they

[1] 'counterpart' was received corrupt.

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should get the more limited distribution of Foreign Office telegrams which provide a general background. I anticipate no difficulty in arranging by consultation to avoid bringing them in on unsuitable foreign policy issues generally.

3. I hope you will agree that no harm but perhaps some advantage might ensue from including them normally at Cabinet meetings at which your telegrams about Indian law and order questions generally, *treatment of Congress leaders and generally*[2] current internal matters of administration in India are discussed. Looking back on such meetings in recent past I am not aware of any but one occasion when their presence might have been embarrassing and not helpful. I should anticipate no difficulty in securing that summonses to such meetings would be issued with discrimination. But difficulty might arise as to suitability for communication to them of occasional incidental comments, e.g. on individual attitude and possible reactions of certain of your colleagues, which might occur in your telegrams as hitherto circulated for discussion. Perhaps with this consideration in mind you could arrange to include such comments in separate telegram which if necessary could be given a more restricted circulation, and it would in general be helpful if you could indicate which of your telegrams likely in ordinary way to be circulated to Cabinet you would prefer withheld from Indian Representatives. Subject to this and to such further safeguards[3] as Prime Minister may desire do you see any objection in principle to Indian representatives being invited to join discussions on India law and order or other administrative issues? Other considerations suggested in my private and personal telegram 1022[4] of 20th August would of course apply to our discussions on constitutional issues as between Great Britain and India in which I do not suggest their participation.

4. Question also arises whether it would be appropriate to circulate to Indian Representatives "Intel"[5] and D[aily] W[ar] Operational telegrams sent to Dominion and Colonial Governments and repeated to you or material from which these are composed. I am not sure if your colleagues do now have access to these summaries. Mudaliar on seeing them may consider that they should not in future be withheld and this may possibly create some embarrassment at your end. But I do see considerable difficulty in withholding from Indian Representatives here matter which would be common property to others attending Cabinets including Dominions representatives.

5. I should be grateful for your early reactions to these suggestions so that I may consult my colleagues before Representatives' arrival.

[2] The words in italics were omitted in decipher.

[3] 'safeguards' omitted in decipher. [4] No. 595.

[5] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has '"intelligence"'. Intels were designed to supply H.M. missions abroad with background information and guidance. They did not normally include information concerning questions of immediate interest to a single mission or a few missions, and were normally seen by Information Officers.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *31 August 1942, 7.20 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 31 August, 9 pm*

No. 2661-S. Situation report. Following is my personal appreciation, midday 31st August. Improvement maintained. *Nil* reports from Punjab, N.-W.F.P., Sind: nothing further from Orissa or Assam: Bombay normal. Mild incidents in certain districts.

Bihar.—General situation on the up-grade, except in north Bhagalpur, Purnea and Santal Parganas, in two latter of which there has been some deterioration. Saran proves less troubled than expected. Elsewhere mopping up operations are proceeding and initiative has definitely been regained though Governor, with the best will in the world, cannot say when it will be possible to release any substantial body of troops. In Tata's there has been no change for better yet. Managing Director has given workers till 31st August to reach settlement. Some supervisory staff back.

Madras.—City quiet. In districts absence of special incidents continues.

Bengal.—Calcutta quiet yesterday. Students' strikes and demonstrations and minor interferences with communications continue in districts. Nationalist papers resumed publication today.

United Provinces.—One or two incidents in districts yesterday dealt with by police firing, which averted attack on police station and railway station.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

IMMEDIATE *31 August 1942*

2662-S. Personal for Prime Minister. (Take Cipher U:— 32-U.) I am engaged here in meeting by far the most serious rebellion since that of 1857, the gravity and extent of which we have so far concealed from the world for reasons of military security. Mob violence remains rampant over large tracts of the countryside and I am by no means confident that we may not see in September

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a formidable attempt to renew this widespread sabotage of our war effort. The lives of Europeans in outlying places are today in jeopardy. If we bungle this business we shall damage India irretrievably[1] as a base for future allied operations and as a thoroughfare for U.S. help to China. Throughout this most anxious crisis I have managed to hold together the Indian members of my Executive Council, though several of them are in mortal terror of the possible consequences to themselves of their having supported me in arresting Gandhi and the Working Committee of Congress. These are the circumstances in which I am now threatened by visitations from Wendell Willkie[2] and Sherwood Eddy. The latter threatens to come to India in the hope of helping by way of mediation (see telegram No. 4367[3] of 29th August addressed Foreign Office from Ambassador, Washington). (Revert to XX:—) My experience of peripatetic Americans which is now extensive is that their zeal in teaching us our business is in inverse ratio to their understanding of even the most elementary of the problems with which we have to deal. My fear now is that these Americans may openly express a wish to see Congress leaders now under detention. Whether they themselves do or do not press for that, I am certain that Hindu press, which is always anxious to exploit the possibilities of American intervention in Indian affairs, will proclaim that they ought to see Gandhi and Nehru. Pressure of that nature is bound to be deeply damaging to my Government. Moreover such visitors do untold harm by airing their uninformed opinions in interviews and private conversations. These are the circumstances in which I feel bound to beg you to ginger up Edward Halifax to arrest at least for a time this flow of well meaning sentimentalists from the U.S.A. to India, so that we may mind here, what is still, I suppose, our own business. Best wishes.

[1] 'damage India irretrievably' deciphered as '(?) India's (omission) y'.

[2] See Nos. 342, 369, 398, and 437. There had been subsequent reports that Mr Willkie would be either visiting India or crossing India on his way to China. Mr Amery had asked Mr Eden to instruct Sir R. Campbell to speak to the U.S. authorities in the sense suggested in the final para. of No. 551. Mr Willkie left the U.S. before this warning could be given, and the Minister of State, Cairo (Mr Casey) was therefore asked to deliver it to him on his arrival there. On 8 September Mr Casey reported that Mr Willkie did not propose to visit India, but he had informed him of the political situation there, and Mr Willkie had promised to avoid any dangerous references. L/PO/5/41.

[3] No. 658; the date should be 30 August.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 525

IMMEDIATE PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *31 August 1942, 8.30 pm*

15339. Your personal tel[egra]m of 29th August 2648–S,[1] para. 4 (*d*). Apart from express exclusion of press representatives do you contemplate any undertaking restricting statements to press by Gandhi's visitors or household?

[1] No. 652.

664

War Cabinet W.M. (42) 119th Conclusions, Minute 9

L/E/8/2527: f 351

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 31 August 1942 at 6.30 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Ernest Bevin

Also present were: Mr S. M. Bruce, Sir Kingsley Wood, Mr Herbert Morrison, Mr Amery, Viscount Cranborne, Mr A. V. Alexander, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Mr Brendan Bracken, Sir Orme Sargent, Sir Wilfrid Freeman, Lt.-Gen. A. E. Nye.

INDIA

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed gratification at the firmness with which the Government of India had dealt with the situation in India. The limited response to the revolutionary campaign of the Congress Party had provided a practical demonstration that Congress did not represent the masses of the Indian people.

General Situation

In this connection reference was again made to the suggestion that urgent attention should be given to the development of a more progressive social and industrial policy in India (W.M. (42) 117th Conclusions, Minute 1).[1] The general feeling of the War Cabinet was that the Government of India might with advantage give early consideration to these questions.[2]

[1] No. 621.

[2] This sentence was later amended to read: 'The War Cabinet invited the Secretary of State for India to draw the Governor-General's attention to the general feeling of the War Cabinet that the Governments in India might with advantage give early consideration to these questions.' See Nos. 671 and 677.

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Detention of Gandhi

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that a further telegram (No. 2648–S of the 29th August)[3] about the conditions of Gandhi's detention had now been received from the Viceroy. He wished to obtain further information from the Viceroy on one point (freedom to receive visitors from outside)[4] and would then bring the matter before the War Cabinet.

The War Cabinet took note of this statement.

[3] No. 652. [4] No. 663.

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Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

SIND SECRETARIAT, KARACHI, *31 August 1942*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I feel it my duty to place before Your Excellency certain matters for consideration with a view to resolving the present political deadlock in India, which is deplored by all men of goodwill who cherish the welfare of this country as well as the great cause for which the United Nations are fighting in different theatres of war.

The people of India have always believed that the British Government had at no time any desire, nor have they even now, to part with power and to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of this country. The statements made from time to time by British spokesmen in authority, including those made by Sir Stafford Cripps, have, if anything, confirmed the belief that in no circumstances would Britain be prepared to give up her power in India, and that although they are waging the present War in defence of democracy, yet so far as India is concerned they wish to continue their imperialistic hold on that country as long as they can manage to do so. The proposals put forth by Sir Stafford Cripps have only strengthened this belief, and there can be no doubt that the present situation is a direct outcome of his visit, which has left nothing but bitterness against the British authorities in the heart of the Indian people.

The Indian nationalists in and outside the Congress who aspire to see the people of India rise to the full height of their political stature are fully convinced that the communal or political differences which have arisen in this country are merely the creation of British diplomacy, which has consistently aimed at holding back power for the purpose of exploiting India economically in the interests of the British people in general and of British capitalists in particular. According to them the communal organisations have been recognised and encouraged with such an object in view, and that persons and parties who do

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not share their narrow outlook have been left unrecognised and discouraged so as to placate the world opinion in favour of the British policy and to use the communal differences so accentuated as an excuse for continuing the British hold over India. They find this clearly reflected in the one-sided character of the British propaganda conducted in America and other Allied countries.

The question which is asked in every quarter is: Is India to remain under subjugation for ever if a section of a particular community or a community as a whole does not come to reasonable settlement with the rest of the body-politic in their just demand for the freedom of their country? If such a proposition were accepted, it is felt that even after the war India will not become a free country. Nor has the British Government exerted itself at any stage to unite the various Indian communities by impressing upon them the supreme necessity from the national point of view of working together for the greatest good of their country. If anything, it has tried to separate them to serve its own advantage.

I think I can state without fear of contradiction that there is no political organisation in this country which believes that the British have ever seriously desired to free India. While there is a consensus of opinion throughout this country that the Allies are fighting in defence of a righteous cause, the attitude of the Indian leaders in regard to the Indian problem may be summed up in the views held by two divergent schools of thought. One school believe that the ideology upon which the action of the United Nations is based in carrying on the present momentous conflict is in conformity with the aspirations of the Indian people themselves, and that India on that very account should throw her whole weight into the war to ensure the victory of the beneficient cause for which it is being fought. They do not believe that India would automatically become free after the war without making further sacrifices. They believe that at the end of the present world conflict they will still have to fight for the attainment of their national freedom, but they consider that the universal cause should be helped first and the fight for the freedom of India resorted to afterwards. They also feel that the British Government will emerge from the titanic conflict far too exhausted to dictate their own terms to the people of this country, and it would then be easy for the latter to gain their national freedom. The other school of thought fear that after the war Britain would be so depleted of her material resources that she would use every means left to her to exploit the people of India economically.

As I have remarked, however, there is no doubt entertained by any section of Indian public opinion that the British have no intention to free India and that the approach to the Indian problem has all along been made in typical imperialistic fashion. In such a state of affairs the policy of repression will materially injure the cause for which the Allies are fighting. The policy is not likely to serve any fructuous end, and if it proves of any avail its success will be merely

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superficial. Repression will not kill the basic discontent of which the present movement is but a symptom, it will only drive that discontent under ground. On the other hand, the repressive measures taken to deal with the present situation have drawn various sections of the people to the Congress fold, partly because their patriotism for India's national cause has been thereby aroused, and partly because they cannot bear the harsh treatment and suffering inflicted upon their own fellow countrymen. The greater the repression the greater will become the sacrifices, and the stronger will be the invitation to persons at present disconnected with the Congress to sympathise with that organisation. Apart from every other consideration, I am bound to say that the policy is fraught with tremendous harm to the cause of the Allies, as the Axis powers will make the fullest capital out of it for propaganda purposes. The inevitable disorder resulting from the policy will provide a ready opportunity to the Axis powers to invade this country, and the bitterness thereby created every day against the British people will strengthen such opportunity and create facilities for any attack which would not have otherwise been afforded them. Thus from every point of view it is the British Government which loses and the Allies who suffer by the adoption of such a policy.

Guided by these far-reaching considerations, I am earnestly of the opinion that it is not too late for the British Government to give a convincing proof of their sincere desire to part with power. I am earnestly convinced that such a proof can be conveyed by a declaration in unambiguous terms that immediately after the war India shall be free and have perfect liberty to frame her own Constitution, and that should any differences arise in safeguarding the interests of particular communities they shall be referred to the arbitration of an independent international tribunal, without the slightest interference of the British Government, who are interested in the economic exploitation of India.

It may be argued that reopening the door for negotiation at this stage and coming to terms with Congress leaders would mar the prestige of the British Government. If such a view is upheld, it would further confirm the prevalent view that the British Government wishes to tighten her hold over India. Whose prestige would suffer: If the British Government have no desire to keep this country under subjugation and there is to be no imperialistic hold over her people, then the question of imperialistic prestige does not arise, for there will be no imperialism whose prestige has to be thought of.

I have tried to express my mind frankly on the subject, for I feel that where the most vital interests of this country are at stake it would be a sacrilege and a disservice to the cause of human welfare to speak with reservation and give only such views as would please persons in authority. I would earnestly plead with you to move His Majesty's Government to make an unequivocal declaration of the nature I have suggested, and to open the door for negotiation by inviting the political leaders to resolve the present deadlock and support the

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vital cause for which the Allies are fighting. With the enemy at the very door of India, nothing can forward that great cause more effectively then by ensuring the willing and heartfelt co-operation of a free people in defence of their own rights in their own country.

Yours sincerely,
ALLAH BAKHSH

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Note by the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/137[1]

SKETCH NOTE—CONCLUSION OF DISCUSSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS IN COUNCIL, DATED 31ST AUGUST 1942

Valuable discussion, which has ranged over a wide field. It has carried us, as I knew it must, into areas of the Constitution with which, in the ordinary way, the Governor-General in Council has neither concern nor responsibility. The Governor-General alone is and must remain accountable to Secretary of State for action in the discretionary field. It is not in my power or anyone else's power to establish any precedent, much less any convention, to the contrary.

Indeed, so clear is this aspect of position that I considered the propriety of inviting my colleagues to meet me in some room other than the Council Chamber in order that I might enjoy the advantage of hearing their views on the topic; but later came to the conclusion that the position could be sufficiently protected by my using the language I have both at the outset of the discussion and now. With that *caveat*, I must say that I do not regret that we have heard each other's views about the position in the Provinces, and particularly, those Provinces in which the breakdown Clause, Section 93, is at present operative.

To take first the Centre. Let me begin by saying that I am sincerely proud of this Council as it stands. I agree with its own measurement of its quality that it is the strongest Government that India has had. My colleagues command my confidence. I believe that the work of Council, given its greatly expanded scope consequent on the war, is being well done. I am not ashamed of my own share in the solid achievements in the constitutional field which we have registered in the past six years.

The very interesting speeches to which we have listened have been broadly divisible under two heads. These [There?] were those of Hon'ble Members who applied themselves in the main to such specific changes as might be

[1] Enclosed in the letter of 15 September from the Assistant Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State, which stated that the note was 'by His Excellency the Viceroy'.

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made whether at the Centre or in the Provinces; and again these [there?] were those speeches which were directed in the main to the question of reconstituting the Central Government as soon as possible and before the end of the war, so as to include representatives of such parties and minorities as may be willing to support Government.

Of these speeches, I think Dr. Ambedkar's and Sir J. P. Srivastava's were outstanding, but other H.Ms. touched upon the same theme. And what emerges quite clearly from those speeches is that no one imagines that the balance of communal or minority representation in an *ad interim* wartime Government is not going to affect, or—if you like—to prejudice, the extent of the representation which communities are going to get by the permanent post-war constitutional settlement.

But the position, and the share of power, and the extent of the special representation and safeguards that minority communities are going to enjoy in the post-war constitution is by far the most vital and the most controversial of all the very difficult problems that the constitution-making body will have to solve. In truth, I cannot feel that that is the sort of task which anyone ought to attempt to solve during the war. Indeed, I am perfectly certain that the thing *could not* be done while hostilities continue. And if the attempt were made to arrive at a settlement during the war, I believe that the attempt would fail, and that in the process, communal difficulties would be grievously exacerbated, and the prospects of a successful settlement after the war seriously prejudiced. In this, I find myself in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief. What we must try to do is to win this war. It is upon victory alone that the new constitutional structure can be built.

The best contribution we can make towards victory is to carry out with fidelity, the task of steady day-to-day administration. Victory is the key to all our most pressing problems. Victory, had it come in time, would—I am convinced—have forestalled the attempted revolution with which we are now coping. Victory—when it does arrive—will sweep away the last vestiges of that rebellion.

I agree that one consequence of the Cripps Mission was to reduce the stature of this Council in this country at that time. You cannot display your 1946 model without taking the eye of the public off the current type. I believe that hurt was largely temporary. Many are coming to see that certain forms of Government are for the time being out of our reach. If it were not so, we should not have heard advocated in this room a revival of the system of Council Government in the Provinces. Indeed, I am positive that, whatever criticism is levelled against the Government of India at the moment on account of the strong action it was bound to take in regard to Congress leaders (and that is quite another matter), the position is that the prestige of this Council both in India and abroad stands very high.

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It was remarked by some H.Ms. that the recent enlargement of Council had made little impression on the public. *That* expansion was of course effected in circumstances of a very high political temperature. No one, I think, expected either Congress or the Muslim League to respond. But I must say this much, because it is true, that that expansion gave very real comfort to the Depressed Classes and to the Sikh community, a result which I regard as politically most valuable.

I do not propose to say more about the matter of the Governor-General's overriding powers *vis-à-vis* this Council according to Section 41[2] of the Act of 1919 than this: that I agree with Mr. Sarker in what he said about the virtue of the subordination, at this stage of India's political evolution, of the Governor-General to Parliament: that control can in practice be rendered effective only through the Secretary of State for India. Mr. Sarker also noticed that Section 41 is as much for the protection of this Council in its position with the Viceroy, as it is a protection for the Viceroy and Secretary of State. The basic principle that until the India executive can draw its ultimate authority from an Indian Parliament, it must derive its ultimate authority from the British Parliament, is not I understand challenged. I am perfectly satisfied it cannot be successfully challenged.

What is complained of is the extent to which the Secretary of State is alleged to interfere with Government in India. I must say quite openly that I very much doubt whether much of that charge would survive any systematic analysis. I think Secretary of State is more often the whipping boy than the guilty party. You cannot have (*a*) the responsibility of Parliament; (*b*) the Secretary of State with his Advisers; and (*c*) the financial arrangements existing between Great Britain and India, without a good deal of business traffic back and forth.

What I do notice is that this new Council as a Council is taking a hand in many matters that under the older system were largely left to the Departments concerned with the Viceroy. In such matters, I have more than once seen cause to make plain to London that since Council had taken a decision I could not reasonably regard the matter as open to review.

Let me say a word now about the Indianisation of the two portfolios remaining in the hands of officials. I agree that they are highly important portfolios. I agree also that the passing of responsibility for the Finance and Home portfolios into Indian hands would be agreeable to many persons of moderate views in this country. I agree also that this step would have not the slightest effect upon either Congress or the Muslim League. I have no doubt too, and this was pointed out by more than one speaker on Saturday,[3] that once achieved, the Indianisation of those two portfolios would very early be discounted, and that we should see a concentration of all nationalist opinion, including the

[2] Continued in force by Government of India Act 1935, Sec. 317 and Ninth Schedule.

[3] 29 August.

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moderates, upon what is quite misguidedly called a *National Government* with the removal of Governor-General's veto. Great Britain has a National Government today because every party in the state has decided to take a share and to stop party warfare. It is a National Government because the whole Nation supports it.

Then again we have heard during this discussion enough to remind us that there is very definitely a communal side to this question. The choice of two new Indian members to fill these vacancies would quite evidently raise very acutely the matter of the communal balance in this Council. That to my mind is a factor to which due weight must be given at this moment.

It would appear, too, that the shape of things in the country at this time would tend to attach an unduly inflammatory quality to the question of whether the *Home Member* should be a Muslim or a Hindu. Incidentally, I can hardly suppose that any experienced person would favour a change of Home Members so long as the present critical position in the country-side persists.

I wonder whether my colleagues have asked themselves how this matter would appear to opinion in Great Britain. No one of them has suggested the appointment of *official* Indians to these portfolios, so they must contemplate the Secretary of State moving Parliament to amend Section 36 (3)[4] which deals with the service qualifications. Let no one suppose that public opinion in Great Britain has not been profoundly disturbed by recent events—the rejection of the Cripps offer, and the declaration by Congress for civil disobedience. Conservative opinion is paramount in the Commons. I should judge that any proposal at this stage for the removal of the service qualifications would give rise to damaging debates in both Houses.

Finally, it is important to keep the question in true relation to the Cripps offer. That offer was specifically contingent upon Parties as such being represented in the Government. That would have involved an entirely new chapter in Indian politics. To achieve that position all, or most of the then Members of Council would have been invited to resign their places. The present Council, however, has been developed on a very different basis. It represents the results of a process of selection on individual merits. The growth has been achieved partly by filling natural vacancies, partly by an increase in the number of portfolios. Thus far neither European nor Indian has been asked to make way for another. I should be less than frank with my colleagues if I suggested that the change that some of my colleagues have urged is likely to be made in the very near future.

I think two of my colleagues made reference to the portfolio of *External Affairs*. I would recommend my friends in the existing state of India's political development to take a very cautious view of that particular charge. Contact with Afghanistan and with the Muhammadan countries of Central Asia is going to be a spiky and most controversial business so long as the Pakistan issue, and the more extreme forms of communal difference persist in this country.

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Parliament, in 1935, clearly saw breakers ahead in this matter when they relegated the charge of External Affairs to the Discretionary field, and empowered the Governor-General to appoint an adviser to aid him in the exercise of that function.

Again, the Governor-General as His Majesty's principal representative in India, speaks in the field of External Affairs for the whole of India, including the Indian States. In the discharge of that duty, he deals, so far as India's business is concerned, with countries like Afghanistan and Nepal in which India has no direct representation, but to which His Majesty's Government and the Foreign Office appoint a British Representative.

I turn now to the Provincial field. I think Mr. Aney was alone in urging Minority Ministries as his first choice; and knowing as I do his careful and practical mind, I should not be prepared lightly to dismiss his opinion. I am bound, however, to admit that I see many and real difficulties.

As I observed during the discussion, I see both *Minority Ministries* and *Council Government* working not alongside of the old and rather staid legislatures elected on a comparatively narrow franchise, but with the large Houses elected under the broad franchise of the Act of 1935—Houses which, be it noted, have already worked with Ministries supported by a majority of their members. *Supply* would have to be certified; legislation for the most part certified; Government would be liable to be beaten any day. Mr. Aney says that no one who does not mean if he can to take the place of Ministers, should be allowed to take a vote of no-confidence. I understand and agree with that. But I should be most apprehensive of the immense strain upon the Speakers which the procedure envisaged would entail.

For reasons of much the same nature, I cannot myself suppose that *Council Government* would be easy, or comfortable, or in the long run beneficial. Council Government would require amending legislation, and I would expect Parliament to be most disinclined in the middle of a war, to take what it would regard as a step amounting to a relapse back to the pre-Reform processes of Council Government. I think Parliament would say "carry on till we have won the war and we will see what may best be done when Indians apply their minds to this problem". Dr. Ambedkar thinks that Council Government would appeal to the public as being more popular than non-official advisers. I understand his meaning, but I would expect that Council Government would be suspect on the ground that it was designed to endure; while Section 93 has at least the saving grace that everyone is anxious to end it.

That leaves me to deal with non-official advisers. I am myself disposed to regard this as by far the most practical expedient at our disposal. I do not challenge the contention that Governors under Section 93 are destined inevitably to be deprived to a large extent of the advantages of intimate touch with the

[4] Of the Government of India Act 1919; see note 2.

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changing currents of popular feeling. Nevertheless I remember Mr. Gandhi saying to me, when the Working Committee pulled the Congress Ministries out of office: "Make a clean cut of it, and don't appoint non-officials to advise the Governors. Let us know where we stand. If the British are to be responsible, let the public understand that." But those were, of course, days when none of us contemplated the breakdown continuing for so long. I think the appointment of non-official advisers may well bring about a very important issue with the Muslim League, and that is an aspect that will need to be most closely watched.

I am much obliged to my colleagues for their help. The discussion has served in this and many other matters to clarify my thoughts. We have indeed had a most interesting and thought-provoking debate.

My colleagues may rest assured that I shall convey to the Secretary of State in sufficient detail, the views of colleagues as expressed in this discussion.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *1 September 1942, 8.45 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 1 September, 9.50 pm*

No. 2682–S. Situation report. Following is my personal appreciation, midday September 1st. Improvement continues. Nothing to report from the North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab and Sind. No incident of special note yesterday in the mofussil in Madras. City quiet.

Central Provinces.—Trying to get wire cutting under control. Mill situation remains difficult, and it is not yet certain whether strikers' objectives are industrial or political, but no incident reported.

Bombay.—Normal.

No change of any importance in provincial situation in *Bihar.* In this Province, situation in northern part of Bhagalpur Division still very disturbed. Purnea situation reported to be grave. Aborigines in Santal Parganas showing signs of unrest, believed to be instigated by Congress and Forward Bloc. The situation in the rest of the Province steady or improved. Jamshedpur quiet, though strike continues.

Assam.—Some deterioration in situation with three or four violent incidents, in two of which troops had to fire on mobs.

Bengal.—Calcutta quiet yesterday. Less activity reported in districts.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/617: f 321

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *1 September 1942*
Received: 2 September

1069. United Provinces telegram 29th August, G–268[1] paragraph 6. I should like if possible to use this quotation from intercepted letter in House of Commons. Would there be any objection and what is name apparently omitted in transmission before word "instructions".[2]

[1] Para. 6 transmitted the first passage from the letter quoted in note 2, i.e. down to 'short of murder'.

[2] Lord Linlithgow replied in tel. 2707–S of 4 September that he had consulted Sir M. Hallett 'who sees no objection to use of letter as proposed' and in his immediately following tel. 2708–S of 4 September he quoted from Sir M. Hallett's letter to himself No. U.P. 156 of 29 August which gave the text of an intercepted letter dated 23 August written by Miss Pandit from her home at Anand Bhawan to a girl friend in Lucknow, the relevant passage of which was 'You asked about the non-violence question. Gandhiji's instructions are to completely paralyse the Government in any way possible, short of murder.' The letter continued: 'The ways resorted to so far have been breaking wires, derailing trains, causing strikes and *hartals*. No specific instructions have been given but each town is supposed to have sufficient brains to think up ways of embarrassing the Government.

'No one can work alone. I am working with the rest of the people here. Publishing leaflets and distributing them—making propaganda, etc. Yes, troops, etc. *must* be made to listen. Half the battle is won if they come on our side. Policemen are more or less on the border line and with encouragement they can be made to change over and help instead of harm us.

'It is also important to work up wives and kids of Government officials and show them that their men folk are utter pansies! No one should attack and bodily injure anyone else but short of that you can do anything.'

In his letter of 29 August Sir M. Hallett also wrote: 'Obviously the girl is fully aware of Congress ideas and I have directed the search of Anand Bhawan and her arrest for clearly it is a centre for distribution of plans.' MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/I/1/756: ff 84–6, 131

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *1 September 1942, 6.20 pm*
Received: 2 September

15392. Your telegram No. 2627–S[1] of 28th August. I fully accept justification for measures described in para. 1. Only safeguard as you know is operation of

[1] In para. 1, Lord Linlithgow referred to Sir M. Hallett's telegram G–262 of 26 August (see No. 641, note 2), announced that he was arranging for press messages reporting views of people like India League or Hewlett Johnson to be submitted for censorship, and proposed same be done in respect of suggestions by left-wing papers like the *Manchester Guardian* or the *News Chronicle* regarding negotiations with Congress. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

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censorship at your end. In present circumstances necessity must be accepted for controlling circulation in India of messages reporting views of left-wing and even liberal political quarters here which advocate approach to Congress, because by conveying misleading impression that such opinions are widely held in responsible quarters here they encourage prolongation of resistance to law and order measures. But fact must be faced that if censorship in India suppresses views of leading newspapers here there will be severe criticism in Press and Parliament. I am of course ready to support you fully in any such measures as you think necessary to maintain internal security and preserve war effort.

2. Reuter's position in this matter *vis-à-vis* their Indian clients is very difficult and while they are anxious to co-operate to fullest extent possible it is obviously much more[2] satisfactory to deal with problem by censorship. (Even if Reuter were to leave these items entirely alone they would be reported by Indian correspondents.) Once it becomes known to Reuter and others that such messages are being stopped they will not waste their money in sending them.

3. Editors here have already been warned by Ministry of Information that a note of caution is desirable in commenting on the situation and I agree that unless there is a radical improvement within the course of a few days it will be desirable to sound a graver note of warning. Publication on [August] 29th Madras communiqué about instructions for sabotage issued by Andhra Congress Committee[3] and *Times* Delhi correspondent's despatch have to some extent prepared the way for fuller emphasis on gravity of situation with which you are confronted. I would propose, subject to any developments that you may report, say by the end of the week, to explain situation confidentially in first instance to meeting of Lobby journalists probably next Monday.[4] I shall of course have to be prepared to make a statement to the House when or soon after it reassembles on 8th September, though it is also possible that this may by consent be deferred till October. In that event I should however probably address a private meeting of Members early next week, so I should in any case be grateful if I could have a full appreciation for this double purpose by the end [of] this week. It will be valuable if public here can be progressively prepared for tone of Government statement and you will no doubt do what you can to see that messages of British and American correspondents in India strike a correspondingly cautious note and that Bajpai and Butler are given fullest guidance.

4. General impression which has been conveyed to and reflected by Press here is that disturbances though violent and fairly widespread have not produced really serious menace to internal security and you will doubtless agree

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that we want to avoid giving too sudden a jolt to public opinion or creating undue pessimism on our side or unnecessary satisfaction to the Axis.

Despatch in *Times* of 29th seems to me to have hit it off nicely.

5. Please inform Hallett.

[2] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'still' instead of 'much more'. [3] See No. 407.
[4] 7 September.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/5/41: f 41

INDIA OFFICE, *1 September 1942*

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 46/42

Prime Minister

You will have had Linlithgow's agitated telegram[1] provoked by the knowledge that Willkie is on his way eastwards, and that one Sherwood Eddy, "though sympathetic to our difficulties" according to Halifax, is hoping to give some help by way of mediation. You have so admirably said "Hands off" to the President and the Generalissimo, but I wonder how far it is possible for you to have it conveyed to people like Willkie and Eddy that at this moment they obviously cannot be allowed to see Congress leaders, who are detained, and that it is really very undesirable for them to discuss the question at all?

A typical result of what the prejudiced American can do is Louis Fischer's statement, to which Halifax refers in his 4367,[2] that Cripps had promised a National Government with the abolition of the Viceroy's veto and had gone back on this offer, a statement which he says is supported by letters between Cripps and the Congress leaders. Cripps did indeed at one moment seem to us here to be going a little far as regards composition of the Government, but he certainly never can have said anything which would have been in flat contradiction to the whole basis of the policy on which he was sent out, and indeed neither he nor those who were his secretaries admit for a moment that anything of the sort happened.

If there is to be an India Debate this next week it would of course be easy for Cripps to deal with the lie in the course of a winding-up speech. On the other hand, there may not be an India Debate, and if so it might be worth considering whether, consistently with the general framework of what you want to say about India, you could nail the lie to the counter yourself. That would indeed

[1] No. 662. [2] No. 658.

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be the most effective method, but it may involve too much of a digression on the back history of the Indian question, and it may then be sufficient for Cripps to clear it up in an interview.

L. S. AMERY

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Sir E. Bridges to Mr Turnbull

L/E/8/2527: f 345

SECRET *1 September 1942*

Dear Turnbull,

I have had a note from the Lord Privy Seal's Private Secretary, commenting on Minute 9 of last night's Cabinet Conclusions.[1]

The Lord Privy Seal would like to see the following sentence deleted:—

"The general feeling of the War Cabinet was that the Government of India might with advantage give early consideration to these questions,"

and the following substituted:—

"The War Cabinet:—

Invited the Secretary of State for India to communicate with the Government of India asking them to put forward their proposals in this respect."

Would you be good enough to let me know whether the Secretary of State for India sees any objection to the amendment proposed?

Yours sincerely,

E. E. BRIDGES

[1] No. 664.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *1 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of 8th/10th August[1] and for all the kind things you say in it. I think we have reason to be pretty well content at the way things have gone, and the situation reports which I have just been looking through this morning make it perfectly clear that the situation is settling down very rapidly. Even Bihar is a great deal better than it was. On the other hand, I would like again to sound a note of warning against any undue optimism. This business has gone very deep throughout the country, and a good many classes or types

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have been stirred up which will not too easily settle back to normal—the students, the hooligans, the violent elements in villages and out of the way parts of the country and the like, while there remains the possibility that we may have to face before too long a better organised underground campaign. I would expect, too, this daily crop of minor incidents in the disturbed areas to continue in greater or less degree for many weeks to come. Finally, if the Mahatma indulges in a fast, we shall certainly have another outburst. But, as I say, things have not gone by any means too badly.

[Para. 2, containing personal comments, omitted.]

3. Stewart's interesting reports give a very good impression of the type of thing that has been happening in Bihar. Incidentally, I am by no means satisfied with the Tata business. All these Parsees are rather inclined to play for safety, but I should have thought that there ought to have been much closer scrutiny in the past months of agitation, &c. in the works and a very much more decisive handling of the present situation. The ultimatum to the supervisory personnel expired yesterday, and the department have in view now the immediate arrest of all supervisory personnel who do not at once return to work, for "conduct prejudicial". The management seem in these last few days to have behaved with extreme weakness, Sir Ardeshir Dalal, I am told, having informed the supervisory staff that he would report to Delhi their demand that, as a condition of their return to work, either a national government should be formed at the Centre or that they should have specific instructions from Gandhi to resume duty! Can you imagine anything more absurd? I have given Mody a very broad hint that while Tatas are important from the point of view of the war effort of the United Nations, they are not in the least degree essential, and that if they continued to play the fool we may have to send our orders in other directions. I am glad to say that he shows signs of having taken that seriously.

4. I think we can be well satisfied with the general response of the services and in particular of the police. There have been weaklings here and there, and that after all is only to be expected when one is dealing with so large an area of country, and when individuals have, too, so heavy a strain to carry. I shall be telegraphing warmly supporting your suggestion[2] that you should say a kind word about the police (and indeed about all the services) in any debate that there may be, and suggesting also that we had better say nothing about any possible errors of judgment or the like on the part of the police. The only one that I can think of, or that we have heard of, has been that business at Multan, which was reported by the Punjab Government at the time,[3] when some boys who had

[1] No. 474. [2] See No. 644.

[3] Sir B. Glancy's telegram 46–G of 12 August to Lord Linlithgow (repeated to Mr Amery) included a report that 'in Multan unfortunate incident occurred. Some youths attacked a police lorry and police ducked some of them in a pond. Later transpired 3 had got out of depth and been drowned. Magisterial enquiry ordered.' L/P&J/8/605: f 208.

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been throwing stones at the police took refuge in a pond, got out of their depth and were drowned. It would be surprising if there were not some difficult cases here and there, but they have not so far come to notice, and in any event they must be judged, I think, against the general background. I shall therefore recommend you in my reply to your telegram to say nothing about this sort of thing, and to give the services, and particularly the police, the warmest commendation that you feel that you can.

5. Twynam mentioned not long ago[4] the desirability of some guarantee of protection against victimisation in the interest of securing the fullest support for our present activities against Congress from the various services. What he had in mind was a declaration that it would be the special concern of the Government of India and His Majesty's Government to see that adequate security was provided against victimisation. I have had some talk about this with my Advisers—one feels as much sympathy with the idea as you would yourself; but, as you will remember from the correspondence with the India Office on this subject in 1940,[5] arising out of the statement that the Government of India proposed to issue if a mass movement had then been started, the difficulties are quite substantial. I still accept the view then taken that we can give no guarantee against victimisation as such, and I realise the difficulty of the Secretary of State of the day or of His Majesty's Government committing themselves to an assurance which it might be impossible for them or their successors to implement. But I do not altogether exclude the possibility that the outcome of the present crisis might be such as to make it possible to suggest, by one means or other, that we shall not be doing business with the present Working Committee during the course of the war. We shall however have to wait and see how things work out.

6. Gandhi seems to be going on quite quietly, and there is no news from the Aga Khan's Palace. But the sensitiveness of some of my Hindu colleagues may be gauged from the fact that when I discussed the business of a fast the other day in Council, and made it clear that I contemplated the old man dying if he wanted to, one of them burst into tears at the table. We will have a good deal of trouble, I dare say, when the time comes, but we must stick to it. I am greatly encouraged to find from the Home Department that the Mahatma has had two pretty long periods in jail previously—one of two years and ten months, and another of 1 year 4 months.

7. I have kept you in touch with the constitutional discussions in my Council. I wound them up last night with a long statement.[6] I shall not have time to give you any detailed account of it this week, but I will send you a copy of what I said next week. Very briefly developments since last week have been as follows:—Firoz Khan Noon expressed himself as opposed to any change at

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the Centre failing agreement between the Government and the principal parties on the general political issue. In the Provinces, he favoured non-official Advisers. Benthall was against Indianisation, and gave good reasons; favoured non-official Advisers; but was inclined to think that the Secretary of State's control should be relaxed. Usman was wholly opposed to any change at the centre which he said would certainly antagonise the Muslim League; and in favour of a mixture of non-official and official Advisers in the Provinces. Ambedkar was a little difficult to follow, for he suggested that he was in favour of a change and so of Indianisation and of the elimination of the Secretary of State in certain circumstances, but made it clear that a preliminary must be a communal settlement at the Centre. On the whole I think he could be put down as a no-changer. Srivastava strongly in favour of building on the Mahasabha if the other parties would not come in: in favour of Indianisation, of eliminating the Secretary of State, and of Executive Councils in Provinces. Jogendra Singh, pretty woolly: in favour of executive councils; in favour of complete abolition of the Secretary of State and in that event of the opinion that European colleagues might still be welcome at the Council table.

8. My reply, to put it into a couple of sentences, warned Council that I could recognise no right on their part, whether by convention or otherwise to discuss or control matters in the discretionary field, though I was of course glad to hear their mind; that (for reasons which I gave) I could not support the Indianisation proposal; or hold out any hope of any early move in that direction; that I could hold out no prospect of any elimination of the Secretary of State's authority which I regarded it as quite essential to maintain unless and until the Government of India became responsible, not to Parliament but to an Indian Legislature; while as regards the Provinces, I refrained from committing myself beyond expressing sympathy with the idea of non-official Advisers and stating in detail the argument against Minority Ministries and Executive Councils. I made it clear that the decision on this latter point was not one which my Council was competent or entitled to take. While my doctrine was fairly stiff they took it better than I expected, with the exception of Mody who was clearly disappointed. We may have a little more trouble with them, but they strike me as too divided to make that very likely. I will give you a full account in my letter next week.

9. A word on the point which you mention in paragraphs 10 and 11 of your letter. I think that the Congress leaders are likely to be destined to a fairly long spell in jail, though I would not like to commit myself as to details. I have, of course, thought (and I know that possible Ministers in minority governments have thought a great deal more!) about the reaction on the constitution of a provincial legislature of the fact that so many Congress

[4] See No. 345, para. 1. [5] See L/S&G/132/40. [6] No. 666.

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M.L.As. or potential M.L.As. are in prison, but I doubt that being a really sound basis on which to plan!

10. I have already thanked you and the Prime Minister for your invaluable assistance over Chiang Kai-shek, and I think that Winston's latest message[7] to Seymour is exactly what is needed. I hope you and he may feel in a position to let Zafrullah see its first four paragraphs, and I am pretty certain that little Bajpai's feet, if they are at all cold, would be warmed a good deal by reading them! I promised the Generalissimo to follow up my original telegram[8] to him turning down his request that his messages should be passed on to Gandhi, &c., with a letter. That I have delayed sending, but one[9] has now gone off in appropriately conciliatory terms, and I send you copy of it by this bag.

11. I send you by this bag copy of a letter, dated the 27th August,[10] from Glancy, from which you will see that his Hindu and Sikh Ministers are most anxious that no declaration on the subject of Pakistan should be made by His Majesty's Government as the result of the recent resolution[11] of the Muslim League, and that both of them would anticipate trouble in the Punjab were any such declaration to be made. That contrasts in an interesting way with a suggestion by Lumley in a telegram to me on 27th August[12] that we may be well advised to make some move towards the Muslims lest they should feel that their recent resolution had passed unnoticed. My own instinct, I will confess, is to do nothing. The recent Muslim League resolution was useful as showing that the Muslim League did not accept the Gandhi view, but it was quite uncompromising so far as we are concerned, and is merely a further example of Jinnah's skill in consolidating his position. I see no reason myself for making any move in that direction, and equally I should be strongly opposed, as you would, to His Majesty's Government coming out any more in favour of Pakistan than was represented by the Cripps declaration. You and I know well how much there is to be said on either side, but I have no doubt in my own mind that the wise course for His Majesty's Government must be to try to remain in the middle of the road and to try to keep the scales evenly balanced between these conflicting interests. The Muslims naturally would be as anxious to get us to come out plump in favour of Pakistan as the Congress would be to get us to come out plump against it. The wise course is for us to do neither of these things and to let the parties try to reach accommodation between themselves.

12. I am sending by this bag a copy of a personal and secret letter, dated 28th August from Hartley, reporting the first "political incident" to occur in the Army, and giving his views and Wavell's as to the line to be taken in dealing with cases of this nature.[13] I have suggested that there might be something to be said for transferring a few of these gentlemen to the Western Desert;

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but subject to that I think that the line taken is the wise one. These Parsees are a nuisance, and I gather that they give a great deal of trouble. Their educational and social standing being high, but unfortunately a great deal higher than their military capacity, they are excessively touchy about serving save as commissioned officers, and extremely bitter whenever any question arises of disciplinary action being taken against them on grounds of inefficiency or the like.

[Para. 13, on delays in receiving plans for parachutes, and para. 14, on the complaint of a Bevin boy about his wages in India, omitted.]

15. I mentioned in my letter of the 11th August[14] the position about Mr. Horace Alexander, and the fact that he had written to me. I now send you by this bag a copy of the reply[15] which I have just had to the letter which, on my instructions, my Private Secretary sent him on the 11th August.[16] I think I had better leave it to you to comment upon! All I will say is that I am by no means satisfied with Alexander's interpretation of the word "overt", and I send you in that connection a quotation from the Press. It is difficult for me to do a great deal, since his despatch here was arranged at home, and I can only hope that

[7] See No. 637. [8] See No. 541, para. 2. [9] No. 622. [10] No. 640.
[11] No. 598. [12] L/P&J/8/591: f 70.
[13] The incident concerned a Parsee second lieutenant who had refused to undertake duties which involved taking an active part against Congress, and had requested permission to resign his commission. General Hartley's letter stated that he had discussed the two ways of dealing with the case with General Wavell which were: '(*a*) Court Martial him: when, if found guilty (as he would have been) the sentence would be "Cashiering" or "D[i]smissa[l]"; or (*b*) allow him to resign his commission.

'Both of us were against a Court Martial, which would almost certainly turn him into a "martyr" and raise all sorts of political questions; and we were both agreed that the only thing to do was to allow him to resign.' They proposed to deal with any similar cases in the same way. MSS. EUR. F. 125/124.

[14] No. 509, para. 23. In fact, Lord Linlithgow mentioned that Mr Alexander had written to him in No. 408.

[15] In this letter of 22 August Mr Alexander explained to Sir G. Laithwaite that he had earlier written to Mr Gandhi that he was unlikely to be able to visit him at all frequently, as his first duty was to the Friends' Ambulance Unit. However, he had happened to be in the neighbourhood of Wardha soon after the publication of the Working Committee's resolution of 14 July (No. 265), the last para. of which had dismayed him, and he had therefore visited Mr Gandhi. He had also visited Mr Nehru to find out 'how he reconciled a mass civil disobedience movement with his strong support for Russia and China'. On the other hand he had resisted strong pressure from 'several friends in Bombay' to go there for the All-India Congress Committee meeting; though just before the meeting he had written strong letters to Mr Gandhi and Mr Nehru explaining why, in his view, English opinion was so hostile to Congress, and pleading for delay. When he read that Mr Gandhi was going to ask the Viceroy for an interview, he had wired to Bombay asking if he might come and see him, but Mr Gandhi's arrest had prevented this. Mr Alexander could not see that any part of this record 'trespasses even one step outside the limits of the understanding with Mr Amery. No one of these acts was in any sense an overt act, as far as I can see, and all were undertaken with the sole purpose of finding some way by which the civil disobedience movement could be averted and the disputing parties brought together.' MSS. EUR. F. 125/137.

[16] Sir G. Laithwaite's letter conveyed to Mr Alexander the substance of No. 498. MSS. EUR. F. 125/137.

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you will be able to keep up your pressure on the headquarters organisation of the Friends. I am quite clear that it would be the greatest mistake to have people wandering about here playing at politics as they think fit under the cover of humanitarian activities. Nor can I feel (but that must be for you to say) that Alexander's suggestion that his "record" does not "trespass even one step outside the limits of the understanding with Mr. Amery" quite squares with the facts. I propose to inform him that I am sending you a copy of his letter and to say that I cannot at the moment agree that he is not engaging in political work, and to draw his attention to his statement to the Press.[17] This Mission has either got to be political or non-political. If Alexander wishes to be political in any way, he would be much better outside the country.

16. Your story about the hospitable lady and her Negro guests is first class and cheered me up on a day of very considerable gloom!

All the best: and I hope it may not be too long before I am in a position to correspond with my successor.

[17] On 3 September Sir G. Laithwaite wrote to Mr Alexander in the sense described by Lord Linlithgow, sending him a cutting from *The National Call*, Delhi, of 17 August, which the Viceroy 'cannot regard as being other than an overt interference in political matters' and enquiring whether his letter of 22 August could be taken as an assurance that he proposed to confine his activities only to the humanitarian work of the Friends' Ambulance Unit. MSS. EUR. F. 125/137.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *1 September 1942*

The question of powers of punishment for Indian officers came up yesterday, and, in spite of Grigg's mutterings of protest, the Prime Minister gave way with not too bad a grace. He had begun by suggesting an alternative, which was to give King's Commissions in special cases, but very soon saw that this would not in the least meet the case of officers temporarily in command owing to battle casualties or other causes. So, as usual, we are one step forward after very unnecessary delay, but I hope before any ill-feelings have been roused by particularly hard cases. I quoted George Washington as an instance of an experienced Colonial senior officer, mortally offended by being put below the youngest-joined subaltern from home, and so largely influenced in the personal decision which had so much to do with the eventual success of the American Revolution!

2. Before this, Winston began one of his usual curious monologues about India, treating the present trouble as completely disposed of and as evidence of

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the fact, which he has always insisted upon, that Congress really represents hardly anybody except lawyers, money-lenders and the "Hindu priesthood". From this he rambled on to the suggestion that it would really pay us to take up the cause of the poor peasant and confiscate the rich Congressman's lands and divide them up. Others chipped in, more particularly Bevin, with demands for social reform, the outcome of which is a Cabinet minute[1] drawing your attention to the matter. Being anxious to get on to the real business and afraid of prolonging the discussion interminably by pointing out how much of social reform was now a matter for the Provinces, I refrained from saying anything.

3. As a matter of fact, I am not sure that the time has not come in the Section 93 Provinces for a much bolder social policy. So long as we felt we were only very temporary caretakers, and more particularly after the overdose of social reform in some of these Provinces, it was only natural that we should mainly mark time. Now that it looks as if we may have to carry on without Congress for a good while to come and the provision in the Act is to be extended for another three years at least, it does become a question whether we should not avowedly embark on a more constructive social policy and make that one of the reasons for bringing in non-official advisers.

4. In that connection I was very interested to read Twynam's last letter[2] to you in which he comes out very definitely and strongly for non-official advisers on a limited scale and without displacement of the official advisers. Incidentally, I note that he also makes the point, which I think I have made more than once to you,[3] that it does not follow that the introduction of non-official advisers in one Province, where the right men are available, need necessarily mean their introduction elsewhere.

5. What, indeed, may be the scope for social reforms at this moment, either in the Section 93 Provinces or at the Centre, in so far as the matter comes within Central purview, I am naturally not in a position to say, but I imagine that the three words land, nutrition and education between them largely cover the field so far as the countryside is concerned. For the industrial worker I imagine the main consideration is a higher level of wage, and it may well be that the present dearness allowances may be on too low a scale. A particular aspect of the wage question in which the High Commissioner is keenly interesting himself is that of the pay of Lascars. The British seaman gets, I believe, £22 a month, and the Chinaman, by refusing to sail, has secured £18, while the lascar still only gets, I believe, as little as £5. That seems to me an indefensible ratio and Azizul Huque is taking the matter up with Bevin and Leathers to see whether pressure cannot be brought on the shipping companies to offer something substantially better. Linked up with this is also the question of Lascars'

[1] No. 664. [2] Letter 115-G.C.P. of 12 August. MSS. EUR. F. 125/63.
[3] See No. 597, postscript.

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accommodation at the ports. There are several quite good seamen's hostels, but apparently the companies encourage them to go to certain lodging houses, the condition of which is by all accounts appalling.

6. I can well sympathise with your appeal[4] to Winston to try and do something to protect you from peripatetic Americans. I have no doubt he will do what he can and we ought to be grateful to him for his very firm intervention with both Roosevelt[5] and Chiang Kai-shek.[6] But it is more difficult to prevent lesser fry reaching India and, when there, talking to whomever they meet, or giving interviews and writing articles. But I am sure you need not hesitate a moment in saying quite frankly that there can be no question of their having access to the Congress détenus, any more than stray Englishmen travelling in the United States would have similar access to political prisoners there.

7. In that connection I have just received a telegram from Smuts, of which I enclose a copy. His suggestion is at any rate more reasonable than most of those which are volunteered to us from outside. In effect it is that the parties should meet in conference to discuss the future while the existing Executive carries on as at present. The only objection to this most reasonable suggestion is that this was perfectly feasible under the Cripps proposals, and is feasible today if only the parties were willing to discuss practical problems in a constructive spirit. I see little prospect of their doing so in the near future, whether summoned together by yourself or not.

Smuts probably fails to realise how largely the intractability of the Indian position and the naughtiness of Congress spring from our military failures and widespread doubts about our beating the Japs. This won't come right till we win.

L.

Vr. could not do Chairman + his other work.

L.

8. I am not sure yet whether we are to have a debate on India next week or whether it may not be postponed till the House meets for good in October. I should have to make it clear, whenever the debate does come, that there can be no negotiation with Congress until the civil disobedience movement has been completely and definitely suppressed and recognised to have failed. What is more difficult is to go beyond that and answer the question whether the Congress leaders are then to be released unpunished after all the mischief they have caused, or to be treated as persons with whom one can negotiate, without their definitely regretting in public their mistake or at any rate abjuring all intention of creating further trouble of the same sort.

Let us hold for as long as that proves practicable. They are far better in than out. No one can do business with any of them while war lasts.

L.

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I do not see them doing that and, if not, find it difficult to think of any justification for releasing them for a very long time to come.

[Para. 9, on slow progress made in Eastern States in implementing the Bowstead Report; para. 10, on the Mundas' grievances in Gangpur State; and para. 11, on General Auchinleck's future, omitted.]

2 September

12. The last arrangement is that there is to be no debate on India when the House meets next week and that Winston himself is to make a statement. He has just sent over his first dictated draft, which is a very queer document, but I hope we may cocker it up into something reasonable before next Wednesday,[7] with the help of whatever you may send us.

13. Discussing the American invaders in Cabinet this morning[8] much sympathy was expressed for you, and a clear conviction that you must obviously refuse flatly to let anyone go and see the prisoners. On the other hand, Eden and others felt that it could only do good your finding time to talk to the better type of American and get our case across. Willkie is very well disposed and Winston adds especially amenable to the influence of good champagne. Eddy is the kind of person who might be greatly influenced by a talk with Ambedkar about the position of the Untouchables.

14. I do hope you are keeping fit in spite of everything.

Enclosure to No. 673

COPY OF MESSAGE FROM FIELD MARSHAL SMUTS

Thank you for your interesting letter of 10th August. Your position appears fairly strong, and while civil disobedience continues I see no alternative but to keep the leaders interned in India, but not to move them outside, which might cause new flare up. If, however, civil disobedience peters out, as appears likely, it would be impolitic to keep leaders interned without making another move towards settlement.

2. In that case it is worth consideration whether they and leaders of other sections should not be approached with the following proposal, viz., the Government to call a fresh conference of leaders of all sections in order to come to an agreement on the future government of India, either as a single entity or partitioned into Pakistan States on an agreed basis of co-operation or confederation for defined common purposes such as defence and foreign relations, such basis to be part of the future constitution. If agreement is secured

[4] No. 662. [5] See No. 532. [6] See No. 637.

[7] The House was to meet on Tuesday, 8 September. Mr Churchill made his statement on 10 September.

[8] See No. 676.

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at the Conference the British Government to undertake to put it in force as soon as peace is made. During the war the Government of India to continue on present lines of majority Indian representation on it. Such a proposal would remove uncertainty still existing as to when after the war India will receive free constitution, and also compel emergence of real issue, viz., non-agreement among Indians themselves as the only obstacle to the immediate grant of freedom after the war.

3. Reference to Dominion Status might usefully be avoided. I am afraid that it would be dangerous both from the point of view of general world opinion and that of internal Indian peace to sit tight after civil disobedience has finally collapsed. Some new move will be necessary at that stage, and it should be calculated to show quite clearly that disagreement among Indians themselves and nothing else bars the way to freedom at the end of the war.

4. This is for your personal consideration. All my best wishes.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *2 September 1942, 5.25 pm*
Received: 2 September, 8.15 pm

No. 2684–S. Your telegram of 30th August, No. 15278.[1] I am most grateful for your support and for your helpful comments. I share your hope that we shall be able to resist pressure for enquiry in ministerial provinces also. As regards a general enquiry I note your view and fully appreciate importance of considerations you mention. I will comment further in due course, but I think there is force in what you say against our taking any initiative in favour of enquiry.

2. As regards debate,[2] when these disturbances are further behind us we shall no doubt have to have a general pooling of experience in the course of which we shall learn more about the manner in which the police have acquitted themselves. But on our present knowledge I am sure that we could safely say of the police generally that they have shown staunchness which reflects greatest credit on the loyalty and morale of the force as a whole, and that in most difficult circumstances. We have heard very little so far about any[3] local collapses among them, although such incidents have no doubt occurred. The Multan incident, referred to in Glancy's telegram No. 46–G[4] of 12th August repeated to you, is so far as I am aware the only known case in which zeal has outrun discretion. Maxwell, with whom I entirely agree, comments that one of

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the principal reasons why the police have stood up to this movement so well is the feeling that they will be backed up wherever they have found it necessary or advisable to meet force with force, and even if incidents should come to notice in which the force used might be held to have been more than strictly required I would see no reason for being apologetic on that account. When organised mob violence is widespread and attacks on the police are common the perpetrators cannot expect to be handled gently and must take what they get, and the situation which the police has had to hold has been one of the utmost gravity. I think therefore that it would be best to say nothing whatever in your speech about any "unfortunate" incidents and that your praise of the police should be without any qualification and in the warmest terms.

3. I would suggest that that commendation should not be confined to the police, although they have of course had to bear the brunt of the movement, but that it should also extend to all ranks of Government servants. There may be areas, e.g. Bihar, where subordinate officers have not come out well, but there are other cases in which Government servants have done their duty at the cost of their lives, and the subordinate ranks also have continued to function very generally notwithstanding the strong pressure brought to bear on them to resign.

4. As regards the public other than Government servants, two points are worth considering: (*a*) increasing signs of reaction of public opinion against the violent side of this movement. I may be able to be more specific on that by the date of any debate; (*b*) the extent to which, apart from the hooligans, Hindu students (Muslim students as you will have seen from my telegram of 23rd August, No. 2567–S,[5] have stood almost entirely aloof) and other persons specially enlisted by the Congress, the public at large and especially the rural population have broadly speaking stayed aloof from the disturbances. This may not be entirely true of Bihar and Madras, but elsewhere despite the wide range of incidents reported I think we can say that there has been no spontaneous participation in this movement on the part of the bulk of the non-politically-minded population.

5. I have emphasised certain favourable features above. But you will I am sure agree with me as to the extreme importance of avoiding any over-sanguine utterances, for I shall be surprised if we shall be out of this wood for some time yet.

[1] No. 659. [2] See No. 644. [3] 'any' deciphered as 'significance of'.
[4] See No. 672, para. 4. [5] No. 613.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *2 September 1942, 8.15 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 2 September, 8.50 pm*

No. 2689–S. Following is my personal appreciation midday, September 2nd. Nothing from Sind, Punjab (who propose now to discontinue daily reports) or of any importance from North-West Frontier Province. Madras: incidents in three districts in mofussil but not of great importance. No signs of disturbance in Madras City. Bombay: all going well. Bengal: Calcutta quiet yesterday. Some activity by students continues in districts. Situation has deteriorated in Dacca City. Continued interruption of telegraphic communications. United Provinces: Governor is personally touring eastern districts and reports that conditions are rapidly returning to normal. All officers seem in good heart. He has still to visit more seriously affected districts of Ghazipur and Ballia where however conditions are reported very greatly improved. Central Provinces: things going well though much interference with telegraph and telephone communications around Nagpur. Bihar: Jamshedpur strike continues. Rest of Chota Nagpur appears quiet except for minor incidents in one district. Progress being made on restoration of order in Purnea and Monghyr districts north of Ganges. In Bhagalpur district portion north of Bengal and North-Western Railway cut off from the rest and believed to be under mob rule. Burning of some police stations, bungalows and liquor shops reported from various parts of Deoghar in Santal Parganas. Assam: some deterioration but situation appears to be in hand.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 120th Conclusions, Minute 2

L/PO/5/41: f 48

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 2 September 1942 at 12 noon were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Ernest Bevin

Also present were: Mr Amery, Viscount Cranborne, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Mr James Stuart

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INDIA

Visits of Influential Americans

Reference was made to a personal telegram[1] from the Viceroy regarding the forthcoming visits to India of Mr. Willkie and of one or two influential American journalists.

The Secretary of State for India was invited to send a telegram to the Viceroy, pointing out to him the importance, not merely of affording reasonable facilities to such visitors, but of taking every opportunity of enabling them to obtain a better understanding of the position. If this was done, it might have an important effect on public opinion in America.

[1] No. 662.

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Mr Turnbull to Sir E. Bridges

L/E/8/2527: f 344

SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *2 September 1942*

Dear Bridges,

In reply to your letter of the 1st September[1] about the Lord Privy Seal's suggested amendment to Minute 9 of the Cabinet Conclusions of 31st August,[2] I write to say that in view of the fact that the question of social and industrial policy is very largely within the Provincial field—to be accurate in the "concurrent legislative" field—Mr. Amery would prefer the following version to the Lord Privy Seal's:

"The War Cabinet invited the Secretary of State for India to draw the Governor-General's attention to the general feeling of the War Cabinet that the Governments in India might with advantage give early consideration to these questions."

Yours sincerely,

F. F. TURNBULL

[1] No. 671. [2] No. 664.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps[1]

L/E/8/2527: ff 339–41

INDIA

2 September 1942

1. On the assumption, which is the only safe one to make, that the war will continue for at least another two years it is necessary that we should now decide upon some policy to be followed as regards the immediate future in India.

2. The ultimate post-war policy has been laid down, that full dominion status will be granted to India, including the inherent right of self-determination. Some form of constituent assembly will be required to formulate the new constitution but the determination of this must now be left until after the war.

3. The sole question is therefore how can we make India most useful or least embarrassing to the United Nations for the rest of the war.

4. Our aim must be to get the maximum support for the war effort, military and industrial, from the greatest possible number of Indians.

5. Although there are wide and bitter differences between the various communities they are all agreed upon the demand for some form of self-government. It is necessary that we should estimate at its full value this nationalist outlook amongst all classes and communities.

6. From the governmental point of view India is divided into two sections—British India (260,000,000) and the Indian States (90,000,000). The people in the States are however divided communally as in British India and are not as a whole supporters of the present autocratic methods of rule in those States.

7. The existing political parties, Congress, Hindu Mahasabha, Muslim League, etc. are all representative of large sections of opinion, but none of them represent exclusively their communities.

Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha if they work together can influence a large part of the Hindu population. The Muslim League, upon any issue which raises the religious question, can influence a great part of the Muslim population.

There is no All-India Depressed Classes organisation, though Ambedkar as an individual has a very considerable following of the depressed classes throughout India.

The Sikhs are divided into at least two main sections and there are within the main communities many cross currents, racial and class in their nature, e.g. Momins amongst Muslims or Maharattas amongst Hindus.

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8. There are two possible approaches to the problem of getting support from the maximum number possible of the Indian people.

9. The first is to adopt the attitude that we have hitherto adopted, which is to say that we cannot do anything unless we can get agreement from all the representative Indian communities. This has been tried, as for example during my visit to India, and has failed. I do not see any better chance of getting that agreement now than hitherto.

10. We made the supreme effort to get such agreement with the offer which I took to India and we failed. I do not see that there is anything further that we can now do along these lines.

11. The second is to attempt to rally to the active support of the United Nations all sections of Indian opinion which are prepared, on conditions, to co-operate.

12. These sections might be defined upon the communal basis, e.g. Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, etc. or upon a class basis, e.g. landlords, industrialists, workers, peasants, etc.

13. Any attempt to make the approach upon a communal basis will lead to very great difficulties. The Muslims will insist upon the acceptance of their Pakistan policies, the Sikhs will insist upon a separate Sikh province, the Mahasabha will insist upon a Hindu majority, etc. and we shall, even if we can get agreement of all sections other than Congress, get ourselves tied up in an inextricable maze of concessions which will make the post-war situation quite impossibly chaotic.

In addition we shall not really be getting the goodwill of the mass of the people, as any arrangement will result in no substantial change or improvement so far as they are concerned.

14. The alternative is to disregard the communal side as the main basis of approach and to concentrate upon an immediate policy of putting right some of the most deep-seated wrongs which affect the mass of the people.

15. The conditions of the Indian workers, who are today responsible for the output of munitions, etc. in India and of the Ryots is certainly appallingly bad compared to those of other countries. The main obstructions to improvement of their lot are the Indian millowners, landlords and money lenders, many of whom are the financial backers of Congress. They are not as a rule actual members of Congress but they in fact give Congress its financial backing.

[1] Enclosed in a letter of 2 September from Mr Russell to Mr Turnbull informing him that a copy had also been sent to Mr Churchill's private secretary with a covering letter (copy also enclosed) suggesting that Mr Churchill might like to discuss the note with Mr Amery and Sir Stafford Cripps.

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16. If the British Government could enlist the sympathy of the workers and peasants by immediate action on their behalf, the struggle in India would no longer be between Indian and British upon the nationalist basis, but between the classes in India upon an economic basis. There would thus be a good opportunity to rally the mass of Indian Opinion to our side.

17. It is most important that the Indian workers and peasants should realise that it is a British initiative which is working for them against their Indian oppressors; this will entail a proper publicity service in India.

18. In addition to this positive programme of improved conditions for the worker and peasant an attempt should be made to make the Viceroy's executive more representative of the wider class interests of India. It should be possible to arrange for a personnel which represents, to some extent, those communal sections which are prepared to co-operate and also the different class interests. If the two cannot be combined, then in view of the policy to be carried through the class constitution should prevail.

19. Some action will be required as to the Indian States to co-ordinate our policy as regards these with our policy as to British India. This can only be done by persuasion, which can however be very powerful in the case of the States. There are a number of more progressive State rulers such as the Maharajas of Indore and Gwalior who should be encouraged in every way to improve the conditions of their subjects and to grant them a greater measure of democracy. A general pressure should be applied to all States to carry through reforms similar to those in British India.

20. This programme and intention could be announced with an appeal to all Indians who wish to help to come forward—whatever their parties, religion or race. It could be matched with the intensification of combined action for the Defence of India, and it would I am sure have a wide international appeal in just those countries where we may have difficulty with public opinion if we do nothing.

21. The exact details of such a policy need not at the moment be declared but it would be quite easy to work out a short list of measures which would mean much to the Indian workers and peasants and which would give a quick return in the alleviation of their lot. Some of these matters would need provincial legislation, others would need legislation at the centre. In the provinces where there are legislatures it should not be difficult to get the necessary legislation passed.

22. The financial position in India is such at the present time that a very considerable amount of social legislation can be carried through, quite apart from the untapped resources of the rich Indians.

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23. I suggest that arrangements should be made for an announcement in this sense in the House of Commons when it meets in October, when there must be a debate on the Indian situation and the Government will have to say something as to how it regards the future.

R. S. C.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 394

R/30/1/2: f 5

INDIA

TREATMENT OF MR GANDHI

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *3 September 1942*

With reference to W.M. (42) 113th Conclusions, Minute 8,[1] regarding the action to be taken in the event of Mr Gandhi starting a fast unto death, I circulate copies of my telegram to the Viceroy of the 19th August[2] and his reply dated the 29th August.[3] I also append copies of the Defence of India Rules to which he refers.

The Viceroy's new scheme (set out in paragraph 4 of his telegram of the 29th August) is, of course, a departure from the policy which he has hitherto contemplated, but, as it appears to be designed to carry his Council with him along a line approximating to that recommended from here, we must clearly give it careful consideration. Its merits seem to turn largely on the extent to which Devadas Gandhi may be willing to take up the rôle assigned to him, and on the extent to which it will be possible for him or for the authorities to ensure enforcement of such undertakings as he feels able to give.

L. S. A.

[1] No. 575. [2] No. 588. [3] No. 652.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *3 September 1942, 8.20 pm*

PERSONAL *Received: 3 September, 6.30 pm*

No. 2699–S. Situation Report. Following is my personal appreciation of situation, midday 3rd September. Things continue to go pretty well.

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Bihar.—Jamshedpur strike settled and all staff, supervisory and other, back at work today. No further incidents reported from any district, but reports are incomplete. General situation unchanged. Signs of a no-rent movement developing against landlords.

Assam.—Disturbances continue but they do not appear to be very serious.

Bengal.—Calcutta normal yesterday, except for minor cases of damage to tram-cars. Situation in districts serious only at Birbhum, where yesterday Munsiff's Court and Post Office at Dubrajpur were looted. Some activity by students in districts and cutting of telegraph lines, &c.

Bombay.—Province generally quiet.

Madras.—Only a few incidents reported yesterday in mofussil. Nothing of importance in the city.

C.P.—All apparently quiet. Local Government are taking steps to bring home their responsibilities for preventing sabotage to village officials and villagers.

N.-W.F.P.—Nothing of any importance, though students' *hartal* at Mardan.

U.P.—Apparently quiet.

Nothing to report from the Punjab and Sind. No further report from Orissa.

In Indian States lightning strike at Indore, in disturbances following on which police had to fire.

Repeated to Washington, Chungking and Kuibyshev.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *3 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2700-S. Your private and personal telegram of 30th August No. 1061[1] raises some extremely difficult questions. We may have to think over certain aspects of this problem further, but for the moment my views are as follows. I should welcome any comment.

2. I would premise that, though I normally make a weekly oral statement to my Council on the Foreign Affairs position, they do not see Foreign Affairs telegrams, nor are they brought in on the detail of the handling of the External Affairs position. Nor do they see telegrams passing between me and *Governors* on law and order, or similar matters, though they may get the substance of those telegrams at times such as the present in the form of a Home Department boil down. Nor do they see any telegrams addressed by me to you as Governor-

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General or Viceroy, whether official, personal or private and personal. We must be careful to protect this position, though equally I attach the greatest importance, for obvious reasons, to avoiding giving or exciting any offence. I would expect Mudaliar in particular to be very much on the watch to see that he is treated no worse than any Dominion representative. A further complication in the general make-up is that, while the Jam Salieb is one of the representatives of India, the States have not hitherto come in in any way on internal Indian business, but I do not see how we could distinguish between him and Mudaliar for this purpose, since, though Mudaliar is of course a Member of my Council, they are both representatives of India as a whole.

3. Subject to the above, my comments are as follows:—

Your paragraph 1.—I entirely agree, and I think that the more they can be given matter of this type the better.

4. *Your paragraph 2.*—I have explained position as regards my Council above. I agree with you that it would on the whole be better that our representatives should *not* be brought in on these matters. If they do come in, Mudaliar will return soaked in this stuff and will insist on keeping his hand in here. In the constitutional discussions I have just been having with my Council, some of them suggested the transfer to an Indian of the External Affairs portfolio. That change would not be expedient at this stage, and I made it clear that I could hold out no hope of any early move in that direction. But clearly such a demand would receive considerable stimulus with Mudaliar's familiarity with the subject, if he is shown papers in London. But I think that a more limited distribution of Foreign Office telegrams might keep them both quiet. At the moment all Members of my Council see the weekly Foreign Affairs printed summary issued by the Foreign Office, and it would be quite consistent with their getting the general appreciation contained in that summary were our representatives in London to see the ordinary type of Foreign Office telegram which forms its background.

5. *Your paragraph 3.*—What we must be careful here to ensure is that recommendations made by me and my government are not modified because of representations made in Cabinet by Mudaliar or the Jam Saheb. Moreover, here and elsewhere, fact that both our representatives are Hindus may give rise to difficulties with Muslims if there is the least suspicion of their coming in on law and order, or constitutional questions, in modification of proposals made from here. Finally, we have to bear in mind that there will be communication between Mudaliar and his colleagues out here, and we must be at particular pains to see that no wedge is driven between me and my Council, or between you and me acting together and my Council. I could not agree to

[1] No. 660.

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the representatives seeing my comments on possible reactions of my colleagues or their individual attitude, and it will be extremely difficult for me to introduce yet a new category of telegram, or to mark in some distinguishing way telegrams to which I see no objection to the Indian representatives seeing. I see nothing for it but in future to mark all telegrams, which I do not want them to see "Personal", and to extend that category very substantially to cover most of my political comments. I recognize that we may have to face some awkwardness, but you will appreciate difficulty of the position. On the other hand, subject to what I have said above, I agree that there would be advantage in taking them in on certain law and order discussions, and difficulties of communicating correspondence might be met by circulation of a summarised or a bowdlerized version. Other possibilities worth consideration in this connection are:—

(*a*) That you should let me know by telegram when certain issues are likely to come up, and that we should discuss between us what could be communicated.

(*b*) That policy adopted in the case of Raisman, under which Cabinet could take advice of Indian spokesmen, but at which latter should not necessarily be a party to the decision which could be taken separately, should be employed. You are better able to judge than I am whether that would be consistent with the position of these people as representatives of India at the War Cabinet, and whether it would be on all fours with line taken with Dominion representatives.

6. I agree that they ought not to be brought in on constitutional stuff.

7. *Your paragraph 4.*—India Office have always impressed on me that distribution of telegrams in question so far as they are Superintendent telegrams must be most strictly limited, and that they must be deciphered under special arrangements, &c. At the moment they are seen only by me, the C.-in-C., the A.O.C.-in-Chief, and Governor of Burma. They are never seen by my colleagues, or even by my Foreign Department. It must be for H.M.G. to decide whether they wish to extend that distribution, but if they do, they must recognise that these telegrams, which contain important statistics, will have to come in future to all Members of my Council if they come to any, and that I cannot in that event be responsible for their security. Am I not right in thinking that these telegrams are for the information of Dominion Prime Ministers? If so, I should have thought that you could explain that I receive them for my own personal information, but that, while actually in London and at the Cabinet, special arrangements will be made for the Indian representatives to see them.

8. The P.S.V.–Kabul information telegrams are less confidential and are of course seen by my Foreign Department[2] here though not by my Council. If

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these would content Mudaliar and the Jam Saheb, I would not anticipate embarrassment being caused to H.M.G. even were we as a result to have to consider their distribution to my Council.

9. Above is less clear than I could wish, but you will appreciate delicacy of this matter and potential importance of reactions of our decisions.

[2] Deciphered as 'Secretary'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 97

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *3 September 1942, 7.10 am*

1075. Your p[rivate and] p[ersonal] tel[egram] 2646-S,[1] Aug. 29. P.M's message to Chiang. P.M. concurs and Seymour and Halifax are being instructed accordingly.

[1] No. 651.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: f 182

MOST IMMEDIATE[1] *3 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 4 September*

1079. My official telegram 15392,[2] dated 28th August. It has now been decided that as India will not be in order in the debate next week Prime Minister should make statement in reply to Private Notice Question on Wednesday. Would you let me have by Sunday night[3] at latest short and balanced summary of history of disturbances and of present position. I am anxious to avoid over-optimism as in consequence of measures taken to check excessive alarmism press has recently been almost silent and public probably is ignorant of seriousness of what has passed and still more of what may still be ahead of us. Also I see difficulty in avoiding reference to Jamshedpur strike and unless you feel it essential to maintain complete silence about it would be glad of guidance as to how much to reveal. You will have seen from Bajpai's message in Washington

[1] Priority mark taken from MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

[2] No. 669; the date should be 1 September. [3] 6 September.

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telegram 215[4] of 26th August that Chinese know of it and may be relied upon to leak.

2. Prime Minister proposes to include in his reply some general matter justifying our policy and factual part of reply must therefore be kept as brief as possible.

3. Your 2684–S[5] of 2nd September received while this was being drafted will be helpful for purposes of Prime Minister's statement in respect of the ground that it covers, but I should still be most grateful for objective account of scope indicated above.

[4] L/P&S/12/2315: f 277. [5] No. 674.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/PO/5/41: f 39

SECRET WASHINGTON, *3 September 1942, 10.41 pm*
Received: 4 September, 4.50 am

No. 4450. My telegram No. 4282.[1]

Indian Agent-General having been informed a few days ago by a member of State Department that Willkie might perhaps visit India on his way to or from China, I thought it advisable in view of correspondence exchanged on this subject between you and Secretary of State for India during my recent visit to London to speak to Welles on the matter yesterday. Welles told me that Willkie was definitely not going to India. He would go to Chungking via Russia and would visit Turkey.[2]

2. As regards India, Welles commented that the President saw the same objections to Willkie going there as we did (see your letter to Secretary of State for India of August 14th).[3]

[1] Not printed.
[2] Mr Amery passed this news on to Lord Linlithgow in telegram 1089 of 5 September. L/PO/446: f 45.
[3] No. 551.

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Mr Amery to Sir Stafford Cripps

L/P&J/13/998: f 381

3 September 1942

My dear Cripps,
I send you an advance copy of a Cabinet Paper[1] about the Princes' grievances which I am circulating for information and guidance rather than for consideration and approval.

I think you will find that it gives nothing away that matters, while preserving an air of sweet reasonableness; and I hope that you will agree that there is no need for a discussion of it in Cabinet. I feel myself that, considering the trouble you took to see the Princes and talk things over with them—and considering the assurances you gave them—they have shown themselves unnecessarily touchy.

Yours ever,
[L. S. AMERY]

[1] No. 691.

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Mr Turnbull to Sir A. Hardinge

L/P&J/8/560: f 61

INDIA OFFICE, *3 September 1942*

Dear Hardinge,
This is to let you know that the Indian Representatives at the War Cabinet, His Highness the Maharaja Jam Sahib of Nawanagar, the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, and Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, a Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council, are arriving in this country probably on Sunday or within a day or two thereafter.

The status of these Indian representatives is to be the same as that of the Dominion Representatives attending at the War Cabinet, i.e. they are invited to attend general discussions on policy relating to the war. Mr. Amery thinks that you should be aware that, while it may be found suitable to invite them to specific discussions relating to Indian matters which come up before the Cabinet, they are not invited here for this purpose and should not be encouraged in any way to suppose that they have a right to attend meetings on such matters.

Yours sincerely,
F. F. T.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 523

IMMEDIATE SIMLA, *4 September 1942, 6.35 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 4 September, 3.45 pm*

329–S.C. Your personal telegram of August 31st No. 15339.[1] What I have in view is the taking of a bond from persons admitted that they will make no public statement. It will probably be difficult to ensure 100 per cent compliance, but I have every intention of making the effort.

[1] No. 663.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL SIMLA, *4 September 1942, 9.5 pm*
Received: 5 September 12.45 pm

No. 330–S.C. Your private and personal telegram of 3rd September No. 1075.[1] Chiang Kai-shek. I am most grateful.

[1] No. 682.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

PERSONAL *4 September 1942*

No. 332–S.C. Following is my personal appreciation midday 4th September. Nothing of great significance.

Madras.—City quiet, minor incidents in Mofussil. Governor, as things have very much quietened down, now proposes to abandon daily reports and telegraph only if there is important recrudescence of serious trouble or important special incident.

Bihar.—Work resumed yesterday at Tata's as already reported but we are still refraining from publicity. Communications with Raxaul and so Nepal by rail reasonably well established, though liable to interruption. Stories of parallel

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government in north Bihar but Governor has no reason to believe that these are more than formal in character or that it will not disappear as soon as control is extended to affected areas.

Bombay.—Minor incidents only.

North-West Frontier Province.—Picketing of schools by students in Bannu district yesterday reported successful elsewhere unsuccessful. No other incidents.

Bengal.—Calcutta normal yesterday. In districts some strikes and demonstrations by students continue.

Assam.—Interference with communications and intimidation continue in Kamrup. Nowgong quiet. Intimidation of the Government servants continues in rural areas. Instructions of Bengal Provincial Congress Committee for paralysis of Government to be completed between 9th and 15th September being discussed in Sylhet district (where of course Bengali influence is very strong). Governor remarks that main problem after suppression of attacks on communications is likely to be maintenance of morale of subordinates. Sporadic trouble in eastern states at Dhenkanal and Bamra.

Central Provinces.—Minor interferences with communications continues. Small processions of mill hands and Congress sympathisers continue in Nagpur. Depressed Classes and Muslim workmen have kept aloof from these demonstrations.

United Provinces.—Governor reports from Ghazipur and Ballia conditions normal. He emphasises scientific character of attack on railways and technical knowledge shown in mischief to roads in these districts.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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Sir A. Hardinge to Mr Turnbull

L/P&J/8/560: f 60

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, *4 September 1942*

Dear Turnbull,

Thank you for your letter of yesterday[1] about the impending arrival of the Jam Sahib and Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, who are to attend the War Cabinet on the same basis as the Dominion Representatives. I will make it clear to His Majesty that they are not invited here for the express purpose of discussing Indian affairs, though they may be asked to attend on special occasions when Indian matters are under consideration.

[1] No. 686.

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The King will certainly wish to see them soon after the middle of this month; and I will communicate with you later as regards the actual date.

Yours sincerely,

A. H. L. HARDINGE

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 391

L/P&S/13/998: ff 382–8

INDIA

INDIAN STATES: REQUEST BY CHAMBER OF PRINCES FOR STATEMENT OF POLICY BY HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *4 September 1942*

THE Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes (the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar) is very shortly arriving in this country and will almost certainly ventilate this matter while he is here. It is very desirable to be in a position, whenever he refers to the matter (which he may take an early opportunity of doing), to say that the Crown Representative is already composing his reply on lines which can be indicated broadly to him as set out in this paper. Unless, therefore, any of my colleagues wish the matter to be discussed in Cabinet, I propose to despatch the draft telegram (Annexure E) to the Crown Representative not later than the 8th September.

2. The Chancellor, in his letter of the 1st June to the Viceroy's Political Adviser (Annexure B), complains:—

(I) of the failure of the Draft Declaration of March 1942 to include an assurance that the British Government stands by its treaty obligations to the States, and of the apparent intention to impose a revision of these treaties on the Rulers;

(II) of the Lord Privy Seal's remarks in the House of Commons on the 28th April (*Hansard*, Cols. 834 and 835), which the Chancellor interprets as meaning that the Paramount Power intends to impose democratic institutions on the States;

(III) of various smaller grievances in connection with the "Cripps Negotiations," which, on the whole, need not concern the War Cabinet (except for the complaint that, by joining an Indian Union, they might involve themselves in secession from the Empire);

(IV) of the absence of recognition of the right of non-adhering States—like non-adhering Provinces—to form a separate Union of their own.

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3. In the view of the Viceroy and his advisers the Princes feel genuinely that their interests were insufficiently considered both in the Draft Declaration and in the discussions arising from it. The Viceroy accordingly suggests (Annexure A) that a considered reply, "the nature of which can only be determined by His Majesty's Government," should be sent. I have accordingly agreed with the Viceroy (Annexures C and D) on the following line of reply:—

I. The absence from the Draft Declaration of a special reference to the States' treaty rights is of no significance; the Prime Minister's statement of the 11th March made quite clear that the fulfilment of treaty obligations to the States remains an integral part of His Majesty's Government's policy. Moreover, these treaties will only be altered by *negotiation* and agreement;

II. The Lord Privy Seal said that the House would wish the British administration in India "to do all it can to encourage and expedite the development of suitable representative institutions in all Indian States." This does not necessarily mean the *imposition of democracy* (which in any case might be quite unsuitable). It means that the Paramount Power will continue, as at present, to urge upon Rulers the establishment of institutions for representing the views and grievances of their subjects with a view to their being remedied (viz. *administrative* reforms)—*constitutional* changes (which might involve restriction on the Ruler's powers) may or may not be a sequel, but that is for the Rulers themselves to decide; no pressure to introduce such changes will be applied by the Paramount Power on the Ruler, as it is in the case of administrative reform. (This conforms with what has been said here in Parliament as recently as 1938[1] and with the Viceroy's own pronouncements on the subject in India. The argument, though somewhat sophistical, is at any rate consistent with our declared policy in a matter on which the Princes are very sensitive.)

III. Replies on the minor points need not concern us (the secession point is covered under IV);

IV. Between now and the next Indian constitutional discussions the Princes may certainly consider the outline of a scheme for a separate Union, if they wish. They might also consider what terms they might wish to demand of an Indian Union before they join it, e.g. the right to secede from the Union if the Union secedes from the Empire. Consideration of these points could certainly not be excluded from future discussions.

(In actual fact, the Viceroy hopes—and proposes that we suggest privately to the Princes—that the idea of a separate States Union might be used by them merely as a bargaining counter to secure better terms for accession to an Indian Union, and not as a serious objective. This seems sound.)

[1] See No. 187, notes 3 and 4.

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5.[2] The question arises whether a reply on these lines should be published. The Viceroy assumes it will; my view is that it should not, since it is in effect an explanation of why we consider that there should be *no* new declaration of policy towards the States at this stage. If the reply does not have the effect of satisfying the Princes, and if the Jam Saheb presses the matter strongly, it might conceivably be necessary to make some statement in Parliament, but I am anxious to avoid it since there is little we can say and it might make matters worse for them by stimulating criticism in other quarters.

6. Finally, the Viceroy and I remain agreed that we should press on as vigorously as possible with measures (such as internal organisation, pooling of judicial and police services between co-operative groups of States, absorption where possible of the administration of smaller by that of larger States, &c.) towards making the lesser States more fit for survival in the modern world. The Viceroy hankers a little after a public pronouncement reaffirming the Crown's existing obligations to protect the States, linked with a warning that we interpret this only to mean protection of such States as are fit to survive. I am against any more pronouncements, and particularly against a qualification of the treaty obligations. It is because internal reforms are in the States' own interests that I think we should continue to urge the Rulers to adopt them.

7. The course of action I propose to authorise is therefore:—

(*a*) the issue in India, on behalf of the Viceroy to the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, of a reply on the lines laid down in paragraph 4, indicating no change in our policy towards the States.

(*b*) this reply to be expressly limited to confidential circulation among the Princes (hints of its contents may no doubt leak out in due course, but it will not be in any sense a formal declaration).

(*c*) the avoidance of any new formal declaration about the sanctity of the Princes' treaties at this stage, even though it is possible that we might have to make some reference to the subject in an Indian debate (even this however I should prefer to avoid).

(*d*) the continuance and intensification, so far as this can be done without alienating the more important Rulers, of our present policy of bringing the States into line with modern administrative standards.

L. S. A.

Annexure A to No. 691

LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE CROWN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INDIA OFFICE DATED JUNE 25, 1942, NO. D. 494-P. (C)/42

[*There follows the text of No. 187.*]

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Annexure B to No. 691

LETTER FROM H.H. THE MAHARAJA JAM SAHEB OF NAWANAGAR TO SIR HENRY CRAIK, POLITICAL ADVISER TO THE CROWN REPRESENTATIVE

[*There follows the text of No. 115.*]

Annexure C to No. 691

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO CROWN REPRESENTATIVE, DATED AUGUST 16, 1942

[*There follows the text of No. 561.*]

Annexure D to No. 691

TELEGRAM FROM CROWN REPRESENTATIVE TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, DATED AUGUST 25, 1942

[*There follows the text of No. 629.*]

Annexure E to No. 691

DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO CROWN REPRESENTATIVE

MANY thanks for your telegram of 25th August, 2591–P.[3] His Majesty's Government agree with conclusions in paragraphs 4 to 10, subject only to following reservations, and letter on these lines may issue forthwith.

2. Paragraph 5, last sentence. They notice that Jam Saheb's letter was marked "Secret" and assume reply will also be so marked. They quite appreciate it will receive wide circulation, but consider this should be on confidential basis and that it should be made clear that publication is not intended. Indeed, object of letter would be (*a*) to remove as far [as] possible genuine apprehensions felt by Princes, particularly those mentioned in I (*i*) of Jam Saheb's letter, (*b*) to show that His Majesty's Government do *not* recognise any need for public statement at this stage either to reaffirm treaty rights, or to gloss Sir S. Cripps' remarks on reforms, or in regard to separate States Union. As I said in paragraph 9 of my telegram of 15th August,[4] there might be opportunity in October for reference to subject in parliamentary debate if reactions to present reply rendered that imperative. But His Majesty's Government see great danger of anything they may be able to say (*a*) not satisfying Princes, (*b*) stimulating criticism in other quarters and embarrassing discussion as to real meaning of our pledges. I propose to take this line if necessary with Jam Saheb.

[2] The paras. are numbered as in the original.

[3] No. 629. [4] No. 561.

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3. Your paragraph 10. I am very glad that you accept the view expressed in paragraph 7 of my telegram 14395[5] as to taking opportunity to stress necessity for improved methods of States' administration in Rulers' own best interests. But rather than that, as suggested in last sentence, your advice to them on this matter should be linked to a pronouncement regarding sanctity of treaties (for such conjunction might be open to interpretation that treaty position was being qualified by new condition), would it not be better to take the line that the Crown Representative to whom the Princes look for support must expect from them in their own best interests a conformity with world opinion in regard to administrative standards as it has developed since relations with them were originally established and as exemplified in the administration of British India?

[5] No. 561.

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Sir C. Gidney to Sir K. Fitze

L/P&S/13/998: ff 355–6

CONFIDENTIAL THE RESIDENCY, HYDERABAD, *4 September 1942*

D.O. No. 2419–C

My dear Fitze,

I enclose a copy of a letter No. 1763 dated the 15th August 1942 containing a representation from His Exalted Highness' Government regarding a statement attributed to Sir Stafford Cripps in a speech he delivered in the House of Commons on the 28th April 1942, which was reported under the caption "Sir Stafford Cripps on his mission to India" in the *Times of India* of the 30th April 1942. I shall be glad if I can kindly be informed in due course of the reply that should be given to the State.

2. The quotation from His Excellency the Viceroy's speech which appears in the State's letter is mentioned on page 16 of the Proceedings of the meeting of the Chamber of Princes held in March 1939,[1] a copy of which was sent to me with your memorandum No. F. 6(14)–I.A./39 dated the 20th November 1939. The later quotation made in the State's letter will be found on page 3 of the "Statement of Constitutional and Administrative Reforms introduced in Indian States since 1st January 1936"[2] copies of which were sent to me for transmission to the State in Thompson's demi-official letter No. F. 233–P/41, dated the 28th April 1942.

Yours sincerely,

C. H. GIDNEY

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Enclosure to No. 692

Copy of letter No. 1763, dated the 15th August 1942, from the President,[3] H.E.H. the Nizam's Executive Council, Hyderabad, to the Hon'ble the Resident at Hyderabad.

The attention of His Exalted Highness' Government has been drawn to a report in the *Times of India*, dated 30th April 1942, of a speech delivered the previous day in the House of Commons by Sir Stafford Cripps, the Lord Privy Seal. Sir Stafford is reported to have said:

> "Unfortunately in my view representative institutions have not yet developed in a great majority of the Indian States. . . . I am certain this House would wish the British administration in India to do all it can to encourage and expedite the development of suitable representative institutions in all Indian States."[4]

and the London correspondent of the newspaper mentioned that Sir Stafford was particularly forceful when he made this statement.

That it conflicts with previous authoritative declarations is apparent from the following quotation from His Excellency the Viceroy's speech in the session of the Chamber of Princes held in 1939:—

"Your Highnesses will have seen the declarations recently made in Parliament on behalf of His Majesty's Government, declarations which I have myself repeated in public utterances in regard to constitutional changes or developments in the Indian States. Those statements will have made clear the attitude in this matter of His Majesty's Government, which is, I repeat, that the decision as to the constitution best suited to the needs of his people and his State rests with the Ruler himself to take, and that no pressure will be brought to bear on him in this respect by the Paramount Power. Nor will any obstruction be placed in his way by the Paramount Power should he wish to give effect to constitutional advances consistent with his Treaty obligations."

Similarly, in the statement of constitutional and administrative reforms introduced in the States as issued by the Political Department, it is stated:—

> "in regard to Constitutional developments, the policy of the Paramount Power has been clearly laid down and repeated in recent declarations in Parliament. It is for the Ruler himself to decide what form of Constitution is best suited to the needs of his subjects, and the Crown Representative and his officers refrain from offering advice in this respect unless they are invited to do so. Several Indian States already possess highly developed Constitutions and the general tendency is to advance in a genuine attempt to associate the subjects of the State with the administration."

[1] *Proceedings of the Meetings of the Chamber of Princes*, 13 March 1939 (New Delhi, Government of India, 1939). The quotation is on p. 4, not p. 16. See also No. 115, note 16.

[2] See L/P&S/13/993. [3] The Nawab of Chhatari. [4] See No. 115, note 15.

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There is an obvious conflict between these previous declarations of His Majesty's Government and the statement recently made by the Lord Privy Seal, and His Exalted Highness' Government on its part is certain, having regard to these declarations, that Sir Stafford's above statement was meant to be an expression of his own personal views. If so, His Exalted Highness' Government would invite the attention of His Excellency the Crown Representative to the need for reiteration of the policy of His Majesty's Government in the matter, as it would remove any possible misunderstanding that may have arisen. Besides, as you are aware His Exalted Highness' Government is committed to a certain scheme of constitutional reforms, a part of which has already been inaugurated; it has, even, otherwise, at different stages, endeavoured to increase the association of its people with the Government, the latest instance being the formation of the Hyderabad Defence Council on which are represented, in a numerical majority, the leading spokesmen of the different political parties in the State and leading citizens. It is the object of His Exalted Highness' Government to bring the two major communities still more closely together and to obtain their joint co-operation in giving effect to the remaining parts of its scheme of reforms, but a statement such as that made by the Lord Privy Seal may conceivably be misinterpreted by certain interested sections who may be encouraged thereby to make extreme demands which may provoke both political and communal controversies and retard instead of accelerating the pace of reforms.

His Exalted Highness' Government will be obliged if you will kindly communicate its views to His Excellency the Crown Representative for favour of transmission to His Majesty's Government.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE SIMLA, *5 September 1942, 5.10 pm*
Received: 5 September, 7.45 pm

No. 339-S.C. I have asked Governors[1] for position as regards whipping. It is briefly as follows.

2. No whippings in North-West Frontier Province apart from sentences imposed by ordinary criminal courts for normal crimes, and none in Madras so far as Hope can ascertain. Sentences of this kind will in general only be awarded to persons caught committing arson or tampering with railway track, and minimum of publicity will be given. Hallett has already given instructions

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that there shall be minimum publicity for whipping sentences, and has no reason to believe that they are being imposed save against leaders responsible for most serious sabotage. A large number of boys in the local schools and colleges at Hyderabad, Sind, were caned on August 10th, five more on the 11th, and four more on the 12th. These spankings appear to have produced entirely satisfactory results and since then trouble has completely ceased and no others have been whipped. All these were in the martial[2] law area. There have been no whippings in Bombay. Lumley has taken steps to see that none will take place, except in most flagrant sabotage cases, and if situation in Bombay and Poona continues peaceful, he will withdraw application of Whipping Act at an early date (it has been applicable to those two places only). Whipping would still remain possible under ordinary law and Enhancement of Penalties Ordinance. In C. P. punishment by whipping has been restricted to hooligans, looters and dangerous characters of low status and is not to be applied to students or persons of superior status without specific reference to Government. No students or persons of superior status have been whipped. Those on whom this punishment has been inflicted are mostly persons caught red-handed committing theft in buildings or for house trespass, for whom sentence of imprisonment would have been inadvisable, because of need of immediate deterrent sentences. Number is 82 in Nagpur where you will remember there were disturbances of the utmost[3] seriousness.[4] No whippings have been reported from elsewhere. I have had no report yet from Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Orissa, or the Punjab. I think it unlikely that there have been any whipping[s], save possibly in Bihar. Above may be useful in case point is raised unexpectedly. I have impressed on all Governors that if there is any whipping, whether under the ordinary law or otherwise, they are to keep publicity down.

[1] No. 656. [2] 'martial' omitted in decipher; see No. 328, note 3.
[3] 'the utmost' deciphered as '(?particular)'. [4] See e.g. No. 544, para. 1.

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Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 241

NEW DELHI, *5 September 1942, 6.30 pm*
Received: 6 September, 1.45 am

7078. Following is text of cable dated Washington August 10th from Quezon President of Philippine Commonwealth to Gandhi.

Begins: Although it has never been my privilege to make your acquaintance I am taking the liberty of addressing to you this personal appeal because in my

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opinion the cause to which I have devoted my life may be prejudiced by what is reported to be your contemplated action. I have fought since my young years for the independence and freedom of the Philippines and have always believed that ultimately the fate of other subjected races would be favourably affected by the successful efforts that my people and I were making. What we did not attain through armed resistance we have achieved through patient negotiations and co-operation with the United States. America enacted a law in 1934 granting the Philippines complete independence to take effect in 1946. We were happily on the road to the full realisation of our national ambition when the Japanese invasion temporarily as I know placed my beloved country under a despotic rule. America with all her might and resources is fighting today not only to preserve her own freedom and for the redemption of the Philippines but also for the freedom of all peoples in every corner of the globe. Every subjugated race and people can and should place their faith in America for she has proved with deeds in dealing with us her unselfishness and her determination to share the boon of liberty which is hers with the rest of mankind. I invite you therefore to give your support to the United Nations and join with us in winning the victory of our common cause. *Ends.*

We regard it as impossible, especially in view of the action taken regarding the messages from Generalissimo to Gandhi and Congress leaders, to make exception in this case and allow delivery of message. We suggest however that Ambassador Washington may arrange to have conveyed to the President Quezon information that his telegram arrived after Gandhi's arrest and therefore cannot be delivered without creating embarrassing breach of our rules.[1]

[1] Mr Amery added here the following: 'with our sincere appreciation of his helpful motive'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT[1] SIMLA, *5 September 1942, 7.55 pm*
Received: 5 September, 9.15 pm

No. 341-S.C. Situation report. Following is my personal appreciation, midday September 5th. Nothing of great significance. Calcutta was normal yesterday but minor incidents in districts. Governor proposes in future only to report bi-weekly, unless some special incident occurs. *Madras.* All quiet yesterday save for a few unimportant incidents. *Bihar.* General situation continues to improve though, except in one or two districts, it has not yet been possible to re-establish outlying police stations which were burnt out. Communications[2] regular if

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slow. Lightning strike of town police at Jamshedpur (where main strike, to which we propose to give no publicity, of course has ended).

2. No reports from any other parts of the country so far received and I would judge that generally situation was steadily consolidating.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

[1] Deciphered as 'immediate'. [2] Deciphered as 'Railway communications'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *5 September 1942*

PERSONAL

No. 347-S.C. Your telegram No. 15392,[1] dated September 1st. I am telegraphing separately appreciation[2] prepared by Home Department with which I agree. I suggest that you should yourself make a selection from this telegram and other factual reports you have been receiving of factual material to be included in Prime Minister's statement.

2. Points possibly worth bearing in mind in deciding on line he is to take are as follows:—

(*a*) Importance of bringing out in public at home and in the U.S.A. that these disturbances have been really serious, and that while they have been brought under control swiftly and effectively and with minimum use of force we are not yet out of the wood.

(*b*) Extremely violent character of disturbances. I suggest emphasis on incidence of murder of policemen at Chimnur, Ashti, Ghazipur and in Bihar, and gross brutality shown by mob.

(*c*) That responsibility for these events must fall on Congress. Without their agitation there would have been none of it. Working Committee were at pains to make it clear that every man must think for himself once the leaders were removed and act as he thought fit. Muslim community have refrained from participating in disorders.

(*d*) Had disorders not been dealt with swiftly and with a firm hand Congress would certainly have produced a situation most embarrassing to us from the war point of view and a direct encouragement to Japanese in their

[1] No. 669. [2] No. 697.

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campaign against us and against the Chinese (it is worth rubbing in publicly evil effect on Chinese position of Congress policy and activities).

(*e*) Special attention might be drawn to evidence of deliberate and elaborate try for sabotage of technical order: interference with signal cabins, control rooms, destruction of roads and bridges, &c. This could not have been planned in a moment or two save as part of plan. Reference might be made to the Andhra Committee circular.

(*f*) I think it of utmost importance that warm tribute should be paid to work of services and particularly of police. They have done extraordinarily well in most difficult conditions, and it would be well to go out of our way to encourage and commend them.

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Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/604: f 12

IMMEDIATE SIMLA, *5 September 1942, 8.50 pm*
Received: 5 September, 9.50 pm

No. 348-S.C. Reference your telegram No. 15392[1] of September 1st asking for full appreciation of the disturbances.

Main points to bring out are we suggest

(*a*) widespread nature of disturbances

(*b*) relatively small area in which disturbances took really serious turn and exceeded powers of local authorities to restore order quickly and

(*c*) extremely serious nature of disturbances in that area and the fact whether by design or otherwise it was so situated as to involve not only isolation of those parts of India which are most exposed to enemy attack but also maximum dislocation of transport and industry throughout the country owing to its being main source of coal supplies. See paragraph No. 4 of Home Department's appreciation telegram No. 6664[2] dated August 22nd 1942.

2. Disturbances which started in Bombay with arrests of Congress leaders and began with what Commander-in-Chief regarded as ordinary displays of mob violence spread swiftly eastwards. Mass railway sabotage and interference with telegraph and telephone lines to the comparative exclusion of more normal acts of violence such as looting [occurred?] almost simultaneously on August 11th and 12th in South Bombay and Central Provinces North Madras East United Provinces and Bihar and the two last named areas soon became centre of really serious trouble. All efforts were concentrated at first on restoring main communications between Calcutta and the North of India by East Indian

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Railway and these have been fairly successful but even now there are districts North of the Ganges such as Ballia in the United Province and Purnea in Bihar which are not yet[3] under complete control.

Sabotage has also shown signs of spreading to parts of Bengal and Assam and is still continuing sporadically in other provinces. Apart from Bihar and East United Provinces disturbed (omission) were quickly brought under control and of course there have been vast areas in which there has been no trouble at all. Comparative immunity of Punjab and North-West Frontier has been remarkable and perhaps even more significant in (sic? is the) ease with which order has been maintained or restored in Congress strongholds like Gujarat and other parts of Bombay Presidency. Further feature[s] of disturbances of which you are already aware are (*a*) preponderating part taken by students (*b*) complete absence of Moslem participation even among student community (*c*) staunchness as a general rule of police and other Government servants (*d*) very large extent to which troops have had to be employed.

3. Our intelligence authorities do not at present see any master hand behind disturbances and attribute them largely to cumulative effect of Anti-British agitation which has been deliberately intensified by Congress leaders since failure of Cripps Mission and partly also to intervention of Congress Socialist Party forward block and extreme revolutionary parties who are always ready to fish in troubled waters. While we reserve final judgement regarding organisation behind revolt we consider it clear and feel this should be emphasised in debate that Congress must accept main responsibility even if they have not directly instigated every act of violence that has occurred. We do not exclude the possibility of enemy agency.

4. To give you fuller picture of seriousness of disturbance our succeeding telegrams give round-up of information available in (*a*) Railway (*b*) Post and Telegraph and (*c*) Home and (omission)[4] Departments regarding damage to property and personnel. You will realise that we have not yet received full reports from Provincial Governments.

[5.] Apart from Tata strike, burning of silk factory in Kashmir, strike in textile mills at Ahmedabad and Madras and iron and steel works in Mysore, there has been comparatively little direct interruption of war industries, but other factories may have been living on their reserves of coal and other materials and may be affected later if stocks cannot be promptly replenished. Every effort is being made to consider restoration of coal position.

[1] No. 669. [2] See No. 621, note 2; the date should be 23 August.

[3] 'are not yet' corrected to read 'may not yet be'. This and subsequent corrections were transmitted in Home Department telegram 7133 of 8 September. L/P&J/8/604: f 10.

[4] Corrected to read 'War'.

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6. Labour if left alone has shown no desire to cause trouble but Bombay, Ahmedabad, Delhi, Madras, Coimbatore and Jamshedpur have all shown dangerous readiness to yield to political influences especially if backed by money, as we believe must have been the case in some instances. Communist Party of India remains doubtful factor. Its official policy is still pro-war and such influence as it possesses (?over) labour has been exercised on the right side in several cases, but behaviour of many of its members proves what has always been clear namely that it is composed far more of anti-British revolutionaries than of genuine believers in communist creed. Tactics of disturbances and many illegal pamphlets circulated in support of them have had distinctly communistic flavour.

7. We are not yet out of the wood but forces of disorder have received sharp lesson. In the uneasy lull that now prevails we may comfort ourselves with hope that now as always main desire vast bulk of people is for peace and security in which to carry on their avocations and that firm but not vindictive action will bring reward it has never failed to yield in the past. Things would certainly have been much worse if arrests had been delayed and if, as may well have been the intention, revolts had been so engineered as to coincide with (?termination)[5] of monsoon and possible attack by Japan.

[5] Corrected to read 'end'.

698

Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/604: f 13

IMMEDIATE SIMLA, *5 September 1942, 10.35 pm*
Received: 5 September, 11.45 pm

No. 349–S.C. Reference our immediately preceding telegram 348–S.C [para. 4]. Part (*a*) railways. Sabotage began simultaneously in widely separated localities on August 11th and took similar form on all lines affected, namely attacks on station buildings, destruction of railway telegraphs, blockade (sic ?blockage) of instruments and signals and damage to track. In some areas there was looting of railway property and of goods in transit and burning of (?coach)-ing stock. Damage to engines has only been reported from East Indian Railway and Bengal and North-Western Railway.

In first week all railways suffered to greater or less extent, but those seriously affected were East Indian Railway, Bengal and North-Western Railway and Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway. On East Indian Railway there was total interruption of traffic between Mogulserai and Kiul on main line and

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between Mogulserai and Gaya on (2 corrupt groups). On Bengal and North-Western Railway there was total interruption of line north of Ganges East of Allahabad. On Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway there was serious sabotage in neighbourhood of Bezwada and also damage on line from Guntakul to Bangalore and Bangalore to Hubli. All railways were instructed to reduce all passenger and goods services so as to conserve coal.

During second week situation improved everywhere except on Bengal and North-Western Railway in North Bihar whence trouble spread Eastwards to B[engal] and A[ssam] near Katihar.

At the end of third week train services were practically normal (subject to reduction on all railways to conserve coal) except on East Indian Railway and Bengal and North-Western Railway. On East Indian Railway goods and coal traffic is being moved from (?most of) fields North Mogulserai but under convoy, by daylight only, between Gaya and Mogulserai. Until recently there was still total interruption between Mogulserai and Patna. North of Mogulserai there is restricted service, mostly by daylight, on upper divisions of the railway and trains are running under convoy from Mogulserai [to] Lucknow. Goods and coal traffic coming North through Mogulserai is about 18 trains a day against 23 trains before disturbances began. Increase will not be possible until Patna–Mogulserai section has been restored. On Bengal and North-Western Railway there is still no through communication on main line for East to West traffic through North Bihar.

It is too early yet to assess full damage but following figures are available for each railway, first of which represents stations damaged and second gives number of derailments. Bengal–Nagpur Railway 4 and 1, Bombay Baroda and C[entral] I[ndia] Railway 11 and 3, B[engal] and A[ssam] 27 and 2, Great Indian Peninsular Railway 8 and 3, Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway 13 and 11, North-Western Railway 4 and 1, Southern India 4 and 3. On East Indian Railway 58 stations damaged and on Bengal and North-Western Railway probably between 150 and 170. Number of derailments on these 2 lines not known. Damage to track and rolling stock very extensive. Apart from (?loss of) earnings which must be very heavy, damage to (?property) must be in neighbourhood of crore of rupees and further information may show this figure to be conservative.

[2.] Part (*b*) Posts and Telegraphs will follow separately.[1] Part (*c*) Home and War Departments. Reports so far received show 65 police stations and posts attacked of which 40 destroyed and some 55 other public buildings attacked of which the great majority destroyed. Latter include many Courts, Treasuries and A.R.P. buildings. These figures are very incomplete and include few from Bihar. Total damage will undoubtedly prove much greater.

[1] See No. 702.

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Fullest use was naturally made of all police forces who were forced to open fire on numerous occasions. Over 100 in Bombay alone. Reports which are exceedingly incomplete and do not include Bihar show casualties thus inflicted to (?exceed) 340 killed and 630 wounded but true total must be considerably higher. Police have themselves suffered heavily and in addition very large numbers injured in dealing with riots, 28 deaths have so far been reported. Reports include dastardly murders of officers two occasions in Central Provinces (?at least) once by burning, burning of police station with entire staff in United Provinces and murders of officers on at least two probably more occasions in Bihar again once by burning.

3. A feature has been the very wide use of military and excellent co-operation between military and civil. Troops were called out in 60 places in the majority of which they are still out. This does not include very widespread use of troops on guard and railway protection (?duties) nor places where troops stood by. At height of disturbances equivalent of 57 battalions were employed. Military also fired on many occasions details of casualties caused not yet available but probably less than those caused by the police. Military casualties were 11 killed, 7 wounded.[2] These include 2 Air Force Officers dragged from train and killed by mob and 1 British Officer and 4 British Other Ranks who were ambushed and murdered by mob after putting up stout resistance. Both these incidents occurred in Bihar. Considerable damage was done to military property including interruption of aerodrome construction, destruction and looting of M.E.S. stores M.T. and military stores on railways. Military W.T. communications proved of great value particularly in Bihar where provincial headquarters and other areas were for time completely cut off from the outer world. Full use was also made in Bihar of the R.A.F. for reconnaissance and firing against rail saboteurs from the air was resorted to on two occasions. There was of course no bombing or cannon fire.

[2] This sentence was inserted later: see No. 697, note 3.

699

Sir T. Stewart to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/49

IMMEDIATE *5 September 1942*

No. 95. A question has arisen in regard to realisation of collective fines on which I should greatly value Your Excellency's advice and guidance, since it has probably more than merely provincial implications. Representatives of Muslim League have claimed that the Muslim community should be exempted from

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liability to contribute to any collective fine which may be imposed on Patna city or elsewhere on the ground that they kept strictly aloof from all mischievous activities. The facts are substantially as stated, though Muslim bad characters have also taken part in disturbance, but my own first reaction was that an attitude of complete aloofness differs little from one of acquiescence in a campaign of destruction and interference with Civic rights and amenities and that Muslim community should pay like the others: otherwise basic idea of collective fine disappears. I instructed my officers accordingly. On the other hand it now appears that elsewhere in Bihar Muslims have taken an active part in restoring order and communications and, while it is possible to exempt Muslims in particular localities where assistance has been given, insistence on a general rule that Muslims must pay with the rest may (*a*) have an adverse effect on those who have co-operated, and (*b*) set Muslim League by the ears not only in Bihar but elsewhere. I confess I do not like sacrificing conviction to expediency but have no particular desire or indeed leisure to take on a fight with the League at present moment, much less embarrass other Governors or Governments. I am inclined therefore if Your Excellency agrees to go to considerable way to meet Muslim claim and to make community liable only when there is reason to believe they were actively involved as in certain places they are said to have been. This is the course of action that more than one of my District Officers have urged upon me.

2. Since drafting foregoing I have received Home Department telegram No. 7076[1] dated September 14th [4th?]. On receipt of Your Excellency's views I shall if necessary issue revised instructions and give Home Department material for dealing with resolution in the Assembly.[2]

[1] Apparently a circular enquiry of Provinces about realizing collective fines from Muslims: see No. 705.

[2] Presumably a reference to the Question which Maulvi Muhammad Abdul Ghani was to put in the Legislative Assembly on 16 September as to the total collective fines imposed in various Provinces, the localities, the amount of the fine, the total population in every such area and the Muslim population, and whether Muslims had been exempted. *The Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. III, 1942 (Delhi, 1942), p. 181.

700

Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/5/41: ff 37, 44

IMPORTANT *5 September 1942, 3.10 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 6 September*

1087.[1] Following personal and secret from Prime Minister. Your No. 2662–S.[2] Here insert my telegram 26–U.

[1] Deciphered as '1080'. [2] No. 662.

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26–U. We can of course deprecate at Washington in such a manner as probably to prevent the visits to India of Mr. Wendell Willkie and Mr. Sherwood Eddy. On the other hand, it is for consideration whether you could not captivate[3] them and convert them if that is necessary. I had a great success here with Wendell Willkie, with whom I took the greatest trouble. He is a good dining companion and very ready to see things through our eyes. He has been a good friend to this country and to the Alliance.[4]

2. I do not know Sherwood Eddy, but he is reported as friendly. I always make a point of seeing these prominent Americans and making sure that they get a good show, and the results have always been most satisfactory. Pray let me know how you feel about this.

3. On no account however should any foreign visitors be given access to any of the internees. *Ends.*

[3] Deciphered as '(?see)'. [4] End of cipher U telegram.

701

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI,[1] *5 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I have escaped to Simla for a couple of days—the first time that I have been out of Delhi, even for a day, since before the rains broke in June. It is misty and damp up here, but the change is pleasant, even though it is for no more than 48 hours. I return to Delhi after lunch tomorrow and have to preside over the National Defence Council on the three following days, 7th, 8th, and 9th September.

2. I have had a request from S. P. Mukerji for an interview on the 8th, and I must try to have him in, even though the Defence Council takes up most of one's day. That has been followed by a telegram from Huq, asking if I could see him, Mukerji, and the Nawab of Dacca. On this I have thought it well to consult Herbert. The fashion nowadays is to endeavour to short circuit your Provincial Governor, if possible, and also, if possible, to short circuit His Majesty's Government: in the first place by making representations of provincial politics direct to the Viceroy; in the second by issuing a statement about the constitutional position and the failures of His Majesty's Government addressed to the Viceroy and repeated to the heads of the allied

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nations! I have no intention of encouraging either disposition! I have telegraphed[2] to ask Herbert what his wishes are in the matter of Huq and to suggest that it would be better that his Ministers, if they want these interviews, should make their requests through him.

3. The general situation seems to continue to improve. I hope to get this afternoon from the Home Department the appreciation[3] which you have asked for of the situation, and I will, I think, suggest to you that it would be best for the India Office to advise the Prime Minister as to the terms of any statement he may wish to make in the House on the factual side in the light of the material which this appreciation will contain. I will send you a parallel private telegram[4] commenting on one or two points. It is obvious that the improvement is being maintained. I am equally clear myself that we must stoutly decline to allow ourselves to be unduly encouraged by that fact. There is clearly a great deal of room for anxiety over it. Bihar is not yet quite tidy. The Bengalees seem to be making themselves a nuisance in the Sylhet Valley and elsewhere in Assam, and I have just seen in Delhi some leaflets urging a further outbreak on the 9th September, being the anniversary of the arrest of the Working Committee. We shall have to be very firm with disorder in this country for some time, and for precisely the reasons you give—that opinion at home may think first that this business has not been so serious as, in fact, it has: and second, that it is now a thing of the past—I am certain that we shall be wise to take any risks involved in giving some publicity to facts which will bring out its true gravity.

4. I am greatly relieved that the Jamshedpur business should have been settled, though I still think that the management there have been lamentably weak, and Stewart shares that view. He has not had much help, I fear, from his great land-owners.

[Para. 5, on the question of granting formal rights in the soil to cultivators in *jagir* villages in Rajputana States; and para. 6, containing personal comments, omitted.]

7 September 1942

7. Many thanks for your letter of the 20th August,[5] which I found here on my return from Simla this morning. A good many of the points mentioned in it are covered by our telegraphic correspondence. But I am most grateful for all this background about feeling at home. I shall probably let you have

[1] Address as in original.

[2] Telegram 333-S.C. of 4 September. Sir J. Herbert replied in telegram 216 of 5 September agreeing 'as to undesirability of anything like a deputation of Ministers obtaining interview with you'. He suggested that Mookerjee be granted an interview, noted that Huq was not now going to Delhi, and had no objection to, though he saw no advantage in, an interview with the Nawab. MSS. EUR. F. 125/42.

[3] No. 697. [4] No. 696. [5] No. 597.

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something about official and non-official advisers in the next few days.[6] I am sending you by this mail the full replies[7] which I have received from the Governors. But it looks very much as though only the Central Provinces and Madras were anxious to have non-official advisers, and I think that it might be well for me to consult the remaining Governors again and find out what importance they attach to uniformity in this matter, and how great they estimate the pressure is likely to be on them to adopt non-official advisers if other provinces do so. Not the least of the problems is the extreme shortage of men. You touch in paragraph 2 of your letter on the Bihar position. Stewart has never been able to produce more than two or three names at the outside from Bihar, and one has of course to strike the communal balance; and neither Darbhanga nor C. P. Narayan Sinha, who are his only Hindu suggestions, have at all distinguished themselves in the recent disorders. Indeed, with Stewart's full approval I had been proposing to administer a fairly sharp rebuke to Darbhanga for his pusillanimity had he attended today's meeting of the National Defence Council, but (the excuse will no doubt be communications and the disturbed state of Bihar) he has, perhaps wisely, decided not to do so!

8. I gave you in my letter last week the outcome of the discussions in my Executive Council about Indianisation.[8] (Incidentally I fear that owing to pressure I must again postpone the fuller account I had meant to send you.) As you will have seen, I stood firm and had some support, but nothing like a majority, and I do not propose to budge from that position. It is quite arguable that someone so staunch as Mohammad Usman, if well served in the Secretariat, might make a possible Home Member when the time comes for Maxwell to go. But (to digress a little from the main theme) I am getting rather uneasy at the fate of my unhappy successor. If he takes over early in April, as we at present contemplate, he would not only have to settle in himself with a new staff, but Lumley, by far the most experienced and capable Governor I have, goes at the same time as I do; Maxwell is also due to go in April; and Craik at about the same moment. I think that if Maxwell's health would stand it, there would be very much to be said for a short extension for him—even six months would give the new Viceroy a chance to find his feet. Craik, on the latest extension, will be able to stay on here for about a month after the new man had taken over; and unless we have been able to make our plans by then it may be necessary to keep him for yet another month or so to see my successor properly in. But we need not go into that now. I do not think it would be fair to Lumley to keep him on, though it is bad luck that in so important a post as Bombay and in the senior Presidency Governorship the new Viceroy should have someone without previous experience, more particularly as the help which a new Governor of Bombay can look for from his services is not, I fear, very great, and Lumley will be irreplaceable.

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9. I am delighted that you dealt as you did with the Chinese Ambassador,[9] and you know how grateful I am to you and to Winston for all your help over these people.

10. Very many thanks for the recommendation of the American War Production Board. I agree with you that there is far too great a tendency to think about a political settlement in India and to believe, first that any early political settlement is possible, secondly, that it would result in a great increase of national effort. You and I know from sad experience the difficulties in securing a political settlement, and I do not believe that we are really doing much worse as we are, in the absence of one, than we should short of being so fortunate as to find one in which no holes could be picked by any of the people who matter.

[Para. 11, on the folding bicycle, omitted.]

12. Paragraph 9 of your letter deals with this difficult business of the Sikhs. My judgment is, quite frankly, that the Sikhs though a nuisance well worth placating, are a relatively small nuisance. But there are no circumstances I can think of in which it would be practical politics to consider any sort of "Sikhistan"; and I would not think it wise even to mention it to Glancy. The Hindus have made the mistake of taking Jinnah seriously about Pakistan, and as a result they have given substance to a shadow. Let us be warned by their example and avoid doing the same to a far more preposterous claim! For I am certain that if we did show the very slightest sign of taking "Sikhistan" seriously in the least degree, not only should we aggravate communal tension gravely in the Punjab, but we should never hear the end of it; and the Sikhs, as the Communal Award discussions in 1931 showed, find themselves occasionally in a position to wreck a scheme which would have gone down perfectly well with the major communities.

[Para. 13, containing personal comments, and para. 14 on the Maharaja of Indore's request to go to America to recover his health, omitted.]

P.S.—My grand-daughter is charming, but she will (*aet* 2) call me "*Gandy* Boy!" This, I feel, gives false hopes to Hindus!

[6] Lord Linlithgow's telegram 416-S.C. of 4 October (L/P&J/8/591: ff 48–9) summarizing the Governors' replies to No. 627 and giving his own views on the question of non-official advisers will be printed in Vol. III.

[7] Not printed; see L/P&J/8/591. [8] No. 672, paras. 7–8. [9] See No. 596.

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702

Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/604: f 14

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *6 September 1942, 3 am*
Received: 6 September, 2.45 am

No. 7100. Following is Posts and Telegraphs supplement to earlier telegrams[1] giving general appreciation and information from (*a*) Railways and (*c*) Home and War Departments.

Part (*b*) Posts and Telegraph.

Recent internal disturbances have materially affected Posts and Telegraph communications which seem to have been made particular objects of attack by mobs. Principal areas seriously affected were Bihar United Provinces Eastern Bengal Northern Assam Nagpur Wardha Chanda Amraoti and Akola districts of Central Provinces Bezwada Guntur Ramnad and Madura districts in Madras Bombay and Poona cities and vicinity. Usual method was to attack post offices and burn furniture forms and records. In a (sic) at Bombay cases buildings were burnt cash looted and instruments destroyed. In case of telegraphs and telephones damage was done by cutting wires and uprooting posts wires being cut repeatedly in a large number of cases and in some cases stolen. Total number of post offices attacked was 553 mostly small offices. Of these 28 were burnt down and 237 seriously damaged. Large number of letter boxes stolen or damaged total value of cash and stamps looted about one lakh of rupees. Value of loss caused by damage to and theft of telegraph and telephone posts and wires apparatus furniture and buildings not yet available. Apart from this, there is loss of revenue due to loss of traffic which cannot be estimated yet. Repairs to lines and wires interfered with by mobs in some cases but carried out under armed protection. Even at worst time of trouble telegraph and telephone communications maintained between principal cities except Patna, either by direct or indirect routes. Present position is—all direct routes re-established except Calcutta–Madras and Calcutta–Delhi which work intermittently. Position in Bihar still disturbed and full extent of damage not known. Scattered cutting of wires still continues. Provincial Governments have taken action by enforcing collective responsibility for protection of wires and by applying Collective Fines Ordinance,[2] Enhanced [Penaltie]s Ordinance,[3] and Section (?4)[4] of Indian Telegraph Act.[5] Daily air service has been started between Delhi and Calcutta for conveying government mails and delayed telegrams. Posts and Telegraphs staff loyal in spite of attempts of threat or persuasion to cease work. Only 15 instances of resignation or other disloyalty reported. Total staff of Department over 125,000. No officials killed in disturbances but

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30 reported injured. 218 Post Offices temporarily closed out of total 24,000 in India.

[1] Nos. 697 and 698.
[2] The Collective Fines Ordinance 1942. See *Gazette of India Extraordinary*, 13 May 1942, p. 500; also 19 August.
[3] The Penalties Enhancement Ordinance 1942. See *Gazette of India Extraordinary*, 2 January 1942, p. 62; also 29 January, 10 June and 26 August.
[4] Part IV laying down penalties under the Act was perhaps intended. [5] XIII of 1885.

703

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *6 September 1942, 8.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 6 September, 8.10 pm*

No. 2712–S. Following is my personal appreciation. Nothing of any importance in reports so far received. Calcutta quiet. Slight disturbances in districts. Congress demonstration in the North-West Frontier Province a failure. Bihar consolidating (no further news of police strike at Jamshedpur).

Repeated to Washington, Chungking and Kuibyshev.

704

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *7 September 1942, 11.45 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 7 September, 10.35 pm*

No. 2719–S. Situation report. Following is my personal appreciation midday today. Things generally continue quiet. In Bihar some recrudescence of trouble in Muzaffarpur district and a serious mutiny of 600 prisoners in Bhagalpur Central Jail, necessitating use of troops and firing. Police strike at Jamshedpur satisfactorily dealt with. Nothing of any importance from other provinces.

2. I think situation is easing to an extent that makes it possible for me to send you these reports, say at intervals of 3 or 4 days. We must continue to expect widely scattered incidents of varying importance (I should hope in almost all cases minor) from these parts of the country that have been disturbed, for some time to come. But the first Congress attack has been quite successfully

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dealt with, and that with reasonable economy of force, though it has caused injury to communications, some loss of life and much senseless and costly destruction of private and public property, both in town and country, and has stirred up the irresponsible student and the dangerous hooligan elements.

Repeated to Ambassadors Washington, Chungking and Kuibyshev.

705

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir T. Stewart (Bihar)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/49

IMMEDIATE *7 September 1942*

PERSONAL

No. 2720–S.[1] As you know, Home Department have made a circular enquiry of Provinces about realising collective fines from Muslims. Question is not at all an easy one. I will do my utmost to expedite a decision, but pending formal official communication from Home Department, I suggest it would be well to go slow, or even desist altogether from realising fines from Muslims.

[1] This telegram apparently refers to No. 699.

706

War Cabinet W.M. (42) 121st Conclusions, Minute 3

L/P&J/8/600: f 522

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 7 September 1942 at 5.30 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Ernest Bevin

Also present during discussion of item 3 were: Mr S. M. Bruce, Sir Kingsley Wood, Viscount Simon, Mr Herbert Morrison, Mr Amery, Viscount Cranborne, Mr A. V. Alexander, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Mr Brendan Bracken, Mr Harcourt Johnstone

INDIA

Detention of Gandhi

The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the S/S for India (W.P. (42) 394)[1] containing the Viceroy's reply to the suggestion, made at the meeting of the War Cabinet on the 17th August,[2] that the conditions of Gandhi's detention should be modified in such a way as to relieve the Government of

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India of responsibility for safeguarding his life and health and thus to enable them, if he chose to fast, to leave him to take the consequences.

The Viceroy did not propose any immediate change in the conditions of Gandhi's detention; but suggested that, if Gandhi began to fast, his eldest son, Devadas Gandhi, should be sent to join him in the Aga Khan's Palace at Poona and should be made responsible for all arrangements inside the Palace and for Gandhi's health. The Government of India would provide all facilities for medical treatment, etc., but it would be made clear that the responsibility for Gandhi's life and health during a fast would rest with himself and his son.

The Viceroy's telegram indicated that, while the Press would be wholly excluded, no objection would be raised to Gandhi seeing a reasonable number of visitors or friends from outside. On this point the Viceroy had explained, in a further telegram (329–S.C.[3] dated 4th September) that all visitors admitted to the Palace would be required to enter into a bond not to make any public statement based upon their visits.

In discussion it was pointed out that the disadvantages of allowing Gandhi to receive visitors were not limited to the risk of public statements, whether in the Press or otherwise, based on these visits. There was also the risk that by this means Gandhi would be able to maintain communication with agents outside and thus continue to direct his revolutionary campaign.

The War Cabinet—

Took note, with approval, of the arrangements which the Viceroy proposed to make if Gandhi began to fast; but asked the S/S for India to impress it upon the Viceroy that, if such a situation arose, the facilities for visits should be made subject to such restrictions as would effectively limit Gandhi's freedom to communicate with the outside world.

[1] No. 679. [2] See No. 575, Minute 8. [3] No. 687.

707

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/8/6: f 50

PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *7 September 1942*

My dear Winston,

I have tried to get some sidelights on Cyril Asquith. I am told he is very shy and gives the impression of being cold and distant. This is what Linlithgow has been most criticised for and I am sure that, in that respect, if in no other, we need a change. He has no administrative or political experience. . . .[1]

[1] Personal comments omitted.

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On the other hand the more I think of Wilfrid Greene the more I like the idea. He is first-class intellectually above all on constitutional issues, understands war (he was a very good G.S.O.1 in the last war and has remained a keen student of strategy), and has great personal charm. You might ask Cripps and Grigg what they think of him—they are both I believe friends of his. The appointment would, I am sure, be very popular here, in America where he was addressing the Bar Association recently, and, so far as any appointment can be popular, in India. The one question I would have to make sure of is whether the fact that he once acted as Counsel for the Princes before a Commission could be considered as a drawback. She is very pleasant and would I am sure play up.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

708

Sir G. Laithwaite to Sir R. Maxwell

MSS. EUR. F. 125/137[1]

D.-o. No. 11694–G.G.

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *7 September 1942*

My dear Maxwell,

I enclose copy of a document received from Amrit Kaur. It was sent under personal cover to me with the top copy marked "For His Excellency the Viceroy" and signed by her. His Excellency asks if we know the extent of its circulation. Perhaps you would like to mention to him this evening.

Yours sincerely,

J. G. LAITHWAITE

Enclosure to No. 708

HARIJAN BULLETIN 3

To Britishers.

The voice of Gandhiji has been suppressed. He always has been and still is your friend. Deliberate misrepresentations of him and his programme have been and continue to be made by your Government both here and in England. You are members of a freedom-loving race. You have been free and have worshipped your freedom for centuries. But you have denied and continue to deny that priceless heritage to India. Is it not natural for us to want to be free to run our own house for the good of our own people? Is it not natural for us to want to harness every ounce of our manpower, our material and moral resources for

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fighting against foreign aggression today if it comes our way? Remember it would not perhaps come our way if it were not for you. Gandhiji and Congress have asked for no more than that freedom for which you yourselves are fighting today. They ask you to part with power with goodwill so that the transference may be peaceful. The moment the hand of your domination is gone Congress, as a party, dissolves for its goal is won. There is no doubt that all will then come together as Indians to run an interim Government and differences will be settled amicably. There is *no* question of India going over to the Axis powers. Long before Britain came into conflict with them Indian leaders had denounced Nazi and Fascist conquests of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Abyssinia and Japanese aggression on China. But the entire history of British dealings with India has shown us plainly that Britain does not want to lose her hold on India. So long as you continue to talk of Empire—what is Empire but domination of race—how can we believe in your *bona fides*? To yearn for freedom is no crime and yet thousands of our noblest men and women who dare to bear witness to the Truth are today locked up. In the Punjab political prisoners are treated as felons. There has been indiscriminate firing on processions and while everyone regrets and condemns the acts of violence perpetrated all over India, no one can deny that it was the foolish act of wholesale arrests of their beloved all India and local leaders that was the root cause of mob fury. The long-seething anger of the people was bound to burst into flame at the slightest spark. The tragedy of it is that anger and hatred are now widespread. The British have lost the goodwill of the people without which no Government can rule for any length of time. I ask you even at this late hour to retrace your steps to release a life-long friend of yours and of humanity and to do right by India. Let not the last days of your contacts with India as Rulers be marred by ruthless repression of Indian feelings. Our cause is just. It must prevail. Help us to free ourselves. Those who are sympathetic let them speak out. If all is well between Britain and India all will be well with the world and humanity. Without our goodwill all worth while is lost for you.

AMRIT KAUR,—4.9.42

[1] Enclosed in the letter of 8 September from the Assistant Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 395

R/30/1/2: ff 7–9

The Indian Representatives at the War Cabinet

NOTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER

10 DOWNING STREET, S.W.1, *7 September 1942*

We may expect the arrival, during this week, of His Highness the Maharaja Jam Sahib of Nawanagar and the Honourable Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, representatives of India at the War Cabinet. The invitation was a generous gesture to loyal Indians, and we should make the most of it. They must be treated in every possible way as Dominion representatives, and I know my colleagues will show them every courtesy and consideration.

But let me sound one note of warning. Though I shall naturally invite them to attend our Monday Meetings on general war affairs, it must not be assumed that I shall feel able to invite them to Meetings when Indian affairs are to be discussed. We have already had several such meetings, and may have more, at which the presence of Indian representatives would be highly embarrassing. I suggest we should bear this point in mind in any personal conversations we may have with the Jam Sahib and Sir Ramaswami, and avoid giving them the impression that they have a right to attend all War Cabinet Meetings, or necessarily to be present when Indian matters are under discussion.

It will, of course, follow that they will not receive all papers circulated to War Cabinet Ministers. No doubt my colleagues will bear this also in mind. A Note is annexed indicating the classes of papers which they will receive.

W. S. C.

Annex to No. 709

Summary of Papers to be Supplied to the Indian Representatives

A.—WAR CABINET AND WAR CABINET COMMITTEE PAPERS

(*a*) *War Cabinet Papers.*

1. The responsibility for considering in each case whether a War Cabinet paper should be sent to the Indian representatives will rest with the Secretary of the War Cabinet. In exercising this responsibility he will proceed on the following basis:—

2. The Indian representatives will receive the *Conclusions* only of those Meetings of the War Cabinet at which they have been present.

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3. *War Cabinet Memoranda* (in the W.P. series) fall into two principal categories:—

(i) Papers requiring a decision or decisions by the War Cabinet.

(ii) Papers circulated for information.

4. In the case of *both* the above categories the Indian representatives will not, generally speaking, receive copies of papers on *either* operational *or* purely domestic matters. They will, however, receive the C.O.S. Weekly Résumé of the Naval, Military and Air Situation, and they may occasionally receive a copy of a paper on a purely domestic subject in which they have some special interest in view of analogous problems in India.

5. Papers in category (i) above will not, as a rule, be sent to the Indian representatives unless they are to be discussed at Meetings to which they are to be invited.

6. In the case of all papers, whether in category (i) or (ii), which deal with *Indian affairs*, the Secretary of the War Cabinet will act in consultation with the India Office.

(*b*) *War Cabinet Committee Papers.*

7. The Indian representatives will receive copies of selected papers of the Lord President's Committee, together with appropriate extracts from the Committee's conclusions.

B.—FOREIGN AFFAIRS

8. The Indian representatives will receive the "*Political Distribution*" *of Foreign Office telegrams.*

9. They will receive the *Political Intelligence Summary* issued each week by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office.

C.—INDIAN AFFAIRS

10. Apart from War Cabinet papers (see "A" above), the Indian representatives will receive a selection of *India Office Telegrams.* Responsibility for considering which telegrams should be supplied to the Indian representatives, and for supplying them, will rest with the India Office.

D.—MILITARY AFFAIRS

11. The Indian representatives will receive the *Cabinet War Room Daily Summary.*

12. They will also receive:—

(i) The C.O.S. Weekly Résumé of Naval, Military and Air Operations (see "A" above).

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(ii) The Weekly Optel telegrams—prepared for the information of His Majesty's Representatives abroad—which are included in the "Political Distribution" of Foreign Office telegrams.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *8 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2725–S. Several questions are tabled for answer in the next session opening on the 14th bearing on the Financial Settlement. One question asks Raisman to make a statement explaining his mission to England and the results thereof. Other questions ask for example whether Indian revenues will be expected to bear any part of the cost of the reconquest of Burma. Suspicion will be aroused unless categorical answers are given to such latter questions.

2. Could you let me know whether a firm decision has yet been reached by War Cabinet on this question or whether it is anticipated that the War Cabinet will promulgate a firm decision? If not is there any objection to our assuming now that the *status quo*[1] has been confirmed?

[1] 'status quo' deciphered as 'Statute'. Mr Amery thought that 'settlement' might have been intended.

711

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *8 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2727–S. Point has been made to me that Congress pretend that they do not believe that His Majesty's Government will keep their promise to India. What however is really worrying Congress is that it believes that His Majesty's Government will keep their promise, which, from Congress point of view, is not the right promise. This strikes me as a good House of Commons point and might be worth using either in connection with the Prime Minister's statement or later by yourself in debate.

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Mr Turnbull to Sir G. Laithwaite

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: ff 53–4

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *8 September 1942, 4.10 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

1094. Laithwaite from Turnbull. H.E.'s private and personal telegram 2700–S[1] dated 3rd September. Indian Representatives expected here to-day.

2. We propose to assume as from tomorrow that all, repeat all telegrams marked personal are not to be seen by them but that telegrams from Viceroy to S/S not marked personal or private and personal may be shown to them at our discretion. Please confirm.

3. Presume all official Government of India telegrams may be shown to Mudaliar who will no doubt expect to be at least as well informed on Indian matters as his colleagues in India. Can we assume that this means showing all official Government of India telegrams of importance and Secretary of State's official replies? Is it considered that Jam Saheb, having no responsibility for British India, should not see such telegrams or that he should see such of them as will inform him of general Indian position and be relevant to his functions as representative at War Cabinet? We see some difficulty in discriminating between him and Mudaliar, but this might be done on British Indian domestic matters.

4. Secretary of State feels that both representatives should see Viceroy's personal appreciation telegrams repeated Washington and Chungking. Have you any objection to their seeing these, with back numbers to date of departure from India? We propose to make available to them immediately Home Department official telegrams 348–G.C.,[2] 349–G.C.[3] and 7100[4] of 5th and 6th September, supplied as background for Prime Minister's statement.

[1] No. 681. [2] This should read 348–S.C., i.e. No. 697.
[3] This should read 349–S.C., i.e. No. 698. [4] No. 702.

713

Mr Turnbull to Sir G. Laithwaite

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: f 52

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *8 September 1942, 6.45 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 9 September*

1097. Laithwaite from Turnbull. My telegram 1094. It may help us to avoid putting our foot in it if you can give us somewhat detailed account of what

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Executive Council see. Do they under Rule 44 (*iii*)[1] see all important official repeat official telegrams to and from S/S or only those relating to their own Department & matters brought before Council under Rule 18 of Part V of Rules of business[2] as amended 1935.

[1] Rule 44 (*iii*) of the Secretariat Instructions directed that the Secretary in each Department should arrange for copies of all official telegrams of importance to or from the Secretary of State to be circulated to Members of Council for their information. L/P&J/7/3999.

[2] Namely rules of business of the Executive Council made by the Governor-General under the Government of India Act 1935, Ninth Schedule Sec. 40 (2). Rule 18 as amended in November 1935 directed that any proposal (*a*) to withdraw, otherwise than in accordance with legal advice, a prosecution instituted by Government, (*b*) to introduce legislation in the Central Legislature, (*c*) to issue a regulation under the Government of India Act 1919, Sec. 71, should be brought before Council. In all other cases, the decision to bring matters before Council lay with the Governor-General, and the rule directed the Secretary in the Department concerned to obtain his orders on the point. *Ibid.*

714

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 521

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *8 September 1942, 3.50 pm*

PERSONAL

15753. Your personal telegram 2645–S[1] of 29th August was considered by Cabinet yesterday[2] and following conclusion reached.

Begins. War Cabinet took note with approval of arrangements Viceroy proposed to make if Gandhi began to fast but asked Secretary of State to impress upon Viceroy that if such a situation arose the facilities for visits should be made subject to such restrictions as would effectively limit Gandhi's freedom to communicate with outside world. *Ends.*

2. The important thing would be to insist that the individuals let in by Devadas are strictly limited to a few personal friends and not allowed to become a political committee or durbar and that they definitely bind themselves not to convey out political instructions or directly or indirectly lend themselves to publicity. The bond you propose to take[3] from them could cover these points.

[1] This should read 2648–S, i.e. No. 652. [2] See No. 706. [3] See No. 687.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/609: f 373

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *8 September 1942, 9.20 pm*
Received: 9 September

15789. Your telegram of the 2nd September 2684-S.[1] Many thanks. I shall certainly be glad to see that in the debate (now to take place on Friday 11th) tribute is paid to police and all Government servants.

I should not be surprised if demand for an enquiry is made in the course of debate here and if so I would propose that whoever replies should stone-wall and avoid any commitment, pointing out that it is not feasible to consider general or particular investigations before the dust of the conflict has settled. I note from Reuter that resolutions demanding an enquiry have been tabled for the approaching session of the Assembly and I should be glad to learn before debate here whether you propose to take a similar line.

[1] No. 674.

716

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *8 September 1942*

Dear Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh,

Thank you for your letter of the 31st August.[1] I have read it with care and close attention, but I fear that many of the suggestions or much of the argument contained in it would not be possible for me to accept, although I appreciate your anxiety to see achieved a settlement fair to all parties and to the advantage of India. I fully accept also that it is your anxiety to see that object achieved that has led you to address me on a matter which falls outside the provincial field at a time when your thoughts and your energies must be devoted in so large a degree to coping with the difficult local situation in Sind.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 665.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *9 September 1942*
PERSONAL

No. 2733–S. I imagine Prime Minister's statement would be essentially confined to Congress situation. If incidentally it is possible for him to put in a word referring to your answer of 30th July[1] about our post-war intentions—if only as part of the argument that Congress have been wholly unreasonable in face of undertakings given by us—it might be worth while, though I doubt anything we can say will carry any conviction to those who do not want to be convinced. Absence from Prime Minister's statement of all reference to future policy would probably be widely cited here as indicating that he is himself lukewarm for constitutional progress and used by our critics to shake confidence in His Majesty's Government's good faith. Point however might be hooked on to points suggested in my private and personal telegram No. 2727–S[2] of 8th September.

[1] See No. 366. [2] No. 711.

718

Sir G. Laithwaite to Mr Turnbull

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *9 September 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2736–S. Laithwaite to Turnbull. Your telegrams Nos. 1094[1] and 1097,[2] dated 8th September. Position is briefly that Members of Council see (*a*) all official telegrams relating to their own Department, (*b*) official telegrams addressed to other Departments but likely to affect them directly or indirectly. In this case it rests with the Department holding the case to include other Departments or their Members in the distribution, (*c*) in circulation on file, or as appendages to papers, circulated for discussion in Council, the telegrams in and out relating to such discussion. A substantial number of telegrams of much importance, especially[3] from Home, Finance, Commerce and Supply, issue departmentally with approval of Viceroy and Member concerned. In other words, Members of Council in practice see very little telegraphic correspondence indeed outside their own Departments.

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2. Secretary, Executive Council informs me that Rule 44 (*iii*) of Secretariat Instructions has in practice, except apparently in the Commerce Department, been for some considerable time almost entirely ignored.

3. It follows from above that Members do not see E[xternal] A[ffairs] D[epartment] telegrams unless specially marked. Peel can I think refer you to difficulties we had some years ago about communication of F[oreign] O[ffice] telegrams to Indian Members. Nor do they see any States telegrams.

4. If Mudaliar is to see all official Government of India telegrams he will thus be a very great deal better informed than his colleagues here. His Excellency thinks it might be worth asking him with what Departments he wishes to be kept specially in touch and adding that Viceroy has informed Secretary of State that at Member's request arrangements have been made for Commerce, Supply, War Transport, War and Defence Departments to send him a weekly letter, and that he will in addition continue to receive minutes of meetings of Council for his personal information. Appetite will grow with time, and if you can keep some margin and not offer too much in the earlier stages, it may help you later, e.g. by letting him see at this stage merely a selection of more important telegrams from the Departments in which he is particularly interested. He has wide interests, which make him rather acquisitive. If you let him have too much, it will not be long before he shows a disposition to wish to come in more actively. Very limited scope of circulation of papers to Members as shown above will I hope help you.

5. Neither Mudaliar nor Jam Saheb should see any telegrams to and from Crown Representative. It is important too that they should not come in on control of Provinces. Political telegrams from Governor-General (as distinct from Government of India) will in future normally be marked personal.

6. Subject to above, His Excellency agrees as to difficulty of discriminating over supply of telegrams against Jam Saheb *in principle*, but in practice he is only likely to be interested in quite broad issues and not in detail such as may attract Mudaliar.

7. Telegrams to/from Governors from/to His Excellency even if purely factual are never shown to Council. They should not (nor should Governors' letters or extracts from them) be shown to Representatives.

8. Your paragraph 4. No objection, and these appreciations may be shown automatically.

[1] No. 712. [2] No. 713. [3] Deciphered as 'enquiries'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *9 September 1942, 11.30 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 9 September, 11 pm*

No. 2742–S. Your personal telegram No. 15789[1] of 8th September. Many thanks. I am sure that all that you and Prime Minister can say in support of Services and loyal elements would be most welcome and invaluable.

2. As regards police enquiries, your formula I think goes further than I would judge to be safe. As you know, I have told Governors that there are to be no enquiries (subject to the caveat in ministerial provinces that they should secure this *if possible*). I have evidence from various quarters of extremely heartening effect of this decision on the police, &c., and I am most anxious not to whittle it down in any way. Formula you suggest holds out possibility of enquiry after dust of conflict has subsided, and for reason I have just given is much too widely drawn.

3. Matter was discussed in Council this evening in connection with our own forthcoming debate. Chief was most emphatic in his objection to any enquiry now or later and found strong support. Danger to morale involved in any undertaking was generally recognised. Sultan Ahmed made the point that while situation was temporarily better, real test would come when troops were withdrawn, and that that was additional argument against anything likely to weaken stamina of police. One or two[2] of my colleagues suggested that we should try to skate round the issue, or handle it tactfully, but decision to resist demand for enquiry was unanimous. I hope therefore that you will resist any suggestion that His Majesty's Government should recommend enquiry now or later to Government of India or provinces (I would prefer you not to quote view of my Council, and to use phrase "recommend to Government of India or provinces"). It goes without saying that cases in which there have been breaches of discipline which come to the notice of local Governments will be dealt with departmentally by those Governments in the ordinary way. But that is quite a different thing from any formal public enquiry into conduct of police or troops (faced as they have been with gross and murderous violence and every form of excess), which could only have effect of wholly undermining morale when we have still a long way to go.

[1] No. 715. [2] 'One or two' deciphered as 'Behaviour'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/2/16: f 119

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *9 September 1942, 4.45 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 10 September*

1099. Your telegram 2725–S.[1] Cabinet have not yet reached final decision but I will endeavour to get early decision. It is unlikely to be taken before Tuesday 15th and if you can get questions put off until after that day that would be desirable.

[1] No. 710.

721

Mr Amery to Sir Kingsley Wood

L/PO/2/16: f 118

INDIA OFFICE, *9 September 1942*

My dear Kingsley,

You will remember that when Raisman was over here we had a discussion in the Cabinet[1] on your paper about India's sterling balances, and that a final decision was deferred until the Prime Minister was available. I have just had a private telegram[2] from Linlithgow to say that a number of questions have been put down in the Indian Legislature for the next session, which begins on the 14th, dealing with the Financial Settlement between H.M.G. and India, one of which asks Raisman to make a statement explaining his mission to England and the results of it. Linlithgow says that suspicion will be aroused unless categorical answers are given to these questions, and says that a further matter which is likely to be raised is whether Indian revenues will be expected to bear any part of the cost of the reconquest of Burma.

I think it is very desirable that the final decision of the Cabinet should be obtained as soon as possible, but this is not a suitable matter to be brought up when the Indian Representatives, who have just arrived, are present, as they will be on Monday[3] next. I expect, however, that there will be a meeting one day next week, probably Tuesday, to consider my paper on the Indian States and this would seem to be a suitable occasion to take the financial matter also, if the Prime Minister agrees.

[1] See No. 435, Minute 2. [2] No. 710. [3] 14 September.

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I venture to suggest that it might be a good thing if you could see the Prime Minister before the paper is taken and explain the position and the sense of the discussion to him. I think we were all agreed, subject to his views. If you do this I should like to come with you.

Yours ever,
L. S. A.

722

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *10 September 1942, 2.20 am*
Received: 10 September, 1 am

No. 2743–S. I saw S. P. Mukherji, in his capacity as acting Chairman of Hindu Mahasabha, yesterday. The Mahasabha, as you will have gathered from Press reports, have put forward new programme, gist of which is—

(i) India to be declared independent.
(ii) His Majesty's Government to initiate negotiations to form an Indian National Government, to which power should be transferred.
(iii) That Government to be composite in character, including representatives of important parties.
(iv) India Office to be abolished.
(v) Provincial Governments to be set up on same basis.
(vi) New National Government to declare its resolve to fight the Axis powers and not conclude a separate peace with them.
(vii) To pursue policy of militarization and industrialisation and to have a common war policy with the United Nations.
(viii) The Commander-in-Chief to continue to have operational control.
(ix) Future Government of India to be determined by a Constituent Assembly to be set up by the National Government: any minorities which so desire will have the right to refer disputed points to international arbitration.[1]

2. I told Mukherji that I thought he had ruined his chances of acting as a mediator by the insistence laid on prior repudiation of Pakistan by His Majesty's Government as a condition of any settlement. I then concentrated on getting him to explain precisely what he meant by National Government, and said that National Government was, in my opinion, national only if really broad based and generally representative and if the result of its formation would be stopping down of controversy. Did he expect to get the Congress and the Muslim

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League to support his National Government? He agreed that he had little, if any, hope of either. Did he then anticipate that a Government based essentially on the Mahasabha, without either Congress or the Muslims, would be likely to act as a sedative, or could be described as national in any true sense or as having behind it either the strength of the legislatures or the general support of the people? He could give no answer to this question. Was he satisfied that the risk of severe communal trouble in the event of a completely Hindu Political Government at the centre, because of the refusal of the Muslim League to participate on the terms which he and his friends could accept, was negligible? He admitted that it was not. Would he agree that there was little hope of ever being able to persuade the parties that what they accepted now in terms of proportions in a Central Government, &c. would be entirely without prejudice to their post-war positions? In other words, were we not obliged by propositions such as his to come face to face at once with those major problems which could only be solved in my judgment by the post-war constitutional body and certainly not in time of war? He admitted the force of this statement. I added that any alternative to my present Council must be one able to deliver the goods in terms of popular support, to give full support to the war, and to carry the burden of work.

3. Our relations during the talk were very friendly, but I left him pretty well tied up: and he said no more to the Press than that he had a "full and frank discussion" with me. I gather, too, that there is considerable internal dissension in the Mahasabha camp. Mukherji also asked if he could go and see Gandhi. I replied, no. He then asked if he could come back in a few days. I said not unless there were some really substantial change in the position, as otherwise false inferences would be drawn.

4. I need only add that his argument was the usual one—that if the Muslim League would not play, and the Congress for whatever reason would not play, we ought to give the vacant seats to those who would support us: in other words, the Mahasabha; and that if we did not we were ruining any confidence left in us in the minds of the progressive parties here. I warned him that if he was thinking of a Government based essentially on the Mahasabha, with odd sections of the Muslims, such as those represented by Fazlul Huq and other oddments, he could hardly hope for much success if Congress were out in opposition and the Muslim League (and probably the Sikhs also) were also in opposition.

[1] The resolution of the Mahasabha Working Committee of 31 August concluded that the Mahasabha felt a duty to try to solve the present deadlock and achieve an Indo-British settlement and to mobilise public opinion in support of 'the national demand'. A committee including Dr Mookerjee was appointed to carry out these purposes and if possible 'to negotiate with the leaders of the principal political parties as well as representatives of the British Government'. *The Times of India*, 1 September 1942.

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5. I was of course at pains not to say that the door was closed to any constitutional progress given the existence of the August offer[2] and the undertaking given by His Majesty's Government[3] as regards an offer not less liberal than the Cripps proposals at the end of the war. But I think I made pretty clear to Mukherji the practical objections likely to operate against his scheme as it stands.

[2] Cmd. 6219; Vol. I, Appendix 1.
[3] Presumably a reference to Mr Amery's statement of 30 July (No. 366).

723

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

PERSONAL NEW DELHI, *10 September 1942, 7.15 pm*
Received: 10 September, 9.15 pm

No. 2745-S. I repeat for your information copy of Lumley's personal telegram of 6th September, No. 560, and of my reply of 8th September, No. 2723-S[1]:—

Begins. 1. I am not entirely happy about the health of inmates of Aga Khan's Palace. Mrs. Gandhi has been suffering from coronary disease of the heart for some years and in the last few days has had some pain. Mrs. Naidu suffers from high blood pressure. Neither is too well.

2. While both have been in this state for some years and might continue for some years longer there is a not negligible risk that either of them might die suddenly. Following on Mahadev Desai's death another event of the same nature would be most unfortunate, and it seems desirable to take every possible precaution. I have therefore arranged for an electro-cardiogram to be taken in Mrs. Gandhi's case and for the Superintendent of Yeravda Mental Hospital (retired I.M.S. Officer) to be in charge of medical arrangements in the Palace and to pay daily visits, the Civil Surgeon being so occupied with other work that he could not be readily available.

3. I think however that we should consider whether further steps to present [?prevent] possible adverse reactions might be taken. I suggest that Mrs. Naidu might be released and that Mrs. Gandhi might be offered release though permitted to refuse if she prefers to remain with Gandhi.

4. Inspector-General, Prisons, also asks that Pyarelal should be transferred to Aga Khan's Palace as in his view the other ladies there are becoming worn out with the task of attending on Gandhi. As newspapers are now allowed, any contact Pyarelal may have made can now do little harm and I suggest this may be done. *Ends.*

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Reply begins. Your personal telegram of September 6th, No. 560. I am most grateful to you for keeping me in touch and realise importance of the points you raise.

2. I agree that Pyarelal should now go to Aga Khan's Palace, and that will ease situation a little.[2]

3. As regards the ladies. I would like to await result of the electrocardiogram in Mrs. Gandhi's case. I am not clear whether if her condition is chronic she would be any better off outside than inside. As for Mrs. Naidu I should be very averse from letting her out at present unless her condition of health is really critical. She would be bound to talk and spread all sorts of information about Gandhi's life in jail, &c. at a time when we want to reduce anything of that sort as much as possible. It is of course at the same time essential (as indeed you are already doing) that we should spare no precaution as regards the health of both ladies for I wholly agree with you that another death following on Mahadev Desai's would be most unfortunate. Some risk has inevitably to be faced when persons of advanced years are interned. *Ends.*

[1] In telegrams 2746–S and 2747–S respectively.
[2] 'a little' deciphered as '(corrupt group) Assam.'

724

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *10 September 1942, 7.15 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 10 September, 5.45 pm*

2748–S. Following for Prime Minister.[1]

I too have done my utmost by exposition fortified by hospitality to put wise our American friends about India's political problems. But I have had a difficult group to manage. Johnson lost his balance during Cripps's visit and did a lot of damage. Lauchlin Currie declined my hospitality on two occasions when he passed through Delhi but I saw him for an hour and we discussed China. He told me he knew nothing of Indian affairs and did not wish to touch on these.

(Take Cypher "U"—33–U.) The same day he was closeted in prolonged conference with the most insidious of our Congress newspaper men and I am informed that this journalist provided a long memorandum which Currie carried off for the President.

2. (Revert to XX) While the existing tension persists I am particularly anxious to avoid anything that might encourage Gandhi's supporters in India

[1] See No. 700.

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to look to the possibility of intervention by the United States as a means of escaping from the impasse in which by their own folly and wickedness they have landed themselves.

3. From this I hope you will understand why I am not able at present to welcome the suggestion that Sherwood Eddy should visit India in the role of mediator. When things are a little quieter we shall be glad to receive these distinguished gentlemen and they will have a far better opportunity to understand our problems.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *10*[1] *September 1942*
PERSONAL *Received: 11 September, 2.45 am*

No. 2754–S. Following is my personal appreciation of Congress situation midday 10th September. Throughout country position continues to settle. There is still a good deal of scattered trouble in North Bihar. In the Darbhanga district police report that over the period of the trouble every police station in this district except 5 was attacked and in most cases the records and furniture burnt. The insurgents in that area are now in possession of arms and ammunition brought from looted thanas. In a number of places interference with communications, whether rail or telegraph and telephone, continues. In the United Provinces there has been a further violent attack on a station in the eastern area. There has been a minor incident in Talcher in Eastern States, and the North-West Frontier Province report the arrest of a number of picketers in Bannu and that most districts report signs of intensification of Congress activities. Madras generally quiet, and an attack on a post office in Tinnevelly district was prevented by villagers. In the Central Provinces[2] there has been one serious case of sabotage and a number of minor incidents. There has also been some temporary trouble in Jubbulpore, not serious and easily brought under control, thought to be due to Axis broadcast instruction to "start again". Students continue active in various parts of the country and Bengal reports that vicious minority among them is obviously spreading disorder and bad feeling in Calcutta. But taken as a whole marked improvement continues. I would repeat my warning given earlier that we should be unwise to think that we were yet out of the wood, and there is great force in comment made by one of my Indian colleagues in Council that it is only when troops are withdrawn from the districts in which they now are that we shall know definitely where we stand.

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2. I have asked Commander-in-Chief to give me an appreciation of the effect of the Congress campaign to date. He informs me that it is difficult at present to assess with any accuracy broad effect of rebellion on war capacity, since indirect effect, which will undoubtedly be considerable due to dislocation of distribution, will not be apparent before three to six weeks at earliest. Following is his preliminary forecast of major aspects, though much will depend on whether situation improves or deteriorates during September and subsequently: (*a*) loss of six to eight weeks' training in certain field army formations and training units due to employment equivalent of 57 battalions on internal security, (*b*) training generally retarded by temporary dislocation of petrol distribution, (*c*) projected movements programme for Eastern Army retarded at least three weeks, possibly more, due to railway damage, (*d*) probably minimum 50 per cent. of aerodrome construction and building projects retarded four to six weeks due to shortages of coal, cement, bricks and labour difficulties, (*e*) loss to date of 10 per cent. of annual steel production due to Tatas strike which will have general progressive repercussions on all projects requiring steel, (*f*) loss of cotton for textiles due to delay in transportation which will have later effect on clothing factory output, (*g*) general effect of dislocation and unrest on economic life of country extending over four to six weeks which will have repercussions on Army in supply and transportation fields. Commander-in-Chief adds that it is unfortunate that effect of disturbances has been accentuated in certain areas particularly Quetta and Eastern India by serious and widespread flood damage.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

[1] L/P&J/8/603: f 11 gives 11 September, 1.30 am.
[2] 'In the Central Provinces' deciphered as 'Reports that'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/2/16: f 117

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *10 September 1942, 8.10 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 11 September*

1109. Your private and personal telegram 2725-S[1] dated 8th September. Financial settlement. It will not I now understand be possible to get final decision on issues discussed when Raisman was here before 18th September and possibly not till 22nd.

[1] No. 710.

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Minute by Mr Churchill

L/PO/8/6: f 49

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, *10 September 1942*

Reference: Mr. Amery's letter of 7.9.42[1] about Sir Cyril Asquith and Lord Greene.

No action should be taken in either case.

W. S. C.

[1] No. 707.

728

Dr S. P. Mookerjee to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/137[1]

NO. 13 BARAKHAMBA ROAD, NEW DELHI, *10 September 1942*

My dear Sir Gilbert Laithwaite,

I am enclosing a copy of a statement which is being issued today regarding the present situation. A copy of it is being sent by Cable to the Prime Minister in England. Certain other signatures may be added before and after the release of the statement. I have not received final communication from some of the leaders who generally approve of the statement.

I shall be grateful if you will kindly place this before His Excellency the Viceroy.

I am leaving Delhi for Calcutta on Sunday morning. Before I do so I shall intimate to the Viceroy the results of our discussions during the last few days.

Yours sincerely,

SYAMA PRASAD MOOKERJEE

Enclosure to No. 728

The present war which has involved all the Nations of the world is proclaimed to be a struggle between democracy and freedom on one side and tyranny and race superiority on the other. It is a conflict between the old order in which all nations are implicated and a new order where every nation has the freedom to grow to its full stature. From the beginning of this titanic struggle India has been demanding that Great Britain where she has the power should implement the professions of equality and freedom so that her moral prestige might rise and her cause be endowed with justice. For some reason or other she has been

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evading this obvious duty and postponing the accomplishment of the great ideals for which she professes to fight. The failure of her policy in Egypt and Ireland, in Burma and Malaya indicates that if she is to be successful in India she must enlist the popular will and enthusiasm. The Indian people must be made to feel that they are defending their honour and freedom, their hearths and homes against the foreign aggressors. The examples of China and Russia are there to indicate that only a people's war can be waged successfully under modern conditions. The most influential political party in a mood of utter despair finding no adequate response to this legitimate demand wished to change their policy of non-embarrassment to achieve freedom. But before they could promulgate the same, they were incarcerated and a policy of repression ensued. We feel that an atmosphere of violence and counter-violence is hardly the atmosphere for a satisfactory reconciliation between India and Great Britain. If Great Britain is willing to grant self-government to India after the war, what is it that prevents its accomplishment today? A National Government pledged to the support of the war against the aggressors consisting of representatives of major political interests with complete autonomy in the internal administration during the period of the war and unfettered freedom thereafter, will satisfy the demand for Independence put forth by all the political parties in the country. Such a declaration of immediate transfer of real power to Indian hands postponing all controversial issues until after the war will produce the right atmosphere for dissolving differences and harmonising the divergent tendencies which are now over-emphasised. By solving the Indian problem Britain will help the Allied Nations, improve her own case and be a powerful instrument for the overthrow of the Aggressive Powers which are menacing civilisation today. There does not seem to be any justification for shirking the issue any longer. Here and now His Majesty's Government must proclaim that India is independent. We have not the least doubt that Free India will not negotiate any separate treaties with the enemy powers but will whole-heartedly fight the aggressors along with the Allied Nations. Events in India are rapidly moving towards a dangerous climax and there never was a period in the last hundred years when the feeling against Britain was so bitter as it is today. Before it is too late we urge the British Prime Minister who has, if he chooses, courage, vision and statesmanship to settle this problem now and for all time in the interests of Britain and India.

KHAN BAHADUR ALLAH BAKHSH
President, Azad Muslim Conference, Chief Minister, Sind

SYAMA PRASAD MOOKERJEE
Working President, All-India Hindu Mahasabha and Minister, Bengal

[1] Enclosed in the letter of 15 September from the Assistant Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State.

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K. HABIBULLAH
Nawab of Dacca, Minister, Bengal

SARDAR BALDEV SINGH
Minister, Punjab

MASTER TARA SINGH
President, Shiromoni Gurdwara Prabhandhak Committee

SIR S. RADHA KRISHNAN
Vice-Chancellor, Benares Hindu University

GIANI KARTAR SINGH
M.L.A., Punjab

MUHAMMAD ZAHER-UD-DIN
President, All-India Momin Conference

N. C. CHATTERJEE
Working President, Bengal Hindu Mahasabha

RAI BAHADUR MEHR CHAND KHANNA
President, Frontier Hindu Mahasabha

RAJA MAHESHWAR DAYAL
Working President, U.P. Hindu Mahasabha

DR. S. S. ANSARI
General Secretary, Azad Muslim Board

K. C. NEOGI
M.L.A. (Central)

729

Mr M. L. Saksena to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

LUCKNOW, *10 September 1942*

My dear Lord Linlithgow,
I am in due receipt of the summons to attend the ensuing session of the Central Legislative Assembly. Ordinarily I would not have taken any notice of it, as for reasons known to you, we of the Congress have normally stopped attending the Assembly nor do we attach any importance to its proceedings. But in view of the changed conditions today, I as one of the few Congress members of the Assembly who accidentally happen to be still out of Jail, feel it my duty not to remain a silent spectator of the great fraud that is sought to be perpetrated upon the whole world.

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Your Excellency has, no doubt, convened the present session to get an endorsement of the repressive policy of your Government and to have it proclaimed to the world that all was quiet on the "Indian front". This is indeed the truest reproduction of the Hitlerian tactics. The promulgation of lawless laws and ordinances, the gagging and throttling of all self-respecting and independent newspapers, the suppression of all news and views, except those doled out by the provincial and district Goebbels, the internment without trial, of thousands of patriots, the banning of Congress and other organisations and meetings, *lathi charges*, *firing*, *public flogging*, shooting resulting in loss of life and limb to thousands and now summoning an attenuated legislature to ditto Your Excellency's Government are but Maxwellian rendering of Nazi methods designed to terrorise and cow down a whole people fired with the spirit of freedom and democracy and which the allies profess to be fighting for. I know these methods are being justified because of the exigencies of the war and the enemy being at our very gates. If so, you only provide a justification for Hitler and other dictators as well. For have they also not been dangling the fear of war before the eyes of their people and exhorting them to suffer and submit to the authoritarian régime in the wider interests of their respective countries.

But it would serve no useful purpose to argue with Your Excellency on this point. Your mind is made up, having become victim of false reports and misrepresentations regarding the intentions and activities of Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress from the civil service bureaucrats as well as about their ability to isolate and crush the Congress by swift and severe repression. It is a well-known fact that for long, they had been regarding Congress as enemy No. 1 and spoiling for an opportunity to deal a death blow to it in the belief and hope that thereby they would have a smooth sailing in their autocratic career.

May be, you may have fallen victim to delusion created by yourself and Mr. Amery regarding the supposed strength and representative character of your new Councillors who dare not face the people and rather being specially guarded from them.

Whatever the reasons, I still sincerely wish and pray, that you may get disillusioned by the course of events of the last few weeks and realise the error of your judgment, while there is yet time to rally the strength of united India for her defence and for making the world safe for freedom and democracy, for which the Congress has stood and worked all these years. It is indeed a travesty of truth, which cannot deceive people, for long, that the organisation which has been foremost in its condemnation of the Japanese, Italian, and Nazi aggression and which strove to give a tangible form to its sympathy with the victims, while Mr. Amery and other British Statesmen pleaded for appraisement [appeasement?] of and justified aggressors, should be painted "pro-axis" as manœuvring itself into power by blackmail. The Congress President Maulana

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Abul Kalam Azad had emphatically clarified the Congress position when he said we could have waited for India's Independence for a few years longer: but the demand for its recognition forthwith and for the formation of a National Government at the centre, had to be made for the simple and obvious reason that it was not otherwise possible to rally the people for an effective defence of the country at this critical moment. Again he and other leaders have declared more than once that they would not have any objection to the Muslim League or any other party being charged with the task of forming the National Government. Maulana Sahib in his concluding remarks had also made it clear that notwithstanding the growing impatience of some members he would strive till the last for a peaceful settlement and for averting the crisis, and exhorted the people to wait with patience.

But within a few hours of the aforesaid speech, the bureaucratic machinery was set in motion. He along with Mahatmaji and members of the Congress Working Committee was arrested and they were taken to unknown places. The Congress organisation were banned and most of the Congress Workers arrested in all the provinces but one. This served as a signal to rouse up the pent-up feelings of the people and there were mass outbursts all over the country excepting N.-W.F.P. The very fact that N.-W.F.P. [which?] has been one of the foremost provinces in the Congress movement since 1930 did not witness the ugly scenes like the rest of the country should be enough to cast the responsibility for all, that has happened during the last weeks on those who were responsible for the banning of the Congress and the arrest of Congress leaders and workers. Mr. Amery in his broadcast the same evening told the world that by adopting that course he had separated the fuse from the bomb, but in effect he had only removed the powerful and restraining hand.

I do not know as to how Your Excellency's mind has reacted to the happenings of the last few weeks or whether you have been even supplied with true reports of all that has happened in the country. But I have no doubt about the verdict of even the present Legislative Assembly, which has not only lost all touch with the masses, but even with the constituencies; and which for the last five years has been in existence at the sufferance of Your Excellency, if all the information in your possession is placed before it and particularly the information as to how seriously the war effort in India has suffered because of the present policy of repression and suppression.

From what I have seen in places I have visited as well as from reliable reports received by me, I am convinced that the country has witnessed a regular "black and tan"[1] régime and even worse. Jallianwalla Baghs[2] have been enacted at more than one place. To cite only one instance from my own constituency I may refer to Sitapur. Peaceful demonstrators were fired upon to teach them a lesson, and at the lowest computation the number of killed, I am informed is sixty, besides many more injured; although the official report gave only 5 killed.

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Those killed were removed in lorries and disposed of by the police without any post mortem. Two of the litigants received shots in the court room and were killed and their dead bodies were removed by the police in defiance of the order of the Judge directing them to be taken to the hospital. Worse scenes are reported to have been enacted in the Eastern Districts of these Provinces and Mr. Nethersole has been posted at Benares with full powers of the Government to deal with the situation, and I am informed he has been doing so with a vengeance. Railway men belonging to repair gangs have been shot at from the patrol trains and one or two have even been killed. Life has become very cheap specially after the local Government's communiqué issued here, as in other Provinces, that there was not going to be held any judicial enquiry or even any formal inquest into all such happenings. I would, therefore, challenge your Government to give the following information to the Assembly:—

1. The number of times and places where military had to be called to control the situation in the country.
2. The total number of times firing had to be resorted to.
3. The total number of ammunition consumed.
4. The total number of casualties.

Again coming to war effort which according your advisers should have been intensified with the arrest of Mahatmaji and other Congress men, the dislocation of Railway transport and the complete *hartal* at Jamshedpur for nearly three weeks, not to mention strikes in numerous other mills and workshop[s] in India, speak for themselves. I would like you to see that the following information is not withheld from the Assembly on grounds of "public interest".

1. The total number of working hours for which the workers were idle in the country since 9th August.
2. The total amount of loss sustained by the railways. I am reliably informed that the amount of damage caused to the E.I.R. in Lucknow Division alone exceeds a crore of rupees. This figure, of course, does not include the loss of income because of curtailed traffic.
3. The total amount of damage caused to other Government property.

I would also like Your Excellency to place before the Assembly the correspondence that has passed between Mahatma Gandhi and yourself, since his arrest to enable the House to judge for itself about the present situation.

[1] Ex-servicemen recruited to the Royal Irish Constabulary by the British Government to combat the Sinn Féin movement during the Irish troubles of 1919–21; so named because of their mixture of military and constabulary uniforms.

[2] At Amritsar 1919. See Cmd. 534 (1920) *Reports on the Punjab Disturbances April 1919*; Cmd. 681 (1920) *Report of the Committee appointed by the Government of India to investigate the Disturbances in the Punjab etc.*; Cmd. 705 (1920) *Correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State for India on the Report of Lord Hunter's Committee.*

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There is one thing more about which I would like the Assembly to be informed. How have Government been treating thousands of those arrested and detained in connection with the present movement? Perhaps you are aware that they are not allowed to have even interviews with wives and children nor are they permitted to write even business letters. Further they are not allowed even their clothes and beddings from outside nor are they supplied with any newspapers. Besides this they are being subjected to other pin pricks. I wonder how this treatment differs from that meted out in Nazi concentration camps and how long will the Jails remain free from trouble!

In the end I must warn Your Excellency against the false, misleading and complacent communiqués that are being issued by the various provincial Governments. The situation is far from quiet. The bitterness and hatred against the alien Rulers have increased manifold and the righteous indignation in the people is mounting up daily. The Government is no doubt taking extra care to suppress reports of the black doings of its underlings, but it forgets that thereby it has made the whole country a sort of whispering gallery, where all sorts of news—true, false or exaggerated—gets currency without any check.

There may still be persons amongst your Advisers who may be believing that the situation has eased but to my mind they are no better than those who had told you that no class or community was with the Congress or nothing serious would happen on the arrest of Mahatmaji and other leaders. From what I have seen I can say that the country is more determined than ever to do or die in the cause of India's freedom. There is yet time to harness the great enthusiasm amongst the people to the cause of India's defence, but I am afraid if the present policy is persisted the people would be perforce driven beyond the control of even Congress leaders.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the President and members of the Legislative Assembly.

Yours sincerely,
MOHAN LAL SAKSENA

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Mr Eden to Viscount Halifax

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 238

FOREIGN OFFICE, *11 September 1942*

No. 371 SAVING. On August 10th President Quezon telegraphed message[1] to Mr. Gandhi appealing to him to refrain from his contemplated action and inviting him to give his support to United Nations.

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2. Government of India have not thought it possible to make exception to rules against delivery of messages to Mr. Gandhi while under arrest. They suggest that President Quezon should be informed that his message arrived after Mr. Gandhi's arrest and that Government of India, while sincerely appreciating his helpful motive in sending the telegram, regret that it could not be delivered without creating an embarrassing breach of the conditions of his present detention. Government of India add that President Quezon will no doubt appreciate that equal embarrassment would result from publication of a message that has not been delivered.

3. I shall be glad if, provided you see no objection, you will convey message on above lines to President Quezon.

[1] See No. 694.

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Note by Mr Croft

L/E/8/2527: ff 332–6

Note with regard to Sir Stafford Cripps' Memorandum to the Prime Minister dated 2nd September[1]

11 September 1942

We can cordially endorse the view stated in paragraph 4 of the Lord Privy Seal's note that our aim must be to get the maximum support for the war effort, military and industrial, from the greatest possible number of Indians. It is what the rest of us have been trying to do since the war began. He distinguishes between two ways—(1) that of getting agreement from all the representative Indian communities, and (2) that of rallying the active support of all sections of Indian opinion which are prepared, on conditions, to co-operate. He describes the first as that which we have adopted hitherto, but as it has now failed he advocates falling back upon the second. I am sure that those who have been actively following the second way all the time, while doing what can be done in the first way, will be only too glad to have Sir Stafford Cripps with them from now onwards.

Unfortunately it is not so easy in practice as it is in logic to distinguish, as the Lord Privy Seal does in paragraph 12 onwards, between various sections of the Indian public according to whether they are defined upon a communal or upon a class basis. So far as Indian interests are organised upon a class basis at all, and of course this organisation does not proceed at all so far in India as it does in more advanced countries, these organisations (Chambers of Commerce, Industrial

[1] No. 678.

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Federations, Trade Unions, etc.) are linked up with and largely inseparable from the politico-communal lay-out of the country. As a matter of fact it is not so very different here. Sir Stafford might as well talk about trying to conciliate the Trade Union Congress while at daggers drawn with the Labour Party.

However, it is quite clear that Sir Stafford Cripps is not really concerned with rallying support behind the Government for the war effort through dealing with India on some basis other than that of politics, so much as with launching a crusade of social and economic reform, "putting right" as he describes it, "some of the most deep-seated wrongs which affect the mass of the people". There certainly is a large mass of population in India on the lower levels of the social and economic scale for which Congress has very little sympathy or interest and whose conditions will receive very little attention unless that of Government. These are the sub-tenants, the landless agricultural workers, the humbler industrial workers, the depressed classes, the Muslim proletariat of Bengal, etc. Probably the only link between these people and Congress is the personal appeal of Gandhi, and their interests are to a large extent in conflict with those of the rank and file[2] of Congress supporters, whose position is comparatively well protected by tenancy legislation. Apart from the consideration that the real under-dog class has little or no political consciousness or value and that the amelioration of their lot would be mainly a humanitarian task, there is a great practical difficulty in isolating and grappling with their problems, and to the extent that it can be done, it would run the risk of arousing antagonism elsewhere, and from the point of view of mobilising support for Government, the result might be largely, if not entirely, discounted.

The social and economic problems which Sir Stafford Cripps has in mind have, of course, received a great deal of attention from the Central and Provincial Governments for a long time past, and not least in the last ten or twenty years, during which they have mostly fallen within the Provincial field and have been virtually the subject of Self-Government since 1919 and practically entirely so since 1935. Virtually the whole of the ground has been exhaustively explored within recent times by Mr. Whitley's Labour Commission[3] and Lord Linlithgow's Agricultural Commission.[4] As a result of the recommendations of these bodies, a good deal has been done and much is still being progressively undertaken. The beneficial results have been by no means negligible, and they would, of course, have been much more substantial if it were not for certain underlying causes such as the backwardness of education and the growth of the population, and these are adverse factors which can only be controlled gradually and for which no waving of the political wand will suffice.

As regards finance, it is true that some, at any rate, of the Provinces (and, as already mentioned, these problems lie almost entirely in the Provincial field) are at the moment comparatively flush of funds. As a matter of fact the

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Provincial Governments *are* devoting such balances as become available to what are termed the "Nation building" services. Before the war the Centre was for several years able, although the financial situation was far from easy, to set aside funds and place them at the disposal of the Provinces for expenditure upon welfare projects, and it is very much to the credit of Sir James Grigg, who in certain respects anticipated Sir Stafford Cripps in the ideas set out by the latter in his Memorandum, that he made a real effort in this direction during his term as Finance Member. But the position now is that the Centre needs, for war purposes, all the money it can lay its hands upon whether by taxation or by borrowing, and it may well have to encroach upon the income tax resources which are the source of the present affluence of some of the Provinces. In these circumstances, as finance is the motive power in matters of this kind, the Centre is not at present well placed for initiating and encouraging a policy of improvement in the Provincial field.

It has long been apparent (and fundamentally this was the justification for the Act of 1935) that the forces necessary for any great expansion and acceleration of social and economic reform in India can only be generated by harmony and co-operation between an administrative system such as British rule has created in India and the political organisations of the country. Unfortunately the effort to establish these conditions has not succeeded and the conditions for progress could hardly be more unpropitious than they are at present. The outlook for remedial measures is darkened, & the difficulties aggravated, by the prospect of partition.

Apart from finance, a great administrative effort would be needed. Even before the recent disturbances the administrative machine was under severe strain. The demands of the Centre for the staffing of Departments created or expanded for the purposes of the war have been very heavy and it must be doubtful whether the Provincial administrations, overwhelmed as they have been by the present troubles (the effects of which, even if there is no recrudescence, will not disappear all at once) are capable of what would be required if a policy such as the Lord Privy Seal advocates were to be undertaken with any prospect of success.

It would hardly be opportune at this moment, until the internal situation is more fully restored, to call upon the Viceroy and his Advisers who, in any case, are concerned with urgent defence problems enough to occupy all their attention, to examine the possibility of a far-reaching policy of social and economic reform. The immediate future might be usefully employed at this end by

[2] Sir D. Monteath minuted: 'and even more with those of the capitalists who to some extent finance Congress activities'.

[3] The Royal Commission on Labour in India (1929–31) chaired by Mr Whitley; for its report see Cmd. 3883.

[4] The Royal Commission on Agriculture in India (1926–8) chaired by Lord Linlithgow; for its final report see Cmd. 3132.

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expert consideration of Sir Stafford Cripps' suggestions so that, when the Government of India are approached, it may be upon well considered and concrete lines.

The views of several of the Secretary of State's Advisers, for example Sir Atul Chatterjee, Sir John Woodhead, Sir Gilbert Wiles, would be valuable. Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar and Sir Theodore Gregory are available, and there are recently retired officials of great experience and authority such as Lord Hailey, Sir Frank Noyce and Sir Malcolm Darling who might, with advantage, be consulted. Sir George Schuster too, has dealt exhaustively with this subject in the book which he published a year or so ago.[5]

The only piece of constructive thinking that I am able at present to contribute is to wonder whether this may be a good opportunity for attempting to tackle the problem of indebtedness which is one of the more fundamental of the social and economic problems of India. There is quite a plethora of money in the country outside the Government Treasuries. As much as possible of it must be tapped for war purposes. But a good deal is likely to remain untouched by appeals to subscribe to war loans etc. Can it be mobilised for the purpose of placing agricultural credit upon a healthier and sounder basis? As a result of hard times and various legislative measures in recent years the money-lending classes have taken a hard knock and are distinctly under the weather. The cultivator himself, though he probably did not benefit much during the first two years or so of the war, has been doing well for the last year or so and is benefiting from the present level of prices which seems likely to be maintained. So often in the past when prosperity has come the cultivator's way its effects have been short-lived and the chance of a lasting improvement of his position has been missed. It may be that this is the time, whether by means of an intensive campaign to strengthen and expand agricultural co-operative credit, or by some other means, to set matters upon a sounder basis and to lay the foundation for a regime in which the money-lender will perform a more beneficial and less oppressive function.

It is no doubt to be agreed that nothing that we may do in the immediate future for the welfare of the population at large should be allowed to interfere with or subtract from the arrangements which must be made for the re-habilitation in normal civilian life of the men who have been serving in the Army or otherwise helping in the war effort. These undoubtedly at the present time have the first claim upon whatever resources are available.

W. D. C.

[5] Schuster and Wint, *India and Democracy* (London, 1941).

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Mr Sherwood Eddy to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

52 VANDERBILT AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY, *11 September 1942*

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

Lord Halifax promises to cable you introducing me, if I can get a seat on an airplane for India. This is doubtful as seats must be taken for the fighting forces. I enclose a rough draft of a tentative four-fold plan for India, after much thought and consultation with Indian leaders and British friends in America.

I gave thirty of the best years of my life to India. (I was Secretary for Asia of the Y.M.C.A.) I am pro-British, my wife being of an old English County family, and I felt while in India that the Government of India by Britain was the finest instance in history of the Government of one people by another. I am pro-Indian, having long been a friend of Gandhi and Nehru, living in the homes with both men. And I am pro-United Nations which must be deeply concerned in the winning of the war.

I went through the crisis of 1920 with Lord Lloyd in Bombay when Gandhi was in prison, and with Lord Halifax when as Lord Irwin he was Viceroy of India, when he sent me with messages to Gandhi on the eve of the violence of 1930. I recognize the extreme danger of the present situation and my only concern is to find some common ground for reconciliation in the present menacing deadlock, so dangerous for India, for Britain, and for the United Nations.

The enclosed rough draft I shall take up with you first, if I come to India, and then seek the agreement for some mediating position on behalf of all parties. I am sending the enclosed by airmail as I fear the time is short in the present crisis.

Very sincerely yours,
SHERWOOD EDDY

Enclosure to No. 732

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

A COMPOSITE ROUGH DRAFT FOR ALTERATION AND SUGGESTION.

A FOUR-FOLD PLAN FOR INDIA

(REVISED SEPTEMBER 11TH, 1942)

(Provided conditions change so that any plan can be considered.)

Prime Minister Churchill expressly stated the aim of the British Government when Sir Stafford Cripps was sent to India "to rally *all forces of Indian life* to

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guard their land from the menace of the invader".[1] It will not be easy to achieve this purpose or for the four principal parties concerned to agree upon any compromise—the British Government, the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, and the Princes of the Indian States. These four parties stand at the four corners of a quadrilateral. It may be possible, if each yields something, to agree upon some compromise or mediating position which will safeguard the rights, the interests and the prestige of each; and also to make India, like China, an asset and a whole-hearted Ally in the war. It is here that every one of the United Nations is vitally concerned, for what happens to India may affect the length of the war and the sacrifice of our own sons, and there will be inevitable and increasing pressure for arbitration or conciliation unless these four parties can reach an agreement and end the present fatal deadlock.

The settlement of the Indian question will affect the faith [?fate] of a billion Asiatics and hundreds of millions in South America and other continents. We cannot conduct a global war with a Provincial or imperialist psychology. Speaking individually on behalf of the United Nations, Lin Yutang well says: "If justice is not given to India now, the world will refuse to believe that justice will be given to the world at our peace conference."

The following four-fold plan is offered only as a tentative proposal for further alteration and suggestion to achieve the common end. While much of the controversy in India arises from differences of opinion as to the post-war constitutional proposals it is the present military urgency which will be decisive; therefore the following plan first seeks a solution of the present impasse:

(1) Yield to the demand of the Congress and the majority of Indian leaders for Indian participation in the defence of the country in a war-time Provisional Government. The Provisional Government might consist of a personnel of fifteen or more members mutually agreed upon from all parties willing to co-operate in the defence of India. They would be chosen chiefly from a panel proposed by the Congress, the Muslim League, and the Indian States. The Provisional Government should include an equal number of representatives of the Congress and the Muslim League, say five each chosen from a panel of ten submitted by each. No individual and no party should be included in the Provisional Government if unwilling to co-operate whole-heartedly in the armed defence of India.

The Provisional Indian Government will guarantee not to make a separate peace, as other United Nations have already done, and effective guaranties shall be agreed upon between the United Nations and the Provisional Government of India which will enable the United Nations to conduct the war against the Axis, in accordance with military exigencies, with the full co-operation of the Provisional Government. In the event of a deadlock between the Viceroy

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and the Provisional Government affecting the defence of India, the matter shall be referred to a Standing Commission composed of representatives of the United Nations concerned. In view of the regrettable bitterness and distrust on all sides in the present deadlock, if necessary two of the leaders of the United Nations, Chiang Kai-shek and President Roosevelt might be asked to use their good offices to see that an equitable agreement is reached and that the promises of a post-war settlement are kept.

While it is agreed on all hands that the setting up of a new Constitution in India and the formal attainment of full self-government will have to wait till the termination of hostilities, it is suggested that the status of a free and equal partner of the British Commonwealth be accorded to India as soon as the Provisional Government is set up. The Provisional Government would be free to appoint its own envoys and Ministers to the United Nations. Should Britain agree to this suggestion, the United States, China and Soviet Russia could recognize India's new status, and accord diplomatic recognition to India's envoys on the same footing as to representatives of other self-governing parts of the British Commonwealth. This will be recognition in advance, as it were, of the full self-determination guaranteed to India at the end of the war.

(2) Follow the suggestion of Sir Stafford Cripps' final broadcast to the people of India where he said: "To show our complete sincerity of desire to give to representative Indian members on the Executive Council the maximum power, we offered to create a new War Department which would take over the governmental relations of the Commander-in-Chief, general headquarters and naval and air headquarters, which would be in his charge as war member, leaving the rest of the Defence Department with a number of other most important functions added, to the Indian defence member."[2] Under this suggestion, allow a genuine Indian Defence Minister in the Viceroy's Council "with power to organize and arm the Indian people".

If Japan seriously threatens to invade India, this armament of the Indian people at the eleventh hour cannot go far because of the lack of arms, but it would be at least a gesture of sincerity, confidence and goodwill which might be enough, if not "too little and too late", to make India's 390,000,000 people, though mostly unarmed, feel that they would resist to the death, whether with Nehru's violence or Gandhi's non-violence. In fairness it must be remembered that Gandhi's seemingly defeatist policy of non-violence against Japan was adopted by the Congress only when Britain refused to allow India to defend herself. Neither Gandhi nor Nehru wanted an instant withdrawal of the British that would leave a vacuum, anarchy or chaos.

(3) As for the future, retain the premiss of the Cripps proposal that the post-war Constitution of India be drawn up by Indians themselves. However,

[1] See Vol. I, Nos. 308–9. [2] Vol. I, No. 609.

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omit what seemed to many Indians a gratuitous invitation to secession which would make provision in advance for a divided, torn, and mangled India. To prevent such a division, 600,000 lives were sacrificed in the United States under Abraham Lincoln to preserve the Union. Following Sir Stafford Cripps' proposals: "Immediately upon cessation of hostilities, steps will be taken to set up in India an elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for India. Provision shall be made for participation of Indian States in the constitution-making body. . . . Secondly, the signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body. The treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands."[3]

(4) The Hindus, Muslims and other parties may seek to agree on a Federal Constitution with the maximum possible autonomy and residuary powers vested in the Provinces, the Central Government retaining only the minimum powers necessary for the common defence of the country and uniform administration of trans-Provincial matters. Or, in lieu of this plan, instead of a Pakistan embracing several scattered Provinces and possibly some Indian States, allow a tentative period of five, or better, ten years, for a united India to see if it can be as peacefully administered as Indian States now are, whether the Ruler is Hindu or Muslim. After the agreed period of say ten years, allow one year for peaceful education by both parties, then a plebiscite of all Muslims, or their representatives, to vote whether they wish a united India or Pakistan; a majority vote to determine the issue. An initial Pakistan would probably prove to be an impractical, economically impoverished, and therefore impossible division of India (as in the case of Vermont which finally assented to the American Constitution on economic grounds); but it is nevertheless imperative that the Muslim League should be allowed the bargaining point in the Constitutional Convention of the right, *in principle*, of the majority of the Muhammadans to set up a separate Muslim State if they wish. This would give them weightage in representation against the Hindu majority without suggesting an India divided by an initial Pakistan.

The United Nations have a stake in this conflict. It is for this reason that Chiang Kai-shek urges an immediate realisation of self-government: "Without waiting for any demand on the part of the Indian people, as speedily as possible give them real political power so that they will be in a position to develop further their spiritual and material strength. The Indian people thus would realize that their participation in the war was not merely to aid anti-aggression nations . . . but also the turning point in their struggle for their own freedom." Under the present deadlock as the London *New Statesman and Nation* have written editorially: "What Britain asks of India is to fight not for herself, but for the British Empire . . . We must give India a national government today."

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We must remember that the Cripps offer which seemed so generous to most Anglo-Saxons was rejected by the Congress, the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikhs, and nearly all liberals who desire a united, self-governing India. And it must be remembered that there has never been such ominous bitterness in India during the last fifty years of agitation as at the present moment.

If the four corners of the quadrilateral, each guarding exclusively their own interests, remain intransigent, there will be no settlement. We drift towards the abyss of either a Japanese invasion or a growingly violent Indian revolution. Either might have dire consequences to the cause of the United Nations. Must not each make some concession in the interests of winning the war and the peace, both of which are going to be incalculably difficult? In the present world crisis, cannot all parties agree upon some concession, some compromise, some mediating position? Every item in the above program has been suggested by Indians in America, whether Hindus, Muslims, or Sikhs, not in the interests of their own community, but of a possible new India and the new world.

SHERWOOD EDDY

[3] See Vol. I, No. 456: Draft Declaration (published 30 March 1942) paras. (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*) (ii). Cmd. 6350.

733

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *12 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2762–S. Your private and personal telegram of 9th September.[1] We have managed with very great difficulty to secure postponement of questions until 21st September but there is no chance whatever of our being able to get further postponement owing to shortness of session. It is of greatest importance as you will appreciate that we should be able to dispose of these questions since grave misunderstanding may otherwise arise. I hope and am sure, that you will do everything in your power to try to get this business settled on the 18th, and hope you will be able to reassure me as to this.

[1] No. 720.

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734

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *12 September 1942, 11.20 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 12 September, 9.50 pm*

No. 2768–S. I have not yet had full text of yesterday's debate[1] but am most grateful to you and to Prime Minister for all the support you have given us. As might have been expected the Prime Minister's statement[2] has had an extremely bad Hindu and Congress reception. On the other hand I have not the least doubt that it has given renewed confidence to the Muslims, Depressed Classes, Princes, and also to those substantial sections among the Hindus who do not in fact sympathise in their hearts with the point of view of Congress. Of my colleagues Sultan Ahmed, who is definitely "progressive" was so delighted with the fillip given to the Muslims that he was quite content to overlook for once the absence of "constructive effort"! Moh[amma]d Usman in an interview at Bombay when asked for his view on the Prime Minister's statement, replied that it had given a real picture of the situation in India today. Mody on the other hand is extremely depressed.

2. Mody has made one point which might be worth passing to you, viz. that he is most anxious that we should not continue to underline the Indian character of the government which has put Gandhi and the Working Committee in prison.[3] I think the fact is in fact sufficiently appreciated by now by anyone who takes any interest in Indian politics, and that we can afford to cease emphasising it and revert to the general description "the Government of India".

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, 11 September 1942, cols. 552–630.
[2] *Ibid.*, 10 September 1942, cols. 302–5. [3] Cf. No. 468.

735

Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 246

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *12 September 1942, 9.20 pm*
Received: 12 September, 8 pm

7266. Prime Minister's statement of September 10th as reported here includes passage that "less than 500 persons have been killed and it has only been necessary to move a few brigades of British troops here and there in support of

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civil power". Our telegram 349–S.C[1] dated September 5th gave incomplete figures of casualties caused by police, not repeat not including Bihar, as 340 killed and added that details of casualties caused by military were not yet available but were probably less than those caused by police. Military figures are now to hand and come to 318 killed. Same telegram stated at height of disturbance equivalent of 57 battalions were employed that is to say far more than a few brigades. It is possible Prime Minister's statement was due to mistakes in deciphering my telegram. In any case Home Member proposes to give correct figures in his statement on September 15th, as being based on latest information now available. Have you any objection?

[1] No. 698.

736

Mr Churchill to Mr Eden and Mr Amery

L/PO/5/41: f 30

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, *12 September 1942*

Reference: Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State for India No. 2748–S,[1] 10th September, 1942.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Secretary of State for India.
In view of Viceroy's deliberate opinion we should deprecate Eddy's visit.

W. S. C.

[1] No. 724.

737

Mr Amery to Sir Kingsley Wood

L/PO/2/16: f 115

12 September 1942

My dear Kingsley,
Please see the enclosed telegram[1] from the Viceroy. It is, of course, very important from his point of view to be able to give some sort of answer in the Legislature to questions asked about Raisman's Mission here. So I hope you will be able to see the P.M. as soon as possible after he gets back and we can get the matter definitely settled in Cabinet next week.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

[1] No. 733.

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Sir D. Monteath to Sir G. Laithwaite

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: ff 43–4

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *13 September 1942, 12.45 pm*
Received: 14 September

1116. Laithwaite from Monteath. Your telegram 9th September 2736–S[1] to Turnbull. I am issuing confidential instructions to Heads of Departments to the following effect, subject to modification in the light of experience:—

(1) Telegrams exchanged with the Crown Representative should be withheld absolutely.

(2) Telegrams marked personal to or from the Governor-General or Viceroy,[2] subject to exception noted in your paragraph 8, to be withheld unless specifically requested from your end to be made available.

(3) Telegrams exchanged with External Affairs Department ditto. It seems possible that some External Affairs telegrams will cover questions of trade or supply, of which Mudaliar might suitably be made aware, but we must rely on your end for guidance.

(4) Official telegrams in other Departments to be made available if—

(*a*) knowledge of contents is necessary for discussion of questions on agenda for Cabinet which Representatives will attend. This on an *ad hoc* basis, or

(*b*) they deal with matters of Commerce, Supply and War Transport Departments, with which Mudaliar might be expected to be concerned in India.

(5) Except in respect of telegrams arising out of a decision of Cabinet attended by Indian Representatives, telegrams from India Office initiating a new topic of correspondence will be withheld until a reply from Government of India has been received and indicates that both can be furnished. Telegrams of this class falling into category (4) (*b*) will be supplied unless, repeat unless, India indicates to the contrary.

In regard to official telegrams not covered by foregoing, we should be grateful for guidance in each case though we realise delicacy involved at your end in affording it.[3]

[1] No. 718. [2] Deciphered as 'are'.

[3] Sir G. Laithwaite replied in telegram 2832–S of 21 September agreeing to these arrangements except that he preferred to leave External Affairs telegrams on trade or supply (see para. (3) above) to the complete discretion of the Secretary of State unless such telegrams emanating from India were accompanied by a personal telegram advising against distribution to Sir A. R. Mudaliar. Circulation of other official Government of India telegrams would likewise be left to Secretary of State's discretion. L/P&J/8/560: ff 40–1.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: ff 182–3

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *13 September 1942, 5.25 pm*
Received: 14 September

1117. Eden has suggested[1] to me that it would help ensure that United States Government and President should get sound advice on India if they could appoint to reside at Delhi a high calibre American in whom both we and the President could have confidence and who would be sufficiently well-known figure to command confidence of American public. Eden suggests that Halifax should put this suggestion to the President.

2. I should be glad of your views on this idea which has attractions. It would enable an American of type suggested to stay long enough in India and in sufficiently close contact with you to grasp and represent to his Government intricacies of the Indian problem. It might stop ill-informed intervention by United States Govnt. or American public men of the type referred to in your telegram 2662–S[2] of 31st August to Prime Minister and reduce danger of special emissaries occasionally descending on you. Vacant post of United States Commissioner at Delhi could be used, or President might prefer to adopt more anomalous course of appointing personal representative and keep Commissionership in abeyance. In either case, however, lack of diplomatic status might deter a big man from accepting the job. A further difficulty is that a big man might be reluctant to stay long and would be the more tempted to interfere in Indian politics, while a lesser figure would not carry enough guns at Washington. There is also the question whether we should encourage the Americans to depart from their original intention of filling Commissionership with Foreign Service officer.

3. Halifax reports that question of Johnson's successor is being canvassed in United States, but O'Grady [Grady] has told Bajpai[3] that a point which needs consideration is whether despatch of new representative in present conditions might be misunderstood as a move towards American intervention. It seems however worth while to face this risk and get it over in order to obtain a good American who would stay in India permanently rather than have it hanging over us constantly whenever any American public man visits India. Moreover it could be largely neutralised by suitable publicity concerted with United States Govnt. when appointment is announced.

[1] See No. 610. [2] No. 662. [3] See No. 619.

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740

Reports of a Press Conference held by Mr Jinnah

MSS. EUR. F. 125/137[1]

NEW DELHI, *13 September 1942*

UNITED PRESS OF INDIA

At a Press conference today Mr. M. A. Jinnah reiterated the Congress attitude as "insensible and a call for civil war". So long as the Congress and other Hindu leaders claimed to represent the whole of India and continued to "camouflage", there could be no honourable settlement.

"I always dread a dishonourable settlement between the British Government and the Congress," said Mr. Jinnah. The Muslim League's demand was reasonable and left three-fourths of India to the Hindus. They were the Hindus, who had been bargaining for the one-fourth of India, which the Muslims claimed as their birthright. Pakistan was not a scheme but was their birthright.

Mr. Jinnah explained Mr. Churchill's speech[2] meant that the Congress did not represent the Muslims and other minorities or interests. The Muslim League was prepared, subject to agreement among all parties regarding the extent of transfer of power, for a provisional and composite Government, provided all parties guaranteed the Muslim right of separation and division of India after the war. The British Government was one of the most important party[?ies], because they were in possession.

Continuing Mr. Jinnah said the Muslim League was not co-operating in the war effort because, he said, "I could not play the rôle of a recruiting Sergeant to collect men, money and materials without having any voice in their disposition. But the Muslim League, however, is not non-co-operating. They would give five hundred per cent. more than the present trouble. Comparisons are odious but the Muslims have got more guts. We appreciate danger but the British Government does not value or care for Muslim co-operation and that is why they do not invite the Muslim League in forming a Government."

Foreign correspondents were present at the conference in large numbers.

REUTER TELEGRAM

"My fundamental point is this that we do not want, under the stress of the war emergency, to be stampeded into forming a provisional government which should be of such a character and composition as would prejudge, prejudice or militate against the Muslim demand for Pakistan", declared Mr. M. A. Jinnah, in replying to questions at a Press conference today.

"Subject to agreement and adjustments which are satisfactory to us", he went on "I put no limit to the degree of power being transferred; but that is

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subject to this proviso, which is a *sine qua non*, that all parties must agree and guarantee the right of Mussalmans to self-determination, and they should pledge themselves to give effect to the verdict of a Muslim plebiscite and carry out the partition of India accordingly. If this proviso was not complied with, and if the Provisional Government was to be formed without the framework of the present constitution and on lines which are urged in important quarters, then it will mean our walking like a fly walking into the spider's parlour; because, if the Provisional Government is to be formed outside the framework of the present constitution, it will involve and must necessarily involve radical and fundamental constitutional changes, and once these changes are made, it will be difficult after the war if we are left without the guarantee and the proviso, upon which we are insisting so much."

Invited to say what he thought of Mr. Churchill's speech, Mr. Jinnah said:— "I have already expressed my views about the Congress movement. It is not possible to defend the indefensible. I particularly want to emphasise that this is not merely a declaration of war against the British and the Government but it is a war against the Muslim League and the non-Congress organisations, who were neither consulted nor referred to, but in spite of whose disapproval and in utter disregard of whom, the civil disobedience movement has been launched, in order to force their demands which are most strenuously opposed by the Muslim League and no less by other minorities and interests in the country. It is axiomatic to say that this is unlawful and unconstitutional because its avowed object is to subvert the government established by law but the greater objection, the much stronger objection, is that this is a declaration of internecine civil war."

Mr. Jinnah disputed a correspondent's interpretation of Mr. Churchill's speech as declaring that the Congress was not important. "The correct reading of the speech, as I understand it, is that the Congress has put forward the entirely false claim that it represents the whole of India, that it is the spokesman of India. I think no man [who?] has got any sense of fairness can possibly say that that is a claim which has got any foundation whatever in it. But that was the claim made in the speech of Mr. Gandhi at the conclusion of the last meeting of the All-India Congress Committee, and also in the speech of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Mr. Gandhi most emphatically maintained in his last speech that the Congress alone represented India; so did Mr. Nehru and he went further and said that the All-India Muslim League was a reactionary body and that the Muslim masses were with the Congress and the Congress represented the whole of India. That is not only broadcast here; it is broadcast all over the world, which people naturally not knowing the realities of Indian conditions believe it.

[1] Enclosed in the letter of 15 September from the Assistant Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State.

[2] See No. 734, note 2.

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This sinister and systematic propaganda is carried on to mislead people, and if you read Mr. Churchill's speech he repudiates that claim."

A correspondent tried to point out that the Congress claim was not that it represented the whole of India. Mr. Jinnah, however, overruled him and said he did not wish to enter into an argument.

"I really think," Mr. Jinnah proceeded, "so long as this camouflage is maintained by the Congress and other Hindu leaders, who directly or indirectly subscribe to that proposition, believe me, there cannot be any reasonable chance of an honourable settlement."

An American correspondent: "Do you anticipate the possibility of a dishonourable settlement being imposed on India?"

Mr. Jinnah: "So far as the Mussalmans are concerned, that has been my fear." "We know in history", he added, "many instances of dishonourable action on the part of the most civilised nations in the world."

Questioned about the Hindu Mahasabha, Mr. Jinnah said: "If I may say so, it is the same. In fact, I think the Hindu Mahasabha is much stronger so far as Mussalmans are concerned. They make no secret of it, be it said to their credit. They don't resort to camouflage or finesse. Bluntly and pointblank they say they want to establish a Hindu Raj in this sub-continent and Mussalmans must submit to it, and if Mussalmans don't behave themselves they will be treated as the Jews are treated."

Reverting to Mr. Churchill's speech, Mr. Jinnah said that speech supported the Muslim League point of view that the British Government did not want Muslim co-operation and did not attach sufficient value to it. "Mr. Churchill referred to the ninety millions of Muslims fundamentally opposed to the Congress. He then went on to say they had their right of self-expression. This to [is?] the only gracious reference by the British Prime Minister to the resolution of the Muslim League passed in Bombay on August 20th, 1942.[3] Is this an indication that there is any desire to seek our co-operation? Is this the only value you attach to the Mussalmans and the Muslim League, that they are opposed to the Congress, which is a fact, and they have the right of self-expression, which is a self-evident truth? Is that all he has to say?"

Asked if there was any chance of a modification of the Muslim demand, Mr. Jinnah said: "If you start by asking for sixteen annas, there is room for bargaining. The Muslim League has never put forward any demand which can by any reasonable man be characterised as unreasonable. The Muslim League stands for independence for the Hindus and for the Mussalmans. Hindu India has got three-fourths of India in its pocket and it is Hindu India which is bargaining to see if it can get the remaining one-fourth for itself and diddle us out of it."

An American correspondent asked: "Would you be willing to join a national government with those who are willing to form one?"

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Mr. Jinnah answered by a counter-question: "Does it not assume that it is in my power to shift from 10 Aurangazeb Road (Mr. Jinnah's Delhi residence) to the Viceregal Lodge whenever I choose and say I am going to form a national government. How is it to be formed and by whom?"

Pressed for an elucidation, Mr. Jinnah went on to point out that the British Government had completely ignored every other party except the Congress. The *Times* for instance stated that no settlement could be made which ignored the Congress. "I entirely disagree with that statement. But reading these things, the impression left on my mind is that the British policy still continues to be this that while protesting and emphasising that the Congress attitude is an impossible one, nevertheless, nothing can be done unless you bring the Congress along with you. I very strongly object to it. It comes to this that you are dictated to by one party."

Asked to elaborate his conception of a provisional composite government Mr. Jinnah said: "It means a government formed for a specific purpose during the period of the war." "I don't exclude anybody," he went on, "unless that body excludes itself. I don't proceed on the hypothesis that this party or that party is to be excluded. If we have to undertake the responsibility, I think it is obvious that those who want to undertake the responsibility would naturally do their utmost to get all the help, assistance and co-operation from every section of the people, unless that body, person or organisation makes itself or himself impossible."

"The Muslim League is not supporting the war effort," Mr. Jinnah declared in answer to questions put by an American "It is not that the Muslim League is recalcitrant or inimical but it is unable to give whole-hearted and enthusiastic support and co-operation in the prosecution of the war unless people feel they have their real voice and share in the government of the country."

"But," he went on, "however much we may deplore and condemn the policy of the British Government during the last three years, nevertheless, our position is that of a melon. Whether the melon falls on the knife or the knife falls on the melon, it is the melon that gets cut. Suppose out of my bitterness and anger at British policy, I was to say tomorrow: 'Embarrass, non-co-operate with the British Government, believe me, it will create at least five hundred times more trouble, than was being experienced today.'

"It is not a question of guts; Mussalmans have five hundred times more guts," Mr. Jinnah said in reply to further questions. "Any intelligent man in India will tell you. I don't want to cast any reflection on the Hindu. It is temperament and the way in which he is brought up. But I say to myself: 'True, we can give five hundred times more trouble, but with what result?' I can only see two results following. The foreign aggressor will seize this country, may be from east, west, south or north. If that happens, what have I achieved with all my sacrifices.

[3] No. 598.

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And if the other parties are with me, it means internecine civil war. The other result is that if this revolution is set on foot by the Mussalmans, I feel that even if it is successful in paralysing British power, the consequences of so doing will be that India will be broken to bits. And when I contemplate these results, however much I condemn British policy and however strongly I feel, I say I am in the position of the melon."

"Could you influence the Indian soldiers?" asked a correspondent.

Mr. Jinnah made it clear that he was making a statement in reply to a specific question and was not saying bloodcurdling things of his own accord. "If" he said, "the Muslim League were to decide—mind you, I am not in touch with anybody—but I have very little doubt in my mind that a very large body in the army will fall out, and today almost 65 per cent. of the army are Mussalmans. And, not only that, but I think you will find the entire frontier ablaze. Reading newspapers that I get from other Muslim countries, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, lately Turkey and Egypt, the entire Middle East right up to Ankara and Cairo are not only in full sympathy with the Muslim demand but they are strenuously supporting it."

741

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *14 September 1942, 9.15 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 14 September, 8.15 pm*

No. 2778–S. Reuter will have carried Jinnah's statement to Press yesterday,[1] from which you will see that he is quite uncompromising on the Pakistan issue. I do not gather that S. P. Mookerjee got any change out of him though the conversation seems to have been both lengthy and polite. Mookerjee has reported to me on the general position that he has succeeded in securing a substantial measure of support in favour of the stand taken by him[2] as he has secured the support of Rajagopalachari, Jayakar, Munshi, Tara Singh and Maharaj Singh, and also has the support of the Premier of Sind and the President of the Momin conference,[3] and has met representatives of European and Indian commercial interests, and Jinnah, with whom he describes his discussion as having been "of a preliminary character and we tried to understand each other's point of view". He goes on to say that it is now essential that he should get into touch with Congress leaders and asks that he and one or two members of his Committee should be allowed to go and see Gandhi.

2. I do not believe that Mookerjee has made any advance that matters. I am not prepared to allow him to go and see Gandhi, and I have replied

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informing him that I had made it clear in the course of our conversation a few days ago that that was the case. The individuals he mentions as supporting the stand taken by the Mahasabha are all respectable and some of them important: but there is nothing behind them that matters. Equally, so far as Muslims are concerned, Jinnah is the only person that matters.

[1] See No. 740. [2] See Nos. 722, para. 1, and 728. [3] Muhammed Zaheer-ud-din.

742

Secretary of State to Government of India, Home Department

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 245

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *14 September 1942, 2.30 pm*

16121. Your telegram of the 12th September 7266.[1] Casualty figures etc. I do not know exactly how Prime Minister arrived at his figures. It would of course be very unfortunate to issue figures only a few days after his speech which might indicate a casualty list twice that given by him. I should be glad if you would do what you can to avoid this on plea that figures are still incomplete. Publication would matter less after two or three weeks interval.

2. As regards troops you will note that Prime Minister's reference was confined to *British* troops.

[1] No. 735.

743

Mr Churchill to Mr Amery

L/P&J/8/617: f 304

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, *14 September 1942*

Prime Minister's Personal Minute: Serial No. M. 373/2

Secretary of State for India.

Please let me have a note on Mr. Gandhi's intrigues with Japan and the documents which the Government of India published, or any other they possessed before on this topic. The note should not exceed three pages of open[1] typescript.

W. S. C.

[1] i.e. double spaced.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *14 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of the 24th August.[1] I fear that pressure has continued to be so heavy that I have been unable to send you the fuller account, which I was anxious to send you of my talks with my colleagues about the Indian constitutional position, &c. If I can I will put a letter together and get it into the bag tomorrow. But I can at any event let you have, and will put into this bag, a sketch of my opening remarks[2] to them and of my concluding statement.[3] Both of these were manuscript notes which I read out to them. You realise, I know, that when I first decided that it would be wise for me to take the initiative in this matter, I reached that conclusion because I was aware, as I explained in earlier letters, that the Hindu part of the Council, *plus* Mody and Sultan Ahmed, were circulating a memorandum[4] specifically directed to the opening of the general question of advance, the Indianisation of my Council, the association of non-official opinion with the Government of the Section 93 Provinces, and the Secretary of State's controls. I am satisfied that the course I took was the wise one, though it involved risks which I have admitted to you in our correspondence by letter and by telegram. Prior to my move a good deal was appearing in the Press clearly from inspired sources, as to the intentions of certain of my Indian colleagues and the line which their representations to me were likely to follow. Since my statement there has not been a word. I think that those of my colleagues who were anxious to push ahead on lines with which you and I are familiar have realised that there is no hope of any unanimous recommendation by Council as a whole; that the communal issue had come out in the worst form possible; and also that they could not rely on my support for their propositions, still less on the support or acquiescence of His Majesty's Government.

2. The latest developments in the political sphere here have a very direct relation to this. By the latest developments I mean the abortive attempts (for I think they are abortive) of Shyama Prasad Mookerjee and the Mahasabha to secure the acceptance of the Mahasabha, &c. as a foundation on which we could build an immediate move,[5] the Prime Minister's statement[6] and your own very valuable and lucid connected statement[7] in the debate which has just taken place; and, not least important, Jinnah's discussions yesterday[8] with the Press, of which I will if I can get it send you a full Press report by the

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bag. Jinnah's Press conference made it clear beyond the least question that the Muslims will do no business except on their own terms, and that those terms involving as they do acceptance of Pakistan, of a Muslim plebiscite, of the partition of India, and the like, are such that it is almost inconceivable that the Hindu majority could ever accept them as a basis of agreement. What begins to emerge from that series of facts is (and I hope that it will begin to percolate into the minds of those concerned) that there is little if any prospect of any advance during the war (and I fear that the prospects of any advance at the post-war conference are no greater). If that is so they may begin to think again and to conclude that the wise course will be (as I have no doubt myself that it is) to concentrate upon and to use my expanded Council, the composition of that Council remaining very much as it is today. That Council may in other words well have to hold the fort for a very considerable time to come. If this is so, any injury to its prestige which its members may feel has been done by the Cripps discussions or the like should begin to assume its proper place in the general perspective and to disappear into the background. And if we could but get it into people's heads that this was going to be the position, and that the right horse to back was an Executive Council of the present type, run by the Governor-General of the day, without any concession on vital points of principle, but in a sympathetic and responsive manner, assisted, again without any concessions on points of principle but in a sympathetic and responsive manner, by the Secretary of State of the day and the Government of the day at home, and that such an arrangement was likely to give India as a whole as good a government, and the Indian with political aspirations as good an opportunity of influencing the policy and the conclusions of that Government, as any arrangement of a purely political character based on the checks and balances of sharply opposed and deeply divided communal representations, with the Governor-General as the mediator and the guide. In other words, what we can do to help this Council (without, I repeat, giving way where questions of high principle are concerned) may be worth while. People I am certain are beginning now, even here, to find themselves forced to admit that the obstacle to progress is not our reluctance to part with power, but the fundamental facts of the Indian situation, which are that neither party dislike us so much as they dislike one another, and that no party can run this country without our assistance—assistance which we shall not be prepared to give to one side or to the other to enable it to dominate its opponents, but assistance which is in any event essential unless we are to have a relapse into internal chaos, and civil war.

[1] No. 626. [2] No. 554. [3] No. 666. [4] No. 483.
[5] See Nos. 722, para. 1, and 728.
[6] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, 10 September 1942, cols. 302–5.
[7] *Ibid.*, 11 September 1942, cols. 604–20. [8] See No. 740.

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3. The provinces of course represent a most intractable problem to the extent that, where Section 93 is in force, they contain a majority of electors who are prepared to support the Congress claims. In the Parliamentary Provinces things are not too bad. The Punjab has shown how successfully a nicely balanced system can be worked. In Bengal, where of course there is often cause for anxiety and no one can claim that the existing arrangement is quite ideal, Parliamentary government has for all that worked for six years. In Assam and in Sind Parliamentary government has not worked badly. Lewis, for the time being at any rate, is able to work it in Orissa. I am telegraphing to you separately about non-official advisers, &c.[9] for the remaining provinces, and I shall have to seek your view as to the case for abandoning uniformity on that matter—there are strong arguments for and against. But it is the Section 93 Provinces, so long at any rate as the official policy of Congress remains what it is today, which in many ways give us the hardest nut to crack.

4. In that connection you mention a very interesting point in paragraph 4 of your letter to which I am now replying. I will only say on that that no one could have listened to the recent discussions which I have had in Council—discussions one's judgment of the trend of which is reinforced by the much more frank and open private talks which I have with individuals and colleagues —without noticing how strongly the Indian, particularly the Hindu, mind veers towards a strong centre, and how small is the confidence in the capacity of the Province to run its own show well. Equally (and perhaps arising out of what I have just said) there is the strong anxiety of the Hindu elements to see India kept as one—an anxiety which becomes greater every day with the growing insistence of the Muslims on the necessity for partition and for the recognition of the right, in practice as well as in theory, of the minority elements to go their own way. I do not propose to weary you with the arguments against Pakistan. You and I know one another's minds on that subject and are fully familiar with the strength of those arguments. But Jinnah, anxious as he may be to turn this question to advantage in his political battle, must in his own mind, for his intelligence is considerable, realise that problems of finance, tariff control, of assistance from the Centre, and the like which any separation must involve, are all of first-class importance and significance, and must realise too both that they have to be faced, and how hard a battle would be fought over them by the Hindu side in any negotiations or discussions designed to lead to an agreement on the basis of partition.

5. In paragraph 6 of your letter you touch on Cripps and his effect on my Council. I think this is a business that we must leave to find its own level. I have suggested above that there may be circumstances in which it will pass out of people's minds. The trouble is that my colleagues do not believe in Cripps: they have formed the strong impression, widely shared throughout the political

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parties, that when he came out here he came out to play his own hand and that he was not honest with them; and for that reason the tributes which he has paid to my Council and the like have fallen completely flat here. I am doing all I can to damp down criticism, and divert people's minds into other channels. But I do not think you would find any political party or any prominent individual (and I base myself not only on public statements, discussion in Council, or conversations; but on a wide range of intercepted correspondence between persons prominent in the political world) who is prepared to give him any credit for endeavours which I fully accept were genuinely meant to lead this country in the way in which it professes to desire to go. I am grateful to you and to the Prime Minister for what you have said about my Council, and that I think does carry weight.

6. I am still turning this business of the succession to C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar over in my mind. As you know I suggested Srivastava.[10] But Maxwell I find somewhat averse from putting him in for reasons which I think have force, and, as I am conscious that there is a good deal of pressure for an increase in the Muslim percentage in my Council,[11] I have on further reflection more or less come down in favour of giving the Department to a Muslim, either from my existing Council or from outside. I toyed with the idea of Firoz as suggested by you:[12] and I have not altogether given that up yet. But Defence (though it may not be a very heavy portfolio) is one very much in the public eye, and much play has been made with the significance of Firoz's appointment. Equally, Information and Broadcasting is of great potential political importance, and as you know you and I agreed that it was a sufficiently substantial post to be worth earmarking for C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar. I think that if we were now to combine the two portfolios we might expose ourselves to a certain amount of criticism and to the suggestion that neither of them really represented anything like as important a charge as we had been inclined to make out. That being so, I have been thinking whether I could find any suitable Muslim from outside. But as elsewhere in this business the field is lamentably small. Mohammad Yaqub is not the man; Chhatari has great personal charm, . . .[13] and could not stand up to pressure. Mirza Ismail, I fear, I could not regard as dependable. Raza Ali is another possible, but I doubt his being of the quality: and people like the Raja of Salempur, Begum Shah Nawaz, &c. would not carry the guns. What would suit me best of course would be to get someone like Nazimuddin if I could get him without having trouble with Jinnah. I have decided on the whole, as I shall in any case be asking Jinnah to a meal one day next week, that the best thing would be to throw a fly over him then as to whether, consistently with his maintaining his present standpoint, there is any one whom

[9] See No. 701, note 9. [10] See No. 635. [11] See e.g. No. 412. [12] See No. 645.
[13] Personal comment omitted.

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he could indicate to me in the Muslim League as a possible Information Member and whom he would be willing to allow to serve in that capacity. He would like being asked, and if experience is any test, he would like still better to be able to say no! But the post is of very great importance from the Muslim standpoint, particularly given the extreme weakness of the Muslims in the Press, and it is just possible that a ray of commonsense might break in and that he might be disposed to consider the suggestion. I shall not be a bit surprised if as soon as he leaves my house he issues a communiqué giving the gist of our conversation, but that cannot be helped!

[Para. 7, on the interpretation of Government of India Act 1935, Ninth Schedule, Sec. 85(2)(*b*), omitted.]

8. In paragraph 13 of my letter of the 8th January[14] I commented on the suggestions made in paragraphs 8 and 9 of your letter of the 12th December about a Pakistan enquiry. I have since seen Gibson's letter of the 15th December and the notes[15] accompanying it. Though none of the schemes examined in the notes has the declared approval of the Muslim League (which of course has carefully refrained from any definition of its aims), it is interesting to have these various ideas brought together and compared. (One of my colleagues has lately contributed to the anthology!) But you will, I think, agree that the position has greatly changed since the letters of December were written. Apart altogether from the change in the political scene caused by the Cripps mission, we are trying to cut down work all round in order to concentrate on matters essential to the prosecution of the war, and both here and in some of the provinces there is a lot to do yet in dealing with the rebellion. I have therefore asked my Public Secretary to write in reply to Gibson's letter suggesting that the proposed enquiry should be dropped for the present.

[Para. 9, on Calcutta Europeans, and paras. 10 and 11, containing personal comments, omitted.]

12. I telegraphed to you at the end of July[16] about a successor to Gwyer as Chief Justice of the Federal Court. I wonder whether the soundings which you may have been able to make at your end have had any result? As you know he is due to hand over in April, and it is a post which you and I will of course be most anxious to see filled by a really good man.

[Para. 13, on construction of aerodromes, omitted.]

[14] Vol. I, No. 7.

[15] These notes, prepared by Mr Turnbull in November 1941 while he was in the Political Department of the India Office, consisted mainly of a summary of schemes put forward by individual exponents of the idea of Pakistan. L/P&J/8/690: ff 272–87.

[16] Not printed.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *15 September 1942, 11.40 pm*
Received: 15 September, 10.30 pm

No. 2789–S. Following is my personal appreciation of Congress situation, midday 15th September, covering period 10–15th September. General improvement continues throughout the country, but nothing of very great significance to report. Minor incidents occur in most provinces but nothing of any very real importance. In Bihar restoration of order is making rapid progress, as is also the reopening of communications. Nothing of any importance from the States. Bombay reports that while in general violence has almost disappeared, civil disobedience of a nuisance kind is taking its place: but even this appears to be on a very limited scale.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Chungking, Washington (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *16 September 1942, 9.45 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 16 September, 9.30 pm*

No. 2797–S. I thought it well to ask Lumley whether he had had any recent news from Ahmednagar. He tells me that he has seen the Inspector-General of Prisons regularly every week lately and also the Surgeon-General who has paid one visit to Ahmednagar. General impression they give is that détenus are in good health, well behaved and reasonable[1] to deal with. Patel described in good form, Nehru morose but joins in games. When asked if they require anything they sometimes reply that the Maulana will speak for them but this does not seem to be very strictly adhered to. Superintendent is being asked for a special confidential report.

[1] Deciphered as '(?honest)'.

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Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 244

NEW DELHI, *16 September 1942, 2.45 am*
Received: 16 September, 2.15 pm

7330. Your telegram No. 16121[1] dated September 14th. We considered it necessary to give the correct casualty figures in the debate but made it clear that they are "as brought up-to-date during the last few days". They are of course nowhere near twice the Prime Minister's figure. No reference has been made to the number of troops employed. In fact the equivalent of some 8 brigades of British troops were actually used.

[1] No. 742.

748

Mr Eden to Viscount Halifax

Telegram, L/PO/5/41: f 28

IMPORTANT SECRET FOREIGN OFFICE, *16 September 1942, 1.45 pm*

No. 5622. Your telegram No. 4367.[1]

The Viceroy is alive to the need for making fullest possible use of Americans who visit India. His experiences have not been too happy, but what is of much greater importance is that he is particularly anxious to avoid anything that might encourage Congress Party supporters in India to hope for intervention by the United States of America in order to escape from the impasse to which they have brought themselves by criminal folly.[2]

2. At this juncture, therefore, Mr. Eddy would not be welcome in India and especially in capacity of mediator. If he is still thinking of a visit I hope you will be able to discourage idea. As he apparently discussed his plans with Mr. Hull, perhaps Mr. Hull could be asked to dissuade him.

[1] No. 658. [2] See No. 724.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 177

SECRET WASHINGTON, *16 September 1942, 4.20 pm*
Received: 16 September, 11.45 pm

No. 4650. I am disturbed by the trend of American public opinion in regard to India. After consultation with Butler and Bajpai, who has just returned from visiting editors in New York and Chicago, I think the situation can be summarised as follows.

2. General trend of responsible opinion recognises that it is necessary for Government of India first of all to restore and maintain order and that there could be no question of setting up a provisional Government without the consent of all parties. Unless civil disobedience is abandoned and unless the parties can agree on the formation of a joint government, reasonable opinion here would accept (group undec: ? position) that His Majesty's Government could not be blamed for what may occur.

3. But this does not mean that from the point of view of this opinion His Majesty's Government can sit back and do nothing except restore order, and the Prime Minister's statement[1] is widely interpreted as meaning that there is no intention of taking any further step, even when civil disobedience has been beaten, to try and bring about the establishment of a provisional government during the war. In some quarters the statement is held to throw doubt on the intention of His Majesty's Government to carry out their undertaking as to the establishment of a constituent assembly and the granting of self-government after the war.

4. There is a general agreement that America is directly concerned in finding a solution, as one of the United Nations engaged in conducting the war in India against Japan. General feeling, even in friendly quarters is that if His Majesty's Government were to appear indifferent to the making of further constructive efforts to find solution, American opinion would conclude that we were not really trying to rally India for active prosecution of the war.

5. Informed American opinion appreciates the difficulty of carrying out any far-reaching changes during the war. At the same time the view is pressed (group undec: ? that if) we are serious in our professed intentions for India we ought to make persistent efforts to find means of setting up a provisional government.

It is recognised that this would have to be chosen by agreement from (group

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, 10 September 1942, cols. 302–5.

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undec: ?all) political parties, but it is thought that it could then be responsible to the authorities, who would follow its advice, except where this might prejudice the war effort of the United Nations. Such a solution would be readily understood by American opinion, accustomed to form of Presidential Government.

6. How position is developing is shown by two articles by well known columnist, Ernest Lindley, appearing in *Washington Post* which clearly bear the signs of official inspiration. His principal point is that "American Government would be remiss in its duty to its own people as well as to the Allied cause if it did not assert its influence on behalf of the treatment of the Indian problem which will best serve to win the war." He suggests that an impartial enquiry "to explore thoroughly the chance of a provisional settlement" should be undertaken by some prominent American, such as Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, or William Phillips, and concludes by saying that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Amery appear to slam the door shut against any further attempt at a settlement for the duration of the war. These should not be allowed to stand as last words. The Indian problem is no longer a solely British property or headache.

7. I have some reason for thinking that American official quarters are not (group undec:) ventilation of demand for some further action on the part of His Majesty's Government and it may even be possible that they would welcome such an agitation as obliging them to intervene. Harry Hopkins spoke to me last night about this strong pressure now being exerted on the President from both official and unofficial quarters to do something about it.

8. The Cabinet should realise how strongly public opinion is moving on these lines and I hope it may be possible to say or do something to counteract it. Otherwise I fear American press, which on the whole has stood by us remarkably well in recent Indian crisis, will rapidly and perhaps completely change its attitude much to the detriment of Anglo-American relations.

Repeated to Foreign New Delhi No. 229.

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 125th Conclusions

R/30/1/2: ff 61–2

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 16 September 1942 at 12.15 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Sir John Anderson, Mr Eden, Mr Bevin

Also present were: Sir Kingsley Wood, Viscount Simon, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair

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INDIA

War Financial Settlement of 1940. Indian Sterling Balances

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 105th Conclusions, Minute 2)[1]

The War Cabinet resumed discussion of this matter and had before them a Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (W.P. (42) 325)[2] and one by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (42) 328),[3] together with a copy of a telegram (No. 2255–S, dated the 31st July)[4] from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India.

The War Cabinet were reminded that the assumption underlying the financial settlement reached in April 1940 had been that the war was not India's affair, except in so far as the local defence of India was concerned. This had no doubt been a tenable point of view in 1939 and 1940, when the war was regarded as primarily a European affair; but the whole position had been altered by the entry of Japan into the war. India was now fighting for her own existence. It followed that the settlement of April 1940 was no longer appropriate to present circumstances, even after taking into account the fact that India was now incurring far more expenditure in her own local defence than had been contemplated when the agreement was concluded.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER drew attention to the fact that, when the settlement of April 1940 had been under discussion, his predecessor in office had written to the then Secretary of State for India (on the 7th February, 1940)[5] asking him to put it to the Government of India that there should be some reconsideration at a later date, in the light of the knowledge of what extra actual expenditure there had been, as to whether, from the financial and political points of view, Indian revenues could not make a further contribution for this purpose, and suggesting that the situation would be met if the question were again examined in a year's time. The then Secretary of State for India (Lord Zetland) had replied (on the 14th February, 1940)[6] that he saw no reason to object to the possibility of India's making some payment towards the general expense of the war being considered from time to time as circumstances permitted, although it must not be assumed that consideration would be favourable.

Reference was also made to the fact that India's war effort included the provision of men and material, not only for the defence of India, but for the war generally. In this connection, however, it would be right to bear in mind that the normal balance of exchange of goods and services between countries had been distorted by the war. Since all our energies were now directed to the war effort, we could not now pay for all the exports from India, including exports of war material, by goods or services exported from this country. This was the

[1] No. 435. [2] No. 375. [3] No. 389. [4] No. 379. [5] L/F/7/2862: ff 74–8.
[6] *Ibid.*, ff 64–7.

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primary reason why India was now accumulating sterling balances so fast that they might reach £M. 400 or £M. 450 at the end of this financial year. There was a strong case for our establishing a position now, which would enable the matter to be readjusted at a later date, so as to take into account the expenditure which we had incurred on Indian defence, in the light of a wider conception of India's partnership in the general war effort.

It was also relevant to bear in mind that any commitment leaving this country liable to repay large sums to India after the war would necessarily have a serious effect on the arrangements made for settlement of indebtedness between this country and others of the United Nations. Indeed, application of the financial settlement of April 1940, without any qualification, would be inconsistent with the basis of settlement which we wished to see applied between the United Nations generally, and would be likely to lead to a repetition of the position in regard to international indebtedness which had arisen after the last war.

At the same time, it was recognised that there would be serious disadvantages in asking for the settlement of April 1940 to be revised at this juncture.

The War Cabinet therefore reached the conclusion that, while the financial settlement of April 1940 should stand, the Government of India should be informed of the views of His Majesty's Government concerning the need for financial readjustment on a wider basis, and that, while His Majesty's Government were not disposed to press the matter at the present time, the issue would have to be raised at a convenient opportunity.

The War Cabinet—

Agreed that a communication in the sense of the above discussion should be sent to the Viceroy at an early date. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was asked to draft a telegram to the Viceroy, in consultation with the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for India. This draft would be circulated to the War Cabinet before despatch.

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Mr Amery to Sir Kingsley Wood

L/PO/2/16: f 112

16 September 1942

My dear Kingsley,

Thank you for your most helpful attitude this morning.[1] The position now is that H.M.G. agrees that the existing financial settlement stands, but, in view of developments since 1940 and of all that may happen before the end of the war,

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reserves the right to reopen the whole question of an eventual adjustment of the position.

The reference with regard to this will have to be left pretty vague and at the same time be carefully worded. "Adjustment" may mean many things, e.g. scaling down of the total, funding as a long-term debt, agreement as to upon what and how either interest or capital is to be spent, etc. etc. Above all, it is important that the language used should not give any handle in India, or elsewhere, for any suggestion that we mean, after the war, to repudiate our obligations.

The best thing of course would be if the Government of India in the Legislature could simply state that the existing financial settlement remains as it is and add nothing else. But it may be difficult to do so, and the most desirable thing obviously is to use language which will evoke the least criticism (and possible impediment of the war effort) now, and leave our hands free to raise all the points we can later on.

Don't forget that the course of the war may very possibly change the whole situation, not only in the sense which I mentioned in the Cabinet of increasing India's contribution to her own defence, but also in the sense of leaving an India so impoverished and devastated by invasion and scorched earth as to make her retention and utilisation of the accumulated sterling balances the very minimum of what she may then be in fairness entitled to!

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

[1] See No. 750.

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Mr Amery to Viscount Simon

L/PO/2/16: f 111

INDIA OFFICE, *16 September 1942*

My dear John,

How do you think something on the following lines would meet the case?[1]

> "The Cabinet agreed that the existing financial settlement with the Government of India should stand, but felt that, in view of the great change in the war situation, as it affects India, which has taken place since 1940, and of the even greater changes which may yet take place in the course of the war, His Majesty's Government must reserve the right at some appropriate future date to raise the whole question of the eventual adjustment of financial relations between the United Kingdom and India in the light both of the general financial settlement between the Allied Nations and of the

[1] See No. 750.

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vital importance for all concerned of the speedy restoration of the maximum volume of world trade."

You will realise the importance, if anything at all has to be said in the Indian Legislature, of not creating the suggestion that we mean to repudiate sterling obligations if we should fail to come to an agreement. The wording I have used is sufficiently vague to permit of a variety of alternative forms of adjustment, e.g. actual scaling down of the capital, agreement that only repayment of interest and not of capital should be demanded, in other words, funding of the balances, agreement as to what they are to be expended upon, etc., etc.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *16 September 1942*

Your two Representatives attended their first Cabinet yesterday.[1] The general survey of the war, with which these Monday Cabinets always begin, was quite an interesting one, raising such topics as whether we can afford to go on sending convoys of tanks round to Russia and having most of them sunk on the way, and again how far bombing of Germany is being carried out at the expense of air co-operation with the army and of air transport. I hope they will write and give you their impressions, but I think they must have been interested. Subsequently we came on to the subject of rice for Ceylon, on which I suggested that Mudaliar should state the case for India, which he did very effectively, both bringing out the difficulties of the position in India, and also making helpful suggestions. The outcome of this was that he got in direct touch at my suggestion with both Cranborne and Leathers immediately afterwards and I hope the whole thing is now by way of being satisfactorily settled, possibly by some diversion of rice from the Arab States to Ceylon and the shipping of wheat to the Arab States instead. I encouraged Mudaliar to telegraph to you direct on this subject and will do so again if any other topic crops up which is obviously within the sphere of the Government of India in the narrower sense. I am genuinely anxious that our visitors should feel that they are in the picture and pulling their weight on behalf of India.

Thank you for backing them up so effectively.

L.

2. I gave them a little Government lunch today at which they met most of the Ministers of Cabinet rank and both made excellent little speeches. I have

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asked a number of my colleagues to invite them to their offices in order to give them a general survey—which of course they cannot get at a Cabinet meeting—of the work of their particular Department. This will all help to make them not only feel that they are really being brought into the inside of things, but give them information of use to you when they return. This applies not only to what I might call the Imperial Services, but also to things like the management of food, A.R.P., &c. I think they are both feeling their feet and quite happy.

3. We had the question of the financial settlement up this morning.[2] Winston harangued us at great length about the monstrous idea that we should spend millions upon millions in the defence of India, then be told to clear out, and on top of it all owe India vast sums incurred on her behalf. I tried, without much effect, to make him understand that a great deal of this expenditure was for goods supplied to the Middle East and even to this country, that anyhow it was impossible to dissociate the defence of India from the general war effort and say that everything we did in the Far East was simply done for the defence of India. However, when he had blown off steam sufficiently, Kingsley Wood agreed that we must accept my contention that the existing agreement stands, but that His Majesty's Government must reserve the right to raise the whole question of eventual settlement at some future date, Winston's idea apparently being that at some such date we should draw up a supplementary bill against India which may equal if not exceed the accumulated sterling balances!

4. As a matter of fact, there is something to be said for the United Kingdom reserving the right—and India for that matter reserving the right on her side—to discuss at the end of the war how to deal with the sterling balances position which, if the war lasts much longer, might run to a thousand millions even. Whether that might involve a big funding operation, with possibly some scaling down of the capital amount, or definite schemes as to how and upon what the money is to be spent, are all matters for legitimate discussion. It may well be, on the other side, that if India is invaded and large tracts of India scorched and destroyed, she may have a case for reconsideration in her favour. What is important is that if anything is said publicly about this reservation on His Majesty's Government's part, it should not be in any form that would look as if we were already contemplating repudiation of our post-war indebtedness. Kingsley Wood, Simon and myself have been asked to draw up a formula and circulate it to the Cabinet in the hope that there may be agreement on it before the end of the week.

5. I think I should draw your attention to a couple of instances in August in which more effective control over outgoing press messages would have

[1] The Cabinet was in fact held on Monday, 14 September. [2] See No. 750.

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helped to save us both from some embarrassment. One was the report of the dismissal of the prosecution against the editor of the *Hindustan Times*[3] on the ground that insufficient evidence was produced to prove that the disorders reported in the paper were part of the mass movement sanctioned by the All-India Congress Committee. The other was the report that the Bombay Whipping Act[4] had been applied in Bombay at an early stage in the disturbances. The fact that this news came out without any explanation of the Act or its operation led to considerable misunderstanding here and in the U.S.A. and to inferences that the Indian authorities were employing methods more commonly associated with the Hun. We were able to correct this by a belated explanation, but the harm had been done and references were made to the matter in the House last week.[5] I mention the two instances only as an example of the need for constant care in the scrutiny of outgoing reports with an eye to their effect on opinion here and in the States.

6. Incidentally I am not clear why Lumley thought it necessary to apply the Bombay Act at all and was not satisfied with applying the Penalties (Enhancement) Ordinance[6] which was introduced, and used, in other Provinces without, so far as I am aware, attracting the least notice over here. In face, however, of the information reported in your helpful telegram of the 3rd September (No. 339–S.C.)[7] I felt bound to refer to the Ordinance in replying to a question in the House on the 10th.[8]

[Paras. 7 and 8, containing personal comments, omitted.]

9. You say you do not want to give the impression as a result of his [Mr Hodson's] departure, that we are closing down on Reforms. I take it that the so-to-say routine or occasional work of proposing drafts of Orders-in-Council as required by Statute or minor amendments of the Act to be promoted in Parliament, as well as advising on questions of interpretation on which Governors have sought your guidance, can be effectively carried on either in the Legislative Department or through your Secretariat (Public) without having a Reforms Commissioner. On the other hand there must be matters of research such as the question of the practicability of adjustment of Provincial boundaries or modifications of Franchise, not to speak of the numerous problems raised but not solved by the Cripps Declaration and its aftermath, which cannot conveniently be unloaded on to any of the administrative Departments of your Government especially in the present conditions of pressure. On the lay-out of the Declaration neither the British Government nor the Government of India would be responsible for the proposals to be discussed in a constitution-making body. But on one or other would pretty certainly fall the devising of measures to facilitate the assembling of such a body and expert assistance would be needed in dealing with the issues to be embodied in a treaty to be negotiated

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therewith. I doubt whether a Reforms Commissioner can now do much towards stimulating useful study among Indians of the various constitutional problems to be faced. But I have little doubt that the constituent body would turn to Government for a mass of data on which to build whatever proposals it may wish to pursue and I have an uncomfortable feeling that for lack of preparatory work on the questions which concern our own responsibilities we may risk being caught inadequately briefed when an occasion for renewing constitutional discussion recurs. I note that Rao Bahadur Menon, whom you contemplate promoting, has much experience in the Reforms Office. But something wider will surely be needed. I should much like to know how you would now propose dealing with the more speculative and long-term side of the Reforms Commissioner's activities and if there is any help that you think I can give you over this.

. . .[9]

[3] The prosecution was for breaking an order restricting publication of news about 'the mass movement sanctioned by the All-India Congress Committee'. The editor was Devadas Gandhi.
[4] See No. 521, note 2.
[5] e.g. *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, 11 September 1942, cols. 599, 612, and 619.
[6] See No. 702, note 3. [7] No. 693; the date should be 5 September.
[8] *Loc. cit.*, 10 September 1942, cols. 296–7. [9] Personal comment by Lord Linlithgow omitted.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/2/16: f 103

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *17 September 1942, 12.1 am*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

1129. Your private and personal telegram 2762–S.[1] Have got Cabinet to agree that existing financial settlement should stand but they feel they must reserve the right, in view of all that may happen before the end of the war, to reopen discussion on the eventual adjustment of the whole situation.[2] I hope to let you have by the end of the week formula in which this reservation is expressed. Meanwhile you might consider whether it is necessary for Raisman to mention this in the Legislature and if so whether in the terms of the formula agreed by Cabinet or in more general terms. Naturally the reservation cannot be one-sided and it may be that as the result of events, e.g. invasion and scorched earth, India may also have her case to put forward for consideration.

[1] No. 733. [2] See No. 750.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: f 196

PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *17 September 1942, 1.20 am*

16323. Your personal telegram of the 14th September, 2778–S.[1] Mookerjee. Of course I agree with your refusal of access to Gandhi.

[1] No. 741.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/P&J/8/617: ff 296–300

INDIA OFFICE, *17 September 1942*

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P.49/42

Prime Minister

With reference to your Minute of 14th September, M.373/2,[1] I enclose as desired a note about Gandhi and the Japanese. There is no evidence that he has actively intrigued with the Japanese, though he has referred publicly to the possibility that a "free India" would negotiate with the Japanese.

I also append the papers seized in the police raid on the Congress Office at Allahabad which comprise a record[2] of the discussion in the Working Committee on Gandhi's draft of the Congress War Resolution, the text of that draft,[3] and the text of the Resolution.[4] These papers were published on 5th August.

L. S. AMERY

Enclosure to No. 756

GANDHI AND JAPAN

The India Office has no evidence to show, or to suggest, that Gandhi has intrigued with Japan.

The only evidence of Japanese contacts during the war relates to the presence in Wardha of two Japanese Buddhist priests who lived for part of 1940 in Gandhi's Ashram. The Buddhist approach seems to have been one of the main channels for Japanese secret activities in India, but there is nothing to suggest

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that the presence of the two priests in Wardha was the occasion or the means for intrigue by Gandhi with the Japanese.

The extent of the charge against Gandhi is that, while professedly condemning Japanese methods and their aggression in China, he is himself opposed to active military aid by Indians to those suffering from aggression and in respect of India has demanded the withdrawal of British power and would not exclude negotiations with the Japanese as a means of averting invasion. Non-violent non-cooperation is his choice of weapon for meeting invasion if it should occur. In illustration of his outlook a selection from his published and unpublished references to the Japanese is appended.

It was to demonstrate the defeatist attitude of Gandhi (and of certain Congress leaders) that the Government of India published certain documents early in August. These documents, seized during a police search of Congress offices in May, comprised the text of a draft resolution prepared by Gandhi and a record of the discussion thereon in a meeting of the Congress Working Commitee at the end of April. The argument of the draft resolution runs (in Gandhi's own words):— The Cripps Mission has shown up British imperialism in its nakedness as never before; Britain is incapable of defending India; there is an eternal conflict between British and Indian interests; Japan's quarrel is not with India; if India were freed, her first step would probably be to negotiate with Japan; if the British withdrew from India India would be able to defend herself; therefore the British should withdraw from India. "The Committee desires to assure the Japanese Government and people that India bears no enmity either towards Japan or towards any other nation." In the course of the discussion Nehru and others pointed out that the background of the draft was one favouring Japan and that its acceptance would imperil the prestige of the Working Committee; but the majority of members were unmoved by these criticisms and the draft finally adopted while bowdlerising Gandhi's frankness retained the essentials of his outlook.

There is no other material giving fresh light on Gandhi's attitude. The Government of India are endeavouring to assess the extent of Japanese influence in the recent disturbances but so far have no direct evidence of it.

GANDHI AND JAPAN

A. STATEMENTS PUBLISHED IN HIS WEEKLY PAPER 'HARIJAN'[5]

26th April. "The Japanese may free India from the British yoke, but only to put in their own instead. I have always maintained that we should not seek

[1] No. 743. [2] Enclosure to No. 113. [3] Enclosure to No. 43, col. 1. [4] *Ibid.*, col. 3.

[5] Summaries of the articles from which the statements of 3, 10, 17 May, 14, 21 June, and 5 July are extracted, are in Nos. 24, 44, 71, 144, 173, and 225 respectively. The statements of 3 and 10 May also appear in Appendix III ('Recent utterances of Gandhi') to No. 150 (a War Cabinet paper).

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any other Power's help to free India from the British yoke. . . .[6] We should have to pay a heavy price if we ever consented to take foreign aid as against the British."

3rd May. "I feel convinced that the British presence is the incentive for the Japanese attack. If the British wisely decided to withdraw and leave India to manage her own affairs in the best way she could, the Japanese would be bound to reconsider their plans."

10th May. "The presence of the British in India is an invitation to Japan to invade India. Their withdrawal removes the bait. Assume, however, that it does not; free India will be better able to cope with the invasion."

17th May. Explaining his method, Gandhi writes: "You say to the British with the greatest goodwill that, if they leave India, she will take care of herself and will probably escape Japanese attention, and if she cannot she will answer it with non-violence."

14th June. The first act of the National Government "would be to enter into a treaty with the United Nations for defensive operations against aggressive powers, it being common cause that India will have nothing to do with any of the Fascist Powers and India would be morally bound to help the United Nations."

In answer to a question whether a free India would declare war against Japan he writes: "Free India need not do so. It simply becomes the ally of the Allied Powers, simply out of gratefulness for the payment of a debt."

21st June. "I have no desire to exchange British for any other rule."

5th July. India's non-violence "will no longer take the shape of non-co-operation and the like. It will express itself in her ambassadors going to the Axis powers not to beg for peace but to show them the futility of war for achieving an honourable end."

26th July. In an article "To Every Japanese" . . . "I grieve deeply as I contemplate what appears to me to be your unprovoked attack against China . . . You have been gravely misinformed[7] that we have chosen this particular moment to embarrass the Allies when your attack against India is imminent . . . You will be sadly disillusioned if you believe that you will receive a willing welcome from India."

B. NOT PUBLISHED: AN INTERCEPTED REPORT OF GANDHI'S INTERVIEW WITH PRESSMEN IN BOMBAY, 15TH MAY

"Mind, I am not pro-Japanese. Indeed Japan is too much of an aggressor for me to be that . . . the entire danger to India would be less if the British withdraw from here. . . . It is Britain who has fought Japan and crossed her

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path. Therefore Japan wants to fight it. And therefore it is possible that when the British withdraw we shall be able to come to terms with Japan. And if even then she does not listen, then I have the same weapon against Japan that I have against Britain . . . We are driving out the British, we do not invite the Japanese. No, I disagree with those who think them liberators. . . . The Japs expect us to sign a neutrality pact with them. And why not? Why should they invade us? But if they do, we shall resist."

[6] The dots indicating omissions in this and the subsequent quotations are in the original.
[7] *Harijan* has the phrase 'as I know you are' after 'misinformed'.

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Draft Telegram from the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy[1]

L/PO/2/16: f 110

The War Cabinet have given further consideration to the question of the War Financial Settlement of 1940 and have reached the following general conclusions.

The War Cabinet fully recognise that a considerable proportion of the expenditure so far incurred by the Government of India and recoverable by India under the 1940 settlement contributes to the general war effort but otherwise bears no relation to the defence of India. They recognise also that the spread of the war to the Far East has meant that India is now incurring far more expenditure in her own local defence than was contemplated when the settlement of April 1940 was concluded. They also wish to acknowledge the extent of the resources in men and material which India is making available as part of the common war effort of the United Nations.

The War Cabinet nevertheless feel that they should put on record their view that the entry of Japan into the war, finally revealing the war as a world struggle against the forces of tyranny and reaction, has fundamentally changed the situation since the financial settlement of 1940 was negotiated. At that time the war was being waged between European powers alone. Today no country can afford to take a narrow view of the nature of the struggle in its entirety, nor of the measures required for its own defence. This changed situation calls for a wider conception of India's partnership in the general war effort of the United Nations and therefore of the contribution she needs to

[1] Enclosed in a letter of 17 September from Sir Kingsley Wood's Private Secretary to Mr Turnbull, which asked for Mr Amery's comments, mentioning that Sir Kingsley Wood had not yet seen the draft, which would be submitted to him that evening. A copy of the draft was also sent to Lord Simon.

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make in her own defence. While the financial settlement as it stands leads to the United Kingdom accumulating large indebtedness to India on expenditure incurred in India's defence, President Roosevelt has recently enunciated the principle that none of the United Nations should end the war with a monetary war debt to any of its partners. His Majesty's Government are impressed alike with the general wisdom of this objective and with the necessity to bear it in mind in the relations between this country and India.

It will be recalled that, at the time when the financial settlement of April 1940 was under discussion, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stipulated that the possibility of India's making some payment towards the general cost of the war should be considered from time to time as circumstances permitted.[2] This stipulation was accepted.[3]

His Majesty's Government do not suggest that a new settlement should be negotiated at the present juncture, and they agree that arrangements should accordingly continue for accounts to be kept on the basis of the settlement reached in April 1940. But a further review there must be, whether in any general settlement between Nations at the end of the war or upon some earlier convenient or necessary occasion, and on such review they would expect the considerations stated in this note to be given their due weight.

[2] See No. 750, note 5. [3] See No. 750, note 6.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

NEW DELHI, *18 September 1942, 4.5 pm*
Received: 18 September, 6.30 pm

No. 2808–S. My telegram of 5th September, No. 339–S.C.[1] Whipping. You will have seen Madras telegram of 9th September, No. 177–M[2], repeated to me. Punjab reports state no whipping reported yet and districts already advised not to inflict whipping in ordinary cases. Stewart states that reports received from 13 out of 16 districts indicate not a single sentence of whipping has yet been carried out. He adds "one such sentence has been imposed and is awaiting expiration of statutory 15 days before being executed. This rather surprising result is doubtless due in part to fact that special tribunals did not start functioning until towards the end of August. A few sentences may have been imposed by now in certain districts since they submitted their 'nil' reports, and it may be taken as certain that there will be some more this

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month, but I have no reason to suppose number will be excessive. Meanwhile we have closed down publicity as suggested by Your Excellency."[3]

[1] No. 693.

[2] In the course of this telegram which was one of his periodical situation reports, Sir A. Hope stated that 'the Engineering College Madras and Annamalai University yesterday staged protests against sentence of whipping carried out on two students of Mofussil College on Saturday last. These had been convicted of attempted train wrecking on local suburban electric line and sentence was first of its kind as far as I know. Whipping is only given to actual crimes of violence and it so happened that first to be caught were students. In crimes of this sort there can be no differentiation between students and ordinary hooligans and they must be treated alike. I feel that this sentence, despite protest, will have deterrent effect.' L/P&J/8/608: f 39.

[3] Lord Linlithgow's telegram 480-S.C. of 7 October 1942 to Mr Amery said that the following further reports had been received: Assam and Orissa—no case of whipping. Bengal—one case of sentence of ten stripes and nine months imprisonment for sabotage. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *18 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2809-S. Your private and personal telegram of 17th September, No. 1129.[1] Most grateful for your help. Raisman has a number of questions to answer on Monday 21st September in the legislature concerning financial settlement which must be considered in Council tomorrow evening. Trust you will make every endeavour to send me the actual formula of reservation as early as possible tomorrow.

[1] No. 754.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *18 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2814-S. Your private and personal telegram No. 1117[1] of the 13th September. I have been becoming somewhat concerned at the continued absence of adequate U.S. representation in this country and I am in complete

[1] No. 739.

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accord as to the importance of having a man of substance to represent the U.S.A. here. The question of the type of representative that we should try to secure is however more difficult. Though we here cannot claim very wide experience of the political boss or personal representative type I should be most reluctant to have to welcome any one after the style of Johnson or Laughlin Currie my views regarding both of whom are already available to you. The technique of this type appears to depend rather too much on sensationalism and a superficial[2] urge for quick results on which presumably their continued eminence in U.S. political circles largely depends. I should therefore very definitely prefer a Foreign Service officer of reputation and controlled ambitions who would be prepared to spend some years in this country studying its problems not solely from an armchair in Delhi but also by wide and thoughtful touring throughout the country in order to accumulate basically sound knowledge. I realise that a well known personality reporting direct to the White House is likely to have greater effect in Washington than a State Department man however sound. But something must be sacrificed in an attempt to get a clear and balanced picture presented in official circles in the U.S.A. and I am certain that the wise course will be to concentrate on a Foreign Service officer of experience and quality yet not of such a standing that he will be discontented in a post the scope of which must be limited, or encouraged to start to play politics and in the light of recent experience, and given the difficulty of the position I have to hold, and the extreme undesirability of facilitating, by the presence of a non-career representative of high standing, endeavours to work on feeling in U.S.A. by Congress, which will be all the more intense given defeat their insurrection here has suffered, I should be very strongly opposed myself to a non-career representative who might well cause us great local embarrassment.

[2] Deciphered as 'superfine'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *18 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2816–S. Since replying[1] to your private and personal telegram of September 13th, No. 1117,[2] about United States representation in India, I have seen Halifax's telegram No. 4650[3] to the Foreign Office, and Bajpai's telegram No. 231 of September 16th which I repeat to you in my immediately following telegram No. 2817–S.[4]

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2. Views expressed in those telegrams do not in any way alter my view. We have in India an extremely difficult and delicate situation, as no one knows better than you and His Majesty's Government, and I am quite certain that risks of that situation becoming most seriously complicated if we have here representing the U.S.A. either an active politician or an ex-diplomat of really high standing are very great indeed. I quite recognise Halifax's difficulties and the danger of alienating American opinion. But his telegram and Bajpai's show quite clearly that United States Administration are still not seized of the complexity or difficulty of this problem. If I thought there was a hope of pleasing the United States without getting ourselves into a hopeless mess here, I should be prepared to play. But I am quite satisfied that no American, however good his quality, could get the hang of Indian problem in the time at his disposal. And once here, it would be Grew's or Phillips' failure if something big did not happen at short notice.

3. Our responsibilities are heavy in this matter. The Prime Minister's speech may have annoyed certain sections of opinion. It has done so because it has hit the nail quite firmly on the head. Congress have been beaten in their endeavour by revolutionary means to upset the position in this country. They can be relied on now to do their utmost to try to secure their objects by other methods. Nothing in my judgment could be better calculated to encourage them and to render our position here and that of His Majesty's Government at home difficult more than the despatch to this country of the type of American representative discussed by Halifax and Bajpai; and my considered advice to His Majesty's Government is to stand firm on this business and take what may come to us if we do.

[1] See No. 760. [2] No. 739. [3] No. 749. [4] See No. 762, note 4.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 174

EN CLAIR *18 September 1942, by bag*
Received: 21 September, 4.50 pm

No. 505 SAVING. Following sent to New Delhi telegram No. 231 of September 16th.

Begins. Following from Agent-General. American interest has now shifted from events in India to debate thereon last week in Parliament. Comment of local columnist, which I quote, is typical of opinion which has so far been friendly to Government and critical of Gandhi: "It should be said that the

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reports to the House of Commons on the Indian situation by Prime Minister Churchill[1] and L. S. Amery,[2] Secretary of State for India, did not make a favourable impression in official circles here. The statements confirmed the impression that the British Government's Indian policy at the present time is solely repression. . . . The friendly offices of the United States or of China, or of both probably are necessary even to explore thoroughly the chances of a provisional political settlement. Such an exploration should not be attempted by a partisan. It is a job rather for a skilled diplomat of the experience, detachment and discretion of Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, or William Phillips, former Ambassador to Italy. The first step presumably would be to ascertain whether any provisional arrangement can be worked out that is satisfactory to both the Congress party and the Moslems. . . . In their comments to the House of Commons, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Amery appeared to slam the door shut against any further attempt at a settlement for the duration of the war. These should not be allowed to stand as the last words. The Indian problem is no longer a solely British property, or headache. By acting as if it were the British Government may create doubts that it is genuinely committed to self-government for India." There is reason to believe that article is officially inspired and that Administration may not be[3] unwilling to see country-wide agitation develop now on these lines in the United States. From talks with editors and others in New York and Chicago last week, I gather that this seemingly new trend of opinion is no more than inevitable expression of view widely held even in friendly quarters that while disorder should be quelled, His Majesty's Government should not stop short at this but should continue to make constructive effort to bring about formation of provisional Government, representative of main political parties, during the war. While impracticability of wholesale revision of Indian constitution and of formation of provisional Government without agreement among major political groups is recognised, it is argued that British Government should offer to transfer power to an agreed provisional Indian Cabinet which will, by convention, be allowed to function as such, provided it co-operates fully in the war effort. Prime Minister's statement has brought this view into prominence and we may expect wide and insistent ventilation of it.[4] *Ends.*

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, 10 September 1942, cols. 302–5.
[2] *Ibid.*, 11 September 1942, cols. 604–20.
[3] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'has been' instead of 'may not be' (see note 4).
[4] The India Office had earlier received a copy of Sir G. S. Bajpai's message from Lord Linlithgow in telegram 2817-S of 18 September. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

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Mr Amery to Sir Kingsley Wood

L/PO/2/16: f 101

18 September 1942

My dear Kingsley,

I confess I do not like your long argumentative telegram[1] at all. For one thing a number of the points, as I must point out later, are very disputable. For another, they are bound to invite an argumentative rejoinder from the Government of India which will almost certainly at some time or other have to be published, with the result that Indian opinion will steadily harden into a campaign against any reconsideration, and this may even influence India's readiness to put herself out to provide supplies (e.g. rice for Ceylon). What I would suggest is a perfectly brief telegram to the following effect:—

[*There follows the text suggested in No. 752.*]

To return to your longer telegram: I think the argument about the entry of Japan into the war is really very weak. We regarded the war as one affecting the whole world and raising issues of world importance from the very beginning and it really is not very effective to say that we originally regarded it as a western war in which India was only indirectly concerned. In so far as she is concerned with the situation to the east of her, she has also been similarly concerned with the safety of the Suez Canal and of Iraq and of Persia.

The statement in the second sentence[2] of the second page about this indebtedness being accumulated on expenditure incurred in India's defence is not of course correct. Most of this obligation has been incurred in respect of materials or troops supplied for the war generally in the Middle East and even here (pig iron, etc.)

The statement in the next paragraph that the stipulation you refer to was accepted is misleading and would certainly create a storm if made public in India. All that Zetland said in his reply was "I see no objection to this and will have it borne in mind. But you must not take this as in any sense implying that consideration will be favourable."

Finally, the last sentence in the Treasury draft is, so far as I am concerned, wholly unacceptable and would be disastrous if communicated to the Government of India, let alone if made public. It is based on the assumption that we are entitled to dictate in this matter, whereas in all these matters of finance, tariffs, etc., the Government of India has by convention been recognised as responsible only for the welfare of India and in accordance with India's interests. If you do insist on retaining something in the nature of the original draft I must

[1] See No. 757. [2] i.e. third para., penultimate sentence.

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at any rate press for the omission of the last sentence and the substitution of the following:

> But H.M.G. feel that they must reserve the right, whether in any general settlement between the nations at the end of the war or upon some earlier appropriate occasion, to press for a further review of the position in the light of the considerations stated in this note, as well as of the vital importance for all concerned of the speedy restoration of the maximum volume of world trade.

Once again let me point out that a short telegram such as I suggest would only elicit a brief note of acknowledgment from India, possibly with the suggestion that India too may have a case to raise owing to changed circumstances (supposing she were the scene of war and completely ruined). On the other hand an argumentative telegram is bound to raise an argumentative rejoinder and start in India a general argument prejudicial to the whole conduct of the war and even to our credit here.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 175

SECRET WASHINGTON, *18 September 1942, 11.3 am*
Received: 18 September, 7.25 pm

No. 4699. Your telegram No. 5622.[1]

I took Sansom to see Hull this afternoon and in the course of general conversation and, as he said, speaking off the record, Hull referred to question of India.

He said that State Department had been under constant pressure to receive deputations on Indian question, or to say something themselves.

All this he had been to the best of his ability holding off, as he realised it was our concern, and also realised our difficulties, and that there were many people at work trying to use this question to drive a wedge between our two governments.

2. I thanked him for following the general lines he had indicated, and took the opportunity of speaking to him about Eddy whom he said he himself had not seen. I said I thought Eddy was generally friendly, but not at all well informed, and that I hoped Hull would continue to discourage him or any other Americans who wished, with whatever good intentions, to visit India at the present time.

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Hull gave general assent to this, as he did to my proposition that plainly the first duty of Government of India was to secure restoration of order.

3. At the conclusion of the conversation, however, he emphasised what I have already reported, namely extreme importance from point of view of public opinion here of making abundantly plain that we have not abandoned constructive efforts to find solution.

I drew his attention to the concluding remarks of the Secretary of State for India in recent debate in the House of Commons.

4. Speaking unofficially he said that he thought we should be wise to go on repeating with as authoritative a voice as possible, what had been our general contribution to freedom throughout the Commonwealth, that we were engaged on the same task in India, that this task had been interrupted by an impatient minority, who had been unable to see the damage that they were in danger of bringing to the war effort of United Nations, and especially to good relations of United States of America and ourselves. And that as soon as we had dealt with overt attempt to create disorder we should in whatever way might be open to us pick up with our task in which we had been temporarily interrupted.

From the point of view of opinion here he was concerned to stress the great importance of combining some note of sympathy and hope and untiring pursuit of our ideal with our plain obligations of preservation of order, although this last naturally must have precedent.

Repeated to the Viceroy of India.

[1] No. 748.

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Minute by Mr Croft

L/E/8/2527: f 308

18 September 1942

Secretary of State,

I had a profitable talk with Sir Atul Chatterjee about social and economic reform, etc.

On the more limited question of the possibility of sending further expert assistance from this country he is doubtful whether anything more can usefully be done. Even the best-intentioned moves on our part within a field which is regarded as a field of Indian self-government are apt to be looked upon with suspicion in India and may easily prejudice the object in view. In Sir Atul's

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opinion, therefore, any approach to the Indian authorities in this connection should be very cautious and circumspect.

He feels that we run the risk of finding any initiative on our part in the direction of a progressive social and economic policy resented and regarded with suspicion as an attempt, which to some extent it would be, to draw away support from the political parties towards ourselves. This might easily lead to friction and do more harm than good. With regard to particular measures that might be undertaken now, Sir Atul thought that we might well be less cautious and conservative towards Indian would-be reformers in the social field. Our traditional caution in regard to social questions, such as the age of marriage, the law regarding divorce, and so on, as trenching upon religious interests may have been, he thinks, over-done and unduly prolonged. Now that we have so predominantly an Indian Government at the Centre we could allow, and even encourage, more latitude than we have in the past in giving support and facilities for the proposals of Private Members for legislative measures of this kind. He also thought that my suggestion[1] that this might be a good opportunity for embarking upon a policy for dealing with agricultural credit, etc. was worth further consideration.

I think that if you were to invite him, Sir Atul would be prepared to undertake the chairmanship of a small informal committee of your Advisers with discretion to consult persons outside if they thought it desirable to do so. Perhaps you would have a talk with him on the subject in the near future when you have some time to spare. If this suggestion is acted upon the terms of reference would need some consideration. I do not think that we want to ask them so much to draw up a programme of reforms as to advise about the best way of approaching the Government of India along practical and well-considered lines.

It seems to me that for the time being this would be a sufficient compliance with the conclusions of the War Cabinet on the two occasions[2] when the subject has been before it. It would also serve as a preliminary answer to the Prime Minister if he refers to you on the subject of Sir Stafford Cripps's note of the 2nd September.[3]

W. D. C.

[1] See No. 731, penultimate para. [2] See Nos. 621 and 664. [3] No. 678.

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766

Viscount Simon to Mr Amery

L/PO/2/16: f 107

HOUSE OF LORDS, S.W.1, *18 September 1942*

My dear Leo,
Thank you for your letter[1] suggesting a formula for the telegram to India about the financial settlement. I have also had from the Treasury the draft[2] which you will have seen. I have sent back to Kingsley Wood, for what it may be worth, his draft with some slight changes, and with the insertion of the substance of two passages in your draft, which seem to me excellent.

Yours ever,
JOHN

[1] No. 752. [2] No. 757.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/2/16: f 99

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *18 September 1942, 7.20 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

1139. Sterling balances. Have agreed reluctantly[1] with Treasury to somewhat lengthy and argumentative statement of H.M.G.'s case for eventual adjustment and will send text as soon as we have Prime Minister's concurrence. Suggest Government of India's best course would be simply to acknowledge and take note without arguing or at most to suggest that it too may have something to say in light of further developments.[2] Meanwhile immediate question is what Raisman is to say in Assembly. Would it be possible for him to avoid saying anything beyond that the settlement of 1940 stands? Failing that could he without being forced to publish documents say that while settlement stands H.M.G. have intimated that they may wish at some future appropriate occasion to reopen question of final adjustment in light of all the circumstances which may arise and that Government of India reserves a similar right to itself.[3]

[1] Mr Amery's memorandum to the War Cabinet W.P. (42) 424 of 22 September, which will be printed as No. 13 in Vol. III, makes it clear that on 18 September he discussed the proposed draft telegram with Sir Kingsley Wood, who had received Lord Simon's comments, and very reluctantly agreed to the draft in the Annex to No. 778.
[2] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'business' instead of 'developments'.
[3] See also No. 754.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/2/16: f 100

INDIA OFFICE, *18 September 1942*

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 51/42

Prime Minister

The Chancellor of the Exchequer is sending you a draft telegram[1] to India about the financial question. This is the result of consultation with myself and the Lord Chancellor.

Linlithgow has strongly urged[2] that, in order that Raisman may be in a position to answer questions in the Indian Legislature on this subject early on Monday morning, the telegram should be despatched tomorrow at latest. If you approve it I hope that in the circumstances you may be willing to authorise its despatch without prior circulation to the Cabinet as required by the Minutes of last Wednesday's meeting (W.M. (42) 125th Conclusions).[3]

L. S. AMERY

[1] See No. 767, note 1. [2] See No. 759. [3] No. 750.

769

Draft by Mr Churchill[1]

L/PO/2/16: ff 97–8

19 September 1942

DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA TO THE VICEROY

The War Cabinet have given further consideration to the question of the War Financial Settlement of 1940 and have reached the following general conclusions.

The War Cabinet fully recognise that a considerable proportion of the expenditure so far incurred by the Government of India and recoverable by India under the 1940 settlement contributes to the general war effort but otherwise bears no relation to the defence of India. They recognise also that the spread of the war to the Far East has meant that India is now incurring far more expenditure in her own local defence than was contemplated when the settlement of April 1940 was concluded. They wish to acknowledge the extent of the resources in men and material which India is making available as part of the common war effort of the United Nations.

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The War Cabinet nevertheless feel that they should put on record their view that the entry of Japan into the war, finally revealing the war as a world struggle against the forces of tyranny and reaction, has fundamentally changed the situation since the financial settlement of 1940 was negotiated. Great changes in the scope and character of the war have taken place since then and even greater changes may take place. At that time the war *was not being actively waged in the Eastern hemisphere, nor was India exposed to imminent danger of invasion.* Today no country can afford to take a limited view of the nature of the struggle in its entirety, nor of the measures required for its own defence. This changed situation calls for a wider conception of India's partnership in the general war effort of the United Nations and therefore of the contribution she needs to make in her own defence. *The financial settlement as it stands* leads to the United Kingdom accumulating large indebtedness to India on expenditure, much of which has been incurred in India's defence *and in the common task.* British industry, instead of meeting the adverse balance by exports, is absorbed in the output of munitions *and three-quarters of British shipping is carrying troops and war supplies.* President Roosevelt has recently enunciated the principle that none of the United Nations should end the war with a monetary war debt to any of its partners. His Majesty's Government are impressed alike with the general wisdom of this objective and with the necessity to bear it in mind in the relations between this country and India.

It will be recalled that, at the time when the financial settlement of April 1940 was under discussion, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stipulated that the possibility of India's making some payment towards the general cost of the war should be considered from time to time as circumstances permitted.

His Majesty's Government do not suggest that a new settlement *or new account keeping* should be negotiated at the present juncture *with the Government of India. We are however also keeping our own account which may eventually serve as the basis of a counter-claim, in which such items as the naval, air and military defence of India by British forces will play their part.* A further review and an eventual adjustment of financial relations between the United Kingdom and India will assuredly be required, whether at the end of the war or upon some earlier appropriate occasion, in the light *and in the framework* both of the general financial settlement between the Allied Nations and of the vital importance for all concerned of the speedy restoration of the maximum volume of world trade.

W. S. C.

[1] The passages where this draft differs from that on which it was based (i.e. the draft eventually embodied in the Annex to No. 778) were underlined in the original and are here shown in italics.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/2/16: f 95

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *19 September 1942, 4.45 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 20 September*

1143. Sterling Balances. Since telegraphing yesterday[1] Prime Minister has amended draft which is now in a form which I am unable to accept. Material paragraph of this draft[2] is as follows.

[*There follows the text of the final para. of No. 769.*]

I should be glad to have your comments on this by Monday night[3] as matter will come up again in Cabinet probably Tuesday morning.

2. In meantime Raisman must give temporising reply in Assembly.

[1] See No. 767. [2] See No. 769. [3] 21 September.

771

Viscount Halifax to President Quezon

L/P&J/8/598: f 198

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL *19 September 1942*

Dear Mr. President,

I have just had a telegram[1] from the Foreign Office referring to the telegram which you sent on August 10th[2] to Mr. Gandhi appealing to the latter to refrain from his contemplated action and inviting him to give his support to the United Nations.

Your message only reached India after Mr. Gandhi had been placed under arrest and the Government of India have felt obliged to make it a rule that no messages should be delivered to Mr. Gandhi while he is under detention. Although the Viceroy would naturally have wished to facilitate the delivery of your telegram, he did not feel that he would be justified in making any exception to the general rule even in the case of a message the contents of which were so entirely unexceptionable. Lord Linlithgow has therefore asked that the position should be explained to you and that I should make it clear why it was that the Government of India, although fully appreciating the helpful motives which inspired you to send this telegram, felt unable to deliver it without creating an embarrassing breach of the conditions of Mr. Gandhi's present

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detention. An almost equally embarrassing position would of course result from the publication of a message which had not been delivered.

I lost no time in informing Mr. Eden of the views about India which you expressed at the last meeting of the Pacific Council. I am glad to be able to tell you that from the most recent reports that I have seen from Delhi it would seem that the situation is improved and that the outlook is reassuring.

In regard to the future developments you will no doubt have noticed Mr. Amery's remarks in the House of Commons on September 11th, when, in addition to what the Prime Minister had said earlier on the subject of Sir Stafford Cripps' offer he said, according to the *New York Times:*

> "I entirely agree that the problem cannot be solved by standing pat, but amidst a war and when there is not a beginning of signs of powerful organizations coming together, there may be no alternative for a time to enforcing law, order and good government. Mistakes always are allowable, but there could be no greater mistake than to negotiate when there is not the slightest chance of success or to negotiate with those not in a position to deliver."[3]

Believe me,
Dear Mr. President,
Very sincerely yours,

HALIFAX

[1] No. 730. [2] See No. 694.

[3] This quotation is a précis of a passage in Mr Amery's speech. The words 'Mistakes always are allowable', at the beginning of the second sentence, appear to be a mistranscription of the words 'Settlement by negotiation is always desirable'. See *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, col. 617.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/2/16: f 94

INDIA OFFICE, *19 September 1942*

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 52/42

Prime Minister

I do not feel able to agree with your amendments[1] to the draft about the War Financial Settlement with India and should be glad if it could be taken in the War Cabinet at the meeting on Indian matters on Wednesday or Thursday. I have told[2] Linlithgow that a temporizing answer will have to be given to the questions in the Indian Legislature.

L. S. AMERY

[1] See No. 769. [2] See No. 770.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *20 September 1942, 9.15 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 20 September, 6.30 pm*

No. 2828–S. Your private and personal No. 1143[1] dated 19th September 1942. It is essential that Prime Minister should appreciate present position here in relation to whole question.

2. Soon after his return Raisman made before Council a verbal statement of results of his visit to England in which he informed them that he hoped that subject to Prime Minister's approval War Cabinet would probably accept India's case that Financial Settlement should not be disturbed. He also informed them of the "offers" he had made to His Majesty's Government within the existing settlement, for example, that India would pay all rupee costs of the Air Forces in India, for one half of capital expenditure on war industrial development, for aerodromes, for U.S. Air Forces, and so on.

3. At that meeting Council declined to endorse Raisman's offers out of hand and requested a detailed written statement showing exactly the financial and other implications of his proposals. They emphasised their assumption that Raisman had not finally committed them and Raisman confirmed that assumption.

4. A written statement[2] was prepared and taken in Council last night. *Council almost unanimously took the line that they were not prepared to agree on such short notice (a) that the continuance of the existing Settlement was fair to India in present circumstances and (b) that Raisman's offers should be confirmed.*[3] They ostensibly asked for time to consider whole question further. Raisman pointed out that he was committed to making some announcement in Assembly tomorrow in answer to several questions bearing on Settlement and on his visit to England. It was clear that Council, if pressed to give an immediate decision at last night's meeting, would have given an unfavourable reply. The large increase in our financial commitments involved by the normal operation of the Settlement together with Raisman's "offers" foreshadowing defence estimates of over Rs. 250 crores obviously came as a violent shock to them. I judge their line of thinking to be that they would not accept responsibility for getting the country in its present temper to swallow such an unpalatable pill, and that having supported firm action against Congress they had done enough unpopular things for the time being.

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5. At last night's meeting I had before me your private and personal No. 1139[4] of 17th September 1942. Raisman and I interpreted this as meaning that the Settlement was safe at any rate for the duration of the war. *After discussion with Raisman I decided nevertheless that it was quite impossible to tell Council in so many words that you had accepted notice of a reservation that His Majesty's Government might reopen discussions on the eventual adjustment of the whole situation even though presumably only after the war.* But I deliberately addressed a question to Raisman in Council enquiring whether he thought that the Settlement was now finally confirmed for all time or whether for instance an Indian Finance Member could have it reopened. He gave a reply arranged between us that of course either party to any agreement of this nature could reopen negotiations at any time to get the agreement modified. This produced an obviously unfavourable impression, and Sarker challenged its correctness in regard to principles.

6. Upshot of last night's meeting was that Mody and Sarker would meet Raisman this evening for informal discussions, and a further meeting of Council is arranged for 10 p.m. tonight. I do not anticipate that Council will change its views by then.

7. Meanwhile your private and personal telegram No. 1143 has arrived this morning. It appears to differ from your No. 1139 in some important respects—

(*a*) You have not (repeat not) accepted notice of the reservation as revised by the Prime Minister. You were prepared to accept notice of the original reservation described in your No. 1139;

(*b*) it declares a review and an eventual readjustment of financial relations to be inevitable rather than expressing a simple reservation of a right to do so, and

(*c*) such a review need not necessarily be postponed till the end of the war, but may be demanded during it if need be;

(*d*) it contemplates counter-claims which are a negation of the present Settlement.

8. I now have to decide the best line to take with Council this evening. It is impossible for me to give Council any indication of the revised reservation for two reasons. Firstly, because you have not accepted it, and secondly because I am confident that it would either be rejected or lead to several resignations, the effect of which I leave you to judge.

9. *As regards the terms of the revised reservation itself I would say that its really objectionable feature is its reference to some "earlier appropriate occasion".* If this were

[1] No. 770. [2] Not printed.

[3] This and subsequent passages in italics were underlined by Mr Amery when he proposed to circulate the telegram to the War Cabinet; see Vol. III, No. 13.

[4] This and subsequent references to telegram 1139 should read 1129, i.e. No. 754.

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deleted then the reservation would mean that the present Settlement will stand for the duration of the war but that after the war His Majesty's Government would raise the question of the disposal of the accumulated sterling. This would amount to negotiating a new agreement at the time, rather than to a modification of the existing War Financial Settlement.

10. *But the actual text of this revised reservation is less important than what you propose to do with it.* Is it necessary for you formally to accept notice of it? If not, then the reservation merely becomes a statement of present intentions which need not be communicated officially to the Government of India and no further action need be taken than to file it somewhere in Imperial archives in England for the duration of the war. *If however you must accept official notice of it then do you propose to pass it on officially to the Government of India? If so, Council will reject it and if pressed Raisman and I are confident will resign.* If not, Council will know nothing about it, and if and when it turns up after the war will reject it even more strongly for the reason that it is ex parte. *Nor could I accept for record in my personal archives and not for communication to my Council, a document or reservation of this character.* If it is to be made, they must be aware of it. No other course would be consistent with straightforward dealing on my part, nor could I defend acceptance for personal record of such a reservation if the matter subsequently came to light. *Finally, if the reservation were accepted by any Government in India and communicated to the country, or if any suggestion were made that it was doubtful whether India would in due course receive value for her sterling balances, the reaction on India's war effort could not fail to be disastrous.*

11. *I suggest therefore that the only course open to His Majesty's Government is to delete from the revised reservation the reference to "some earlier appropriate occasion" and bury the rest of it in the Treasury's records.* Whether it will be expedient to exhume it after the war can be judged in the light of the situation then ruling, not the least important element in which will be the colour and complexion of the Government of India with whom such negotiations will have to be conducted.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 169

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *20 September 1942*
Received: 21 September

1146. Your private and personal telegram of the 18th September, 2816-S.[1] I anticipate that War Cabinet will wish to discuss Halifax's telegram[2] during next

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week. In regard to paragraph 6 of his telegram I shall bring forward and support the views expressed in your 2814-S[3] and I shall propose that you send Halifax direct a brief appreciation[4] of the political situation as you now see it and of the answer to possible American pressure for formation of provisional Government composed of representatives of the main political parties during the war. Points that occur to me are failure of Rajagopalachariar and Mookerjee to make any progress with Jinnah (substance of this depends on our being still able to say that Jinnah has the weight of Moslem opinion behind him) and recognition by members of your Council of difficulty of achieving unity (cf. your private and personal telegram of 25th August, 2583).[5] There is also the question of what would happen if temporary agreement were followed by subsequent disagreement in absence of an accepted Constitution unless the ultimate authority of the Viceroy and H.M.G. were obtained [retained?].

2. Please telegraph if you agree. Should you wish Cabinet to see your appreciation for Halifax I am afraid I should have to ask you to let me have this by Tuesday.[6]

[1] No. 761. [2] No. 749. [3] No. 760.
[4] Lord Linlithgow sent an appreciation to Viscount Halifax in telegram 2843-S of 22 September (repeated to Mr Amery); see Vol. III, No. 9.
[5] No. 628. [6] 22 September.

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Mr Churchill to Sir S. Cripps and Mr Amery

L/E/8/2527: f 307

20 September 1942

Prime Minister's Personal Minute: Serial No. M. 396/2

Lord Privy Seal
Secretary of State for India

You have no doubt been discussing together the matter contained in the Lord Privy Seal's note.[1]

I consider it is most important that a movement should be made in the sense of paras. 13, 14, 15 and 16, and that these points should not be excluded from any statements that may have to be made on Indian policy. I suggest that you should ask the Minister of Labour and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to join you in a preliminary survey.

Please report to me at your earliest convenience.

W. S. C.

[1] No. 678.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *21 September 1942, 12.45 am*
Received: 21 September, 12.15 am

No. 2830–S. Following is my personal appreciation midday 20th September, for period covering 15th to 20th September. General improvement continues. Minor incidents (interference with telegraph wires, railway lines, and minor attacks on post offices and here and there on Government buildings) are reported from various parts of the country but there is nothing of any significance. Restoration of communications, &c. is being pressed on. Process of recovery reported to be continuing in Bihar. Some restlessness in Jamshedpur with efforts to bring about another strike and increased activity among school students. Bihar reports indicate persistence of underground activities. A good many minor incidents reported from Bengal districts.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

NEW DELHI, *21 September 1942, 2.55 am*
Received: 21 September, 2 am

No. 2831–S. Hodson I understand hopes to leave next week. When he vacates I am appointing Menon to be Reforms Commissioner and suppressing the post of Deputy Secretary at present held by Menon. He has great knowledge of and long familiarity with this business and I am sure will be most useful in collecting material for the next stage. And I know that you agree with me as to the importance of maintaining this post as an independent post and of making it a focus of study for later constitutional developments.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 421

L/PO/2/16: f 91

INDIAN STERLING BALANCES

(Reference: W.M. (42) 125th Conclusions)[1]

NOTE BY THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

TREASURY CHAMBERS, S.W.I, *21 September 1942*

I circulate herewith the draft of a telegram to the Viceroy which has been agreed by the Lord Chancellor, the Secretary of State for India and myself.

K. W.

Annex to No. 778

DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA TO THE VICEROY

THE War Cabinet have given further consideration to the question of the War Financial Settlement of 1940 and have reached the following general conclusions:—

The War Cabinet fully recognise that a considerable proportion of the expenditure so far incurred by the Government of India and recoverable by India under the 1940 settlement contributes to the general war effort but otherwise bears no relation to the defence of India. They recognise also that the spread of the war to the Far East has meant that India is now incurring far more expenditure in her own local defence than was contemplated when the settlement of April 1940 was concluded. They also wish to acknowledge the extent of the resources in men and material which India is making available as part of the common war effort of the United Nations.

The War Cabinet nevertheless feel that they should put on record their view that the entry of Japan into the war, finally revealing the war as a world struggle against the forces of tyranny and reaction, has fundamentally changed the situation since the financial settlement of 1940 was negotiated. Great changes in the scope and character of the war have taken place since then, and even greater changes may take place. At that time the war was being waged between European Powers alone. To-day no country can afford to take a limited view of the nature of the struggle in its entirety, nor of the measures required for its own defence. This changed situation calls for a wider conception of India's partnership in the general war effort of the United Nations, and therefore of the contribution she needs to make in her own defence. While the financial

[1] No. 750.

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settlement as it stands leads to the United Kingdom accumulating large indebtedness to India on expenditure, much of which has been incurred in India's defence (largely because British industry, instead of meeting the adverse balance by exports, is absorbed in the output of munitions to use in the common cause), President Roosevelt has recently enunciated the principle that none of the United Nations should end the war with a monetary war debt to any of its partners. His Majesty's Government are impressed alike with the general wisdom of this objective and with the necessity to bear it in mind in the relations between this country and India.

It will be recalled that at the time when the financial settlement of April 1940 was under discussion, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stipulated that the possibility of India's making some payment towards the general cost of the war should be considered from time to time as circumstances permitted.

His Majesty's Government do not suggest that a new settlement should be negotiated at the present juncture, and they agree that arrangements should accordingly continue for accounts to be kept on the basis of the settlement reached in April 1940. A further review and an eventual adjustment of financial relations between the United Kingdom and India will assuredly be required, whether at the end of the war or upon some earlier appropriate occasion, in the light both of the general financial settlement between the Allied Nations and of the vital importance for all concerned of the speedy restoration of the maximum volume of world trade.

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Mr Gandhi to the Secretary, Government of India, Home Department

L/P&J/8/621: f 190

21 September 1942

Sir,

In spite of the chorus of approval sung by the Indian Councillors and others of the present Government policy in dealing with the Congress, I venture to assert that, had the Government but awaited my contemplated letter to H.E. the Viceroy and the result thereafter, no calamity would have overtaken the country. The reported deplorable destruction would have most certainly been avoided.

In spite of all that has been said to the contrary, I claim that the Congress policy still remains unequivocally non-violent. The wholesale arrest of the Congress leaders seems to have made the people wild with rage to the point of losing self-control. I feel that the Government, not the Congress, are responsible

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for the destruction that has taken place. The only right course for the Government seems to me to be to release the Congress leaders, withdraw all repressive measures and explore ways and means of conciliation. Surely the Government have ample resources to deal with any overt act of violence. Repression can only breed discontent and bitterness.

Since I am permitted to receive newspapers, I feel that I owe it to the Government to give my reaction to the sad happenings in the country. If the Government think that as a prisoner I have no right to address such communications, they have but to say so and I will not repeat the mistake.[1]

I am,

Yours etc.

M. K. GANDHI

[1] In a letter of 5 October 1942 to Mr Turnbull enclosing a copy of this letter Sir G. Laithwaite said that it was not proposed to send Mr Gandhi a direct reply but the officer in charge would be instructed to inform him that the Government of India had received his communication. MSS. EUR. F. 125/137.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *21 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letters of the 27th August[1] and 1st/2nd September,[2] for which I am most grateful. I think we can be pretty well content with the general situation in the country. There is still, as you will observe from the reports, a good deal of tiresome stuff here and there, and I notice in particular a slight increase in the number of incidents in Bengal. But taken as a whole things are pretty comfortable, and when one considers that it is only some six weeks from the beginning of the Congress outbreak, we have good reason to be thankful. It follows naturally with this decrease in tension here that the Left-Wing elements, both at home and in the United States, will start to revive pressure upon us for a "constructive policy" and for negotiation with the Congress. (I comment later in this letter on the American aspects of this business, arising out of our recent telegrams[3] about the anxiety of Eden and Halifax to see a high grade American representative here.) I do not overlook the pressure which as time goes on is likely to be put upon you and upon His Majesty's Government. I hope that we shall be able to resist it, and I am certain that we are likely to find resistance to the endeavours of these well meaning if

[1] No. 641. [2] No. 673. [3] Nos. 739, 749, 760, 761, and 774.

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misinformed people the right course. I can never help feeling that valuable as Cripps' Mission was in its reactions on opinion in the United States and in the United Kingdom, we should have done quite well had we but held to the more conservative policy that I recommended last January and which you were then prepared to support. I have little doubt that the price we shall be called upon to pay for the Cripps Mission will prove to be increasingly tall as time goes on.

2. There still seems complete peace both in the Aga Khan's Palace and at Ahmednagar—in itself a significant fact, for the Congress have taken a bad beating, and one can only conclude that its leaders are content to acquiesce in that, at any rate for the time being; and relieved to be free of the responsibility for conducting in the open their subversive movement.

[Para. 3, containing personal comments, omitted.]

4. I am sorry to have had to trouble you at such length over Raisman's financial settlement.[4] But it was obvious from your telegram of the 19th September[5] that the latest developments in this business had been as disturbing to you as they were to me, and to Raisman. I was, I will confess, a little surprised (even before we received that telegram) at the extremely critical disposition of Council, or rather of those members of my Council who were at all familiar with this highly technical subject. It was perfectly obvious after we had been talking for about an hour and a half on the basis of a memorandum by Raisman, which made out the best possible case for the arrangements which he had been discussing in London, that there was not the very slightest chance of those arrangements going through save possibly after a fairly intensive further course of argument and persuasion. I was amused to find Ambedkar, supported by Jogendra Singh, disposed to go even further than the others and to take the line that since all this business, and indeed India's having to be at war at all, arose out of the failure of our foreign policy, which was conducted exclusively by His Majesty's Government, it was up to His Majesty's Government to foot any bills that there might be! That is nonsense, but you should know it since it will give you an idea of the way the wind was blowing.

5. Many thanks for all your help over the Americans: it has been invaluable to have had your assistance and Winston's about this. I fear the fact is that both the Foreign Office and the Ambassador are as disposed to think that the Americans are invariably right as that we ourselves are invariably wrong in any case in which the two countries are concerned! Perhaps that is going too far, and I do not wish to overstate the case! But the type of interference represented by Currie, Johnson, &c. has been such as to impress one with the danger of really high grade representation rather than with the help that such representation might on occasion give. I do not feel much doubt that the wise course would be to get back to career representation and that as soon as may be.

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I do not feel any doubt, either, that we shall have to stand firm over the general Indian business as against the U.S.A. unless we are to be prepared to contemplate throwing our hands in altogether. I am sending, as you wished me to, an appreciation to Halifax which I am repeating to you. It does not attempt to go into detail, but with his familiarity with the situation as it used to be in this country I would hope that the points which I have taken will give him something on which to build an argument which he could support with conviction; and that he will not misunderstand the vigour with which I have put my case.

6. Now a line about specific points arising out of your letters. I quite agree with you on the whipping business,[6] and I was relieved on asking Governors for statistics to find that, save for a couple of enthusiasts, no particular use seems to have been made of these powers, and that they were all of them alive to the importance of avoiding publicity.[7]

7. As regards the representative character of my present executive, I wholly agree with what you say in paragraph 3 of your letter. Neither Sapru nor Jayakar would be any good, or would strengthen me in the least degree—in fact I should expect them to be a source of weakness rather than of strength. I think your judgment is quite right on Rajagopalachariar, and I doubt if his stock is rising. My difficulties over filling these vacancies at any rate so far as the Muslims are concerned are well illustrated by the problem of the vacant Information Membership.

8. I am grateful, and have telegraphed to thank you, for your help over the question of powers of punishment for Indian Officers which you mention in paragraph 1 of your letter of the 1st September, and I am amused that you should have been able to quote so good an American precedent! Winston's comments reported in paragraph 2 of your letter lead up well to his subsequent speech in the House on the general Indian issue.

9. I shall look forward to seeing the Cabinet memorandum on social policy and, of course, I shall be glad to be able to do anything that I can; though time in my own case is now short, and in the immediate future I shall pass into the stage in which I shall have to leave a good deal for my successor and to avoid starting fresh campaigns of my own. I agree with you that non-official advisers have a distinct relation to social policy. Unfortunately as you will see from the replies I have had from Governors there is a marked difference of opinion as to the case for non-official advisers, and as to the possible embarrassment to those who do not want them, e.g. Lumley, at this stage, of their appointment by other Governors. We may have to face up to that, and I will hope to get you off a telegram consulting you in the next day or two.[8]

[4] See No. 773. [5] No. 770. [6] See No. 641, para. 2. [7] See Nos. 693 and 758.
[8] See No. 701, note 9.

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10. I am very grateful to you and to Smuts for the telegram enclosed in your letter of the 1st September. His intentions are, of course, of the very best and I agree with you that his suggestion is more reasonable than many of those which are passed to us. But I also, alas, agree with you in seeing little prospect of the parties being willing to discuss practical problems in a constructive spirit in the near future, whether under the Viceroy's chairmanship or not. Nor indeed (a subordinate but very important detail) do I believe that any Viceroy could be chairman and do his other work even in peace time, let alone in time of war. Smuts, I think, probably fails to realise how largely the intractability of the Indian position and the naughtiness of Congress spring from our military failures and the widespread doubts in this country about our beating the Japanese. I doubt very much if we can really hope for things to go smoothly and well until it is pretty clear that we are winning. But while for the reasons I have touched on above, and others with which you are familiar, I do not think there is anything doing on the lines he suggests, in present circumstances I am sure that we must be as sympathetic and as welcoming as we can to any suggestion of this order from persons elsewhere in the Empire of the standing of Smuts; and if you should in replying to him think of mentioning that you have consulted me, I hope that you will make it clear that if I do not see any immediate prospect of advance on these lines it is not from any lack of real anxiety on my part (or your own) to find a way out of this tangle.

11. In paragraph 8 of your letter you touched on the future of these Congress prisoners. I am pretty sure myself that they will have to stay in for some time to come and my own judgment would be that the course of wisdom will be to hold on for as long as proves practicable. They are far better where they are and as I have suggested earlier in this letter it may very well be that they are not too unhappy at being relieved of all responsibility. I do not believe that any one can do business with any of them while the war lasts.

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Glossary

AFRIDI Name of one of the tribal groups into which PATHAN people are divided.

AHIMSA Hindu (also Buddhist and JAIN) doctrine of non-violence.

AHRAR *Lit.:* free, free men. Militant pro-Congress Muslim political and religious organisation founded in 1928.

AKALI *Lit.:* worshipper of the eternal one. Particularly strict devotee of the SIKH faith. In modern usage, the principal Sikh political party.

AKHAND-HINDUSTAN *Lit.:* United India. The slogan of the MAHASABHA.

AMIR *Lit.:* commander. Prince, ruler.

ANNA Unit of money of the value of $\frac{1}{16}$th of a rupee.

ASHRAM Hermitage; retreat for research and study.

AYYANGAR, AYYAR (AIYAR, AIYER) Separate groups of high caste BRAHMANS in South India; titles added to names.

BADSHAH GUL *Lit.:* King Rose. Title or distinguishing epithet.

BAHADUR *Lit.:* champion, hero. Formerly a military title following the name usually after KHAN; later conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign in conjunction with DIWAN, KHAN, RAI, RAO, and SARDAR.

BAI Mistress, lady; respected form of address commonly used as second name to Hindu lady's forename.

BANIA Grocer, trader.

BAPU Father.

BEGUM A feminine Muslim title, originally of princesses and noblewomen.

BEN Sister; commonly used as second name to Hindu lady's forename.

BRAHMAN (BRAHMIN) The highest caste of the Hindu world. Originally a priestly caste.

BUND Artificial embankment, dyke.

CRORE 100 LAKHS or 10 million.

DACOIT Member of a gang of robbers.

DACOITY Robbery with violence committed by a gang.

DARBAR (DURBAR) Court, ceremonial assembly; government of a Princely State.

DIWAN (DEWAN) Minister; in Princely States, chief Minister; also Council of State. The titles DIWAN SAHIB and DIWAN BAHADUR were conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign on distinguished south Indians.

GOONDA Hooligan.

GUJARATI Inhabitant of northern districts of Bombay Presidency and neighbouring States; language of that area.

HARIJAN *Lit.:* the people of God. Term coined by Gandhi for untouchables. Title of Gandhi's newspaper.

HARTAL Strike, picketing, shopkeepers' strike.

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HIMSA Violence.
HUR *Lit.:* free man. Member of group of guerrillas, or bandits, with a quasi-religious background, operating in Sind under the leadership of the Pir Pagaro.
JAGIRDAR Holder of a *Jagir*, a tenure under which public revenues of the land were assigned to the tenant either in return for services or unconditionally. The tenure frequently became an hereditary property.
JAIN Believer in religion differing from Hinduism founded by Vardhamana Mahavira in sixth century B.C.; numerous among bankers and merchants in central and northern India.
JAM Chief; part of the title of the ruler of Nawanagar.
JAT The great agricultural caste of north-west India: found in Baluchistan, Sind, Punjab, western United Provinces, and Rajputana and comprising people of the Muslim, Hindu, and SIKH faiths.
-JI *Lit.:* life, soul. As a suffix to a name denotes affectionate and deep respect.
JIRGA Council of elders.
JUAR Millet.
KHAKSAR *Lit.:* like the earth, humble. Volunteer organisation of Muslims.
KHALISTAN The state which SIKHS aspired to establish; see also KHALSA.
KHALSA *Lit.:* pure. Applied by SIKHS to denote their community.
KHAN *Lit.:* ruler, sovereign. Muslim title; commonly an adjunct to Afghan or PATHAN names. The titles KHAN SAHIB and KHAN BAHADUR were conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign.
KHILAFAT *Lit.:* deputyship. The office of Caliph, the title adopted by successors of the Prophet in the headship of the Muslim world.
KISAN SABHA *Lit.:* Peasant Society. Political party representing peasants.
KUOMINTANG The National People's Party founded by Sun Yat-sen at beginning of twentieth century. At first the party's authority was confined to a small area of South China, but in 1923–4 it was reorganized on the model of the Soviet Union Communist Party and in 1926–7 Chiang Kai-shek led the Northern Expedition which resulted in the unification of China under its control.
LAKH (LAC) 100,000; 100,000 RUPEES.
LASCAR Indian sailor.
MAHARAJA *Lit.:* Great King, Prince. A Hindu title.
MAHARATTA See MARATHA.
MAHASABHA *Lit.:* Great Assembly. Political party based on militant Hinduism.
MAHATMA Great Soul.
MALGUZAR One liable for payment of revenue assessed on an estate, whether on his own behalf or as a representative of others.
MALIK Muslim title inferior to KHAN and AMIR. Chief man of one of the kinship groups into which PATHAN tribes are divided.

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MARATHA (MAHRATTA) Warrior caste of western India.
MARWARI Strictly, a native of Marwar in Rajputana; often settled elsewhere in India; usually a banker or merchant; loosely used for BANIA.
MAULANA *Lit.:* our Master. Title of respect accorded to Muslim judges, heads of religious orders, and persons of great learning.
MAULAVI (MAULVI) Judge or Doctor of Law. Title of respect often given to learned Muslims, sometimes to Muslim priests.
MAUND A measure of weight varying in different localities; the standard maund is 82·28 lb.
MIR (MEER) Abbreviation of AMIR; title of descendants of the Prophet.
MOFUSSIL Outlying parts of district, province, or presidency, as distinct from chief station or town.
MOHMAND Name of one of the tribal groups into which PATHAN people are divided.
MOMIN Muslim weaver.
MUNSIFF Judge of lowest court with civil jurisdiction; summary civil court of first instance.
NAWAB Originally a Governor under the Moghul Empire; thence a title of rank conferred on Muslim nobles.
PANDIT A Hindu title. In its strict sense applied to those versed in the Scriptures, but used commonly to denote a member of the BRAHMAN community.
PARGANA A fiscal area; a subdivision of a *Tahsil* (Northern India).
PARSEE Descendant of Zoroastrian refugees who fled from Persia on its conquest by Muslims in the eighth century A.D.; chiefly settled in western India and distinguished as merchants, shipbuilders, and traders.
PATHAN Generic name given to Pushto-speaking people inhabiting North-West Frontier of India and Afghanistan.
PIE Unit of money of the value of $\frac{1}{12}$th of an ANNA.
PIR *Lit.:* old man. Muslim religious leader. The Pir Pagaro was the hereditary leader of the HURS.
POROMBOKE Government land.
QADIANI Unorthodox Muslim sect properly termed *Ahmadi* after their founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839–1908), but also known as Qadiyani after the Punjab town of Qadiyan from which he came.
QAUMI SEWA DAL *Lit.:* National Service Force.
QUA'ID I A'ZAM The Supreme Leader.
RAI Prince; Hindu title derived from RAJA. The titles RAI SAHIB and RAI BAHADUR were conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign.
RAJ Kingdom, rule, sovereignty.
RAO Prince; Hindu title derived from RAJA. The titles RAO SAHIB and RAO BAHADUR were conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign.
RUPEE Unit of money of the value of 1*s.* 6*d.* in 1942.

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RYOT Peasant, cultivating tenant.
SAHIB (SAHEB) *Lit.:* master. Respectful form of address.
SAIYID (SAYYID, SYED) *Lit.:* lord, chief, master. Title of descendants of the Prophet.
SANAD Grant, charter; certificate awarded for meritorious service.
SANGHATANIST From *Sangathan*: 'tying together'. Adherent of the movement aiming at Hindu unity.
SARDAR (SIRDAR) *Lit.:* chief, leader. Title borne by SIKHS, also by Hindus and Muslims; the titles SARDAR SAHIB and SARDAR BAHADUR were conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign.
SATYAGRAHA *Lit.:* holding on to truth. Total self-giving; integral to Mahatma Gandhi's concept of victory achieved through non-violent resistance.
SATYAGRAHI Participant in SATYAGRAHA.
SEVA SANGH *Lit.:* service league, association or society. The Gandhi Seva Sangh was an all-India organisation intended to apply Gandhian principles to industrial problems.
SHABASH Exclamation: well done! excellent!
SHI'AH (SHIA) *Lit.:* party, sect. The name given by other Muslims to those who believe that Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, was his rightful successor.
SIKH *Lit.:* disciple. Follower of Guru Nanak (1469–1538), the first of the line of ten leaders (*Gurus*) who formulated the Sikh faith and welded the Sikhs into an independent community. In the face of religious persecution, the Sikhs under the last of the Gurus, Gobind Singh (1666–1708), acquired a formidable military reputation.
SIWALIKS Range of hills north of Delhi running parallel to Himalayas.
SUNNI From *sunnah*: 'way', 'practice'. One who follows the practice of the Prophet; the term generally applied to Muslims who acknowledge the first four Caliphs equally as his rightful successors.
SWARAJ (SWARAJYA) Self-rule, independence.
TAHSILDAR (TEHSILDAR) Officer in charge of a *Tahsil*, a revenue subdivision (approximately 150 villages) of a district.
TALUQDAR Holder of a *Taluq*, a proprietory estate usually smaller than a ZEMINDAR's, paying revenue to Government direct (like a Zemindar) or through a third party. In North-West, a joint proprietor. In some places, a Government officer; collector of revenue on behalf of Government or revenue farmer.
TAMIL Inhabitant of Madras Province (except the Malayalam-speaking west coast) south of Madras city, and language of that area.
THANA Police station, and hence area of its jurisdiction.
ZEMINDAR (ZAMINDAR) One holding land as an actual proprietor but paying a fixed annual sum to the Government.
ZILA (ZILLA, ZILLAH) Division, district, area of jurisdiction of Collector or, in Punjab, Deputy Commissioner.

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